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IMPLIED MOTIVATION IN DIODORUS' NARRATIVE OF THE SUCCESSORS*

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Abstract: This chapter examines the issue of implied motivation in Diodorus' narrative of the Successors, *Bibliotheke* Books XVIII–XX. It focuses on the depiction of three individuals, Peukestas, Peithon, and Polyperchon, and argues that Diodorus preserves evidence of a sophisticated and layered narrative that combined historical narrative with a critical dissection of individuals' thoughts and motives. The use of embedded focalisation within the text reveals an interest in a hermeneutic approach to history which, while likely not Diodorus' own, was preserved by him because it fit the moral-didactic programme of Diodorus' *Bibliotheke*.

Keywords: Implied motivation, historiography, Diodorus, Successors

1. Introduction

The elaboration of motives is an important feature of ancient historiography, though it is more frequently studied in highly regarded historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides than in Diodorus.[1] Debate has focused not only on its historiographical role but also on

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* Before the Lampeter workshop this paper was also presented at the Classical Association conference in Durham in 2011. I would like to thank Alexander Meeus and the anonymous reviewer, whose comments have greatly improved this paper. Translations of Diodorus are adapted from the Loeb Classical Library, Geer (1947) and (1954). I have used Hellenised spelling, except in the case of well-known individuals, e.g. Alexander, Herodotus, Thucydides, Diodorus.

[1] Herodotus: Baragwanath (2008); Fröhlich (2013). Thucydides: Tamiolaki (2013); cf. Hornblower (1994).

whether the motives ascribed to a character are authentic or inferred by the historian. Thucydides, for instance, continually recounts the thoughts and intentions of his characters, both collectively (e.g. 1.5.1) and individually, and in the debate leading up to the Pylos campaign he gives a detailed account of Kleon's thoughts and motives, which it is extremely unlikely that he would have known.[2] It is widely assumed that Thucydides inferred a character's motives from the result of his actions,[3] though Simon Hornblower and others have cautioned that in some cases, such as Thucydides' account of the campaigns of Brasidas, first-hand knowledge of a character's motives cannot be discounted.[4]

The use of implied motive allows authors such as Herodotus and Thucydides, amongst other things, to 'focalise' their narrative through individual characters, from whose perspective the situation can be perceived and evaluated.[5] In doing so the author gives his audience a character's perspective: what he sees and thinks and how he responds to events. This individual becomes the focal-point and the author, as focaliser, evaluates the situation by focalising the narrative through the character's thoughts and motives.[6]

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[2] Thuc. 4.27.3, 27.4, 28.2; Hornblower (1987) 78–81.

[3] Thompson (1969); Hunter (1973); Schneider (1974) 127–37; Hornblower (1987) 77–81; id. (1991–2008) I.23, II.161; Rood (1998) 20–1, 49. Note also Lang (1995). Westlake (1989) argued that Thucydides either gleaned motives directly from the individuals to whom the motives are ascribed, derived them from recorded actions, or interpreted them based on the individual's character.

[4] Hunter (1973) 23–41; Hornblower (1987) 78–81; id. (1991–2008) II.164–5; Westlake (1989). Hornblower (1987) 79: 'It is a mistake to suppose that a literary device is somehow inconsistent with a truthful account; it may rather be a stylised way of presenting what is true.'

[5] On focalisation as a tool of ancient historiography, see Genette (1972) 203–24; id. (1983) 43–52; Schneider (1974) 39–52; Bal (1977) and (1981); esp. ead. (1985) 100–15; Rood (1998) 12–13, 294–6. For a useful overview of focalisation in classical texts, see de Jong (2014) 47–72.

[6] Bal (1977) and (1981) uses focaliser to refer to the character. Rood (1998) 294–6 uses it to refer to the author. Thus, Thucydides focalises events through Kleon by describing what the latter sees and thinks.

In this chapter I explore the importance of implied motive in Diodorus' narrative of Alexander's successors. The feature was recently highlighted by Joseph Roisman, who ascribed its appearance, without discussion, directly to Hieronymos of Kardia.[7] I build upon Roisman's arguments in a number of ways. A holistic treatment of implied motive within the entire *Bibliotheke* is beyond the scope of this chapter, which merely points some directions forward. Instead, I discuss a number of instances where the historian uses implied motive as a way of focalising the narrative and examining events through the perspectives of individual characters. I examine Books XVIII–XX, which form a convenient source unit, and explore the different functions that implied motive serves within Diodorus' narrative. I avoid explicit source ascription and instead focus primarily on the roles focalisation and implied motive play within Diodorus' work, not that of his hypothesised source (though when discussing Diodorus' work we are to some degree discussing the work it condenses). In doing so, I argue that the use of embedded focalisation and the interest in implied motive adds nuance to the narrative and reveals an interest, though likely not Diodorus' own, in a hermeneutic approach to history whereby history as agency is manifested through the thoughts, motives, and decisions of individual historical actors.

Implied motive recurs throughout Books XVIII–XX—it would likely have been even more common in Diodorus' source—and marks a new trend in historical analysis from the previous books, where the thoughts and motives of actors were not subjected to the same degree of extended analysis. Roisman cites the reasons given for Alexander's 'Exiles Decree' in 324 as an example of this new focus on implied motive. In Book XVII (109.1), based on Kleitarchos, the simple fact of the restoration of the exiles is recorded, without description or elaboration.[8] In Book XVIII (8.1–3),

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[7] Roisman (2010) 136–7.

[8] On Kleitarchos (*FGrHist* 137) and his use by Diodorus as the source for Book XVII, see Goukowsky (1976) ix–xxxi; Pearson (1960) 212–42; Prandi (1996); Parker (2009); Ogden (2010). Kleitarchos has commonly

commonly thought to be based on Hieronymos of Kardia (below, §6), the text of Alexander's edict is recorded and the historian describes the king's motives: to gain fame and to prevent sedition by planting loyal followers throughout the Greek cities. Document and motive come together in Book XVIII and Diodorus' new focus on motive is drawn from his new source.[9] The focus on thoughts and motives early on in Book XVIII signifies its importance for Books XVIII–XX as a whole, the Greek and Asian narratives of which are likely based on the same account.[10]

Modern scholarship on Diodorus is rarely positive and historians seldom look for sophisticated historiographical techniques in his work, and when they find them they are usually ascribed directly to his source. Scholarship has moved beyond Macaulay's 'stupid, credulous, prosing old ass', but Diodorus is still commonly and influentially thought of by the likes of Panico Stylianou as a garbled epitomator, an organ-grinder to his sources.[11] More recently, however, there has been a tendency, initiated most notably by Kenneth Sacks, towards rehabilitating Diodorus as an original thinker and a serious historian.[12] As is often

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been dated to the late fourth century, with his work published ca. 310. *P.Oxy.* LXXI 4808, however, records that Kleitarchos was a tutor (διδάσκαλος) of Ptolemy IV Philopator (ca. 224–205), placing him firmly in the late third century. This important piece of evidence is dismissed by Prandi (2012) as incompatible with the 'high' dating, but see Michael Park's (2014) cogent criticisms.

[9] However, as Alexander Meeus suggests to me, it is also possible that Diodorus, coming to the end of the very long Book XVII, and knowing that he would address the matter in more detail at the start of Book XVIII, decided not to dwell on Alexander's motives at 17.109.1.

[10] The Sicilian narrative is probably based on Timaeus of Tauromenium, on whom see Baron (2013).

[11] Macaulay, letter of 30 November 1836: 'I have finished Diodorus Siculus at last, after dawdling over him at odd times ever since last March. He is a stupid, credulous, prosing old ass; yet I heartily wish that we had a good deal more of him'; Stylianou (1991); id. (1998) *passim*.

[12] Sacks (1990). See also, for instance, Sheridan (2010) and (2014); Sulimani (2008) and (2011); Muntz (2011), (2102), and (2017); Stronk (2016); Rathmann (2016); Walsh (2018); cf. Dudziński (2016).

the case, by responding to the highly negative *communis opinio* the pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction, with some scholars crediting Diodorus with a level of originality not found in his work.[13] Lisa Hau's work on *tyche* is a sobering reminder that seemingly original themes or ideas found throughout the *Bibliotheke* might actually be historiographical motifs or techniques drawn from his sources.[14] Future publications promise to nuance further our understanding and, dare one say it, appreciation of Diodorus as a historian.[15] This modest contribution argues not for Diodorus' originality as a historian, but for his interest in and preservation of sophisticated historiographical techniques, such as implied motive, which he found in his sources.

Diodorus wrote long after the events he described and depended on earlier, now lost works. It is unlikely that he invented *ex nihilo* the motives and intentions that he ascribes to his characters; rather, he likely preserved what he found in his source. The fact that both he and Plutarch record similar ulterior motives for Polyperchon suggests a common source (below, §4). If Diodorus' source for Books XVIII–XX was indeed Hieronymos of Kardia, as is widely assumed (below, §6), then it is possible that Hieronymos knew an individual's motives from personal experience, as has often been argued for Thucydides. At the very least, he would have been in an excellent position to infer logically their motives based on his own first-hand knowledge of their actions and personalities. Both Diodorus and his source wrote histories which were literary works, but, as historians, their purpose was also to create truthful accounts of the past, which recorded events and explained the causes of actions. The inference of motives acts as a way of stressing the human agency within history. It may also, however, have served a function specific to Diodorus' *Bibliotheke*,

[13] See in particular the reviews of Stylianou (1991) and Fornara (1992).

[14] Hau (2009).

[15] See now the proceedings of the conference 'Diodorus Siculus: Shared Myths, World Community, and Universal History' held at the University of Glasgow in September 2011: Hau–Meeus–Sheridan 2018.

which would explain why he preserved the technique in his own work: the emphasis on ulterior motives reinforces Diodorus' claim that those who act in a hybristic manner will be punished and cannot escape their fate (1.1–2.4). The elaboration of a character's thoughts, motives, and intentions, and the use of focalisation as an interpretative tool, reflects a hermeneutic approach to history whereby the historian stresses human agency. Actions are manifestations of individuals' intentions and become, as a series of *erga* or *res gestae*, the events of history. By emphasising a character's thoughts and motives the historian, as narrator, is emphasising the importance of human agency as a motivating factor in historical analysis. In some episodes, events become manifestations of the will of historical actors.

2. Peukestas

Between 318 and spring 316 the royal general Eumenes led an alliance of satraps and generals against Antigonos Monophthalmos.[16] Eumenes' alliance consisted of numerous different groups each with their own interests and allegiances: Eumenes and his own troops opposed Antigonos, the Silver Shields joined Eumenes by royal order (Diod. 18.58.1, 59.3), while the Persian and Macedonian satraps of the Upper Satrapies were united in opposition first to Peithon and then to Antigonos (Diod. 19.14). Loyalty to either Eumenes or the cause was not a given and Peukestas, the Silver Shields, and others would all later turn to Antigonos.

The most powerful of Eumenes' contenders for command of the royal army was Peukestas, whose reputation was based on his defence of Alexander during the Mallian campaign, for which he was made an unprecedented eighth bodyguard.[17] Peukestas was popular

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[16] Schäfer (2002) 131–66; Anson (2004) 147–90.

[17] Curt. 9.5.14–18; Arr. *An.* 6.9.3, 10.1–2, 11.7–8, 28.4; Arr. *Ind.* 19.8; Diod. 17.99.4; Plut. *Alex.* 63.5. On Peukestas, see Heckel (1992) 243–6; id. (2006) 203–5.

in the east. He was made satrap of Persis, spoke Persian, and was given permission by Alexander to dress in Persian attire.[18] He turned to Antigonos after Eumenes' defeat at Gabiene in winter 317 and later appears as a member of the courts of Antigonos and Demetrios.[19] Many scholars have detected a negative portrayal of Peukestas in Diodorus' narrative: he is an open contender with Eumenes for the leadership of the satrapal forces (19.15.1, 23.1), is slow in executing orders (19.17.5), considers defecting to Antigonos' side (19.17.5), and is both cowardly and lacking in spirit (19.38.1–2, 42.4–5, 43.2–5). Since Diodorus is widely assumed to have used Hieronymos of Kardia, a compatriot of Eumenes and an eye-witness source for the wars of the Successors, the negative depiction of Peukestas is often taken at face value and ascribed directly to Hieronymos.[20]

Diodorus' depiction of Peukestas has recently come under scrutiny. Alexander Meeus has questioned whether Diodorus/Hieronymos actually depicted Peukestas negatively, arguing that the aforementioned examples may simply be statements of fact, and that negative accounts of Eumenes' deceits and deceptions are also present (Diod. 19.23.1, 3–4, 24.1).[21] Joseph Roisman has focused on Diodorus' description of Peukestas' motives.[22] Upon Antigonos' advancement into Mesopotamia and his alliance with Seleukos, Eumenes ordered Peukestas to summon 10,000 bowmen from Persia. Diodorus (19.17.5–6) records that:

[18] Arr. *An.* 6.30.2–3; 7.6.3, 23.3; Diod. 19.14.5, 48.5. Note in particular his Persian-style banquet at Persis: Diod. 19.21–23; Plut. *Eum.* 14.3; Polyaen. *Strat.* 4.8.3; Bosworth (2002) 255–6; Wallace (2017) 8–10. Peukestas was not, however, the only Macedonian to wear Persian dress (Meeus (2009a) 121–2).

[19] Diod. 19.48.5; *Staatsverträge* III 429, line 13; Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F 12. Tisikrates of Sikyon, a pupil of Lysippos' son Euthykrates, created a statue of Peukestas, though the date, location, and context are unknown (Plin. *HN* 34.67).

[20] Westlake (1969) 314; Goukowsky (1978) 99 n. 115; Hornblower (1981) 151, 155; Bosworth (1992) 68; id. (2002) 145; Schäfer (2002) 138–9, 156; Anson (2004) 9, 164–5, 172, 183, 187; cf. Meeus (2009a) 147–8, 165–6.

[21] Meeus (2009a) 147–8.

[22] Roisman (2010) 136–7.

ὁ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐ προσεῖχεν αὐτοῖς, μεμψιμοιρῶν
ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ τετευχέναι τῆς στρατηγίας, ὕστερον δὲ δοὺς
αὐτῷ λόγον συνεχώρησεν ὅτι κρατήσαντος Ἀντιγόνου
συμβήσεται καὶ τὴν σατραπείαν αὐτὸν ἀποβαλεῖν καὶ
περὶ τοῦ σώματος κινδυνεῦσαι. ἀγωνιῶν οὖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ
καὶ τῆς στρατηγίας μᾶλλον τεύξεσθαι νομίζων ὡς
πλείστους ἔχων στρατιώτας προσήγαγεν, καθάπερ ἠξί-
ουν, τοξότας μυρίους.

At first Peukestas paid no heed to them, since he still
bore a grudge for not having received the generalship;
but later, reasoning with himself, he admitted that
should Antigonus be victorious, the result would be that
he himself would lose his satrapy and also be in danger
of his life. In his anxiety, therefore, about himself, and
thinking also that he would be more likely to gain the
command if he had as many soldiers as possible, he
brought up 10,000 bowmen as they requested.

In this passage, we can see the narrative focalisation
through Peukestas within the text, elaborating his response
to Eumenes' order. Roisman argues that the narrative
creates a negative image of Peukestas, who initially refused
to obey Eumenes and Antigenes, and only provided the
requested troops once he realised that his situation would be
worse under Antigonos, when he would have no chance of
gaining command. However, from a practical point of view,
Peukestas was given an order that must have taken some
time to complete and that he eventually fulfilled. For
Roisman, the account of Peukestas' thoughts is unnecessary
and exists solely to undermine his actions by causing the
reader to see the selfish, ulterior motives behind his loyal
fulfilment of an order. Roisman ascribes this technique to
Hieronymos of Kardia and sees in it 'Hieronymus'
tendency to look for, and to explain actions through, the

actor's ulterior motive, even when such explanation is unwarranted.'[23]

While Roisman's focus on internal motives is worth pursuing, one must exercise greater caution in attributing this trend to a specific source. It is important to remember that we are dealing with Diodorus' account not Hieronymos', of Peukestas' thoughts. What we have in Diodorus is a compression of what was present in his source, ultimately perhaps Hieronymos, but we cannot be certain of the degree of compression, how Diodorus altered his source, or whether he used Hieronymos directly or through an intermediary.[24] Both of these considerations caution against Roisman's attribution of this technique directly to Hieronymos.

Rather than attributing historiographical techniques to now lost sources, it is worthwhile to consider how these techniques work within the surviving historical narrative. We do not know whether Diodorus' source invented Peukestas' delay or whether it actually happened, but as the former cannot be proven it is perhaps better to assume the latter. Peukestas delayed for some reason, perhaps to consider his options, as Diodorus suggests. The ascription of deceitful motives to Peukestas shows the historian applying a model of rational explanation to an interpretation of Peukestas' actions, whether based on first-hand knowledge of Peukestas' intentions or inferred through logical deduction. Roisman's comment that this 'distorted cooperative conduct [sc. of Peukestas]' is correct, even if we cannot tell whether the source was accurately reporting Peukestas' thoughts or simply inferring them from his actions, as Roisman suggests.[25]

This passage must be read in light of Peukestas' characterisation throughout Diodorus' narrative. Peukestas, as emphasised above, would later desert Eumenes after the

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[23] Roisman (2010) 135.

[24] On Diodorus compression of his sources see Simpson (1959); Meeus (2013).

[25] Roisman (2010) 137.

Battle of Gabiene. His loyalty to Eumenes throughout the year 317 was continually in doubt. Therefore the motives given to Peukestas at this point in the text, whether authentically Peukestas' or not, are plausible within the wider narrative; they further his image as an unreliable and untrustworthy ally and they foreshadow his eventual betrayal of Eumenes after the Battle of Gabiene. By using embedded focalisation to present Peukestas' motives, the author (Diodorus or his source) attempts to understand his actions—his delay in sending troops—by understanding his thought processes. Peukestas' later desertion of Eumenes perhaps conditioned his depiction in Diodorus' source.

If the description of Peukestas' thoughts was influenced by his later desertion of Eumenes, then this suggests that implied motive played an important role in both Diodorus' and his source's narratives. By representing Peukestas as someone who thinks of himself first, delays obeying orders, and considers desertion, the historian is telling us that he is an untrustworthy character who may later betray Eumenes in order to pursue his own interests. By describing an actor's thoughts and motives, the historian reveals his character and elucidates the logic behind his actions. Repeatedly employed over a detailed narrative, this allows the reader to learn the personalities of the protagonists and use this knowledge to anticipate their actions. By analysing an actor's motives, the historian is giving the reader the tools to predict that actor's response to events; he is also offering genuine historical analysis by analysing events and inferring motives. Furthermore, he is creating an engaging and thought-provoking narrative that draws the reader into, and makes him a part of, the machinations of Alexander's successors, forcing him to consider issues of loyalty and deceit and, by analysing the relationship between thoughts and actions, form his own opinions on historical causation.

3. Peithon

Many scholars have also identified the presentation of Peithon son of Krateuas as hostile.[26] As with Peukestas, Diodorus' description of Peithon's ambitions and motives allows the reader to learn his character, anticipate his actions, and understand the role of human agency in history. It also reflects Diodorus' own interests in the vicissitudes of fortune and the ways in which hybris and excessive ambition lead to defeat and even death.[27] Cicero's statement (*Fam.* 5.12.4) that 'nothing tends more to the reader's enjoyment than varieties of circumstance and vicissitudes of fortune' (*temporum varietates fortunaeque vicissitudines*) suggests that these themes were commonplace in ancient historiography. Naturally, then, the narrative of Peithon's repeatedly thwarted ambitions appealed to Diodorus and was preserved by him because it reflected his interest in reversals of fortune and allowed him to focus on Peithon's deceitful and hybristic actions in the Upper Satrapies as a prelude to his later downfall under Antigonos. It is tempting to follow Roisman and ascribe this narrative directly to Hieronymos, but the fact that Diodorus preserved this depiction of Peithon argues for its relevance within the *Bibliotheke*'s own moral-didactic programme.

When the question of the regency was debated in Babylon after Alexander's death, Peithon son of Krateuas, one of Alexander's bodyguards (Arr. *An.* 6.28.4; Diod. 18.7.3), opposed the kingship of Philip Arrhidaios, Alexander's half-brother, and proposed instead that Perdikkas and Leonnatos be made joint guardians of Alexander IV while Antipatros and Krateros act as governors of Europe (Curt. 10.7.4–5, 8–9; Just. *Epit.* 13.2.14). This placed Peithon, for the time being, in Perdikkas' camp. He was awarded the satrapy of Media and charged with quelling the rebellion of

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[26] Holt (1988) 90 n. 12; Anson (2004) 240 n. 27; Landucci Gattinoni (2008) 52.

[27] For examples of these themes in the *Bibliotheke*, specifically Books XVIII–XX, see Meeus (2009a) 23–6; id. (2013) 86–7.

the Greek settlers from the Upper Satrapies.[28] Peithon was given 3,000 Macedonian infantry and 800 cavalry as well as letters for the satraps ordering them to furnish him with 10,000 foot and 8,000 horse. Diodorus describes the preparations for the suppression of the revolt. His account is notable for dwelling at length on Peithon's motives and Perdikkas' suspicions (18.7.3–5):

Περδίκκας δὲ πυθόμενος τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπόστασιν ἐκλήρωσεν ἐκ τῶν Μακεδόνων πεζοὺς μὲν τρισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ ὀκτακοσίους. τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἑλόμενος στρατηγὸν Πίθωνα τὸν σωματοφύλακα μὲν Ἀλεξάνδρου γεγονότα, φρονήματος δὲ πλήρη καὶ δυνάμενον στρατη-γεῖν παρέδωκε τούτῳ τοὺς ἀποκληρωθέντας. δοὺς δ' αὐτῷ πρὸς τοὺς σατράπας ἐπιστολάς, ἐν αἷς γεγραμμένον ἦν στρατιώτας δοῦναι τῷ Πίθωνι μυρίους μὲν πεζούς, ἱππεῖς δὲ ὀκτακισχιλίους, ἐξαπέστειλεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀποστάντας. ὁ δὲ Πίθων μεγαλεπίβολος ὢν ἀσμένως ὑπήκουσεν εἰς τὴν στρατείαν, διανοούμενος τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας ταῖς φιλαν-θρωπίαις προσάγεσθαι, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν τῇ τούτων συμ-μαχίᾳ μεγάλην ποιήσας ἰδιοπραγεῖν καὶ τῶν ἄνω σατρα-πειῶν δυναστεύειν. ὁ δὲ Περδίκκας ὑφορώμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν διεκελεύσατο καταπολεμήσαντα τοὺς ἀφ-εστηκότας ἅπαντας ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὰ λάφυρα διαδοῦναι τοῖς στρατιώταις.

When Perdikkas heard of the revolt of the Greeks, he drew by lot from the Macedonians 3,000 infantry and 800 horsemen. As commander of the whole he selected Peithon, who had been of the Bodyguard of Alexander, a man full of spirit and able to command, and assigned to him the troops that had been drawn. After giving

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[28] For Peithon, see Berve (1926) 311 no. 621; Heckel (1992) 276–9; id. (2006) 195–6 s.v. 'Peithon [3]'. On his role in the settlement at Babylon in 323, see Meeus (2008) 71. On his role in the revolt of the Upper Satrapies in 323, see most recently Kochelenko (1972); Schober (1981) 27–37; Fraser (1996) 193–5; Iliakis (2013) 190–4. Walsh (2009) argues for a sophisticated ring composition in Diodorus' narrative of the Lamian War and the revolt of the Upper Satrapies.

him letters for the satraps, in which it was written that they should furnish Peithon 10,000 footmen and 8,000 horsemen, he sent him against the rebels. Peithon, who was a man of great ambition, gladly accepted the expedition, intending to win the Greeks over through kindness, and, after making his army great through an alliance with them, to work in his own interests and become the ruler of the upper satrapies. But Perdikkas, suspecting his design, gave him definite orders to kill all the rebels when he had subdued them, and to distribute the spoils to the soldiers.

As primary narrator-focaliser the author is omnipresent. He knows and records his character's thoughts and motives, simultaneously presenting the intentions of multiple characters with overlapping narratives. Tension arises not just from the elaboration of motives and intentions, but from their deliberate and explicit contrast. Peithon's character is revealed by the author ('full of spirit and able to command … a man of great ambition') who then, in turn, elaborates the thoughts of both Peithon and Perdikkas, each of whom is planning to deceive the other: Peithon's deception is anticipated by Perdikkas, who, unknown to Peithon, takes measures to forestall it.

Before the narrative of Peithon's actions has even begun he is presented as ambitious and duplicitous and the reader is told to suspect his intentions, as Perdikkas already does. Once again, as with Diodorus' description of Peukestas' recruitment of 10,000 Persian archers, an individual's deceitful motives are highlighted in advance of the narrative of his actions in order to present him as dishonest and prefigure his impending desertion or rebellion. As a result, we know in advance that Peithon is going to betray Perdikkas, but that Perdikkas has foreseen this and taken steps to prevent it. By applying a model of rational explanation, the historian has shown us how, by under-standing both Peithon and Perdikkas' characters, we can anticipate how events will unfold. This technique also en-gages the reader by building the suspense over whether or

not Peithon's deception will succeed. A simple narrative of thwarted ambitions becomes an engaging exposition of deception and counter-deception.

Diodorus' account of Peithon's motives may work on another level. As with Peukestas' uncertainty over the provision of bowmen, the focus on motives and intentions works in tandem with the narrative and causes the reader to re-evaluate the historian's account of events. Diodorus continues (18.7.5–9):

ὁ δὲ Πίθων ἀναζεύξας μετὰ τῶν δεδομένων αὐτῷ στρατιωτῶν καὶ παρὰ τῶν σατραπῶν προσλαβόμενος τοὺς συμμάχους ἧκεν μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀφεστηκότας. διὰ δέ τινος Αἰνιᾶνος διαφθείρας Λητό-δωρον, ἐπὶ τρισχιλίων στρατιωτῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀποστάταις τεταγμένον, τοῖς ὅλοις προετέρησε. γινομένης γὰρ τῆς παρατάξεως καὶ τῆς νίκης ἀμφιδοξουμένης ὁ προδότης ἐγκαταλιπὼν τοὺς συμμάχους ἀλόγως ἀπῆλθεν ἐπί τινα λόφον, ἔχων τρισχιλίους. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι δόξαντες τούτους πρὸς φυγὴν ὡρμηκέναι διεταράχθησαν καὶ τραπέντες ἔφυγον. ὁ δὲ Πίθων νικήσας τῇ μάχῃ διεκηρύξατο πρὸς τοὺς ἡττημένους, κελεύων τὰ μὲν ὅπλα καταθέσθαι, αὐτοὺς δὲ τὰ πιστὰ λαβόντας ἐπὶ τὰς ἰδίας κατοικίας ἀναχωρῆσαι. γενομένων δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅρκων καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀναμιχθέντων τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ὁ μὲν Πίθων περιχαρὴς ἦν, κατὰ νοῦν αὐτῷ προχωρούντων τῶν πραγμάτων, οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες μνησθέντες μὲν τῆς τοῦ Περδίκκου παραγγελίας, οὐδὲν δὲ φροντίσαντες τῶν γεγενημένων ὅρκων παρεσπόνδησαν τοὺς Ἕλληνας. ἀπροσδοκήτως γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐπιθέμενοι καὶ λαβόντες ἀφυλάκτους ἅπαντας κατηκόντισαν καὶ τὰ χρήματα διήρπασαν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πίθων διαψευσθεὶς τῶν ἐλπίδων ἀπῆλθε μετὰ τῶν Μακεδόνων πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκαν.

Peithon, setting out with the troops that had been given to him and taking the allies from the satraps, came upon the rebels with all his forces. Through the agency of a certain Ainianian he corrupted Letodoros, who had been made a commander of 3,000 among the

rebels, and won a complete victory. For when the battle was begun and the victory was doubtful, the traitor left his allies without warning and withdrew to a certain hill, taking his 3,000 men. The rest, believing that these were bent on flight, were thrown into confusion, turned about, and fled. Peithon, being victorious in the battle, sent a herald to the conquered, ordering them to lay down their arms and to return to their several colonies after receiving pledges. When oaths to this effect had been sworn and the Greeks were interspersed among the Macedonians, Peithon was greatly pleased, seeing that the affair was progressing according to his intentions; but the Macedonians, remembering the orders of Perdikkas and having no regard for the oaths that had been sworn, broke faith with the Greeks. Setting upon them unexpectedly and catching them off their guard, they shot them all down with javelins and seized their possessions as plunder. Peithon then, cheated of his hopes, came back with the Macedonians to Perdikkas.

This passage presents numerous embedded focalisations: the Greeks ('believing that these were bent on flight'), Peithon ('Peithon was greatly pleased, seeing that the affair was progressing according to his intentions'), and the Macedonians ('remembering the orders of Perdikkas and having no regard for the oaths that had been sworn'). The use of different perspectives, besides showing the author's continued omnipresence, builds tension and plays with the reader's expectations—will Peithon or Perdikkas be successful?—while also developing an overarching narrative of deceit and deception.

Peithon's ambitions initially go according to plan. Leaving Babylon in December 323,[29] he used his contacts in the Greek army to turn Letodoros who, with 3,000 troops, deserted the battlefield and handed victory to Peithon. The Macedonian troops, however, remembered Perdikkas'

[29] On the date, see Sachs and Hunger (1988) no. 322; Bosworth (2002) 61; Walsh (2009) 79; Yardley et al. (2011) 123.

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orders and killed the surrendering Greeks. Perdikkas had
anticipated Peithon's intentions and his plan to thwart them
had been successful. Cheated of his hopes, Peithon returned
to Perdikkas. Both the historical narrative and the
prefiguring description of Peithon's ulterior motives work
together to create an image of intended but unfulfilled
deceit. Indeed, the description of Peithon's motives at
18.7.3–5 conditions our reading of the narrative itself,
forcing us to expect and assume Peithon's guilt at 18.7.5–9.

A different reading may be possible if we focus just on
the historical narrative. What actually happened? Peithon
defeated the Greek army through a ruse, swore an oath
with them causing them to be disarmed and interspersed
among the Macedonian troops, massacred the rebels, and
returned to Perdikkas in Babylon. When we compare this
with Perdikkas' orders to Peithon—to defeat and massacre
the Greeks—we find that he has fulfilled these orders to the
letter. Peithon's deceit is only apparent in the author's
description of his ulterior motives. In action he completes
his orders and returns to Perdikkas; in intention, however,
we see this as a failed rebellion.[30]

This is not to argue that Peithon did not plan to betray
Perdikkas and rule the Upper Satrapies. He may well have
intended to do so, and his later actions suggest as much (see
below). My point is simply that within the context of
Diodorus' narrative Peithon's duplicity only becomes
apparent through the historian's description of his motives.
In the end, both Peithon and Peukestas fulfil their orders.
Their planned deceit is just the historian's inference, but the
focus on their motives characterises each individual as
untrustworthy, both prefiguring and explaining their later
betrayals and downfalls. Peithon may indeed have planned
to betray Perdikkas and rule the Upper Satrapies, but the
relationship between historical narrative and ulterior motive
calls for a more sensitive and nuanced reading of Diodorus'
account than it has frequently been given.

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[30] Waterfield (2011) 31 has argued that Peithon's actions were not
rebellious—he simply dismissed the Greeks back to their colonies—but
that later propaganda turned this into a bid for power.

Deception is the major theme not just of Diodorus' characterisation of Peithon, but of his account of the revolt of the Upper Satrapies. Peithon is representative of a wider, more pervasive trend whereby every individual or group involved in the revolt of the Upper Satrapies is untrustworthy. Peithon intends to betray Perdikkas and rule the Upper Satrapies. Perdikkas anticipates this and devises his own ruse to prevent it. Peithon has secret contacts within the Greek army and contacts 'a certain Ainianian' who in turn corrupts Letodoros who, with his troops, abandons the Greek army to the Macedonians. The Macedonian troops in turn break their oaths with the Greeks and massacre those who have surrendered to them. No one is trustworthy and everyone has ulterior motives and hidden agendas. The depiction of Peithon must be read as part of this larger sequence of events. By elucidating Peithon's ulterior motives, and describing the failure of his planned revolt, the historian focalises his narrative of ulterior motives, hidden agendas, and failed revolts through the character of Peithon, who becomes the centrepiece of this wider narrative of deception and deceit. In doing so, the historian engages the reader, through an entertaining narrative of hidden agendas and unfulfilled expectations, to consider the role of deceit and individualism in the wars of Alexander's Successors.

The passage as we have it in Diodorus, though 'ampio e articolato',[31] is a condensed and reworked version of what he found in his source. Consequently, we should be cautious when ascribing the use of motives and intentions directly and unhesitatingly to his source. As it stands, there are features that suggest compression. The commander of the Greek army is Philon the Ainianian, while Peithon used 'a certain Ainianian' to corrupt Letodoros, himself perhaps also Ainianian, though Diodorus does not specify his ethnicity.[32] We may have here an instance of personal or

[31] Landucci Gattinoni (2008) 49.

[32] On Philon, see Heckel (2006) 215–16, s.v. 'Philon [2]'. Yardley et al. (2011) 122 state, without discussion, that Letodoros was Ainianian. Heckel (2006) 151 is more cautious. The name itself does not provide a

national hostility between two or more Ainianians within the Greek alliance, perhaps more fully elaborated in Diodorus' source.[33] Peithon's actions after the battle are also perhaps unusual. Diodorus records that he made an oath with the defeated Greeks allowing them to return to their colonies, which would appear to be contrary to his apparent plan to recruit the Greeks into his own army. Furthermore, it is not at all clear who the Greeks executed by the Macedonians were. Diodorus implies that the entire Greek army of 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry was killed (ἀφυλάκτους ἅπαντας κατηκόντισαν, 18.7.9) and most scholars have accepted this, but the numbers involved seem implausible.[34] Holt suggested that only the 3,000 with Letodoros were killed, though Heckel maintains that Letodoros and his troops would have been rewarded.[35] Heckel further argued that only the prisoners were executed (though I am unsure why they would then have been intermingled with the Macedonians in a way that pleased Peithon).[36] Tarn and Welles make the interesting suggestion that Diodorus has confused the revolts of 326/5 and 323/2

definite answer. The manuscripts preserve 'Leipodoros' (F) and 'Lipodoros' (R) and most scholars emend this (though Goukowsky (1978) 14 retains 'Leipodoros' in the Budé edition), with Dindorf (1868) 512 proposing 'Nikodoros' and Niese (1893) 199 n. 4 suggesting either 'Diodoros' or 'Asklepiodoros'. 'Letodoros', suggested by Dittenberger (1896), is rare. Thirteen entries are recorded in the *LGPN* for Λητόδωρος, from Rhodes (9), the Black Sea (2), Thrace (1), and Cyprus (1). The 'Leto-' stem relates, most likely, not to the Homeric Leto of Delos but to the local Leto of south-western Asia Minor, recently illuminated by the remarkable dossier recording the Kytinian embassy to Xanthos in the late third century (*SEG* XXXVIII 1476; Parker (2000) 71). 'Letodoros' is also attested in a 3rd-century graffito from Egypt, with no indication of the bearer's origins (Perdrizet and Lefebvre (1919) 364).

[33] The Ainianians also sided with Athens during the Lamian War (Diod. 18.11.1). National tensions were earlier apparent during the first revolt of the Upper Satrapies in 326/5 between Athenodoros and Biton who were of the same nationality but hostile to each other (Curt. 9.7.3–4).

[34] Griffith (1935) 36–7; Goukowsky (1976) 257; Walbank (1982) 44–5; Fraser (1996) 194; Widemann (2009) 39; Romm (2011) 108–9.

[35] Holt (1988) 88–91; Heckel (2006) 151.

[36] Heckel (2006) 216.

and that the 3,000 he claims were killed in 326/5 (17.99.6) are actually the 3,000 under Letodoros executed in 323/2.[37] In short, while Diodorus' account is clear in its general narrative it seems abridged in certain details, due no doubt to his process of compression. His description of Peithon's motives and the deceitful actions of the other protagonists would also presumably have been more fully elaborated in his source.

As Peithon's implied motives must be understood in the context of Diodorus' narrative of duplicity within the revolt of 323/2, so too must his actions be understood in relation to his depiction throughout Books XVIII–XIX. Again we need to bear in mind that we are dealing with Diodorus' portrayal of Peithon, not his source's. We do not know what Diodorus left out of his source's fuller account. In the *Bibliotheke*, Peithon continually, though not exclusively, appears in connection with the Upper Satrapies. He quells the revolt of 323/2 and looks to govern the area himself (Diod. 18.4.8, 7.3–9). In 319/8 he expels the satrap of Parthia, Philotas (Philip?), and assumes the title 'General of the Upper Satrapies' (19.14.1).[38] Finally, in spring 316 he is executed by Antigonos who deceived him (for a second time, after Perdikkas) by promising to make him General of the Upper Satrapies (19.46.1–4; Polyaen. 4.6.14).[39] Peithon is

[37] Welles (1963) 405 n. 5; Tarn (1984) 72; Hammond (1983) 65–6; cf. Goukowsky (1976) 257.

[38] Most scholars agree that Diodorus confused Philip, who had been awarded Parthia in 320 (Diod. 18.39.6; Arr. *Succ.* 1.35) with Philotas: see Wheatley (1997) 62; Billows (1990) 90 n. 17; Heckel (2006) 214; Meeus (2009a) 117–18, for an overview of the scholarship. Alternatively, the satrap may have changed between 320 and 318 (Schäfer (2002) 159; Bosworth (2002) 105–6 with n. 32). Peithon likely assumed the title 'General of the Upper Satrapies' in 319/8 (Bengtson (1937) 179–80; Schober (1981) 74–8; Billows (1990) 90 n. 16; Meeus (2009a) 117). Yardley et al. (2011) 122 plausibly suggest that he revived the title he had held in 323/2.

[39] Bosworth (2002) 160–2 argues that Peithon did not plan a revolt. He suggests that the historian assumed this based on Peithon's actions. On Diodorus' account of Peithon's downfall and death, see Meeus (2009a) 239–41.

routinely presented as ambitious and scheming, a characterisation that, in its vocabulary at least, might be Diodorus' own.[40] His ambitions regarding the Upper Satrapies are a key feature of his presentation throughout Books XVIII and XIX and they lend a sense of dramatic irony to his eventual death.

Once Antigonos decides to do away with Peithon we have reached the climax of his story in the *Bibliotheke*. His characterisation, established through his suppression of the revolt of 323/2 and his attempted usurpation of power in 319/8, means that the reader can guess in advance that Antigonos' ruse will work. Peithon is untrustworthy and has twice tried to gain control of the Upper Satrapies; his ambitious and duplicitous nature means that he will try again. The reader can therefore expect that Peithon's repeatedly unsuccessful ambitions will be his downfall. Antigonos distrusts Peithon but he hides his intentions (τὴν μὲν ἰδίαν προαίρεσιν ἐπεκρύψατο, 19.46.1), claiming instead that he wishes to make him 'General of the Upper Satrapies'. The ruse works. Peithon meets with Antigonos who prosecutes him before his council and has him killed.

Without prior knowledge of events, the reader cannot tell whether Antigonos' plan will work or not, much as he did not know whether Perdikkas' earlier plan would, but because Diodorus has described Peithon's twice-frustrated ambitions towards the Upper Satrapies the reader knows, as Antigonos does himself, that Peithon will not be able to resist the offer of command. The continued focus on Peithon's ambitions means that the reader can anticipate the outcome by understanding Peithon's motivations. As

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[40] φρονήματος δὲ πλήρη … μεγαλεπίβολος (18.7.3–5); ὄντος τοῦ Πίθωνος κινητικοῦ καὶ μεγάλα ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς περιβαλομένου (19.14.2); Πίθωνα πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν τῇ χειμασίᾳ στρατιωτῶν ἐπαγγελίαις καὶ δωρεαῖς ἰδίους κατασκευάζειν καὶ διανοεῖσθαι νεωτερίζειν, τὴν μὲν ἰδίαν προαίρεσιν (19.46.1); cf. Polyaen. *Strat.* 4.6.14. Peithon was also one of the leading members of the revolt against Perdikkas in 321 (18.36.5). Meeus (2009a) 119 points out that some of the terms used to describe Peithon, such as μεγαλεπίβολος, appear elsewhere in the *Bibliotheke* (2.7.2; 15.66.1) and so might be Diodorus' own.

with Diodorus' depiction of Peukestas, the elucidation of Peithon's ambitions towards the Upper Satrapies allows the reader to learn how he thinks and how he will act. The account of Peithon's actions in 323/2 means that the reader can anticipate his actions in 319/8 and his eventual downfall in spring 316. Peithon may have been ambitious, but these ambitions were obvious and clearly anticipated by both Perdikkas and Antigonos, who, like the reader, understood Peithon's character and were able to take measures to forestall him.

It is difficult to assess the purposes of this depiction. On one level, the focus on implied motive shows the historian employing a model of rational explanation to reveal how the historical actor perceives the situation, what the consequences of his actions might be, and what his aims and motivations are. This focus on aims and motivations nuances the reader's understanding of the narrative and allows him to see how events are conditioned by the personality of the historical actor. Furthermore, this gives the reader the means to anticipate the consequences of events and understand how and why individuals act in the way they do. The reader learns that Peukestas will desert Eumenes and that Peithon will fall for Antigonos' plan. By focalising the revolt of the Upper Satrapies in 323/2 through Peithon, the historian presents and examines wider issues of revolt, deception, individualism, and the breakdown in centralised authority through the failed ambitions of an individual character. The author uses embedded focalisation to elaborate the plans and deceptions of Perdikkas, the Greeks, and the Macedonians, a technique that contributes to the moral-didactic elements of Diodorus' history, namely the claim that individuals who act in a hybristic manner will be punished and cannot escape their fate (1.1–2.4). The focus on intentions, motives, and characterisation serves multiple functions within Diodorus' narrative.

4. Polyperchon and Alexandros

The focus on motives and intentions can also be used to present an overtly negative image of an individual, as can be seen in the case of Polyperchon and his son Alexandros. In this instance Diodorus' description of the ulterior motives behind Polyperchon's claim to liberate the Greeks in late 319 helps create an explicitly negative image of the Successor and his son. That this image appears in both Diodorus and Plutarch implies a common source.[41]

After the death of Antipatros in autumn 319, Polyperchon was appointed regent of the kings Philip-Arrhidaios and Alexander IV. Antipatros' son Kassandros, appointed chiliarch but upset at not succeeding his father to the regency, plotted war against Polyperchon.[42] Fearing Kassandros' influence over the garrisons and oligarchies installed throughout Greece by Antipatros after the Lamian War, Polyperchon decided to free the Greek cities and remove Antipatros' oligarchies (Diod. 18.55.3):

> ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν, τὰς δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ὀλιγαρχίας καθεσταμένας ὑπ' Ἀντιπάτρου καταλύειν· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα τὸν μὲν Κάσανδρον ταπεινώσειν, ἑαυτοῖς δὲ μεγάλην δόξαν καὶ πολλὰς συμμαχίας ἀξιολόγους περιποιήσειν.

> It was decided to free the cities throughout Greece and to overthrow the oligarchies established in them by Antipatros; for in this way they would best decrease the influence of Kassandros and also win for themselves great glory and many considerable allies.

Polyperchon drafted, under the name of Philip Arrhidaios, an Edict that drew attention to the benefactions (*euergesiai*) given to the Greeks by the Macedonian kings and the

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[41] On the negative image of Polyperchon in the historical tradition, see Heckel (1978) and (2007).

[42] On the chiliarchy under Alexander and his successors, see the series of articles by Collins (2001) and (2012), and Meeus (2009b).

goodwill (*eunoia*) Philip Arrhidaios still maintained for them. Further, he claimed to restore the Greeks to the freedom and democracy they held under Philip and Alexander (Diod. 18.56).[43] Polyperchon's claim to liberate the Greeks offered something to both parties. He would win the 'great glory and many considerable allies' required for his war against Kassandros, while the Greek cities would regain the freedom and democracy they had lost after the Lamian War. Diodorus' narrative confirms the widespread popularity of Polyperchon's action (18.57, 64–9). Having published his Edict, Polyperchon wrote immediately to the Greek cities (18.57.1):

> ἔγραψεν ὁ Πολυπέρχων πρός τε τὴν Ἀργείων πόλιν καὶ τὰς λοιπάς, προστάττων τοὺς ἀφηγησαμένους ἐπ' Ἀντιπάτρου τῶν πολιτευμάτων φυγαδεῦσαι, τινῶν δὲ καὶ θάνατον καταγνῶναι καὶ δημεῦσαι τὰς οὐσίας, ὅπως ταπεινωθέντες εἰς τέλος μηδὲν ἰσχύσωσι συνεργεῖν Κασάνδρῳ.

> Polyperchon wrote to Argos and the other cities, ordering them to exile those who had been leaders of the governments in the time of Antipatros—even to condemn certain of them to death and to confiscate their property—in order that these men, completely stripped of power, might be unable to co-operate with Kassandros in any way.

Diodorus records that there was a popular movement to Polyperchon's side throughout Greece, especially in Athens and the Peloponnese (18.64–9). After leaving an army in Attica under his son Alexandros with orders to besiege Kassandros' garrison in Piraeus, Polyperchon moved into the Peloponnese. He wrote a second time to the Greek cities (18.69.3–4):

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[43] On Polyperchon's Edict, see Poddighe (1998) and (2013); Wallace (2014a).

ἐξέπεμψε[44] δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς πόλεις πρεσβευτάς,
προστάττων τοὺς μὲν δι' Ἀντιπάτρου καθεσταμένους
ἄρχοντας ἐπὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας θανατῶσαι, τοῖς δὲ δήμοις
ἀποδοῦναι τὴν αὐτονομίαν. πολλῶν δ' ὑπακουσάντων καὶ
κατὰ τὰς πόλεις φόνων γινομένων καί τινων φυγαδευ-
ομένων οἱ μὲν Ἀντιπάτρου φίλοι διεφθάρησαν, τὰ δὲ
πολιτεύματα τὴν ἐκ τῆς αὐτονομίας παρρησίαν ἀπέλαβον
καὶ συνεμάχουν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πολυπέρχοντα.

Polyperchon also sent envoys to the cities, ordering that
those who through Antipatros' influence had been
made magistrates in the oligarchical governments
should be put to death and that the people should be
given back their autonomy. Many in fact obeyed him,
there were massacres throughout the cities, and some
were driven into exile; the friends of Antipatros were
destroyed, and the governments, recovering the
freedom of action that came with autonomy, began to
form alliances with Polyperchon.

Polyperchon's claims to liberate the Greeks won him
widespread support throughout Greece, but his ineffective
sieges of Piraeus and Megalopolis (18.68–72.1),[45] coupled
with Antigonos' defeat of his general Kleitos, cost him
dearly.[46] By spring 317 Polyperchon was seen as slow and
ineffective and the goodwill and support he had earned in
Greece and Macedon was slipping away.[47] Diodorus' nar-
rative contrasts the private, ulterior aspect of Polyperchon's
intentions with Athens' open, public perception of them.
Although Polyperchon's actions are initially popular and
win him widespread support throughout Greece, Diodorus

[44] Rosen (1967) 68–9 argues for a pluperfect meaning here and
suggests that the letters sent at 18.69.3–4 are simply duplications of those
sent at 18.57.1.

[45] Heckel (1992) 197 n. 134 connects Polyaen. *Strat.* 4.14 with this
campaign.

[46] See also, Polyaen. *Strat.* 4.6.8; Engel (1973); Landucci Gattinoni
(2008) 264–7.

[47] Wallace (2014a) 622–3.

repeatedly undermines this by stressing that his intentions were deceitful and self-centred. Diodorus' account of Phokion's trial and Polyperchon's campaign into Attica is worthy of note (18.64–9). Polyperchon and his son Alexandros are singled out for particular criticism and on two separate occasions Diodorus describes in detail the ulterior motives that underline their actions. The first example is when Alexandros arrives in Attica in spring 318 (18.65.3):

> ἧκεν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Πολυπέρχοντος υἱὸς μετὰ δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι διέλαβον αὐτὸν ἥκειν ἀποκαταστήσοντα τῷ δήμῳ τήν τε Μουνυχίαν καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς οὐχ οὕτως εἶχεν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ παραληψόμενος ἀμφότερα πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ χρείας.

> Alexandros the son of Polyperchon arrived in Attica with an army. The Athenians, indeed, believed that he had come to give back Munychia and the Piraeus to the people; this, however, was not the truth, but on the contrary he had come from interested motives to take both of them himself for use in the war.[48]

As with his description of Peithon's suppression of the revolt of the Upper Satrapies in 323/2, the author as primary narrator-focaliser again employs multiple perspectives to stress tension and the gulf between expectations and reality. The Athenians expect Alexandros to act in a certain way, but his intentions are otherwise. This heightens the tension in advance of the narrative of Alexandros' actions by causing the reader to wonder how these contrary expectations will play out.

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[48] Plutarch (*Phoc.* 33.1) preserves a similar account: '[Alexandros'] ostensible design was to bring aid to the citizens against Nikanor, but he really wished to seize the city, if he could, now that she was ruinously divided against herself' (λόγῳ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν Νικάνορα τοῖς ἐν ἄστει βοηθήσων, ἔργῳ δὲ τὴν πόλιν εἰ δύναιτο καταληψόμενος, αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ περιπετῆ γενομένην).

The ulterior motive that Diodorus ascribes to Alexandros is used to present his actions negatively. It is plausible within Diodorus' narrative as he had earlier made clear that Polyperchon's claim to liberate the Greeks was not entirely altruistic. The claim to liberate the Greeks would give Polyperchon glory and loyal allies just as the Greek cities would win their freedom from Kassandros' garrisons and oligarchies. The ulterior motives ascribed to Alexandros, however, do not simply cause us to doubt the absolute magnanimity of his actions—if the actions of any of Alexander's Successors were completely magnanimous—but also present him as disloyal to his father's word and intent on deceiving the Athenians.[49] The deceitful image of Alexandros prefigures that of Polyperchon. The doubts concerning Alexandros' aims and his apparent intention to deceive the Athenians act as warnings to both the Athenians and the reader of his father Polyperchon's intentions. Alexandros' campaign into Attica sets the scene for his father's later arrival in more ways than one.

By the time Polyperchon arrives in Athens both the Athenians and the reader suspect his intentions, and there is little expectation that he will fulfil the promises of his Edict. However, Polyperchon initially appears true to his word. Whereas Alexandros had welcomed the exiled oligarchs and sent them to Polyperchon with favourable letters, Polyperchon sides with the democrats (Diod. 18.66.1–2). At Pharygai, in Phokis, he adjudicated between the embassies of Phokion and the Athenian *demos* concerning the return of Munychia. Phokion called on Polyperchon to hold Munychia for himself, while the *demos*, led by Hagnonides (Plut. *Phoc.* 33), requested him to return it to Athens, in accordance with the autonomy guaranteed in the Edict.[50] Diodorus' account of Polyperchon's thought process is worth quoting in full (18.66.2–3).

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[49] Alexandros apparently held meetings with Nikanor, the commander of Kassandros' garrison in Piraeus, to which the Athenians were not invited (Diod. 18.65.5; Plut. *Phoc.* 33.3). The purpose of these meetings is unknown.

[50] On these events, see Wallace (2014a) 609–18.

Πολυπέρχων ἔσπευδε μὲν φρουρᾷ κατέχειν τὸν Πειραιᾶ διὰ τὸ πολλὰ δύνασθαι χρησιμεύειν τὸν λιμένα πρὸς τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις χρείας· αἰσχυνόμενος δ’ ἐναντία πράττειν τῷ ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ γεγραμμένῳ διαγράμματι καὶ νομίζων ἄπιστος κριθήσεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἐὰν εἰς τὴν ἐπιφανεστάτην παρανομήσῃ πόλιν, μετενόησε τῇ γνώμῃ. διακούσας δὲ τῶν πρέσβεων τοῖς μὲν παρὰ τοῦ δήμου πρεσβεύουσι φιλανθρώπως κεχαρισμένας ἔδωκεν ἀποκρίσεις, τοὺς δὲ περὶ Φωκίωνα συλλαβὼν ἀπέστειλε δεσμίους εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας, διδοὺς τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῷ δήμῳ εἴτε βούλεται θανατοῦν εἴτ’ ἀπολῦσαι τῶν ἐγκλημάτων.

Now Polyperchon was eager to occupy the Piraeus with a garrison because the port could be of great service to him in meeting the needs of the wars; but since he was ashamed of acting contrary to the edict that he himself had issued, believing that he would be held faithless among the Greeks if he broke his word to the most famous city, he changed his purpose. When he heard the embassies, he gave gracious responses in a kind manner to the one sent by the people, but he arrested Phokion and his companions, granting the people the authority to put them to death or to dismiss the charges as they pleased.

Polyperchon's actions follow his declarations in his Edict. He supports the democracy, grants it the authority to prosecute the oligarchs, and besieges Kassandros' garrison in Piraeus. However, the author undermines these positive actions by claiming that Polyperchon originally intended to deceive the Athenians and take control of Piraeus but only changed his mind because of selfish concerns for his reputation and the success of his campaign.[51] This passage

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[51] Plutarch (*Phoc.* 32.2) ascribes the same intention to Polyperchon, though without Diodorus' analysis of his internal thought process: 'Polyperchon was scheming (as he plainly showed a little later) to dispose the city in his own interests, and had no hope of succeeding unless Phokion was banished' (συσκευαζόμενος γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτόν, ὡς μικρὸν

undermines Polyperchon by presenting as selfish and deceitful that which was apparently the fulfilment of his promise to reinstate the *demos*, support its freedom, and restore the Piraeus to Athens. Positive action is undermined by negative intentions. The preceding passage concerning Alexandros functions in a similar way and the presence of both so close together—although we cannot be sure that they were as close in Diodorus' source—betrays a strongly negative interpretation of not only Polyperchon's campaign, but of the intentions and character of both himself and his son.

A source close to the events of the years in question, such as Hieronymos, might have assumed that Polyperchon intended to remove Kassandros' garrison from Piraeus and fortify the site for his own use in the war, but the description of Polyperchon's changing thought processes must remain the historian's own interpretation and it likely belongs to Diodorus' source (below, §6).[52] As such, it serves a distinctive and important role in the work. As in the cases of Peukestas and Peithon, it shows the author once again applying the model of rational behaviour to describe, in this instance, the aims and motives of the actor and his perception of and response to events. The author is offering the reader his interpretation of his characters' thoughts and motives. He is showing the reader how the events of his history are dependent on the thoughts, decisions, and actions of his historical actors and how their characters and personalities influence the events of history.

5. Truth and Perception

Diodorus makes it clear that there is a gap between what the Athenians assumed Alexandros' and Polyperchon's intentions to be and what they actually were. The discrep-

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ὕστερον ἔδειξε τοῖς ἔργοις, ὁ Πολυπέρχων τὴν πόλιν, οὐδὲν ἤλπιζε περαίνειν μὴ τοῦ Φωκίωνος ἐκπεσόντος).

[52] Dixon (2007) 163–7 has argued that Hieronymos was present in Macedon when Polyperchon's Edict was published in autumn 319.

ancy between what is alleged and what is intended recurs throughout Books XVIII–XX and is frequently expressed in terms of perceptions of the truth (ἀλήθεια).[53] For instance, when Antigonos sided with Kassandros in 319/8 (18.54.4) 'he pretended (προσποιούμενος) to be aiding him because of his own friendship for Antipatros, but in truth (τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ) it was because he wished Polyperchon to be surrounded by many great distractions.' Eumenes counsels Olympias (18.58.3) 'not to trust those who are always supposed to be guardians of the kings but were in truth (τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ) trying to transfer the kingdom to themselves.' When Antigonos decides to do away with Peithon he devises a plan 'because he wished to prevent Peithon from suspecting the truth (τῆς μὲν ἀληθοῦς ὑποψίας) and to persuade him to come within reach.' As with the afore-mentioned examples of Alexandros and Polyperchon, the historian highlights the distinction between what the actor intended and what the audience thought he intended, frequently by emphasising the actor's own thoughts.

Antigonos Monophthalmos is not treated in a uniformly positive manner by Diodorus. He is presented as an ambitious rebel, duplicitous, deceitful, aggressive, and unjust.[54] Kings were expected to be truthful, but Antigonos was happy to lie when it suited his interests.[55] However, Antig-

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[53] Further examples: 18.42.2; 19.70.2, 107.4; 20.30.2, 106.5, 113.2, cf. 20.44.2. Equally relevant, though not expressed in terms of ἀλήθεια, are 18.23.3 and 19.15.5.

[54] See, for instance, Diod. 18.41.4–5, 47.5, 50.1–5, 52.4, 54.4, 58.4; 19.48.3–4, 55.4–6, 56.2; 20.106.3; 21.1.1. Landucci-Gattinoni (1981–2) and (2008) xvi–xviii argues that such passages cannot come from Hieronymos; she suggests Duris of Samos as a source: see ead. (1997) 194–204 and (2008) xii–xxiv. Hornblower (1981) 156 sees no problem attributing anti-Antigonid sentiment to Hieronymos, in spite of Pausanias' comments regarding his partiality towards the Antigonids (*FGrHist* 154 FF 9, 15; *P. Oxy.* LXXI 1408).

[55] Diod. 19.94–96.1–2. Mendacity was not a royal virtue (Gorteman (1958) 262–5) and kings were expected to tell the truth, as Arrian famously presumed of Ptolemy in the preface to his *Anabasis*. Herodotus (1.136) records that the Persians taught their children three things: riding, archery, and truthfulness (ἱππεύειν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀληθίζεσθαι).

onos' commitment to the policy of Greek freedom between the years 315 and 302 is routinely presented in highly positive terms by Diodorus, who claims that on a number of occasions Antigonos tried to convince the Greeks of the sincerity of his actions and his commitment to fulfil his promises.[56] In this instance we see how the historian uses an individual's intentions and thoughts not to make a contrast with his actions but rather to emphasise the consistency between intention and action.

At Tyre in 315 Antigonos called for the Greeks to be 'free, autonomous, and un-garrisoned'. According to Diodorus (19.61.4), 'Antigonos believed ($\hat{v}\pi\epsilon\lambda\acute{a}\mu\beta a\nu\epsilon$) that through their hope of freedom ($\tau\grave{\eta}\nu\ \grave{\epsilon}\lambda\pi\acute{\iota}\delta a\ \tau\hat{\eta}s\ \grave{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\theta\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}as$) he would gain the Greeks as eager participants with him in the war.' Ptolemy quickly recognised the importance of this statement and similarly declared his commitment to the principle of Greek freedom, 'since he wished the Greeks to know that he was no less interested in their autonomy than was Antigonos' (19.62.1). Both successors, 'perceiving ($\acute{o}\rho\hat{\omega}\nu$-$\tau\epsilon s$) that it was a matter of no little moment to gain the goodwill ($\epsilon\check{v}\nu o\iota a\nu$) of the Greeks, rivalled the other in conferring favours ($\epsilon\grave{v}\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}as$) upon this people' (19.62.2).

In 313 Antigonos dispatched his nephew Telesphoros to Greece.[57] Diodorus again intrudes with a comment elucidating Antigonos' motives (19.74.1):

> $\tau o\hat{v}\tau o\ \gamma\grave{a}\rho\ \pi\rho\acute{a}\xi as\ \mathring{\eta}\lambda\pi\iota\zeta\epsilon\ \pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\iota\nu\ \kappa a\tau a\sigma\kappa\epsilon\upsilon\acute{a}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu\ \pi a\rho\grave{a}$
> $\tau o\hat{\iota}s\ \Xi\lambda\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\nu\ \mathring{o}\tau\iota\ \pi\rho\grave{o}s\ \grave{a}\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\epsilon\iota a\nu\ \phi\rho o\nu\tau\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\iota\ \tau\hat{\eta}s\ a\grave{v}\tau o$-
> $\nu o\mu\acute{\iota}as\ a\grave{v}\tau\hat{\omega}\nu.$

> Antigonos hoped by doing this to establish among the Greeks the belief that he truly was concerned for their autonomy.

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[56] On the importance of declarations of freedom in Antigonos' campaigns and the wars of Alexander's successors, see Wallace (2011) and (2014b).

[57] On Telesphoros' campaigns under Antigonos, see now Wallace (2014b).

Later again, when Antigonos' general Polemaios captures Chalkis, he leaves the city ungarrisoned (19.78.2):

> τοὺς Χαλκιδεῖς ἀφῆκεν ἀφρουρήτους, ὥστε γενέσθαι φανερὸν ὡς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν Ἀντίγονος ἐλευθεροῦν προῄρηται τοὺς Ἕλληνας. ἐπίκαιρος γὰρ ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις ἔχειν ὁρμητήριον πρὸς τὸ διαπολεμεῖν περὶ τῶν ὅλων.

> He left the Chalkidians without a garrison in order to make it evident that Antigonos in very truth proposed to free the Greeks, for the city is well placed for any who wish to have a base from which to carry through a war for supremacy.

Once again, the author's use of embedded focalisation forces the reader to consider events from Antigonos' standpoint and in line with his expectations. Rather than emphasise the gulf between what is claimed and what is intended, Diodorus stresses instead their unity. Klaus Rosen saw in these comments Hieronymos' unqualified praise of Antigonos.[58] Others, however, have argued that they show that Antigonos only claimed to defend Greek freedom in order to deceive the Greeks into becoming his allies.[59] Both readings are possible, but an important distinction must be drawn between principle and policy. These comments are only negative if we assume that Antigonos was committed to the principle rather than the policy of Greek freedom. Antigonos is presented as genuinely committed to a political policy that benefitted both him and the Greek cities, not altruistically enamoured of the principle behind that policy. He is only concerned with making the Greeks believe that he is committed to their freedom and he achieves this by liberating cities such as Athens and Chalkis.

A contrast with Ptolemy is also drawn. Ptolemy is presented as much less devoted in his defence of Greek

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[58] Rosen (1979) 474 with n. 73; cf. Hornblower (1981) 175–6.

[59] Meeus (2009a) 330.

freedom. When his declaration of Greek freedom at the
Isthmian Games of 308 is not met with the expected
support, he abandons the policy altogether, garrisons
Sikyon and Corinth, and returns to Egypt (20.37.1–2).[60]

ἐπεβάλετο μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις
Πτολεμαῖος ἐλευθεροῦν, μεγάλην προσθήκην ἡγούμενος
ἔσεσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις πράγμασι τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὔνοιαν·
ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι συνταξάμενοι χορηγήσειν
σῖτον καὶ χρήματα τῶν ὡμολογημένων οὐδὲν συνετέλουν,
ἀγανακτήσας ὁ δυνάστης πρὸς μὲν Κάσανδρον εἰρήνην
ἐποιήσατο, καθ' ἣν ἑκατέρους ἔδει κυριεύειν τῶν πόλεων
ὧν εἶχον, τὴν δὲ Σικυῶνα καὶ Κόρινθον ἀσφαλισάμενος
φρουρᾷ διῆρεν εἰς τὴν Αἴγυπτον.

Now Ptolemy planned to free the other Greek cities
also, thinking that the goodwill of the Greeks would be
a great gain for him in his own undertakings; but when
the Peloponnesians, having agreed to contribute food
and money, contributed nothing of what had been
promised, the dynast in anger made peace with
Kassandros, by the terms of which peace each dynast
was to remain master of the cities that he was holding;
and after securing Sicyon and Corinth with a garrison,
Ptolemy departed for Egypt.

Embedded focalisation is once more employed, here
elucidating Ptolemy's plans and his anger at their failure.
Both Antigonos and Ptolemy claim that they want to free
the Greeks and both made significant efforts to that end,
though with Ptolemy apparently following Antigonos'
example (19.62.2). But whereas Antigonos maintains his
commitment to the policy of Greek freedom in the face of
numerous setbacks, Ptolemy abandons his once events do
not go in his favour. There appears to be a contrast in
Diodorus' account, which the author elaborates through the
aforementioned embedded focalisations explaining each

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[60] See also, Suda s.v. Δημήτριος (Δ 431); Polyaen. *Strat.* 8.58; D. L. 2.115.

successor's thoughts and intentions. Antigonos is presented as genuinely concerned with making sure that the Greeks see him, as indeed many later did, as truly committed to Greek freedom;[61] Ptolemy, on the other hand, merely claims to support Greek freedom. He garrisons Corinth and Sikyon, whereas Antigonos leaves Chalkis ungarrisoned, and he forgoes his campaign to liberate the Greeks once it encounters resistance, Antigonos, on the other hand, continues his policy in the face of resistance and the revolt of two of his nephew-generals, Telesphoros and Polemaios.[62]

The author's focus on Antigonos' motives, and his use of embedded focalisation, presents Antigonos as trustworthy and committed to the policy, if not the principle, of Greek freedom. The description of Antigonos' motives adds depth to the narrative by showing his commitment to Greek freedom in both intention and action, which ensure his success in winning the goodwill of the Greeks. A contrast is drawn with Ptolemy who also sought their goodwill but abandoned his claims to defend the Greeks once he encountered difficulty. He, unlike Antigonos, is duplicitous and so he garrisons Corinth and returns to Egypt. Antigonos might also be contrasted with Polyperchon, who is also the subject of detailed embedded focalisation. Whereas Antigonos' motives are congruent with his actions, Polyperchon's are not and he plans to deceive the Athenians and seize Piraeus. Polyperchon does not intend to honour his claims. Like Ptolemy, his motives are deceitful, the historian is careful to record them, and he fails to win the goodwill of the Greeks.

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[61] Plut. *Demetr.* 8.1–3; *Phoc.* 29.1–2; *I. Manisa* 69–74 (cult of Ζεὺς Ἀντιγόνειος in Lydia, though Rigsby (1996) 169 and Şahin (2002) identify Antigonos as a cult founder, not the Hellenistic king); *cf. I. Sardis* VIII 1; Thonemann (2009) 385–9. A cult of Zeus Philippios, in honour of Philip of Macedon, existed on Eresos (*GHI* 83; Ellis-Evans (2012)).

[62] Wallace (2014b). Antigonos did, of course, have garrisons in Cilicia (Diod. 20.27.1) and Myndos (Diod. 20.37.1), the latter of which may have been installed by Dioskourides under Antigonos' orders or independently by Polemaios on his journey to Kos; see Seibert (1969) 188 n. 41; Billows (1990) 224–5. Hammond and Walbank (1988) 170 claim that it was installed by Kassandros.

6. Sources and Conclusion

The use of embedded focalisation and the emphasis on thoughts and motives in Books XVIII–XX is part of a hermeneutic approach to history whereby history as agency is manifested through the thoughts, motives, and decisions of individual historical actors. The focus on motive serves numerous functions within Diodorus' narrative. First, it emphasises characterisation as a tool of historiography. The depictions of Peithon and Polyperchon, for instance, show that an accurate understanding of the character of the individual can allow the reader to predict that person's reactions to, and influence on, historical events. Thus, Peithon's end can be anticipated because the reader, like Antigonos within the text, has learned Peithon's character and ambitions regarding the Upper Satrapies and knows that he will fall for Antigonos' trap. The reader can understand the history of the period by understanding the thoughts and motives of the individuals whose actions shaped it. Second, it highlights the importance of the distinction between what an individual said in public and what he thought in private. This serves a number of different roles. While it shows the reader the realities of power during the wars of Alexander's successors—loyalty and sincerity were sacrificed at the altar of individual expediency—it can also be used to undercut or nuance the narrative. In the cases of both Peukestas and Polyperchon the historian explains that neither intended to fulfil their promises but only did so after they realised that deception would not be in their best interests. The exposition of an actor's motives necessitates a close engagement with the text on the reader's part if he is to understand the relationship between thoughts, actions, and characterisation.

Third, it problematises the view that individuals are depicted in either a positive or negative light by Diodorus. While Antigonos is often presented negatively in Books XVIII–XX, he is continually presented as committed to the policy of Greek freedom. This stands in stark contrast to others, such as Polyperchon and Ptolemy, who are represented as duplicitous and manipulative in their claims

to be supporting Greek freedom, but elsewhere described in highly positive terms (below, n. 65). Fourth, it allows the historian to use embedded focalisation as a tool of historical analysis, elucidating his characters' thoughts and motives. On its simplest level, this adds tension and excitement to a narrative whose outcome the reader very likely knew. It also functions within a hermeneutic approach to history whereby the historian, be it Diodorus or his source, attempts to reveal historical truth by exploring his characters' motivations. By focusing on the motives and intentions of individuals such as Peukestas, Peithon, and Polyperchon, the historian examines the role of the individual within history and compels his reader to consider the importance of character as an influence on historical events. Further, the historian uses embedded focalisation to discuss the wider relationship between thought and deed. By studying the motives of individual Successors the historian explores the breakdown of centralised authority in the wars of Alexander's Successors and the role played by personal ambition within it.

The use of embedded focalisation and the elaboration of thoughts, motives, and intentions is not unique to Books XVIII–XX, but it does seem to operate differently there than in other Books. Elsewhere in the *Bibliotheke* we are told Alkibiades' motives in offering advice to Pharnabazos (13.37.3–5), Hannibal's plans regarding his embassy to Syracuse (13.43.6–7); Hermokrates' reasons for stopping outside Syracuse to bury the Syracusan dead (13.75.4), and Konon's thoughts and plans before his actions at Methymna (13.77.2). However, in none of these examples does Diodorus' account of an individual's thoughts and motives undermine the subsequent historical narrative or cause us to reinterpret it as it does throughout Books XVIII–XX. The topic will obviously benefit from further study, but I would suggest that the use of embedded focalisation and the focus on thoughts and motives is, as Lisa Hau has shown with *tyche*, a historiographical technique of interest to Diodorus and lifted by him from his sources.[63] If so, then it

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[63] Hau (2009).

would likely differ in its frequency and use depending on the source Diodorus used. As mentioned above (§1), the focus on ulterior motives fits well with Diodorus' interests in reversals of fortune and his aim of showing how those who act in a hybristic manner cannot escape their fate and will suffer punishment (1.1–2.4), a moral especially clear in the case of Peithon.

It is widely assumed that the ultimate source for Books XVIII–XX is Hieronymos of Kardia and it is tempting to follow Roisman and ascribe Diodorus' use of implied motive directly to him.[64] However, since we cannot say for certain that Diodorus used Hieronymos either directly or exclusively for Books XVIII–XX, attributing historiographical features of Diodorus' text to him is hazardous. Diodorus' account contains numerous pro-Seleukid, pro-Ptolemaic, and anti-Antigonid passages that do not fit well with Hieronymos' known bias towards the Antigonids.[65] Landucci-Gattinoni has argued that Diodorus drew on both Hieronymos and Duris of Samos, but this goes against what we know of Diodorus' working method, namely that he tended to follow one source for extended periods of time.[66] The traditional *Einquellentheorie* has yet to be disproved, and there is no conclusive evidence that Diodorus used more than one source at a time. Accordingly, the presence of pro-Seleukid, pro-Ptolemaic, and anti-Antigonid passages in Books XVIII–XX is most logically explained by Diodorus' use of an intermediary source, which integrated Hieronymos and other accounts. This would also explain the presence of pro-Rhodian features of apparently second-

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[64] Roisman (2010) 135.

[65] Pro-Ptolemaic: 17.10.7; 18.14.1, 21.9, 28.6, 33–34.4, 36.6–7; 19.55.5, 56.1, 86.2–5; 18.21.9. See also, Suda s.v. Δημήτριος (Δ 431); Just. 13.6.19; 15.1.7; Plut. *Demetr.* 5.4. Pro-Seleukid: 18.14.1, 28.6, 33.3; 19.55.5–9, 56.1, 90.3–4, 90–92. Anti-Antigonid: above, n. 54. On Antigonos and Hieronymos, see above n. 54.

[66] See above, n. 54. Volquardsen (1868) is still important. More recently, see Hornblower (1981) 19–22, 27–32; Stylianou (1998) 49–84, 132–9; Bleckmann (2010). See, however, Muntz's recent publications (2011), (2012), and (2017).

century BC date.[67] Agatharchides of Knidos is the most likely suggestion; he used Hieronymos (*FGrHist* 86 F 4a–b) and Diodorus used him (1.32–41.3 (*FGrHist* 86 F 19); 3.11.1–3 (*FGrHist* 86 F 1), 18.4, 48.1–4).[68] Since the issue of Diodorus' sources for Books XVIII–XX cannot be resolved, it is best to avoid attributing historiographical features to lost historians and analysing them as part of their literary style. It is surely more profitable to analyse the appearance and use of such features in the context of the authors in which they are preserved.

It is useful to begin with what we have, even if that is only Diodorus. The focus on motives and intentions, as we have it, forms part of Diodorus' narrative and must be a much-compressed version of the now lost original. Due to this process of compression, we cannot be sure that what Diodorus preserves is an accurate representation of the original. We do not know the degree to which he altered or condensed the original account to fit the structures of his own work. We can, therefore, only analyse the use of embedded focalisation and the elaboration of motives and intentions within Diodorus' narrative, with awareness of the limits of such analysis. The depiction of Peukestas, Peithon, Polyperchon, and Antigonos might have been radically different in Diodorus' source, and the parallels that I have highlighted between the depiction of Antigonos, Ptolemy, and Polyperchon may simply be the result of Diodorus' process of compression. Further, the characterisation of Peithon that I have argued for may not even have been represented within Diodorus' source, nor even intended by Diodorus himself. It could simply be the result of Diodorus' process of compression.

[67] A Rhodian source has been hypothesised for Diodorus' account of Demetrios' siege of Rhodes (20.81–88, 91–100; compare 20.93–4 with *FGrHist* 533 F 2 = *P. Berol.* 11632): see Hauben (1977) 319; Hornblower (1981) 56–60; Lehmann (1988) 10–12; Billows (1990) 165 n. 5; Wiemer (2001) 222–50; Pimouguet-Pédarros (2011) 24–5, 31–4; Wheatley (2016) 45–9.

[68] Schubert (1914); Bottin (1928) 19; Meeus (2009a) 56; *contra*, Hornblower (1981) 62–3; Merker (1988).

In this chapter I have highlighted one interesting feature of Diodorus' narrative that has not hitherto been given much attention and have pointed some directions forward in the analysis of Diodorus' role as an author and epitomator, rather than as a cipher for his sources. The use of embedded focalisation and implied motive within Books XVIII–XX shows that these were historiographical techniques of interest to Diodorus, perhaps because they could be used to express his views on *hybris*, and they merit further study for that reason alone. Diodorus' text is what survives and our analysis should begin with it.

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