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REVIEW–DISCUSSION

BALANCING CAESAR'S ACCOUNT OF THE CIVIL WAR

Richard W. Westall, *Caesar's* Civil War*: Historical Reality and Fabrication*. *Mnemosyne* Supplements, vol. 410. Leiden: Brill, 2017. Pp. xvi + 400. Hardback, €116.00/$230.00. ISBN 978-90-04-35614-6.

This book is a revision of Westall's (henceforth W.) 2000 PhD dissertation (Stanford): *Caesar's Civil War and the Mediterranean World of 49–48 BC*. It is divided into nine chapters, the first two of which lay the groundwork: (1) Introduction and (2) The Civil War of 49–48 BCE. Next come seven chapters that form the main body of the work, arranged chronologically and geographically: (3) Italia, (4) Hispania, (5) Gallia, (6) Africa, (7) Macedonia, (8) Asia, and (9) Aegyptus. Each of these seven regions, which were theatres of war, is provided with a map in black and white, and the collection of maps (313–20) is introduced by one of the Mediterranean that depicts the whole of the Roman empire. The maps show topography, most but not all place names mentioned in the text, but not Roman roads.[1] The Bibliography (25 pp.) is extensive, up to date, and well integrated into the discussion. The work is rounded out with six indices: (1) Ancient and Non-Literary Sources; (2) Modern Authors; (3) Persons (arranged alphabetically by *nomen*, without the aid of cross-references by cognomen of the type 'Cato, see Porcius'); (4) Places; (5) Subjects; and lastly (6) Greek and Latin Words and Expressions. English translations accompany nearly all quotations from Greek and Latin sources, and there is a handy list on pp. xiii–xiv of the seventy-two block quotations distributed across Chapters 3–9. Where accompanying English translation has not been supplied, the Latin is usually a portion of Caesar's *Bellum Civile* (e.g., 3+ lines from 1.30.5 quoted at 180 n. 69, or 2+ lines from 3.31.4 at 234 n. 128), which can be consulted in various, fine English versions that are readily accessible.[2] Translation is not, however, so readily accessible for the occasional recherché text that stands alone, such as, for instance, several lines of Latin

[1] Of course, thanks to several splendid, open-access digital mapping sites, such as Antiquity À-la-carte (http://awmc.unc.edu/wordpress/alacarte/) and ORBIS (http://orbis.stanford.edu), the reader can easily fill in the gaps.

[2] E.g., the Oxford World's Classics translation (1998) by J. M. Carter (a revision of his 1991–2 Aris & Phillips ed.); the Loeb (2016) by Cynthia Damon; the *Landmark Caesar* (2017) by Kurt Raaflaub.

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quoted from a scholiast on Lucan and offered to demonstrate that Lucan drew upon Livy as a source (240 n. 12).[3]

The scholar will be able to make good use of the Index of Sources, which spans twenty-two pages arranged in double columns. This resource allows the reader to see at a glance whether a given text is treated by W., and if so, where it is to be found. For instance, it discloses that W. did not include in his discussion of Caesar's finances at the outbreak of the war a seemingly relevant report in Suetonius (*Iul.* 68.1) that when Caesar embarked on the war, the centurions in each of his legions offered to subsidise the cost of a horseman out of their own pockets: *ingresso civile bellum centuriones cuiusque legionis singulos equites e viatico suo optulerunt.* One might expect this text to have been taken into account since W. believes that Caesar was bankrupt at the outset of the civil war (e.g., 89, 298, 300). On a similar note, W. (89) rejects, without discussion, the widely accepted interpretation of a comparable passage in the *Bellum Civile* (1.39.3–4) that concerns cash distributed to the troops thanks to loans made to Caesar by his military tribunes and centurions in June 49, during the Ilerda campaign.[4] W. believes, on the contrary, that the Pompeian commander L. Afranius, not Caesar, was the recipient of the loans, and he cites a 1990 article by McDonnell as his basis for adopting that view.[5] Unfortunately the

[3] Occasionally, too, though not often, translation is not quite apt. For instance, on 152, *conservans*, describing Caesar's treatment of Massiliotes after the surrender of the town (*BCiv.* 2.22.5–6), is glossed 'saved', whereas on 158, the translation 'sparing' better conveys Caesar's act of *preserving* the inhabitants from the wrath of the soldiers who occupied the town.

[4] Most historians have not questioned the text as it is transmitted in the MSS: W. Drumann and P. Groebe, *Geschichte Roms* (Leipzig, 1906) III.410; T. Rice Holmes, *The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1923) III.52, 390; M. Gelzer, *Caesar: der Politiker und Staatsmann*[6] (Wiesbaden, 1960) 196 n. 99 = 213 n. 6 (Eng. ed.); P. A. Brunt, 'The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution', *JRS* 52 (1962) 79 n. 101; I. Shatzman, *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics* (Brussels, 1975) 351 n. 460; C. Meier, *Caesar* (Berlin, 1982) 459.

[5] M. McDonnell, 'Borrowing to Bribe Soldiers: Caesar's *De Bello Civili* 1.39', *Hermes* 118 (1990) 55–66—twice incorrectly cited by W. (89 n. 14 and Bibliography, 335) as having appeared in *Historia.* This is a thought-provoking article that deserves to be more widely known than I discovered it to be from consulting several colleagues who are leading authorities on the life and writings of Caesar. McDonnell argues persuasively for an interpretation of *BCiv.* 1.39.3 that, in part, goes back to C. Nipperdey (*C. Iulii Caesaris commentarii, quaestiones Caesarianae* (Leipzig, 1847) 138–9) and was adopted by F. Kraner in his 1856 (Berlin) commentary on the *De bello civili*, a work that went on to become a standard, with revisions by H. Hofmann (1864) and H. Meusel (1906). Unfortunately when it was revised by Meusel, the linguistic argument justifying the view that Afranius, not Caesar, is the subject of *audierat* (§3) was excised. McDonnell offers a cogent defence of that interpretation of the text, pointing out that if Caesar had been the one handing out borrowed money to the troops in Spain, he would have been unlikely to use the term *largitio* (almost invariably pejorative) to describe his act. The act of currying favour sounds like something Caesar

reader is not given enough information to decide which interpretation makes better sense.

As W. states in the introductory chapter, the goal of his monograph is 'to extend our knowledge of those factors that contributed to the outbreak of civil war and to elucidate the characteristics of Roman society and economy in the late Republic' (1). W. seeks to balance Caesar's one-sided account, and so W.'s focus is on the first twenty-one months of the civil war, Jan. 49–Sept. 48, the period covered by Caesar's *Bellum Civile*, minus the last six chapters of Book 3 (107–12) that sketch the opening stages of the civil war in Egypt into which Caesar was drawn after his arrival in Alexandria on 2 Oct. 48. Treatment of the Egyptian and Asian campaigns (48–47 BC) and the later ones in 46 (Africa) and 45 (Spain) and the continuation of the war under the Triumvirs is incidental. Throughout the work, W. draws the reader's attention to important elements in this period of history that are either misrepresented in Caesar's narrative or passed over in silence such as the mutiny of the IXth legion at Placentia in late Oct. (early Sept., JUL) 49 (Suet. *Iul.* 69; App. *BCiv.* 2.47; Dio 41.26.1; Luc. 5.237–373). Close philological and literary analysis of the text, combined with careful historical investigation, results in a superior understanding of the sequence of events in the war and the links between cause and effect.

W. correctly observes (2) that modern accounts of this period of history often accept Caesar's premises without question. By way of example, W. calls attention to how the emphasis Caesar places on there being only one of his legions south of the Alps (the XIIIth) when he received news of the *senatus consultum ultimum* passed on 7 Jan. can give the false impression that Caesar was not in a state of readiness for war at that time. This is contradicted by the fact that just over one month later (by 17 Feb.), Caesar had three veteran legions at his disposal at the siege of Corfinium. W. argues (2) that the arrival of the two additional legions 'would not have been possible if they had been situated to the north of the Alps at the moment of the declaration of war'.[6] Those two legions were among the forces that had been placed in winter quarters among the Aedui, north of the Alps, at the conclusion of the campaign season in 50 (Hirt. *BGall.* 8.54.4). So what calls for investigation is the date by which Caesar must have dispatched a messenger to summon the two legions that joined the XIIIth. Ramsey–Raaflaub by taking into account the time needed for a summons to reach the winter camp north of the Alps, the distance that was traversed by the legions, and the average speed that could have reasonably been maintained on a rapid march, with appropriate allowance made for days

would have credited to a Pompeian commander who, unlike himself, could not rely on the undying loyalty of his troops.

[6] Later (69) W. concludes that the levying of new legions by Caesar must have taken place before the passing of the SC.

of rest, estimate 8 Dec. (23 Oct., JUL) 50 to be the latest date by which Caesar dispatched a messenger from Ravenna to call up those forces.[7] Needless to say, the summons in December goes unreported by Caesar. On 57, W. writes that the rapidity with which Caesar raised 'forces deep within the Italian peninsula reveals a fundamental contradiction between Caesar's action and his claims to have reacted only in response to the *senatus consultum ultimum* of 7 January 49'. This is a true observation, but when W. adduces as supporting evidence the fact that by the time Caesar departed Corfinium in late February he was in possession of six legions, it is only fair to observe that W. errs in the opposite direction. That is, fully half of those six legions, some 30 plus cohorts,[8] had been raised not by Caesar but by Caesar's enemies. Those units were taken over by Caesar from Domitius Ahenobarbus and incorporated into his army upon the surrender of Corfinium.[9]

Citing recent studies of financial conditions in the 50s,[10] W. argues that the financial crisis facing Caesar in late 49 was not so much a result of his invasion of Italy and the disruption of the economy as it was a root cause of the war in the first place. As mentioned earlier, W. (4) believes that Caesar was insolvent at the outbreak of the war, which explains his need to seize the emergency cash reserve (*sanctius aerarium*) in Rome. This is a topic to which W. returns in the final chapter (298–300), placing, it seems to this reviewer, undue faith in the reliability of Pompey's attestation of Caesar's insolvency (Suet. *Iul.* 30.2). W. regards Pompey's testimony as trustworthy because Pompey had been Caesar's son-in-law and so, it is supposed, ought to have been in a position to know the details of Caesar's finances. Given, however, that the marriage tie was severed by the death of Julia in the late summer of 54,[11] and that the two political allies drifted further and further apart during the last few years of the decade, one has to wonder how well informed Pompey was concerning the solvency of his ex-father-in-law. A good deal of what was said about Caesar's unpopularity with his troops and lack of military preparedness, in contrast with

[7] J. T. Ramsey and K. A. Raaflaub, 'Chronological Tables for Caesar's Wars (58–45 BCE)', *Histos* 11 (2017) 162–217, at 187; henceforth R–R.

[8] *BCiv.* 1.17.2: *cohortesque amplius xxx* (cf. 1.15.5–7).

[9] *BCiv.* 1.23.5: *milites Domitianos sacramentum apud se dicere iubet.*

[10] Inter al., K. Verboven, '54–44 BCE: Financial or Monetary Crisis?', in E. Lo Cascio, ed., *Credito e moneta nel mondo romano* (Bari, 2003) 49–68; and C. Rollinger, *Solvendi sunt nummi: die Schuldenkultur der späten romischen Republik im Spiegel der Schriften Ciceros* (Berlin, 2009).

[11] Caesar received news of his daughter's death shortly before his return from his second invasion of Britain (Plut. *Caes.* 23.4), which can be assigned to c. 25 Sept. 54: see K. A. Raaflaub and J. T. Ramsey, 'Reconstructing the Chronology of Caesar's Gallic Wars', *Histos* 11 (2017) 1–74, esp. 46 and n. 149. H. E. Butler and M. Cary, ed., *Suet.* Iul. (Oxford, 1927) 84 comment on 30.2 that Pompey's assertion is nowhere else attested, and if genuine, 'it shows how thoroughly Pompey underrated his opponent'.

Pompey's lustre and supposed ability to produce an army to counter Caesar by merely stamping his foot on Italian soil, was grossly out of harmony with reality (Plut. *Pomp.* 57.4–5; cf. 60.4). The remainder of Chapter 1 briefly surveys topics that are treated in detail in each of the succeeding chapters.

Chapter 2 ('The Civil War of 49–48 BCE', 12–43) provides an easy-to-follow narrative of the first twenty-one months of the war. This nicely prepares the reader for diving into the discussion of details in succeeding chapters. Dates are given according to the Roman civil calendar, which on 1 Jan. 49 (14 Nov. 50, JUL) was forty-eight days ahead of the sun, whereas by the date of Caesar's arrival in Alexandria, 2 Oct. 48 (28 July, JUL), the difference amounted to sixty-six days. W. occasionally draws attention to the difference in season, stating, for instance (30) that when Antonius and Calenus finally succeeded in crossing the Adriatic to bring reinforcements to Caesar in late March or early April 48, 'the civil calendar was some 60 days in advance of the solar year'. To drive home the disparity between Roman calendar dates and the seasons of the year, W. observes by way of illustration that according to the civil calendar 'spring began on 10 April 48 BCE', a true statement but one that is bound to puzzle most readers. No light is shed on the matter by n. 112, which is attached to the remark, since its content ('For the date, cf. KHM 1959[12]: 373 (27 March).') has nothing whatsoever to do with the commencement of spring. Instead, the note merely informs the reader, in a not very clear fashion, that the 'Zeittafel' of Kraner–Hofmann–Meusel ed. 12 of Caesar's *BCiv.* gives 27 March as the date on which Antonius landed at Nymphaeum.[12] That piece of information more properly belongs in the previous note (n. 111), which cites Caes. *BCiv.* 3.25.1 and Suet. *Iul.* 35.1 *per quattuor paene menses* and concerns the date by which reinforcements arrived. What n. 112 should have pointed out to help the reader understand the remarks concerning 10 Apr. 48 marking the commencement of spring is that in 48 the Julian equivalent of *a.d. iv Id. Apr.* (10 April) was 8 Feb., the date that ushered in spring, according to Pliny,

[12] 'Antonius landet bei Nymphaeum (3,26,4)'; for this edition of the *Bellum Civile*, see n. 5 above. The date 27 March is, of course, merely an estimate, despite its apparent precision. This fact is more apparent in the tables of R–R (above, n. 7) since R–R print firm dates in boldface, which sets those fixed points of reference apart from dates that are only approximate. As can be seen at R–R 197–9, after 5 Jan. 48 (7 Nov. 49, JUL), the date of Caesar's landing at Palaeste in Epirus, all subsequent dates are based on estimates until the Battle of Pharsalus on 9 Aug. (7 June, JUL). The date of Caesar's landing on 5 Jan. is known because according to *BCiv.* 3.6.3 it took place on the day after Caesar set sail from Brundisium (*postridie terram attigit*), and the date of his embarkation, 4 Jan. (*ii Non. Ian.*), is given at *BCiv.* 3.6.1–2. The only other precise date supplied in the *BCiv.* is found at 1.5.3–4, for the *senatus consultum ultimum*: 7 Jan. 49 (*vii Id. Ian.*).

because on or about 8 Feb., JUL the West Wind (Favonius) usually began to blow.[13]

Along the same lines, much later in the discussion W. (198–9) points out that the date of Caesar's sailing for Macedonia as given by the civil calendar (4 Jan. 48 BC) corresponded to 6 Nov. 49, JUL, which means that Caesar's embarkation took place less than a week before the date on which the sailing season traditionally came to a close for the winter (11 Nov.).[14] W. goes on to remark that our ancient sources give a distorted picture by linking the date of Caesar's voyage to the winter solstice. The fact is, ancient writers generally did not have the wherewithal to reconcile dates in the civil calendar with the solar year, and so authors typically credit dates with reflecting whatever season was appropriate to the calendar month. Thus, to cite another example, Dio (42.46.3) places the retreat of Cn. Domitius Calvinus from the Battle of Nicopolis in 48 just before the onset of winter (ὁ χειμὼν προσῄει), although the Julian date of that battle is likely to have been in early October.[15]

The summary of events in Chapter 2 incorporates many details that can be gleaned from non-Caesarian sources. For instance, W. (15 n. 20) supplements Caesar's account of the flight of the tribunes M. Antony and Q. Cassius on the night of 7/8 Jan. 49 (20/21 Nov. 48, JUL) by mentioning that they were accompanied by the ex-tribune C. Curio (Cic. *Fam.* 16.11.2). W. fails, however, to note that M. Caelius, too, was a member of the travelling party (Cic. *Fam.* 8.17.1). Both Curio and Caelius appear later in the narrative, Curio as leader of the ill-fated expedition to Africa in the summer (22–3), Caelius, as praetor in 48, who with Milo lost his life in trying to subvert Caesar's financial measures (29–30). In naming (38) Caesar's legate P. Sulla, who commanded the right wing of Caesar's army at Pharsalus (*BCiv.* 3.89.2), W. takes it for granted that the legate was the disgraced consul-designate for 65. A case can be made, however, that this sub-commander was instead the son of the consul-designate.[16]

Chapter 3 (Italia) begins W.'s close analysis of Caesar's narrative under three subheadings: (1) 'Crossing the Rubicon'; (2) 'Opening the *Sanctius Aerarium*'; and (3) 'The Sources of Soldiers'. W. starts by reconstructing, principally from Plutarch (*Caes.* 32.4–8), Pollio's account of Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon. W. calls attention to the high drama in Pollio's version, with indirect as well as direct discourse ('let the die be cast') concerning Caesar's choices on

[13] Pliny, *Nat.* 16.93–4: *flare incipiente vento Favonio ex a.d. fere vi Id. Feb.* [8 Feb.] … *flat ab occasu aequinoctiali* ***ver inchoans***.

[14] Vegetius, *De re mil.* 4.39: *a Novembri autem mense crebris tempestatibus navigia conturbat Vergiliarum hiemalis occasus. ex die igitur tertio Idus Novembres* (11 Nov.) *usque in diem sextum Idus Martias* (10 Mar.) *maria clauduntur.*

[15] R–R (above, n. 7), 202, with bibliography, assign the battle to c. 8 Dec. (2 Oct., JUL).

[16] J. T. Ramsey, App. A §43 in the *Landmark Caesar* (above, n. 2) 661–2.

that momentous occasion. As W. points out (49–57), Caesar's narrative strategy is entirely different. Caesar frames the choices facing him strictly in terms of the defence of *libertas* (the veto power of the plebeian tribunes), as opposed to submission to the tyranny of a *factio*. Caesar omits explicit mention of the crossing of the river Rubicon, and he places the address to his troops in the town of Ravenna, in his province, before he marched into Italy and seized Ariminum (*BCiv.* 1.7.1–8). And Caesar furthermore casts his remarks in a form that resembles a political address to a body of citizens, a *contio* (*apud milites contionatur*), rather than a harangue of soldiers. The reader is reminded that the rapidity with which Caesar was able to deploy more than one legion south of the Alps belies Caesar's portrayal of his invasion as a response to the *senatus consultum ultimum* passed on 7 Jan. Section 2 similarly reveals Caesar's clear misdirection in describing how the consul L. Lentulus supposedly opened the *sanctius aerarium*[17] but failed to remove the cash because he fled Rome in a panic at the false news of the imminent arrival of Caesar's cavalry.[18] This narrative strategy allows Caesar to portray the doors of the treasury as standing invitingly open (61), which we know is the opposite of reality. Caesar did eventually take possession of the cash on reserve, but he did so by breaking open the locked doors when the keys could not be produced. Furthermore, he did so after he had threatened with death the plebeian tribune L. Metellus, who tried to block those doors (Plut. *Caes.* 35.2–4; cf. Cic. *Att.* 10.8.6, 9A.1; App. *BCiv.* 2.41; Dio 41.17.2). Caesar's account does not mention these embarrassing details, nor does he connect the obstruction of Metellus with the seizure of the *sanctius aerarium*. Instead, Caesar portrays the tribune's intransigence as unreasonable and unwarranted in the face of Caesar's legitimate needs and mission (*BCiv.* 1.33.3–4). In Section 3, W. examines the source of Caesar's soldiers for the invasion of Italy in Jan. 49 and draws attention to the way in which Caesar portrays the conduct of his foes in an unfavourable light (e.g., in the treatment of Caesar's gladiators in Campania, *BCiv.* 1.14.4–5). As remarked in n. 6, W. concludes that new units must have been raised in Cisalpina, well

[17] This special reserve was designed to be used only to meet the emergency of a direct threat of attack on Rome by the Gauls.

[18] *BCiv.* 1.14.1. When in Chapter 7 (208–9) W. returns once more to Caesar's negative portrayal of Lentulus, he remarks that behind Caesar's claim that Lentulus repeatedly boasted 'he would be another Sulla' (*seque alterum fore Sullam*, *BCiv.* 1.4.2) may lie a Sibylline oracle that was in circulation in 63 and foretold the mastery of Rome by three Cornelii. The Catilinarian conspirator who in 63 hoped to be the third Cornelius to follow in the footsteps of Cinna and Sulla was, as chance would have it, another Lentulus, specifically P. Lentulus Sura (*cos.* 71, pr. II 63): *Lentulum autem sibi confirmasse ex fatis Sibyllinis haruspicumque responsis se esse tertium illum Cornelium* (Cic. *Cat.* 3.9; cf. Sall. *Cat.* 47.2). Oddly, however, W. misidentifies the conspirator as Cethegus, while at the same time citing my commentary (the 1984, 1st ed.) on Sall. *Cat.* 47.2. Nowhere does W. mention P. Lentulus Sura, as revealed by his absence from the Index of Persons.

in advance of Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon (57). However, the important fact to be borne in mind is that two of Caesar's three veteran legions were clearly summoned from north of the Alps. The XIIth caught up with him at Firmum on c. 8 Feb./20 Dec., JUL (*BCiv.* 1.16.1), while the VIIIth was present at Corfinium on 17 Feb./29 Dec., JUL (*BCiv.* 1.18.5).[19] Along the way, W. (76–81) makes some shrewd estimates regarding the amount of land held by, and the amount of wealth possessed by, Pompey and L. Domitius (*cos.* 54) by extrapolating from the number of shepherds and slaves they were able to form into scratch military units.

Each of the remaining six chapters examines closely different sections of Caesar's narrative to uncover subtle, and not so subtle distortions in his account of the war. What emerges is a more historically accurate and balanced account of the course of the fighting. Chapter 4 (Hispania) addresses Caesar's strategy for removing the serious threat posed on his western flank by Pompey's armies in the two Spains. W. explores the deep roots of support upon which Pompey could rely in the provinces of Nearer and Farther Spain thanks to his six years of campaigning against Sertorius in the 70s and his five-year proconsular command awarded by the *lex Trebonia* of 55 and renewed for another five years. Chapter 5 (Gallia) logically makes Massilia its chief focus, a venerable ally of Rome and a *civitas libera* whose failure to support Caesar presented him with a grave and unforeseen setback.[20] The setback was a logistical one in that Massilia could block communications, while at the same time Massilia's refusal to admit Caesar served as a bellwether. It raised the hopes of Caesar's enemies by casting a negative verdict on his chances of success and the merits of his cause. W. (152) credits Caesar with indulging in misleading logic by urging the Massiliotes to follow the example of Italy and welcome him within their gates. As W. points out, Italy met Caesar's invasion in a defensive state. On the other side of the coin, however, there is no denying that Italy's defences crumbled and melted like the morning dew, just as Sulla and his young follower Pompey drove out the governmental forces in town after town of Italy in 83. In Chapter 6 (Africa), W. tackles the thorny problem of trying to work out Caesar's source(s) for his account of Curio's failed campaign (*BCiv.* 2.23–44). W. concludes that it was not Pollio, although Pollio

[19] R–R (above, n. 7) 189.

[20] To explain the attested presence of a Massiliote embassy in Rome in Jan. 49 (Caes. *BCiv.* 1.34.2—a reference not supplied until later in the discussion, on another matter), W. (147–8) suggests the aim of the mission may have been to secure formal recognition of benefits conferred on Massilia by Caesar as governor of Transalpina. One has to wonder, however, if that was the goal of the embassy why Caesar did not take the opportunity to highlight the ingratitude of the Massiliotes in the face of his recent benefactions (in 51–50 BC?). It is indeed striking that this major allied city receives not a single mention in Caesar's *De bello Gallico*.

participated in the campaign. It is suggested that Caesar may have relied upon reports from the legate C. Caninius Rebilus, who holds the distinction of later serving as consul for a single day (31 Dec. 45). Documents seized in the capture of Pompey's camp at Pharsalus are identified as another promising source. As W. perceptively remarks, such details as the execution of captives on the orders of King Juba of Numidia and the triumphal entry of the king into Utica (*BCiv.* 2.44) could hardly have been described to Caesar by those who managed to board ships and escape capture, as Pollio did. Chapter 6 also takes the opportunity to explore how the loss of Africa as a source of grain for Italy had a profound impact on financial and living conditions during Caesar's absence in 48. W. links those hardships to the failed uprising led by the praetor M. Caelius in late Feb.–Mar. 48, pointing out that Caelius' route through southern Italy was most likely intended to take him to the province of Africa, where his family had holdings (195).

Chapter 7 (Macedonia) examines such misleading elements of Caesar's account as his representation of Pompey's strategy in stationing troops on the Adriatic coast as a defensive measure designed to ward off Caesar's invasion (206). In reality, the build-up of Pompeian forces was doubtless modelled on Sulla's winning strategy of invading Italy from the East in 83. Similarly, the way in which Caesar narrates the sack of the Thessalian town of Gomphi (3.80.1–7) pales in comparison with the brutal and grim scene of the townspeople's suffering that appears to have been included in Pollio's account, the likely source of Appian, *BCiv.* 2.64 (229–34).

Chapter 8 (Asia) explores such relevant and intriguing subjects as (a) did Caesar make a visit to Ilium, as related by Lucan (9.961–99)—W. concludes he did not—and (b) what role in Caesar's narrative is played by the two failures of Pompeian officials (Metellus Scipio and T. Ampius Balbus) to loot the treasure housed in the temple of Artemis at Ephesus. Regarding Ephesus, W. speculates that Caesar's account drew upon panegyrics celebrating his arrival at Ephesus and sought to offset the ill will that resulted from his harsh treatment of Rome's venerable ally Massilia. As for the tradition that Caesar's progress through Asia in pursuit of Pompey took him to Ilium, W. adduces Plutarch's failure to mention a visit by Caesar to the ruins of Troy as evidence that it is likely to be fictional. Certainly Lucan is guilty of introducing other major historical inaccuracies such as portraying Cicero as present at Pharsalus (7.60–85). W. also draws attention to the unflattering way in which Caesar is portrayed in Lucan as an ignorant tourist when he beholds the sights at Ilium. From this it is surmised that Lucan may have been drawing upon a tale invented by some hostile Pompeian, perhaps Ampius Balbus (?). Left out of account is one other piece of evidence that may have some bearing on this question, namely Strabo's mention of territory granted to Ilium by Caesar and other acts of generosity in recognition of his claimed descent from Aeneas (13.1.27 (595C)). The ninth and final chapter (Aegyptus) addresses such topics

as (a) the various logical points of closure for Caesar's narrative that he chose to pass over (e.g, the Battle of Pharsalus and Pompey's death) and what this says about his aims and intentions in composing his account of the war, and (b) the tangled financial relations between Rome and the Ptolemies, which made Egypt such an alluring prize that was eventually seized by Augustus.

To sum up, W. has provided a fresh and masterful analysis of Caesar's civil war commentary.[21] His study offers new and valuable insights into the history of the period. Careful attention is paid at every turn to Caesar's method of justifying his actions as a response to supposed stubborn and unreasonable resistance on the part of his opponents. The author's application of critical methods yields interesting and important results. The structure of the book makes it accessible to a broad range of readers, from someone new to the subject to an advanced scholar. By offering a narrative overview of the war in Chapter 2 and then segmenting the campaigns chronologically and geographically in the seven subsequent chapters, the book succeeds in exploring a complex set of questions with perfect clarity. This book is a credit to the author and to the series in which it appeared. Every university library should include this book in its holdings, and every scholar who studies this period of Roman history will gain from W. fresh insight into Caesar's *Bellum Civile*.

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[21] Errors are few. Apart from the one mentioned above in n. 18, the following corrections may be noted. The consular colleague of M. Marcellus (*cos.* 51) was not Serv. Sulpicius Galba (54) but Sulpicius Rufus. The temple of Saturn is not located 'at the northeastern end of the Forum' (58) but below the Capitoline, at the southwestern corner. It is not the case that 'all four consular candidates for 54 BCE were disbarred for activity of this sort [sc. *ambitus*]' (110). They were, it is true, all indicted in 54 (Cic. *Qfr.* 3.3.2), but two of them, Domitius Calvinus and Messalla Rufus, were eventually elected in July 53 to serve for the remainder of that year. And lastly, C. Pomptinus (pr. 63), who governed Transalpina in 62–59, did not wait 'over a decade in order to hold a triumph [in 54 BC]' (169 n. 21).