

EXCHANGE AND REPLY

CHARLES HEDRICK, JOHN MARINCOLA,
ELLEN O’GORMAN, AND JOHN MOLES¹

Moles’ *‘Ανάθημα καὶ κτῆμα’* (above, pp. 27–69) evoked diverse responses from Charles Hedrick, John Marincola and Ellen O’Gorman (hereafter respectively **‘Mo.’**, **‘Hed.’**, **‘Mar.’** and **‘O’G.’**): some related to organisation and presentation; some to questions of interpretation/documentation; some to theoretical issues. The editor thanks the three respondents for their interest and comments. The sequel presents a digest of responses and counter-responses, one of which (1.2 below) constitutes an extended ‘reply’ to Hed. Further comments and responses are of course welcome. References to ‘sections’ and ‘notes’ are to *‘Ανάθημα καὶ κτῆμα’* (hereafter ‘AKK’). Scholarly publications are first cited in full, thereafter by author’s name only.

The material is organised as follows:

1. Questions of interpretation/documentation
 - 1.1 Thucydides’ superiority at 1.22.2 to Hecataeus and Herodotus
 - 1.2 The claim that ὅσοι βουλήσονται σκοπεῖν (1.22.4) evokes the Athenian inscriptional formula τῷ βουλομένῳ σκοπεῖν
 - 1.2.1 The epigraphical question (including the Decree of Tisamenus)
 - 1.2.2 Thucydides’ use of the formula
 - 1.3 Historians’ attitude to inscriptions
 - 1.4 The superiority of Thucydides’ inscription to Herodotus’
 - 1.5 Thucydides’ *History* as a ‘possession’
 - 1.6 Thuc. 1.22.4 ξύγκειται
 - 1.7 Polybian σύνθεσις
2. Theoretical issues
 - 2.1 Ancient historians and ancient critics as readers of ancient historiography
 - 2.2 Literary allusion and intention
 - 2.3 Historicist issues
 - 2.4 Texts as reading texts
 - 2.5 Reading the Internet.

¹ I thank Christopher Joyce, Peter Rhodes and Tony Woodman as readers. Peter Rhodes’ important recent paper, ‘Archives and Inscriptions’, which is very germane to the general issues of 1.2.1, is to be published in two halves in *G&R* 2001. {‘Public Documents in the Greek States: Archives and Inscriptions’, *G&R* 48 (2001) 33–44, 136–53}

1. Questions of interpretation/documentation

1.1 Thucydides’ superiority at 1.22.2 to Hecataeus and Herodotus (§8 and nn. 33 and 34)

Mar. rightly cites J. Marincola, ‘Thucydides 1.22.2’, *Classical Philology* 84 (1989) 216-23, for documentation and discussion of Thucydides’ verbal polemics against Hecataeus and Herodotus here. On the general topic of Thucydides ~ Herodotus see also the unjustly neglected study of T. F. Scanlon, ‘Echoes of Herodotus in Thucydides: Self-sufficiency, Admiration, and Law’, *Historia* 43 (1994) 143-76.

1.2 The claim that ὅσοι βουλήσονται σκοπεῖν (1.22.4) evokes the Athenian inscriptional formula τῷ βουλομένῳ σκοπεῖν

Hed. writes: ‘the formula is never used of inscriptions, but only of documents temporarily posted on impermanent materials (σανίδια, λευκώματα, πετεύρια, etc.). Wilhelm noticed this as long ago as 1909 (*Beiträge zur griechischen Inschriftenkunde, mit einem Anhang über die öffentliche Aufzeichnung von Urkunden* (hereafter ‘Wilhelm’), p. 285 and cf. N. Robertson, ‘The Laws of Athens, 410-399 B.C.: the evidence for Review and Publication’, *JHS* 90 (1990) 43-75, esp. p. 47. I deal with the formula briefly in an essay in *Hesperia* 68 (1999) 387-439, ‘Democracy and the Athenian Epigraphical Habit’ [hereafter ‘Hed.’], at 411-13, and at length in an essay coming out in a Festschrift for Frank Frost, to be published as a special number of *Ancient World*, ‘For Anyone Who Wishes to See’. So the formula, if it is to be recognized in Thucydides (and I do not concur with Moles in recognizing it there) makes a point opposed to the one he wants to make. As an aside, the verb σκοπεῖν in the epigraphically attested formula clearly alludes to a communication of the content of the text, not to its physical, monumental character. See only *IG ii²* 487, lines 4-10, where a person is honored for having the laws written up “so that they may be set out for anyone who wishes to see, and no one be ignorant of the laws”’.

Mo.: ‘I am not an epigraphist and am grateful to Hed. for highlighting this epigraphical problem, which was entirely new to me. Although Hed.’s forthcoming essay will provide further arguments for his position (cf. Hed. 413 n. 132), his challenge to this element of AKK is so radical that I can’t wait.

Modern scholars distinguish between ‘inscriptions’ (on stone or bronze) and ‘documents’ (on impermanent materials, or in, or as, archives), though

‘documents’ can be used as an umbrella term for both categories.² Nothing I said in AKK was intended to contravene that distinction. The formula ‘for anyone who wishes to look’³ can fairly be described as ‘inscriptional’ in that it is found on stone inscriptions and in decrees preserved in literary texts.

Hed.’s objection raises the following questions: (a) whether the formula *always* refers to ‘documents temporarily posted on impermanent materials’ (whose publication the stone inscription or decree itself either records or enacts); (b) whether, if so, such documents are *always* regarded as a lower form of commemoration; and (c) if the answer to (a) and (b) is in the affirmative, whether evocation by Thucydides of the formula is thereby precluded. (Hed.’s ‘aside’, ‘the verb *σκοπεῖν* in the epigraphically attested formula clearly alludes to a communication of the content of the text, not to its physical, monumental character’, seems to come under category (a).)

I think that Hed.’s objection can be satisfactorily met on several different levels. In the sequel I shall first consider the epigraphical question (1.2.1) and then its implications for the question of whether Thucydides is exploiting the formula in 1.22.4 (1.2.2).

1.2.1 The epigraphical question

It is worth noting at the outset that while the claim that the formula ‘[was] used ... only of documents temporarily posted on impermanent materials’ is orthodoxy for some, it is not so for others. Even Hed. himself in *Hesperia* is not quite so categorical (413: ‘is it possible that it is *especially* [Mo.’s italics] used for documents other than those that are inscribed on stone?’). Among those who evidently do not accept Wilhelm’s claim are: B. D. Meritt, *Epigraphica Attica* (Cambridge 1940) 89-90; D. MacDowell, *Andokides: On the Mysteries* (Oxford 1962) 122; R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford 1969) no. 45 (p. 113); R. Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens* (Cambridge 1989) 60-1 n. 151; M. H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford 1991) 311-12; R. Sealey, *The*

² ‘Close reading’ of the writings even of scholars who insist most strongly on the distinction shows that they themselves do not always observe it (there are examples in Hed. 411-12); I do not think that this observation is empty point-scoring; rather, it indicates that the practical attitudes of such scholars are (quite rightly, in my view) much less strict than their ‘editorial’ positions.

³ I prefer to translate *σκοπεῖν* by ‘look’, as allowing both ‘see’ and something more than ‘see’ and as readily transferable to the context of Thucydides 1.22.4 (‘see’ 1.2.2). Translations such as ‘examine’ or ‘read’ are too specific and restricted and often needlessly prejudicial; further discussion of the translation question (which involves the question of function [mentioned in the main text]: (mere) display or genuine information?) in Hed. 411.

Justice of the Greeks (Michigan 1994) 45-49; J. P. Sickinger, *Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens* (Chapel Hill 1999) 78; P. J. Rhodes (in conversation); and several anonymous epigraphists to whom Mo. orally re-appealed.

But one needs arguments. Here are some:

Although the above distinction between ‘inscriptions’ and ‘documents’ (on impermanent materials, or in, or as, archives) makes a perfectly valid distinction based on the durability of the respective media, one may nevertheless question the strong polarisation Hed. seems to make between the two categories and the implications with which he seems to invest the phraseology, ‘documents temporarily posted on impermanent materials’.

While there are certainly contexts where stone inscriptions are particularly privileged and certainly contexts where ‘documents’ (in the sense used above) are regarded as a lower form of commemoration,⁴ there are other contexts where the latter is less obviously the case, when, for example, the content of a document is the same as that of a stone, when, in short, stone and non-stone media are *part of the same process* of public commemoration. (Naturally, these questions have been extensively discussed, e.g. by Thomas 34-60 and by Sickinger 64-92.)

Furthermore, the relative utilisation by fifth-century Athens of inscriptions or non-stone documents is a matter of vigorous scholarly dispute. Whereas for Hed. in Hed. and in ‘Writing, Reading and Democracy’, R. Osborne and S. Hornblower (edd.), *Ritual, Finance, Politics: Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to David Lewis* (Oxford 1994) 157-74 at 173, stone inscriptions are characteristic of fifth-century practice and archives characteristic of fourth-century, other scholars hold that ‘only a relatively small number of documents were ever inscribed on stone’: thus Sickinger 66, cf. his whole discussion, ‘Inscriptions and Archives’, 64-72. The dispute about relative utilisation obviously entails a dispute about relative esteem: cf. again Sickinger 65, arguing against the claim that ‘inscriptions preserved the only lasting records of documents’. These disputes, which are by no means restricted to the fifth century, are of course also bound up with the question of function: (mere) display or genuine information (Thomas 51, 61; Hed. 411 and n. 128)?

However these debates are ultimately to be resolved, at the least one should resist any notion that, except when the content of non-stone media is explicitly provisional, texts written up on such media were regarded as being the ancient equivalent of disposable tissues. That the Athenians (and other Greeks) did not always rank stone inscriptions above other sorts of documents is sufficiently indicated by the facts that the commonest Greek word

⁴ As, for example, in the first ‘writing-up’ ordered by the Decree of Tisamenus (see the discussion in the main text).

for ‘inscribe’, ἀναγράφω, literally ‘write up’, is used of both categories (cf. e.g. Sickinger 104 and 230 n. 48) and that it is often difficult to decide which category is meant. (Other examples of ‘overlapping’ terminology in Robertson 55 n. 39 and P. J. Rhodes, ‘The Athenian Code of Laws, 410-399 B.C.’, *JHS* 101 (1991) 87-100 at 93 n. 31.) Presumably it would have been less difficult for Athenians, but at least their language shows that they did not always bother to make the distinction and that there must have been cases when at least some of them did not in fact know which category was being referred to.

If this general perspective is anything like correct, the claim that the formula ‘for anyone who wishes to look’ was *restricted* to ‘documents temporarily posted on impermanent materials’ already begins to look less plausible.

But it is time to consider the hard evidence (to the extent that one can do so ‘on-screen’; the curious will have to consult *IG* directly). Hed.’s claim is based on the following instances: five Athenian inscriptions (Hed. 411), of which four come from the fifth century and one from 304/3; three examples from the orators (two in Andocides 1.83 and 84; one in Demosthenes 24.18; Hed. 413); two non-Athenian inscriptions (fourth-century and end-second-century; Hed. 413 and n. 134); and three non-Athenian inscriptions (respectively ca. 200, the beginning of the third century and the first half of the second century; Hed. 413 n. 134) which use clearly related formulae (consolidated catalogue in Hed. 431). This list is compiled from the database of the PHI-6 disk, updated with *SEG* (Hed. 409). It could be extended by further recourse to the literary material, which Hed. did not trawl systematically. As it stands, thirteen is a very small total on which to base so decided a claim.

Moreover, not all the instances are certain. Of the five Athenian inscriptions, two, *IG* i³ 140 (which is very fragmentary) and *IG* i³ 1453 = Meiggs–Lewis no. 45, are simply unclear (in fact Tod and Meiggs–Lewis restore the latter with reference to publication on a *stèle*). A third, *IG* ii² 487 (the example cited by Hed. in his comments on AKK) is also unclear, unless one accepts as decisive (and I don’t see why one should) his apparent argument (Hed. 412) that the fact that ‘the inscription provides a justification for its own erection’ means that the application of the formula ‘for anyone who wishes to look’ to the ‘writing-up’ (from his point of view, Hed.’s translation, ‘inscription’, is a mistake) of the laws must refer to a different medium.⁵ Of the three examples from the orators, one of the two in Andocides is highly debatable

⁵ I thank Peter Rhodes for commenting on these cases; obviously, I have tried to exercise my own judgement as well, but, equally obviously, in this context that judgement is of little value.

and will be debated below. Thus out of a grand total of 13 references only 8 are certainly to non-stone media. It’s not nearly enough.

In my opinion (but somebody must have said this before) further scepticism about Wilhelm’s/Hed.’s claim should be generated by the fact that the formulae ‘so that they may *know*’ and ‘so that it may be possible *for anyone who wishes to know*’ are applied to stone publications (Hedrick 413-14). These formulae are both verbally and conceptually extremely close to ours (τῶ βουλομένῳ σκοπεῖν effectively = a purpose clause; ‘know’ = ‘have seen’ ~ ‘see’/‘look’). It is quite unclear what logic would dictate the restriction of our very similar formula to non-stone media.⁶

Moreover, as just indicated, the literary evidence contains at least one highly critical case. This is the much-debated decree of Tisamenus, as quoted and contextualised by Andocides, *On the Mysteries* 81-5. This whole sequence is also important in that it will help to give practical substance to the doubts expressed above concerning Hed.’s polarisation between ‘inscriptions’ and other types of documents. I here reproduce a translation of Andocides’ summary of the relevant political circumstances, of his contextualisation of the decree and of the decree itself. (Obviously, some readers will want to consult the original Greek.) Since discussion of the decree and of Andocides’ contextualisation and interpretation of it is inevitably implicated with the larger and very complicated questions concerning the ‘writing-up’ of Athenian laws from 410 to 399, the present treatment is necessarily simplified and such complexities as are considered (not all can be) will be relegated to footnotes (especially n. 14).

(81) ‘When you returned from the Piraeus, when it came into your power to take vengeance, you decided to let the past go, and you put a higher value on saving the city than on private vengeance, and you resolved not to remember past injuries against one another for the past. Having resolved that, you chose twenty men: these were to take charge of the city, until other laws should be put in place. Until then, you were to use the laws of Solon and the ordinances of Draco. (82) And when you had filled up the council and had chosen law-makers, they found that there were many of the laws of Solon and Draco to which many of the citizens were liable on account of the things done previously. Holding an assembly you took counsel concerning them, and you decreed, having examined all the laws, then to write up in the stoa those of the

⁶ Or as Peter Rhodes comments more generally: ‘I am not attracted by the idea that the Athenians would regard one of the many “purposes-of-publication” formulae catalogued by H. as appropriate only to *leukomata* and not to *stelai*’.

laws which should have been approved by this examination. Read me the decree.

(83) “The people decided, Tisamenus proposed. The Athenians shall conduct their public affairs in accordance with ancestral tradition, and they shall use the laws of Solon and his measures and weights, and shall use also the ordinances of Draco, which we used in the former time. Such additions to the laws as are needed, let the law-makers chosen by the council have them written up on boards and let them set them forth in front of the eponymous heroes for anyone who wishes to look, and let them hand them over to the magistrates during this month. (84) The laws which are handed over [Gk. *παραδιδόμενους*, present participle] let the council first examine and the five hundred lawmakers whom the demesmen have chosen, when they have taken the oath; also it is permitted for any individual who wishes to go into the council and give whatever good counsel he may have about the laws. And when the laws are passed, let the council of the Areopagus take charge of the laws, so that the authorities may use the established laws. And those of the laws that are validated [? are being validated: Gk. *κυρουμένους*, present participle] they should write up on the wall, where indeed they were written up before, for anyone who wishes to look.”

(1) So the laws were examined, gentlemen, in accordance with this decree, and the ones that were validated [Gk. *κυρωθέντας*, aorist participle] they wrote up in the stoa. And when they had been written up, we made a law which you all use.’

Andocides then proceeds to quote five (often described as ‘supplementary’) laws (85-7), as follows (87):

(1) “The authorities shall not use an unwritten law, not even concerning a single matter.”

(2) “No decree, either of the council or of the people, shall have greater validity than a law.”

(3) “It shall not be permitted to make a law for an individual, unless the same law is made to apply to all Athenians, unless it is decided by six thousand voting secretly.”

(4) “The judgements and arbitrations shall be valid, all those that were made in the city when it was ruled by the people.”

(5) “They shall use the laws as from the archonship of Euclides [403/2].”⁷

⁷ Translation and interpretation of the fifth law are controversial; I think that MacDowell 128 is clearly right: ‘the law means that no one is to be prosecuted for an offence against the laws which was committed before 403/2. This is the law carrying out the decision in 81’ (‘you resolved not to remember past injuries against one another for the past’), i.e. ‘from the archonship of Euclides’ is adverbial in relation to ‘use’, not adjectival in re-

Andocides’ citation of the decree is sandwiched between a preliminary gloss of its contents (end-82 ‘you decreed ... examination’) and a resumptive summary of the procedure of the decree and of its practical enactment (85 ‘So ... stoa’).⁸

lation to ‘the laws’ (detailed arguments in MacDowell). Robertson 63-4 and Rhodes 97 interpret similarly. Sealey 48, however, translates: ‘the laws made in and after the archonship of Eukleides shall be observed’, i.e. taking ‘from the archonship of Euclides’ as adjectival, and he then comments: ‘as a whole these measures answer the question, what henceforth shall be recognized as valid law. The first and the fifth measures are of importance here. Together they provide that officers shall only uphold measures ratified in written form in or after the year 403/2 B.C., the archonship of Eukleides’. But this interpretation fails, not only because of the arguments advanced by MacDowell, but because it is expressly contradicted by the law of Diocles (*apud* Demosthenes 24.42): ‘the laws made before Euclides, and those which were made at the time of Euclides and are written up shall be valid’.

The effect of this controversy on the questions with which the present discussion are concerned is rather double-edged: on the one hand, Sealey’s case that the Decree of Tisamenus allowed for more or less substantial ‘revision’ of Athenian laws is in this respect (but not necessarily in others) weakened (see further n. 14 below); on the other hand, this law makes it less necessary for Andocides to misrepresent the law-making of 403/2 and less likely that he is doing so, at any rate to the extent urged by some modern scholars.

⁸ The translation tries to preserve relevant verbal patterns in the Greek. Thus ‘examined’ glosses *δοκιμάσαντες* at the end of 82 and *ἐδοκιμάσθησαν* at the beginning of 85, and ‘approved by examination’ *δοκιμασθῶσι* at the end of 82.

Douglas MacDowell (MacDowell 121, cf. 196), who presumably knows as much about classical Greek prose as anyone, finds ‘the sentence [at the end of 82], with the change in sense of *δοκιμάζειν* [from ‘examine’ to ‘approve by examination’] ... extremely clumsy, and the exact interpretation doubtful’. But a more modernist (some might say ‘laxer’) ‘lit. crit.’ approach would claim the reverse: that the change in sense from as it were potentiality to actuality is elegant and from a rhetorical point of view can be analysed in either, or possibly both, of two ways: (a) as a sort of extension of such quasi-punning usages as ‘persuading me, you do not persuade me’ or ‘saying this, what do you say?’, or (b) as an instance of the figure variously known as *ἀντανάκλασις* (Quint. 9.3.68), *διαφορά* (Rutilius Lupus 8.12 Halm) and *trductio* (Quint. 9.3.71), whereby, according to Quintilian, ‘the same word is used in two different meanings ... [the figure has] greater elegance when it is employed to distinguish the exact meanings of things’: discussion and documentation in J. Moles, *Tria Lustra: essays and notes presented to John Pinsent* (Liverpool 1993) 152; C. S. Kraus, *Livy Ab Urbe Condita Book 6* (Cambridge 1994), 20 and index. Then the move from ‘examined’ to ‘validated’ in the resumptive summary at 85 is as it were finally epexegetic of the sentence at the end of 82, with further clarification imported by the echo in ‘examined’ of ‘examine’ in the decree and by the echo in ‘validated’ of ‘validated’ in the decree. No doubt the reader (or listener) has to work a little at the meaning but, progressively, that meaning becomes quite clear. At 89 there is the same (and surely there entirely unproblematic) slippage in the sense of *δοκιμάζω*: ‘so when you resolved to examine the laws, and having examined them, to write them up ...’. At least in these contexts, Andocides’ sometimes criticised Greek is (I think) very good. Whether his verbal echoes of the

The decree contains two occurrences of the formula ‘for anyone who wishes to look’ (83 and 84–end). On most older interpretations (Wilhelm 265 is an early and notable exception) the decree distinguishes between a first ‘writing-up’ on boards ‘for anyone who wishes to look’ (as part of the ‘examination’ process) and a second ‘writing-up’ on stone (‘on the wall’) after the laws have been validated (thus e.g. J. H. Oliver, ‘Greek inscriptions: laws’, *Hesperia* 4 (1935) 8–9; MacDowell 122; Rhodes, ‘*Nomothesia* in Classical Athens’, in *L’educazione giuridica*, v. 2 (Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane for Università degli Studi di Perugia and Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 1987) 12; Thomas 61 n. 151). If so, the second use of the formula supplies an example where it is applied to a stone inscription. But a series of recent discussions has argued that the second ‘writing-up’, like the first, is also on a medium other than stone: M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley 1986) 519–20; Robertson 46–52 (the discussion which is accepted by Hed.); P. J. Rhodes, ‘The Athenian Code of Laws’, *JHS* (1991) 98–99 (recanting from ‘*Nomothesia* in Classical Athens’ [above] and largely following Robertson); Sickinger 104.

A variant within these recent discussions is the suggestion of H. A. Thompson, *apud* Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford 1981; pb. with select addenda 1993) 134–5, cf. 441–2, and *apud* Ostwald 519–20, that the second ‘writing-up’ was in ink on the back wall of the Stoa of the Basileus.

A dissentient voice is that of Sealey 45–9, who reaffirms the older view.

This debate has wide significance, bearing as it does on such questions as the form of publication for the laws envisaged under Tisamenus’ decree, the reliability of Andocides’ evidence, and the relationship between the procedures described by Tisamenus’ decree and the activities of the *ἀναγράφεις* (‘writers-up’) of Athenian laws, who include Nicomachus (Lysias *Or.* 30), within the two periods, 410/09–405/4 and 403/2–400/399.⁹ For our present (restricted) purposes, however, it crystallises the question: can the formula ‘for anyone who wishes to look’ ever be applied to stone publication? Nevertheless, there is an obvious and important point here which immediately problematises the distinction between ‘permanent’ and ‘non-permanent’ publication: whereas the first ‘writing-up’ on boards is explicitly provisional, this second comes at the end, and as a culmination, of the ‘examination’ process: no subsequent changes will be made. The wording of the text itself is permanent: *on any view, this second ‘writing-up’ is in effect a permanent publication,*

decree are objectively misleading is another question, which will be discussed in the main text (cf. also (a) in n. 14 below).

⁹ On these precise dates see P. J. Rhodes, ‘The Athenian Code of Laws, 410–399 B.C.’, *JHS* 101 (1991) 87–100 at 88.

*whatever the medium of the ‘writing-up’.*¹⁰ The fact, too, that the formula can be applied to two such different processes does not much favour Wilhelm’s hypothesis.

However, it is still worth pursuing the question whether the second occurrence of the formula provides an example of stone publication. The recent discussions produce two main arguments in support of their contention that the second ‘writing-up’ is on a non-permanent medium:

The first is that ‘the present participle, *τοὺς δὲ κυρουμένους*, “those that are being approved”, particularly as contrasted with Andocides’ aorist participle, shows that the law-making is still in progress’ (Robertson 46, accepted by Rhodes 99 and Sickinger 99, cf. also already Ostwald 519 n. 79), and that therefore the second writing up is on a ‘non-permanent’ medium.

To this Sealey 46 ripostes: ‘a present tense can refer to time that is past in relation to that of the finite verb The present participle could better be called a “present-and-imperfect” participle. Its essential difference from the aorist participle is not temporal but aspectual. The last sentence of the decree of Tisamenus can best be rendered: “Let the laws, as they come to be validated ...”’.

As a linguistic statement concerning the present participle this is correct, and Sealey’s various examples and his appeal to W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (London 1889) 47-8 can be supported by phrases such as *τὰ λεγόμενα* and *τὰ γραφόμενα*, which often have past reference. It follows that Andocides’ gloss on the wording of the decree is not necessarily misleading (*pace* Robertson 47) but may simply illustrate the way in which the present participle could here be understood by an ancient Greek living at the time. It might be argued that this only shows how the present participle *could* be understood and that while the argument from the participle is not actually convincing, the present sense is not itself excluded. In favour of his own rendering, Sealey argues: (a) that ‘[this] makes the provisions of the decree cohere better than the proposed alternative does’; (b) that ‘it is also supported by the ensuing comment of Andokides’. (a) is not particularly strong, because on practically any view the drafting of the decree is not immaculate.¹¹ (b), however, has some force, because Andocides presumably cannot lie about broad statements of fact, here that in 403/2 at least some laws were written up in the *stoa*.¹²

¹⁰ Sealey 46 misrepresents Ostwald, Robertson and Rhodes when he writes: ‘[these] recent readers have concluded that the texts to be inscribed on the wall were *not the laws that had been validated but the bills under consideration for possible ratification*’ (my italics).

¹¹ See e.g. Robertson 46; Rhodes 98-99.

¹² This common and reasonable (if necessarily slippery) *criterion* is invoked by (e.g.) Robertson 62; Sealey 47 and n. 53, 48; Sickinger 103; cf. also n. 7 above; note that when

And Sealey's observations can be strengthened. Even within the terms of the decree itself, the attempt to take the present as a literal present is forced. Not only would the form of expression have been very unclear (to achieve the requisite 'present-sense' clarity, Tisamenus should have inserted an adverb or adverbial phrase, e.g. *τοὺς νῦν* or *τοὺς ἐξῆς κυρουμένους* or *τοὺς καθ' ἕνα κυρουμένους* = respectively 'the laws now being ratified', 'the laws being ratified in sequence' and 'the laws being ratified one by one'), but the 'present-and-imperfect' sense is surely paralleled by *παραδιδόμενους* at 84, a present participle which it is very difficult to read as a literal, temporal, present.

The second argument is the use of the formula 'for anyone who wishes to look'. This argument takes two forms: (a) Wilhelm's thesis (also invoked by Hed.) that the formula *necessarily* envisages 'writing-up' on a medium other than stone (Robertson 47; but if that thesis is in doubt, appeal to it is circular; (b) Rhodes 99 finds 'the phrase "for whoever wishes to inspect", repeated there from 83, an embarrassment' to the older view. This observation simply assumes that the second 'writing-up' was on the same sort of medium as the first, which is circular.

Since these two arguments have no force, the situation is as follows: (a) the present participle *κυρουμένους* is a 'present and imperfect' participle; (b) Andocides' *κυρωθέντας* echoes that participle, but not duplicitously; rather, when describing the actual publication he switches into a simple past tense to match 'they wrote up'; (c) Andocides seems to represent the final clause of the decree correctly; (d) his statement that at least some of the laws were written up in the *stoa* should be accepted. It follows that it is entirely reasonable to accept Andocides' statement that the publication instruction of the decree was actually carried out and that Robertson's claim that the statement is itself false and that it is falsely buttressed by the laws which Andocides quotes in 85-7 (Robertson 44-45, 49, 62-64) is both redundant and implausible.

The next crucial question therefore is: what sort of 'writing-up' is Andocides here describing? Both Sealey 46-7 and Rhodes 98 simply assume 'permanent publication' (by which they mean publication on stone). On the other hand, Sickinger 103-4 is 'not convinced that either Andokides or the decree of Teisamenos must be understood to refer to publication on stone of all Athenian laws. Neither mentions a stone wall or *stelai*'; and, as Sickinger observes (above), the use of the verb *ἀναγράφειν* can point either way.

Robertson 62 brands this statement 'a patent falsehood', he does not, *pace* Sealey and Sickinger, mean that *no* laws were written up in the *stoa*: he is objecting to what he takes to be the implication of the statement: namely, that "all the laws" of Athens, newly revised, ... in virtue of Tisamenus' decree' were so written up. On the latter question see (a) in n. 14 below.

Robertson 49 also confronts the question directly, but he opts for ‘permanent publication’, which he, like Sealey and Rhodes, takes to be on stone. One of his arguments is that ‘this form of interim publication seems very unlikely, all the more when we remember that it will be the second interim publication: the laws “shall be written up on the wall, just where they were written up before”’. That it would be the *second* ‘interim’ publication depends of course on the hypothesis (here disputed) that ‘the wall’ of Tisamenus’ decree is a temporary publication; the broad statement about the ‘unlikelihood’ of such ‘interim’ publication depends on a general view that the ‘permanent’ medium is always stone, a general view which it is one of the aims of Sickinger’s wide-ranging study to contest and about which I myself have above expressed reservations, but one which obviously has greater force in a context of the ‘writing-up’ of law. Robertson also observes that ‘Andocides expatiates on the finality of the “writing-up’ in the stoa”, which forbids recourse to any contrary law (*De myst.* 82, 85, 89)’. More substantially, we know that many of the laws of the ‘writing-up’ of 410 following (a ‘writing-up’ of which the exercise of 403/2 was in some sense a part) were written up on stone (e.g. Andoc. *On the Mysteries* 96; Lysias 30.21; *IG* i³ 104.4-7; 105; and the joining *stelai*). *Pace* Sickinger, it is very implausible to dissociate Andocides’ statement about the ‘writing-up’ of the ‘validated laws’ from this general picture.¹³

Hence immediately another point which undermines Hed.’s sharp polarisation between ‘stone’ and ‘impermanent’ publication. Irrespective of whether Andocides is being honest or duplicitous in his glossing of the final clause of the decree, the very fact that he can gloss it by allusion to the permanent commemoration of laws on stone proves that, unlike Wilhelm, Robertson and Hed., Andocides’ Athenian audience and readership were not pre-programmed to the thought: ‘the formula “for anyone who wishes to look” is *restricted* to non-permanent publication’.

But we can go further. The case that Andocides is here being duplicitous is weak. So far, we have had: (a) the present participle *κυρουμένους* is a ‘present and imperfect’ participle; (b) Andocides’ *κυρωθέντας* echoes that participle, but not duplicitously; rather, he switches into a simple past tense to match ‘they wrote up’; (c) Andocides seems to represent the final clause of the decree correctly; (d) his statement that at least some of the laws were written up in the *stoa* should be accepted. We can now add: (e) these laws were written up on stone.

To sum up, the second occurrence of the formula ‘for anyone who wishes to look’ seems to provide an example which was understood by con-

¹³ ‘General picture’ seems to me a fair description: see Rhodes 91, 93; of course, both Robertson 45 ff. and (to a lesser extent) Sickinger 103-4 dispute this ‘general picture’.

temporaries to apply to stone publication and which could apparently be verified as such in ‘the *stoa*’.¹⁴

¹⁴ I here re-emphasise that I am offering a simplified case; a fully-developed case would need to take account of further challenges and difficulties. These include: (a) Robertson’s claims that Andocides is representing the law-making of 403/2 as a thorough-going ‘revision’ and that this representation is false, being motivated (according to Robertson) by Andocides’ need to make himself immune from still valid pre-403/2 laws (Robertson 44-46, 49, 62-64); (b) the argument that in Tisamenus’ decree (84) the words ‘where indeed they were written up before’ gloss the first ‘writing-up’ on boards (Robertson 48; Rhodes 99); (c) the argument that these words entail that ‘the laws were previously written up on the wall, but they were written up no longer; ... the previous writing-up is expressed by the aorist ..., “where they were written up”, not by the imperfect ..., “where they were being written up”, nor by the perfect ..., “where they have been written up”. It follows that the earlier text has been removed or otherwise superseded; no laws but those written up hereafter will be seen on the wall’ (Robertson 47-48); (d) the claim that ‘when a document provides for “writing up on the wall” ... “the wall” is typically a place for the temporary display of public notices’ (Robertson 47); (e) the question of whether the older view (that ‘the wall’ is a stone inscription) entails taking ‘the wall’ as the joining *stelai*; (f) the difficulties of so doing (Robertson 47-8); (g) the need to explain the erasure on the principal side of the joining *stelai*.

Some brief comments:

(h) ‘Revision’ is an elastic term. Any ‘revision’ starts from ‘the laws of Solon and the ordinances of Draco’, so there would necessarily be overlap between ‘old’ and ‘new’. In combination MacDowell 196 and Sealey 47-48 seem to me to show that (1) Andocides is not (or not necessarily) misrepresenting the decree and its wider context; (2) the decree was itself only a part of the general law-making of 403/2, which was extensive. Rhodes’ more conservative reconstruction of that law-making also allows a degree of ‘revision’ (97-98, 100); cf. also n. 7 above.

(i) and (c). The words can just as well gloss the location of laws previously inscribed on stone (the new publications, both the first, provisional, ‘writing-up’ and the second, permanent publication, naturally being in the same location as the previously inscribed laws). It is true that there is a slight slippage of reference between the ‘previous’ laws and the new laws, or modifications of existing laws, but that is precisely what ‘revision’ would lead us to expect. The aorist tense refers to the original time of ‘writing-up’ in the past and does not require that the laws so written are no longer in a state of being ‘written-up’. (‘I wrote this reply to Hedrick at the beginning of April’ does not imply that it is no longer ‘written up’.)

(d) The argument doesn’t seem to have much force. While *IG* i³ 84.23-5 has an allusion to ‘the wall’, it is the only other *Athenian* reference to such publication and since it dates to 418/17, it need say nothing about the joined *stelai*, the product of the ‘writing-up’ of 410 and following.

(e) The combination of (a), (b) and (c) seems to make it necessary to take ‘the wall’ as the joined *stelai*, which might surely be reasonably described as a ‘wall’.

(f) Robertson’s arguments against this rest largely on (b) and (c), which are already answered. It is true that there are problems in reconstructing a consistent topography for the stone publication of Athenian laws from 410 on. For example, it seems to make sense that ‘the *stoa*’ mentioned by Andocides should be the *Stoa* of the *Basileus*, in front of

1.2.2 Thucydides’ use of the formula

The claim made in AKK that Thucydides’ wording in 1.22.4 ‘those who wish to look (at)’ recalls the Athenian inscriptional formula ‘for anyone who wishes to look’ rested in the first instance on the close verbal similarity, which is undoubted. Hed.’s objection to the claim that this verbal similarity

which Draco’s law of homicide was written up on stone as part of the ‘writing-up’ of 410 following (*IG i³* 104.4-7), and that the general collection of laws resulting from that codification was intended to be published in or near that stoa, home as it was of the *kyrbeis* or *axones* on which the laws of Draco and Solon had originally been written up (so Rhodes 91-3 vs Robertson 58-60, 64-65). Such a reconstruction would of course provide further support for the notion that both the final clause of Tisamenos’ decree and Andocides’ statement that the validated laws were written up in the *stoa* alluded to stone publication. But the Stoa of the Basileus is at the north-west of the *agora*, whereas nearly all the fragments of the joined-up *stelai*, which certainly contain *some* of the results of the 403/2 exercise, come from the south-west. Had they been moved (so Thompson *apud* Rhodes, *Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, 135)? Another objection to the hypothesis of the Stoa of the Basileus as the general location of Athenian laws is the apparent fact that after Andokides’ speech there is no word of current Athenian laws there (M. H. Hansen, ‘Diokles’ Law (Dem. 22.42) and the Revision of the Athenian Corpus of Law in the Archonship of Eukleides’, *C&M* 41 (1990) 70-1); of course, this is not necessarily decisive, given the imperfections of the evidence, and the hypothesis that at some stage the joining *stelai* were moved can again be invoked.

On the other hand, Robertson’s own attempt to locate the joined *stelai* in ‘South Stoa I’ (Robertson 65) runs into the difficulty that ‘H.A. Thompson tells [us] that the floor of South Stoa I is well preserved and has no trace of beddings for *stelai*’ (Rhodes 91 n. 22). By contrast, the north annex of the Stoa of the Basileus has a base which carried multiple *stelai*: T. L. Shear, Jr., ‘The Athenian Agora: Excavations of 1970’, *Hesperia* 40 (1971) 251 with plate 49a and 255.

Non liquet; on balance I think one should bite the bullet and say that at some stage the joining *stelai* were moved from their original location in, or near, the Stoa of the Basileus (‘the library overflowed’). This does not obviate the need to find a ‘home’ for the *stelai* in, or near, the south-west of the *agora*, since the excellent state of the lettering indicates that they must always have been protected by some building, but at no stage does South Stoa I seem to have been that building and the Stoa of the Basileus still remains in the frame as the original building.

(a) Robertson 65-75 argues that the erasure was made not by the Thirty, nor by the restored democracy of 403, but as a reaction against the *anagrapheis* at the end of their second term, i.e. in 399. The arguments are complicated but attractive and I accept them (Rhodes’ counter-arguments [Rhodes 94-95] are rather *a priori*); the erasure thus becomes mercifully irrelevant to the circumstances of 403/2 and there need be no messy interaction with either (a) (‘revision’ as perhaps including ‘erasure’ of some of the established ‘laws of Solon and ordinances of Draco’) or (c) (the idea that the wording ‘where indeed they were written up before’ entails erasure of the ‘previous’ laws).

My opinion concerning topographical and epigraphical matters is obviously of little value. On the other hand, I hope that, if nothing else, the present survey has made it abundantly clear that everybody (including some very eminent bodies) makes mistakes.

constitutes a parallel (in the ‘strong’ classicist sense of that term) rests on the counter-claim that the formula is applied only to ‘documents temporarily posted on impermanent materials’, hence that if Thucydides were evoking it, he would be undermining his claim that his work was a ‘possession set down for ever’, so he is not in fact doing so. (No doubt the simplicities of these formulations need adjustment in the light of the theoretical considerations of 2.2 below.)

The above survey of the epigraphical problem has reached the following conclusions: (a) it is certainly true that such documents can be impermanent, transitory, provisional, etc.; (b) it is, however, sometimes erroneous to make a sharp distinction between ‘inscriptions’ (on stone) and ‘documents’ (on other media): both can be viewed as being part of the same process of public commemoration and the distinction between them was sometimes not made by the Athenians themselves; (c) the important distinction is sometimes not between ‘permanent’ and ‘impermanent’ media but between ‘permanent’ and ‘impermanent’ public *texts*; (d) the Athenians were evidently not pre-programmed to the notion that the formula was restricted to ‘impermanent’ publications; (e) the proportion of *certain* applications of the formula to stone inscriptions is insufficient to justify so decided a claim as Hed.’s; (f) almost certainly, on the evidence of the parallel formulae ‘so that they may know’ and ‘so that it may be possible for anyone who wishes to know’ and on the evidence of the Decree of Tisamenus, the formula could be applied to stone publication.

To be absolutely frank, when Hed. and Robertson thus appeal to the authority of the great Wilhelm, I think that what we are seeing is hero-worship of an iconic figure and his more or less arbitrary pronouncements, a form of worship, invariably deluded, to which we have all at times succumbed.

If these conclusions are accepted, the only one that causes any difficulty at all for the claim of AKK is (a), and this only on the deconstructionist fallacy that in literary interpretation *all possible implications* of a word or phrase can legitimately be brought into interpretative play in any context. Even were this not a fallacy, however, the difficulty raised by (a) is purely fleeting, because Thucydides’ climactic ‘it is set down/put together as a possession for always’ decisively shores up the permanent ‘material’ solidity of his work. (Incidentally, it is interesting here to note Dionysius’ word for ‘inscription’ at *On the Style of Demosthenes* 10 (quoted as the superscription to AKK, with the Greek in n. 17): *ἀνάθημα*, strictly = ‘dedication’. Is Dionysius interpreting Thucydides as claiming that his work is the analogue of, specifically, a *stone* inscription (many stone inscriptions being of a religious character)?)

The difficulty raised by (a) is also utterly disproportionate to the densely interwoven conceptual and verbal tapestry of 1.22.4. Together, 1.1.1 and 1.22.4 evoke several different sorts of ‘inscriptions’: the Hecataean, quasi-

governmental edict, the Herodotean funeral monument, the Athenian democratic ‘open-to-all’ inscription, the everlasting monument, which appropriates and transcends *all* merely physical inscriptions and *all* previous historiographical ‘inscriptions’ (cf. §10 and 1.5 below). The *κτῆμα* also has other associations: the material object, the essential possession, the ‘treasure-house’, the single literary possession which appropriates and transcends all comparable literary ‘possessions’ from Homer downwards (cf. §§3 and 5). Furthermore, AKK sought only to establish the ‘inscriptional’ quality of Thucydides’ phrase ‘those who wish to look (at)’ (1.22.4), not to discuss *all* the implications of those words. In context, *each* of those words is rich in further implication: *βουλήσονται* (readers of Thucydides’ *History* crucially require a serious initial *βούλησις*); *σκοπεῖν* ~ ‘see’ > ‘look’ > ‘consider’ > ‘understand’; also < 1.1.3 (the complementary, even interactive, processes of the historian and the reader); *σκοπεῖν* also introduces notions of ‘vividness’, the *History* as a ‘seeing’ text, etc.; then *τὸ σαφές* = the ‘clear truth’ of ‘the things that happened’ but also the ‘clear truth’ of ‘the things which, in accordance with the human thing, are going to happen again some time like this and near the present ones’, so that Thucydides’ ‘inscription’ contains past, present and future, specific things, general things and universal things. In the midst of such riches, the argument that the words ‘those who wish to look’ cannot contain an inscriptional allusion seems inappropriately flatfooted and literalist. As David West would say: ‘it’s poetry!’.

I continue also to believe that Livy’s wording at *Praefatio* 10 ‘glosses, indeed almost translates, Thucydides’ “look at the clearness” of his *History* as imaged as a monumental inscription’ (§12).

On the ‘inscriptional’ quality of 1.22.4 see further 1.5 below.

1.3 Historians’ attitude to inscriptions

On the implications of the image of the historiographical inscription for historians’ attitude to/use of real inscriptions (§7 and n. 30) **Mar.** writes: ‘I don’t think that the ancient historians’ rare use of inscriptional evidence is necessarily at odds with a belief in the permanence of inscriptions. As I suggested in *ATAH* pp. 104-5, inscriptions were of very limited use for one writing a narrative. Thus historians could value inscriptions even though they might not use them much’.

Mo.: Must be right. That emphasis on ‘narrative’ is crucial. It’s still noteworthy that ancient historians generally use inscriptions as a factual source of information less often than we would expect. See also now Sickinger 176-85 (‘Archives and Historians’).

This seems to lead on to **Mar.**’s second series of observations on this question:

‘You claim throughout that the inscription stands for (to take one formulation) ‘authority truth and permanence’. But I wonder if this is really rather a modern interpretation, based on our respectful attitude towards ‘primary’ evidence. It does not seem at all to be the ancient attitude to inscriptions: they were regularly taken down, destroyed, written over, etc., and Theopompus was not alone in calling the authority of some of them doubtful. They were, in short, treated like any other sort of evidence. It is this aspect of them that leaves me feeling just the slightest bit reluctant to embrace your interpretation.

On the other hand, such an attitude towards inscriptions would explain why it was possible for Polybius, Livy, and Arrian (and anyone else) to try to improve on Thucydides’ approach and formulations. If inscriptions were not sacred, one could (a) attack them and (b) try to do it better. So Thucydides could argue that his work was a monumental/inscriptional piece for all time—and those who followed would be free to dismiss him (though few did). Or perhaps, as I suspect, Thucydides’ work did come to be seen as ‘the monument’ for the Peloponnesian War (which Plut. *Nicias* 1 and Sall. *Cat.* 8.2-3 testify to in different ways), thereby leaving the field open for other monuments, say of Rome’s history or of Alexander’.

Mo.: There are many questions here. My formulations were no doubt too sweeping, but they might be OK in context(s). The difficulty (as so often) is one of generalisation: I’d certainly dispute that ‘at all’ in the third sentence of the first paragraph.

Some suggestions:

(a) All inscriptions are implicitly memorialising and some are explicitly and centrally so (e.g. the funeral inscription, arguably relevant to Herodotus).

(b) Presumably when public inscriptions first became a big medium they could be regarded as making a greater claim to authority than they sometimes were later (because there were fewer of them and they weren’t yet overtaken by subsequent developments [changes in laws etc.] or by ‘rival’ inscriptions).

(c) Presumably when an ‘inscriptional’ claim is allied to a claim for the authority of writing, a claim is being made to inscriptional ‘authority’, and both these claims carry more punch in the 5th century.

(d) Inscriptions memorialise both their factual content and their ‘inscriber’.

(e) The sudden burst of Athenian inscriptions in the middle of the 5th century is usually explained in terms of power display or educative purpose (or both) (see 1.2.1. above); in either case, implying a claim to ‘authority’.

(f) Any claim for a ‘respectful attitude’ to inscriptions must surely always allow for a distinction between ‘good’/‘authentic’ and ‘bad’/‘inauthentic’ in-

scriptions, so that while the fact that inscriptions ‘were taken down, destroyed, written over’ sometimes no doubt attests no great belief in the authority of the medium, it sometimes also suggests precisely the opposite, namely the desire—or at least the claim—to get an inscription right (hence e.g. Athens’ attempt to put genuine laws on inscriptions or the removal from inscriptions of the names of persons whom the state no longer regards as legitimate).

(g) The distinction between ‘inscription’ with regard to ‘Thucydides’ approach and formulations’ and ‘inscription’ with regard to a particular war or topic seems to me important and I would work it through rather differently; (some) later historians could regard Thucydides’ ‘inscription’ as the best as regards the Peloponnesian War; they (some of them) could also ‘inscriptionalise’ their particular war(s); they (some of them) could also claim that *their* inscription was better than Thucydides’, because it better served the historiographical needs of their time and/or their considered view of what historiography should aspire to achieve; so Livy (on my view) isn’t just doing a *different* ‘inscription’ (AUC Roman history rather than the Peloponnesian War): for all the *Preface*’s ‘modesty’, he’s claiming that it’s a *better* ‘inscription’.

1.4 The superiority of Thucydides’ inscription to Herodotus’ (§10)

Mar. writes: ‘There seems to me to be one other aspect of Herodotus’ work that Thucydides would have seen as being inappropriate to its being considered a monument: i.e., its ways of dealing with traditions, its use of variant versions, and its method of explanation and elucidation, all of which are inappropriate to a monument. Monuments present a linear narrative which in their ways are as magisterial and unproblematic as Homer’s: the *demos* decides and it’s done. No parallel narratives or other explanations need apply’.

Mo.: Right, this is important, though I touched on it in n. 50. On the other hand, there is also an important respect in which Thucydides’ own narrative isn’t straightforwardly linear: in the ways in which it interweaves past, present and future and specific things, general things and universal things cf. 1.2.2 above.

1.5 Thucydides’ *History* as a ‘possession’

Hed. writes: ‘I would agree with the general point about the connotations of *κτῆμα*, and have said as much on two occasions: first and chiefly in a 1993 article entitled ‘The Meaning of Material Culture: Herodotus, Thucydides and their Sources’, in R. Rosen and J. Farrell, eds., *Nomodeiktēs: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald* (Ann Arbor) 17-37, and again to a lesser extent in 1995, ‘Thucydides and the Beginnings of Greek Archaeology’, in D. Small,

ed., *Methods in the Mediterranean: Historical and Archaeological Views on Texts and Archaeology* (Mnemosyne supp. 135, Leiden) 45-88. The contrast between permanence and impermanence, written and oral, monument and text, is, I think, far more pervasive in Thucydides than Moles suggests. At a minimum, if he is going to write about the historical connotations of inscriptions in Thucydides, he should consider the Funeral Oration, where the issue is played out in great detail, and in language that reverberates through the poem’.

Mo.: AKK was not concerned with the *general topic* of ‘the historical connotations of inscriptions in Thucydides’, but thanks for the valuable bibliographical references. Hed. 1993, 32-35, on Pericles’ appropriation of the monumental and the material and on the analogies between Pericles’ construction of the past and Thucydides’ own, provides some support for AKK’s interpretation of 1.22.4, which seems to make Hed.’s rejection of the allusion to the Athenian inscriptional formula all the more surprising! Hed. 1993, 25 (‘I am inclined to emphasize the immediate reference of ἔργα to “monuments”’) reminds me that AKK might have considered adducing ἔργα in support of the case for an ‘inscriptional reading’ of Herodotus’ *Preface*: it didn’t, because that understanding of ἔργα seems to me so obviously incoherent!

1.6 22.4 ξύγκειται (§4)

Mar. writes: ‘given that κείμαι is so often used as the passive of τίθημι, can you really say that ξύγκειται ‘trumps’ ξυνέθεσαν? In other words, isn’t the contrast somewhere else, where it has been traditionally seen: between what is put together for momentary pleasure vs. perennial use? And I wonder too if it is rather that ξυνέγραψεν trumps the ξυνέθεσαν of the logographers by adding the sense of permanence that one finds in writing (hence contributing to your notion of inscriptional permanence)’.

Mo.: Of course I agree that there is an important contrast between momentary pleasure and perennial use: I was angling my description of the way the section works towards the notion of Thucydides’ work as the “synthetic”, “compound”, “treasure-house” which transcends Homer and all other relevant works, and from that point of view I think the original formulation is OK. On the other point, the logographers do explicitly use writing, though they sometimes ‘deliver’ orally (22.4), so the contrast is between different types of writing, or (as I think) between writing mainly (or strongly) associated with oral delivery/aural reception (allowing here for some Thucydidean distortion) and writing designed mainly for reading’.

On the Persian regard for εὐεργασία, **Mar.** writes: ‘you might perhaps want to cite Hdt. 8.85.3 (cf. 8.90.4), since he there notes explicitly that a

benefactor of the king has his name inscribed’. **Mo.**: See also the brief bibliography in nn. 23 and 25.

1.7 Polybian *σύνθεσις* (§11)

O’G. comments: ‘one feature of Polybian *synthesis* that must surely be mentioned is the way it goes hand in hand with the Roman imperialist encroachment on the Mediterranean world. So the history of Polybius establishes its total cognitive dominion on the backs of the Roman conquerors (and of course we can have this both ways). The echoing uses of ὅλως and καθολικῶς in the prefatory statements in books 3 and 1 point this up, I think’.

Mo.: This must be right. Presumably one might make observations of a somewhat similar kind about both Herodotus and Thucydides (with perhaps again a claim that Polybius also so read them). Not only is Herodotus’ work a ‘demonstration’ of ‘deeds demonstrated’ but the series of ring structures which link the beginning and end of the *History* seems to enact the completion of one ‘cycle’ (Lateiner, *Historical Method of Herodotus*, 47; Moles, *PLLS* 9 [1996] 277); further, if one believes that Herodotus is centrally concerned with the Athenian empire, he ‘begins’ his narrative with a ‘beginning [ἀρχή] of unjust deeds’ which reflects the Athenian ‘beginning’/‘empire’ [ἀρχή], and he ends (but also in a sense refuses to end) his narrative with that empire’s actual ‘beginning’. Likewise Thucydides, whose narrative is sometimes described as ‘imperialist’ (in its ruthless suppression of doubt as to ‘the facts’), is centrally concerned with Athenian imperialism, and he ‘begins’ with ‘the beginnings’ of the Athenian ‘beginning’/‘empire’ (the Herodotean word-play and its implications are crucial to Thucydides’ ‘pre-writing’ in Book 1 of the causes of the war).

2. Theoretical issues

2.1 Ancient historians and ancient critics as readers of ancient historiography

On the contention that Thucydides’ ancient successors understood the claim of 1.22.4 far better than do modern scholars, **Mar.** comments: ‘I appreciate the paradox that those historians and critics to whom we feel so superior are better readers of ancient historians than we are. I think that possibly because of our overriding concern whether this or that historians is telling the truth, we have failed to see how historians really were attentive readers of their predecessors, and how, as in poetry, they seek (silently as well as explicitly) to amalgamate and better them’.

Mo.: So: the old ‘truth’–‘untruth’/‘history’–‘literature’ polarisation still distorts, here as in other areas, and more attention still needs to be paid to ‘history as literature’.

2.2 Literary allusion and intention

Both Mar. and O’G. have pointed things to say about literary allusion/intertextuality/authorial intention.

Mar.: ‘I would state it even more strongly than you do that allusions do not need to be identical with their models: I would say that they *must* not be identical if they are to be true creative imitation. S. Hinds, *Allusion and Intertext* (Cambridge 1998), pp. 17-47 and *passim* is excellent on the whole problem (and problematic notion) of ‘deliberate’ reference. (I too will discuss this at length in my response to Rhodes)’.

O’G.: ‘your use of Horace [in §3] as first way in to looking at *ktema* as a monument puts us (momentarily) in the world of non-authorial intention intertextuality, since it is H.’s reading of Thuc. that affords us access to this interpretation. The intention position is just as shaky to occupy consistently as is the non-intention; cf. §2 where you bracket ‘deliberate’ (BUT I think glossing ‘real’ as ‘deliberate’ is a fudge anyway) but later you bracket ‘to me’ (i.e. the non-intentionalist position)—what anxieties are enclosed therein?’

Mo.: Of course I have ‘anxieties’ about these matters (who doesn’t? if anyone doesn’t, s/he jolly well ought to!), and I’m well aware that I’m not nearly as theoretically fleet as many modern classicists, including O’G. I think one should frame literary interpretations in ways which (a) acknowledge the existence of theoretical questions; (b) remind self-proclaimed non-theorists that these questions can’t just be ignored; (c) may nevertheless allow some sort of practical progress, irrespective of one’s own or other people’s theoretical or allegedly non-theoretical positions (this may include an indication of one’s personal preference, though that preference is not driving the argument). Is this hopelessly naïve? Of course such a hybrid procedure is vulnerable to attack both from theorists and ‘non-theorists’.

On the question of ‘intention’, I here attributed a fairly high degree of intention both to Thucydides and to Polybius, Livy and Arrian; in all cases the agonistic societies and the consequent intensity of the debate about authority and of the resultant intertextualities seem to me to make it difficult to exclude the image of the writer reading his predecessors with care and constructing his own text with the others before him (as R. Thomas, *Classical Philology* 83 (1988) 59, nicely puts it: ‘to imagine Ovid writing the *Metamorphoses* at an uncluttered desk is impossible’). And writers may have intentions: Henry James, *The Notebooks of Henry James*, ed. Matthiessen and Murdock (1947) 46-7: ‘I wished to write a very *American* tale, a tale very character-

istic of our social conditions, and I asked myself what was the most salient and peculiar point of our social life. The answer was: the situation of women, the decline of the sentiment of sex, the agitation on their behalf’.

If one may compare small things with great (though *The Bostonians* is admittedly one of the Master’s most drearily uninspired productions), I am perfectly clear that I wrote AKK with numerous intentions (some of which are mentioned below). However, in literary criticism one should avoid crude expressions of intention (‘Thucydides thought/believed/wanted’) and one should also try to construct arguments which don’t rest on intention at all; ‘fudging’ seems to me/(to me) a necessary and a sensible ‘both–and’ rather than ‘either-or’ approach. And ‘is this a real (‘deliberate’) [6] echo?’ was ‘intended’ as a tease to ‘intentionalists’ as well as ‘non-intentionalists’, although the actual content of n. 6 was ‘intended’ to indicate where my own sympathies (in this case) lie. But of course, whatever an author’s ‘intentions’, s/he can’t control reception (or not much, though I’m trying hard here).

As for the bracketed ‘to me’, in ‘the immediate context of 22.4 seems (to me) enough to guarantee the conclusion that Thucydides images his *History* as being (among other things) an *inscription*’, its ‘intended’ functions were (a) softening: to deflect charges of arrogance; (b) to register the fact that, as we all know, these things aren’t provable in an absolute sense; (c) by registering this fact, to take cognisance of the views both of those for whom this fact always destabilises any particular reading and of those for whom it has no practical consequences (which includes me, who think that ὄσοι δὲ βουλήσονται is proof positive of Thucydides’ imaging his work as a monumental inscription). Of course Hinds’ discussion is far more nuanced than any of this (though he doesn’t in the final analysis exclude ‘the alluding author’: 47-50, ‘the limits of intertextualism’; and many of his formulations seem to me less ‘unprejudiced’ than he supposes). J. Farrell, *Virgil’s Georgics and the Traditions of Ancient Epic* (New York/Oxford 1991) 3-25 is also strong.

2.3 Historicist issues

O’G. writes: ‘I don’t think Thucydides’ choosing to read his predecessors in this way is a “watering down” and I think again you are choosing to fudge your own historical position as one who approaches Hecataeus and Herodotus through Thucydides (and Thucydides through Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Livy, Horace *et al.*—the necessity for which is a central premise of your whole paper—cf. n. 79).’ And: ‘I mean your repeated claim to a “cumulative” case is in itself not only intertextual but atemporal’.

Mo.: I’m not sure if I understand this. It was part of my argument that we (now, in our own historical position) can and should learn from the ways in which Thucydides’ successors read him (and the ways in which Thucy-

dides read Herodotus and Hecataeus) because, to a far greater degree than is generally now recognised, they saw things we generally haven't (characteristically through our own foolish conceit). The argument: (a) naturally involves trying to establish what their readings (in the particular aspects of the particular passages) were and trying to establish also their quality, in full recognition of their varying temporal situatednesses; (b) it is more firmly underpinned by trying to show (by internal analysis of the passages themselves) that those readings are right; but (c) I think that if it can be shown that (a) and (b) coincide, this strengthens the overall interpretation of the passage, hence (in part) the appeal to 'cumulative cases'. I don't really see what's wrong with this; the concept of the 'cumulative case' is of course always vulnerable, but there can be good and bad cumulative cases, and (b) is also free-standing.

2.4 Texts as reading texts

On the claim that Thucydides (especially) presents his work as a reading text and on the implications of such a presentation, **O'G.** writes: (*re* section 6 n. 27) 'is the availability of the text in tension with its difficulty? Cf. D.H. on Thucydides' style. That is, anyone can choose to read Thucydides, but are they able to read Thucydides? Your "interactive interpretation" comes in here—how is a reader "authorised" to read? (Or am I dragging this "back" to Tac. *Ann.* 4.32-33?). **Mo.:** This seems another important factor, which should have been mentioned; of course, Thucydides' difficulty varies—some of the military narrative is as vivid and appealing and as relatively straightforward as Herodotus', and 1.22.4 shows some awareness on Thucydides' part of the 'pleasure principle' and 1.23 (arguably, and despite the *emphasis* of 1.22.4) a certain accommodation of it (Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography* 28ff., though Woodman's notion of 'entertainment' seems to me both too narrow and too autonomous and there is plenty in ch. 23 that is historically and historiographically serious).

On the same topic, **O'G.** also writes: 'the possibility, afforded by the written text, of re-reading and turning back to earlier passages also affects the reception—this fits with [your] example of the beginning and end of Herodotus'.

2.5 Reading the Internet

O'G. writes (*re* n. 67): 'despite your disclaimers, I think your style has been affected by the medium in which you choose to be published (look at how you guide the reader to earlier sections and notes—the next step on from Herodotus' ring composition?). The question of who chooses to read and who is afforded access to reading resonates here: we are barraged with im-

ages which imply that the Internet affords free access to information (like Thucydides’ inscription), but who controls the electricity supply? Hence, I think, your scare quotes in the conclusion: Thucydides’ work as “democratically” open to all who wished to look at it’.