

DIVERGING TRADITIONS ON MARCELLUS' SICILIAN CAMPAIGN (214–211 BC): LIVY, CICERO, PLUTARCH, AND APPIAN ON MARCELLUS' *FIDES* AND HUMANITY*

Abstract: This paper attempts to analyse the discussions of and controversies about Marcellus' campaign in Sicily in the ancient authors, with particular attention to four sources: Livy, Cicero's *Verrines*, Plutarch's *Life of Marcellus*, and Appian's *Sicilian book*. These texts provide very different judgements about the morality of Marcellus' deeds and reveal the presence of diverging traditions; they also show the malleability of Marcellus' character. The debated issues appear to be centred around three main points: Marcellus' honesty in respecting pacts and treaties; his humanity towards his enemies; and the ethical value of his pillage of Syracuse. In this paper, the malleability of Marcellus' character is highlighted in the analysis of these representations, which seeks to connect them to the aims and approaches of the authors.

Keywords: Marcellus, Syracuse, Sicily, *fides*, *perfidia*, cruelty

1. Introduction

M Claudius Marcellus was one of the leading figures in Rome at the end of the third century BC. He was elected to the consulship five times, was one of the only three commanders to gain the *spolia opima*, and one of the most important generals deployed by the Romans against Hannibal, whom, according to some sources, Marcellus was the first to defeat in battle. The fame he was able to achieve made him feature prominently among our sources; however, these ancient representations are not without their problems: Marcellus became a very controversial figure, and the accounts that a modern reader finds in the sources reflect these controversies.¹ In this paper, I will deal with the diverging traditions about him, narrowing the focus to Marcellus' campaign in Sicily during the Second Punic War.

* I would like to thank my mentors from the University of Pavia, most notably Livia Capponi and Rita Scuderi, with whom I have discussed the issues treated here. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions, and to the editors for their patience. All English translations quoted in this paper are from the *Loeb Classical Library*, with occasional modifications.

¹ Flower (2003). The author especially discusses the negative traditions about his Sicilian booty and his death.

This campaign extended from 214 to 211 BC. Marcellus had to besiege Syracuse, which had gone over to the Carthaginians, and at the same time reconquer some other Greek Sicilian cities. Most notably, at the beginning of the war he captured Leontini, whose inhabitants, according to the Sicilians, he killed, and later Megara, which was destroyed. He was also able to retain Henna through a pre-emptive massacre of the population. He managed to conquer most of Syracuse by exploiting a religious festival in the city; he then had to fend off the menace of a Punic army on the island, and, at last, he captured the remainder of the city thanks to the treason of Moericus, apparently while negotiations for the surrender of the Syracusans were in progress. After returning to Rome, he was required to answer accusations and criticism of his behaviour on the island. Several detailed modern accounts of these events are available;² in this paper, my aim is rather to analyse the way in which these events are described by four ancient sources, namely Cicero, Livy, Plutarch, and Appian. By dealing with the inconsistencies, complexities, and distortions in their accounts, it is possible to catch a glimpse of the diverging traditions about Marcellus, highlight the malleability of the *exemplum* of Marcellus, and discuss the aims and approaches of these sources as they deal with a character who could be (and was) depicted in very different and conflicting ways.

2. The Sources

As a preliminary to discussion of the presentation of Marcellus by these four authors, it is useful to investigate briefly what sources they could consult. This discussion will provide some context to the following investigation, by highlighting the different currents that developed about Marcellus.³

Marcellus probably featured in the account of his contemporary Fabius Pictor.⁴ It would be easy to suppose that Fabius provided a very benign view of Marcellus' Sicilian campaign,⁵ especially if one accepts the view according to which his annals in Greek were meant as a piece of propaganda directed at

² Marchetti (1972); Lazenby (1978) 102–8, 115–19; Marino (1988) 40–80; Serrati (2020) 72–5; and above all Eckstein (1987) 135–77.

³ For an outline of the sources about Marcellus, see Flower (2003) 41–5.

⁴ The last event for which Pictor is mentioned by Livy is the Battle of Trasimene; it has been supposed that he did not conclude his account of the Second Punic War (Bispham and Cornell in *FRHist* I.166–7; *contra* Badian (1966) 4–5). However, one should note that Livy does not mention him for the embassy to Delphi (in which Fabius Pictor took part), even though Pictor certainly wrote about it (App. *Hann.* 27). About the organisation of Fabius Pictor's work in general, see Rich (2018) 39–48, with further bibliography.

⁵ Flower (2003) 43.

the Greek world.⁶ That Fabius tried to depict Roman wars in a patriotic way is undoubtedly true, at least to some extent, as Polybius (1.14) testifies concerning the First Punic War. However, this does not necessarily entail a positive depiction of Marcellus. Fabius Pictor was a kinsman of the famous *cunctator*, Fabius Maximus. Although it has been suggested that Fabius Maximus and Marcellus were friends and political allies,⁷ it is probably better to believe that the two were not on good terms. Marcellus and Fabius Maximus are often contrasted by the sources,⁸ especially about the issues that spurred criticism against Marcellus. The siege of Syracuse was compared to the capture of Tarentum by those who wanted to cast Marcellus in a bad light,⁹ and, according to Plutarch (*Marc.* 21.4–5) and Livy (27.16.8), Fabius Maximus' 'good' example was contrasted with Marcellus' bad behaviour: Marcellus was said to have corrupted the people through the Greek works of art that he took to Rome.¹⁰ Livy also juxtaposes them in the context of the capture of Casilinum: Marcellus is cast in the role of a treacherous commander, while Fabius is moderate and keeps his word.¹¹ It is also probable that Pictor was behind the accounts about Marcellus' death, in which the commander is blamed for his rashness and (in some cases) for his *impietas*.¹² In short, while it is extremely unlikely that Fabius Pictor represented the Roman intervention

⁶ Gelzer (1933); Alföldi (1965) 169–75; Gabba (2000) 65–7. This view has been rightly nuanced: Momigliano (1966); Timpe (1972) 946–7 and 954–8; Bispham and Cornell in *FRHist* I.167–9. Cf. Badian (1966) 2–6; Wiseman (2007) 74–5.

⁷ Càssola (1962) 315–20 (cf. Scullard (1951) 57–9). His argument is based on the consular elections for 215 and 214, in which, however, Fabius appears not to have helped Marcellus. McDonnell (2006) 80–1 makes a much more convincing case for 'rivalry or, better, hostility between the two men'.

⁸ Because of their different approach to the war, they were nicknamed respectively 'the sword' and 'the shield' of Rome: Plut. *Marc.* 9.4; *Fab.* 19.3.

⁹ Scardigli (1979) 40–1; Gruen (1992) 101–2; McDonnell (2006) 78–81; Hölkeskamp (2018) 712–18.

¹⁰ On the discussions on the Syracusan spoils and the way they influenced the Romans, see Gros (1979); Gruen (1992) 84–113; Galsterer (1994); Flower (2003) 47–8; McDonnell (2006); and Miles (2008).

¹¹ According to Liv. 24.19.8–11, Marcellus exploited the negotiations between Fabius and the Campanians to capture a gate, kill those who tried to surrender, and then massacre the population. Only fifty Campanians managed to escape and sought the protection of Fabius, who gave them an escort to reach Capua. Livy does not comment; Levene (2010) 210 takes this as a case in which Livy suspends his judgement, wishing to involve the readers.

¹² Vishnia (2012), with further bibliography.

in Sicily as morally flawed, the importance of his family tradition¹³ makes it probable that Marcellus' actions were not cast in a good light.¹⁴

Another important author was Fabius Pictor's near contemporary Cincius Alimentus. Again, it is not clear whether he was able to write an account of the whole Hannibalic War.¹⁵ What is interesting is that he was praetor in Sicily under Laevinus, the successor of Marcellus.¹⁶ This does not reveal anything of his stance towards Marcellus, but suggests that, if his work covered the topic, he must have treated the war in Sicily as a prime subject.¹⁷

Authors of the following generation, especially Cato and Ennius, must have played an important role, too. The former probably offered a negative account of the influence of Marcellus' booty¹⁸; the latter is said by Cicero (*Arch.* 22) to have praised Marcellus.

The last important Roman source is Coelius Antipater. According to Livy (27.27.12–14), Coelius conducted thorough investigations into Marcellus' death, comparing the *tradita fama* (the tradition that focused on his rashness?) with the account found in Marcellus' *laudatio funebris* by his son.¹⁹ It is unclear what this tells about Coelius Antipater's own stance. However, this suggests that Marcellus probably featured prominently in Coelius Antipater's work and, above all, that Marcellus' *laudatio funebris* was still available at the end of the second century BC: it might have had a role in propagating a positive view of the commander.²⁰

Among Greek sources, Polybius immediately springs to mind. In modern scholarship it is often assumed, with good reason, that Polybius' general representation of Marcellus was far from favourable.²¹ Unfortunately, much of his account of Marcellus' campaign in Sicily is lost. In only two instances does the historian clearly condemn the general: about the Syracusan spoils (9.10) and about his rashness, which led to his death (10.32). According to Plutarch (*Comp. Pel. Marc.* 1.7), Polybius also refused to believe the Roman

¹³ Underlined by Bispham and Cornell in *FRHist* I.176–8; Richardson (2015) 180–4; Hölkeskamp (2018) 740–54.

¹⁴ Scardigli (2012) 231 n. 57.

¹⁵ Bispham and Cornell, *FRHist* I.179–81.

¹⁶ Bispham and Cornell, *FRHist* I.179 and n. 3. Cincius was subsequently captured by Hannibal, with whom he was able to speak in person (Liv. 21.38.5). On Laevinus as governor in Sicily, see Serrati (2020) 75–7.

¹⁷ According to Flower (2003) 43, his account was probably favourable to Marcellus.

¹⁸ Cato's stance was probably in line with the Fabian milieu (Liv. 34.4).

¹⁹ On the traditions about Marcellus' death, see Caltabiano (1975).

²⁰ Flower (2003) 44. On the importance of *laudationes* for the development of traditions, see Hölkeskamp (2018) 737–8.

²¹ Münzer (1899a) 2738; Walbank (1957) 210–11; Caltabiano (1975) 67; Champion (2013) 145–6.

tradition according to which Marcellus was the first general to defeat Hannibal.²²

Some earlier Greek philo-Punic sources are known as well, especially those mentioned by Polybius himself: Sosylus the Lacedaemonian, Chaereas,²³ and in all likelihood also Silenus of Caleacte.²⁴ Among them, Silenus might have had an important role. He wrote a monograph on the Hannibalic War and a book on Sicily, possibly a sort of periegesis;²⁵ as a Sicilian Greek²⁶ and a member of Hannibal's entourage, he was in a good position to emphasise the worst traits of the Roman conquest,²⁷ and to cast Marcellus in the worst light possible.

3. The Livian Outline: A Complex Portrait

Although Livy is not the most ancient among the four main sources considered in this text, it is best to start with his account. His presentation is nuanced and complex, and therefore very suitable to highlight the main contentious points.

A suitable starting point is offered by Livy's account of the discussions in the senate concerning Marcellus' campaign. According to the historian, Marcellus complained that his own personal enemies, and Cornelius Cethegus in particular, were stirring up the Sicilians and inciting them to invent *crimina ficta* against him. Livy does not judge this claim; in the following pages, however, the historian appears to distance himself from the view that Marcellus' enmities in Rome were the only reason for the accusations. As Sicily was initially allotted to Marcellus as a province once again, the Syracusan envoys

²² This is probably an instance of Polybian polemic against a historical tradition. Cf. Burton (2022).

²³ Pol. 3.20.5. A couple of other Greek historians of the Hannibalic war are known: Eumachus of Neapolis (*BNJ* 178) and a Xenophon (*BNJ* 179); see also *BNJ* 180.

²⁴ Polybius probably has Silenus in mind when he criticises the fabulous accounts about Hannibal's crossing of the Alps (3.47–4): Pédech (1964) 375 and Meister (1971).

²⁵ Walbank (1968–9) 495–7; Galvagno (2004) 57; Williams (2022). *Contra* Manni (1957) 151–3.

²⁶ Athenaeus (12.59) writes that he was *Καλλατιανός* (so, from Kallatis, on the Black Sea), but this is generally interpreted as a scribal mistake for *Καλακτινός*: Williams (2022), with further bibliography. Speaking of Sicilian Greeks, it has been suggested that Silenus was used as a source by Diodorus (Lauritano (1956); Manni (1957); La Bua (1966) 233–79), although this hypothesis is very controversial (Walbank (1968–9); Williams (2022)). It is a shame that Diodorus' account of the capture of Syracuse is lost. The only two surviving fragments describe the ingenuity of Archimedes (26.18) and the pitiful condition of the inhabitants after the sack (26.20); the latter might betray a negative stance towards Marcellus.

²⁷ Walbank (1957) 382; Brizzi (1984) 92–3; Seibert (1993) 184–91; Briquel (2004); Galvagno (2004) 47–51.

in Rome were cast into utmost despair, and, wearing mourning dress, went from house to house declaring that they would have preferred for Syracuse to be swept away by a flood or by an eruption of Mount Etna, than to have to face Marcellus' *implacabilitas* once again.²⁸ This time, Livy comments (26.29.5) that their complaints had great resonance both because of the widespread *invidia Marcelli* (as in Marcellus' own earlier complaint) and because of a genuine *misericordia Siculorum*.

Livy also gives space to the Sicilians' oration: they protested that they had never wanted to betray Roman *fides*, and that Hieronymus, Hippocrates, and Epicydes were the only ones to blame for the war. They also accused Marcellus, arguing that he had encouraged anti-Roman resentment because of his *crudelitas* at Leontini, that he had preferred to take Syracuse by force than to accept their surrender, and that he had been too harsh in his looting (26.30.1–10). In short, three main accusations emerge: *crudelitas*, *perfidia*, and greed. In his answer, Marcellus replied that his actions were entirely justified,²⁹ and he also maintained that he had never received significant overtures from the Syracusans (26.31.4–7). Once again, Livy does not judge, but he represents some of the senators as being genuinely moved by the Greeks' despair. According to the historian, the two orations spurred a hotly contested debate: many senators (most notably T. Manlius Torquatus) agreed with the Syracusans, although Marcellus' decisions were ultimately ratified. Livy's presentation of the debate is nuanced.³⁰ The historian allows different and opposing visions to emerge, without fully committing to any of them.

It is interesting to try and trace back the three major Syracusan complaints in Livy's account of the campaign. Starting with the consul's cruelty, the historian maintains (20.30.3–7) that the rumours concerning his massacres at Leontini were false. However, he also writes of a terror-based strategy, especially at Megara: *Megara vi capta diruit ac diripuit ad reliquorum ac maxime Syracusanorum terrorem* ('Megara he took by armed force and he destroyed and pillaged it to inspire terror in the others, especially the Syracusans').³¹ This comment does not imply any condemnation, but it is easy to see how it might lend some support to the Sicilians' complaints. More interesting is Livy's presentation of the pre-emptive massacre of the population at Henna. On the

²⁸ Liv. 26.29.3–4.

²⁹ Liv. 26.31.2: *quidquid in hostibus feci, ius belli defendit* ('in the case of an enemy whatever I did is sanctioned by the rules of war').

³⁰ Mineo (2016); cf. Carawan (1984); Mensching (1996) 259–67; Bernard (2000) 321–5; Levene (2010) 208–14, 330–4.

³¹ Liv. 24.35.2. On the psychological importance of the Roman violence and devastations in the framework of the balance of power in Sicily in the First and Second Punic Wars, see Marino (2006).

one hand, Livy gives space to Pinarius' speech (24.38), in which the commander of the garrison maintains that the terrible act was necessary, as the population was on the verge of defection; on the other hand, he closes the episode with this remark (24.39.7): *ita Henna aut malo aut necessario facinore retenta*. Livy, then, does not deny that this cruel and treacherous act was a crime; he just provides his readers with two alternatives: the crime was either justifiable as necessary or was just wrong.³² He adds that Marcellus endorsed Pinarius' decision. Moreover, Livy's next statement, concerning the widespread defections of the Sicilian cities, appears to be in line with what the Syracusans say in the senate: Marcellus' cruelty instigated the defections. About the general's cruelty, then, Livy chooses not to commit to either of the two versions in a coherent way. The historian appears to be more interested in letting both emerge, and generally refrains from commenting. When he does, he still points to the difficulty of judging Marcellus' actions in a morally clear-cut way. Modern historiographers have pointed out that Livy is often quite complex in the characterisation of the men he discusses.³³ Levene's study is particularly important in this regard, and Marcellus' portrait is indeed taken by him as a case-study to illustrate the potential complexities and meaningful inconsistencies of Livy's representations.³⁴ The historian seems to be encouraging his readers to approach Marcellus and his actions in a critical way.³⁵

A very similar picture emerges regarding the other two major accusations. Concerning Marcellus' lack of *fides* in his negotiations for the surrender of the city, Livy again does not pick sides clearly. On the one hand, he has Marcellus declare twice (25.31.6; 26.31.4–7) that the Syracusans had never made any serious steps towards a surrender. On the other, the historian's text does not lend full support to this statement. Inconsistencies arise, once again: Livy attests to an early plot of the pro-Roman Syracusan faction against Epicydes (25.23.4–7), which must be the same one recalled by the Syracusans in their oration (26.30.5–6). According to Livy, it failed because of an informer, while the Syracusans blamed Marcellus' indolence. Either way, Marcellus appears to know nothing about it. More importantly, Livy's account of the fall of Syracuse appears to lend support to the Greeks' complaints: when the

³² On Livy's nuanced presentation of the events in Henna, see Marino (1988) 69–70.

³³ Livy's characterisation of individuals and peoples has often been regarded as simplistic and based upon stereotypes. Recent scholarship has added nuance to this view: see above all Bernard (2000) (in particular pp. 133–60); Bernard (2015); and Levene (2010) 165–214; cf. Foulkes (1999) 74. Along the same lines, scholarship about the employment of *exempla* in Livy has highlighted the fact that his exemplary characters are often complex, and can be interpreted in different ways by the readers: Chaplin (2000) 24–5, 30–1, and *passim*; Beltramini (2017) 173–4 and 191–2.

³⁴ Levene (2010) 197–213.

³⁵ Levene (2010) 212–13.

Achradina was betrayed to Marcellus, negotiations were being held (25.30). The account is not completely clear, but it appears that Marcellus consciously decided to rely on Moericus, therefore conquering the city, instead of pursuing the negotiations for its surrender.³⁶ Once again, the presentation is complex, and Livy makes no attempt to even out the inconsistencies between the different visions or to follow one of the two sides consistently.

Concerning the sack of the city, Livy apparently chooses to side with Marcellus, echoing his statement according to which his actions were in line with the *ius belli*. Livy agrees: the *spolia* were *parta belli iure* (25.40.2); however, the historian then goes on to discuss the negative effects that the booty had on the Romans, as a trigger for their greed and contempt for the gods.³⁷ In this instance, the readers appear to be invited to reflect on Marcellus' actions not so much in relation to the Sicilian complaints, but rather for their long-term effects in Rome.

In short, Livy does not make any effort to provide a consistent and morally unilateral picture of Marcellus and his actions in Sicily. On the contrary, he allows for contrasts and inconsistencies to emerge, and provides the information needed to judge the events. Livy could probably consult, as argued above, several diverging accounts about Marcellus, but, instead of following one of the diverging tendencies, he chose to highlight the discussion and the contrasts about Marcellus and to portray his character in a complex way. The potential moral ambiguity of the Sicilian campaign comes to light from his text, and commentators have rightly underlined both the nuanced nature of this representation³⁸ and the fact that it is probably meant to encourage a critical approach by the readers to the themes he discusses.³⁹

4. Cicero: Marcellus the Good Conqueror

Modern scholarship has often underlined the importance of the employment of *exempla* by Cicero.⁴⁰ Marcellus is cited as an *exemplum* in several passages throughout Cicero's works. However, in most cases, Marcellus is just praised together with many other commanders. He is employed as an *exemplum* for

³⁶ Livy even maintains that Moericus and Marcellus decided for this reason to prevent further negotiations.

³⁷ See above, n. 10. Specifically on Livy's presentation, see Rossi (2000) 61–3.

³⁸ See above, n. 30.

³⁹ Again, Levene (2010) 165–214. On the importance of Livy's audience, and on the ways he engages with it, see Pausch (2022), with further bibliography.

⁴⁰ Especially van der Blom (2010). See also Rambaud (1953) 36–40; Price (1975) 103–29; David (1980); Stemmler (2000); Bücher (2006); van der Blom (2011) and (2020); Langlands (2018) 168–71; Pierzak (2021).

several virtues (military skill, courage, good fortune, lack of greed), but he does not appear to have had, in Cicero's eyes, any really peculiar qualities.⁴¹ There is one case, however, in which Marcellus, as an *exemplum*, gains a great significance, and in which his virtues are taken as the true standard against which to compare the faults of Cicero's adversary: Gaius Verres.

In the *Verrines*, Cicero attempts to build up a paradoxical juxtaposition between Marcellus, a conqueror who behaved with justice and moderation, and Verres, a governor whose conduct was the opposite. A first description of Marcellus' behaviour is found in the digression about the *dignitas* of Sicily (*Verr.* 2.2.4), in which the orator underlines the general's *virtus*, *fides*, and mildness, and his decision not to plunder Syracuse. Another reference to the general's mildness is found later in the same book (2.2.51),⁴² but it is especially in the fourth book that Marcellus shines as the 'good hero', in the first part of Cicero's treatment of Syracuse (2.4.115–33). Cicero compares Verres and Marcellus explicitly, stating that the former was a conqueror rather than a governor, and the latter a founder rather than a conqueror. He writes that Marcellus did not even destroy one single building; then, the author admits that some works of art were brought to Rome, but also states that his *clementia* led him to spare many others, and all of the inhabitants and buildings as well. He also recalls Marcellus' displeasure at the death of Archimedes. According to the orator, the Syracusans had the impression that Marcellus had come to defend, rather than to attack, the city.⁴³ In conclusion, Cicero reiterates that no one was killed on his orders (2.4.131). The last, brief reference comes from the fifth book (2.5.84), in which again Marcellus' *miser cordia* shines.

Marcellus' role in the *Verrines*, in short, is as an *exemplum* employed against Verres. Marcellus' three main virtues, *fides*, leniency, and lack of greed, are meant to contrast with Verres' vices:⁴⁴ the latter did not have any *fides* towards the allies, was cruel, and, above all, was greedy. Interestingly, these accusations are the same charges that were levelled, according to Livy, against Marcellus himself: *perfidia*, cruelty, and greed. Cicero must have followed or re-elaborated an apologetic tradition in his presentation.⁴⁵ The orator maintains that Ennius

⁴¹ This explains why Marcellus does not feature prominently in the conspicuous literature about Cicero's employment of *exempla*. On Marcellus as an exemplary figure, however, see Langlands (2018) 71.

⁴² According to Cicero, the Syracusans owed their very existence to the Marcelli (so, clearly, to Marcellus the conqueror).

⁴³ Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.120: *quasi ad ea defendenda cum exercitu, non oppugnanda venisset* ('as if he had come with his army to defend [the buildings of the city], instead of to assault them').

⁴⁴ On this Ciceronian juxtaposition ('eine Synkrisis von Marcellus und Verres') see Torregaray Pagola (2004) 501–2, 506–7; Baldo (2004) 45–7, 501–2; Schwameis (2020); Pierzak (2021) 61–3.

⁴⁵ Baldo (2004) 45–7.

praised Marcellus (*Arch.* 22), but he does not offer more details. Perhaps the family tradition of the Marcelli was still able to influence public opinion?⁴⁶ Or did Cicero read a favourable annalistic account?⁴⁷

Several reasons probably lie behind Cicero's choice. First, as the conqueror of Syracuse, Marcellus could be cast as a paradoxical antithesis to Verres (the magnanimous conqueror vs the evil governor). He probably could also be seen as the man who re-established the provincial system in Sicily⁴⁸. Cicero repeatedly casts his defence of the Sicilians as an attempt to protect this good provincial system,⁴⁹ and insists on the fact that wicked governors such as Verres endangered this harmony (*Verr.* 2.3.212): the importance of the juxtaposition with Marcellus is thus clear. Furthermore, Marcellus was strongly associated, in the public imagination, with Sicilian works of art. His role as one of the first (if not the first) adorners of Rome is recognised by Cicero himself (*Verr.* 2.1.55), and the influence of the Syracusan booty on the morality of the Romans was, as mentioned, a hotly debated issue. This provided the orator with the opportunity for making another contrast between Marcellus and Verres. Indeed, it is probable that he felt compelled to compare the two men and to underline the differences between them.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, C. Claudius Marcellus, great-grandson of the conqueror of Syracuse, was among the jurors.⁵⁰ He had also been proconsul in Sicily. Cicero does not miss the opportunity to underline the honesty of his administration, and to compare it with those of his

⁴⁶ As mentioned in the section about Livy, according to that historian, Coelius Antipater used Marcellus' *laudatio funebris* by his son as one of his sources. If it was still widely known, Cicero is unlikely to have contradicted the tradition it reported, given the presence among the jurors of the grandson of the man who wrote the *laudatio* (see below). Langlands (2018) 71 emphasises the importance of the aristocratic tradition in the creation of the 'exemplary figure' of Marcellus. According to *Nep. Att.* 18.3, Atticus wrote books about several illustrious families, including the Claudii Marcelli. The book about them had been commissioned by a Claudius Marcellus.

⁴⁷ At the beginning of his digression about Syracuse, Cicero tells the judges that they had often heard of the capture of the city, and that they had also read about it in the history books (2.4.115: *nemo fere vestrum est quin quem ad modum captae sint a M. Marcello Syracusae saepe audierit, non numquam etiam in annalibus legerit*: 'There can hardly be any among you who has not often heard, and on occasion read in the history books, how Syracuse was captured by Marcus Marcellus').

⁴⁸ Cicero himself insists on Marcellus' role as a 'founder' of Syracuse (*Verr.* 2.4.115) and stresses the link between the Marcelli and the Sicilians as one of the foundations of the good relationship between the province and Rome.

⁴⁹ *Cic. Div. Caec.* 7–9, 66–9. On Cicero's representation of his own role in defence of the provincials (and on his rhetorical distortions of these relationships), see Prag (2013); cf. Lintott (2008) 82–3.

⁵⁰ Münzer (1899b). He was one of the jurors for both the choice of the prosecutor (*Cic. Div. Caec.* 13) and the trial itself (*Verr.* 2.3.212). In both cases, Cicero addresses him directly.

predecessor Lepidus and, of course, of Verres himself.⁵¹ He associates Marcus and Gaius Marcellus as patrons of all Sicily (*Verr.* 2.4.86), as well as mentioning the festivals held in Sicily in honour of the latter, which had been abolished by Verres.⁵² On the whole, it is clear that Cicero is trying to enlist C. Marcellus as an ally against Verres, which makes his treatment of the elder Marcellus even more transparent.⁵³

This employment of Marcellus as a positive *exemplum* by Cicero, however, does not mean that the orator is always entirely consistent in the picture he provides. Recent commentators have underlined the potential flexibility of an *exemplum* in Cicero's works (and in Roman culture in general).⁵⁴ Not only could a historical fact be distorted, or represented in such a way to convey a precise message, but a character or an event could also be portrayed in slightly different ways, or at least with a focus on slightly different details, in different situations.⁵⁵ Historical fairness or accuracy was not Cicero's primary concern while presenting an *exemplum*,⁵⁶ nor was consistency. To juxtapose Marcellus and Verres in the context of Sicilian artworks, for example, the orator employs slightly different strategies.⁵⁷ One of these strategies is to compare Verres' rapacity with Marcellus' decision to spare the beauties of Syracuse and to leave

⁵¹ Cic. *Div. Caec.* 13 (here Cicero refers to another juror, Gn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus, as well); *Verr.* 2.2.8, 3.212. Another member of the family, M. Marcellus (aedile in 91) is recalled as a very honest man. The good administration of the Marcelli is also mentioned in the context of their intervention in the writing of the electoral law of the Sicilian town of Alesa (2.2.122).

⁵² *Verr.* 2.2.51, 2.154, 4.151. See Rives (1993); Beltramini (2020) 341. Cicero also mentions Verres' abuses towards the statues set up by the Sicilians for the Marcelli (*Verr.* 2.4.89–90). Prag (2013) 278–9 interprets these actions as an attempt by Verres to replace Marcellus' patronage with his own.

⁵³ Lintott (2007) 6 and (2008) 84–5; Pittia (2009); van der Blom (2010) 75.

⁵⁴ See, above all, Langlands (2018), esp. 53–66 and 141–65 (p. 53: 'Roman *exempla* easily incorporate moral ambiguity and troubling elements'; p. 59: 'the capacity of *exempla* to incorporate and communicate contradiction and moral complexity'; p. 163: 'the possibility of continual re-elaboration and reinterpretation of familiar material is what lends life to *exempla*'). Specifically on Cicero, see van der Blom (2010); cf. Stemmler (2000) 182–3; Fox (2007) 152–71; Pittia (2009); Langlands (2018) 113–14 and 228–9; Bellini (2020).

⁵⁵ Van der Blom (2010) 16 and 82–128 (p. 122: 'the flexibility of historical *exempla* consists in selectivity, that is, the choice of aspects or variant traditions of a particular *exemplum*, and in the interpretation and presentation of those chosen aspects and traditions'); Bellini (2020); cf. Fox (2007) 154.

⁵⁶ Lintott (2008) 3 and 33–9. Cf. Rambaud (1953); Stemmler (2000) 168–79; Martin (2013); Stok (2021) 17–21. On the *Verrines* in particular, see Pittia (2009), who highlights Cicero's distortions (cf., on the *de frumento* specifically, Steel (2007)). On Cicero's rhetorical strategies in the *Verrines*, see Lintott (2007) 11–18.

⁵⁷ On Cicero's representation of the spoils, see Lazzeretti (2006) 319–21 and 339–44 and Miles (2008) 65–6.

the city *incolumem* and *ornatam*.⁵⁸ Later, he stresses Marcellus' decision to spare the temples (the chief example being that of Minerva, which remained *plenam atque ornatam*: 2.4.122), and points out that he did not even want any of the statues to adorn his temple of *Honos* and *Virtus* (2.4.123). A few lines before this last passage, however, the orator adopts a different approach. In his sack of Syracuse, it is reported, Marcellus managed to conciliate the right of war of the victors with his own mildness:

in ornatu urbis habuit victoriae rationem, habuit humanitatis; victoriae putabat esse multa Romam deportare quae ornamento urbi esse possent, humanitatis non plane exspoliare urbem, praesertim quam conservare voluisset.

In dealing with the city's treasures he did not forget either that he was a conqueror or that he was a humane man. As a conqueror, he thought it proper to remove to Rome many objects that might fitly adorn our city: as a humane man, not to strip the place completely bare, especially as he had resolved to prevent its destruction.

This time, Cicero concedes that it was fitting for a consul to plunder a captured city. The orator also writes that part of the booty was set up *ad aedem Honoris et Virtutis* (so, strictly speaking, not 'in' the temple). The juxtaposition with Verres is centred on the fact that Marcellus had every right to loot Syracuse, while Verres did not; despite this right, he was moderate, while Verres was not. One last strategy for contrasting the two men comes earlier in the text, in the first *actio* (2.1.55). This time, the orator does not bother to try and underplay the extent of the looting by Marcellus, who is listed among those who adorned with their spoils not only every part of Rome, but also the cities in Italy. In this case, the comparison between Marcellus and Verres plays on the fact that Marcellus took almost nothing for himself, while Verres was moved by his own greed, and did not give anything *in publicum*.⁵⁹

The example of the spoils is very well suited to showing Cicero's strategies in employing Marcellus as an *exemplum*. Given his service in Sicily, Cicero must have had at least some knowledge of negative traditions about Marcellus. However, his forensic aims led him to discard these traditions completely. In the *Verrines*, Marcellus always shines as a good hero, and he is always put forward as a positive *exemplum*. Depending on the faults of Verres that he is trying to underline, Cicero highlights different aspects of Marcellus' character:

⁵⁸ Lazzeretti (2006) 43–5.

⁵⁹ See also *Rep.* 1.21, where Cicero writes that the booty was large, but Marcellus took for himself nothing but the famous globe of Archimedes.

his extreme mildness, his *fides*, his selfishness, and his strict adherence to the rights of war. This can even give rise to some slight perplexities for the reader: what was the ultimate extent of Marcellus' plundering?⁶⁰ However, a historically accurate—or even a completely consistent—portrayal of Marcellus is not Cicero's primary concern. What matters is the power of his *exemplum*, which required the selection of the traditions that were better suited to an effective juxtaposition between the 'good conqueror' Marcellus and the 'evil governor' Verres.

5. Plutarch: Marcellus the Mild Philhellene

Another very unilateral portrait is provided by Plutarch. A first sketch of his subject's personality is found in the very first chapter of the *Life of Marcellus* (1.2), where, after mentioning Marcellus' famous martial prowess, the biographer adds:

τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ σώφρων, φιλόανθρωπος, Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας καὶ λόγων ἄκρι τοῦ τιμᾶν καὶ θαυμάζειν τοὺς κατορθοῦντας ἐραστής, αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπ' ἀσχολιῶν ἐφ' ὅσον ἦν πρόθυμος ἀσκήσαι καὶ μαθεῖν οὐκ ἐξικόμενος.

But otherwise he was modest, humane, and so far a lover of Greek learning and discipline as to honour and admire those who excelled therein, although he himself was prevented by his occupations from achieving a knowledge and proficiency here which corresponded to his desires.

Plutarch's statement on Marcellus' philhellenism does not have any significant parallels elsewhere.⁶¹ The biographer, however, constantly reiterates this characterisation throughout the work. Marcellus always figures as a wise, mild, and merciful man.⁶² His love and respect for the Greeks and their culture are particularly evident in the context of his Sicilian campaign.

⁶⁰ Rambaud (1953) 47: 'Les Verrines affirment plusieurs fois que Marcellus n'a pas pillé la Sicile, et d'autres fois qu'il a enrichi Rome, les deux pour décrier Verrès'.

⁶¹ See Gros (1979) 101–4; Ferrary (1988) 573; Gruen (1992) 573–5; Mineo (2016) 249–52. Pelling (1989) 200 rightly states that Plutarch's representation of this trait of Marcellus' personality was made 'doubtless with no evidence at all'.

⁶² Plut. *Marc.* 7.5 (on the mild terms offered to the Gauls after their surrender); 10 (on the good treatment of the Neapolitans); 22.1 (on the modesty he displayed when he settled for the lesser triumph); 27.3–4 (on the calmness and wisdom with which he defended himself when charged with lack of courage). Besides, according to Plutarch, Marcellus triumphed with an *ovatio*, and not with a proper triumph, because his victory had been achieved through benign means and persuasion, not through force: Mossman (2016) 114.

Plutarch presents the consul shedding tears at the thought of the looting of Syracuse (19.1–2). This episode is found in Livy as well (25.24.11–14), but, while the historian only hints at the idea of a great commander being moved by the thought of the power of fortune (or by the happiness generated from his own victory!),⁶³ in Plutarch's *Life* it gains a different significance, as a way of expressing Marcellus' compassion for the Syracusans and their city:

αὐτός μέντοι λέγεται κατιδὼν ἄνωθεν καὶ περισκεψάμενος τῆς πόλεως τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐπὶ πολὺ δακρῦσαι τῷ μέλλοντι γίνεσθαι συμπαθήσας, ἐννοήσας οἶον ἐξ οἴου σχῆμα καὶ μορφήν ἀμείψει μετὰ μικρὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου διαφορηθεῖσα. τῶν γὰρ ἡγεμόνων οὐδεὶς μὲν ἦν ὁ πολμῶν ἐναντιοῦσθαι τοῖς στρατιώταις αἰτουμένοις δι' ἀρπαγῆς ὠφελῆσθαι, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ πυρπολεῖν καὶ κατασκάπτειν ἐκέλευον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲ ὅλως προσήκατο τὸν λόγον ὁ Μάρκελλος, μάλα δὲ ἄκων βιασθεὶς ἔδωκεν ἀπὸ χρημάτων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὠφελεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ ἐλευθέρων σωμαίων ἀπέειπεν ἄψασθαι, καὶ διεκέλευσατο μήτε ἀποκτεῖναι τινα μήτε αἰσχῦναι μήτε ἀνδραποδίσασθαι Συρακουσίων.

He himself, however, as he looked down from the heights and surveyed the great and beautiful city, is said to have wept much in commiseration of its impending fate, bearing in mind how greatly its form and appearance would change in a little while, after his army had sacked it. For among his officers there was not a man who had the courage to oppose the soldiers' demand for a harvest of plunder, nay, many of them actually urged that the city should be burned and razed to the ground. This proposal, however, Marcellus would not tolerate at all, but much against his will, and under compulsion, he permitted booty to be made of property and slaves, although he forbade his men to lay hands on the free citizens, and strictly ordered them neither to kill nor outrage nor enslave any Syracusan.

According to Plutarch, Marcellus did not even want to allow his soldiers to plunder the city, but was compelled to let them loot it because no one could oppose their savage desires. No other source provides such a benign picture; as said, in Polybius (9.10.2), Diodorus (26.20), and Livy (25.25.9) the sack of

⁶³ Marcellus cries *partim gaudio tantae perpetratae rei, partim vetusta gloria urbis* ('partly from the joy of his great achievement and partly because of the city's glory of old'). The theme of his tears is well known to modern historiography: see Moralejo (2018) and Schwameis (2020) 35–6, with cited literature. On the differences between Plutarch's and Livy's representations, see Marino (1988) 72 and Rossi (2000) 59. According to Rossi (2000), Livy employs this literary topos to hint at the negative effects of the conquest of Syracuse.

Syracuse is harsh,⁶⁴ and the only common point with Plutarch is the decision to spare the freeborn citizens.

Plutarch cannot deny that many works of art were taken to Rome; he actually concedes that Marcellus took 'the most part and the most beautiful' (τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα) of the city's statues. Even this decision, however, is cast in a positive light and presented as a proof of the consul's love for Greek culture. While some Romans criticised him for introducing the love for Hellenic luxury in Rome, he took pride in it: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτοις ἐσεμνύετο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνας, ὡς τὰ καλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἐπισταμένους τιμᾶν καὶ θαυμάζειν Ῥωμαίους διδάξας ('Notwithstanding such censure, Marcellus spoke of this with pride even to the Greeks, declaring that he had taught the ignorant Romans to admire and honour the wonderful and beautiful productions of Greece').⁶⁵ This presentation is almost paradoxical: it is his love for the Greeks that leads Marcellus to raid their masterpieces, through which he aims to make the Romans a little more similar to the Greeks. The first two accusations against Marcellus (cruelty and greed) are thus refuted.

In keeping with this characterisation of Marcellus, Plutarch accepts the entire encomiastic tradition about him. The biographer stresses that the cities that suffered any harm were at fault (20.2). Conveniently, he does not say a word about the massacre at Henna, although he clearly knew the city's fate,⁶⁶ and he does not speak of the strategy of terror at Megara Hyblaea.⁶⁷ As in Livy, the bloodshed at Leontini is seen as a malign invention by Hippocrates, and Plutarch also simplifies the situation at Syracuse, and writes that Marcellus was not believed because the city was led by Hippocrates' faction (14.1–3). This is wrong, as Hippocrates had been exiled, and maybe even sentenced to death, together with his brother, by the Syracusans,⁶⁸ who remained loyal to Marcellus until the revolt of the army and Hippocrates' conquest of the city. Plutarch eliminates any hint about the presence of several factions in Syracuse,

⁶⁴ Livy, writing about Marcellus' tears, says that the consul was thinking about the imminent fire that would consume the city (*arsura omnia et ad cineres reditura*). The suppliants from Tyche and Neapolis begged him to refrain from fires and massacres, but Livy only mentions his decision to prevent these latter (25.25.6–7).

⁶⁵ Plut. *Marc.* 21.5. See Gros (1979) 92–100. The idea according to which the Romans were (or could be) unable to appreciate Greek artworks can be found in Roman sources as well: see, for instance, Vergil's portrayal of the difference between Greek and Roman skillsets (*Aen.* 6.847–8), or Velleius' comments on the inability of L. Mummius and his contemporaries to understand the artistic value of the spoils of Corinth (1.13.4).

⁶⁶ Henna and Megara are mentioned as cities which suffered a harsh treatment; see Clark (1991) 246–8.

⁶⁷ Plut. *Marc.* 18.1 records Megara's capture, but not its destruction.

⁶⁸ Liv. 24.30.12; App. *Sic.* 5 writes about a death sentence.

which is seen as united against the Romans, which in turn helps to justify Marcellus' war. For his part, Marcellus always behaves with the utmost justice during the campaign. The third accusation is thus refuted as well: far from being unfair, Marcellus is the man who teaches the Greeks how just the Romans could be. To support this claim, Plutarch cites just one example of his morality (20.3–7), which, however, does not seem particularly relevant.⁶⁹ As for the accusations against Marcellus in Rome,⁷⁰ any hint of sympathy towards the Greeks is missing. Their accusations are false, and their speech is very brief. They just complain about having been treated cruelly and with perfidy, and they present the evils suffered as *δεινὰ καὶ παράσπονδα πεπονθότας*: the accusations are the usual ones. Marcellus, on the other hand, stresses his own leniency and justice,⁷¹ while the debate closes with the Syracusans acknowledging their own fault and thanking the conqueror for sparing them.⁷² Plutarch, in short, constantly chooses to cast Marcellus in the role of the positive hero and of the mild and benign conqueror, as well as emphasising the role of Marcellus' philhellenism in determining his good conduct.

This choice can appear quite puzzling to the modern reader. No other source mentions Marcellus' philhellenism. Indeed, Plutarch himself (1.2) has to concede that, despite his love and reverence for the Greek culture (*παιδεία* and *λόγοι*), Marcellus was prevented from pursuing these beloved studies due to lack of time. Furthermore, Plutarch was in all likelihood able to read negative, or at least nuanced, accounts of Marcellus' campaign. He surely read Livy and Polybius, whom he cites among his sources.⁷³ Indeed, Polybius is mentioned as an authority who ran contrary to the encomiastic view of Marcellus' campaigns against Hannibal that Plutarch found in his Roman sources.⁷⁴ The importance of some of the elements of Marcellus' campaign, such as the fate of Henna, appears to be consciously downplayed by Plutarch.

⁶⁹ At Engyium, upon the intercession of a pro-Roman citizen, the commander decided not to punish the community: Clark (1991) 276–7.

⁷⁰ Plut. *Marc.* 23; the biographer transforms the episode into a real process suffered by Marcellus (he mentions the scrutiny of the votes and Marcellus' acquittal). In Livy, on the contrary, Marcellus refuses to be put in the condition of a general called to defend his actions (Liv. 26.31.1). Eckstein (1987) 172–7 interprets the debate as an attempt by a section of the senate to have some of Marcellus' decisions revoked.

⁷¹ Plut. *Marc.* 23.4–5.

⁷² Liv. 26.33.8 relates a reconciliation as well (Mineo (2016) 234–5), but in his text the Syracusans do not recognise their own fault and, above all, do not mention any 'favour' received from Marcellus.

⁷³ Plut. *Comp. Pel. Marc.* 1.4–5. Cf. Scardigli (1979) 38–42; Pelling (1989) 203–5; Clark (1991) 20–40.

⁷⁴ According to Plutarch, Polybius maintained that Marcellus was never able to defeat Hannibal. The biographer chooses to side with Livy, Augustus, Nepos, and Juba (although he cites Nepos mistakenly: Nep. *Hann.* 5.4), who believed the contrary.

The biographer must have been aware of some negative traditions, and this makes his choices in the representation of Marcellus all the more interesting.

It is particularly difficult to understand, as mentioned, why Plutarch specifically decides to cast Marcellus in the role of a philhellene. Scuderi noted, for instance, that Fabius Maximus is generally described in a positive way by the biographer, but is never assumed to be a philhellene.⁷⁵ Marcellus could have equally been represented as a good man without the need to underline his love for the Greeks and their *παιδεία*. Scholars such as Duff, Swain, and Pelling have rightly emphasised the importance in Plutarch of Greek culture and education.⁷⁶ Whereas these features are often taken for granted for the Greek characters, in the *Lives* of the Romans the author often stresses either their ability to absorb them (which is praised) or the negative effects of their lack.⁷⁷ So, it is not surprising that these issues are explored in the *Life of Marcellus* as well. However, in a life of the man who captured and looted Syracuse, and was pictured as the main cause for the uprising of much of Greek Sicily against the Romans; whose war crimes against the Greeks were well known; and who was publicly accused by the Greeks themselves at Rome, the reader might well have expected a wholly different treatment of these issues by Plutarch.

The best way to make sense of this characterisation might be to turn to the hints in the other sources about the relationship between Marcellus and Greek culture. One hears nothing of his philhellenism in any other source. However, as noted, Livy does mention the idea that Marcellus determined, unwillingly, the advent in Rome of the love for Greek art (25.40.2–3). It is unclear whether the Syracusan booty constituted a sort of artistic turning point for the Romans,⁷⁸ but it is at least presented as such by both Livy and Plutarch (and by Pol. 9.10 as well). However, both Livy and Polybius conceive of this turning point as negative.⁷⁹ In Livy, Marcellus is the man who makes the Romans forget about their ancient and good *mores*, swept away by the new luxury. Plutarch himself was well aware of these accusations, which, in his text, are expressed by the older citizens (*παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις*: 21.4–5):

⁷⁵ Scuderi (2010) 474–94.

⁷⁶ Pelling (1989); Swain (1990); (1996) 139–44; Duff (1999) 289–309; cf. Wardman (1974) 39–41.

⁷⁷ Swain (1990) 128–9 ('an effective method of evaluating character in the *Lives* of Roman heroes is to ask with what benefit they have absorbed Greek culture'); Duff (1999) 304–9; Pelling (2002) 285–6; Stadter (2014) 21–2; Ginn (2017) 128–35.

⁷⁸ As McDonnell (2006) thinks; *contra* Gruen (1992) 98–101. Cf. Galsterer (1994) 859 and Miles (2008) 61–2.

⁷⁹ See above, n. 10.

Μάρκελλον δ' ἠτιῶντο πρῶτον μὲν ὡς ἐπίφθονον ποιοῦντα τὴν πόλιν, οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν οἶον αἰχμαλώτων ἀγομένων ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ πομπευομένων, ἔπειτα ὅτι τὸν δῆμον εἰθισμένον πολεμεῖν ἢ γεωργεῖν, τρυφῆς δὲ καὶ ῥαθυμίας ἄπειρον ὄντα [...] σχολῆς ἐνέπλησε καὶ λαλιᾶς περὶ τεχνῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν, ἀστεῖζόμενον καὶ διατρίβοντα πρὸς τούτῳ πολὺ μέρος τῆς ἡμέρας.

And they blamed Marcellus, first, because he made the city odious, in that not only men, but even gods were led about in her triumphal processions like captives; and again, because, when the people was accustomed only to war or agriculture, and was inexperienced in luxury and ease [...] he made them idle and full of glib talk about arts and artists, so that they spent a great part of the day in such clever disputation.

This is the sort of criticism one finds in Livy, which probably derived from the milieu of Fabius Maximus.⁸⁰ However, Plutarch's approach is very different from Livy's.⁸¹ Plutarch follows these accusations with a response by Marcellus himself (21.5). The general takes pride in Hellenising the Romans, and the older citizens' reproaches become his own boast. Indeed, Plutarch does not deny the Hellenisation of Rome because of the Syracusan spoils: on the contrary, he stresses it, writing of the transformation of a city that looked like a military camp into a culture-loving and not necessarily always war-oriented community.⁸² With his Hellenisation of Rome, Marcellus becomes a sort of 'bridge' between the Romans and Greek culture.⁸³ The difference from Livy's presentation is striking: that historian agrees with the 'old citizens', and later has Cato the Elder denounce the bad effects of the Syracusan spoils and of the Greek culture they brought with them. Plutarch, to whom Cato, despite all his

⁸⁰ McDonnell (2006) 78–81.

⁸¹ Pelling (1989) 201–2; Lazzarotti (2006) 343–4; Miles (2008) 71.

⁸² Plut. *Marc.* 21.1–2. Rome's only adornments were spoils, weapons, and triumphs. A similar description is also found in the *Life of Coriolanus* (1.4): the Romans did not know any other form of virtue than manly valour, before being changed by (Greek) culture. See Ginn (2017) 129–31.

⁸³ Pelling (1989) 199–208; Swain (1990) 131–2, 140–2; Bocci (1995); Duff (1999) 305–7; Ginn (2017) 135. Another character in Plutarch who is similar to Marcellus in this regard is Numa (Plut. *Num.* 8), who managed to moderate the Romans' lust for war and violence by introducing justice and the cults in honour of the gods. This moderation is linked by Plutarch to the Pythagorean culture.

virtues, is the embodiment of the failure to appreciate the importance of Greek παιδεία,⁸⁴ cannot agree.

In view of this criticism of Marcellus' capture of Syracuse as a turning point in the Hellenisation of Rome, I think that Plutarch's characterisation of Marcellus should be read as an answer to these accusations. As Marcellus could be viewed as a man who unwillingly caused the ruin of Rome through its Hellenisation, Plutarch seems to react by turning him into a conscious Helleniser, and by praising him as such. In this decision, his belief in the importance of the absorption of the Greek παιδεία must have played a decisive role.

One should probably believe, in short, that Plutarch chose to re-shape Marcellus' character and picture him as a Helleniser. Indeed, the controversies and diverging traditions available about Marcellus probably allowed the biographer to mould his character's ethos quite freely. While some authors have suggested that the biographer took this characterisation from his own source,⁸⁵ it is more likely that this is Plutarch's own vision: on the one hand, he had access to some negative accounts of Marcellus. On the other hand, the very high importance that he attaches to the connection between Roman characters and Greek culture leads one to think that Plutarch himself is behind this peculiar portrait.⁸⁶

It would be unfair, on the whole, to maintain that Marcellus' character in Plutarch is completely unilateral and simple.⁸⁷ On the contrary, he embodies two sets of virtues that could even be described as antithetical: in Plutarch's initial description, he is not just a φιλόανθρωπος, but also a proper warrior, bold, daring, and even τῇ φύσει φιλοπόλεμος. These are not necessarily bad traits; on the contrary, Plutarch appreciates military triumphs and prowess in

⁸⁴ Pelling (1989) 214–15. See especially Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 4–6 and 20–4: Cato's virtues (parsimony, fairness, justice, care for his loved ones) are counterbalanced by a certain degree of pettiness, which would have benefitted from a 'Greek cure'. Other negative figures in this respect are Coriolanus and Marius (Pelling (1989) 206–7; Swain (1990) 136–40).

⁸⁵ Generally identified with Posidonius, mentioned by Plut. *Marc.* 20.3–7 as the source for the episode of Marcellus' leniency at Engyum: see Gros (1979) 99–100; Ferrary (1988) 509–10; Bocci (1995) 173–88; Rodríguez Horrillo (2014); and above all Gabba (1993), according to whom Posidonius focused on Marcellus as one of the instances of the good Roman conquerors/governors, whose character legitimised Roman rule (p. 88: 'Certamente per Posidonio uomini come Marcello avevano legittimato l'egemonia romana fin dal suo nascere'; cf. Scuderi (1996) 425). *Contra* Swain (1990) 141 and Clark (1991) 274. About Plutarch's sources for the *Life of Marcellus* see Scardigli (1979) 38–41 (cf. pp. 39–40 for a *status quaestionis* and the older literature about the relation between Posidonius and Plutarch's *Life of Marcellus*) and Clark (1991) 20–40.

⁸⁶ Swain (1990) 141–2.

⁸⁷ Pelling (1989) 205–7.

battle.⁸⁸ However, in the final comparison between Pelopidas and Marcellus (3.3–4), Plutarch stresses, in line with Polybius, the importance of Marcellus' excessive rashness in the episode which led to his death. It might be that, according to the biographer, Marcellus could not mitigate his excessively daring *φύσις* with the proper amount of *παιδεία*.⁸⁹ It would be unfair, then, to maintain that Marcellus' character in Plutarch is entirely un-problematic and simple. However, in his depiction of Marcellus' philhellenism, Plutarch appears to be very consistent. If the proposal put forth here is correct, this consistent representation derives from the biographer's moralising aims, and is meant as a response to the criticism of Marcellus' role in the Hellenisation of Rome.

6. Appian: Marcellus the Cruel Traitor

The clearest confirmation of the presence of negative traditions about Marcellus comes from the three brief fragments which survive from the account devoted by Appian to Marcellus' Sicilian campaign in his book on the wars in Sicily and the islands.⁹⁰ Unlike the *Verrines* and the *Life of Marcellus*, these passages have received little attention.⁹¹ Unfortunately, the passages are few and short; the hints they provide, however, are very interesting.

The first fragment (App. *Sic.* 3) relates to the exile of Hippocrates and Epicydes voted by the Syracusans, while the two brothers were stirring up a rebellion in Leontini. This passage agrees with Livy (24.30.6–11): it presents Syracuse, at this time, as a Roman ally, and describes Hippocrates' propaganda in the same terms. It also contradicts, as mentioned, Plutarch's statement according to which Syracuse was under the control of the 'Hippocratic faction'.

The second passage (*Sic.* 4) is more interesting:

ὅτι Σικελοὶ, καὶ τέως ἀγανακτοῦντες ἐπὶ τῇ ὀμότητι Μαρκέλλου τοῦ στρατηγού, μᾶλλον τι καὶ τῶδε τῷ ἔργῳ συνεταράσσοντο, ἐφ' ᾧ κατὰ προδοσίαν ἐς Συρακούσας ἐσήλθεν, καὶ πρὸς Ἴπποκράτη μετετίθεντο καὶ

⁸⁸ Duff (1999) 97–8; Mossman (2016) 111–13.

⁸⁹ Pelling (2002) 290. Scuderi (2010) 484 notes that, in Plutarch, Fabius Maximus' calmness ultimately has the edge over Marcellus' bellicosity. Wardman (1974) 115–24 and Duff (1999) 83–7 note the ambiguous status of striving for honour and fame in Plutarch: although *φιλοτιμία* is not bad in itself, it must be kept in check as an irrational part of the soul, which Marcellus ultimately did not manage to do.

⁹⁰ All three of them are transmitted by the *Excerpta de virtutibus et vitiis*; the first one is found in the *Suda* as well (*s.v.* 'Epicydes'), which drew from the *Excerpta* themselves.

⁹¹ A notable exception is Scardigli (2012) 230–2; cf. the brief remarks in the comments by Galli (1985) 130–41 and Goukowsky (2020) 354 and 365–6.

συνώμνυντο μὴ διαλύσασθαι χωρὶς ἀλλήλων, ἀγορὰν τε αὐτῷ καὶ στρατιὰν ἔπεμπον, ἐς δισμουρίου πεζοὺς καὶ ἵππεας πεντακισχιλίους.

The Sicilians had been angry for some time at the cruelty of Marcellus, the commander in chief, and they were even more disturbed at the fact that he had effected entry in Syracuse by means of treachery. So they changed sides to Hippocrates and swore an oath to make no treaty without mutual agreement; and they sent him supplies and an army of twenty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry.

Here the reader finds a presentation which is the opposite of what Plutarch says. First, Marcellus was cruel. According to Livy, as we have seen, the general tried to terrorise the Greeks, which turned many Siceliotas against him. Appian confirms this, from the point of view of the Greeks themselves. However, it is his treacherous behaviour against Syracuse that raised Sicily against him. Appian's mention of treason (*προδοσία*) is puzzling. At first sight, one might take this as a reference to Moericus' treason.⁹² However, Appian writes about a treason through which the Romans entered (*ἐσῆλθεν*) Syracuse, and, at the time of Moericus' action, Marcellus had already conquered most of the city. Furthermore, Hippocrates was already dead: the Greek army referred to by Appian was defeated (and then destroyed by disease) before the final attack. Appian, thus, is probably speaking of Marcellus' first attack, the one with which he captured the Hexapylon. If this is correct, however, it might be the case that the Alexandrian author wrote about another betrayal, which Livy did not consider: about the first, partial capture of Syracuse, Livy (25.23.8–17) just gave an account of the estimation of the height of a wall during the negotiations and of the attack during a festival. It is difficult to understand why the Greeks should have been enraged by this. Attacks during religious festivals were a common stratagem in the Greek world⁹³ and could hardly be presented as treasonous. Given that negotiations were being conducted, it is not impossible that, according to Appian at least, a truce was in place, and that Marcellus violated it. In this case, there would be another ground for the Syracusan accusations of *perfidia*.

At any rate, Appian must have written about the violation of a pact by Marcellus: this is confirmed by the last fragment (*Sic.* 5):

⁹² Goukowsky (2020) 365 n. 33 appears to think this. Cf. Galli (1985) 137–8.

⁹³ It is found with reasonable frequency, for instance, in Polyaeus' *Stratagems* (e.g., 2.4.3, 31.4, 34; 5.1.1; 6.45).

ὅτι διαβεβλημένω τῷ Μαρκέλλῳ οὐκ ἐπίστευον χωρὶς ὄρκων. διὸ καὶ Ταυρομενίων προσχωρούντων οἱ συνέθετο καὶ ὕμωσε μήτε φρουρήσειν τὴν πόλιν μήτε στρατολογήσειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς.

Marcellus was so discredited that they refused to trust him without the swearing of oaths. For this reason, when Tauromenium went over to him, he agreed under oath not to garrison the town or draft troops from it.

No one, according to the author, trusted Marcellus any more: the contradiction with the righteous and just man described by Cicero and Plutarch is astonishing. This passage probably follows the capture of Syracuse, not only because of its position within the *Excerpta*, but also because of Livy's attestation (25.40.4) according to which, after Syracuse's surrender, Marcellus accepted the capitulation of several other Greek cities. Tauromenium must have been one of the cities that had gone over to Himilco and Hippocrates and were then retaken by the Romans.⁹⁴ This passage completes the negative portrait of Marcellus. Not only was he harsh and cruel, but he was also an untrustworthy traitor. Here one finds, again, two of the recurrent themes about his Sicilian campaign: his *fides* and his *clementia*, this time in a negative form. In Appian, one finds an image of a commander famous for his brutality, unfairness, and unreliability, in sharp contrast with Cicero's and Plutarch's texts.

It is unclear where Appian might have taken this presentation from: the sources for the Sicilian book and for the Hannibalic war are not well known.⁹⁵ Among the authors identified as possible sources, Polybius and Fabius Pictor stand out.⁹⁶ As seen in the section about the sources, both authors were unlikely to provide a positive image of Marcellus' campaign, and Appian might have found in their texts the material from which he drew his presentation. Of course, one should keep in mind the fact that Fabius Pictor is

⁹⁴ See Galli (1985) 139–41, with further bibliography. It is probable that Tauromenium was not actually captured by Marcellus, but went over to him after the conquest of Syracuse. Indeed, Cicero (*Verr.* 2.2.160, 3.13, 5.49–50) mentions Tauromenium, together with Messina, as a *civitas foederata*, exempt from the tribute because of a *foedus* that must be the same as the one Appian mentions.

⁹⁵ For an overview, see Hahn (1982) 267–70; Seibert (1993) 53–4; Leidl (1993); Goukowsky (2020) 354.

⁹⁶ Polybius' authority is followed by Appian for the wars in the East in the first half of the second century BC (Rich (2015)), but was probably used by Appian for the Punic wars as well: Leidl (1993) 453–5; McGing (2018). Fabius Pictor is mentioned by Appian himself (*Hann.* 27) and has therefore been assumed to be one of his sources (Canfora (1996) 85; Hahn (1982) 267–70). However, one should note that Fabius Pictor is mentioned as an ambassador to Delphi, and not as a source, although Appian attests that he wrote an account of his embassy. It is not certain that Appian read it (Leidl (1993) 449–53; Rich (2015) 66).

very unlikely to have condemned the Roman campaign in Sicily as a whole. Regardless of the extent to which his work was meant as a piece of Roman propaganda, his stance was surely pro-Roman and anti-Punic. If he was used as a source by Appian, one might interpret the second fragment, about the defections of the Greeks, as a direct accusation by Fabius Pictor against Marcellus: because he was harsh and cruel (unlike Fabius Maximus), he caused the Greeks to side with the Carthaginians, and thus made the war much more difficult for the Romans.

On the other hand, Scardigli and Goukowsky have detected in Appian's fragments a Greek point of view.⁹⁷ This would make it easier to make sense of the totally negative picture that emerges from the fragments. If this is the case, then the most immediate guess would be one of the Greek historians of Hannibal. It is tempting to suppose that he read the lost account of Silenus, or at least that some of his sources were influenced by the Sicilian author. Regrettably, the fragmentary state of Appian's text does not allow us to reach a firm conclusion. It is perhaps more interesting to investigate the reason why he adopted this negative view, wherever it may come from.

It is very likely that Marcellus' whole presentation by Appian was negative, as the two relevant passages leave very little room for any moral virtue to shine.⁹⁸ On the other hand, it is difficult to understand whether the entire Roman campaign in Sicily was presented in a bad light. In the book on the war with Hannibal, Roman morality in waging war is generally described as decent. For instance, responsibility for the war is entirely laid on Hannibal,⁹⁹ while the previous Roman seizure of Sardinia (which Polybius considered an immoral action, and a valid motive for war on the Carthaginian side: 3.15.10) is presented as a war indemnity offered to the Romans (*Hisp.* 4). Scipio's *fides* is underlined, in contrast to the Punic *perfidia* (*Hann.* 34–5, 53). However, modern commentators have highlighted the fact that this presentation changes drastically for the subsequent wars, especially the Third Punic War and the conflicts in Spain.¹⁰⁰ Appian appears to be very interested in Roman morality in their wars and to have selected comments about this theme from his sources.

⁹⁷ Scardigli (2012) 231–2: 'there was also a Greek tradition, from which derives his fame as cruel man in Appian and his scarce reliability stem' (cf. Scardigli (1979) 40–1); Goukowsky (2020) 366 n. 38 mentions that 'sources grecques mettent en doute la *fides* du général romain' (cf. p. 354: 'une source grecque n'est pas à écarter').

⁹⁸ It is unlikely that the preserved fragments do not do justice to Appian's general point of view: Pittia (2006).

⁹⁹ App. *Hisp.* 9; *Hann.* 3. In both instances, Appian says that Hannibal wanted a war to solve his political problems at home. He also defines the attack on Saguntum as a mere pretext.

¹⁰⁰ Gómez Espelosín (1993) 416; Gabba (1996) 27–8; Swain (1996) 250–3; Carsana (2013) 196–8.

The general picture seems to be a progressive decadence after the Hannibalic war, with the Romans becoming increasingly greedy and unscrupulous.¹⁰¹ In two interesting speeches, Appian has two ambassadors (one from Carthage, in the Third Punic War, and the other from Perseus) declare that the Romans wanted to achieve a great reputation for their justice and *εὐσέβεια*, but they were by no means up to these standards.¹⁰² These accusations appear to be very much in line with those levelled at Marcellus.

In this context, it is easy to understand Appian's interest in the negative comments about Marcellus that he found in his sources. It is much harder to decide why he chose to report them in his own text. It is likely that Appian portrayed the behaviour of Marcellus in Sicily as an exception to the generally good Roman morality of that time, and maybe even as one of the first instances of the corruption which would soon become commonplace. After all, as discussed above, Livy and Polybius identified in the sack of Syracuse and its spoils an important turning point that triggered Roman greed and immorality. Appian's position must have been different, as Livy does not accuse Marcellus of conscious immorality in this regard, and in the surviving fragments Appian himself does not mention the spoils at all. However, the siege of Syracuse must have remained a controversial issue, and interpretations of it must have differed significantly. The remaining fragments of the book on the wars in Sicily and the islands seem to imply that Appian chose to commit to one of these interpretations, for reasons that are today very difficult to explain, but probably have to do with his conception of a progressive moral decline in Roman practices of war.¹⁰³

7. Conclusion

Marcellus surely was a controversial character.¹⁰⁴ In this paper, I have explored some of the historiographical features which contribute to these divergences in his characterisation. I have also suggested that these controversies can be divided into three main themes: Marcellus' *fides*, his mildness/cruelty, and the importance of his sack of Syracuse and of the spoils of the city in Rome.¹⁰⁵ However, it would be too rash to split the entire tradition about

¹⁰¹ Hahn (1993) 383–9; Carsana (2013) 198 (who writes of a 'processo degenerativo' which 'avrà come esito finale il lungo secolo di guerre civili').

¹⁰² App. *Pun.* 75; *Mac.* 11.

¹⁰³ See the very brief remarks in Scardigli (2012) 232.

¹⁰⁴ Flower (2003) 45–51. Mineo (2016) 240 writes of a 'légende noire' about Marcellus; Goukowsky (2020) 366 n. 36 supposes that a list of his 'war crimes' might have circulated.

¹⁰⁵ Other controversial themes about him could be explored: one is the fine line between his military prowess, which led him to win the *spolia opima* (on these, see Flower (2000)) and

Marcellus into two, and to speak of a Greek negative tradition opposed to a Roman encomiastic and apologetic one. Both the negative and the positive visions cannot be reduced to unity.¹⁰⁶ While it is true that most of the Sicilian Greeks must have been incensed against him (but what about those Sicilians who had remained loyal to the Romans?), perhaps the most favourable account about Marcellus comes from a Greek intellectual, Plutarch. Perhaps more interesting is Marcellus' reputation in the Roman context. Some of the accusations raised against him can hardly have come from the Greeks: it is quite absurd to picture the Syracusans complaining that Marcellus had ruined Rome's morality through the Syracusan spoils. Moreover, Marcellus' morality in war was apparently debated, as mentioned, not only about Sicily, but also about Casilinum. In the previous pages, the conflict between the conqueror of Syracuse and Fabius Maximus has been highlighted as the origin of a debate about the actions of the former.

It would also be wrong to assume that the Greek and the Roman views about Marcellus were completely independent from each other. On the contrary, one might assume that discussions about him at Rome and in the provinces influenced each other. For example, the Sicilians' accusations about his lack of *fides* may well have had resonance in Rome. There were certainly differences, as well. Members of the Roman élite such as Fabius Pictor would never have translated these accusations into criticism of the Roman rule as a whole.¹⁰⁷ Part of the Greek opinion in Sicily around the time of Marcellus might have done this, however. While Gabba maintained that Posidonus' (supposed) appreciation of Marcellus was meant to underline the positive aspect of Roman rule,¹⁰⁸ the argument could be reversed. Appian's representation of a cruel man who cannot be trusted might well come from a source (Silenus?) who wanted to undermine the ethical basis of the Roman *imperium*.

In conclusion, I hope that I have been able to highlight, at least in part, the complexities of the tradition(s) about Marcellus and his Sicilian campaign. These complexities appear to have characterised the debate about him from its very start. They also left the sources whose accounts have come down to us free to choose the features and the views which were best suited to their aims. Marcellus had become a powerful *exemplum*, but he was one of those *exempla* that could be employed to demonstrate several different (and sometimes

his excessive audacity, which led to his death (Flower (2003)). Another is the debate about whether he was the first to defeat Hannibal in battle.

¹⁰⁶ On these complexities, see the comments in Scardigli (2012) 231–2 and Beltramini (2020) 289–90; cf. again Flower (2003).

¹⁰⁷ This is exactly Cicero's position about Verres and Roman rule in Sicily: see above.

¹⁰⁸ Gabba (1993).

antithetical) things.¹⁰⁹ As such, his treatment by our sources is interesting as it reveals something about their respective aims and approaches. The way in which Livy, Cicero, Plutarch, and Appian chose to exploit Marcellus' character, or to employ his figure as an *exemplum*, is often more revealing about their own objectives and ways of working than about the historical reality of a figure whose moral traits appear to have soon become quite blurry—and therefore very malleable.

Università di Pavia

GABRIELE BRUSA
gabriele.brusa02@universitadipavia.it

¹⁰⁹ See again Langlands (2018) about the potential flexibility of the *exempla*; the same author (286 n. 55) recognises Marcellus as one of the '*exempla* with evidently controversial elements'.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alföldi, A. (1965) *Early Rome and the Latins* (Ann Arbor).
- Badian, E. (1966) 'The Early Historians', in T. A. Dorey, ed., *Latin Historians* (London) 1–38.
- Baldo, C. (2004) *In C. Verrem actionis secundae liber quartus (de signis)* (Florence).
- Bellini, G. (2020) 'Manipolazione e flessibilità nelle allusioni storiche delle orazioni di Cicerone', *Rhesis* 11: 299–308.
- Beltramini, L. (2017) 'Narrazione ed *exemplum* in Livio', *Eikasmos* 28: 171–94.
- (2020) *Commento al libro XXVI di Tito Livio* (Pisa).
- Bernard, T.-E. (2000) *Le portrait chez Tite-Live: Essai sur une écriture de l'histoire romaine* (Brussels).
- (2015) 'Portraits of Peoples', in B. Mineo, ed., *A Companion to Livy* (Oxford) 39–51.
- van der Blom, H. (2010) *Cicero's Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer* (Oxford).
- (2011) 'Historical *exempla* as Tools of Praise and Blame in Ciceronian Oratory', in R. Cowan and C. Smith, edd., *Praise and Blame in Roman Republican Rhetoric* (Swansea) 49–67.
- (2020) 'Bildung durch *exempla*: Ciceros gebrauch von Vorbildern in der römischen Bildungskultur', in P. Kuhlmann and V. Marchetti, edd., *Cicero im Rahmen der römischen Bildungskultur* (Tübingen) 45–60.
- Bocci, S. (1995) 'Il ritratto paradossale di M. Claudio Marcello nella biografia plutarchea', *MGR* 19: 161–88.
- Briquel, D. (2004) 'Sur un fragment de Silènos de Kalèactè (le songe d'Hannibal, *FGrHist* 175, F 8). À propos d'un article récent', *Ktèma* 29: 145–57.
- Brizzi, G. (1984) 'Ancora sul papiro di Annibale (*P Hamb.* 129)', in id., *Studi di storia annibalica* (Faenza) 85–102.
- Bücher, F. (2006) *Verargumentierte Geschichte: Exempla Romana im politischen Diskurs der späten römischen Republik* (Stuttgart).
- Burton, P. (2022) 'Polemic in Polybius', in T. Stevenson, ed., *Polemic in Ancient Historiography, Literature, and Culture* (Pretoria) 60–75.
- Caltabiano, M. (1975) 'La morte del console Marcello nella tradizione storiografica', in M. Sordi, ed., *Storiografia e propaganda* (Milan) 65–81.
- Canfora, L. (1996) 'Fonti latine e uso del latino in Appiano', in *Filellenismo e tradizionalismo a Roma nei primi due secoli dell'impero* (Rome) 85–95.
- Carawan, E. M. (1984) 'The Tragic History of Marcellus and Livy's Characterization', *CJ* 80: 131–41.
- Carsana, C. (2013) 'Tre punti di vista sull'imperialismo romano: Polibio, Diodoro e il *Libro Africano* di Appiano', in A. Gonzalès and M. T. Schettino,

- edd., *Le point de vue de l'autre: Relations culturelles et diplomatie* (Besançon) 191–204.
- Càssola, F. (1962) *I gruppi politici romani nel III secolo a.C.* (Trieste).
- Champion, C. B. (2013) 'Historiographic Patterns and Historical Obstacles in Polybius' *Histories*: Marcellus, Flaminius, and the Mamertine Crisis', in B. S. Gibson and T. Harrison, edd., *Polybius and his World: Essays in Memory of F. W. Walbank* (Oxford) 143–53.
- Chaplin, J. D. (2000) *Livy's Exemplary History* (Oxford).
- Clark, E. D. (1991) *A Historical Commentary on Plutarch's Marcellus* (Diss., University of British Columbia).
- David, J.-M. (1980) 'Maiorum exempla sequi: l'exemplum historique dans les discours judiciaires de Cicéron', in id., ed., *Rhétorique et histoire: L'exemplum et le modèle de comportement dans le discours antique et médiéval* (Paris) 67–86.
- Duff, T. E. (1999) *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice* (Oxford).
- Eckstein, A. M. (1987) *Senate and General: Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264–194 BC* (Berkeley).
- Ferrary, J.-L. (1988) *Philhellénisme et impérialisme: Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique* (Rome).
- Flower, H. I. (2000) 'The Tradition of the *Spolia Opima*: M. Claudius Marcellus and Augustus', *CA* 19: 34–64.
- (2003) 'Memories of Marcellus: History and Memory in Roman Republican Culture', in U. Eigler et al., edd., *Formen römischer Geschichtsschreibung von den Anfängen bis Livius: Gattungen, Autoren, Kontexte* (Darmstadt) 39–52.
- Foulkes, M. (1999) 'Livy's Characterization of Individuals and Races in Book 21', *Histos* 3: 70–6.
- Fox, M. (2007) *Cicero's Philosophy of History* (Oxford).
- Gabba, E. (1993) 'Posidonio, Marcello e la Sicilia', in id., *Aspetti culturali dell'imperialismo romano* (Florence) 79–88.
- (1996) 'Qualche annotazione su Strabone e Appiano a proposito della Spagna', in id., P. Desideri, and S. Roda, edd., *Italia sul Baetis: Studi di storia romana in memoria di Fernando Gascó* (Turin) 25–31.
- (2000) 'Origine e carattere della più antica storiografia romana', in id., *Roma arcaica: Storia e storiografia* (Rome) 61–8.
- Galli, A. (1985) *Appiani Historia Romana, EK THΣ ΣΙΚΕΛΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΝΗΣΙΩΤΙΚΗΣ* (Thes. Mag., Università degli studi, Siena)
- Galsterer, H. (1994) 'Kunstraub und Kunsthandel im republikanischen Rom', in G. Hellenkemper Salies, ed., *Das Wrack: der antike Schiffund von Mahdia* (Cologne) 857–66.
- Galvagno, E. (2004) *I successori di Timeo: Studi sulla storiografia siceliota di età ellenistica* (Padua).
- Gelzer, M. (1933) 'Römische Politik bei Fabius Pictor', *Hermes* 2: 129–66.

- Ginn, J. P. (2017) 'Plutarch and the Advent of Hellenism in Rome', in A. Georgiadou and K. Oikonomopoulou, edd., *Space, Time and Language in Plutarch* (Berlin) 127–35.
- Gómez Espelosín, F. J. (1993) 'Appian's *Iberiké*', *ANRW* II.34.1: 403–27.
- Goukowsky, P. (2020) *Appien, Histoire romaine: La destinée d'Appien pendant le haut moyen âge et la tradition indirecte; La préface de l'Histoire romaine et les fragments des livres I–V* (Paris).
- Gros, P. (1979) 'Les statues de Syracuse et les dieux de Tarente (la classe politique romaine devant l'art grecque à la fin du IIIe siècle avant J.-C.)', *LEC* 57: 85–114.
- Gruen, E. S. (1992) *Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome* (Ithaca and New York).
- Hahn, I. (1982) 'Appian und seine Quellen', in G. Wirth, ed., *Romanitas—Christianitas: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Literatur der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Berlin and New York) 251–76.
- (1993) 'Appian und Rom', *ANRW* II.34.1: 364–402.
- Hölkeskamp, K.-J. (2018) 'Mythen, Monumente und die Multimedialität der *memoria*: Die "corporate identity" der *gens Fabia*', *Klio* 100: 709–64.
- La Bua, V. (1966) *Filino–Polibio, Sileno–Diodoro* (Palermo).
- Langlands, R. (2018) *Exemplary Ethics in Ancient Rome* (Cambridge).
- Lauritano, R. (1956) 'Sileno in Diodoro?', *Kokalos* 2: 206–16.
- Lazenby, J. F. (1978) *Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second Punic War* (Warminster).
- Lazzeretti, A. (2006) *M. Tulli Ciceronis in C. Verrem actionis secundae liber quartus (de signis): Commento storico e archeologico* (Pisa).
- Leidl, C. G. (1993) 'Appian's *Annibaikē*: Aufbau–Darstellungstendenzen–Quellen', *ANRW* II.34.1: 428–62.
- Levene, D. S. (2010) *Livy on the Hannibalic War* (Oxford).
- Lintott, A. (2007) 'The Citadel of the Allies', in Prag (2007) 3–18.
- (2008) *Cicero as Evidence: A Historian's Companion* (Oxford).
- Manni, E. (1957) 'Da Ippi a Diodoro', *Kokalos* 3: 136–55.
- Marchetti, P. (1972) 'La deuxième guerre punique en Sicile: Les années 215–214 et le récit de Tite-Live', *BIBR* 42: 5–26.
- Marincola, J., ed. (2007) *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography* (Oxford).
- Marino, R. (1988) *La Sicilia dal 241 al 210 a.C. (Testimonia Siciliae antiqua, I, 12): supplementi a Kokalos* 7 (Rome).
- (2006) 'Città di Sicilia tra violenza e consenso nell'età delle guerre romano-puniche', *Hormos* 8: 41–7.
- Martin, P. M. (2013) 'La manipulation rhétorique de l'histoire dans les *Philippiques* de Cicéron', *DHA supp.* 8: 109–42.

- McDonnell, M. (2006) 'Roman Aesthetics and the Spoils of Syracuse', in S. Dillon and K. E. Welch, edd., *Representations of War in Ancient Rome* (Cambridge) 68–90.
- McGing, B. (2018) 'Appian, the Third Punic War and Polybius', in N. Miltsios and M. Tamiolaki, edd., *Polybius and his Legacy* (Berlin and Boston) 341–56.
- Meister, K. (1971) 'Annibale in Sileno', *Maia* 23: 3–9.
- Mensching, E. (1996) 'Über Livius, den alten und den jungen Marcellus', in C. Klodt, ed., *Satura Lanx: Festschrift für Werner A. Krenkel zum 70. Geburtstag* (Hildesheim) 257–77.
- Miles, M. M. (2008) *Art as Plunder: The Ancient Origins of the Debate about Cultural Property* (Cambridge).
- Mineo, B. (2016) 'M. Claudius Marcellus dans le récit livien', *LEC* 84: 229–57.
- Momigliano, A. (1966) 'Linee per una valutazione di Fabio Pittore', in id., *Terzo contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico*, vol. 1 (Rome) 55–68.
- Moralejo, J. L. (2018) 'Las razones de la compasión: Una nota sobre Liv. 25,24, Plb. 38,21–22 y App. 8 (Pun.) 132', *EClás* 154: 41–50.
- Mossman, J. (2016) 'Plutarch and the Roman Triumph', *Hermathena* 200–1: 107–28.
- Münzer, F. (1899a) 'M. Claudius Marcellus (220)', *RE* III.2: 2738–55.
 — (1899b) 'C. Claudius Marcellus (214)', *RE* III.2: 2733.
- Pausch, D. (2022) 'Livy, the Reader Involved, and the Audience of Roman Historiography', in M. Baumann and V. Liotsakis, edd., *Reading History in the Roman Empire* (Berlin and Boston) 59–78.
- Pédech, P. (1964) *La méthode historique de Polybe* (Paris).
- Pelling, C. (1989) 'Plutarch: Roman Heroes and Greek Culture', in J. Barnes and M. Griffin, edd., *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society* (Oxford) 199–232.
 — (2002) 'Aspects of Plutarch's Characterisation', in id., *Plutarch and History* (Swansea) 283–300.
- Pierzak, D. (2021) *Exempla externa in Cicero's Orations: A Rhetorical Approach* (Berlin).
- Pittia, S. (2006) 'La fiabilité des fragments d'Appien sur l'histoire diplomatique et militaire de Rome aux IV^e–III^e siècles', in ead. and E. Caire, edd., *Guerre et diplomatie romaines, IV^e–III^e siècles av. J.-C.: pour un réexamen des sources* (Aix-en-Provence) 113–35.
 — (2009) 'Usages et mésusages de l'histoire dans les *Verrines* de Cicéron', *CEA* 46: 181–225.
- Prag, J. R. W., ed. (2007) *Sicilia nutrix plebis Romanae: Rhetoric, Law, and Taxation in Cicero's Verrines* (London).

- (2013) 'Provincials, Patrons, and the Rhetoric of *repetundae*', in C. Steel and H. van der Blom, edd., *Community and Communication: Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome* (Oxford) 267–83.
- Price, B. J. (1975) *Paradeigma and Exemplum in Ancient Rhetorical Theory* (Diss., Berkeley).
- Rambaud, M. (1953) *Cicéron et l'histoire romaine* (Paris).
- Rich, J. (2015) 'Appian, Polybius and the Romans' War with Antiochus the Great: A Study in Appian's Sources and Methods', in K. E. Welch, ed., *Appian's Roman History: Empire and Civil War* (Swansea) 65–123.
- (2018) 'Fabius Pictor, Ennius and the Origins of Roman Annalistic Historiography', in K. Sandberg and C. Smith, edd., *Omnium annalium monumenta: Historical Writing and Historical Evidence in Republican Rome* (Leiden and Boston) 17–65.
- Richardson, J. H. (2015) 'The Complications of *Quellenforschung*: The Case of Livy and Fabius Pictor', in B. Mineo, ed., *A Companion to Livy* (Malden, Mass.) 178–89.
- Rives, J. B. (1993) 'Marcellus and the Syracusans', *CPh* 88: 32–5.
- Rodríguez Horrillo, M. Á. (2014) 'El excursus sobre Marcelo en las *Historias* de Posidonio: Crítica y reinterpretación de los fragmentos', *Habis* 45: 115–35.
- Rossi, A. (2000) 'The Tears of Marcellus: History of a Literary Motif in Livy', *G&R* 47: 56–66.
- Scardigli, B. (1979) *Die Römerbiographien Plutarchs* (Munich).
- (2012) 'Appian, the *Sikeliké* and *Nesiotiké*: Presentation and Tendencies', in P. H. Ilievski, ed., *Ad perpetuam memoriam Michaelis D. Petruševski* (Skopje) 223–35.
- Schwameis, C. (2020) "'Die schönste griechische Stadt": Syrakus bei Cicero und Silius Italicus', *Millennium* 17: 35–53.
- Scuderi, R. (1996) 'La raffigurazione ciceroniana della Sicilia e dei suoi abitanti: Un fattore ambientale per la condanna di Verre', in C. Stella and A. Valvo, edd., *Studi in onore di Albino Garzetti* (Brescia) 409–30.
- (2010) 'L'*humanitas* di Fabio Massimo nella biografia plutarchea', *Athenaeum* 98: 467–87.
- Scullard, H. H. (1951) *Roman Politics, 220–150 BC* (Oxford).
- Seibert, J. (1993) *Forschungen zu Hannibal* (Darmstadt).
- Serrati, J. (2020) 'Agōn *Sikelia*: The Hannibalic War and the (Re)organization of Roman Sicily', in H. L. Reid, J. Serrati, and T. Sorg, edd., *Conflict and Competition: Agōn in Western Greece* (Sioux City, Iowa) 69–91.
- Stadter, P. A. (2014) 'Plutarch and Rome', in M. Beck, ed., *A Companion to Plutarch* (Oxford) 13–31.
- Steel, C. (2007) 'The Rhetoric of the *de frumento*', in Prag (2007) 37–48.

- Stemmler, M. (2000) ‘*Auctoritas exempli*: zur Wechselwirkung von kanonisierten Vergangenheitsbildern und gesellschaftlicher Gegenwart in der spätepublikanischen Rhetorik’, in id. and B. Linke, edd., *Mos maiorum: Untersuchungen zu den Formen der Identitätsstiftung und Stabilisierung in der römischen Republik* (Stuttgart) 141–205.
- Stok, F. (2021) ‘Strategie ciceroniana fra storiografia e retorica’, *Maia* 73: 9–21.
- Swain, S. C. R. (1990) ‘Hellenic Culture and the Roman Heroes of Plutarch’, *JHS* 110: 126–45.
- (1996) *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism and Power in the Greek World, AD 50–250* (Oxford).
- Timpe, D. (1972) ‘Fabius Pictor und die Anfänge der römischen Historiographie’, *ANRW* 1.2: 928–69.
- Torregaray Pagola, E. (2004) ‘Quelques remarques sur le langage politique de la décadence dans les Verrines’, *Athenaeum* 92: 499–507.
- Vishnia, R. (2012) ‘A Case of Bad Press? Gaius Flaminius in Ancient Historiography’, *ZPE* 181: 27–45.
- Walbank, F. W. (1957) *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 1 (Oxford).
- (1968–9) ‘The Historians of Greek Sicily’, *Kokalos* 14–15: 476–98.
- Wardman, A. (1974) *Plutarch’s Lives* (London).
- Williams, M. F. (2022) ‘Silenos (175)’, *BNJ* 2.
- Wiseman, T. P. (2007) ‘The Prehistory of Roman Historiography’, in Marincola (2007) 67–75.