

## REVIEW–DISCUSSION

### A NEW THUCYDIDES COMPANION

Polly A. Low, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Thucydides*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. Pp. xiv + 382. Paperback, \$39.99. ISBN 978-1-107-514607.

Only six years separate *The Cambridge Companion to Thucydides* from *The Oxford Handbook to Thucydides*, which appeared eleven years after Brill's *Companion to Thucydides*. The shorter interval between publications helps to explain the current volume's modest length. Its fewer pages also mean that topics are broad, while its organisation suggests that the editor sought to minimise disciplinary boundaries. Thucydides as historian and as artist, for example, are treated together (cf. the Brill volume). The final section, 'After Thucydides', however, includes an essay on translation, missing from earlier collections. My treatment of individual chapters cannot do justice to their complexity and nuances, but hopefully will give a sense of their 'overall intent' (*ksumpasēs gnōmēs*, Thuc. 1.22.1).

In the Introduction (1–13), the editor, Polly A. Low, concisely sketches some of the debates the *History* has provoked and the questions it has raised. How neutral is Thucydides as a historian? How is our understanding of the *History* complicated by its incompleteness? What does Thucydides mean when he claims his work is useful and of lasting value (*ōphelima; ktēma es aiei*, 1.22.4)? Why has Thucydides become an authority for modern ideologies? In the section 'Reading Thucydides', Low moves from issues like the historian's difficult style to debates between 'unitarians' and 'separatists' about how the text was composed, to modern approaches to the *History*.

Part I, 'Context and Methods', begins with Jonas Grethlein's 'Establishing a New Genre: Thucydides and Non-historiographic Memory' (17–30). Rather than enthrone Thucydides at the head of the discipline of history, he situates the *History* within a range of competing fifth-century BCE media commemorating the past. He also shows how Thucydides incorporates examples of competing memorial genres (e.g., epideictic and deliberative speeches as well as a popular story about the tyrannicide) in order to reveal their shortcomings. By pointing out the political implications of inaccurate history, Grethlein argues, Thucydides underscores the utility of his own work.

Tom Beasley's 'Thucydidean Self-Presentation' (31–49) discusses how the historian establishes his authority. In general, Thucydides creates the

impression of a ‘narrator-less’—and therefore objective—history. When he does intervene as narrator, features like the use of superlatives (e.g., ‘by far the greatest disaster’, 3.113.6) imply his superior knowledge about the whole conflict; conversely, his refusal to mention extremely large numbers, which could appear to be exaggerated, emphasises his trustworthiness. As Beasley shows, however, these impressions of objectivity do not always hold up to close scrutiny. In his description of the destruction of Plataea, for example, Thucydides subtly heightens the pathos by importing details from a later time. Less convincing is Beasley’s assertion that the *Archaeology* (1.2–20) is Thucydides’ model for how *not* to do history, in large part because it is a mere *logos*, which tries to persuade by using the same kinds of analysis and argumentation found in forensic oratory and the Hippocratic Corpus. In contrast, the historian presents his account of the Peloponnesian War as an *ergon*, a kind of lasting monument. Indeed, Thucydides is limited by the quality of evidence available for the far past, which necessarily is inferior to that on which he bases his arguments about the contemporary war. But the antithesis in the *History* between *logos* (speech, analysis) and *ergon* (deed, fact) is not as simple as Beasley suggests. (See Greenwood’s chapter, discussed below.)

In ‘Thucydides’ Use of Evidence and Sources’ (50–62), the late P. J. Rhodes clearly distinguishes between the historian’s evidence for the Peloponnesian War and for his early history of the Greeks. About early events, however, Rhodes says that Thucydides ‘started from what he thought he knew’ and ‘investigated as best he could’ whatever he was not sure about (55). He uses epic poetry, for example, with caution, even while accepting (as his contemporaries would have) that early legends are ‘true in their main outline’ (57). For the Peloponnesian War Thucydides conferred with men on both sides of the conflict, and he drew upon physical evidence, including inscriptions and documents, although his general practice was not to provide his sources. Rhodes, however, is no apologist for Thucydides. Ancient documents could provide only limited information; moreover the historian was highly selective in their use. Rhodes also acknowledges the religious and political biases that seem to have coloured some of Thucydides’ interpretations of evidence.

Emily Greenwood begins ‘Rhetorical History: Speeches in Thucydides’ (63–76) by distinguishing between the traditional and current meanings of ‘rhetorical history’. What is now meant by ‘rhetorical’, for example, extends beyond the inclusion of formal speeches to encompass indirect speech (and, possibly, thoughts) as well as messengers’ reports and even the ‘soundscape of war’ (71). It also connotes ‘the inalienable narrativity of every historical account’ (63). For example, scholars emphasise the interaction of speeches with the narrative and argue that the mimetic nature of speeches contributes to the experiential quality of the *History*. These features, together with the vividness of the narrative, persuade readers of the credibility of Thucydides’ account. At

the same time, Greenwood observes that, like speeches in tragedy, Thucydidean orations carry multiple layers of meaning: between historical actors and their historical audiences and between the historian and his readers (66). Thus she criticises those analyses of Thucydides' programmatic statement on *logoi* (1.22.1) that have led to 'a reductive depiction of the domain of *logos* and speech in Thucydides' *History*' (74).

In 'Prolegomena to the Peloponnesian War: Thucydides Book 1' (77–88), Jeffrey S. Rusten shares some of the fruits of his labours on a Cambridge 'Green and Yellow' commentary for the first book. His analysis of the book's structure and of the disjunctions between its parts draws attention to the (often overlooked) range of styles and historical modes that Thucydides incorporates into the *History*. Although in some ways Book 1 may seem unique, Rusten argues that similar disjunctions and modes can be found throughout the work, even if they are less obvious because they seem to relate naturally to the war. The appearance of the promised commentary, to which some of the chapter's notes refer, is greatly anticipated.

Rosaria Vignolo Munson's 'Time and Foresight in Thucydides' (89–109) examines the historian's use of prolepses, passages that refer (or allude) to future events. Especially helpful is the distinction she draws between those made by actors in the *History* (usually general predictions) and those in which Thucydides, as narrator, speaks of the future. As Munson shows, the prolepses in Book 1, all by actors, do not point outside the Archidamian War. In Books 2–6, on the other hand, three important narratorial prolepses (2.65; 5.26; 6.15) allude to matters beyond the final chapters, including Athens' defeat. Two of them also look backward either to confirm (2.65) or revise (5.26) the historian's opinions at the earlier time. The absence of narratorial prolepses between 5.26 and the Melian Dialogue, Munson suggests, reinforces the impression that this unsettled period offered little material for predictions. She also discusses 'implicit or "ironical" prolepses' (95), such as Archidamus' prediction about the war extending to the next generation, and how the Melos episode as a whole directs readers to the Athenians' own mistakes in the Sicilian Expedition. Similarly, the tragic structure of Books 6 and 7 keeps the imminent destruction of Athens' forces in the forefront of the reader's mind. The surprising emphasis on the Athenians' resilience in Book 8 leads Munson to wonder whether Thucydides had in mind the restoration of democracy both after the rule of the Five Thousand and after the fall of the Thirty Tyrants in 403 BCE. Munson concludes with two insights gained from her investigation: first, that 'History as a whole is a journey through events, ... and we often cannot tell *where* it is going or where we definitively stand in relation to it'; second, that 'all historiography is provisional' (109).

In 'Labouring for Truth in Thucydides' (110–25), Elizabeth Irwin argues that Thucydides' appeal to an elite few who want clear knowledge of the past (1.22.4) is also an invitation to an even more elite group to perceive how

Thucydides intentionally distorts history. Irwin discusses omissions from the Pentecontaetia, as well as the obfuscation of Pericles' responsibility for the war and, most of all, for the plague. Because the historian only goes into detail about the plague among the troops Hagnon took to Potidaea, Irwin accuses him of hiding Pericles' earlier use of these same forces, who must also have suffered an outbreak of the disease as they were harassing the Peloponnese. She further complains that Thucydides fails to mention what was 'historically likely to have been a common view' (117), namely that Apollo brought the plague because he was angered, either by the violation of the Peace (Pericles' mistreatment of Megara, according to Irwin) or by Athens' misuse of Delian funds. So, too, she argues that Thucydides (misleadingly) distanced the detail about the overcrowding in Athens caused by Pericles' strategy (2.52) from his discussion of the possible origins of the disease (2.48).

Few would deny that Thucydides had biases. But Irwin's accusations and the motives she attributes to the historian for omissions tend to be overly confident. In some instances, Thucydides may have passed over complaints about Pericles because he genuinely considered them worthless; for example, he may have thought that the Spartans (and their allies) broke the Peace by invading Plataea and rejecting mediation, as Thucydides reports that the Spartans themselves believed (7.18.2). Moreover, he may simply have failed to understand the cause(s) of the plague—which even modern scientists have found difficult to identify. Despite my scepticism, Irwin's close and critical reading of the *History* in conjunction with other ancient evidence raises provocative questions.

The second part of the volume, 'Themes and Content', begins with Jason Crowley's informative 'Thucydides and War' (129–42). Following an opening section on the war's brutalising dynamic come the practical details of warfare. First, there is the make-up of land forces and the two main views about hoplite combat (open- or closed-rank fighting). After outlining how the cavalry and light infantry supported the hoplites, Crowley observes that the correspondence between the military and the social hierarchy explains why Thucydides (an elite) generally neglects the roles played the light infantry and crews, drawn from the lower classes. Mention of crews leads to the three basic approaches to naval combat in the *History*, dependent on the different designs of the trireme and the roles played by the infantrymen aboard them. The contrasting strengths and weaknesses of the two alliances, Crowley notes, led to their avoidance of direct confrontations. The failure to break the resulting impasse prolonged the war and caused horrendous suffering, examples of which he provides in the closing section.

As Polly A. Low points out in 'Thucydides on Empire and Imperialism' (143–59), Thucydides wrote the history of a war, not an account of the Athenian empire or Athenian imperialism. Readers concerned with these topics, therefore, 'need first to decide exactly what problems [concerning

empire] Thucydides was trying to explore and then to establish what (if any) solutions he might be proposing' (143). Low asks, for example, whether Thucydides thought the development of empire was natural, given human nature. Readers, she says, might take the compression of the Pentecontaetia and its omission of important changes in Athens' hegemony as evidence that the fate of the Athenian empire was set from the very beginning. Likewise, the words of the Athenian ambassadors in Sparta could be understood to imply that natural forces led them to strengthen and expand their rule. Low, however, advises careful navigation of the tricky waters of the speeches. Evidence can also be marshalled to challenge the ambassadors' claim that they were passively 'compelled' (*katēnagkasthēmen*, 1.75.3) and overcome (*nikēthentes*, 1.76.2) by fear, honour, and profit. Nor should the Pentecontaetia be read in isolation. While it implies that the accumulation of wealth (naturally) leads to imperial power, later passages in the *History* show that the Athenians' excesses ultimately deprived them of both. Low also asks whether the historian thought better leaders after Pericles could have prevented the empire's demise or believed that it was inevitable, and whether Thucydides' observations apply to empires in general. Such questions are, as she points out, impossible to answer definitively, especially given the unfinished state of the *History*. Nonetheless, they offer valuable approaches to Thucydides—and (*mutatis mutandis*) can be usefully applied to contemporary theories about imperialism as well.

In 'Ethnicity in Thucydides' (160–76), Maria Fragoulaki aims to show what Thucydides contributes to the understanding of ancient Greek ethnicity and to explain his views of ethnicity's role in the Peloponnesian War. The chapter begins with a distinction between the ancient concept of *ethnos*, which was dynamic and fluid, and modern notions of fixed, biological race. After providing examples of Thucydides' treatment of non-Greek ('barbarian') groups like the Persians and Thracians, Fragoulaki then turns to Greek ethnic subgroups (Dorians, Aeolians, Achaeans, and Ionians) that are introduced in the Archaeology.

Ethnicity, Fragoulaki makes clear, does not always unite communities in the *History*. Thucydides points to the role of intercommunal kinship ties in the conflicts between (Dorian) Corcyra and (Dorian) Corinth as well as between (Aeolian) Plataea and (Aeolian) Thebes. Thucydides' complex treatment of ethnic divisions, moreover, coexists with a simpler presentation of the war as a bipolar ethnic conflict between (stereotyped) Dorians and Ionians. Thus she asks whether the idea of ethnic conflict is Thucydides' or one promoted by actors in the war. Fragoulaki's answer is that while the historian does contrast Athenian and Spartan character and customs, he also provides evidence for the blurring of ethnic boundaries by both individuals and cities. An important conclusion drawn from the chapter is that 'The study of ethnicity in

Thucydides enables us to perceive different levels and notions of ethnic selfhood and Otherness outside and within the Greek world' (176).

In 'Thucydides and Leadership' (177–97), Sarah Brown Ferrario first uses the leadership methods and rhetorical strategies of Pericles, whose abilities Thucydides clearly admired, as a standard by which to judge three of his Athenian successors. She then asks whether the Periclean standard applies beyond Athens. Both parts of the chapter necessarily rely heavily on speeches for evidence. As Ferrario demonstrates, although the Athenians Cleon, Alcibiades, and Nicias echo some of Pericles' words, they each fall short in at least one area of his leadership, for example, in the ability to unite an audience through inclusive rhetoric. Beyond Athens, Hermocrates brings together Sicilian Greeks at Gela; however, his rhetoric in Syracuse is divisive, even if he later successfully rouses the Syracusans to action. As for Spartan leaders, Ferrario points out that the words used to describe the political virtues of King Archidamus 'overlap in sentiment' with those used of Pericles and Hermocrates (188). But since she acknowledges early in the chapter that norms for leadership are socially determined (177), Ferrario could also have mentioned that the distinction Archidamus makes between the young and the old in his audience reflects the Spartans' renowned respect for age. While I am not convinced by the claim that Archidamus privileges deeds over words (he advises, for example, to negotiate *and* to prepare), the author is right that the Spartan ephor Sthenelaidas—unlike Pericles—rejects words and calls for immediate action. Brasidas is shown to be a good leader in that, like Pericles, he converts words to deeds, inspires loyalty, and promises inclusive treatment of the populace in the cities he approaches. Ferrario adds that Brasidas is perceived to be first in many respects outside his city, much as Pericles was the 'first citizen' inside Athens. More could have been said, however, about some significant differences. Brasidas' speeches, for example, rely in large part on the threat posed by his troops—physical threats being a means of persuasion wielded by other Spartan leaders. The chapter concludes with mention of how later authors drew upon leaders in the *History* for exempla.

In the next chapter, 'Thucydides on Democracy and Other Regimes' (198–214), Ryan K. Balot weighs Pericles' ideal vision of democratic Athens in the Funeral Oration against Thucydides' presentation of real democracies and other kinds of *politeia* (which he refers to as 'regimes'). The author first contrasts the emphasis in the Funeral Oration on the potential for humans to flourish under a democracy with the flaws in Athens' democracy revealed by the pressures of war. He then turns to Hermocrates' speech at Gela and the evidence for the 'democratically based similarities between Athens and Syracuse' (208)—a statement reflecting the author's tendency to conflate national character and political regimes (see also 202). Balot points out that both cities are innovative and daring naval powers, but acknowledges that their regimes function differently. He oversimplifies, however, when he

attributes the political difference to Syracuse's democracy and empire both still being in their infancy. Changes in populations in Syracuse, for example, could have generated more pronounced internal divisions than there were in Athens, with its myth of autochthony. So, too, even under its earlier tyrants Syracuse was an aggressively imperialist city—at sea as well as on land. Balot further observes that Thucydides does not hold up Sparta as an ideal. But even while acknowledging that fear of their helots affected the Spartans' policies (213), he treats the differences between Athens and Sparta primarily in terms of their regimes. Given the Athenians' resilience in the *History*, their modification of democracy after Sicily, and the historian's praise of Athens' brief experiment with a limited oligarchy, Balot concludes that Thucydides favoured a 'political "mixture"' (214), one that he believes was the foundation of Plato's views in the *Laws*.

Paul Woodruff prefaces 'Justice and Morality in Thucydides' (215–30) with three important points. First, Thucydides' ideas about justice were traditional. Second, actors in the *History* are rarely motivated by justice, even if they appeal to it in their speeches. Third, for Thucydides, human actions, not the gods, impose limits on unjust behaviour. To explain how he determined the historian's opinions Woodruff notes that, while Thucydides rarely voices his own moral views, there are exceptions—like the excursus on the civil war in Corcyra and the historian's judgement of individuals—from which readers can infer his beliefs. He further observes that the placement of events can offer clues about Thucydides' opinions (e.g., the injustice at Melos juxtaposed to the disastrous Sicilian Expedition).

After a brief review of ancient Greek virtues (justice and reverence, in particular) Woodruff turns to Thucydides' views concerning character. The historian's description of war as a 'violent teacher' (3.82.2) shows that he well understood the general effect of circumstances on human character, while individuals like Pericles, Brasidas, and Nicias also elicit Thucydides' moral judgement. Woodruff's brief comparison of morality from Spartan and Athenian perspectives is necessarily painted in broad strokes, covering the entire *History* as it does. He concludes that according to Thucydides the Athenians were not, as they claimed, forced to expand their rule, but that the historian 'appears to agree that fear, greed and ambition are powerful motivators' (230).

Part III, 'After Thucydides', covers a huge amount of territory in a short space. The decision to provide readers with sketches from a bigger picture seems reasonable, since they can be directed to volumes focused on the growing field of reception theory for more focused analyses.

In 'Thucydides in Greek and Roman Historiography' (233–48), Luke V. Pitcher first discusses the historians Xenophon, Polybius, and Sallust and then turns to later authors like Appian, Cassius Dio, and Herodian. In each case he examines both implicit and explicit connections to Thucydides, as well as the

aims of authors. Xenophon, for example, links his *Hellenica* to the *History* with his opening words, ‘And after these things ...’, which refer to events at the end of Thucydides’ Book 8. The seams between the two works, Pitcher notes, are not as smooth as Xenophon’s expression suggests, and his aims differ from Thucydides’. The Roman historian Sallust alludes to Thucydides only to turn his belief in the greatness of his subject on its head: he asserts that the skill of the writer makes a subject seem great. Pitcher also discusses adaptations. Cassius Dio, for example, attributes to Augustus a speech that echoes the Thucydidean Funeral Oration. Whereas Pericles, however, says that the feats of the dead will seem beyond belief, Augustus speaks of his own behaviour, which, as Pitcher points out, is “‘incredible” for all the wrong reasons’ (245). He also cautions that explicit echoes of Thucydides’ vocabulary or phrases do not necessarily indicate a shared aim. Despite such echoes, Herodian, for example, is primarily interested (unlike Thucydides) in personalities, especially those of the emperors.

‘Thucydides in Byzantium’, by Scott Kennedy and Anthony Kaldellis (249–64), begins with an informative summary of the survival of the text of the *History* in Byzantium. In late antiquity (the early Byzantine period) Thucydides’ *History* was a standard text for teaching rhetoric (e.g., by Libanius), but between the seventh and fourteenth centuries it fell out of favour among Byzantine rhetoricians. Following a revival of interest in Thucydides, about half of our fourteenth- and fifteenth-century manuscripts of the *History* began to contain other works as well. The inclusion of Xenophon’s *Hellenica* in some reflects an increasing interest in Greek history, while those with essays by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (some along with a life or lives of Thucydides) likely served (once again) as pedagogical and rhetorical resources. The authors also point out that not all responses to the *History* were positive; for example, in the twelfth century, when there was a renewed interest among scholars in the *History*, Ioannes Tzetzes wrote at the end of a manuscript that he wished ‘the Athenians had cast [Thucydides] and his book into a pit rather than ostracizing him’ (257). At the end of the chapter the authors delve into recent approaches to late Byzantine authors like Kritoboulos (fifteenth century), whose apparent encomium of the Turkish sultan Mehmet II has been shown to use Thucydides to discreetly signal subversive views.

Kinch Hoekstra’s ‘Thucydides in the Renaissance and Reformation’ (265–81) begins with an overview of the most well-known part of the story of Thucydides’ revival in the West. Thanks to the arrival of a Greek teacher in Florence at the end of the fourteenth century, humanists like Leonardo Bruni learned the language well enough to be able to read the *History* in the original Greek. Nonetheless, most intellectuals read translations of the *History*, such as Valla’s Latin version and the vernacular translations it spawned. Hoekstra also tells the less familiar story of ‘the most substantial school of Thucydides



interpretation in the Renaissance’, initiated by Philipp Melanchthon, best known as a close associate of Martin Luther but also ‘the most influential teacher of rhetoric in the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century’ (267). For Melanchthon the *History* not only offered rhetorical models but also supported arguments for peace. The moral approach to the *History* was shared by other Lutheran intellectuals who saw the applicability of its lessons to contemporary Germany. Later figures also drew upon Thucydides for moral, political, and military insights. The chapter ends with a nuanced discussion of Thomas Hobbes’ understanding of the *History*, which challenges the philosopher’s ‘bellicose reputation’ (278).

The perspective shifts to academe in ‘Narratives of Thucydides and the 19<sup>th</sup>-Century Discipline of (Ancient) History’, by Alexandra Lianeri (282–300). The author’s goal is to show the paradox between, on the one hand, Thucydides’ adoption by scholars in the nineteenth century (in particular, Barthold Niebuhr) as the true father of the discipline of ancient history, and, on the other, their view that true history began only after the end of the eighteenth century. Lianeri recounts that as ancient historians began to reject the rhetoric and moralising of authors like Plutarch and Polybius, they turned to Thucydides, who (in their view) relied only on facts. Thucydides’ methods, that is, allowed nineteenth-century scholars to align the practice of history with scientific approaches. At the same time, however, the upheavals at the end of the eighteenth century had created the sense of a marked rupture with what came before. Earlier times became (in terms Lianeri borrows from Stephen Bann) ‘relics’ that, when contemplated, might be transformed into a story line, instead of ‘specimens’ that could be examined closely and provide relevant historical evidence. Scholars reconciled the contradictions by distinguishing ancient Greek and Roman history from other pasts—for example, that of Egypt, allegedly lacking a ‘true history’, or that of China, for which they thought there was no division between ancient and modern history. In this way, historians could incorporate Greek and Roman antiquity (including Thucydides) into their grand narrative of European history. Lianeri further observes how this treatment of ancient Greece and Rome contributed to the ‘Western temporality of primitive others’ in anthropology and helped ‘provide the logic of colonialism’ (298). She concludes with questions that the appropriation of Thucydides poses for today’s ancient historians.

Joel Alden Schlosser’s “‘What Really Happened’: Varieties of Realism in Thucydides’ *History*’ (301–16) moves readers into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and the use of Thucydides in the realm of international relations—in practice and in theory. He identifies two strands of realist readings of the *History*, both of which assume that Thucydides provides an account of ‘what really happened’ (302), a view now disputed. For conventional realists the world of politics is fundamentally a contest about power and survival; culture and ideology play no role, and morality does not count. The new kind of

realists, on the other hand, treat ‘Thucydides as a student of political complexity where history, moral psychology and misjudgements of political actions create a tragic political universe’ (302). Both forms of realism are fundamentally pessimistic and imply limited human agency. Both, as Schlosser points out, have also been criticised for ignoring evidence in the *History* that does not suit their theories. The chapter ends with the description of a political initiative that uses Thucydides to promote the idea that reality is not simply the power of states or historical forces, but ‘what people make of it’ (315). Schlosser leaves open the question of whether a careful reading of Thucydides can support such a claim.

The final chapter of the volume, ‘Translating Thucydides’, by Jeremy Mynott (317–29), is a lightly revised version of an article he published in *Arion* in 2013, the year of his own translation in the series ‘Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought’. In the ‘Further Reading’ section he acknowledges that in the interim a chapter by Emily Greenwood on the theory and practice of translating Thucydides appeared.<sup>1</sup> Although the current chapter does not engage with Greenwood’s, the unique insights of a translator are still well worth (re)reading.

Mynott first addresses the challenge anachronism poses. When Thucydides composed his work, for example, there was no genre of history. Thus Mynott uses the title *The War between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians*, phrasing that resembles the opening lines of the work. To ward off interpretations based on book divisions, which were added much later, he emphasises Thucydides’ year-by-year chronology. Concepts like *aretē* and *logos*, he acknowledges, are notoriously difficult to translate without importing modern beliefs, although leaving them untranslated is an unsatisfactory solution. Another challenge is that the style and the content of the *History* are so intertwined that any attempt to make Thucydides’ difficult prose accessible risks distorting its meaning. The English translation by Hobbes, even if inaccurate in places, receives Mynott’s high praise for capturing Thucydides’ ‘voice’. I would add that his seventeenth-century Latinate prose is also well suited for capturing the rhetorical effects of the Greek. But, as Mynott acknowledges, Hobbes’ translation poses its own obstacles for modern readers, and all translation requires compromises. Despite these challenges, because of the themes Thucydides treats Mynott insists that the *History* can still contribute to modern political theory. The chapter (and volume) fittingly concludes with praise of Thucydides’ intellectual temper and virtues: ‘We get the strong impression of an intense, penetrating gaze; quite unflinching and unsentimental but with a deep sense of the tragedies and ironies of the human condition’ (328).

<sup>1</sup> E. Greenwood (2015) ‘On Translating Thucydides’, in C. Lee and N. Morley, edd., *A Handbook to the Reception of Thucydides* (Chichester) 91–121.

The chapters of the *Companion* are informative, concise (about fifteen pages), well written, and accessible to non-specialists. In addition to the lengthy general bibliography (331–62), each essay includes a discursive ‘Further Reading’ section. The volume also includes an *index locorum* and a subject index. All of these features make *The Cambridge Companion to Thucydides* a desirable addition to libraries, including (given its reasonable price) private libraries.

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