

REVIEW-DISCUSSION

Simon Hornblower (ed.) *Greek Historiography*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. xii+286. Hardback (1994) £35; Paperback (1996)

The title is ambitious. Historiography covers a vast field and, with the adoption of new techniques of enquiry borrowed from modern critical theory, it seems to grow. Individual historians, their aims, the literary and rhetorical devices which they employed to achieve those aims, their own access to information and how they assessed this and on what grounds they made their selection from it, their influence one on another, their relationship to writers in other fields, their criteria for distinguishing between true and false (and how far that mattered to them), their notions of causality, the role of religion in their works, their concept of how the flow of history occurred—whether according to some overarching scheme or by pure chance—what Masfield called ODTAA, ‘one damned thing after another’—the list can be prolonged almost indefinitely.

So what do we get in this volume entitled *Greek Historiography*? In fact a *satura lanx*, for it is basically the proceedings of a seminar held at Oriel College, Oxford, in 1991 and, since an Oxford term lasts eight weeks, it contains eight papers by senior scholars writing on particular historical problems. Between them they touch on many of the issues just mentioned and their contributions are linked together in the first section of a 70-page introduction by the editor Simon Hornblower (henceforth H.), who singles out for emphasis themes common to more than one paper. This introduction also devotes 45 pages to ‘the story’ of Greek historiography, a formulation intended to query the usual concept of ‘development’, with its implication that successive historians in the main knew and built on their predecessors’ work. Instead H. asks ‘how far these historians resemble an organically growing coral reef and how far a set of pigeon-holes’. It is by virtue of this concern with what each individual historian knew, or could know, of his predecessors—how far, that is, a ‘tradition’ could establish itself -, that H. claims to diverge from the pattern of the regular ‘handbook’. He too, however, follows the usual chronological sequence, starting in fact with epic and ending, a little breathlessly, in the Second Sophistic. There is also a 21-page bibliography and an English index, which happily and helpfully includes those words taken from the jargon of recent literary criticism which feature extensively and perhaps less happily in H.’s own contribution.

2

How best can a reviewer deal with so varied a body of material? I must necessarily be selective and I shall start with the introduction, which is certainly lively, informative and provocative. Unlike Moses Finley, H. argues for a direct legacy to the earliest Greek historians from epic and oral traditions. Plato (*Hipp. mai.* 285d) mentions the fondness of the Spartans for ‘genealogies and city-foundations’ and H. suggests, very plausibly, that colonisation may have encouraged the emphasis on genealogies drawing on oral techniques, such as are often found in Herodotus. He also points out that genealogies occur frequently in the *Iliad*, whereas city-foundations are more relevant in the *Odyssey*. This is a distinction which persists; for, according to Polybius (ix.1), these two themes, genealogies and city-foundations, appealed to different kinds of readers, genealogies interesting τὸν φιλήκοον (the casual reader), but colonies and city-foundations τὸν πολυπράγμονα καὶ περιττόν (the man with antiquarian interests). For the view that genealogies constitute ‘false history’ H. quotes Asklepios of Myrleia; read ‘Asklepiades’. but blame the present reviewer, who originated this error in his *Commentary on Polybius*, note on 9.1.4, which H. quotes.

H. rightly observes that the division of a historian’s work into separate books is a fourth-century development, later than both Herodotus and Thucydides; from then onwards the grouping of books together forms an important structural element in many histories. H. makes the interesting suggestion that Polybius’ geographical book, foreshadowed in three earlier passages in book 3 (37.11, 57.5 and 59.6), was originally intended to be 24, not 34. Placed there it would have formed part of a hexadic structure, like 6 (early Rome, army and constitution) and 12 (criticism of other historians). Against this, however, is the fact that as 24 it would not have come at a very natural point for such a digression, whereas a geographical book fits very well at 34, where it falls at the very beginning of the period of παραχῆ καὶ κίνησις (see my *Commentary*, vol.3 pp. 563-4). Moreover, the hexadic arrangement is already interrupted at 18, which, *pace* H., is not a true digression, for it covers half an olympiad (145.3-4) and so advances the narrative at an important point (198-196) in the Second Macedonian War. On H.’s hypothesis the economy of books 21-30 of the *Histories* becomes difficult to reconstruct and would, I think, require more olympiad years to have been covered in the original books 27-9, where at present the very full events of only four years (172-168) occupy the whole of three books. Nor do we know, of course, whether the original 30, like the present 40, was to have been an index-volume. As regards the ‘foreshadowings’ mentioned above, all three are likely to be insertions made after 150, when the extension to the *Histories* was already planned. It seems therefore altogether more likely that the geo-

graphical book was first devised as an integral part of that extension (which came after, and recorded, Polybius' own travels).

Herodotus, H. argues, switched from a Hecataeus-style ethnographical to a more historically slanted work under the influence of the Persian wars rather than that of Athens and Pericles, as Jacoby believed. Thucydides—'the Master' (p. 24) and H.'s special interest—plays a large part in this introduction, as well as in H.'s own chapter. There he discusses Thucydides' use of rhetorical devices to ensure his readers' acceptance of the truth of his narrative; in the introduction he has some striking observations on the historian's capriciousness in recording distances and on his dating system. The priestesshood of Argos, for example, is mentioned (2.2.1) to impose solemnity and 'mockingly' to expose the ineptitude of this old way of dating (in contrast to the use of campaigning seasons). That there is mockery here I am not at all sure. True, in 5.20 Thucydides points out the cumbersomeness of the old method compared with his own based on campaigning seasons. But for the *beginning* of a war he had to give a dating anchor-point independent of the campaigns of the war itself. The new system only works once the war has begun.

Polybius, unlike Thucydides, used Timaeus' system based on olympiads. H. draws attention to the inferiority of olympiad years to campaigning seasons as a chronological system for a mainly military narrative (p. 47). He ought, however, to have added that Polybius frequently got round the difficulty of an awkward break by prolonging his olympiad year to the end of the campaigning season, thus enjoying the best of both worlds (since the olympiad years provided him with an 'absolute' chronology). Further to Polybius, there is an error on p.45, where Antiochus' eastern expedition is said to be described in book 5; it comes in books 9-11.

Coming to the fourth century, H. has a short digression on women historians. We are not perhaps intended to take too seriously the choice of Homer's Helen (*Iliad* 3.125-8), weaving the events of the Trojan War onto a tapestry, to head the list. But if she is to figure there, then an appropriate successor must be Virgil's Dido, whose panels depicting the Trojan War in the temple of Juno (*Aeneid* 1.430 ff.) inspire Aeneas' *lacrimae rerum*. More seriously, H. lists only three further Greek female historians, Nikoboule, Hestiaia and Pamphile. To these, if historical epic can be counted under history, we may add Aristodama of Smyrna, who so delighted her Lamian audience with references to Aetolian history and their own ancestors (*Syll.* 522).

On so-called 'tragic history' H. remarks that today (i.e. 1994) this is a 'disgraced concept'. True enough; but already in 1960, in an article mentioned by H., the present reviewer argued that it would help our understanding of Hellenistic historiography, if that term were to be discarded. In mentioning my view that Polybius adopted a positive view of Roman impe-

rial expansion, H. should perhaps have indicated that this has not gone unchallenged; for a different interpretation see J.-L. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme* (1988) 327-34; D. Musti, *Polibio e l'imperialismo romano* (1978) 55-7 and A. Eckstein, *Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius* (1995) 232. In general, this introductory survey, a thing difficult to carry out in such a restricted space, is highly successful. It contains many original and thought-provoking remarks and raises in a sharp form several problems of cross-fertilisation between historians.

Cross-fertilisation is a theme developed further in the last section on intertextuality. Here H. bases his conclusions not only on positive evidence for influence and borrowing, but also on relevant and significant cases of deliberate silence. Discussion is limited to two exemplary situations: Thucydides' relationship to Herodotus, and Polybius' relationship to Thucydides. An important (and surely correct) observation is that one can learn nothing certain about B's knowledge of A either from his silences about A or from his choice of C rather than A as a source for a particular event (e.g. Strabo's use of Ephorus in preference to Thucydides or of Callisthenes in preference to the latter's own source, Herodotus: p. 57). Several passages in Polybius indicate a knowledge of Thucydides. To those quoted on p. 60 add, perhaps, Polyb. 7.7, where his use of the word *λογογράφου* (found only here in the extant parts of Polybius in this sense) to describe the historians he is about to criticise may have acquired its slightly pejorative tone from Thuc.1.21.1. I agree with H. that Polybius' knowledge of Thucydides was uneven and that he did not know Herodotus at all; but, as Momigliano pointed out, he often preferred Ephorus—a universal historian—to Thucydides. H. thinks Polybius had a clear view of Greek history from about 480 onwards. Yes, but it is mostly 'schoolboy history' (cf. my article 'Polybius and the Past', *Tria Lustra* ed. H. D. Jocelyn (1993) 21). His knowledge became fuller with the fourth century, which raised issues still resonating in his own times.

3

H.'s introduction presents and correlates the eight essays, to which I shall now turn. The first is that of Derow (D.), who discusses 'historical explanation' as a theme in historians down to and including Polybius; the earlier writers are viewed—'focalized', one would say nowadays—from a Polybian vantage-point. For Herodotus events are to be explained on two levels: that of 'fate' and the human level, where greed and vengeance play a great part in precipitating action. At this level causation is primarily related to the acts of individuals and is therefore seen in terms of individual motivation; and this naturally leads the reader to ask: 'How do you know?'. For Thucydides' view of causation the basic passage is of course 1.23.4-6 and this, to D., does

not distinguish superficial from underlying causes (as is frequently assumed), but rather refers, on the one hand, to the events which lead to the Spartans' breach of the peace and, on the other, to Thucydides' explanation of *why* they broke it—two different things. D. points out that the Spartan actions in this situation are represented by Thucydides as a response to circumstances and as an expression of a human emotion, fear—and that both are Herodotean concepts.

Another important Thucydidean passage, to which D. gives a nuanced interpretation, is 5.105.2, οὗ ἂν κρατεῖ ἄρχειν, which he translates 'exercise dominion wherever they have the power', not 'rule wherever they can'. This makes the passage a statement of what happens when and where people hold power, and *not* a statement about a human disposition to *seek* dominion. This is, I think, correct, but one cannot disregard the fact that the passage occurs in a description of an aggressive move against Melos, which is designed to extend Athenian power. So perhaps the distinction is not so very important.

D.'s account of Polybius' notion of causality does not seem to me quite right. In the first place he says that Polybius enlarged that notion to include 'how' and especially 'why'. But surely Herodotus had asked δι' ἣν αἰτίην (1.1.1)—why?—and Thucydides too, with his ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις, is answering the same question, 'why the war came about'. But I am also unhappy about his treatment of Polyb. 3.6.7, the famous passage distinguishing ἀρχή, αἰτία and πρόφασις. What Polybius is saying there is, surely, that the αἰτίαι of a war are 'the reasons shaping decisions and judgements in advance (τὰς προκαθηγουμένας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων). According to D., those decisions to act (i.e. κρίσεις) are 'processes involving several elements: a proper explanation must delineate those processes and identify the various elements'. This is, I believe, wrong. The αἰτίαι are processes leading up to the decision to act; it is *they* that consist of the events shaping those decisions (κρίσεων) in advance. As Polybius goes on to say, the αἰτίαι are everything δι' ὧν ἐπὶ τὸ κρῖναί τι καὶ πρόθεσθαι παραγιγνόμεθα—by virtue of which we reach decisions and projects (where κρῖναί τι takes up the κρίσεων of the previous sentence). The point is that it is the αἰτίαι, the preceding circumstances, which form a process, not the κρίσεις, the decisions, which come at the end of the process. To get D.'s meaning (making *kriseis* a process) one would have to follow Pédech (*La Méthode historique de Polybe* (1964) 78-9) and take the words τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων as a partitive genitive, 'those elements of our decisions and judgements, which shape them in advance'; see further my *Polybius* (1972) 158 n. 12.

As D. points out, Polybius explains only why whoever began the war began it, which is in fact what Thucydides does for the Spartans; neither histo-

rian explains the causes of the war as they involve both states, with all their intricacies and full complexity. D. also suggests that, had we the full text of Polybius, we might better understand the role of Philip V in the events leading up to the Third Macedonian War, a role which sometimes looks ‘down-right silly’. I think the clue here may lie in the fact that Polybius, like Herodotus, understands causation at two levels, human and divine. It is primarily because of the existence of the second level that Philip V is brought into the causation of the Third Macedonian War. As I have shown elsewhere (*Ventures into Greek History*, ed. Worthington (1994) 28-42), for Polybius the rise of Rome to world dominion in just over fifty years echoes the rise of Macedon under Philip II (which had so greatly impressed Demetrius of Phalerum) and is seen as the action of a retributive *Tyche*, exacting penalties for the conspiracy of Philip V and Antiochus III against Ptolemy V, the boyking of Egypt. Since the rise of Macedon took place under Philip II (rather than Alexander), so its fall had to be under Philip V (rather than Perseus) and evidence had to be adduced and interpreted to support this thesis. The role of *Tyche* at the centre of Polybius’ history is somewhat anomalous and sits awkwardly alongside his emphasis elsewhere on Roman natural resources, political acumen, the possession of a mixed constitution and an unrivalled military machine. But here, as in his attitude to so-called ‘tragic history’, he is not wholly consistent.

4

John Gould’s (G.) paper deals with the role of religion in Herodotus and he is surely right to claim, against Lateiner (*The Historical Method of Herodotus* (1989)), that Herodotus accepted non-human forces as operative in history. G. is, however, more interested in how Herodotus viewed religion than with the part it played in his scheme of history and causality. He certainly introduces ‘the divine’ into causal contexts, but with apparent hesitation; and his ‘hesitations’, G. argues, spring not out of any weakness of belief, but from the ‘uncertainty principle’: we just don’t know enough. G. also takes the view that we (i.e. his readers collectively) experience disappointment at Herodotus’ lack of interest in iconography and his failure to appreciate that different religions imply different views about the world. Differences of ritual were Herodotus’ prime concern. The Greeks possessed no religious *Book*. For them religion meant primarily ritual, with the gods of Homer and Hesiod superimposed. Any difficulty we feel about this G. relates, interestingly, to our northern protestant tradition. The Greek attitude, as here described, is easier to comprehend and accept for those brought up in the catholic tradition of southern Europe. This is an exciting paper, but the reviewer must leave it to those with stronger protestant (or catholic) connections than him-

self to judge whether G.'s distinction is valid. He has certainly thrown new light on Herodotus.

5

The next paper, also on Herodotus, deals with his treatment of Alexander I of Macedonia and is vintage Badian (B.). According to Hdt. 5.17-21, Alexander had seven Persian envoys assassinated by a trick; they were stabbed by seven young Macedonians disguised as women—a device which incidentally (though this is not mentioned by B. here nor by C. J. Tuplin in his *Foundations of Empire* (1993) 147) is copied by one version of the seizure of the Cadmea in 379 by Melon and six other Thebans: Xen. *Hell.*5.4.4-6 (note the number of assassins, seven). B. argues that the traditional interpretation of this story is correct: it was intended to conceal the fact that Alexander's father Amyntas had given earth and water to the King and sealed his submission with a marriage alliance between his daughter Gygaia and a Persian noble Bubares. Amyntas, B. argues, had taken the initiative in approaching the King (by sending Alexander); later the latter made up the story of the seven Persian envoys to hide the spontaneity of Amyntas' action.

B. argues a powerful case, though not all his arguments are of equal weight. He observes that Alexander is described (in Hdt. 5.20.4) as Μακεδόνων ὑπαρχος, i.e. satrap. But this phrase is put into Alexander's mouth when he is welcoming the Persians and before the King can have accorded him that status. True, ὑπαρχος must imply subordination (and that to Darius, whom else?); but its position here is a difficulty. B. argues that Herodotus got his account from Alexander or someone in his circle. If so, one would have to assume that Alexander (or Herodotus' source, if it was not he) reported the Macedonian king's stress on his subordinate role in addressing the envoys as a piece of bluff—though, if B. is right, it was an accurate description of his true position.

One or two other points may be briefly mentioned. The son of Gygaia and Bubares is called Amyntas (Hdt. 8.136.1). B. argues that he was given that name because he was intended ultimately to be appointed satrap of Macedonia. This I find over-refined; there can have been other, less specific, reasons for such a name. In relation to Alexander's visit to Athens on the eve of Plataea (Hdt. 8.136.1), he is described as πρόξενος and εὐεργέτης of Athens, but without any explanation of these two titles. B. suggests that Alexander's προξενία was a transfer from the personal ξενία of the tyrant Hippias to the Athenian *demos* and that he will have encouraged the Athenians to appeal to Sardes in 508/7, when the envoys got into trouble on their return for offering earth and water (Hdt. 5.72.3). Contrary to the general belief and despite Herodotus' silence, B. argues that this acceptance of the

rank of vassal was approved on the envoys' return, so making Athens the first state to medise!

I find this just possible, but far from proved. B.'s suggestion that Alexander's *proxenia* was a development of the *xenia* existing between Hippias and Amyntas is in itself quite plausible—though to say that Alexander 'decided to transfer his family connection with the Athenian tyrants to the new Athenian *demos*' obscures the fact that it was for the Athenian *demos*, not Alexander, to declare him *proxenos*. But the older explanation of Alexander's role, viz. that he may have supplied timber and pitch to Athens for its war against Aegina, still remains the most likely explanation of his titles. The later embassy (Hdt. 5.96.2), when the Athenians were asked to take Hippias back, does not read like one from a vassal state. True, one might fairly ask whether the Athenians would have sent it at all if they had already repudiated their envoys of 508/7. I am not sure, however, that the answer to that question would necessarily be in the negative. Briefly, B.'s thesis seems vulnerable at certain points and perhaps depends excessively on 'reading between the lines'.

B. attacks Errington for calling Alexander I the first Greek ruler to betray the Greek cause: there was, he says, no Greek cause until Xerxes' expedition. This ignores Herodotus' statement (6.49.2) that when the Aeginetans gave earth and water in the late 490s, they were reported to Sparta as *προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα*. However, although I have queried some aspects of Badian's argument, this is undoubtedly an impressive piece of interpretation, closely argued and never less than plausible.

6

Simon Hornblower's own contribution supplements his broader coverage in the introduction. It is on 'narratology'—the 'theory that deals with the general principles underlying narrative texts'—in relation to Thucydides, and uses methods borrowed from G. Genette (on Proust) and I. J. F. de Jong (on Homer and Euripides). 'Can principles established in such contexts be profitably applied to historical texts?' he asks; 'and are history and fiction truly separate genres?' He proceeds by examining various rhetorical devices common to both and attempts to discover whether, and how, they were used differently in the two contexts. Two of them are given special attention.

'Narrative displacement' ('anachrony' or 'achrony'—H. is not afraid of current jargon) occurs where Thucydides wants to soften the impact of something he prefers not to emphasise, but feels obliged to include. Thus, with regard to the build-up of Athenian ships in the Corcyrean affair, he slurs over the increase from ten to twenty ships without comment, although it was the sight of this fleet that caused the Corinthians to retreat. By doing

this he softens the impression of Athenian aggression in the events leading up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Similarly in 1.40.5 the Corinthian envoys to Athens in 434/3 mention the part they had played in preventing Peloponnesian support for Samos, when that island revolted in 440. This H. terms ‘external analepsis’, since it looks back to an event outside Thucydides’ narrative; this is mentioned now to exaggerate the aggressiveness of the Spartans who, given a fuller presentation, might have shown that they were relying on an autonomy clause in the Thirty Years Peace (as Badian has argued elsewhere).

H. also discusses Thucydides’ use of ‘iterative presentation’, in which the full force of an action and its dimensions are only gradually demonstrated. Thus the Athenian fleet attacks Epidaurus in 430 (Thuc. 2.56), but its size is only emphasised in 6.31—so as to mask Athenian aggression or failure to stick with Periclean defensive strategy. I think H. makes too much of this example. Aggressiveness and departure from defensive strategy are different things: the one bears on responsibility for the war, the other concerns only the best way to fight it. Thucydides in fact describes the composition of the expedition fully in book 2; its size only becomes relevant when he wants to emphasise the scale of the Sicilian expedition. As regards the background of this, H. is now inclined to accept the newly supported late dating of the Segesta inscription (ML 37) to 418/17 (p. 148), as Harold Mattingly has long contended (see now M. Chambers, *ZPE* 83 (1990) 38-63, and, for recent bibliography, M. Vickers, *JHS* 116 (1996) 171-4), but leaves a full discussion to his *Commentary* on Book 6. Here he merely asks the old and still relevant question: why does Thucydides fail to mention it at all? But does not H.’s own expressed view, that it would have detracted from the picture of the expedition as a mad and tragic shot in the dark, still hold good for the later no less than the earlier date? Or is it possible that Thucydides simply did not know of its existence? As Chambers pointed out, he was in exile at the time it was concluded. On the difference between history and fiction (and so on the applicability to the former of schemes employed in the latter) H. in each case ends up with the conclusion that the historian, unlike the poet or the writer of fiction, has to take account of certain ‘irreducible facts’. The Segestan alliance, if Thucydides knew of it, was surely one such fact.

H.’s paper is devoted to what one might term the literary and presentational aspects of historiography, leaving aside questions of truth and falsehood or the historian’s personal convictions (such as form the topic of A. Eckstein’s *Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius*). It is an important paper, which should affect the way we read Thucydides (and other historians).

7

Peter Fraser (F.) contributes a critique of Theophrastus, viewed rather unusually as a historian, in particular of the Middle East and Italy. In a well-documented study he draws a contrast between the rich material available after Alexander for the east with the still rudimentary evidence for Italy. A large part of this paper is taken up with discussion of particular passages, which are conveniently assembled at the end (presumably the original hand-out from the seminar). F. argues that Theophrastus derives most of the information on the east in books 4-5 of the *Historia Plantarum* from bematists and explorers rather than from his own travels and he queries whether Theophrastus ever visited Egypt and Cyrene. He also doubts Alexander's personal involvement; as he points out, there is no mention of this in Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*. The *Hist. Plant.* is, however, the main source (outside the Alexander-histories) for the changes brought about by Alexander's campaigns and for the innovations in the realm of plants and agriculture in the Hellenistic world.

This picture is convincing and enlightening. For Italy, however, the situation is quite different. Surviving scraps of information seem to come from the *paradoxa* literature. We are confronted especially with oddities, such as capital punishment as the penalty for drinking unmixed wine at Epizephyrian Locri (Athen. 429a: perhaps from Theophrastus). Much of this material seems to go back to research conducted within the Lyceum and Fraser speaks of an Aristotelian view of Italy. He also suggests that many of the bizarre stories originate in peripatetic *Nomima barbarika*: but would a work with such a title include customs of Locri, or the report, attributed to Aristoxenus of Tarentum, of how the Greek citizens of Paestum, now under Lucanian domination, were wont to meet and lament the passing of their ancient traditions? Or even the sack of Rome by the Gauls, if Rome was thought of as a *polis Hellenis*? Even if they lived far away from the Aegean, Greeks were still Greeks; and 'barbarian' still carried its old connotation of non-Greek.

8

John Davies (D.) uses the problem surrounding the tradition of the First Sacred War (590s-580s) to look into the crop of pro-Athenian pseudo-documents which surfaced from around 400 onwards and of which he now claims to have upwards of 125. For their sudden appearance he propounds several converging reasons, including the attested move over to a more extensive use of written records, a process which in itself introduced distortion. D.'s concern is not so much the truth about the war, but rather the stages in the development of the tradition about it, a tradition which most likely

changed over the years in response to certain key events—the Amphictyonic law (c. 380), the publication of Hellanicus' *Atthis* (late fifth century), the Second Sacred War (440) and the Athenian connection with the Delphic Amphictyony, going back perhaps as far as 520-510—any of which may have made an impact on how the First Sacred War will have been seen.

D. sets out this problem very clearly, but his answers are tentative. To the question whether one can extract history from myth in this context his response is *non liquet*, though he draws attention to a residual list of events which must have taken place and which *might* plausibly be explained on the hypothesis that the war took place. This perhaps does not get us very far in either methodology or 'history', but it does throw light on several phenomena which ask to be explained, not least the forged documents; and it provides a framework within which a tradition such as that surrounding the First Sacred War can be examined. Like Fraser, D. appends a list of the passages to which he refers.

9

Kenneth Sacks' (S.) paper on Diodorus is based (in some places verbatim) on his book *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century* (1990). It tackles the ancient problem of how far Diodorus expresses his own views on moral, philosophical and political matters and how far he merely reflects those of his sources. S. shows convincingly that he did not take his moral views from Ephorus, for Diodorus mainly offers bad examples to avoid, whereas Ephorus offered only good ones to emulate; and Diodorus' consistent moral judgements appear in passages where Ephorus cannot possibly be the source. A problem which I do not think S. has fully solved, however, concerns Diodorus' views on what leads to successful imperialism. In books 11-16 he consistently shows Athens and Sparta succeeding when they treated their subjects with moderation (*epieikos*), but losing out when they began to behave badly (*biaios*); and S offers good reasons for attributing this view to Diodorus himself and not to his source Ephorus. In 32.2, however, there is an exception: paralysing terror (*phobos kai kataplexis*) is there said to be the (effective) method of securing an established empire against attack. It is now generally agreed that Diodorus has not taken this passage from Polybius, as Gelzer believed. It is his own view and represents a change from that expressed in the earlier books. As an explanation of this change of view S. suggests (p.218) that it sprang from Diodorus' recognition that it described Roman practice—and yet Roman power was still in place! But this is not a satisfactory explanation. Rome's experience was not simply an exception, a slight modification of the norm (as S. termed it in his book on Diodorus, p. 46). On the contrary, it was a complete reversal of his earlier thesis; nor does it apply simply to

Rome, for Diodorus says that it is confirmed if one looks at *ταῖς πάλαι ποτε συσταθείσαις δυναστείαις*, and he supports it with a reference to Philip II's destruction of Olynthus and Alexander's of Thebes, as well as the Roman razing of Corinth, Carthage and Numantia. Has Diodorus changed his mind under Roman influence (as S. suggests) and then generalised his new theory? And, if so, does it supersede his earlier formulation? S. does not appear to think so. 'The key concept of moderate behaviour', he asserts, 'is a hallmark of Diodoran thought.' On this, then, S. has not made his view entirely clear.

Despite the central position occupied by Rome in Diodorus' later books, S. makes the interesting point that Rome was not his primary interest. When, for example, he discusses the role of Fate (*pronoia*) in history in 1.1.3, he ignores Rome; and most of his independent comments on Rome (e.g. 32.36.2 on butchery in Greek cities) are negative. This is a good point, but it should not be exaggerated. I am not persuaded, for instance, that when in 4.83.6 Diodorus describes the patronage of the temple prostitutes of Venus Erycina at Eryx by Roman officials, he is delivering a 'coarse insult' to Rome. He seems rather to be indicating that even the most important Romans recognised the correct and time-hallowed way of honouring the goddess. The notion that this custom would have been regarded as rather disgusting is surely a modern anachronism.

A further problem discussed by S. concerns the Aous conference between Flaminius and Philip V in 198. Diodorus (28.11), drawing on Polybius, tells us that the demands of the former were based on a *senatusconsultum*, whereas to Livy (also following Polybius) they were put forward on Flaminius' own initiative. Whom are we to believe? Diodorus, S. rightly points out, never uses Polybius via an annalist, nor does he introduce extraneous material into 'Polybian' speeches, whereas Livy can be shown to tamper with his source here and there for rhetorical effect. On these grounds and others, including Diodorus' use of the technical terms *ἀφρούρητος καὶ ἀυτόνομος* argues strongly in favour of accepting Diodorus' version here in preference to Livy. But there is still a difficulty, namely the fact that, according to Diodorus, Philip was required to liberate (*ἐλευθεροῦν*) the Greeks, whereas at the Isthmus, as we know from Polybius himself (18.44.3), the S.C. required the garrisoned cities to be handed over to the Romans (later, as we know, to be liberated). So is Diodorus' account of the Aous demands compressed? Or did Flaminius there present them more summarily than later? Or did the Senate change them in the meantime? If the last, such a change could well have fuelled Aetolian suspicions. Unfortunately we do not possess Diodorus' account of the Isthmus demands. So, as between Livy and Diodorus on the Aous encounter, the verdict must be one of 'unproven'.

10

The last paper is that of Antony Spawforth (Sp.), on the tradition of the Persian Wars as a theme popularised under the Roman Empire. It contains three elements: the Parthenon inscription of 61/2 honouring Nero, the place of Parthia in Roman ideology and the effectiveness of the Persian Wars as a unifying symbol in the Greek east. It would be very satisfactory if we could be sure that the Parthenon inscription (*IG ii²*, 3277 = Sherk no. 78) was linked to the Parthian Wars of Nero and, by reason of its position on the Acropolis, with the Persian Wars. But against that assumption (which was already made by K. Carroll, who published a monograph on the inscription) there is absolutely no indication of such a connection in its wording. It is true that Ti. Claudius Novius, who is mentioned on it, was high priest of Nero and Zeus Eleutherios at Plataea; but the inscription refers only to his eight tenures of the hoplite generalship at Athens. It is surely improbable that people reading the inscription can reasonably have been expected to think: Yes! Novius = Plataea and the Persian Wars; and of course Persian Wars = Parthian Wars; that's it, we are celebrating Nero's great victory in the Parthian Wars! (Sp.'s remarks about Novius having perhaps met his Spartan wife at Plataea, where her brother was perhaps a fellow competitor in the games, are pure speculation, which unfortunately does nothing for the argument.) The location of the inscription is held to link it with the Persian Wars through juxtaposition with the Pergamene Gigantomachia, which had Persian overtones through its panel referring to Marathon; and as Pollitt remarks (*Art in the Hellenistic Age* (1986) 93), the whole Periclean Acropolis was a kind of celebration of the Persian Wars. That does not, however, apply to every monument or inscription set up on it; and people reading the Parthenon inscription to Nero would not immediately associate it with the Gigantomachia and make the deduction Gauls = Persians = Parthians. On the whole, public monuments eschew subtleties.

Finally, 61/2 is not a very obvious date at which to draw attention to the Parthian Wars. In that respect the great year was 58 (Artaxata) or even 59 (Tigranocerta). In 60 the Romans set Tigranes IV on the throne of Armenia, but in 61 he proceeded to attack Parthia alone: Corbulo had to make an armistice with Volugeses. In 62 Paetus surrendered at Rhandeia. Of course, his boastful dispatches to Nero earlier could have given a false impression of his achievements; but the deception cannot have lasted long. So, briefly, I find the Roman equation between the Persian and Parthian Wars generally well established; but the Neronian inscription on the Parthenon is very hard to bring into that story. Sp. makes the good point that in the course of the second century Rome, now quite sure of its predominance, switches the historical focus of its propaganda from the fifth century defensive wars of the

Greeks against Persia to Alexander's successful attack on the Persian empire—a theme much in evidence under Trajan and later Caracalla.

Two passages adduced by Sp. call for comment. He speaks of 'Livy's remarkable observation that Greeks always will be at war with foreigners and barbarians' (31.20.15). It should be noted that this comes from a passage of Livy derived from Polybius and, moreover, from a speech in which a Macedonian orator is trying to persuade the Aetolians not to ally themselves with the Romans against Philip V of Macedonia. It implies of course that the Romans are barbarians—not a view to be lightly attributed to Livy, as Sp.'s comment implies. Secondly, Plutarch, *Polit. Praecepta*. 814c, warns Greek politicians not to use rhetoric about the Persian Wars to whip up the masses. Sp. suggests that the Romans took over the Persian Wars theme to prevent Greek demagogues using it to stir up trouble. Here, he thinks, the issue is one of 'privileged ecclesiasts' being tempted into hot-headed ways of resisting Rome on local and petty issues, instead of sending a deputation to Rome or talking to the right persons. This may be so; but would this restricted constituency within the Greek cities be referred to as *hoi polloi*? I am inclined to think that Plutarch here has something more demagogic in mind.

II

The Oriel seminar must have been a stimulating affair. The resultant volume is a highly successful contribution to a subject which is attracting increasing attention. All eight papers are of high quality and some are very good indeed. This is a book to which one will frequently refer and on which scholars can build.

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