

A COMMENTARY ON PLUTARCH'S *BRUTUS*

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A COMMENTARY ON
PLUTARCH'S *BRUTUS*



J. L. MOLES

With updated bibliographical notes by Christopher
Pelling

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FOREWORD

The *Histos* team is deeply grateful to Professor Christopher Pelling for the enormous effort that he has expended in producing and updating this commentary on Plutarch's *Brutus* by John Moles, our late and much-missed founder. We hope that Professor Pelling's labours will make John's early work, which is so full of his customary insight, acumen, and wit, available to a larger audience.

No changes have been made to the original text except for the correction of obvious typographical or other slight errors. The formatting and method of citation follow the original rather than *Histos* house style. Numbers in the margins refer to the original pagination of the dissertation. Cross-references are to the pages of this edition, not of the original.

JOHN MARINCOLA
12 September 2017

PREFACE TO THE NEW EDITION

John Moles died suddenly and prematurely on 4th October, 2015. This is not the place to pay tribute to him as a scholar and a person, but an elegant and perceptive appreciation is given by A. J. Woodman at *Histos* 9 (2015) 312–8.*

His doctoral thesis on Plutarch's *Brutus* was completed in 1979; I had the privilege of being one of its examiners, along with Professor Alan Wardman. As Woodman says, 'One of [Moles'] later regrets was that he never seemed to have the time or opportunity to revise his thesis for publication', though I know from our last conversation a few months before his death that he had not given up the idea entirely. The thesis itself has been widely consulted and quoted much more often than most doctoral work: it is often for instance credited in *Fragments of the Roman Historians* (ed. T. J. Cornell et al., 2013), particularly in the contributions of Andrew Drummond, and often cited too in the work of Kathryn Welch (e.g. *Magnus Pius*, 2012) and in my own commentaries on *Antony* and *Caesar*. After his death several friends agreed that the time had come for publication; John Marincola, Tony Woodman, Ted Lendon, and Elizabeth Meyer were particularly active at that stage, and John's widow Ruth graciously and generously agreed that we might go ahead. *Histos*, the journal which Moles had conceived, founded, and edited with such distinction, was the obvious place, and we are most grateful to the editor Christopher Krebs for agreeing to publish it as a Supplement.

A lot of scholarship has appeared since 1979 (including a fair number of contributions by Moles himself), and it seemed clear that a bibliographical update would be helpful—though as I have done this it has struck me how few of Moles' arguments would need substantial revision. Still, had John been able to do it himself he would of course have wished to engage on several occasions with radically different opinions, just as he did with Shackleton Bailey in his 1997 paper on the authenticity of Cic. *ad Brut.* 1.16 [25] and 1.17 [26] (Moles, *Letters*): on all but a very few occasions I have resisted the temptation to reconstruct the objections and qualifications that he might have made. Except for including in square brackets Shackleton Bailey's numberings of Cicero's letters, these supplements are marked by curly brackets—{ }—and full details are given in the Supplementary Bibliography. Naturally these updates are anything but full: further bibliography can often be found in Affortunati's excellent 2004 commentary and earlier in Magnino's editions of Appian *BC* 3 and 4, and I have also often been content to refer to the citations given in other recent

* <http://research.ncl.ac.uk/histos/documents/2015AA12WoodmanJLMolesObituary.pdf>

works, especially Kathryn Welch's *Magnus Pius* (2012), my own *Caesar* (2011), and the *Fragments of the Roman Historians* (2013).

In 1979 Moles had access to the earlier D. Phil. theses of Joseph Geiger on *Cato minor* (1971) and my own on *Caesar* 1–27 (1974), and cited them fairly often: both Geiger and I have since had the opportunity to put (rather shorter) versions into print, Geiger in his introduction to the Rizzoli *Focione e Cato Uticense* (1993) and I in my Clarendon Ancient History Series *Caesar* (2011). Where possible I have added references to those versions as well. Moles also saw and referred to my paper on 'Plutarch's method of work in the Roman *Lives*' before publication: this was then published in *JHS* 99 (1979), 74–96 and has been reprinted with a postscript in Scardigli, *Essays* and in my *Plutarch and History* (2002), and I have added page-references to the *Plutarch and History* version. Other short titles are:

- | | |
|--|---|
| Affortunati | M. Affortunati, <i>Plutarco: Vita di Bruto</i> , with an introduction by B. Scardigli (Frankfurt am Main, 2004). |
| Beck, <i>Companion</i> | M. Beck, ed. <i>A Companion to Plutarch</i> (Malden, Oxford, and Chichester, 2014). |
| Clarke, <i>Noblest Roman</i> | M. Clarke, <i>The Noblest Roman: Marcus Brutus and his Reputation</i> (London, 1981). |
| Duff, <i>Plutarch's Lives</i> | T. Duff, <i>Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice</i> (Oxford, 1999). |
| <i>FRHist</i> | T. J. Cornell et al., eds., <i>Fragments of the Roman Historians</i> (Oxford, 2013). |
| Geiger {D. Phil.} | J. Geiger, <i>A Commentary on Plutarch's 'Cato minor'</i> (Oxford D. Phil. thesis, 1971). |
| Geiger, <i>Focione e Catone Uticense</i> | Introduction to <i>Cato minor</i> in C. Bearzot, J. Geiger, and L. Ghilli, edd. and tr., <i>Plutarco: Focione e Catone Uticense</i> (Milan, 1993). |
| Gotter, <i>Der Diktator is Tot!</i> | U. Gotter, <i>Der Diktator is tot! Politik in Rom zwischen den Iden des März und der Begründung des Zweiten Triumvirates</i> (<i>Historia Einzelschriften</i> 110; Stuttgart, 1996). |
| Gowing, <i>Triumviral Narratives</i> | A. M. Gowing, <i>The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio</i> (Ann Arbor, 1992). |
| <i>LIMC</i> | <i>Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae</i> (Zurich, München, and Düsseldorf, 1981–2009). |
| <i>LTUR</i> | E. M. Steinby, ed., <i>Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae</i> (Rome, 1993–9). |
| Moles, <i>Cicero</i> | J. L. Moles, <i>Plutarch: Cicero</i> (Warminster, 1989). |
| Moles, <i>Latomus</i> | J. L. Moles, 'Some "last words" of M. Iunius Brutus', <i>Latomus</i> 42 (1983) 763–79. |

- Moles, *Letters* J. L. Moles, 'Plutarch, Brutus and Brutus' Greek and Latin letters', in J. Mossman, ed., *Plutarch and his Intellectual World* (Swansea, 1997) 141–68.
- OLD P. G. W. Clare, ed., *Oxford Latin Dictionary*² (Oxford, 2012).
- Pelling, *Antony* C. Pelling, *Plutarch: Life of Antony* (Cambridge, 1988).
- Pelling, *Caesar* C. Pelling, *Plutarch: Caesar* (Oxford, 2011).
- Pelling, {D.Phil.} C. Pelling, *Introduction, Text, and Commentary on Chapters 1–27 of Plutarch's Life of Caesar* (Oxford D. Phil. thesis, 1974).
- Pelling, *Plutarch and History* C. Pelling, *Plutarch and History: Eighteen Studies* (Swansea, 2002).
- Ramsey, *Cic. Phil.* J. T. Ramsey, *Philippics I–II* (Cambridge, 2003).
- Scardigli see Affortunati above.
- Scardigli, *Essays* B. Scardigli, ed., *Essays on Plutarch's Lives* (Oxford, 1995).
- Scott-Kilvert–Pelling I. Scott-Kilvert, I. and C. Pelling, *Plutarch: Rome in Crisis* (Penguin translation, Harmondsworth).
- Wardle, *Suet. Aug.* D. Wardle, *Suetonius: Life of Augustus* (Oxford, 2014).
- Welch, *Magnus Pius* K. Welch, *Magnus Pius: Sextus Pompeius and the Transformation of the Roman Republic* (Swansea, 2012).

I am most grateful for various forms of assistance and encouragement to John Marincola (who undertook some of the copy-typing), Ted Lendon, Elizabeth Meyer, Tony Woodman, John Ramsey, Kathryn Tempest, Henriette van der Blom, and Kathryn Welch, and of course to Ruth Moles, without whom this would not have been possible. It has been a sad pleasure to play a part in making more accessible this remarkable work by a scholar of formidable learning and intelligence and a very good friend.

Oxford

CHRISTOPHER PELLING
August, 2016

PREFACE

The subject of this thesis originally occurred to me because of the lack of a proper commentary on P.'s *Brutus* in any language. At this late stage of Classical studies one might indeed wonder whether there is any justification at all for the writing of detailed commentaries on relatively short texts. Yet, despite the vast number of books and articles devoted to the study of P. in recent years, P. is an author whose richness and subtlety can *only* be appreciated by precise analysis of individual texts. General studies can, and do, indicate certain lines of thought and certain principles whose application may benefit the understanding of particular works, but in the final analysis there remains no substitute for interpretation based on continuous, line by line, section by section, and text by text, exposition. Again, there have been several excellent commentaries on individual *Lives* produced over the last twenty years (e.g. Hamilton's *Alexander*, Geiger's *Cato minor*, Pelling's *Caesar* {the last two of those known to Moles as doctoral theses}), but each text poses its own problems of understanding and interpretation, and in an author as Protean and varied as P. what is true of one work is not necessarily true of another, or, if true, true only in a trivial sense.

To write a fully adequate and comprehensive commentary on P.'s *Brutus* one would have ideally to be an expert in Roman Republican history, Greek philosophy, and Greek literature, both early and late. Few people combine these three qualifications. This commentary is therefore to some extent restricted in its scope and is avowedly a 'literary' one. But one must use inverted commas because it is really impossible to make an absolute distinction between historical, philosophical, or literary approaches. One cannot, for example, fully understand P.'s 'literary' purpose at any given moment without establishing as far as possible the nature of the historical material with which he is working: his literary purpose may be underpinned by a conscious decision to prefer source 'x' to source 'y', or by a deliberate reworking, or reinterpretation, of his source. Equally, one cannot assess P.'s reliability as a 'historian, or—perhaps more accurately—his reliability as a historical source, without trying first to evaluate his literary purpose: so often what appears at first sight to be a historical 'error' turns out, on closer inspection, to be deliberate. If, then, this commentary is a 'literary' one, that is in the first instance a reflection of the commentator's lack of competence in Roman Republican history and Greek philosophy: it does not reflect any conviction that the literary approach is in itself sufficient and adequate. There is of course a practical point: a commentary exploiting all three

approaches to the full would be many times the size of this one. Subject to these constraints, I have tried, although my general approach is 'literary', to make some contribution to the acute philosophical, and some of the more acute historical, problems raised by this, one of the richest and most thought-provoking of all P.'s *Lives*, and to provide adequate documentation for those whose interests are different from mine.

The *Introduction* is deliberately restricted in scope, partly for reasons of space, partly through a desire to avoid mere regurgitation of established and largely incontrovertible views. Thus there is nothing about P.'s life and career, the study of which has been put on a sounder basis than ever before by C. P. Jones' *Plutarch and Rome*, or about P.'s purpose in writing the *Lives*, a subject upon which there is naturally widespread agreement. (Personally, I believe that more weight than is currently fashionable should be given to the view that P. is concerned partly to demonstrate the need for the restraining influence of Greek civilization upon potentially barbarous Roman power, but this is an interpretation which can only be justified, if at all, at length and in detail, though this is a topic of some relevance to the *Brutus* and I have touched upon it from time to time in the *Commentary*.) Nor have I discussed P.'s style separately, preferring to confine my observations to the *Commentary*. The lack of discussion of the manuscript tradition arises partly from the fact that the whole question has recently been treated by Pelling in his D.Phil. commentary on the | *Caesar*, partly also from the fact that the text of the *Brutus* is on the whole very good: there are of course many cases where the true reading may be disputed and there are a few major textual *crucis*, but there are (I believe) no passages where the essential meaning is in doubt. For similar reasons, within the *Commentary*, I have not attempted to discuss in depth P.'s practice with regard to hiatus, or various minor orthographical problems: these are technical questions, and their resolution, if indeed the evidence were good enough to provide it, would not (in my opinion) advance our understanding of anything very important.

In writing the *Commentary* I have been greatly helped by the work of early editors such as Coraes, Reiske, Schaefer, Sintenis, and Voegelin, all of whom exhibit what must even today be regarded as an enviable grasp of Plutarchean language and style, in some cases, and certainly on some occasions, in excess of Ziegler, whose Teubner text (second edition) I have quoted throughout. I have also benefited from the historical commentary of F. M. Wilson, which, while modest in purpose, contains many useful observations. I have found the commentaries of Paukstadt and R. Del Re of more limited value. Many scholars in England and Ireland have kindly offered their expertise on various points of difficulty. I thank particularly Mr D. A. Russell, who acted as my supervisor for two terms, Dr C. B. R. Pelling, who generously allowed me to read his important paper 'Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman *Lives*' in advance of publication, and above

all my supervisor, Mr E. L. Bowie, who has been tolerant, stimulating, and exacting far beyond the call of duty. And without the practical assistance and inspiration of many *φίλοι*, especially Ronny, George, Hilary, and Catherine, I should never have been able to carry on.

The Queen's University of Belfast

J. L. M.
January 1979

ABBREVIATIONS

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'P.' = Plutarch. Other abbreviations follow standard practice. For references to P.'s own works I have followed the abbreviations of Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*, xii–xiii, as far as possible, inventing my own abbreviations of the Latin titles where necessary.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE *LIFE* OF BRUTUS

In the *Brutus* P. is dealing with a theme of central importance throughout the *Lives*, and indeed much of the *Moralia* as well: the need for the union of philosophical reason and political statescraft. His subject is a man whose character and principles fascinated his contemporaries, inspired many of the leading figures in the political 'opposition' in the early Empire, and have caught the imagination of succeeding generations, down to the present day. Brutus' strong philosophical bent makes him a figure highly congenial both to P.'s moral purpose in the *Lives*, and—one might almost say—to his own heart (one recalls here the warm intimacy P. feels towards his subjects: *Aemil.* 1.1–2). P.'s emotional identification with Brutus is the stronger for the fact that (in his opinion) Brutus' philosophy was not dour and implacable, but rather tempered by humanity and grace: in P.'s portrayal of Brutus-φιλόσοφος there are few of the reservations or signs of alienation so well documented in the *Cato minor* by Babut 169–75, and evident also in the parallel to the *Brutus*, the rather scrappy and unsatisfactory *Dion*. (One may note here the care with which, on the whole, P. glosses over Brutus' Stoic characteristics, preferring instead to emphasize Brutus the Academic.) And Brutus' character and political importance were such as to attract to the tradition a wealth of anecdotal material, the use of which harmonizes excellently with the programme P. sets out in *Alexander* 1. A central concern of the *Brutus* is naturally the struggle between ἐλευθερία and μοναρχία (and to a certain extent ἐλευθερία and τυραννίς), a splendid theme, much celebrated in Greek literature but also still of great contemporary relevance in P.'s own day. The strongly philhellene Brutus naturally exerts considerable appeal to P., the reconciler of the divergent strengths of Greek and Roman civilization. No wonder, then, that the *Brutus* is one of the most committed and successful of all the *Lives*.

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It is rich in colourful anecdote: the altercation of Caesar and Cato | (5.3–4), the disaster brought upon themselves by the Megarians (8.7), the fight between the boy Cassius and Faustus Sulla (9.1–4), the emotional reconciliation of Brutus and Cassius (10.3–7), the interview of Brutus and Ligarius (11.1–3), the stories of Porcia (13.1–11, 15.5–9, 23.2–7, 53.5–7), the lynching of Cinna the poet (20.8–11), Brutus' ill-omened toast on his birthday (24.5–7), the kindly treatment bestowed on him by his enemies (26.1–2), the treachery of Theodotus and his just punishment (33.2–6), the quarrel of Brutus and Cassius and the antics of the buffoonish Favonius (34.2–8), the visitations of 'the ghost of Caesar' (36.1–37.1, 48.1), the harsh

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fate of Volumnius and Saculio (45.6–9), the desertion of Clodius (48.8–9), the bravery of Lucilius (50.1–9), the further careers of Strato and Messalla (53.1–3). It is rich also in apophthegm and revealing quotation: Brutus’ tart admonitions to the Greek cities of Asia Minor (2.6–8), Caesar’s memorable *dicta* about Brutus and about Brutus and Cassius (6.7, 7.4, 8.2–3), the *graffiti* by which Brutus was impelled against Caesar by the citizens of Rome (9.7–8), the sharp pun of Ligarius (11.3), Brutus’ retort to those who would appeal to Caesar above the laws (14.7), his reproaches to Cicero (22.4–6) and Cassius (28.4–5, 35.4–6), his wryly humorous remarks about Porcia (23.6–7), his Delphic prognostication of defeat (24.6), his reflections on the death of Cicero (28.2), Antony’s assessment of Brutus (29.7), Brutus’ attitude to his prospects in the forthcoming trial of strength and the behaviour of Antony (29.9–11), the complaints of Cassius’ friends (30.2), Cassius’ refusal of the title of king (30.3), the poisonous sophistry of Theodotus (33.4), Brutus’ imperturbable response to the evil *φάσμα* (36.7), the inappropriate remark of Atellius (39.10), Cassius’ *ultima dicta* to Messalla (40.3), his *ultima verba* before his suicide (43.7), Brutus’ salutation of the dead Cassius (44.2), Lucilius’ proud boast of the ‘uncapturability’ of the philosophical Brutus (50.5), Brutus’ quotations from Greek tragedy (51.1), his pregnant ‘it is drunk up’ (51.4), his last words (51.6, 52.3–5), the spirited response of Messalla (53.3). |

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It is also as a whole extremely well written (among the very few signs of carelessness one may instance the use of *συνωμοσία* in 1.4, the unfulfilled back-reference of 13.3, or the somewhat opaque battle narrative of 42.2–4). Of the rich imagery in the *Life* one may single out especially the brilliant metaphor of 7.7, excellently conceived in itself and also of great importance for the whole narrative of *chs.* 6–9. P.’s exploitation of literary evocation and association is sustained and impressive: although there are countless examples throughout the *Life*, one may think particularly of sections 5.3–4, 7.7, 13.1–11, 15.1–9, 20.8–11, 23.2–7, 31.1–7, 36.1–7, 40.1–9. Perhaps above all the *Brutus* is conspicuous among the *Lives* for the impression it makes of internal coherence and unity. The sustained narrative power of *chs.* 7–10 (Brutus’ alienation from Caesar), 11–13 (the formation of the conspiracy), 14–16 (the day of the assassination), 17 (the assassination), or of *chs.* 24–28 (preparations for war), 38–53 (the campaign of Philippi and the deaths of Brutus and Cassius), is indeed partly simply a reflection of the fact that Brutus’ (and Cassius’) political and military career from the end of 45 until October/November 42 fell naturally into a coherent mould. But the skill with which P. organizes his narrative in detail is still most impressive. In broad terms, there are perhaps four main organizing elements in the structure of the *Life*:

(i) the characterization of Brutus as (very nearly) the ideal *πολιτικός*; the *Brutus* is a very ‘moral’ *Life*, and the characterization of Brutus is central to it, in the way that one would expect from reading P.’s editorial statements

in *Alexander* 1, *Nicias* 1, *Pericles* 1–2, *Aemilius* 1, etc. There are three emphatic editorial characterizations of Brutus in the *Life* (1.2–3, 6.8–9, 29.1–10), but much of the narrative is also illustrative of Brutus' character (details in the commentary). In the *Brutus*, as in other of the *Lives* (cf. e.g. Hamilton xl), the attempt to distinguish the 'chronographisch' and 'eidologisch' elements in P.'s biographical technique has limited value. |

(ii) the *σύγκρισις* between Brutus and Cassius; this is very important to the structure of the *Life* and is sustained practically throughout. For discussion see pp. 44f. x

(iii) the theme that 'even his enemies' respected Brutus. For discussion see p. 52.

(iv) the political framework; the struggle between *ἐλευθερία* and *μοναρχία*.

The struggle of *ἐλευθερία* against *μοναρχία*, *τυραννίς*, and *δεσποτεία*, is obviously very important in, and gives shape to, sections 1.1–8, 2.1–5 (I think—see commentary *ad loc.*), 4.1–7, 7.6–11.3, 12.1–14.7, 18.2–5, 21.2–3, 22.3–6, 24.2–3, 28.2, 28.4–5, 29.4–11, 35.4–6, 39.8, 40.8, 44.2, 52.4–5. One may link with this P.'s own belief that the assassination of Caesar was ordained by heaven (14.2–3 and n.) and that the final defeat of the Republic was equally heaven-ordained (6.5 and n.). The latter belief consistently informs the narrative after the assassination of Caesar: 24.6–7, 29.11, 36–37 (see p. 301), 39.3–6, 40.3, 40.8, 47.7, 48.2–5, 52.5, cf. *Comp.* 2.2. (Even dubious omens reinforce the theme.)

One may also note what appear to be conscious structural parallelisms between *chs.* 29–30 (the conference at Smyrna) and 34–35 (the conference at Sardis); between the deaths of Cassius (43.5–8) and Brutus (51.5–6 *et seq.*); between the missions of Clodius (47.8–9) and of Lucilius (50.1–9); between the activities *τὸ προαποθνήσκειν* (10.5) and *τὸ προκινδυνεύειν* (49.10 and 51.2)—see n. on 49.10); and—more speculatively—between the distasteful seductiveness of Caesar (7.7) and his son (27.1 and n.), between the 'insomniac' descriptions of 4.8, 13.1–2, and 36.1ff. (see nn. on 4.8 and 13.2), and the imagery of 7.7 and 55.2 = *Comp.* 2.2 (see n. on 7.7).

All this is very satisfying aesthetically and helps to make the *Brutus* the tightly organized and impressively structured *Life* that it undoubtedly is, but one may well ask the questions: how far do these four main unifying structural devices restrict the historical value of P.'s narrative, and how | far do they impose a naïve interpretation of historical events? xi

The historical value of the *Brutus* is difficult to assess. It is obviously a 'moral' rather than a 'historical' *Life*. In addition, it has some clear encomiastic elements (see on 1.4, 4.4, 29.3). On the other hand P. preserves a mass of material otherwise unattested (e.g. 1.7–8, 2.4, 4.4–8, 6.1–4, 8.6–7, 10.1–2, 11.1–3, 12.3–6, 14.4–5, 14.7, 15.5–9, 19.1 [Plancus], 19.4 [second meeting of the senate on March 18, 44], 20.9, 21.5–6, 23.2–7, 24.1, 24.2–3, 25.4–26.2, 27.5, 28.3–5, 29.1, 30.1–2, 30.3–4, 34.8, 35.1–6, 36.2–4, 39.7–

40.12, 41.8, 42.6–9, 43.1–3, 44.1, 44.4, 45.1 [Briges], 45.2, 45.6–9, 47.8–9, 49.2–4, 51.2–52.7, 53.1–3, 53.6). Much of this is relatively trivial, although of interest for the characters and relations of Brutus and Cassius. P.'s accounts of a *second* meeting of the senate on March 18, 44, of the military council the night before the First Battle of Philippi (39.7ff.), and of Brutus' ignorance of the Republican victory at sea when he decided to accept the Second Battle, are, however, of substantial historical interest, and perhaps also of substantial historical value (this is naturally debatable). As usual in P. there are several occasions when he gets the chronology of events wrong (as distinct from manipulating the chronology for artistic or thematic effect), e.g. in his narrative of the events of March 15–17 (see pp. 198ff.), his summary of the events between May and October 44 (see pp. 236ff., 238ff.), his dating of the letters *Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25] and 1.17 [26] (see pp. 239ff.). In the circumstances these are venial errors: the accounts of Appian and Dio for the period 15–17 March, 44, are no better than P.'s, his summary of events from May to October, 44, is brief and thematically organized (although certainly intended to give the impression of chronological movement), and the dating of *Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25] and 1.17 [26] is a difficult matter.

xii On two occasions P. embarks upon discussions of 'historical' questions (1.6–8, 53.6–7). From a strictly historical point of view, his discussions are not impressive, but they are hardly intended to be, and one cannot blame P. for not operating by criteria in which he himself is not at that | point much interested.

The question of the general validity of P.'s portrayal of the character of Brutus is obviously too large a question to discuss in detail here. His portrayal is clearly thoroughly idealized, but it has been enormously influential (the Brutus who emerges in *Julius Caesar* or even Syme's *Roman Revolution* is recognizably the Plutarchean Brutus). The resulting picture is not quite as naïve or simplistic as the overriding schematization of Brutus as the (all but) ideal *πολιτικός* would at first sight suggest. Twice Brutus is said to have lost his temper (34.3, 45.9), and this is less trivial than it seems because of the emphasis placed throughout the *Life* (1.2–3 etc.) on the conflict between philosophical *λόγος* and elemental *θυμός*. (The second reference is certainly important—see below.) P. roundly criticizes Brutus for his promise to allow his troops to pillage Thessalonica and Sparta (46.2ff.)—of course his discussion of Brutus' motives is as apologetic as he can make it, but this stems as much from his desire wherever possible to take a charitable view of human nature (cf. e.g. *De Herod. malign.* 855B, *Cim.* 2, *Aemil.* 1, etc.), as from any intent to whitewash Brutus, and in the final analysis he does condemn Brutus here. More subtly, he suggests a development in Brutus' character from the rather recalcitrant youth of 3.3 to the mature patriot (as he represents him) of 4.4, he shows an interest in the conflict in Brutus' soul between Caesarism and Republicanism in *chs.*

6–11, and perhaps also in *chs.* 36–37 (on this see pp. 110ff., pp. 118ff.), and he *seems* to suggest a deterioration in Brutus' character under the stress of war after the First Battle of Philippi (see pp. 357, 358f., 360f.). Much the same may be said of his portrayal of Cassius. Of course the overriding Brutus–Cassius *σύγκρισις* operates against a proper portrayal of Cassius. Yet there are times when P. quietly drops the prevailing anti-Cassius line (see n. on 29.1), and his narrative of the formation of the conspiracy actually seems to imply that at that stage Cassius was more true to his principles than Brutus (see pp. 110f., 118ff.). Again, P.'s argument in | 9.1ff. may not be impressive in itself, but the mere fact that he is ready to break his schematic *σύγκρισις*—one, moreover, thoroughly embedded in his sources—, in the interests of the truth as he sees it, *is* impressive and deserves credit. One need not doubt that Cassius was self-interested to a degree, a man of passion, rapacious, and cruel, but yet also in some sense a man of principle: once allowance is made for the inevitable exaggerations and distortions created by the monumental *σύγκρισις*, P.'s portrayal of Cassius (as of Brutus) *is* interesting, shows a certain psychological insight, and does to some extent do justice to the complexity of the man.

xiii

P.'s political analysis in the *Brutus* is also naturally a great oversimplification, and is necessarily hampered by the overriding schematizations: the characterization of Brutus as very nearly the ideal *πολιτικός*, and the great emphasis placed on the struggle between *ἐλευθερία* and *μοναρχία/τυραννίς*. These schematizations inevitably create a certain unreality about much of the narrative. For example, in 26.6 P. notes approvingly that Brutus did not deprive C. Antonius of the insignia of his magistracy. This, to P., is a proof of Brutus' *φιλανθρωπία* or *μεγαλοφροσύνη*, which in part it may have been, but nothing is said of its political significance. Or, in 21.3 the *δῆμος* longs for Brutus, being sickened by the *μοναρχία* of Antony. Historically, this verges on the ridiculous, but it conforms to the schema Antony = *μοναρχία*, Brutus = *ἐλευθερία*, the fickle *πλήθη* of 21.2 necessarily becoming the sovereign *δῆμος* of 21.3. But again, the inadequacy of P.'s political analysis can be overstressed. He shows a good appreciation of the degradation Caesarian autocracy exacted of proud aristocrats like Brutus and Cassius (7.7, cf. 16.5, 17.3, and nn.). In defence of his operating within the frame *ἐλευθερία* v. *μοναρχία/τυραννίς*, it must be said that he is after all only adopting the terminology and categorizations of Brutus and Cassius themselves, and many of their contemporaries and admirers. | And to a certain extent, too, he is simply entering into the spirit of the ethos of his subjects, just as in the *Cato minor* he is more indulgent to Cato's unbending Stoicism than he would otherwise be.

xiv

P.'s belief in the influence of the divine will upon the fall of the Republic at first sight might also seem to rob his political analysis of any serious historical worth (cf. the dismissive remarks of Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*,

rooff). But in P., as in Homer and the tragedians, the divine does not influence events in any crude mechanistic way. Why is the conspiracy against Caesar successful? On one level, it is because Caesar's fall has divine sanction. But on another the success of the conspiracy is due to the scrupulous secrecy with which the plot was kept (12.8), the care with which preparations were made (14.1), and the calmness of Brutus at a critical moment (16.4; this is made up, so it is 'unhistorical', but at least it is not totally irrational). On one level, too, the Republicans failed because the fall of the Republic was foreordained. But on another level they lose the political initiative after the assassination of Caesar because of the timorousness of the senate (18.1, cf. 14.1) and because of the decision of Brutus to allow Antony to live and Caesar to have a public funeral (or any funeral at all), which permits Antony, a man of unstable moral character, to whip up the emotions of the mob (20.1–2, 20.4). In the same way, P. does not disguise the fact that the decision to fight the First Battle of Philippi was a military error (40.3), reached, however, by the exercise of the free will of the Republicans, and he makes it clear that in his opinion Brutus *could* have secured a Republican victory in that battle had he been able to control his troops (44.5–6, cf. 49.8). Even for the apparently uncompromising assertion of divine intervention at 47.7 a reasonable explanation on the human plane is provided, for P. seems to imply that Clodius was a thoroughly untrustworthy type.

xv Another radical objection might be levelled against P. If much of the *Life* is built round the political frame of the struggle between *ἐλευθερία* | and *μοναρχία*, and even on occasion *τυραννίς* (7.7, 9.1ff.), but P. himself believes that in the end monarchy was necessary and even beneficial to Rome (55.2 etc.), is not the whole political analysis of the *Brutus* flawed by a fatal contradiction at the very outset? It must be conceded that there is a certain fundamental ambivalence in P.'s attitude to the establishment of the empire, which does indeed lead him into logically contradictory positions. The attitudes of 7.7 and 9.1ff., where P. is not simply reflecting the opinions of Cassius in virtual *oratio obliqua*, or of *Caes.* 28.3, where Caesar's *προαίρεσις* is said to be *τυραννική*, cannot logically be reconciled with the statement of 55.2. Yet this, after all, is an ambivalence towards the establishment of the Roman monarchy which can be paralleled among many Greek and Roman aristocrats of the Imperial era (e.g. Seneca and Tacitus). And despite this fundamental ambivalence, P. manages to span the credibility gap between his admiration for his Republican heroes and his love for the principles for which they stood *and* his intellectual conviction that monarchy was necessary, to a surprisingly successful extent. The narrative of the second half of the *Life* is from this point of view quite subtly written. When Caesar is killed the *τυραννίς* of the first half of the *Life* is dead, but *ἐλευθερία* is not restored because of the failure of the senate to rise to the occasion, of Brutus' political errors (however admirable they

were morally), of Antony's demagoguery, of the arrival of Octavian, and the rivalry between him and Antony with the subsequent levy of troops. Brutus, perforce, prepares for war (23.1, 24.2ff.). Octavian mounts a *coup d'état*, the Triumvirate is formed, and the proscriptions take place. After the preparations of Brutus and Cassius and their meeting at Smyrna, P. says (28.7) that they are now fit to challenge Antony and Octavian *περὶ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας*. It may (I think) already be regarded as significant that they are *not* described as fit to fight on behalf of *τῆς ἐλευθερίας*. The validity of the Republican cause is somewhat undermined by the behaviour of | Cassius, who (according to P., no doubt wrongly, but he has Brutus as his authority) is interested in *ἀρχή* for its own sake (28.4, 29.5). When Cassius kills himself, Brutus salutes him as 'the last of the Romans' (44.2). Brutus is thus left alone in his struggle against Antony and Octavian. His own behaviour now shows signs of incipient *μοναρχία* (45.6–9 and n.), and in the last battle his followers, gallant and heroic as they are, are fighting *πρὸ ... Βρούτου* (49.10, 51.2), *not πρὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας*. The opposite was the case before the assassination of Caesar (10.5). On this interpretation, the narrative moves quite naturally from *partial* acceptance of the Republican analysis of Caesar's rule to a recognition that monarchy became inevitable in the two years after Caesar's assassination, inevitable not because Brutus and Cassius were mere puppets in the hands of God, but because even if Brutus and Cassius had won the First Battle of Philippi (as P. correctly believes they could have done) or if Brutus alone had won the subsequent campaign (as he could have done, had he avoided battle), even then the cause of *ἐλευθερία* would have been doomed. This of course is hardly profound stuff, but it is far from being as naïve or simplistic or self-contradictory as the monumental frameworks of the *Life* would initially suggest. It is in fact essentially an analysis with which many a modern historian would agree. Finally, the third main organizing element in the structure of the *Life* contributes to P.'s acceptance of the establishment of empire, for if 'even his enemies' respected Brutus, then some sort of reconciliation was possible between *ἐλευθερία* and *μοναρχία*.

THE DATE OF THE *LIFE* OF BRUTUS

xvii The date of the *Dion–Brutus* cannot be fixed with precision. 96 A.D. may be regarded as a fair preliminary *terminus post*, since it is reasonable to assume that because of its subject matter the *Life of Brutus* must have been written after the death of Domitian. This *terminus post* may be extended to 99, *if* we accept the attractive, though unverifiable, suggestion of Jones, ‘Chronology’, 70 {= Scardigli, *Essays* 114}, that the consulship of Q. Sosius Senecio, to whom several of the *Lives* are addressed, gave P. the opportunity of dedicating the series to him. *If* Jones’ suggestion is right, then the *Dion–Brutus*, the 12th pair of the *Parallel Lives* (*Dion* 2.7), must of course already be dated some years later than 99. An equally loose *terminus ante* is provided by Sosius’ death (? a few years) before 116, for the *Dion–Brutus* is addressed to him (*Dion* 1, cf. Jones, ‘Chronology’, 69 (= Scardigli, *Essays* 113}); the dating of the *Dion* by Porter xv to 116–20 is therefore too late).

Since neither *Life* contains any reference to datable events of the recent past, further progress can only be made by considering the relationship of the *Dion–Brutus* to certain other of P.’s works, both in the *Moralia* and the *Parallel Lives*.

Brut. 25.6 cross-references to *Quaest. conviv.* 693F. The use to which the cross-reference is put, as well as the style of the passage 25.4ff., indicates the priority of the *Quaest. conviv.* discussion, although the *Brutus* must be roughly contemporaneous (on this see pp. 25off.). This, however, is little help, merely confirming (? a few years) before 116 as a *terminus ante* and making 99 certain as a *terminus post* (Jones, ‘Chronology’, 69, 72–3 {= Scardigli, *Essays* 113, 121}, cf. p. 257 below).

Brut. 6.9 links with *De vit. pud.* 530A, which *may* have been written earlier, though again the two passages must be more or less contemporaneous, but this is no help at all, as the *De vit. pud.* is simply undatable (cf. p. 101 below).

xviii One might attempt to make something of P.’s interest in ‘demonology’ in the *Dion–Brutus*. This must be done with great caution, since efforts | to reconstruct the ‘development’ or otherwise of P.’s thought in this difficult field have so far failed to yield any consistent or convincing results. But *if* it is the case that the *Dion–Brutus* shows P. toying with (though actually rejecting) Zoroastrian dualistic doctrine and—more important—possessed of quite detailed knowledge of it (as argued on pp. 32off. below), then one might try to link this with the *De Iside et Osiride*, in which Zoroastrian dualistic doctrine is very important and P. seems relatively well informed about it (p. 321). The dating of the *De Iside et Osiride* is unfortunately much disputed, but all that is required in the present argument is to establish a *terminus post* for its composition, since the *Dion–Brutus* has a secure *terminus ante* of a year or so before 116. The most likely *terminus post* for the *De Iside et*

Osiride seems c. 115 or a few years later (cf. Jones, ‘Chronology’ 71, 73 (= Scardigli, *Essays* 118–9, 122–3}, Griffiths 16f., Brenk, *In Mist Apparellled*, 5, n. 12). The argument is tenuous, but the parallelism between *Dion* 2 and the doctrine of the *De Iside et Osiride* might tend to favour a dating of the *Dion–Brutus* as near as possible to the later work, subject to the constraint of the death of Sosius Senecio as a *terminus ante*.

The question of the relationship of the *Dion–Brutus* to other *Parallel Lives* is much more difficult and inevitably raises the vexed problem of the cross-references. The discussion that follows is restricted in scope, aiming only to establish the position of the *Brutus* in relation to the Roman *Lives* that overlap directly in subject matter. The *Cicero* definitely precedes the *Brutus*, for the *Demosthenes–Cicero* is the 5th pair (*Demosth.* 3.1). The relationship to the *Brutus* of the *Caesar*, *Pompey*, *Antony*, and *Cato minor* can only be established (if at all) by invoking the evidence of the cross-references. One may then hope to bring additional information to bear in the attempt to provide the *Dion–Brutus* with a more precise absolute dating.

Cross-references are scattered through almost all the *Lives*, often in the form ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ δεινὸς γέγραπται, and appear at first | sight to offer valuable indications of the order in which certain *Lives* were written. When *Life* ‘x’ cites *Life* ‘y’ it would seem reasonable to conclude that *Life* ‘y’ was written first. But there is a difficulty, which must be tackled before the reliability of the cross-references can be taken at face value. This is that several times they appear to contradict each other, in two rather different ways:

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(i) *Life* ‘x’ cites ‘y’ but ‘y’ also cites ‘x’. Thus *Dion* 58.10 cites the *Timoleon* and *Timoleon* 13.10 and 33.4 the *Dion*, *Alcibiades* 13.9 cites the *Nicias* and *Nicias* 11.2 the *Alcibiades*, and *Brutus* 9.9 cites the *Caesar* and *Caesar* 62.8 and 68.7 the *Brutus*.

(ii) With one group of *Lives* the argument simply breaks down: *Camillus* 33.10 cites the *Romulus*, *Theseus* 1.4 and *Romulus* 21.1 cite the *Numa*, but *Numa* 9.15 and 12.13 cite the *Camillus*.

Scholars have adopted several different approaches to this problem.

(1) The old method was simply to reject as spurious all the apparently contradictory cross-references. Thus Stoltz, essentially following nineteenth century practice, deleted *Dion* 58.10, *Brut.* 9.9, and *Cam.* 33.10. He in turn was followed (e.g.) by Ziegler 90iff {= *Plutarchos von Chaironeia* 264ff.} and Theander, *Eranos* 56 (1958), 12–20. This method has rightly been criticized by (e.g.) Jones, ‘Chronology’, 66 {= Scardigli, *Essays* 107}, and—more substantively—by Geiger {D.Phil.} 102ff. {cf. *Athen.* 57 (1979), 61 n. 47} and Pelling {D.Phil.} iff., and in his ‘Plutarch’s Method of ‘Work in the Roman *Lives*’ {= *Plutarch and History* 8}. For the purposes of the present investigation it is sufficient to note that not only is the style of *Brut.* 9.9 and *Dion* 58.10 apparently Plutarchean but *Brut.* 9.9 actually appears necessary to its context (p. 129f. below).

(2) A method that has not found much favour is to assume that some of the cross-references were added subsequently by P. himself—a possibility that is not ruled out by Ziegler 901 {= *Plutarchos* 264}, Hamilton xxxv, n. 4, or Pelling. *Brut.* 9.9 (I think) rather goes against this. Even if this theory is right, however, the attempt can still be made to distinguish ‘second’ from ‘first’ edition cross-references.

xx (3) Mewaldt, *Hermes* 42 (1907), 564ff., followed by Flacelière, *REG* 61 | (1948), 68f., cf. *Plutarque Vies* I, xxv–vi, II, 217, and Stadter, *Plutarch’s Historical Methods*, 32, n. 1, and—with modifications—by Jones, ‘Chronology’, 67 {= Scardigli, *Essays* 107–8}, argued that the *Lives* were not all issued one pair at a time, as usually assumed, but that certain pairs were published in groups, the *Themistocles–Camillus*, *Lycurgus–Numa*, and *Theseus–Romulus* in one batch, the *Dion–Brutus*, *Aemilius–Timoleon*, and *Alexander–Caesar* in another, hence a reader could easily have consulted (e.g.) the *Dion* while reading the *Timoleon* and *vice versa*. Mewaldt’s hypothesis as stated cannot stand, because of the wording of *Thes.* 1.4, which proves that the *Lycurgus–Numa* had already come out separately. This is the decisive argument, though for others see the discussions of Stoltz 58ff., Pelling, and (most trenchant) Hamilton xxxv–vii (including a cogent refutation of Flacelière’s defence of Mewaldt).

(4) A few scholars (e.g. Gomme, *HCT* I, 83, n. 3; Brożek, *Eos* 53 [1963], 68–80; Pelling) have seen the contradictory cross-references as an indication of simultaneous preparation of groups of *Lives*. Thus *Life* ‘x’ might refer to *Life* ‘y’, even with the formula *ὡς ... γέγραπται*, and even if *Life* ‘y’ had not actually been written, provided that it had already to some extent been planned in advance. This attractive idea has the advantage of preserving the authenticity of the contradictory cross-references, while avoiding the hypothesis that some are to be explained as later inserts, and thus of enabling them still to be used as chronological pointers to close relationships between *Lives*. (It is of course logically the case, as Geiger and Pelling emphasize, that *any* explanation of the contradictory cross-references short of simple deletion must imply that other apparently non-contradictory cross-references cannot be taken as reliable indicators of relative chronology: the mere fact that a given cross-reference is not ‘contradicted’ does not, as the very existence of the contradictory cross-references shows, validate the inference that *Life* ‘x’ postdates *Life* ‘y’—it *may*, or it *may not*. Ironically, therefore, the ‘contradictory’ cross-references will be more | reliable indicators of close chronological relationships than the non-contradictory.)

xxi This interpretation of the contradictory cross-references makes excellent sense. In the *Caesar* P. cross-references to the *Brutus* either (a) because the *Brutus* is already written, or (b) because he knows what he will put in *Brutus*; in the *Brutus* P. cross-references to the *Caesar* either (a) because the *Caesar* is already written, or (b) because he knows what he will put in it; *ergo*, he has

been preparing the material for both simultaneously. The subject matter of both *Lives* is very similar, the sources practically identical. The same applies to *Timoleon* and *Dion*, and to a considerable extent to the *Numa*, *Camillus*, and *Romulus*. (One notes here that in the case of the *Theseus–Romulus* P. chose his Roman hero first: *Thes.* 1.4.) The *Theseus–Romulus* was written immediately after *Lycurgus–Numa* (*Thes.* 1.4), and P.'s wording in the introduction to the *Theseus–Romulus* indicates that he was working by period.

One small difficulty arises: why (in most cases) P.'s use of the *perfect* tense (*γέγραπται* etc.), if some of these cross-references are to *Lives* not yet actually written, especially when he uses precise future tenses at *Caes.* 35.2 and *Mar.* 29.12? The perfect tenses can be explained as indications that the *Lives* are to be regarded as a unified opus, or as quasi-epistolary (so Pelling), so that very little should be made of this.

Such an interpretation of the contradictory cross-references is of course not susceptible of final proof, but it seems the simplest and best available (as well as the most productive) and offers a very reasonable picture of P.'s likely method of work. It is here accepted.

The *Dion–Brutus*, *Aemilius–Timoleon*, and *Alexander–Caesar* were therefore very probably composed together (which naturally does not mean that P. actually *wrote* them simultaneously!). The question of their precise relative chronology is perhaps rather academic, but is worth pursuing for the sake of accuracy. The *Caesar* seems to have been written after the *Brutus*: *Caes.* 62.8 ἐν τοῖς περὶ Βρούτου γεγραμμένοις δεδηλώκαμεν | (similar formula-
xxii
tions in *Fab. Max.* 19.2, *Coriol.* 33.2, 39.11) is a perfect of quite a different character from the bald ὡς ... γέγραπται. Two necessarily vague, but convergent, arguments may be added: (i) *Caes.* 67.7 μεθ' ἡμέραν is perhaps an attempt to supply the March 16 so conspicuously absent from the narrative of the *Brutus* (see pp. 199, 201ff.); (ii) P.'s different accounts of who it was who kept Antony outside the senate on the Ides suggest the sequence: correct version in the *Brutus*, error in the *Caesar*, attempt to fudge the issue in the *Antony* (see p. 173 below). The relative chronology of the *Dion* and *Timoleon* can only be guessed at, although the unfulfilled cross-reference of *Timol.* 13.10 would tend to suggest that the *Dion*, while already researched in detail, had not yet been written. This, however, is of no importance for the attempt to place the *Brutus* in relation to the other relevant Roman *Lives*.

The *Pompey* came after the *Caesar* (*Caes.* 35.2—a *future* tense. The precise implications of this future tense may be debated: paradoxically it may suggest that P. anticipated more delay between the *Caesar* and *Pompey* than between *Lives* linked by contradictory perfect tense cross-references, as Pelling acutely seems to imply {explicit at *Plutarch and History* 34 n. 54}). The *Pompey* therefore also came after the *Brutus* (this is true even if it is not the case that the *Brutus* preceded the *Caesar*). But the *Brutus* show clear signs

of contamination of material that must have been collected for the Pompey: *ch.* 33.2ff.—the story of the treacherous Theodotus, just as the Pompey in turn shows signs of contamination by Brutan material (cf. p. 87 below, and *Pomp.* 16.8), so the time gap between the two *Lives* cannot have been great.

xxiii The chronological relationship of the *Brutus* and the *Cato minor* is not easy to decide. Geiger's belief that the *Brutus* is prior is based mainly on the cross-reference to the *Brutus* at *Cat. min.* 73.6, which cannot in itself be regarded as a sufficient indication. Certainly the *Cato* shows clear signs of contamination by Brutan material, notably in the story of the death of Porcia (*Cat. min.* 73.6), the further adventures of Statilius (73.7), probably the account of the death of Cato's son (73.5), which | presumably comes from reading of accounts of the Second Battle of Philippi (though not, I think, from Messalla, *pace* Geiger 75, 115), and perhaps also the anecdote of the altercation between Cato and Caesar in the senate (*Brut.* 5.3–4, *Cat. min.* 24.1–3), which should be associated with the romantic tradition linking Caesar, Servilia, and Brutus rather than the personality of Cato (note the lameness of its introduction in the *Cato*, whereas it is perfectly appropriate to its context in the *Brutus*). On the other hand the *Brutus* shows at least one clear example of contamination of material that must have been gathered for the *Cato* (*Brut.* 3.1–4, with pp. 83f. below), and while the allusiveness of *Cat. min.* 24.2 (p. 93 below) and the fact that most of the traffic of material is from the *Brutus* to the *Cato*, taken together with the consideration that most of the source material of the *Cato* is *sui generis*, would tend to indicate the priority of the *Brutus*, the two *Lives* must still be quite close in time. Nothing much can be gleaned by considering the problem of the relationship of the *Cato* and *Pompey*. The *Pompey* is obviously contaminated by Catonian material—cf. especially *Pomp.* 40.1–5 and 44—but *Cato* cross-references to the *Pompey* at 54.10. This only produces a chronological link between *Pompey* and *Cato* and therefore between *Cato* and *Brutus*, which does not advance the enquiry.)

Finally, one can be fairly certain that the *Antony* postdated all the relevant Roman *Lives*, simply because the *Demetrius–Antony*, together with the *Alcibiades–Coriolanus*, represented a technical experiment in 'deterrent' *Lives*. (Two small pointers to the priority of *Brutus* over *Antony* are P.'s obfuscation of the question who detained Antony outside the senate, mentioned above, and the allusiveness of *Ant.* 22.6, cf. p. 269 below). But again, the *Antony* can hardly have postdated the *Brutus* by very much, since it is clear that P. had already evolved a coherent and satisfying characterization of Antony, similar to the one he was to use in Antony's *Life*, when he wrote the *Brutus* (cf. on 18.3–5, 20.4).

xxiv Time now to return to the problem of the absolute dating of the *Brutus*. | A new start may be made by invoking the evidence of the group *Themistocles–Camillus*, *Lycurgus–Numa*, and *Theseus–Romulus*, chronologically

linked as these *Lives* are (above). This group must be dated to c./post c. 105, since *Romulus* 15.7 and *Camillus* 19.12 cross-reference to the *Quaestiones Romanae*, whose *terminus post* is c. 105 (Jones, ‘Chronology’ 73 {= Scardigli, *Essays* 122}); cross-references between the *Lives* and other works are of course not as open to suspicion as cross-references within the *Lives*). But the group seems also to be early in the sequence, since *Per.* 22.4 (from the 10th pair) cites the *Lysander* and *Lysander* cites *Lycurgus* (*Lys.* 17.11). These cross-references must indicate the priority of the *Lives* cited, for the simple reason that the above analysis of the interrelationships of the *Brutus*, *Caesar* etc. shows that P. went off on another tack in pair twelve (or possibly pair eleven). *Lys.* 17.11 is particularly interesting here, since if the reference really is to the *Lycurgus* (as Stoltz 101f.), it must imply a fair passage of time between the two *Lives* (the cross-reference is vague and P. uses the *aorist* tense). The *Lysander–Sulla* itself must be dated within the limits c. 105–115 (cf. Jones, ‘Chronology’, 69 {= Scardigli, *Essays* 113), since at *Sulla* 21.8 P. says that ‘almost 200 years’ have passed since the battle of Orchomenus (86 B.C.). (For refutation of Stoltz’ argument that the wording of *Thes.* 1.2 proves the lateness of the *Theseus–Romulus* see Hamilton xxxvi.) It follows that the *terminus post* of the *Brutus* can be extended to at least 105 A.D.

Further progress is less certain. The dating for the *Alexander* suggested by Hamilton xxxvii of 110–115 seems only to rest upon a very rough construct of how long P. might have been expected to take in his research for the *Lives*, nor does Pelling’s dating to a *terminus post* of c. 100–105 (Pelling {D.Phil.} p. 8) give much away. (It anyway seems too early {as Pelling now agrees: ‘he was probably at work on [the *Caesar*] some time around 110, perhaps a few years later’, Pelling *Caesar* 2}.) The *terminus ante* for the *Demetrius–Antony* is 117/118 (Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* 33, n. 38), which does not advance the discussion. Finally to be considered is an interesting argument for the dating of the *Cato minor* of Geiger {D.Phil.} 117–119 {and in the Rizzoli *Focione–Catone Uticense* (1993), 308–10} (and cf. W. C. Helmbold, | *Plutarch Loeb Moralia* VI, 245, quoting C. Brokate, *De aliquot Plut. libellis*, diss. Göttingen 1913, 17–24, 58). Noting that *De frat. am.* 487C uses material obviously drawn from knowledge of Cato’s life but not actually utilized in the *Life*, he infers that the two works date from about the same period, with the *De fraterno amore* possibly prior, and thus, following the dating of the *De fraterno amore* within the limits 68–107 of Jones, ‘Chronology’ 70f. {= Scardigli, *Essays* 116}), provides a *terminus ante* for the *Cato*. (In *Plutarch and Rome*, 27, 52, Jones in fact argues for a Domitianic dating for the *De fraterno amore*, but he is rightly criticized by Russell, *JRS* 62 [1972], 227.) This inference is criticized on general grounds by Pelling {D.Phil.} 8, n. 4. A dating of pre–107 for the *Cato minor* certainly seems rather on the early side, given the *terminus post* established for the *Lycurgus–Numa* etc. (provided that they really are early in the series), and given, too, that the *Cato minor* must have been rather more than half way

through the extant *Lives*, and it is reasonable to suppose that P. died before the completion of his task (as the unfulfilled promise of a *Life* of Metellus Numidicus at *Mar.* 29.12 {and of a *Leonidas* at *De Malignitate Herodoti* 866B} naturally suggests). To avoid the conclusion reached by Geiger one must suppose either that P. did his research for the *Cato* a year or so before producing the work, as part of a unified programme for a whole series of Roman *Lives*, or (possibly) that through his acquaintanceship with Avidius Quietus, the friend of Thræsea Paetus, P. had come into contact with Thræsea's biography before he used it directly as a source for the *Cato*.

To sum up. The evidence allows only an imprecise dating for the *Brutus*. The *termini post* c. 105 and *ante* (? by some years) 116 seem secure. Unless Geiger's argument is given weight, the dating of the *Lycurgus–Numa* etc. and (perhaps) P.'s interest in Zoroastrian demonology (if that is what it is!), taken together with the position of *Dion–Brutus* in the series as a whole, suggest a tentative dating within the period c. 110–115. It | seems fairly clear that the *Brutus* was actually *written* before the *Caesar*, *Pompey*, *Cato minor*, and *Antony*, though this is a finding of somewhat theoretical import, as it is very likely that all these *Lives* were prepared together.

PLUTARCH'S SOURCES IN THE *LIFE* OF BRUTUS

xxvii

In P., as in other historical writers, the pursuit of 'Quellenforschung' requires no apology. As usual the pitfalls and dangers inherent in the exercise are great (though often much exaggerated), but one cannot hope to penetrate to the heart of P.'s creative process in the *Lives* without trying to ascertain the basic material with which at any one moment he is working, even though one knows that on many occasions results can only be reached within a range of probability and that on some occasions no results can be reached at all. An *Introduction* is not the best place to pursue the task, for source-analysis must to some extent depend on the minute analysis and comparison of small verbal parallels between writers. P.'s sources in the Roman *Lives* have of course been endlessly discussed, but it is important first to present the evidence as far as possible without preconceptions. To begin with, therefore, I set out in abbreviated form the results obtained within the *Commentary*. Two valuable aids to the discovery of P.'s sources in the *Brutus* are of course the parallel accounts of the historians Appian and Cassius Dio. Here obviously one must exercise care, for complicating factors in deciding source interrelationships are (i) the possibility that Appian and Dio are in fact sometimes using P. as their primary source; (ii) the possibility that their accounts, based on the whole on main-line historical sources, are themselves contaminated by some of the minor sources, which P. is (sometimes) using as his *major* sources, and (iii) the difficulty of interpreting close parallelisms between Dio on the one hand and P. and Appian on the other: are they evidence of a direct common source or a common source embedded in, but distinct from, Dio's main source?

1.1-8

The (alleged) descent of Brutus from the (alleged) first consul is of course stressed both in Cicero and in the historical tradition (Appian 2.112.469, Dio 44.12.1). The statue of the first consul is mentioned also | in all accounts (except the *Caesar*) of the *graffiti* impelling Brutus against Caesar (see on 9.6). The characterization of L. Brutus adopted by P. here is traditional (D.H. 5.8ff., Val. Max. 5.8.1), the *σύγκρισις* between the two Bruti no doubt original. Whether P. is drawing on knowledge acquired from work on *Publicola* is unclear. (On the place of that *Life* in the series see Jones, 'Chronology' 68 [= Scardigli, *Essays* 110-11], with the usual reservations about analysis based solely on the evidence of the cross-references. The wording of *Publ.* 24.1 would tend to suggest a dating later than the *Brutus*.) The sentiment of 1.4 is general and unites two themes: (i) 'even his enemies' respected Brutus' integrity; (ii) the motivation of Cassius

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was less pure than Brutus'. The Brutus–Cassius *σύγκρισις*, though naturally developed and expanded by P. for his own purposes, is stressed in the historical tradition (the source behind 8.6–7, the source behind 29.7, Vell. 2.69.6, 2.72.2, Appian 4.123.518–9, 4.133.561). P. will also have been influenced by Brutus' own strictures (28.4–5, 35.3–6). P. is the only narrative source to mention Brutus' descent from Servilius Ahala; he may have got this from Cicero (letters, Second Philippic, or *Brutus*) and researched the connexion elsewhere. His account of the assassination of Sp. Maelius seems to follow the version of L. Cincius Alimentus and L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi as retailed by Dionysius 12.4. In his discussion of the controversy over Brutus' lineage (1.6–8) P. may of course have glanced at Dionysius (5.18), and some discussion may have featured in a main-line historical source (cf. Dio 44.12.1), but his main source is clearly Posidonius (1.7–8). The detail given, and the flourish with which the evidence is introduced, imply direct consultation. (Note: it is possible that Dio 44.12.1 is merely a brusque dismissal of P.)

2.1–8

Brutus' admiration for Cato is stressed in the historical tradition (Dio 44.13.1, *De vir. ill.* 82). Naturally P. could have learned this from many sources (Cicero's *Brutus*, knowledge of Brutus' *Cato*?, his own researches for the *Cato minor* etc.). His brief treatment of Brutus' philosophical associations could reflect reading of Cicero (*Ad Att.*, *Acad.* 1, *Tusc.*, *De fin.* etc.) or perhaps even Brutus' own works. (I am less sure than Pelling in 'Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman *Lives*' that P. does not use Brutus' philosophical works in the *Brutus*, though it is certainly true that they are used very little.) His knowledge of Empylus comes from letters of Brutus and his friends (2.4), which P. obviously knows at first hand. The wording of 2.4 also implies direct consultation of Empylus' *Brutus*. The characterization of Brutus' Roman oratory might reflect the opinion of Roman friends. The discussion of Brutus' Greek epistolary style (alleged) is based on P.'s own consultation of the collection of 'Mithridates' or something very like it.

3.1–4

The source for Brutus' activities in Cyprus is the same as that used in the *Cato minor*, i.e. Thrasea Paetus, who used Munatius Rufus (Peter 65ff., Geiger {D.Phil.} 32ff., {*Athen.* 57 (1979), 48–72, and in the Rizzoli *Focione–Catone Uticense* (1993), 289–304}. P. may also have used a biographical supplement, and if so, perhaps Empylus (?), but this is speculation. One notes also that Thrasea Paetus probably used Brutus' *Cato* as a source (Geiger {D.Phil.} 51ff., 79 {and Rizzoli *Focione–Catone Uticense* 302–3}, which conceivably might have provided detail of Cato's dealings with Brutus in Cyprus.

4.1–8

The general feel of this section suggests a biographical source, or sources, if 4.5 ὄτε καὶ ... is an insert; 4.6–8 is particularly impressive.

5.1–5

5.1–2 is closely parallel to Appian 2.112.467, and implies a common source, for Appian does not seem to be using P. One can only speculate on the provenance of the anecdote of 5.3–4 (~ *Cat. min.* 24.1–3). One would be inclined to link it with the romantic Caesar/Servilia/Brutus saga, as P. implies, but this helps little. Geiger {D.Phil.} 114f. is agnostic.

6.1–12

In 6.1–5, 6.1–2 (to γραψάντος ... αὐτοῦ) and 6.3–4 are unparalleled | elsewhere, 6.2 is recorded by all relevant sources. The bulk of the material xxx looks biographical, as the distortion of 6.4 would tend to support. In 6.6–7 the *dictum* of Caesar suggests direct use of *Ad Att.* 14.1 [355].2, creatively reinterpreted by P. The characterization of 6.8–9 is P.'s own work (cf. 1.3–4 and 29.3–11). Brutus' views on 'those unable to refuse anything' may come from one of his philosophical works (e.g. the *De officiis*), despite εἰώθει λέγειν. The formulation of 6.11 was *perhaps* inspired by Cic. *Orat.* 10.34. P. *might* have found something about Brutus' governorship in a biographical source.

The general parallels with Appian from 5.1 to 6.10 (5.1–2 ~ Appian 2.112.467; 6.2 ~ Appian 2.111.464; 6.10 ~ Appian 2.111.465) combine to suggest that P. is fleshing out a basic historical source shared with Appian by the introduction of biographical and other material.

7.1–7

P.'s account of the quarrel of Brutus and Cassius over the urban praetorship is closely parallel to Appian 2.112.466f., down to Caesar's *dictum* in 7.4. Appian is not following P., so (again) a common source may be inferred. P.'s 7.1 (on Brutus' and Cassius' former differences) is not attested by Appian and comes from a source different from the common source. *Ergo*, P. is contaminating a main-line source with a biographical source, very probably Empylus. (Note: Appian's suggestion that the quarrel was a tactical device of Brutus and Cassius is likely to be his own speculation.)

7.6 is to be linked with 8.3–4 and comes ultimately from the supplementary biographical source. 7.7 goes with 8.5–6 and the same applies, though the brilliant imagery is clearly P.'s own.

8.1–7

None of this is paralleled elsewhere (Plutarchean parallels aside). It is all of a piece and must go back to a detailed contemporary source interested in the respective characters and merits of Brutus and Cassius. (Note: 8.5, on the primacy of Cassius in the formation of the conspiracy, | is consistent with Appian 2.113.470–3, but in that passage Appian, it may be argued, is probably following P.—see on 10.3–7 below.) P.’s main original contribution appears to be the characteristic development of thought in 8.4 (cf. *Pomp.* 14.4), though Caesar’s *dictum* of 8.2 acquires a resonance it can hardly have had in its original form owing to its juxtaposition with 7.7.

One cannot prove, but it seems very likely, that *chs.* 7 (mainly) and 8 (almost entirely) are both taken directly from Empylus (cf. also Peter, *Quellen*, 140; *HRR* II, lxviii; Pelling, ‘Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman Lives’ [= *Plutarch and History* 14–15]).

9.1–9

The anecdote of 9.1–4 is paralleled only in Val. Max. 3.1.3, whom P. is not here following. The tentative suggestion of Peter, *Quellen*, 140 and n. *, that the common source is Bibulus seems most improbable. The source of *chs.* 7–8 is obviously ruled out. Apart from that one can only speculate (? Livy).

P.’s account of the *graffiti* etc. impelling Brutus against Caesar is so close to Appian 2.112.469 and Dio 44.12 that a common source must underlie all three versions, although P. is actually closer to Dio than Appian. This might (cf. above), or might not, be significant.

10.1–7

This section is a coherent narrative, though 10.1–2 is otherwise unattested. 10.3–7 is closely paralleled by Appian 2.113.470–473, but contrary to the consensus view (as e.g. Theander, *Eranos* 57 [1959], 120) this is more likely to be a case of Appian following P. than the reflection of a common source. In any case, the source is likely to be biographical: ? Empylus.

11.1–3

The Ligarius story is otherwise unattested, though Appian 2.113.474 mentions Ligarius in his list of conspirators. *Ch.* 11 surely goes with *chs.* 10 and 12: none of them look derived (primarily) from main-line | history. (Even if they did find their way into main-line history, their ultimate source, or sources, would surely have to be somebody like Empylus, whom P. is using direct.)

12.1–8

12.1 is very similar to Appian 2.113.474 and reflects a common source, though P. has made changes to fit the characterization of D. Brutus at 12.5 (already an indication that he is contaminating a main-line historical source with a minor source, or sources). 12.2 (closely parallel to *Cic.* 42.1–2)

seems to come from a biographical source rather than the source latent in 12.1 (especially if it is true that P. wrote the *Cicero* without benefit—or substantially without benefit—of Asinius Pollio, as argued by Pelling in his ‘Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman *Lives*’ [= *Plutarch and History* 2–7, 12–13]). The negotiations of 12.3–6 are also unparalleled elsewhere and again argue a biographical source close to Brutus (note especially the striking characterization of D. Brutus, which may to some extent reflect the feelings of Brutus and Cassius in the months directly after the Ides). 12.8 reflects a common source with Appian 2.114.475, though P. has changed the emphasis slightly to stress the amazing secrecy with which the conspiracy was kept.

13.1–11

The intimate, ‘domestic’, character of the story strongly suggests Bibulus as the source (cf. Peter, *Quellen*, 140; *HRR* II, lxvii; {Drummond, *FRHist* I.408–9; } Theander, *art. cit.*, 122 n. 1; Pelling, *art. cit.*). P.’s manner of describing Bibulus’ work and his observation that it was still extant also strongly suggest first hand use, though one notes that Bibulus has found his way into a main-line historical account (parallel accounts in Dio 44.13–14, Val. Max. 3.2.15, and Polyaeus 8.32). Theander’s discussion of the question whether P. did or did not use Bibulus direct (*Eranos* 57 [1959], 125) is unhelpful. The suggestion of Peter, *Quellen*, 139, and Cichorius in *RE* 3.1368 that the title of the work suggests that its scope was restricted to ἀποφθέγματα can be dismissed out of hand (cf. Theander, | *art. cit.*, 123, n. 2; {Drummond, *FRHist* I.407–8}).

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14.1–7

14.1 (the hope that other senators would join in the fight for ἐλευθερία) is closely parallel to Appian 2.114.476, although ‘written up’ by P. 14.2–3 to some extent represent P.’s own reflections on divine influence on Caesar’s fall. 14.4 (paralleled by Polyaeus 8.32) may well come from Bibulus (cf. Theander, *art. cit.*, 123). The rest of 14.4–5 is otherwise unparalleled and presumably stems from a detailed minor source. 14.6 is very similar to Appian 2.115.482, and indicates a common source (note that P. seems to be switching sources at 14.6). 14.7 is otherwise unparalleled, and, being a story that would suit a variety of settings, may or may not be integral to its present context. In sum, P. is contaminating a main-line historical source shared with Appian with material drawn from Bibulus and possibly elsewhere.

15.1–9

15.1 is perhaps partly Livian (cf. *Caes.* 63.8–11). 15.2–4 shares a common source with Appian 2.155.483–4. 15.5–9 is surely Bibulan (cf. Theander, *art.*

cit. 123; {Drummond, *FRHist* I.408}), though nicely laced with Plutarchean histrionics.

16.1–5

16.1 shows close verbal and thematic parallels with Appian 2.115.481 and 2.116.485. 16.2–5 is very similar to Appian 2.116.487, though 16.4 is almost certainly just made up by P. Again, P. and Appian clearly share a common source.

17.1–7

Treatment of source interrelationships here requires very detailed analysis because of the plenitude of comparative material and the complicated nature of the events described. For discussion see pp. 169ff. and for a summary of the results achieved 176f. Briefly, they are that (a) a common source underlies the accounts of P. and Appian (cf. also Theander, *art. cit.*, 120–21 and n. 2), (b) P. develops some of his | material in an original and idiosyncratic way, (c) he is using more than one source (cf. *Caes.* 66.12), one at least of an intimate and detailed kind, (d) he has failed to ‘gut’ systematically the source lying behind the *καὶ σὺ, τέκνον*; story retailed by Suetonius and Dio, and (e) he *may* have glanced at the account of Nicolaus.

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18.1–14

This is also a very complicated section, resolution of whose problems is not facilitated by the errors to be found in all major accounts (cf. pp. 198ff.).

18.1–2 does not allow of useful comparison with other versions. 18.3 (Antony the only other candidate for assassination and the reasons why the proposal was made) shares a common source with Appian 2.114.478. 18.4–5 (Brutus’ hopes of Antony’s conversion to the good) is not otherwise attested and could conceivably stem from Bibulus, adherent of Brutus and later devoted follower of Antony, or from Empylus (cf. 20.1–2). 18.6 shows similarity to Dio 44.22.2 (the resemblance of *Ant.* 14.1 and Dio is striking). 18.7–8 suggests Nicolaan influence. 18.9 (no more killings) is verbally very like Dio 44.20.4, despite different contexts arising from Dionian error, and very different from Appian 2.118.495. 18.9–10 (the deputation to the Capitol and Brutus’ speech) is elsewhere unattested and apparently drawn from a detailed source outside the main historical traditions. P.’s description of the conspirators’ descent from the Capitol is unique in its detail and suggestive of a detailed, ‘intimate’ source. 19.12 again shows a resemblance to Nicolaus (26A.100). The description of the *πολλοί* as *μυγάδες* perhaps reflects the influence of the same analysis of the urban *plebs* as is found in Appian 2.120.505–7 (cf. also 21.2–3). 18.13 is closely parallel to what Appian ought to be saying but does not! (Cf. pp. 204ff. below.) 18.14 (cf. *Caes.* 67.3–4) reflects, but twists, a common source shared with Appian 2.119.500 and Dio 44.24.3.

This messy picture presents severe problems of interpretation. *Either* | P. has produced a patchwork stitched together from the sources that underlie Appian and Dio; Nicolaus; and one or two minor sources favourable to the conspirators; *or* the minor source(s) with which he is partly working are embedded in the accounts of Nicolaus and the source underlying Dio. The latter interpretation might seem more likely, although it is one over which there is little control. What is certain is that P. is working at least with a common source shared with Appian and at least one 'minor' source heavily committed to the conspirators in general and Brutus in particular (i.e. Empylus). I incline also to thinking that P. *has* glanced at Nicolaus, though it must be said that he has failed to make proper use of him, otherwise the account in the *Brutus* would hardly have omitted March 16 from the narrative.

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19.1–5

19.1 appears to derive from a minor source strongly prejudiced towards the tyrannicides, in emphatic contrast to all other narrative accounts, Appian especially. The rosy picture of 19.2–3 is much nearer that of Dio 44.34.6–7 than Appian 2.142.594. 19.4–5 (the second meeting of the senate on March 18) is otherwise unattested, partial in intent, and inaccurate in detail, although probably not totally fraudulent. It should be linked with 19.1, again reflecting use of a minor, pro-tyrannicide source: Empylus!? Cf. also Pelling, *art. cit.*

20.1–11

20.1 (the disagreement between Brutus and Cassius) goes with the second meeting of 19.4–5, and is, *ex hypothesi*, the same minor source. (Note: Empylus or something like his version seems to have found its way into the account of Vell. 2.58.2.) The reflections on Brutus' political errors, obviously grist to the Plutarchean mill, may or may not reflect the interest of the same source (of course the merits of Brutus' handling of these two issues *were* debated in the aftermath of the Ides). 20.3, on Caesar's will, is roughly parallel to both Appian 2.143.596f. and Dio 44.35.2–3. 20.4 (Antony's funeral speech) works with the same source as Appian 2.144.600–|145.606 (see pp. 222f. below), though P. is radically reinterpreting his material. 20.5–7 does not permit useful comparison with other accounts—it is broadly in line with the main historical tradition. The parallel with the funeral of Clodius and the emphasis on the sacrilegiousness of Caesar's cremation are probably original Plutarchean touches. P.'s account of the lynching of Cinna (20.8–11) stems from a main historical tradition reflected also in Val. Max., Suet., Appian, and Dio, but is unique in recording (correctly) that Cinna was a poet, and his dream, and the details about his physical and mental condition. This information, from outside the historical tradition, may come (e.g.) from a dream-book or from L. Crassicius. P. may have been pointed in this direction by learned Romans.

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21.1–6

This elusive section is a mixture of hard fact and Plutarchean distortion (21.3, reflecting probably the influence of the political analysis found in Appian 2.120.505–7). 21.1 is in line with the general historical tradition; the ‘hard’ detail of 21.2 is elsewhere unparalleled. 2.6 shows use of Brutan letters. 21.4–5 *might* reflect a biographical source (if so, Bibulus), though letters must have been able to provide the essential information, which after all is not great.

22.1–6

The summary of 22.1–3 does not lend itself to comparative analysis. 22.4–6 shows direct consultation of the letters *Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25] and 1.17 [26] (but not *Ad Fam.* 10.28 [364].3, *pace* Ziegler), though P. may be quoting from memory.

23.1–7

23.2–7 is definitely all Bibulus (23.7). 23.1 is in line with an inaccurate historical tradition evident also in Nicolaus 31.135 and Dio 47.20.3–4, though it obviously also suits P.’s purpose here.

24.1–7

xxxvii 24.1 (honours voted the tyrannicides) is paralleled in Dio 47.20.4. 24.1 (Brutus’ philosophical pursuits), and 24.2–3 are essentially | unparalleled elsewhere, though 24.3 is obviously from a letter of Brutus to Cicero (cf. Peter, *Quellen*, 141). Brutus’ corruption of Appuleius (24.4–5) is naturally attested in the historical sources, but P. is hardly following a main-line historical tradition since 24.4–5 and 24.5–7 seem all of a piece. The anecdote of 24.5–7 is attested in closely similar form in Val. Max. 1.5.7 and Appian 4.134.564; Appian is not following P. Peter, *Quellen*, 140, plausibly suggests that Bibulus is P.’s source. One notes that he has got into a main-line historical tradition. P. seems to have pointedly changed the reference of 24.7. Theander, *art. cit.*, 123, thinks 24.1 also from Bibulus. It seems quite likely that 24.1–7 is *all* from that source. {Drummond, *FRHist* I.409 n.14 is sceptical.}

25.1–6, 26.1–2

25.1 (Antistius) is not attested in any other narrative source. P. *could* have got the information from *Ad Brut.* 2.3 [2].5 and 1.11 [10]. 25.1 (Pompeian veterans) resembles Dio 47.21.3. 25.1 (cavalry) is paralleled in Dio *loc. cit.* 25.2 is paralleled in Appian 3.63.259. 25.3 offers no close parallels with Appian or Dio. 25.4–26.2 has no real parallels elsewhere (25.5–6 is of course P.’s own digression.) One suspects that P. has contaminated a historical source with a biographical supplement.

26.3–8

26.3–5 is similar in spirit to Appian 3.79.321–3. The emphasis on the achievements of the young Cicero could stem from *Ad Brut.* 2.5 [5].2, 1.6 [12].1. P. may again be using a biographical supplement. 26.6 suggests use of Cicero's letters to Brutus on the fate of C. Antonius, though they are not P.'s only source. 26.7–8 is similar to Dio 47.23.2–4 but not sufficiently so as to suggest a common source. 26.8 has something of a Greek source flavour. The picture presented in chs. 25 and 26 is thus obscure, though it seems likely that there is some use of a source that is 'biographical' in the sense of being centred strongly on the person of Brutus.

27.1–6

The summary of 27.1–2 does not allow of useful source comparisons. | The citation of Augustus' *Autobiography* in 27.3 may well be 'inherited'. P.'s account of the fate of P. Silicius Corona differs from the rest of the historical tradition. In 27.6 the figure of 200 senators seems just a lapse of memory, of no source significance.

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28.1–7

28.1 seems to reflect use of a Brutan letter. 28.1 (Antony's killing of Hortensius) *may* be Livian. 28.2–3 must come from a letter of Brutus' (cf. Peter, *Quellen*, 141), perhaps the same as that of 28.1. 28.3 *may* come from Livy or (also) reflect Brutus' (alleged) Greek letters. 28.3f. has a common source with Appian 4.63.270, though P. is perhaps also drawing on a letter of Brutus to Cassius. The meeting at Smyrna is attested also in Appian 4.65.276ff., and Dio 47.32.1–3. 28.7 is Plutarchean rhetoric, without source justification.

29.1–30.2

The circumstantially detailed 29.1 and 30.1–2 are otherwise unparalleled and suggest a source interested in the personal relations of Brutus and Cassius, perhaps also rather favourable to Cassius. Messalla is possible. 29.2–7 is P.'s elaboration of the traditional Brutus–Cassius *σύγκρισις*, with 29.5 'built' from Brutus' strictures against Cassius of 28.4f. 29.7 might be Bibulan (cf. Theander, *art. cit.* 123). 29.9–11 reflect and quote a letter of Brutus to Atticus, whose sentiments (one notes) found their way into a main-line historical account (Appian 4.130.547).

30.3–31.7

In 30.3 Cassius' *dictum* is otherwise unattested; the hostile tone of the account is nearer Appian 4.65.277–74.313 than Dio 47.33.1–4. 30.4–31.7 is difficult to unravel. (For discussion and summary see pp. 283–289 below.) P. seems to be following mainly the same source as Appian (cf. already Peter, *Quellen*, 141 n. **), though he may have supplemented this with material from the source underlying Dio and another 'minor' source. (This

xxxix does not seem *a priori* too unlikely, since this is very much a purple passage in P.'s narrative.) The rest is the exaggeration and | distortion of 'tragic' history.

32.1-4

Most of 32.1 and 32.2 is suspiciously similar to the account of Dio 47.34.4-6, with 32.1 made flush with the earlier account of the fall of Xanthus. A common source may well be latent. 32.3 offers nothing. One wonders if the Brutus-Cassius *σύγκρισις* of 32.4 shows P. reacting against Brutus' 'mimicry' of Cassius' methods of distortion attested by Appian (?).

33.1-6

The programmatic 33.1 offers little and may rest on nothing very much. 33.2-6 parallels the accounts of Appian and Dio, Appian especially closely. There are similar reflections to 33.5 in Velleius and Dio, but this is a rhetorical commonplace of the Imperial period. In 33.6 the discrepancy between Appian and P. over who killed Theodotus *may* be Appian's error.

34.1-35.3

Appian does not record the conference at Sardis. Dio 47.35.1 offers a *general* parallel, hence one can assume either a common source or Dionian indebtedness to P. The latter seems more likely, for the general tone of the passage and the strong interest in *personalia* go against a main-line historical source. 35.4-6 may be made up by P. or reflect a source (? the latter more likely).

36.1-37.1

P.'s account of the first visitation of the apparition is paralleled in Appian 4.134.565, Florus 2.17.8 (and Zonaras), while Val. Max. 1.7.7 has a very similar story about Cassius of Parma, on which the Brutus story is presumably modelled. There is nothing in Dio. A common source must inform P., Appian, and Florus. It is unclear whether Appian is in fact following, or is influenced by, P., but probably at least the latter. In P. 36.2-4 looks like an insert drawn from a detailed 'minor' source. (For the tone cf. 4.6-8.) Was that source written in Greek? Brutus' spirited reply to the apparition (36.7) is P.'s invention.

37.2-6; 37.7 |

xi Cassius' speech is pure invention by P. (37.2-6). The omen of 37.7 is closely paralleled in Appian 4.101.425, though Appian is not following P. Peter, *HRR* II, lxxxii, supposes the ultimate source to be Messalla, which is of course possible, though one would be happier to invoke Volumnius (cf. 48.2ff.), who obviously specialized in this kind of thing. {Cf. also Drummond, *FRHist* I.404.}

38.1–7

38.1 seems to exhibit Plutarchean (unfounded) exaggeration. 38.1–2 is nearer the account of Dio 47.35–36 than the complex narrative of Appian, yet 38.3 looks suspiciously like a conflation of Appian 4.106–108. The standard motif of 38.5 is also found in Appian (4.137) but evidently familiar also to the dyspeptic Dio (47.39.iff.). P. and Appian are nearer agreement on the forces on each side than Dio. I am inclined to think that 38.6–7 on Brutus' encouragement of display in his army is P.'s own *apologia*, based solely on the letter of Brutus which lamented it.

39.1–40.12

39.1–2 (lustrations on both sides) is paralleled in Dio 47.38.4, 47.40.7–8 (*not* Appian 4.89.374, which refers to a different occasion). Presumably this is from an eyewitness account, and the P./Dio parallel reflects not a shared historical source, but a source directly used by P. which has found its way into Dio's source.

39.3 (Cassius' garland) is paralleled in Appian 4.134.563, Dio 47.40.7–8, and Jul. Obs. 70; 39.4 (Cassius' Victory) is also in Appian 4.134.563, Dio, and Jul. Obs.; 39.5 (vultures) is the same sources plus Florus 2.17.7; 39.5 (bees) is attested also by Appian, Dio, Jul. Obs. Peter, *HRR* II, lxxxii, again supposes Messalla to be the source, with P. using him directly. Again, I would prefer Volumnius {so also, tentatively, Drummond, *FRHist* I.404}, both for general reasons and because those bees are hard to credit. 39.7 (Cassius' credulousness) is P. taking a characteristic swipe at Cassius' Epicureanism, surely without source justification.

39.7–40.4 is almost certainly *all* Messalla. (And note that P. seems to be switching sources here—cf. above on the omens.) 40.1–4 is avowedly | Messalla and the rest goes with it, even though the imagery of 40.3 is P.'s own contribution. (Note: is Dio 47.38.2 a 'reply' to *Brut.* 39.7?) 40.5 is otherwise unattested but is surely Messalla, being entirely consistent with what has preceded. (One notes in passing that a sort of bowdlerized Messalla account is implicit in Dio's dreadful rendering of the first battle of Philippi.) 40.5–9 is otherwise unattested but one need not doubt that Brutus and Cassius had a conversation before the battle, a *fact* which Messalla might have recorded, and one notes an interesting parallel in Florus 2.17.14, who attests a suicide pact in the event of defeat. The conversation itself is obviously made up by P. but suggests an intriguing knowledge of Brutus' earlier philosophical attitude to Cato's suicide (? from one of Brutus' writings). 40.10–12 is again Messalla (cf. 40.11). {Cf. Drummond, *FRHist* I.468–9.}

41.1–8

41.1–3 is roughly in agreement with Appian 4.109–110, but this is surely to be explained by the facts of the case rather than a shared ‘source’ at this point. 41.4 is very roughly paralleled by Dio 47.43.1, again showing that Dio’s account is contaminated at some level by P.’s main source. 41.4 on the charge of Brutus’ men is attested also by Appian 4.110 (differently though). 41.5–6 is otherwise unattested and surely stems from Messalla. 41.7 (Octavian’s providential absence from camp) is attested by all relevant sources. P.’s citation of Augustus’ *Autobiography* seems inherited. The description of his litter (41.8) is closely paralleled in Suet. *Aug.* 91.1. The account of the massacre in the camp is presumably Messallan, though the mention of the luckless Lacedaemonians just *might* reflect Greek tradition. In sum, it seems clear that Messalla is behind all, or very nearly all, this section. {Drummond, *FRHist* I.468–9 is more cautious, especially about 41.4–6.}

42.1–9

xlii 42.1–2 is essentially unparalleled elsewhere. 42.3 (on Antony’s alleged absence) is attested also by Florus 2.17.10, and is in very marked contrast to the emphasis in Appian’s account of Antony’s activities. In | itself, the item could come from Republican or Caesarian (in the narrow sense) propaganda, but in context it seems best to take it with the rest of the narrative (and Messalla was not gentle towards Antony, cf. *HRR* II, 67, frags. 7, 8, 10 {not accepted as genuine in *FRHist*: see Drummond, *FRHist* I.47. Drummond also argues against this assumption of hostility to Antony, 469 n. 50}). 42.3 (Brutus told of Octavian’s alleged death) looks ‘eyewitness’ material. 42.4 is unparalleled elsewhere. The ‘if-of-history’ reflection of 42.5 is broadly paralleled in Dio 47.45.2–3, Livy *Epit.* 124, Flor. 2.17.11–12, cf. perhaps Eutrop. 7.3.2. It could thus stem from a major historical tradition (and one obviously distinct from that enshrined in Appian) but equally well, and probably better, could be original Messalla, who is immediately quoted for a proof of Brutus’ victory. 42.6–9 (plus 44.1) is also elsewhere unattested and makes an attractively circumstantial impression. Messalla, who may well have been by Brutus’ side, is the obvious choice. Again, one can be fairly confident that all *ch.* 43, following naturally from 42, and showing eyewitness touches, comes substantially from Messalla, cited in 42.5.

43.1–9

43.1–3 (on the activities of Cassius before his flight) has no real parallels in any other account. There may be a little Plutarchean distortion, but the narrative is substantially circumstantial. Messalla was not present at these events (cf. 40.11), but obviously could have got the information from some of the *ὀλίγοι* of 43.4 who retired with Cassius.

Cassius' suicide (43.4–9) is much attested, but of the important accounts Dio 47.46.3–5 and Appian 4.113, giving a tradition variant from the main narrative, are extremely close to P. Peter, *HRR* II, lxxxii, supposes Messalla to be the source here too. Technically unprovable, this is surely right: Messalla *must* have given an account of the death of 'imperator suus', and one would naturally expect a highly apologetic one (cf. 43.4). The frigid, but poignant, reminiscence of Cassius' escape from the Parthians (43.8) is no doubt P.'s own contribution. The observation of 43.8 (*ἐνίοις* etc.) does not necessarily imply source fragmentation. |

44.1–6

xliii

On 44.1 see on 42.6–9. 44.2 is paralleled in Appian 4.114.476f. (close, but not following P.) and Dio 47.47.1 (more general). This poses a by now familiar conundrum: is P. here following a main-line historical source shared (at some level) with Appian and Dio, or is he using a 'minor' source directly, which is reflected in such a historical source? That 44.2 goes back *ultimately* to a 'minor' source seems very likely. *If* P. has access to the 'minor' source, then it is more probable that his 44.2 comes from it, used continuously, than a main-line historical source which incorporated items from that 'minor' source. That P. does have access to the 'minor' source (i.e. in this case Messalla) is, in the final analysis, impossible to *prove*, but it can be supposed to a high degree of probability, simply because of the amount of circumstantial detail he preserves in contrast to the narratives of Appian and Dio (who shows far more regular 'contamination' by this minor source than Appian). Further, there are a few cases where it seems that the historical sources underlying the narratives of Appian and Dio have incorporated Messallan evidence without accepting it *in toto*. Thus Dio shows traces of the Messallan version that Brutus and Cassius had decided to fight and that the battle was at least intended to be fought in the regular way, but this version is fudged by the statement 'although no arrangement had been made as to when they should begin the battle, yet as if by some compact they all armed themselves at dawn ...' (47.42.1). In P., by contrast, chs. 39ff. are a coherent whole. Similarly, in the accounts of Cassius' suicide given by Dio and Appian, although Dio gives essentially the (*ex hypothesi*) Messallan version to be found in P. 43.4–9 and Appian records it as a variant tradition, both Appian and Dio say that Cassius knew of the loss of his camp, but P. is unclear whether he did or not, and backs this up with the observation that Cassius' eyesight was bad (43.4). The conclusion is not inescapable, but it is likely that Messalla in Appian and Dio is inherited, but integral in P. (For general observations along the same lines, cf. | Peter, *HRR* II, lxxxii, though I do not always agree with him about what is Messallan in P.)

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For 44.2 as Messallan cf. also 44.2n. (the Cremutius Cordus/Messalla link). In 44.3–4 P.'s narrative is closer to Dio 47.47.2 than Appian 4.114.476.

44.4 (Brutus and Victory) is unattested elsewhere, though obviously (to some extent) circumstantial, and to be taken with 44.3. 44.5–6 seems to be P.'s own emphatic judgement, based on the verdict of Messalla.

45.1–9

The same figures as P. 45.1 are given by Appian 4.112.471, without the source (Messalla) or Brutus' nickname for the camp servants. Peter, *loc. cit.*, cf. *Quellen*, 138, rightly sees as significant the fact that what in P. seems integral in Appian seems 'inserted' (cf. above). Voegelin suggests that the detail about Brutus' nickname comes from Volumnius, which it might (or even Bibulus?), but the form of the sentence does not necessarily imply that the source for the first part was different from the second—cf. Appian *loc. cit.*—and Messalla does seem to have recorded picturesque detail (cf. *HRR* II, 66f; {Drummond, *FRHist* I.469–70, 'perhaps a memoir, enlivened by colourful anecdote ...'}). 45.2 (Demetrius and his effect on enemy morale) is otherwise unattested, though one may connect it with the tradition of *De vir. ill.* 83.7 (Antony's exultant 'vici!' on the news of Cassius' death). The marshalling of the armies and failure to engage (45.2–3) is also attested by Appian 4.114.478 and 4.119.499; in the first case it is the Caesarians who back down, in the second, in Antony's speech to his troops, it is implied that it was Brutus who refused battle! Brutus' dealings with the captives (45.4–5) are paralleled in Dio 47.48.3, which is more general, but ultimately presumably from the same source. This is consistent with the hypothesis that P. is using that source directly.

45.6–9 is otherwise unattested and presumably Messalla (cf. 45.7 and Pelling, 'Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman *Lives*' [= *Plutarch and History* 15; cf. Drummond, *FRHist* I.469 n. 48}). The sinister implications of the story to be observed in P.'s account are no doubt his own contribution; the Messallan emphasis should rather be that of the | preoccupied Brutus of 45.7.

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46.1–5

The same essential facts as 46.1 are given by Appian 4.117.489–118.498, with the implication that the promise of Thessalonica and Sparta for plunder comes from a different source, or at least an 'insert' within that source. Again, what in Appian is 'inserted' is integral to P. P. is following the 'insert' directly, it may be assumed. 46.2–4 are P.'s own anguished comments. 46.5–end stems from the same source as 45.3, and as (a) apologetic of Brutus and (b) honorific of Cassius may be thought *consistent* with Messallan authorship.

47.1–9

47.1–2 is matched in general terms by Appian 4.117–118 and 121.508–122.513 and Dio 47.47.3–4 (no striking resemblances). Appian 4.112.513ff. and Dio 47.47.4 agree with 47.3 that Antony and Octavian learned of their

defeat at sea and that this was an additional spur to their attempts to force a battle. The details of 47.3 are quite close to those given in Appian. P. *may* be contaminating his main ('minor') source with the historical source behind Appian. 47.5 (battles fought on the same day) is also in Appian 4.115–116. 47.5 (chance rather than the incompetence of the Republican commanders) and 47.6 (otherwise Brutus would never have fought) must reflect the source behind 47.8–9, which is otherwise unattested and should come from Messalla. (Note that Dio 47.47.5ff. *seems* to be in the same general tradition.) 47.7 (the need for monarchy) is presumably just P.

48.1–5

48.1 (also in Appian 4.134.565) is evidently from the same source as 36.1ff. (Note that as the two visitations go together Volumnius is excluded from consideration in *ch.* 36.) 48.2–4 is avowedly Volumnius. (Note that Volumnius has got into a main historical tradition, or traditions, the bees of 48.2 emerging in Florus 2.17.7 and the fight of the eagles reappearing in Appian 4.128.532 in his main narrative and in Dio 47.48.4.) | The omen of the Ethiopian (48.5) is also in Appian 4.134.566, Florus 2.17.7–8, and Jul. Obs. 70. The comparative precision of P., put against the imprecision of Appian and Florus, who do not make clear whether the omen is to be connected with the first or second battle, and the fact that it appears in one of Appian's 'inserts', would tend to suggest that P. knows it at first hand. If so, his wording does not exclude Volumnius, for the argument goes: (i) there is a tradition that the apparition appeared to Brutus again, but (ii) Volumnius does not record it, though he does record 'x', 'y', and 'z', and (iii) *everybody* knows about the Ethiopian, i.e. it is thoroughly well attested in several accounts (which would not exclude the possibility that Volumnius was the *original* offender).

xlvi

49.1–10

49.1 (delay) is paralleled *very generally* in Appian. Neither Appian nor Dio adduce fear of desertions once Brutus has actually drawn up his army (49.2–3), nor the Camulatus incident (49.3). Appian gives the same time as P. (49.4). 49.5–8 has no parallel elsewhere. 49.7 may reflect Plutarchean invention or simply Republican propaganda. 49.7–8 (the link between Brutus' failure to press home his advantage in the first battle and his defeat in the second) is no doubt P.'s own contribution. Thus far, the signs are that *ch.* 49 is drawn from a continuous narrative source which may be reflected in, but is distinct from, the sources underlying Appian and Dio. It is also obviously one on the Republican side. 49.9–10 is more difficult. Peter, *HRR* II, lxxxii, cf. *Quellen* 75, followed by Geiger {D.Phil.} 75, cf. 115, supposes the account of the death of Cato the Younger to be Messallan. It may be, but Messalla cannot have been on the scene, and the *general* feel of 49.9–10 (the death throes of the Republic) is perhaps rather Livian (vague parallels in Livy *Epit.* 124, Vell. 2.71.2, Eutrop. 7.3.2; cf. also on 28.1). P.'s

highly ambiguous observations on what these men were fighting for are (of course) his own. (Note: Appian's version of the death of Cato at 4.135.571 *may* be independent, as his account of the death of Labeo, *ibid.*, certainly is.) |

xlvi **50.1-9**

This story is also related by Appian 4.129.542-545 in such closely similar terms as to clinch a common source. Yet Appian does not seem to be following P. (though he may have glanced at him—cf. 50.5n.): not only are there no real signs of direct verbal indebtedness, but in Appian the story is thoroughly meshed with its context, which is somewhat different from that in P., and Appian's version of Lucilius' *dictum* seems more likely to be true to the original source than P.'s (50.5n.). (Peter, *HRR* II, lxxxii, is—in my opinion—wrong to see the story as an 'insert' in Appian's narrative.) *Ergo*, the story was contained in Appian's main historical source. But it does not *necessarily* follow that P. is also using that source: he could be using a source which has been absorbed by Appian's. Peter, *HRR* II, lxxxii, thinks in terms of Messalla or Volumnius, and these possibilities have to be considered (even if Peter is wrong in his 'insert' theory). But although both Messalla and Volumnius are important in P.'s narrative of the Philippi campaign, neither seems very likely here, for 50.5ff. has an Antonian perspective, one also not unfavourable to Antony, which would also perhaps tend to go against Messalla. {Drummond, *FRHist* I.469 and n. 50 agrees on the Antonian perspective but denies that this tells against Messalla.} Bibulus is out for chronological reasons. This probably is a case where the parallel between Appian and P. implies common use of a major historical source.

51.1-52.8

52.1-52.7 is straight Volumnius (51.1 and 3-4, 52.2-3). One notes that Volumnius has found his way into the source followed by Appian (cf. 48.4). (So also Peter, *Quellen*, 138). P. is clearly using Volumnius direct. 51.1 *may* imply ignorance of the tradition attested by Florus 2.17.11 and Dio 47.49.2. 52.8 is probably Messalla, the patron of Strato. (So also Peter, *Quellen*, 139; {Drummond, *FRHist* I.405}.)

53.1-7

xlvi **53.1-2** is probably also Messalla. 52.3-4 *might* also be (a story of the 'he says to me and I says to him'-type? Messalla was renowned for his | *παρηγορία*). The victors' treatment of Brutus' body is attested in Appian 4.135.568 (integral), Dio 47.49.2, Val. Max. 5.1.11, Suet. *Aug.* 13.1. Dio and Suetonius record a quite different tradition from the rest. The suggestion of Peter, *HRR* II, lxxxii, that the ultimate source of the P./Appian version is Messalla or Volumnius seems implausible. The very favourable portrayal

of Antony, combined with the fact that the story is integral to Appian's narrative, suggests rather that Appian's source is in fact the ultimate source. (If so, the apparently Livian 28.1 above is not *in the first instance* Livian.)

P.'s discussion (53.5–7) of the manner of Porcia's death suggests quite strongly that he has actually looked at Nicolaus and Val. Max. himself to see what they had to say on the subject, and then weighed it against other evidence to which he had access, i.e. Brutus' letters, which elsewhere he is clearly using direct. If so, Nicolaus is the ultimate source for this story (cf. the wording of 53.7), and its genesis is to be sought in Stoic opposition circles active (no doubt) already in the early Empire. The suggestion of Peter, *Quellen*, 140, tentatively followed by Geiger {D.Phil.} 53, that the ultimate source is Bibulus, is implausible, since (i) P. does not here seem to be using Bibulus, whose work he surely knew at first hand, and (ii) even granted the widespread mendacity of ancient historical, and particularly biographical, writing, it still seems unlikely that Bibulus would/could have perpetrated such a flagrant untruth.

Thus far the bare bones of the apparent source interrelationships in the *Brutus*. It remains to try to put them together into coherent form. Two general points cannot be overstressed: (i) for all that the exercise *must* be attempted if an understanding of P.'s methods is to be gained, Plutarchean source-criticism remains a field in which the limitations of the exercise and, in many instances, the lack of proper controls must clearly be recognized; (ii) the possibility of deep rooted and thoroughgoing contamination of major historical sources by 'minor' sources makes the undertaking especially difficult. It is *not* sufficient to document a | series of parallels between P. and Appian on the one hand, and P. and Dio on the other, and from them to infer a common source as if that were the end of the matter, *if* (as is probably true in parts of the *Brutus*) P. is following a 'minor' source direct. The parallels between P. and Appian and Dio *may* be sufficiently close to indicate a common source, but they do not *necessarily* prove that P. is actually *using* that source: it *may* be the case that he is using a 'minor' source, which, on occasion, then found its way into the major sources followed by Appian and Dio. Some examples of this phenomenon have already been mentioned above. In dealing with this problem there are obviously two main controls: (i) has P. direct access to the 'minor' source? (ii) was the 'minor' source of sufficient scope to allow *sustained* consultation? The answer to the first question in all relevant cases in the *Brutus* is a qualified 'yes', qualified simply because one can rarely be *absolutely* sure in these instances, for the inference that P. has direct access to a particular source may depend on nuances of wording rather than explicit statement. The answer to the second question is much more difficult. If there is no external evidence, or if such external evidence as there is is insufficient to

establish reasonable parameters, then clearly one is reduced to looking for possible indications of the presence of the source in the main narrative and there is a real danger of circularity. These difficulties borne in mind, much progress can still be made.

To begin with, it is of interest to consider what sources P. does not use, although they might have been of relevance to his *Life* of Brutus. It is rather striking that P. makes no use of statuary evidence, despite his interest in it as an indicator of character (1.1n.), and despite the fact that there must have been some available to him (cf. H. Moebius, ‘M. Junius Brutus’, *AE* 1952–1954, 3 [1961], 207; cf. also *Comp.* 5.2ff.). The explanation may simply be that Brutus’ bust, if such it is, shows what might reasonably be thought a sensitive, but rather weak, physiognomy, an impression the coin portraits support. P.’s evident failure to make use | of any of Brutus’ speeches, some of which were still extant in his own day, is discussed in 2.5n. For his failure to use Brutus’ poetry see p. 69 below. Nor does he utilize the poetry of Horace, which could have found a place in the narrative of 24.2, or chs. 28/30. This will reflect general ignorance of/lack of interest in Roman poetry. {On this topic see A. Zadorojnyi in C. Schrader, V. Ramón, and J. Vela, edd., *Plutarco y la Historia* (1997), 497–506.} But an intriguing question may be raised: if C. Oppius wrote a biography (or similar work) on Cassius, as seems likely (cf. *HRR* II, 48; {*FRHist* 40 F 4 and C. J. Smith and T. J. Cornell, *FRHist* I.382}), did P. consult it for his *Brutus*, a *Life* in which Cassius is very prominent indeed? P. certainly uses Oppius’ work on Caesar in the *Caesar* (*Caes.* 17.7, 17.11, cf. *Pomp.* 10.7–9; {Pelling, *Caesar* 49–50; Smith and Cornell, *FRHist* I.382}). Unfortunately, this is a possibility over which there is no control whatever, and for that reason alone must in practice be set aside.

Of the sources P. does use, it is convenient first to detail those whose use seems relatively straightforward. Brutus’ letters are cited at 2.4, 21.6, 22.4–6, 24.3 (by implication), 28.2 (by implication), 29.9–11, 53.6–7. They may well also lie behind 28.1, 28.4–5 (cf. 29.5), 38.6–7 (see n. *ad loc.*), and perhaps offered some of the information in *ch.* 21. It is beyond reasonable doubt that P. consulted them himself directly, and the examples at 22.4–6, 28.2, and 29.9–11 provide evidence of the first importance for Brutus’ character and attitudes. Brutus’ (spurious) Greek letters are quoted in 2.6–8; the use to which they are put is subtle and ambiguous (see discussion *ad loc.*). It is just possible (if not very likely) that they helped in the narrative of 28.3. Brutus’ philosophical works *could* have contributed to 2.2–3, and may well have done to 6.9 and 40.7. Ciceronian evidence may inform 1.5 (the link between Brutus and Servilius Ahala) and 2.2–3 (Brutus’ philosophical associations). *Ad Att.* 14.1 [355].2 certainly lies behind 6.6–7. Some of Cicero’s letters to Brutus probably substantiate 26.6 (Cicero and C. Antonius). It is possible that *Orat.* 34 shaped 6.11, and letters such as *Ad Brut.* 2.5 [5].2, 1.6 [12].1, may have helped 26.4. (For P.’s use of Ciceronian

evidence see further Flacelière, *Plutarque Vies XII*, 56–61; Pelling, ‘Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman Lives’ (= *Plutarch and History* 16–18; Moles, *Cicero* 28–9.) Ciceronian evidence is at least likely to have produced | the important items of 1.5, 2.2–3, and 6.6–7. Other sources appear on specific occasions. Dionysius seems to have been consulted for 1.5 (P.’s version of the conspiracy of Spurius Maelius), Posidonius for the discussion of 1.7–8 (whether Brutus really was descended from the first consul), Thræsea Paetus for the narrative of 3.1–4 (though this will have come from P.’s research for the *Cato minor*). The details of Cinna’s dream may have been culled from the work on Cinna by L. Crassicius or from a dream-book. In either event P. may have been pointed on his way by erudite Roman friends. (Their opinion may also lie behind the cool estimate of Brutus’ Roman oratory in 2.5.) Use of (Greek) oral tradition can (at the least) only have been small. It *might* (or might not) be reflected in vague terms in 6.11 or—more concretely—in the information of 41.8, but in both cases other sources are more likely. Valerius Maximus is used in a trivial sense in 53.5ff., trivial, because P.’s wording suggests that he has looked at him, but is in fact following Nicolaus. All other parallels between the *Brutus* and Val. Max. (9.1–4, 13.1–11, 24.4–7 are the most important instances) are to be explained in terms of a common source (cf. in general Peter, *Quellen*, 139f.).

Before attempting to parcel out the main narrative sections among the various sources on offer, it will be useful to set out in abbreviated form the main parallels between P., Appian, and Dio. I do not include unimportant parallels (e.g. that all three writers attest the mere fact of a particular event), but only those that appear significant, first between P. and Appian, second P., Appian, and Dio together, and third between P. and Dio. These parallels remain the essential tool of Plutarchean ‘Quellenforschung’ in the Roman *Lives*.

(a) Parallels between P. and Appian (only)

5.1–2 ~ A. 2.112.467; 6.2 ~ A. 2.111.464; 6.10 ~ A. 2.111.465; 7.1–4 ~ A. 2.112.466f.; 12.1 ~ A. 2.113.474; 12.8 ~ A. 2.114.475; 14.1 ~ A. 2.114.476; 14.6 ~ A. 2.115.482; 15.2–4 ~ A. 2.115.483–4; 16.1–5 ~ A. 2.115.481–116.487; in *ch.* 17, 17.3 (supplication), 17.4 (Casca), 17.6 (Brutus’ intervention | deciding factor), and 17.7 (self-wounding of the conspirators) are close parallels between P. and Appian. (There are of course other close parallels, but they are also shared with Dio—see below.) 18.3 (Antony) ~ A. 2.114.478; 18.12 (*μυγάδες*) ~ A. 2.120.505–7; 18.13 ~ what A. ought to be saying! 20.4 (Antony’s funeral speech) ~ A. 2.144.600–145.606; 25.2 ~ A. 3.63.259; 26.3–5 ~ A. 3.79.321–323; 28.1 ~ Appian (?—see 53.4); 30.3 ~ A. 4.65.277–4.74.313; 30.4–31.7 ~ A. 4.76.321–80.338; 32.4 ~ Appian (? showing P. reacting against the emphasis of Appian’s source); 33.2–6 nearer A. than Dio; 36.1–37.1 ~ A. 4.134.565 (cf. also 48.1); 37.7 ~ A. 4.101.425; 38.3 ~ A.

4.106–108! (? Plutarchean simplification); 38.5 ~ A. 4.108.454f.; 41.1–3 ~ A. 4.109–110 (very general); 41.4 (charge) ~ A. 4.110 (context different); 45.1 ~ A. 4.112.471 (though from Messalla); 45.2–3 ~ A. 4.114.478 and 4.119.499; 46.1 ~ A. 4.117.489–118.498; 47.3 ~ A. 4.115.479 (details of plight of defeated Caesarian navy); 47.5 (same day) ~ A. *ibid.*; 48.5 ~ A. 4.134.566; 49.1 (delay) ~ A. 4.128.532 (very general); 49.4 (time) ~ A. *ibid.*; 50.1–9 ~ A. 4.129.542–545; 53.4 ~ A. 4.135.568.

(b) Parallels between P., Appian, and Dio

9.5–8 ~ A. 2.112.469 ~ D. 44.12; 17.1 (surrounding) ~ A. 2.117.490 ~ D. 44.19; 17.2 (Trebonius) ~ A. 2.117.491 ~ D. 44.19.1; 17.3 ~ A. and D. (cf. 17.1); 17.4 (Tillius Cimber) ~ A. and D. (by implication); 18.14 (by implication) ~ A. 2.119.500 ~ D. 44.21.3; 20.3 ~ A. 2.143.596f. ~ D. 44.35.2–3; 20.8–11 ~ A. and D.; 28.6 (Smyrna) ~ A. 4.65.276ff. ~ D. 47.32.1–3; 33.2–6 ~ A. and D. but nearer A.; 38.5 (greatness of contest) ~ A. 4.137 ~ D. 47.39.1 (by implication); 39.3–5 ~ A. and D.; 41.7 ~ A. and D.; 43.4–9 ~ D. 47.46.3–5 ~ A. 4.113; 44.2 ~ A. 4.114.476f. ~ D. 47.47.1; 47.1–2 ~ A. 4.117–118, 121.508–122.513 ~ D. 47.47.3–4; 47.3 ~ A. and D. in general; 48.4 (eagles) ~ A. 4.128.532 ~ D. 47.48.4.

(c) Parallels between P. and Dio (only)

18.6 ~ D. 44.22.3 (details of Antony's flight); 18.9 (no more killings) ~ D. 44.20.4; 19.2–3 closer to D. 44.34.6–7 than A.; 25.1 (Pompeian veterans) ~ D. 47.21.3; 25.1 (cavalry) ~ D. *ibid.*; 26.7–8 ~ D. 47.23.2–4 | (not close enough for a direct common source!); 30.4–31.7 shows some traces of a shared source with Dio, even though in general the parallels with Appian are much more important; 32.1–2 ~ D. 47.34.4–6; 34.1–35.3 ~ D. 47.35.1 (but D. may be following P. and in any case this section in P. looks 'biographical'); 38.1–2 ~ D. 47.35–36 (nearer than Appian); 39.1–2 ~ D. 47.38.4, 47.40.7–8 (*not* in Appian); 41.4 (password) roughly paralleled by D. 47.43.1; 42.5 ~ D. 47.45.2–3; 44.3–4 closer to D. 47.47.2 than A. 4.114.476; 45.4–5 ~ D. 47.48.3; 47.5ff. is *generally* paralleled in D. 47.47.5ff.

Before finally analysing the significance of these parallels, it will be helpful to exclude from discussion those passages where P. (fairly clearly) is just inventing material. These are 16.4 (decisive role of Brutus), 36.7 (Brutus' spirited reply to the apparition), 37.2–6 (Cassius' speech), and 39.7 (Cassius succumbs to superstition), none historically important.

It has been demonstrated to a high degree of probability that Appian's main historical source for the 50s and 40s B.C. was Asinius Pollio (see e.g. E. Kornemann, *Jb. f. cl. Phil.* Spb. 22 [1896], 555ff.). {Pollio is *FRHist* 56. It is still widely accepted that he was an important—though by no means the only—source for Appian (see the judicious discussion by Gowing, *The Triumviral Narratives*, 39–40), but qualifications have been increasingly

stressed: Drummond, *FRHist* I.439–40 is particularly sceptical, and see R. Westall, ‘The relationship of Appian and Pollio: a reconsideration’, *Analecta Romana Instituta Danaici* 38 (2013), 95–123, with further bibliography, and various papers in Welch (2015b), esp. those of Westall, Stevenson, and Welch. In 1984 Magnino was already sounding a warning note in his comm. on App. *BC* 3: ‘una posizione di prudente riserbo ‘de forse la migliore’.’}

Throughout the relevant Roman *Lives* P. shows continuous and systematic parallels with the account of Appian (basic documentation in Kornemann 672ff., cf. above). Many of these are so close as to guarantee reliance by both P. and Appian on Asinius Pollio. (For general discussion of P.’s use of Pollio see e.g. Kornemann, *art. cit.*; Peter, *Quellen*, 124ff.; Garzetti xxii ff.; Gabba, *Appiano e la storia delle guerre civili*, 119ff., 229ff.; André, *La vie et l’œuvre d’Asinius Pollion*, 41–66; Geiger {D.Phil.} 71f., 74ff., 79, 336 {and in Rizzoli *Focione–Catone Uticense* [1993], 288–9}; Pelling {D.Phil.}, 51, 69ff. and ‘P.’s Method of Work in the Roman *Lives*’ {= *Plutarch and History* 1–44, esp. 12–13; Drummond, *FRHist* I.439–40, with further bibliography. Drummond in particular favours the view that many of these parallels are to be explained in terms of Appian’s use of Plutarch; in response Pelling [in C. Smith and A. Powell, edd., *The Lost Memoirs of Augustus* (2009), 62 n. 34] points out that this would imply that Appian knows and combines all six of Plutarch’s versions in *Caesar*, *Brutus*, *Cato Minor*, *Crassus*, *Pompey*, and *Antony*}. The case is overwhelming, and I have nothing to add here.

It has also been shown beyond reasonable doubt that Dio’s main narrative source was Livy (basic discussion in E. Schwartz, *RE* 3.1697–1714). {This too is now far more contested: see esp. B. Manuwald, *Cassius Dio und Augustus* (1979).} Thus when Dio’s account shows close parallels to those of P. and Appian the most economical and likely hypothesis is that this reflects Pollian influence upon Livy (for discussion see Pelling, ‘P.’s methods’ {cf. *Plutarch and History* 40–1 n. 125, backtracking on this point}). There are of course complicating factors, | as already mentioned, notably (i) the possibility that ‘major’ sources (Pollio, Livy) have been contaminated by some of the ‘minor’ sources used by P., and (ii) the possibility of Plutarchean influence upon Appian (cf. Gabba, 225ff.; {Drummond, *FRHist* I.440, 470–1}) and upon Dio.

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In chs. 1–20 of the *Brutus*, the basic sources used in 1–3 are clear enough. In 5–20 the parallels between P. and Appian are sufficiently close to establish 5.1–2, 6.2, 6.10, 7.1–4 (substantially), 12.1, 12.8, 14.1, 14.6, 15.2–4, 16.1–5, 17.3, 17.4, 17.6, 17.7, 18.3, 18.12 (to a minimal degree), 18.13, and 20.4 as essentially Pollian. Also Pollian (cf. the list of parallels between P., Appian, and Dio) will be 9.5–8, 17.1, 17.2, 17.3, 17.4, 18.14 (by implication), 20.3, 20.5–7, 20.8–11 (plus supplement at 20.9). One must next invoke Bibulus’ and Empylus’ works. P.’s characterization of both as *μικρόν* only

defines their scope in the most general terms (in particular, allowance must be made for the fact that at 13.3 P. is punning horrendously), but it is beyond reasonable doubt that P. is using both works directly. Bibulus {*FRHist* 49} probably accounts for 13.1–11, 14.4, and 15.5–9. Empylus {*FGrHist* 191} may well have produced 7.1 (earlier quarrels of Brutus and Cassius), the emphasis of 7.6–7 (~ 8.3–6), the *dicta* of Caesar (8.1–3), and the story of Cassius' lost lions (8.6–7). Despite the parallel between 10.3–7 and Appian 2.113.470–473, he could very well also lie behind 10.1–7, and behind 11.1–3 (for Appian's attestation of Ligarius among the conspirators at 2.113.474 is only the most flimsy of 'parallels'). He may well also have supplied 12.2 (omission of Cicero), 12.3–6 (note especially the hostile characterization of Decimus Brutus), 14.4–5, 14.7 (?), a few details in *ch.* 17 (Cassius' appeal to Pompey's statue, 17.3; Caesar's cry to Casca in Latin, 17.5), the very partial account of 19.1 and 19.4–5, and perhaps also 19.2–3 (an emphasis which might then have got into Livy—cf. Dio 44.34.6–7). If 19.4–5 is Empylan, then 20.1, and maybe 20.2, will also be. One might also think of Empylus in 3.1–4 (*if* P.'s account implies supplementation by a biographical source), *ch.* 4, 6.1–2, 6.3–4, 6.10 and 12, 18.4–5 (going with 20.2?), the very prejudiced | 18.6 (Antony's disguise, which might then have got into Livy—cf. Dio 44.22.2; for Empylus in a main-line historical tradition cf. perhaps Vell. 2.58.2, cf. *Brut.* 20.1), 18.9 (which might also have got into Livy, cf. Dio 44.20.4), 18.9–10 (otherwise unattested and very prejudiced in favour of the conspirators), and 18.12 (which might then have got into Nicolaus 26A.100). All this must remain speculative, but it does not seem unlikely that Empylus' no doubt apologetic 'Brutus' should have dealt with such topics as Brutus' early association with Cato, the respect in which he was held by Pompey, his subsequent close relations with Caesar, his dissension with Cassius, their contrasting prospects and characters, their reconciliation, the formation of the conspiracy, who was chosen and who was not chosen to join it, some of the events on the Ides, the subsequent meetings of the senate, Brutus' ambivalent attitude to Antony and its political consequences.

Whether P.'s narrative in *chs.* 17 and 18 shows any traces of Nicolaan influence is difficult to decide. I incline to think it does, but the important point is that it is (at best) trivial: sustained and systematic consultation of Nicolaus would have improved P.'s chronology from March 15–17 out of all recognition. Livian influence is equally hard to document. 15.1 is perhaps trivially Livian. The parallels between 18.6 and Dio 44.22.2, and between 18.9 and Dio 44.20.4, *could* indicate Livy, but it is surely more likely that they show that a 'minor' source used directly by P. has got into Livy. And if the *καὶ σὺ, τέκνον*; story retailed by Dio and Suetonius is Livian, or at least recorded by Livy, this would tend to argue that P. did not consult Livy in a sustained and systematic manner for the *Brutus*, for he would hardly have omitted so juicy an item had he known of it.

The anecdotes of 5.3–4 and 9.1–4 remain outstanding. In both cases one might speculate that Livy might be the source, but a speculation is all that it would be.

Next, chs. 21–35. |

Already accounted for are 21.6 (letter), 22.4–6 (letters), 23.2–7 (Bibulus), 24.3 (letters), 26.6 (to some extent Cicero's letters to Brutus), 28.1–2 (letters), 28.4–5 (letters), 29.8–11 (letters). One would be inclined to suggest a 'biographical' source for parts of *ch.* 21 (21.4–5), 24 in its entirety, 25.4–26.2, 26.3–5 (similar in spirit to Appian 3.79.321–323, but factually different), 26.7–8 (similar to Dio 47.23.2–4, yet different in detail and perhaps with a Greek source flavour), 29.1/30.1–2, 34.1–35.6 (despite the parallel with Dio 47.35.1). There might be something of Bibulus in *ch.* 21 and there very likely is in 24.1, 24.4–7, and perhaps the whole chapter. 25.4–26.2, 26.3–5 (apologetic of Brutus' treatment of Antony's brother), 26.7–8, and 34.1–35.3 (favourable to Brutus at the expense of Cassius) *might* also be Bibulan. If 26.7–8 has a Greek source flavour, that would not necessarily go against Bibulus, as there is no evidence which language he wrote in, and he would (of course) have been perfectly capable of writing in Greek. 29.7 (Antony on Brutus) might also be Bibulus. For 29.1 and 30.1–2 one might think of Messalla, though there is no control over this.

There may be Pollian influence at work in the schizophrenic description of the Roman people in 21.2–3, and on general grounds 22.1–3, 27.1–3, and 27.6 may be put down as Pollian. More concretely Pollian seem 25.2 (cf. Appian 3.63.259), 28.3f. (cf. Appian 4.63.270), 30.3 (hostile to Cassius), 30.4–31.7 (discussion on pp. 283ff.), 33.2–6. Use of the source underlying Dio, i.e. Livy, is again difficult to demonstrate. It would be dangerous to build much on the parallels between 25.1 and Dio 47.21.3, but there *may* be Livian elements in 30.4–31.7 and in 32.1–2 it does rather look as if P. is reshaping the account that lies behind Dio 47.34.4–6. For the rest, 29.2–6 is not drawn from any one 'source', 25.5–6 are P.'s own speculations, and the anecdote of 27.5 is of unknown provenance.

Finally, chs. 36–53.

Already accounted for are 37.2–6 (Plutarchean invention), 38.5–7 (letter!?), 39.6 (P. invents Cassius' depression over unfavourable omens), | 40.1–4 (explicitly Messalla), 40.6–9 (largely Plutarchean invention), 42.5 (explicitly Messalla), 45.1 (explicitly Messalla), 48.2–4 (explicitly Volumnius), 53.5–7 (explicitly Nicolaus, Val. Max., and a letter of Brutus). The main difficulty in assigning particular sections to particular sources lies in the question of how thoroughly P.'s narrative is impregnated by the testimony of Volumnius and Messalla.

That P. is using Volumnius {*FRHist* 47} direct is not certain, but is likely (cf. the flourish with which Volumnius is introduced at 48.2, the way he is characterized, and the great detail of the narrative 51.1–52.7). But nothing is known of the scope of the work, apart from the fact that it contained omens (48.2–4) and an affecting description of Brutus' last hours

(51.1–52.7). It also appears quite likely that Volumnius is the source for the omens of 37.7 and 39.3–5. He may, or may not, also have been responsible for the omen of 48.5. This is little to go on. His work may have been entitled ‘*Commentarii de pugna Philippensi*’ (Peter), or it could have had a more restricted scope (? ‘*De exitu Bruti*’). It is not known whether it was written in Latin or Greek. {Cf. Drummond *FRHist* I.404–5.}

Messalla {*FRHist* 61} is a much more fruitful figure. Again, that P. is using him direct is not certain, but very likely (some of the arguments have already been rehearsed), though it is not known in which language he wrote (cf. Peter, *HRR* II, lxxviii; {Drummond, *FRHist* I.470}). Peter’s suggestion that his work was entitled ‘*Commentarii de bello civili*’ seems plausible. Given that Messalla recorded his last conversation with Cassius the night before the First Battle of Philippi (40.1–4), expressed his opinion that the Republicans won the first battle (42.5), and gave the numbers of dead on both sides (45.1), it is clear that the scope of his work must have been considerable, and therefore, if P. is indeed using him direct, that he could have been an important—even the most important—source in this part of the *Life*. Examination of the narrative tends to bear out that he is indeed very important, even though the risk of circularity of argumentation always remains. |

lviii With the explicit 40.1–4 go 39.7–11, 40.5 (otherwise unattested), the ‘hard’ material of 40.5–9 (i.e. that Brutus and Cassius had a conversation before the battle in which they agreed on a suicide pact), and 40.10–12 (cf. 40.11). Messalla is interestingly prominent in 41.5 and there seems no good reason why the whole of *ch.* 41 should not also go back to Messalla: the ‘parallels’ between P.’s account and those of Appian and Dio are not close enough to indicate a common source, or sources, except in the sense that vestiges of the account given in P. are discernible in Dio. (For extended discussion see the chapter-by-chapter analysis above.) Similarly with *ch.* 42: the lack of substantive parallels with other accounts, the virulently anti-Antony tone of 42.3, the presence of obvious eye-witness material (especially 42.6ff.), and the emphatic citation of Messalla at 42.5 combine strongly to suggest Messallan authorship. In *ch.* 45 Messalla is quoted for the losses on both sides (45.1). 45.3–5, however distorted, must stem ultimately from someone actually present in Brutus’ camp, and Messalla is prominent in the unfortunate affair of Saculio and Volumnius (45.6–9). Messalla evidently also supplied the alternative version of Brutus’ death given in 52.8. In the light of all this, while the case cannot in the nature of things be proven to the hilt, it does not seem rash to suggest that practically all P.’s narrative of the Philippi campaign derives directly from Messalla. This would include, besides the instances already cited, 39.1–2 (which then found its way into Livy—cf. the less detailed account of Dio 47.38.4, 47.40.7–8), 43.1–3 (elsewhere unparalleled), 43.4–9 (with the highly apologetic 43.4 ‘lost’ in the parallel accounts of Appian and Dio), 44.1 (unparalleled elsewhere and going closely with the equally unparalleled,

and circumstantial, 42.6–9), 44.2 (which naturally got into the sources underlying Appian 4.114.476f. and Dio 47.47.1), 44.3–4 (with Brutus and Victory unattested in the parallel accounts of Appian and Dio because P. is following Messalla direct, whereas with Appian and Dio he is ‘inherited’, 46.1ff. (an ‘insert’ in Appian 4.117.489ff.), 47.5–9 (Dio 47.47.5ff. is only a very general parallel, and the highly | apologetic tone, backed up by the Clodius story, finds no real parallel elsewhere, 49.1–8 (essentially unparalleled elsewhere, for the links between 49.1 and 49.4 and the account of Appian are wholly trivial), 53.1–2 and (?) 52.3–4. {A. M. Gowing, *Phoenix* 44 [1990], 174–6 agrees that much of this contact is to be explained in terms of Messallan material, but thinks that Appian may be using Messalla directly, Dio more likely indirectly. Magnino is evenhanded between Volumnius and Messalla in his intr. to App. *BC* 4, p. 22).}

At the same time P. must (of course) have read other accounts. The wording of 48.5 is proof of this, though none is needed. He had certainly read the Pollian version for the *Antony* (*Ant.* 22.1–6), where all the emphasis is on the invincible mastery of Antony at the expense of Octavian (note especially the parallel between *Ant.* 22.1 and Appian 4.129–start, a parallel which is the more striking not despite, but because of, the different contexts in Appian and P.). Probable Pollian elements in the *Brutus* are 38.3, suspiciously like a conflation of the account found in Appian 4.106–108, and an emphasis that might well have been suppressed by Messalla; the picturesque detail of 47.3, which looks like an abbreviation of the still more colourful material of Appian; the whole of *ch.* 50 (see the chapter-by-chapter analysis above); and 53.4 (*ibid.*). Livian elements are again difficult to determine. The parallel between 38.1–2 and Dio 47.35–36 is likely to be explained by Livy’s partial reliance on Messalla. The thought of 42.5 seems to have got into Livy, but might well have its origin in Messalla’s desire to demonstrate that the Republicans won the first battle. The formulation of 49.9–10 is the most likely Livian element (I think it *is* likely), but even this is far from certain of course.

The outstanding question still remaining is the provenance of the apparition story (36.1–37.1, 48.1), and the obviously authoritative details of Brutus’ *δίαιτα* given in 36.2–4. The two seem distinct. For the apparition story Volumnius, purveyor of the bogus supernatural, would be an attractive possibility, were he not ruled out by 48.1 (one cannot have the one apparition without the other, especially since the Brutus story is probably modelled on the unfortunate experiences of Cassius of Parma, cf. Val. Max. 1.7.7). Bibulus is obviously impossible (he died before Actium, apart from anything else. {But this is now thought to rest on a misidentification of Bibulus: see 13.3n., citing Syme, *Roman Papers* VI [1991], 193–204 and Drummond, *FRHist* I.407. We do not know the death-date of the right Bibulus.}) The story hardly seems in keeping with the | political *persona* of Messalla, for it clearly represents Caesarian propaganda

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of a distasteful kind, nor—more substantially—with the emphasis of 42.5 or 43.8: Messalla was keen to demonstrate that the Republicans could have won, not that they were dogged by a malign fate. Since the story does not seem to have been in Livy (it is not found in Dio, replete as he is with portents) and does occur in Appian, it seems to me likely, though unprovable, that it comes from Asinius Pollio, who was not averse to judicious exploitation of supernatural effects (cf. *Caes.* 43.4ff.). One hopes naturally for the sake of his integrity that he retailed it simply as a *λεγόμενον*. As for the details of Brutus' *δίαιτα*, these could come from either Bibulus, or possibly Messalla, who does seem to have gone in for descriptions of personal habits of the great (cf. *HRR* II, 66f., frgs. 5 {=FRHist 61 F 4}, 8, 10 {FRHist does not accept 8 and 10 as genuine}). Bibulus is rather more likely, but either case would probably imply that their work was written in Greek (cf. 36.4 and n.). The verdict must be 'unproven'.

A few general concluding observations. The *Brutus* shows P. employing, as often, a wide range of sources. He seems to have used Pollio as a basic structure for his narrative, but has supplemented his account from many diverse sources, and in his version of the Philippi campaign (about a third of the whole) relies very heavily upon Messalla. Certainly in the first part of the *Life*, especially chs. 7–20, he exhibits enviable skill in knitting together several different (and mutually incompatible) accounts. Characteristically, he has chosen as his supplements contemporary sources, most notably Brutus' letters (and to a much lesser extent Cicero's), Empylus, Bibulus, Volumnius, and Messalla. Obviously, his choice was dictated to a considerable extent by the need to get information in detail about Brutus from men personally close to him. Yet from the historical point of view, also, his choice should not be criticized. Brutus' letters do provide evidence of the character and convictions of Brutus, Bibulus' work does throw valuable light upon the 'domestic' man, and Messalla's work is at least an interesting complement to the *Histories* | of Asinius Pollio, and perhaps upon specific questions an improvement upon them. Even the thoroughly prejudiced Empylus (as he seems to have been) *may* provide the odd item of historical significance (19.4), and more probably *is* responsible for interesting information about the relations of Brutus and Cassius, their characters, and the way they set about their task in recruiting members of their conspiracy. P.'s historical acumen is an uneven quality, but his erudition and industry in collating material remain impressive.

COMMENTARY

1

Ch. 1: Ancestry and Character

P. starts off at once in his usual way (especially in the second *Life* of a pair), with a brief account of the *γένος* of his subject. But, as always, the arrangement has more than purely formal significance, for P. here adumbrates three of the major themes of the *Life*: Brutus the tyrannicide, Brutus the philosopher, and Brutus the superior in virtue to Cassius, his friend and partner. And because a pair of *Lives* is an artistic unity, this section of the *Brutus* has also to be read in the light of the opening of the *Dion* (1.1–4), where P. has established Dio and Brutus as followers of the Academy, exemplars of the Platonic doctrine of the need for philosophers to become statesmen, and possessors of a philosophically balanced character (*Brut.* 1.3 picks up *Dion* 1.4). On a more general level, the two *Lives* are of course linked by the common theme of the struggle against tyranny. {The openings of the *Lives* are discussed by P. A. Stadter, *ICS* 13 (1988), 275–95 and T. Duff, *CLAnt* 30 (2011), 213–78 at 216–42. On Brutus’ family and their possible influence on his character, cf. Clarke, *Noblest Roman* 9–11. On P.’s general interest in ancestry and its use to prefigure important themes, see Duff, *Plutarch’s Lives* 310–11.}

1. δέ: the conjunction is used because the *Brutus* is the second *Life* of the pair and pair is regarded as a unity (usually called a *βιβλίον*, as in *Alex.* 1.1, *Dem.* 3.1, *Per.* 2.5, *Demetr.* 1.7, but also *λόγος*, *Dion* 2.7, *Thes.* 1.4, and *γραφή*, *Dion* 1.1), though there are no connectives at the beginnings of the *Romulus*, *Alcibiades*, *Pompey*, *Caesar*, *Antony*, and *Marius*. In the case of the *Caesar* the explanation no doubt is that the beginning of the *Life* has been lost (so, rightly, Niebuhr and many editors; Ziegler; C. B. R. Pelling, *CQ* n.s. 23 [1973], 343 ff.; J. Briscoe, *CR* n.s. 27 [1977], 177–8; *contra*, wrongly, R. Flacelière, Budé ed. of *Alexander and Caesar*, 130). In the case of the *Antony* the asyndeton might be justified after *Demetr.* 53.10. The other examples may be explained as signs of haste in | composition (a frequent phenomenon in the *Lives*, if the *MSS* have reported the matter correctly.

2

ἦν: polemical and emphatic: P. will discuss the problem of Brutus’ ancestry on his father’s side at 1.6–8, but he is not going to weaken the force of the tyrannical *διαδοχή* by raising the question at the very beginning of the *Life*. As in other accounts of Brutus his alleged descent from the first consul is an important theme in P.’s *Life*, implicit here, explicit at 9.5–8, 10.6, and 22.4 (even though P. has misunderstood the point of Brutus’ remark in *Ad Brut.* 1.17 [26].6), and rightly seen as a prime cause of Brutus’ joining the plot against Caesar. (Cf. on 9.5–8 below.)

Ἰούλιος Βρούτος: the historicity of the great hero of the Roman Republic is debated (for: Broughton I, 1, Ogilvie 216 f.; against: Schur, *RE*

Suppl. 5.359, Gjerstad, *Legends and Facts of Early Roman History* [1962] 45 f. See now J. Gagé, *La chute des Tarquins et les débuts de la république* [1976]; {A. Mastrocinque, *Lucio Giunio Bruto* (1988); K. Welwei, ‘Lucius Iunius Brutus: ein fiktiver Revolutionsheld’, in K.-J. Hölkeskamp and E. Stein-Hölkeskamp, edd., *Von Romulus zu Augustus* (2000), 49–57; and T. P. Wiseman, *Unwritten Rome* (2008), 293–305, who attempts to disentangle the various stages in the development of the legend}). P., hardly to his discredit, has no doubts.

ἀνέστησαν: ζ has ἔστησαν but the majority MSS verdict is supported by the unchallenged ἀνιστάσιν of *De superst.* 170E. The pure Attic idiom is the simple form (e.g. D. 13.21, 19.261, Pl. *Phdr.* 236b, Arist. *Rh.* 1410a 33). The use of compound instead of simple verbs—sometimes, as here, with little or no increase in precision—is a characteristic of P.’s style, as of later Greek prose in general. Nor was P. interested in attaining the standards of pure Attic idiom (cf. on 6.9 below).

Καπιτωλίω: Καπι- here, but Καπε- at (e.g.) 18.7 and 9 below. The MSS in P. veer between the two without consistency. In such cases it is idle to try to determine which | form P. himself used. He may not have bothered with such questions of orthography himself. In any case he may have used scribes to transmit his work to writing.

The statue was a famous one, mentioned also by Suet. *Caes.* 80.3, Plin. *NH* 33.9, 33.24, 34.22 f., Plin. *Iun. Paneg.* 55.6, Dio 43.45.4 and 44.12.3. P. is the only authority to give the detail ἐσπασμένον ξίφος—perhaps from autopsy (cf. his descriptions of the statues of Marius, *Mar.* 2.1, and Sulla, *Sulla* 2.1; and for his use of statue evidence in general see A. E. Wardman, ‘Description of Personal Appearance in Plutarch and Suetonius: The Use of Statues as Evidence’, *CQ* n.s. 17 [1967], 414–20, cf. *Plutarch’s Lives*, 140–44; B. Bucher-Isler, *Norm und Individualität in den Biographen Plutarchs* [1972], *passim*; F. E. Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled* [1977], 252 f. and n. 11); {and J. Mossman in M. A. Flower and M. Toher, *Georgica: Greek Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell*, *BICS* Supp. 58 (1991), 98–119}. For the celebrated bronze head of L. Brutus in the Capitoline Museum see W. Helbig, *Führer durch die öffentlichen Sammlungen klassischer Altertümer in Rom* (4th ed. 1963), II, no. 1449; {good illustration in A. Schwarzmaier, *Antike Welt* 2010 (1), 32–33}.

The statue on the Capitol voted by the senate to Caesar in 45 B.C. was set up beside Brutus’ (Dio 43.45.4, cf. Cic. *Deiot.* 33, Suet. *Caes.* 76.1, 80.3)—something which Dio finds hard to understand. (On the significance of this provocative act see Weinstock 145ff.; {J. deRose Evans, *Opuscula Romana* 18 [1990], 99–105}). Dio also surmises that the setting up of Caesar’s statue beside Brutus’ was the chief factor in M. Brutus’ decision to plot against Caesar—an exaggeration not entirely consistent with his own narrative (44.12), though it may have been one of the many factors at work (cf. on 9.5ff.). {On the importance of statues for M. Brutus’ public image see M. Lentano, *Latomus* 67 (2008), 881–99.}

οἱ πάλοι Ῥωμαῖοι: deliberately vague. Brutus' statue was set up in the third century B.C. or later (Weinstock 145f. with references): P. can hardly be expected to know this.

μέσον τῶν βασιλέων: not literally true (see Dio), but the | point is rhetorical, almost as if Brutus was laying about the *reges* with his sword. Cic. *Deiot.* 33 ('te in invidia esse, tyrannum existimari, statua inter reges posita animos hominum vehementer offensos') is equally imprecise about the location of Caesar's statue to similar flamboyant effect.

ὡς ... καταλύσαντα Τ.: a gloss on ἀσπασμένον ξίφος. The drawn sword was a characteristic symbol of the tyrannicide (see Weinstock 146) and here the Greek *exemplum* is clear, especially as Brutus did not actually kill Tarquin. Cf. further 18.7 below.

καταλύσαντα: the regular term for overthrowing an established government or person in authority (*Alex.* 1.1, *Caes.* 28.1, *Sulla* 6.9, *Per.* 6.3, *Gracchi* 19.3, 35.3, etc.)

2–3. ἐκείνος μὲν ... οὐτοσί δ': a good example of the way in which P. skilfully reshapes stock material. M. Brutus' alleged descent from the first consul, an important element in the tradition, is given full and appropriate weight, but P. pointedly disagrees with the usual Roman view of the Elder Brutus in order to introduce the theme of the superior philosophical character of the younger. This in turn prompts a further *σύγκρισις*—between M. Brutus and Cassius, who is characterized by association with the Elder Brutus as a man of *θυμός*, and as a tyrannicide whose motivation was not completely pure, and who (by implication) was unable, or unwilling, to restrict himself to the killing of the tyrant alone (thus P. prepares for 18.3–6 below). The manner in which these major themes are brought out is extremely adroit.

The use of the *σύγκρισις*-technique is fundamental to P.'s art in the *Lives*. On the *σύγκρισις*-technique in general see F. Focke, *Hermes* 58 (1923), 327 ff. On the *Comparisons* in P. see Ziegler 909f. S. Constanza, 'La syncrisis nello schema biographico | di Plutarco', *Messana* 4 (1955), 127–56; H. Erbse, 'Die Bedeutung der Synkrisis in den Parallelbiographen Plutarchs', *Hermes* 84 (1956), 398–424; Wardman 234–44; {P. Stadter, *GRBS* 16 (1975), 77–85, repr. in Scardigli, *Essays* 155–64; C. Pelling, in F. E. Brenk and I. Gallo, ed., *Miscellanea Plutarchea* (1986), 83–96, repr. in Pelling, *Plutarch and History* 349–64; Pelling, *Antony* 18–26 and *Caesar* 25–35; Moles, *Cicero* 19–26; Duff, *Plutarch's Lives*, index s.v. 'Synkrisis'; N. Humble, ed., *Plutarch's Lives: Parallelism and Purpose* (2010)}.

The formal comparisons are examples of a type of elementary rhetorical exercises practised in the schools—*προγύμνασμα* (see Hermogenes, pp. 18ff. Rabe; Quint. 2.4.21. Their rhetorical character is well emphasized by Ziegler 909). On the modern reader at any rate they do not make a very favourable impression. Only rarely do they add to the information given in

the main narrative (as e.g. *Comparison of Nicias and Crassus* 2.3. On the other hand, the final section of the *Comparison of Dion and Brutus* [5.2–4], reminiscent in tone of *Cic.* 49.5, is certainly revealing as P.'s last word on Brutus, and picks up a theme of great significance in the *Life* [*Brut.* 50.7–9, 53.1–3, 53.4]). And although they are integral to the whole conception of the *Lives* (so Erbse—Ziegler does not regard them as so important), by their very nature they involve juggling with a limited range of arguments in essentially sophistic style. P. is simply not a very successful performer in this type of genre and his efforts seem forced and tedious by contrast with the easy virtuosity of a Dio Chrysostom or even an Aelius Aristides. Nonetheless, *Comparisons* are important as showing the extent to which the mature P., who has supposedly 'outgrown his early rhetorical training, and ... come to despise the rhetorical excesses which he himself once practised' (Hamilton xxiii), is still heavily influenced by rhetorical and sophistic tradition (on the general point see D. A. Russell, *JRS* 62 [1972], 227; J. L. Moles, *JHS* 98 [1978], 8of.). Much more interesting, however, is P.'s use of synkristic technique within the *Lives* themselves. For example in the *Fabius Maximus* the cautious hero is contrasted successively | with C. Flaminius (2.3ff.), Minucius, his Master of Horse (5.5ff.), Terentius Varro (14.2ff.), all of whom meet disaster through their rashness, Claudius Marcellus (19.1ff.), whose boldness complements Fabian tactics perfectly, and Scipio Africanus (25.1ff.), who outshines Fabius himself. The technique helps to illustrate Fabius' character, both his virtues and his shortcomings. Similarly in the *Pericles* Pericles is compared to and contrasted with Cimon (9.2), Tolmides (18.2), and Thucydides, son of Melesias (14). Essentially the same technique, though less elaborate, can be seen at work in such lives as the *Marius*, *Lysander*, *Aristides*, *Nicias*, and *Antony* (on all this see Russell, *G&R* 15 [1966], 15off. He concludes that 'Σύγκρισις is a key idea for the understanding of Plutarch's purpose and methods of arrangement. Nor is it fanciful to see in his style, with its innumerable comparisons of μέν ... δέ sentences, the same tendency in a more microscopic field.' {See also Duff, *Plutarch's Lives* 251–2 and index, s.v. 'synkrisis: internal'.}

In the *Brutus* P. makes great play of the difference in character between Brutus and Cassius (1.4, 7.1–5, 8.5–7, 9.5–6, 16.4, 20.1, 28.3–6, 29.2–7, 30.2, 30.3–4, 32.3–4, 35, 39.7–8, 40.1–2, 46.3, cf. *Comp.* 1.2–3). Such an elaborate and sustained σύγκρισις is without real parallel in the *Lives*. The explanation for it lies partly in P.'s obviously deep interest in the character of Cassius, evident also in the *Crassus*, where Cassius plays a disproportionately important role (cf. 7.3 below and n.). To a considerable extent the *Brutus* is 'the story not of one man but of two, Brutus and Cassius' (Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives*, 174). Possibly P. did not think that he had sufficient material on Cassius to justify separate treatment. More likely, he may have felt that the careers of the two men were so closely connected that their characters were best studied in tandem. From | that

point of view the *Brutus* can be regarded as an interesting technical experiment, half-way between the usual form and the *Agis–Cleomenes–Gracchi*.

The Brutus–Cassius *σύγκρισις* is highly illuminating. The dangers as always are clearly oversimplification of character and even downright distortion in the interests of rhetorical contrast, and P. does not avoid them. On the other hand, he is sufficiently honest to record evidence which may implicitly weaken the overriding editorial interpretation, and on one important occasion (9.1–4) he goes out of his way to demonstrate that the usual interpretation of Cassius' motivation is wrong, even though it is very much in line with his own general view. As so often in P. there is a considerable tension between the monumental schema and the details of the narrative. The purposes of the moralist and the devices of the literary artist do not always harmonize with the conscientiousness of the generally honest historian or the scrupulousness of the generally fair human being.

{On the *σύγκρισις* see further E. Rawson, *Past Perspectives* (1986), 113–4 and 117–9 = *Roman Culture and Society* (1991), 500–502, 505–7 ('almost a double life'): she finds some basis for the characteristics P. highlights in contemporary, especially Ciceronian, evidence. See also Scardigli in Scardigli–Affortunati, 17–20.}

2. τὰ ψυχρήλατα τῶν ξιφῶν: the image springs naturally from the references in 1 to a bronze statue and drawn sword, and is maintained by *σκληρόν* and *οὐ μαλακόν* (cf. e.g. *Dion* 7.5–6, *Numa* 8.1). It also looks forward to the idea of 'mixing' at 1.3 (for the association of ideas cf. *De def. orac.* 436A, *Lyc.* 16.3). P. is perhaps still playing with it in his characterization of Brutus as *ἀπλοῦς* and *καθαρός* in 1.4 (terms that can be used of pure, unalloyed metals).

P. uses the same phrase in *De def. orac.* 434A, quoting A. fr. 356N (= fr. 356R). The point of the simile is that 'cold-forged' metal is hard and unyielding. Cf. A. Neuberger, *The Technical Arts and Sciences of the Ancients* (1930), 50: 'Water drawn from a very cold stream and used immediately for tempering would produce harder and more brittle steel than water from a warmer source'; Plu. *De def. orac.* | 436C, quoting *Od.* 9.393 (one of many references in P.). The interpretation offered by Ath. 11.501B is unhelpful, as are also the comments of Casaubon and Schweighäuser *ad loc.* Perrin's translation here ('like the tempered steel of swords') creates exactly the wrong impression. P. is extremely fond of imagery drawn from swords and metal-working: cf. *Quom. adul. ab amico internosc.* 73C–D, *De tuenda san.* 136A–B, *De Pyth. orac.* 395B, *De def. orac.* 434A, 436A–C, *De cohib. ira* 458E, *De vit. pud.* 530E, *De sera num. vind.* 556C, *Quaest. conviv.* 622D, 625C, 660C, 693A, 712B, 734A, *Amat.* 752D–E, 762C, *De facie in orbe lunae* 943D, *De primo frigido* 946C, 954C, *Lyc.* 9.3, 16.3, *Numa* 8.1, *Dion* 7.5–6, *Alc.* 6.7, *Pomp.* 8.6, and in general see F. Fuhrmann, *Les Images de Plutarque* (1964), 86–88, 187.

σκληρόν: similarly D.H. 5.8ff. describes Junius Brutus' behaviour as ἔργα μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστά ... σκληρὰ ... τοῖς Ἑλλησι. This of course does not indicate that P. is following Dionysius: the epithet is a natural one (Val. Max. 5.8.1 talks of Brutus' *severitas*).

φύσεως ... ἦθος: here, as at 1.3 below, the distinction between ἦθος ('acquired character') and φύσις ('innate character') is quite clear. It is not always so in P. (cf. *Arat.* 49.1, *Comparison of Cimon and Lucullus* 1.4, and Russell, *G&R* 13 [1966] 147, n. 2). It is assumed here that ἦθος can be changed for the better, whereas it seems that there was nothing much L. Brutus could have done about the *σκληρότης* of his φύσις. I do not intend to discuss the question to what extent P. conceived of character as static, since it is not directly relevant to the *Brutus* (though it might have been, had P. chosen to *emphasize* the deterioration of Brutus' character which is certainly implied by the narrative at 45.4, 45.6–9, and 46.1–5 below). On the question see e.g. F. Leo, *Die griechisch-römische | Biographie* (1901), 188; A. Dihle, *Studien zur griechischen Biographie* (1956), 160; D. R. Stuart, *Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography* (1928), 121ff., H. Erbse, *Hermes* 70 (1952), 400, n. 1, V. Cilento, *Trasposizioni dell' Antico* (1961), 108, Russell, *art. cit.*, 139–54, esp. 146, Hamilton xxxviii–xxxix, Flacelière, Budé ed. of *Pyrrhus–Marius*, 17–18, Bucher-Isler 79–80, Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives*, 132–40, Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 176–81; {C. Gill, *CQ* 33 (1983), 469–87; S. Swain, *Phoenix* 43 (1989), 62–8; Duff, *Plutarch's Lives* 72–78}. Certainly ἦθος can change (e.g. *Alex.* 52.7, *Alc.* 2.1, *Sert.* 10.5–7, *De sera num. vind.* 551E, 559C, *Quaest. conviv.* 620D, *Praec. ger. reip.* 799B). The possibility of some change of φύσις appears to be conceded in *De sera num. vind.* 551D (though it is 'unnatural' because God makes a rich endowment of goodness at birth), *Praec. ger. reip.* 799B, *Comparison of Cimon and Lucullus* 1.4. Of course the distinction between ἦθος and φύσις is often blurred: that may indicate careless use of terminology, but it also raises the possibility that the distinction is not always felt to be hard and fast.

ὑπὸ λόγου: Perrin's 'by letters' is quite incorrect: it is the λόγος of philosophy ('reason') that is meant. Cf. *λόγῳ διὰ φιλοσοφίας* (1.3).

ἄχρη ... ἐξώκειλε: 'he ran aground to the point of children-slaying'. The violent switch of imagery suits the violence of the θυμός in question. The image is a great favourite of P.'s: e.g. *Quaest. conviv.* 654E, *De facie in orbe lunae* 940F, *De soll. anim.* 985C, *Luc.* 38.3, *Mar.* 2.4, 45.10, *Timol.* 36.8. In the *Lives* it is used in circumstances where some emotion has got out of control, as here. P.'s partiality for the image was evidently appreciated by the writer of the *De liberis educandis* (5B). For a similar image cf. *De fort. Rom.* 319F.

On P.'s use of nautical imagery see Fuhrmann 49–50. One of his more striking achievements in this area is the image of 46.4–5 | below.

τυράνων: the standard Greek view of the Tarquins (e.g. *Publ.* 2.1, D.H. 5.2). On the Hellenization of the character of Tarquin see Ogilvie 195.

P.'s portrayal of L. Junius Brutus here is worth comparing with his verdict at *Publ.* 6.5–6, where after much soul-searching he suppresses his own natural feelings (*ἀσθένεια τοῦ κρίνοντος*) and decides to follow Roman opinion in commending Brutus. It appears from this passage that what troubled P. was not so much the *fact* of L. Brutus' execution of his sons, but rather the *manner* in which Brutus reacted to it: his verdict follows hard on a description that emphasizes Brutus' pitilessness (6.4–5). Consistent with this is his approval of Timoleon for murdering his brother (*Timol.* 4.4–5, 5.1–2, cf. *Comp.* 2.11), his evident appreciation of M. Brutus' sentiments in *Ad Brut.* 1.17 [26].6 (22.4 below) and his refusal to accept that he was wrong to kill his *φίλος* Caesar (*Comp.* 3.6): on the contrary that was an argument for Brutus' disinterested motives. If L. Brutus' behaviour was to be praised there were two possible ways of doing it: (i) by arguing that he selflessly put country before family at the cost of great personal anguish (so Livy 2.5.8 'inter omne tempus pater voltusque et os eius spectaculo esset eminente animo patrio inter publicae poenae ministerium'); (ii) by representing him as successfully repressing his natural emotions in splendid Stoic style (so D.H. 5.8.6). It is the second procedure that P. charitably inclines to in the *Publicola* (6.5). But he emphatically rejects the Stoic line in the *Brutus* and goes even further: instead of representing the difference between L. and M. Brutus as a difference between Stoicism and Academicism he represents it starkly as a conflict between simple barbarous *θυμός* and civilized (and Hellenic) *λόγος*. This of course has certain formal advantages for P. in the *Brutus*: it introduces the philosophical theme of passion versus reason and it helps to emphasize the *mediocritas* of M. Brutus the Academic, while playing down his Stoic affiliations. (Later, of course, P. does describe Brutus in rather Stoic terms, e.g. 29.3, 50.5, but at the beginning of the *Life* he is keen to establish him as an Academic, in the light of his programmatic remarks in *Dion* 1.1–2. {S. Swain, *Hermes* 118 (1990), 202–3 agrees on the importance of Platonism as a linking theme with *Dion*, but concludes that '[w]hile Plutarch certainly underplays Brutus' Stoicism, he does not overplay his Platonism'.}) But P. is not merely manipulating his verdict to suit his present theme. Although in the *Publicola* he finally adopts the Stoic solution by approving L. Brutus' *ἀπάθεια*, he also emphasizes his *ὀργή*, and anger is pre-eminently the passion upon which civilizing *λόγος* has to be brought to bear (cf. the *De cohibenda ira* 452F–464D, *passim*).

Furthermore, it was his considered view that Stoic *ἀπάθεια* was both impossible (e.g. *De profect. in virt.* 83E, cf. *Publ.* 6.5, *De virt. mor.* 443C, 452B, *Stoic. absurd. poet. dic.* 1057D) and undesirable (*De virt. mor.* 443C), since removal of the passions would blunt the reason (*De virt. mor.* 452B). On this see Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme* (1969), 321ff., and his edition of the *De virtute morali* (Paris, 1969); {M. Spanneut in *ANRW* II.36.7 (1994), 4704–7; J. Opsomer in Beck, *Companion* 96; but J. Dillon, 'Plutarch the philosopher and Plutarch the historian on *apatheia*', in J. Opsomer, G. Roskam, and F.

B. Titchener, ed., *A Versatile Gentleman: Consistency in Plutarch's Writing* (Festschrift van der Stockt, 2016), 9–15, stresses that P.'s views on ἀπάθεια can vary in different works}. In general, Stoic ἀπάθεια could easily be attacked as callous insensitivity (cf. *Publ.* 6.5 *θηριώδες*). Thus although to a certain extent P. tailors his judgement of L. Brutus to suit the different requirements of the two contexts, the discrepancy is less great than it appears at first sight. Both passages reflect P.'s deep-rooted unease at Stoic ἀπάθεια as he understood it.

3. οὐτοςί: picking up Μάρκου ... Βρούτου. Although Μάρκου ... Βρούτου is the more remote of the two elements in position, it is the nearer in time and much the more important. This use of οὐτος according to sense rather than position is very common. In any case P. immediately makes himself absolutely clear by a qualifying clause. |

12 **ὑπὲρ οὗ ... ταῦτα:** a qualifying clause of a type often used by P. to bring the discussion back to the subject of the *Life* (cf. e.g. *Aem.* 2.5, *Sert.* 1.8, *Fab. Max.* 1.3, *Coriol.* 1.3, *Cic.* 1.5, *Agis* 3.3, *Gracchi* 1.7). The practice is an indication (were one needed) that the cross-references between *Lives* would have come naturally to him.

παιδεία καὶ λόγῳ: on the need for παιδεία and λόγος for the formation of a suitably balanced character see esp. *Timol.* 6.1 ff., *Themist.* 2.7, *Coriol.* 1.3, 15.4, *Numa* 3.7, *Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa* 4.9, *Marc.* 22.10, *Arat.* 10.5, *Dion* 9.1, 10.1. A closely related theme is the need for Hellenic humanity and civilization to offset the potential barbarism of Rome. This is implicit here and at *Numa* 3.7, and explicit at e.g. *Galba* 1, *Coriol.* 1.5–6, *Comparison of Pelopidas and Marcellus* 1, *Comparison of Numa and Lycurgus* 4, *Mar.* 2.2–4. It is fashionable to deny P. any civilizing political purpose in writing the *Lives* (so e.g. R. H. Barrow, *Plutarch and his Times* [1967], 57–9, C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* [1971], 103–9), but perverse: although the message is tactfully put across, it is there for those who are willing to see it (cf. e.g. Russell, *G&R* 13 [1966] 141 [= Scardigli, *Essays* 78], *JRS* 62 [1972], 227, *Plutarch* [1972], 98). Acquaintance with Greek culture in always noted with approval: *Marc.* 1.3, *Luc.* 1.4, *Aem.* 6.8–10, *Mar.* 29.12, *Gracchi* 40.2, while P. is relatively uninterested in the achievements of Romans in their own culture. Cf. 2.5 below; {C. Pelling in M. Griffin and J. Barnes, ed., *Philosophia Togata* I (1989), 199–232; and esp. S. Swain, *JHS* 100 (1990), 126–45 [= Scardigli, *Essays* 229–64] and *Hermes* 118 (1990), 192–203}.

διά: 'by means of', 'by the agency of', a common enough usage in P.

φιλοσοφίας: the Platonic doctrine (e.g. *R.* 5.473C–D, 6.487E, 499B, 501E, *Lg.* 4.712A, *Ep.* 7.326A, 325D) that statesmen should be philosophers and vice-versa is of course fundamental to P.'s conception in the *Dion-Brutus*, and is constantly invoked throughout his works. Cf. e.g. (in addition to the references | quoted above, all more or less relevant) *Numa* 20.8–9, *Philop.* 1.3, 4.6, *Septem sapi. conv.* 151E, *Maxime cum princ. phil. diss.*, *passim*, *Ad*

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princ. inerud., passim, An seni sit ger. resp. 796Dff., *De Stoic. repugn.* 1033A–F, etc., etc. Of course philosophy can be undertaken in the wrong spirit (*Dion* 11.1, 16.1–2, 18.5, cf. below 34.4 on Favonius), while Stoicism was a philosophy that might be dangerous for ‘great natures’ (*Cleom.* 2.6). And Epicureanism is vehemently attacked by P. in political contexts because of the doctrine of non-involvement. In the *Brutus* this is not a criticism that could be levelled at Cassius, but P. still manages to get in a gratuitous (and unfair) swipe at the inadequacy of Cassius’ philosophy (39.6 below), even though he uses Cassius as his mouthpiece in *ch.* 37, and is aware that Cassius took his philosophy seriously and sincerely.

καταμείξας ... κραθῆναι: for the idea that the properly constituted character consists of a good ‘mix’ cf. e.g. *Galba* 1, *Arat.* 4.1, *Coriol.* 15.4, *Numa* 3.7, *Timol.* 3.5, *Aem.* 22.6. For the dangers of ‘unmixed’ characters cf. e.g. *Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa* 1.9, *Dion* 12.2, *Mar.* 2.1, *Coriol.* 1.4, *Nic.* 9.1 (more examples in Holden’s *Sulla*, 59). A good ‘mix’ is achieved when reason tempers and harmonizes (but does not suppress) the irrational, cf. *De virt. mor.* 443C–444C, and the *De virtute morali* and *De cohibenda ira* in general, and see Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme* 318–33; {Duff, *Plutarch’s Lives* 91–4; J. Opsomer in Beck, *Companion* 95–8}.

ἐμβριθῆ: Perrin’s ‘sedate’ is inappropriate to the context, for it implies that Brutus was rather slow by nature. Although *ἐμβριθής* can have such connotations (cf. Pl. *Tht.* 144B, where οἱ ἐμβριθέστεροι are contrasted with οἱ ὄξεῖς) it is rarely so used by P. and certainly not here: the whole point of the description is that Brutus’ character was an excellent ‘mix’. Voegelin catches the tone well: ‘indolem significat ratione ita temperatam, ut affectibus numquam nimis turbetur; vertas: gesetz’. | τὸ ἐμβριθές is a key element in P.’s interpretation of Brutus. Dion and Brutus are seen as ἄνδρες ἐμβριθεῖς καὶ φιλόσοφοι καὶ πρὸς οὐδέν ἀκροσφαλεῖς οὐδ’ εὐαλότοι πάθος (*Dion* 2.5). Brutus’ ἐμβριθία is again emphasized at 6.7–8 below and seen in action at 14.6, 15.9, 16.4, and 19.4 below. It is linked with the themes of his immunity to external pressures (6.8), his control over the passions (29.3), his steadiness (29.4), and the consistency of his προαίρεσις (29.4). It is difficult to offer a good rendering of ἐμβριθής in English: ‘weighty’, ‘dignified’, ‘mature’, ‘steady’, ‘steadfast’, ‘unflappable’ are all contained in it. The Latin ‘gravis’ is closely similar (note that Quintilian 12.10.11 singles out *gravitas* as the distinguishing characteristic of Brutus’ oratory). To P. τὸ ἐμβριθές is one of the supreme political virtues. Numerous references include *An seni sit. ger. resp.* 791B, *Non posse suav. vivi* 1097E, *Per.* 4.6, *Arat.* 4.1, *Demetr.* 5.6, *Coriol.* 4.1, 15.4, *Marc.* 28.6, *Alex.* 4.8, *Gracchi* 10.2, *Dion* 11.2, *Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero* 2. Related virtues are βάρως (*Cat. mai.* 1.6, *Per.* 37.1, cf. *De curios.* 522E, *Demetr.* 2.2) and (at a somewhat lower level) κοσμιότης (*Praec. ger. reip.* 800F, 817B, and often in the *Lives*), and σεμνότης (*Praec. ger. reip.* 801D, 813C, 823E and often in the *Lives*). On the other hand βαρύτης seems nearly always to be a pejorative

term (Hamilton 147; *Fab. Max.* 1.4 may be an exception—Coraes' *βραδυτήτα*, printed by Ziegler, is by no means certain). It is hard to document much use of *ἐμβριθεία* and *βάρος* in political ideology before P. By far the most significant reference is Pl. *Ep.* 7.328B, where Dion's *ἦθος* is described as *ἐμβριθές*. This must have influenced P.'s choice of words at *Dion* 2.5 and probably also 11.2, where the reference is immediately followed by a citation of the same passage of the Seventh Letter. ¹⁵ *Ἐμβριθεία* seems also to be found in an inscription from Priene in the second century B.C. (*Inscr. Prien.* 108.65). The use of *βάρος* in Plb. 4.32.7 and D.S. 19.70 is not really comparable to P.'s. The whole concept obviously fits well within the frame of two of P.'s most central concerns: the control of the emotions, and the contrast between the steadiness of the statesman and the inconsistency of the demagogue. In origin it seems to be Platonic, though one may suspect the influence of the Roman concept of *gravitas*. The emphasis P. puts upon it seems greater than in any earlier writer.

Τὸ ἐμβριθές is also linked with *πραότης* in *Coriol.* 15.4 (below).

πραεῖαν: 'gentle', 'mild'. *Πραότης* is also one of the cardinal virtues in P., particularly in a political context. Although none of the ideas implied by it are in any way profound or difficult to grasp, the whole concept is so basic to P.'s ethical and political thought that it seems worth analysing it in a little more detail.

In philosophical terms *πραότης* is one of the supreme virtues, to be contrasted with the elemental passions (*ἀγριότης*: Pl. *Smph.* 197D, *ὀργιλότης*: Arist. *EN* 1125b26, *ὀργή*: *Rh.* 1380a6). So in P. *πραότης* is defined as *ἀναληγσίας καὶ ὠμότητος μεσότης* (*De virt. mor.* 445A) and is to be used for softening and controlling the *πάθη* (e.g. *De profect. in virt.* 83E <έν> *ἐνδόσει* ... *καὶ πραότητι παθῶν ἢ προκοπή*) It can be opposed to *θυμός* (*De cohib. ira* 458C, *Fab. Max.* 9.1, cf. the present passage), *ὀργή* (*De cohib. ira* 461A, *Philop.* 3.1), *τὸ θηριῶδες* (*De soll. anim.* 959F), *σκληρότης* (*Lyc.* 11.7, cf. the present passage), excessive ambition (*Comparison of Aristides and Cato Maior* 5.4, *Philop.* 3.1), *ὠμότης* (*Art.* 30.9), excessive indulgence in 'the pleasures' (*Alex.* 4.8). ¹⁶ It is a general term of approbation of personal manner and behaviour | (*De frat. am.* 489C, *Consol. ad ux.* 608D, *Praec. ger. reip.* 800C, *Lyc.* 11.6, 23.2, 28.13, *Themist.* 3.3, *Arist.* 23.1, *Luc.* 2.1, *Fab. Max.* 1.4, 7.7, *Art.* 2.1, *Pyrrh.* 8.8, *Gracchi* 2.2, *Cat. min.* 14.4 etc. etc.), and a general term of approbation in political contexts (e.g. *De cap. ex inim. util.* 86B, *De fort. Alex.* 332C–D, *De tranq. animi* 468F, *De frat. am.* 489D, *Cimon* 3.1, 5.5, 16.3, *Luc.* 4.1, *Per.* 2.5, *Galba* 3, *Dion* 13.3, *Timol.* 3.4, 37.5, *Agis–Cleom.* 20.5, *Gracchi* 9.2, *Cic.* 6.1, *Sert.* 11.2, 25.6). *Τὸ ἐμβριθές* and *πραότης* are the two supreme virtues of statecraft (*Coriol.* 15.4; cf. *Philop.* 3.1 etc) and the need for *πραότης* in the exercise of power is heavily stressed throughout P.'s work (*De cohib. ita* 459C, *De laude ips.* 543D, *De sera num. vind.* 551F, *Praec. ger. reip.* 800B, 808D, 809E, 810E, 815A, 819B, 824D, cf. more generally *Ad princ. inerud.* 781A, *Numa* 20.4, *Art.* 1.1, 30.2, *An seni sit ger. resp.* 788C, *Numa* 6.4). Tyrants do not

have it (*De sera num. vind.* 551F, cf. *Dion* 13.3)—a deliberately paradoxical contradiction in terms, *Pyrrh.* 23.3, and often by implication). It is particularly important in the treatment of subjects, enemies, conquered individuals or peoples, and in the allocation of punishment (*De fort. Alex.* 337B, *De sera num. vind.* 550F—of God, 551C, *Fab. Max.* 20.1, 21.3, 22.8, *Nic.* 27.5, *Arat.* 10.2, *Pomp.* 33.2, 39.6, *Pelop.* 26.8, *Dion* 47.5, *Demetr.* 44.7, *Pyrrh.* 11.8, *Flam.* 21.2, *Caes.* 15.4), often approximating closely to *clementia*. It is linked with other key personal and political virtues such as *φιλανθρωπία* (*De fort. Alex.* 332C–D, *De cohib. ira* 464D, *Consol. ad ux.* 608D, *Ad princ. inerud.* 781A, *de esu carniūm* 996A, *Arist.* 23.1, *Cimon* 6.2, *Fab. Max.* 22.8, *Art.* 30.2, *Galba* 1.3, *Pyrrh.* 11.8, *Mar.* 8.2, *Agis–Cleom.* 20.5, *Philop.* 3.1, etc.), *μετριότης* (*De tranq. anim.* 468F, *An seni sit ger. resp.* 788C, *Per.* 39.4, *Nic.* 27.5, etc.), *ἐπιείκεια* (*Quaest. conviv.* 729E, *de invidia et odio* 537D, *Per.* 39.1, *Fab. Max.* 30.2, *Art.* 4.4, *Pyrrh.* 8.8, 23.3, *Caes.* 15.4, *Sert.* | 25.6, etc.). P. correctly regards it as a distinctively Hellenic virtue (*Marc.* 3.6, and often by implication). By far his greatest emphasis is on *πραότης* as a quality of the ruler, though it can also be a quality of the ruled (*Galba* 1.3, *Ages.* 2.2). Only occasionally is there any implication that *πραότης* can lead to weakness (*de invidia et odio* 537D, *Lyc.* 5.9, cf. *Cic.* 20.3, *Aem.* 3.7). 17

For the importance of *πραότης* in the *Lives* see further H. Martin Jr., ‘The concept of *Praotes* in Plutarch’s *Lives*’, *GRBS* 3 (1960), 65–73; as a political virtue much canvassed in P.’s own time: L. Robert, *Hellenica* 13 (1965), 223; cf. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*, 114 and n. 34; and as an imperial attribute: e.g. D. Chr. 1.20, 1.40, 2.26, 2.74.

In the present passage the description of Brutus’ character as *πρᾶος* emphasizes the contrast between the barbarous first consul and his philosophical and Hellenized descendant, and the central conflict between reason and passion. It strengthens the parallel between Brutus and Dion (described as *πρᾶος* at *Dion* 47.5) and prepares for the *σύγκρισις* between Brutus and Cassius, who was decidedly not *πρᾶος*. Brutus’ *πραότης* is also singled out at 29.3 below and illustrated by his government of Cisalpine Gaul (6.10), his personal charm (6.12), his insistence on sparing Antony (18.4–5), his treatment of C. Antonius (26.6), his readiness to defer to Cassius (29.1), his distress at the suicidal behaviour of the Lycians (31), his merciful treatment of Patara (32) and his attempt to save his captives (45.4–5). That his *πραότης* could lead to weakness is pointed out by Appian 4.123.518 (cf. on 41.4 below), but suppressed by P., although his narrative at 41.4, and later in his description of the build-up to the second battle of Philippi, does provide the raw material for such a judgement. |

How far P.’s description of Brutus’ character here corresponds to the historical truth will be discussed as the crucial cases arise. 18

ἐπεγείρας ... ὀρμαῖς: reflecting the philosophical doctrine of *De virt. mor.* 444C (the *πάθη* provide the *ὀρμή*: the *πρακτικὸς λόγος* stimulates it to

produce the correct *μεσότητος*), so often referred to in P. There is no implication that Brutus was sluggish by nature, *pace* Perrin.

19 **4. ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀπεχθανομένους:** if P. has anyone specifically in mind, then the generalized form of expression could be explained by the desire to avoid cluttering the stage with too many *dramatis personae* at once (a need to which he is acutely sensitive: cf. 17.2 and n.). Reference to specific individuals at this juncture would certainly weaken the *σύγκρισις* between the Elder and Younger Brutus, and between Brutus and Cassius. But he is aware that Antony, although a *πολέμιος*, did not ‘hate’ Brutus (cf. 18.4–5, 50.4–9, 29.7), and, although he must have been aware that Octavian did, he deliberately plays this down and rather gives the impression of a sort of *post mortem* reconciliation between the two men (53.1–2, *Comp.* 5.1–4). It is more likely that the thought should be seen as part of the important general theme: ‘even his enemies’ respected Brutus. For this see 29.3, 29.7, and, by implication, 4.5, 5.1, 6.2, 18.12, 26.1–2, 50.4–9, 53.1–2, *Comp.* 5.1–4. A common encomiastic *τόπος* (X. *Ages.* 6.8 etc. In P. e.g. *Alc.* 14.1, *Dem.* 12.7), it is used by P. to give shape to the structure of his narrative. It also allows him to take a relatively consistent ideological standpoint: if the monarchists admired Brutus, then it was possible to combine admiration for the great Republican leader with intellectual conviction of the necessity for monarchy (*Brut.* 47.7 etc.; {cf. Pelling in C. Smith and A. Powell, edd., *The Lost Memoirs of Augustus* (2009), 55–6}). The theme is one of several encomiastic elements in the | *Brutus* (cf. esp. *ch.* 29). There is no need to stress here the influence of the rhetorical encomium on *Lives* such as the *Cato minor* or *Timoleon*. The influence of the prose encomium on Greek biography in general is well brought out by Stuart, *Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography*, and A. Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography* (1972).

If, then, the thought here is as general as the expression, it is a little carelessly expressed, conflicting as it does with the idea that Antony and Octavian and their followers did not cherish vindictive feelings towards Brutus, and P. perhaps tacitly corrects his earlier statement at 29.3: *μισεῖσθαι δὲ μηδ’ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων*. Such small carelessnesses indicate the speed with which P. composed his *Lives*. The carelessness will have arisen because the ‘even his enemies’-*τόπος* often does take the form ‘even those who hated him’ (as e.g. *Dem.* 12.7).

Καίσαρα: *Καίσαρ* usually refers to Augustus in P. (e.g. *Cic.* 49.5, *Alex.* 69.9, *Per.* 1.1, *Marc.* 30.10, *Rom.* 17.3), but here it is clear from the context who is meant. When Octavian is introduced he is referred to as *ὁ νέος Καίσαρ* (22.1). Thereafter he becomes *Καίσαρ*. Similarly in the *Alexander–Caesar*: introduced as the Caesar *ὑφ’ οὗ κατελύθη Πομπηίου* (*Alex.* 1.1), Caesar is simply referred to as *Καίσαρ* in his *Life*.

συνωμοσίαν: so also *συνωμόται* (16.3) and *συνωμοσία* (20.2). Why then the qualification *λεγέσθω γὰρ οὕτως* (16.3)? Some scholars (Reiske, Voegelin, Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives*, 193; and others) have felt that P. was reluctant to use so hard a word as ‘conspirators’, either because he was emotionally committed to the cause of the Liberators (Reiske), or (Wardman) because of his general avoidance of unnecessary derogatory comment (in general see Wardman 192–6 and cf. *Crass.* 2.4, *Cimon* 2.4–5, *Aem.* 1.5, *Agis–Cleom.* 37.8 etc.) Reiske offers *Arat.* 38.7 | *εἰ δὲ Κλεομένης ἦν (λεγέσθω γὰρ οὕτως) παράνομος καὶ τυραννικός* as a parallel. But the use of the word *συνωμοσία* at 1.4 and 20.2 tells against *συνωμότης* having any pejorative implication in the *Brutus*. At 1.4 it might conceivably be argued that the word is effectively in indirect speech (what ‘those who hated Brutus’ said, not what P. himself accepts), for in P., as in other subtle and allusive stylists like Sallust and Tacitus, it is often difficult to know where the *oratio* stops and the editorial comment begins (for the problem see 18.3ff. below). No such defence, however, can apply to 20.2: if it is the *oratio* of the conspirators, they ought not to be using self-critical terminology. It is of course true that *συνωμότης* and *συνωμοσία* sometimes have a pejorative tone in P. (e.g. *De sera num. vind.* 556D, *Luc.* 42.6) and P. seems carefully to avoid using them in the *De genio Socratis* (P. H. de Lacy and B. Einarson, Loeb *Moralia* VII [1959] 365, n. c). But they do not always have such a tone (e.g. *De garrul.* 505E of the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, *Mul. virt.* 252D on an equally estimable affair), and it is clear that they do not in the *Brutus*. The correct explanation for *Brut.* 16.3 lies in 12.8 *μηθ’ ὄρκον συνομόσαντες* (I am anticipated in this observation by Schaefer). P., however outlandish some of his etymologies (but on this question see the convincing *apologiae* of F. H. Sandbach, Loeb *Moralia* IX [1961], 231, n. d, 266, n. a), is often alive to the exact meaning of words (cf. on 11.3 and 13.3). Once *συνωμόται* was used at 16.3, P. no longer felt any awkwardness about using *συνωμοσία* at 20.2. The conclusion is that either he did not bother about the linguistic point at 1.4, or (perhaps more likely) he was composing so rapidly that he simply forgot about it until 12.8 (for he could certainly have found some other way of expressing himself at 1.4). If so, another indication of the speed with which he composed the *Brutus*. |

20

One may note that P. uses the words ‘conspiracy’ and ‘conspirators’ also at *Caes.* 62.6, 64.1, 68.6; *Ant.* 13.4; *Cat. min.* 73.6. The first four of these references could be explained away by the ‘hard word’ theory as showing a different ideological perspective from the *Brutus*. This is certainly not true of the last. Note also in the *Brutus* P.’s unabashed use of the words *ἀναίρεσις* (2.4) and *ἐπιβουλή* (9.1), both of which can, but need not, be words of pejorative implication.

21

εἰ: the *εἰ*, going closely with *τι* (= ‘whatever’), does not deny that there was something *γενναῖον* in the *πρᾶξις*.

πρᾶξις: used often by P. (as e.g. in the *De genio Socratis*) for ‘conspiracy’.

δυσχερέστερα: Reiske's suggestion is obviously right. The comparative makes for a better contrast with *εἰ ... τι γενναῖον*, nor does P.'s general attitude to the conspiracy in the *Brutus* allow for the possibility that it had 'very' unpleasant features.

τρέπειν: 'ascribe to', 'put the blame on Cassius for', cf. *Sulla* 24.3 τοῦ πολέμου τὰ μὲν εἰς δαίμονας τρέπειν. The usage is classical (Is. 8.41, D. 8.57)

οἰκέλον: as an *οἰκέλος* of Brutus, Cassius ought, P. feels, to have had a similar character. *οἰκέλον* is explained at 7.1 below, again with the implication that the two men should have been unified in sentiment.

φίλον: the point (similar to that implied by *οἰκέλον*) is that ideally friendship is closely linked with sound character (*Quaest. conviv.* 660A; inspired by Arist. *EN* 1159a33ff.) and dependent upon *ὁμοιότης* (*Quom. adul. ab amico internosc.* 51B, 51E, *de amicorum mult.* 96D, *Praec. ger. reip.* 807C).

ἀπλοῦν ... καὶ καθαρόν: 'simple and pure'. The words have a wide range of application, quite well conveyed by the modern English slang 'straight' and 'clean'. P. is thinking | primarily of difference in motivation—Brutus was 'pure' and 'disinterested' in his purposes (8.6, 18.4, 22.4–6, 28.4–5, 29.4, 29.9–11, etc.), Cassius less so (8.6, 28.4–5, 29.5). This is the verdict of the overriding Brutus–Cassius *σύγκρισις*, but it should be noted that P. is not denying Cassius a certain degree of *ἀπλότης* and *καθαριότης* (*οὐχ ὁμοίως*). P. may also have in mind specifically Brutus' financial probity, as opposed to Cassius' greed, since *καθαρός* is often used in this sense, and it is possible that P.'s imagination is still toying with metal-working imagery (1.2 n. above), although this must be subordinate to the main point.

Dion is also *ἀπλοῦς* (*Dion* 8.3). For *καθαριότης* as a cardinal political virtue in P.'s own day cf. *Praec. ger. reip.* 800C, E; and see A. Wilhelm, *JÖAI* 17 (1914), 36, 120; Robert, *Hellenica* 4 (1948), 38–41.

5. Σερβιλία: *RE* 2A. 1817 ff. (Münzer).

Ἄλαν: Cobet suggested *Ἄαλαν* but *Ἄλαν* is unchallenged at D.H. 4.5 and P. seems to have been working from Dionysius here (below). The etymology of the *cognomen* given by Dionysius (12.4.5 *τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὸν Ἄλαν αὐτῷ τεθῆναι λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ξίφος ἔχων ὑπὸ μάλης ἦλθεν ... ἄλας γὰρ καλοῦσι Ῥωμαῖοι τὰς μάλας*), though obvious, may not in fact be correct, but the Latin meaning was obviously exploited to provide an aetiological myth (see Ogilvie 555).

For the alleged conspiracy of Sp. Maelius in 440–439 B.C. the sources are: D.H. 12.1–4, Livy 4.12–16, Val. Max. 5.3.2, Quint. 5.9.13, 13.24, *De vir. ill.* 17.5, cf. Cic. *Pro Mil.* 72, *Lael.* 36, *In Cat.* 1.3, *De rep.* 2.49. See Münzer *RE* 2A, 1768; and Ogilvie 550ff; {and A. Drummond, *CAH* VII.2 (1989), 183}. According to the account favoured by Dionysius (12.2) Ahala was the Master of Horse of the dictator Cincinnatus. He approached Maelius in the forum and bade him stand trial, but Maelius ran away | and was

killed—apparently not by Ahala. Livy’s account is essentially the same as Dionysius’, but he does make Ahala slay Maelius. Dionysius also records the version (which he regards as ὁ δοκῶν ἦντον εἶναι πιθανὸς λόγος, 12.4.2) of L. Cincius Alimentus and L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, in which information was laid in the Senate against Maelius, and Ahala, a private individual, was chosen to assassinate him. Parallelism of detail and perhaps of wording (?) indicate that P. is working from Dionysius’ paraphrase of these early Roman authorities.

M. Brutus was already linked with L. Brutus and C. Servilius Ahala as early as 59 in connexion with the notorious ‘Vettius affair’ (on which see W. C. McDermott, *TAPA* 80 (1949), 351ff.; W. Allen, *TAPA* 81 (1950), 153ff.; L. R. Taylor, *Historia* 1 (1950), 45ff.; R. J. Rowland, *Historia* 15 (1966), 217ff.; {A. W. Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence* (2008), 173–5}. Vettius tried to implicate Cicero by quoting his remark ‘Aham Servilium aliquem aut Brutum opus esse reperiri’ (*ad Att.* 2.24 [44].3). Early in 46 in the *Brutus* (97.331) Cicero exhorted Brutus to be worthy of his ancestors, L. Brutus and Servilius Ahala (and kill Caesar—so, rightly, J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Historia* 7 [1958], 91). In *ad Att.* 13.40 [343].1 (c. 17 August, 45) he laments Brutus’ naïveté in supposing that Caesar has joined the ‘boni’ and continues: ‘Ubi igitur φιλοτέχνημα illud tuum, quod vidi in Parthenone, Aham et Brutum?’ (At Brutus’ request Atticus had compiled a pedigree of the Junii from their origin down to his own time, complete with the parentage of each member of the family, the offices they had held, and their dates: *Nepos, Att.* 18.3 {with N. Horsfall’s comm. [1989] *ad loc.*}). In an attempt to rebut Antony’s accusation that he was responsible for the assassination of Caesar, he points out that Brutus had *imagines* of L. Brutus and Ahala in his house (*Phil.* 2.26 ‘Brutos ego impellerem, quorum uterque L. Bruti imaginem cotidie videret, alter etiam Ahalae?’). (For full references to Brutus’ ancestors see Gelzer | 988). At what period Brutus first took a strong interest in his family tree is a matter of controversy, and depends partly on the dating of coins struck by Brutus in Rome with L. Brutus on the obverse and Ahala on the reverse, and with *Libertas* on the obverse and L. Brutus on the reverse. The dating of Babelon (Iunii 30–32) to the period late 44, when Brutus was in Macedonia, is immediately excluded by the fact that the coins were struck in Rome. A dating of c. 60/59 is favoured by Grueber 1.479f., Sydenham 150, and Broughton II, 442, creating a pleasing synchronization with Brutus’ possible (? probable) involvement in the conspiracy of 59. But the most recent and (in my opinion) most persuasive discussion, that of Crawford I, 88 and 455–6, puts the coins in 54, linking them with the opposition to Pompey and his proposed dictatorship (for references see Crawford 455–6). In either case *ad Att.* 2.24 [44].3, written before Cicero became friends with Brutus, strongly suggests that Brutus was already highly conscious of his ancestry in 59.

Μαίλιου: verifiable from Livy 4.13.14. The *MSS* Μαλλίου is the choice also of most D.H. *MSS*.

προσνεύσαντα ... ἀπέκτεινε: an impressively crisp finish to the sentence.

It is worth pointing out that P. is the only narrative source to mention Brutus' descent from Ahala. His source? He was familiar with much of Cicero's correspondence, as well as with the *Second Philippic*. If the parallels between his account and Dionysius are indeed an indication that he used Dionysius, this would mean that, having come across a reference in Cicero, he then took the trouble to research it more fully.

25 **6. οἱ διὰ τὸν Καίσαρος φόνον ...:** elegant variation on the phraseology of 1.4. Of course it was not just those who hated M. Brutus who disputed the claim, but by restricting the dissent to that category P. means to strengthen his own case in favour of | Brutus' claim.

The problem is discussed at length in D.H. 5.18 and touched on by Dio 44.12.1. According to Dionysius οἱ τὰ Ῥωμαίων σαφέστατα ἐξητακότες produced τεκμήρια πολλά that L. Junius Brutus died without issue male or female, the hardest to gainsay being that he was a patrician, whereas all his putative descendants were plebeians. {The Dionysius passage is discussed by J. H. Richardson, *CPh* 106 (2011), 155–60, who suggests Q. Aelius Tubero as a source.} This is the view that Dionysius himself plainly inclines to, though he contents himself with a modestly agnostic conclusion. Dio simply argues that L. Brutus killed his two sons, the only ones he had. His emphatic ἀμφοτέρους ... τοὺς παῖδας, τοὺς μόνους ... γενομένους reveals that he knows of, but disbelieves, theories that L. Brutus had more than two sons. According to him those who scrawled on the statues (see on 9.5ff.) did not believe that M. Brutus was descended from the first consul: they simply exploited the propaganda value of the claim. There is no clue to Livy's account of the matter, and it is possible, although there are no significant verbal parallels between Dio and P., that Dio is merely dismissing Posidonius' theory as relayed in the *Brutus*. Appian 2.112.469 simply accepts the descent without discussion. There are, then, two arguments to be faced: (i) traditionally L. Brutus only had two sons, both of whom he killed; (ii) L. Brutus was a patrician, the later Iunii Bruti were plebeian. P. only deals directly with the first.

δημότην: = 'plebeium'. This is the argument that impressed Dionysius.

26 **οἶκον ὁμώνυμον ... Βρούτοις:** Madvig's οἶκον ὁμώνυμον seems certain. It is practically impossible to construe the *MSS* reading (τοῦτον is particularly hard to fit in) and a reference to ὁμωνυμία is necessary (cf. Dio's τῇ ὁμωνυμῖα καταχρώμενοι). Wurms' Βρούτοις is based on the fact that P. nearly always uses the dative with ὁμώνυμος and on a | desire to avoid hiatus (see on 4.6). The plural in any case makes better sense. See further Ziegler, *Rh. Mus.* 81 (1932), 76f.

ἄρτι και πράην ... ἄρχοντας: slightly similar is D.H. 5.18 ὑπατείαν δ' οὐδέεις, ἧς τοῖς πατρικίοις μετῆν, ὅψι δέ ποτε καὶ ταύτης ἔτυχον τῆς ἀρχῆς, though P. does not seem to be using Dionysius here.

7. Ποσειδώνιος ὁ φιλόσοφος: *FGI H* 87 F 40 {= Edelstein–Kidd fr. 256}. For general discussion of P.'s use of, and attitude to, Posidonius, see Babut, 214–20.

ὡς ἰστόρηται: Ziegler takes this as a reference to the account of *Publ.* 6.4ff., but it is better to take it in the sense 'as the usual version has it' (so Voegelin, Latzarus, Perrin {and Kidd in the Edelstein–Kidd ed. of Posidonius [1972–99], fr. 256; Scott–Kilvert–Pelling leave it ambiguous}). Jones, *JRS* 56 (1966), 61–74 {= Scardigli, *Essays* 95–123}, does not seem to consider it a cross-reference.

τρίτον ... νήπιον: Posidonius is the only authority for this (unless Dio is alluding to a separate tradition), although some such argument must often have been used (it is less likely that the whole story of the execution of the sons would have been thrown out).

τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς ἰδέας: it is not clear from P.'s wording here how far Posidonius used this rather startling observation as a substantive argument. It is hard to believe that the representation of L. Brutus' ἰδέα in the Capitoline statue was based on an authentic *imago*, even if one accepts that the man himself existed, or that the resemblances averred can have been in any way striking. But in the ancient world such things were taken seriously: Antony believed that his physique supported his claim to be a descendant of Heracles (*Ant.* 4.3), and Brutus himself may have believed (or wanted other people to believe) that he resembled L. Brutus—certainly the profiles on his coins are not unlike (Crawford, nos. 433/2, 507/1b, 508/3). |

καὶ τῶν γε ... ἐνίου: Jacoby suggests M. Iunius Brutus, the *accusator* of M. Scaurus (*RE* 10.971f.) or M. Iunius Brutus, praetor in 88 and partisan of Marius (*RE* 10.972). Speculation seems fairly fruitless in view of the vagueness of τῶν γε ... ἐνίου, though the Marian circle is tempting in view of *Mar.* 45.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ... τοσαῦτα: Babut 215 infers from these words that 'Plutarque volontairement restreint un développement qui remontait ... au philosophe-historien du Portique'. This is dubious. The words are P.'s usual 'signing-off' formula when he has finished with one subject: it is impossible to know whether Posidonius had anything more to say about the descent of the Iunii Bruti.

As often, P.'s discussion of the historical problem posed by Brutus' claim that L. Brutus was his ancestor makes a somewhat mixed impression. He defines the problem, but does not come to grips with one of the key difficulties: the plebeian status of the historical Iunii Bruti. He seems to have gone to some trouble to ferret out sources: the flourish with which he introduces the evidence of Posidonius suggests direct consultation. The fact

that Posidonius was a *φιλόσοφος* is meant to give his evidence weight (for *φιλόσοφοι* as reliable witnesses cf. e.g. *Dion* 2.5, *Brut.* 48.2, *Themist.* 13.5 {and *Caes.* 63.3 with Pelling's n.}. P. is often slightly put out when he is forced to disagree on a historical point with a 'philosopher': *Brut.* 53.5–7, *Solon* 32.4 are good examples). He himself would not dismiss out of hand the argument from *ὁμοιότης τῆς ἰδέας*: his belief in heredity was profound (cf. the *De sera num. vind.*, and for the present passage especially 563A–B). On the other hand, he is perfectly well aware that prestigious genealogies can be fudged (*Numa* 21.4, *Sert.* 9.10). In the last resort, however, the question: 'did P. really believe that M. Brutus was descended from the first consul?' is irrelevant. | P. is writing the *Life* of a tyrannicide, who claimed, and perhaps himself believed, that he *was* descended from L. Brutus. P. admires Brutus and the ideals he stood for, and all he is trying to do in *ch.* 1 is to show that a case can be made for the claim. In the *Caesar*, where the ideological perspective is rather different, he simply says *γένος ... ἐκεῖθεν εἶναι δοκοῦντα πρὸς πατέρων* (*Caes.* 62.1).

As to the ultimate truth of the matter, little need be said here. The claim excites incredulity on *a priori* grounds, though neither of the two specific arguments against it amounts to very much: one can believe in the historicity of the first consul without accepting the story that he killed his sons (a typical variation on the well-known theme of public virtue achieved at the cost of private pain). And the argument from the plebeian status of the later Iunii Bruti can be met by the observation that the genuine Fasti of the early Republic are full of plebeian names (so Ogilvie 232; {cf. A. Mastrocinque, *Lucio Giunio Bruto* (1988), 95–101}). For rationalists it is perhaps a little disconcerting to find a T. Iunius Brutus attested as aedile in 491 by D.H. 7.26.3.

Finally, in this section it is striking how P. omits all reference to Brutus' father. He seems to have regarded him as rather a disreputable character (*Pomp.* 16.4–8). He could have introduced him at the beginning of the *Life* and treated him as a foil for Brutus, much as he does Pompey's father in *Pomp.* 1. But the arrangement he has preferred is far more impressive, setting out at once the stark contrast between elemental *θυμός* and philosophical *λόγος* and the influence of the centuries old tradition which moulded the character of the great tyrannicide.

On the general topic of legendary genealogies in Republican Rome see T. P. Wiseman, *G&R* 21 (1974), 153–64. |

Ch. 2: Philosophical Allegiances and Literary Accomplishments

29

The same general point may be made about this section as about the previous one. It is standard for P. to include material on his hero's education and his literary abilities (when he has the evidence for them), but stock elements may serve important structural and thematic functions. In *ch. 1* P. has intimated Brutus' philosophical character and brought out the ancestral tradition of tyrannicide of the Iunii Bruti and Servilii. He now documents the specific philosophical influences upon Brutus, sharpening the parallel with Dion begun at *Dion* 1.2–4. The tyrannicide theme is also implicitly maintained, although now in a rather more Hellenic guise. The effect of the whole section indeed is to cast Brutus as a strongly Hellenized figure.

1. Σερβιλίας ... γενόμενον: the form of the sentence is exactly the same as that of 1.1. Accident or design? In the mind of a creative artist certain patterns suggest themselves and it does not matter whether the artist himself is conscious of them or not. The *effect* certainly is to reinforce the sense of a *διαδοχή* of influences upon Brutus.

ἀδελφός: half-brother (both children of Livia, sister of M. Livius Drusus, *tr. pl.* 91). At *Cat. min.* 1.2 P. mistakenly says that Drusus was their mother's uncle, if the text is right (see Geiger {D.Phil.} *ad loc.*). For the family tree of the Servilii Caepiones see Münzer, *RA*, 328ff., reproduced conveniently in Syme, *RR*, 'genealogical tables' II {and for its later stages Geiger, *Anc. Soc.* 4 (1973), 156, summarizing his disentangling of the multiple homonyms of the late Republic}. The intricacies of the relationship between Servilia and Cato have naturally no place in the *Brutus*.

Κάτων ὁ φιλόσοφος: on P.'s portrayal of Cato in general see V. Tandoi, *Maia* 18 (1966), 20–41; Babut 169–175; Geiger {D.Phil.} *passim* {and in the Rizzoli *Focione–Catone minor* (1993), esp. 282–8; S. Swain, *Hermes* 118 (1990), 192–203 and *JHS* 110 (1990), 134 = Scardigli, *Essays* 243–4; Duff, *Plutarch's Lives* 131–60; Pelling, *Plutarch and History*, esp. ch. 4, and in Scott-Kilvert–Pelling, 171–81; A. Zadorojnyi, *CQ* 57 (2007), 216–30}. On Cato's character see also P. Grimal, *REA* 47 (1945), 264; {R. Fehrle, *Cato Uticensis* (1983)}.

P.'s description of Cato here as a 'philosopher' is highly significant. It is of course true that, like many of his contemporaries, P. is inclined to use the term rather loosely (thus at *De esu carn.* 998B Polemarchus, brother of Lysias, is so described. This should on no account be regarded as an 'interpolation', *pace* W. Helmbold, Loeb *Moralia* XII [1957], 573, n. b). But he repeats this description of Cato at *Pomp.* 40.2 and *Cat. mai.* 27.7 (very emphatic indeed), and it is of course a dominant theme in the *Cato minor*. To a considerable extent this way of presenting Cato has to be seen against the background of the hagiographical literature that sprang up after Cato's death. In response to ill-judged Caesarian ridicule of Cato in the triumph of 46 (Appian 2.101) Cicero produced a *Cato*, probably in 46, with a second

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edition the following spring (*Ad Att.* 12.4 [240].2, 13.40 [343].1, 13.46 [338].2, *Ad Fam.* 16.22 [185].1; this at the suggestion of Brutus), so did Fabius Gallus (*Fam.* 7.24 [260].2), and Brutus himself (*Ad Att.* 12.21 [260].1, 13.46 [338].2; 17 March and 12 August 45 respectively). Perhaps a little less purely laudatory was the work of Munatius Rufus (Plut. *Cat. min.* 25.2, 37.1 {see Geiger, *Athen.* 57 (1979), 48–7}), but the spate of such works prompted both Caesar (*Ad Att.* 12.40 [281].1, 41 [283].4; 13.51 [349].1) and Hirtius (*Ad Att.* 12.40.1 [281], 12.41 [283].4, 12.44 [285].1, 12.48 [289], 12.45 [290].2) to produce an *Anticato* each. An earlier attack was that of Metellus Scipio, a later the *Rescripta Bruto de Catone* of Augustus (Suet. *Aug.* 85.1 {with Wardle *ad loc.*}). (On this pamphlet literature see: A. Dyroff, *Rh. Mus.* 63 [1908], 586f; H. Bardon, *La Littérature latine inconnue* I (1952) 276f.; Balsdon, *Historia* 7 [1958], 92; R. MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order* [1967], 4–6, 295f.; M. T. Griffin, *Seneca* [1976], 187, n. 8; {G. Zecchini, *Athen.* 58 (1980), 39–56, esp. 39–45; H. J. Tschiedel, *Caesars Anticato* [1981]; Pelling on *Caes.* 54.2–6}. Bardon, Balsdon, and MacMullen rightly stress it as an important factor in Brutus’ alienation from Caesar.) There are also many suggestive references to Cato as philosopher in Cicero’s extant works, e.g. the parallel between Socrates and Cato in *Tusc. disp.* 1.30.74, or the description of Cato as ‘perfectissimo Stoico’ in *Brut.* 31.118. Cato became a cult hero to the Stoics of the first | century A.D. Thræsea Paetus wrote a life of Cato modelled on that of Munatius Rufus (*Cat. min.* 25.2, 37.1), and contrived a studied suicide owing everything to that of Socrates and Cato (Tac. *Ann.* 16.34–5), Titinius Capito had his house full of busts of *Catones* (as well as *Bruti* and *Cassii*: Pliny, *Ep.* 1.17.3), and to Seneca Cato was the paragon of Stoic virtues (*Dial.* 2.2.1, 1.3.14, *Ep.* 70.22, *Dial.* 2.7.1). (On Cato in the first century see e.g. Ch. Wirszubski, *Libertas as a Political Idea during the late Republic and early Principate* [1950], 126–9; MacMullen 4–5, 18–19, 80–82; F. M. Ahl, *Lucan* [1976], 231–79; Griffin *passim*.) All this is *post mortem* adulation, but the process of characterizing Cato in strongly philosophical terminology had already begun during his lifetime (e.g. Cic. *Pro Mur.* 6iff., *Ad Att.* 2.1 [21].8 [June 60]). Thus the phrase *Κάτων ὁ φιλόσοφος* has numerous resonances, all of them important to the present context. But not only is the philosophical aspect important: P. is also thinking of Cato the great champion of the Republic, and perhaps also Cato the near tyrannicide (*Cat. min.* 3.3, cf. Val. Max. 3.1.2). Close thematic continuity with *ch.* 1 is implicitly maintained.

ὄν μάλιστα Ῥωμαίων ἐζήλωσεν οὗτος: the theme is only touched on in the rest of the *Life* (3.1–4, 5.3–4, 13.3, 13.7, 29.10, 40.7 help to keep it in mind), but P. is working by allusion and association rather than explicit demonstration. Brutus’ admiration of Cato is also noted by Dio 44.13.1 (as a factor in Brutus’ joining the conspiracy) and the *De viris illustribus* (‘avunculi Catonis imitator’), and is much emphasized in Cicero’s *Brutus* (e.g. 31.118). It manifested itself in Brutus’ consistent opposition to Pompey

in the 50s (cf. on 1.5 and 4.1 below), his decision to join Pompey at Pharsalus (4.4), his involvement in the pamphlet warfare following Cato's death, and his marriage to Porcia.

οὗτος: P. could have written *ἐκεῖνος*, but he is perhaps | still thinking in terms of 'this Brutus' (1.3). 32

πενθερόν ... γενόμενον: posthumously—Brutus divorced Claudia, daughter of Appius Claudius, *cos.* 54, in the summer of 45 (*Ad Att.* 13.9 [317].2, 13.10 [318].3), and married Cato's widowed daughter Porcia shortly afterwards (*Ad Att.* 13.11 [319].2, 13.16 [323].2, 13.22 [329].4). Cato had killed himself after Thapsus (spring 46) when Utica became indefensible. P. explains *πενθερόν* at 13.3. P. could easily have verified this chronology—perhaps he actually did know it (*Cat. min.* 73.6 does not help to settle this)—but here he is sketching in the influences on Brutus with bold, simple strokes, and the effect would be spoiled by detail.

2–3. τῶν δ' Ἀντίοχον: the structure of this whole section is strikingly similar to that of *Luc.* 42.3–4, though one can hardly make any deep inference from this, other than that the general form of expression is a favourite of P.'s, as of course it is of Greek in general. The question, however, arises: does *τῶν δ' ... ἀλλότριος* reflect real knowledge, or is P. simply using a conventional structure in order to put the emphasis on a specific area? (One might compare 6.10–11, where *τὰς ... ἄλλας* does not seem to stem from real knowledge.) The answer is that it must reflect real knowledge, for not only the facts contained about Brutus' philosophical allegiances in 2.3, but also the information given in 24.1, and the implications of the philosophical debate between Brutus and Cassius at 40.7–9, show that P. was extremely well informed about Brutus' philosophy. *τῶν δ' ... ἀλλότριος* therefore hints at Brutus' eclecticism (as perhaps also *διέτελει ... Ἀντίοχον*). But, simply because the mode of expression is so conventional, the effect is to put tremendous emphasis on Brutus as Academic, and to play down his other affiliations. This is important because the Academic philosopher in action is one of the unifying themes of the whole *Dion–Brutus*. It is with such subtle | touches that P. shapes his material to suit the overriding theme. 33

2. τῶν δ' Ἑλληνικῶν: emphatic—as opposed to Cato, the Roman philosopher.

ἀνήκοος ... ἀλλότριος: a favourite, and much-remarked trick of P.'s style—the use of two words closely similar in meaning and of similar form. This can become a mannerism (and a slightly irritating one), but here at least there is some difference in meaning between the two words ('not unacquainted with, nor hostile to').

τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος: with this, and the following reference to the Academy, P. drives home the parallel between the philosophy of Dion and

that of Brutus, and between their political careers. The reader is meant to remember the contribution of Plato and the Academy to the struggle against tyranny in Sicily, and the distinguished reputation of the Academy in the fight against tyranny in general (cf. *Philop.* 1.3–5).

3. νέαν: the New Academy was associated with Lacydes, head from 241/40 to at least 224/3 (D.L. 4.59), and the successor of Arcesilaus (*ibid.*).

μέσην: the Middle Academy was associated with Arcesilaus (316/5–241/40) and scepticism (D.L. 4.28). See H. Cherniss, *Loeb Moralia XIII*, Part II (1976), 436f. with *testimonia* and further references.

λεγομένην: P. uses the usual labels, but does not himself subscribe to them. Cf. no. 63 of the Lamprias Catalogue: Περὶ τοῦ μίαν εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Ἀκαδημειαν (discussed by Babut 199).

Ἀκαδημειαν: Sintenis' correction. In verse a long penultimate syllable is required (e.g. Ar. *Nu.* 1005). See *LSJ s.v.* and Porter on *Dion* 1.1, where the same error occurs.

34 **παλαιᾶς:** for Brutus' adherence to the so-called Old | Academy see Cic. *Brut.* 120, 149, 332, *Acad.* 1.12, *De fin.* 1.8; {D. Sedley, *JRS* 87 (1997), 42}.

Ἀντίοχον: for Brutus' commitment to the philosophy of Antiochus cf. e.g. *Ad Att.* 13.25 [333].5.3, 13.12 [320].3, *Tusc. disp.* 5.21, and the references above.

For discussion of the philosophy of Antiochus of Ascalon, the successor of Philo of Larisa, see A. Lueder, *Die philosophische Persönlichkeit des Antiochos von Askalon* (1940); G. Luck, *Der Akademiker Antiochos* (1953); {J. Barnes in M. T. Griffin and J. Barnes, ed., *Philosophia Togata I* (1989), 51–96; D. N. Sedley, ed., *The Philosophy of Antiochus* (2012)}. For P.'s attitude to Antiochus see (besides the present passage) Cic. 4.1–2 {with Moles' n.}, *Luc.* 42.3, Babut 198–200, {D. Sedley, *JRS* 87 (1997), 41–53}, and below.

In context, the important thing to note is that whereas Philo denied that there were two Academies (i.e. he considered the New Academy to be a legitimate continuation of the Old) Antiochus maintained that there were (Cic. *Acad. post.* 4.13), and advocated a return to the dogmatism of the Old Academy. {Cf. M. Bonazzi in D. N. Sedley, ed., *The Philosophy of Antiochus* (2012), 310.}

Ἀριστον: for Brutus and Aristus cf. e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 5.21, *De fin.* 5.3.8, *Brut.* 97.332. It was at Athens that Brutus first heard Aristus (*Acad. post.* 1.3.12). ,

ἐν λόγοις: not 'in learning' (Perrin), but 'in eloquence'. Cf. *Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero* 1.2 τὸ συγκρίνειν τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἕξι. Antiochus by contrast was a forceful and eloquent speaker (Cic. 4.1–2.1 *Luc.* 42.3).

εὐταξία: εὐταξία was a technical term of the Stoics = 'practical judgement, tact' (e.g. *SVF* 3.64). This seems to be the way Perrin takes it ('good sense' is his translation). Perhaps 'orderliness', 'restraint' is a little more appropriate, going closely with *πράοτητι* (on which see 1.3n.). In any

event it is significant that P. emphasizes the gentle, humane Aristus instead of the more controversial figure, Antiochus. |

The exact nature of the philosophy of Antiochus of Ascalon is much too complex a problem to deal with here. But two questions are relevant to P.'s handling of his material: his true attitude to Antiochus, and the character of the philosophy of M. Brutus. Babut 198–200 demonstrates that the somewhat hostile account of Antiochus in *Cic.* 4.1–2 more truly represents P.'s own views than *Brut.* 2.3 and *Luc.* 42.3. It follows that P. is deliberately playing down the controversial aspects of Antiochus in order to portray Brutus as a relatively orthodox Academic, for reasons already sufficiently made clear in this commentary. At this juncture in the *Life* he does not wish to give Brutus Stoic characteristics. He has to say that Brutus was a follower of Antiochus and the 'Old Academy', because he was, but he says as little as possible about Antiochus, and puts the stress instead upon his more amiable brother Aristus, a much less important philosopher. The character of the philosophy of Brutus requires more detailed discussion.

Brutus studied philosophy at Athens (*Cic. Acad.* 1.3.12, *De vir. ill.* 82.1) under Aristus. The date must be regarded as uncertain. A dating in the 60s is possible, especially if Brutus was born in 85 (as I think virtually certain—see note on 3.1), subject only to the proviso that c. 68 is a *terminus post* (Antiochus died c. 68 and Brutus evidently did not 'hear' him). But even on the lower dating of Brutus' birth to 79/8 Brutus could have studied philosophy at Athens in the late 60s. 59/58 has also been suggested (e.g. by Tyrrell and Purser III, 22), which would have the effect of getting Brutus conveniently out of Rome immediately after his ill-starred involvement (or putative involvement) in the Vettius affair of 59. But this seems to be ruled out by P.'s narrative at 3.1, which, while none too clear, certainly seems to imply that in the first instance Brutus left Rome in the company of Cato. The other possibility is 56/55 (as | Gelzer 977) after his service under Cato. Certainty is impossible, but I think a dating in the 60s the most likely, simply because Brutus would then be of the usual sort of age for acquiring a philosophical education (for possible ages see E. Rohde, *Kleine Schriften* II [1901], 51, paraphrased by H. E. Butler and A. S. Owen, *Apulei Apologia* [1914]. ix, n. 5). Three philosophical works are attested:

(i) *De virtute*. This was addressed to Cicero in the form of a letter in summer 47 (*De fin.* 1.3.8. *Tusc. Disp.* 5.1 and 30, *Sen. Cons. Helv.* 9.4, where there is a quotation from the work). It can be identified with the letter mentioned in the *Brutus* (3.11). Cicero's *Brutus* was written in reply to it. Brutus wrote the *De virtute* after his visit to the exiled M. Claudius Marcellus, *cos.* 51 (*Brut.* 71.250, *Sen. Cons. Helv.* 9.4–8) and it was clearly designed to reconcile Cicero to the loss of *libertas* under Caesar: Boissier, *Cicéron et ses amis* (1899): 'la morale du livre était que pour vivre heureux on n'a besoin que de soi'.

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(ii) *De officiis*. (See Charisius 83, Priscian 679, Sen. *Ep.* 95.45, under the title Περὶ καθήκοντος).

(iii) *De patientia* (Diomedes, *GLI*, 383, 8K).

Various assessments of their quality are on record. They were rated more highly than his oratorical works (Tac. *Dial.* 18.25, Quint. 10.1.123)—not a great compliment. Cicero, *Acad. post.* 1.3.12 is fulsome ('Brutus quidem noster excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris persequitur, nihil ut eisdem de rebus Graeca desideres', cf. also *De fin.* 1.3.8). Quintilian *loc. cit.* praises their earnestness: 'Egregius ... multoque quam in orationibus praestantior Brutus suffecit ponderi rerum; scias eum sentire quae dicit' (cf. below on 6.7). Seneca is obviously less impressed, complaining that the Περὶ καθήκοντος exemplifies the useless type of philosophy that gives precepts | without reference to a final moral purpose (*Ep.* 95.45; Griffin 188). Modern discussions of their content and philosophical orientation include: Boissier 343–45; G. L. Hendrickson, *AJP* 47 (1926), 240; 60 (1939), 401–13; Schanz–Hosius I, 396; Bardon I, 209, 228; MacMullen 298; A. E. Douglas, *Cicero: Brutus* (1966), xi; {Sedley, *JRS* 87 (1997), 41–53, esp. 51–3}. Syme, *RR*, 57, offers some sharp observations. The titles *De officiis* and *De patientia* have been felt to have a Stoic flavour, and καθήκον is of course a Stoic term. And Cicero addressed his *Paradoxa Stoicorum* to Brutus. Yet apparent use of Stoic terminology is not a proof of adherence to stoicism (cf. P.'s *De profectibus in virtute!*). The *De officiis*, lacking, according to Seneca, any rigorous underlying philosophical base, could be linked rather with Brutus' devotion to the welfare of his clients (so Syme, cf. Gelzer 1005f.): a Roman, rather than a Greek philosophical, concept. 'Academic' is the label Cicero uses, and though labels are sometimes misleading, particularly in such an eclectic age as this, the fact must be given some weight. Brutus' original disapproval of Cato's suicide seems to have been along Academic lines (cf. on 40.7–9). On the other hand, as a follower of Antiochus, Brutus must have been influenced considerably by Stoicism, particularly with regard to the emotions, sense perception theory, and the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of the wise man. The *De virtute* might obviously have been Stoic in tone (for the conditions under which Stoics countenanced 'withdrawal' see M. J. McGann, *Studies in Horace's First Book of Epistles* [1969], 24–8; Griffin, 315ff.). And there are indeed signs that Brutus was associated with the idea of the Stoic 'sapiens' in, and shortly after, his lifetime. In *Ad Brut.* 1.15 [23].5 Cicero writes: 'cedebas, Brute, cedebas, quoniam Stoici nostri negant fugere sapientes'. This is clearly meant as a telling jibe. Similarly Horace's 'fracta virtus' (*C.* 2.7.11, of Brutus' defeat at the second battle of Philippi) derives some of | its force from the paradoxical contradiction of the famous Stoic paradox (see now Nisbet and Hubbard *ad loc.*). Lucilius' boast at 50.5 (if historical) must have the same general implication. The conclusion of this necessarily brief and undetailed survey is that Brutus was an Academic greatly influenced by

Stoicism. {So also E. Rawson, *Past Perspectives* (1986), 102 = *Roman Culture and Society* (1991), 489, ‘an Academic, if admittedly a Stoicizing one’. S. Swain, *Hermes* 118 (1990), 192–203 puts it more strongly: ‘Brutus shared Cato’s Stoicism’, 193; ‘in Plutarch’s portrait the Stoicism that Brutus shares obviously with Cato is suppressed’, 202.} Those modern scholars who refer to him blithely as a ‘Stoic’ *tout court* (e.g. Wirszubski 140; J. Brisset, *Les Idées politiques de Lucain* [1964], 148 and n. 1; Nisbet and Hubbard *ibid.*) are guilty at least of a technical inaccuracy. On the other hand, simply to point to *Brut.* 2.2–3 or *Dion* 1 as if that explained everything about Brutus’ philosophy (see e.g. Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 124, n.14) does not do justice to P.’s delicate manoeuvres at *Brut.* 2.2–3. He is not quite being dishonest, but he is emphasizing Brutus’ Academic character in order to suppress the Stoic element. {See also Moles’ further discussion of Horace’s *fracta virtus*, *QUCC* 25 (1987), 59–72 at 64–5, with Sedley’s sceptical response, *JRS* 87 (1997), 43 n. 17; Moles notes Sedley’s scepticism and briefly responds in *Letters*, 168 n. 82.}

4. Ἐμπυλος: *RE* 5.2543 (Brzoska). Empylus is introduced here because of the *συμβίωσις* theme. The mention of him then allows an easy transition to discussion of Brutus’ oratory. Empylus was a Rhodian (Quint. 10.6.4), so it was presumably at Rhodes, where Brutus learnt rhetoric (*De vir. ill.* 82.1), that Brutus first met him. His prodigious memory was remarked upon by Cicero: Quint. *loc. cit.* ‘Cicero certe Graecorum Metrodorum Scepsium et Empylum Rhodium nostrorumque Hortensium tradidit quae cogitaverant ad verbum in agendo rettulisse’.

ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς: not extant. Presumably Latin letters, so the remark has no relevance for the problem of 2.5–8. It looks as if P. himself has seen them: the allusive phraseology suggests first hand acquaintance with the letters. This should come as no surprise, for several collections of Brutus’ letters seem to have been published (Schanz–Hosius 1.397), and there are several passages in the Brutus which strongly indicate first hand knowledge of them (21.6, 22.4–6, 24.3, 28.2, 28.4, 29.8–11, 53.6–7, cf. | *Cic.* 45.2, *Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero* 4.3). 22.4–6 virtually proves first-hand acquaintance; so also 2.5–8 below (though here of course there is a real problem of authenticity). See further A. Sickinger, *De linguae Latinae apud Plutarchum et reliquiis et vestigiis* (diss. Freiburg 1883), 81–3; Peter 140–1; {Pelling, *Plutarch and History* 15–17 with nn. 93 and 111}.

ῥήτωρ: in P., as in all *φιλόσοφοι ἄνδρες*, this can often have pejorative connotations. But here it is obviously just a technical description, in context best rendered ‘orator’ (cf. Quintilian. Perrin’s ‘rhetorician’ restricts the scope of the term, though to judge from his Rhodian origin and the likely circumstances of Brutus’ first meeting with him, Empylus will also have been a professional teacher of rhetoric). For another Greek *ῥήτωρ* friend of Brutus see 52.7–53.2.

[**μὲν**]: rightly deleted by Coraes. The eye of the scribe was presumably caught by the following *μικρὸν μὲν*.

οὐ φαῦλον δέ: emphatic, since *μικρός* often implies triviality (cf. 13.3 on Bibulus' work).

ἀναιρέσεως: P. avoids the use of this word in the *De genio Socratis*. His use of it in the *Brutus* is of a piece with his unabashed reference to the *συνωμοσία* (cf. 1.4 and n.).

Βροῦτος: *FGrH* 191 T 1. The way P. characterizes this work virtually proves first-hand acquaintance with it. One imagines that it was a defence of Brutus' joining the conspiracy against Caesar, perhaps something along the lines of the various *Catones* (2.11.). Thus the apparently restricted scope of the work (*μικρὸν, περὶ τῆς Καίσαρος ἀναιρέσεως*) might surely allow, not only for material concerned with the facts of the assassination and its aftermath, but also for discussion of Brutus' motivation (perhaps as opposed to Cassius?). There are a good many passages in the *Brutus* which must depend on a source of this kind (I discuss them as and when they arise in the text). |

40 **5. Ῥωμαῖσι ... Βροῦτος**: a notably perfunctory treatment of Brutus' Latin oratory. It is worth trying to discover why this is so.

Brutus studied oratory at Rhodes, and under Pammenes ('vir longe eloquentissimus Graeciae') at Athens. With him he went carefully through the whole of Demosthenes (*Brut.* 97.332). He began to speak in the courts at Rome in the 50s and took part in several cases with Cicero and Hortensius (*Brut.* 51.190, 94.324), but his career was cut short by the Civil War and the consequent loss of *libertas loquendi* (*Brut.* 6.22). He spoke in defence of his father-in-law Appius Claudius Pulcher, *cos.* 54, along with Hortensius in 50, (*Brut.* 94.324, *Ad fam.* 3.11 [74].3, cf. Diomedes, *GL* I, 367, 26K). He composed and published a defence of Milo *exercitationis gratia* (Quint. 10.1.23, 10.5.20, 3.6.93; Ascon. *In Milon.* 36). He spoke on behalf of Deiotarus (cf. on 6.6 below). He also produced a political pamphlet *De dictatura Pompei* in 52 (Quint. 9.3.95, Sen. *Controv.* 10.1.30). His *Cato* has already been mentioned (see on 2.1 above). Brutus was a fervent Atticist (*Brut.* 83.286–7, Tac. *Dial.* 18, 21, 25), and sided in this debate with Calvus against Cicero. Estimates of Brutus' oratory vary. It was rated below his philosophical works (Tac. *Dial.* 18.25, Quint. 10.1.123). Cicero *Brut.* 331 represents Cicero's official view of extreme enthusiasm; his real view was that Brutus was 'otiosus atque diiunctus' (*Dial.* 18.25). Caesar was dismissive of the *Cato* (*Ad Att.* 13.46 [338].2). Cicero considered the speech delivered on the Capitol (see on 18.10) elegantly written but lacking in fire (*Ad Att.* 15.1a [378].2). Quintilian 12.10.11 singles out *gravitas* as the distinguishing characteristic of Brutus' oratory, but he does not include him among his list of orators. Tacitus (*Dial.* 21.26) refers scathingly to Brutus' 'lentitudo ac tepor'. The less critical Velleius (2.36.2) puts him

among the oratorical luminaries of his | time. It is clear that the informed view was not enthusiastic, even when allowance is made for the fact that Cicero was temperamentally out of tune with Brutus and his style. 41

For modern discussion see E. Filbey, *Class. Phil.* 6 (1911), 325ff.; Morawski, *Eos* 17 (1911), 1–6; Hendrickson, *AJP* 47 (1926), 234ff.; F. Portalupi, *Bruto e i neoatticisti* (Turin, 1955); Douglas, *Brutus*, xx–xxii; {A. Balbo in C. Steel and H. van der Blom, edd., *Community and Communication* (2012), 315–28}. Wilson 14–21 sets out almost all the evidence. On the date of Brutus' oratorical studies see above on the date of his philosophical studies (though in the case of his oratory Rhodes in 58 is an additional possibility).

As a general rule, P. is greatly interested in the relationship between a man's character and his λόγος, and between his oratory and his political career. Character is naturally revealed through λόγοι (cf. e.g. *De fort. Alex.* 330E, *Lyc.* 25.5, *Cat. mai.* 7.3, *Timol.* 15.1 etc.). The statesman naturally requires at least a modest competence in oratory (*Praec. ger. reip.* 801E; see further Hamilton xxii–xxiii, and for fuller discussion Wardman 226–34). For both themes reference can be made to (e.g.) *Cat. mai.* 1.5, 7.1–3, *Luc.* 1.4–5, *Per.* 8.1–9, *Fab. Max.* 1.7–9, *Crass.* 3.3, *Arat.* 3.3, *Pomp.* 1.4, *Ant.* 2.8, *Gracchi* 2.2–3, *Demosth.* 3.1–2, 6.2–5, *Cat. min.* 4.3–4. Why then so brief a mention of Brutus' oratory here?

Specimens of Brutus' oratory, as has already been made clear above, certainly survived down to P.'s time (see further Schanz–Hosius 1.400), so he could have read them. But it is an important question how far P. bothered to (or had the competence to—cf. *Demosth.* 3.1–2) assess the speeches of Roman statesmen for himself (on the general question see Jones 82–86 {and Pelling, *Plutarch and History* 16–18}). This of course raises the problem of the extent of P.'s ability in Latin, too large a field to investigate here. For references see on 6.7.) There is really no sign in the *Brutus* of P.'s having read any of Brutus' | speeches (see 6.6–7, 18.1, 18.10, 18.11–12, 44.3, 46.1: all this is vague stuff and could readily be taken straight from a source). Consequently, P.'s judgement here might well derive from a source, or—quite possibly—from the opinions of P.'s Roman friends. It is still, however, a perfunctory judgement, and needs to be explained. P. must have been aware that Brutus' oratory was rather poorly regarded, so one explanation will be that he does not wish to emphasise this (even so, *ικανῶς* is not very enthusiastic). The other obviously is that, where a Roman is not especially celebrated for his achievements in his own culture, P. is naturally inclined to put even more weight on his achievements in Greek culture than he would normally do. Here he has at his disposal a lot of easily consulted evidence for Brutus' epistolary style in Greek, a style moreover (*τὴν ἀποφθεγματικὴν ... βραχυλογίαν*) in which he himself is greatly interested (for P.'s interest in *βραχυλογία* see Wardman 227–8). Thus the disproportionate emphasis upon Brutus' Greek letters (alleged) tells us a lot 42

about P.'s personal priorities and interests, as well as illustrating the carefully detailed way in which he manipulates his material to emphasize Brutus' Hellenic qualities.

<δι>εξόδους: the MSS *ἐξόδους* makes no sense. Vulcobius' *διεξόδους*, accepted by all subsequent editors, is excellent: 'Opponitur ... *βραχυλογία* indicatque effusam illam disserendi rationem et singulas causae partes exsequentem, quam ex Ciceronis fere omnibus orationibus cognitam habemus' (Voegelin). For *διέξοδος* as a quasi-technical term of literary theory cf. Pl. *Criti.* 109A, *Tht.* 207C, *Prt.* 326A.

ἱκανῶς: imprecise and (I think—cf. above) deliberately so. The range of meaning can be anything from 'barely adequately' to 'very well'. It is untranslatable in English.

43 **ἀποφθεγματικὴν ... βραχυλογίαν:** for P.'s interest in this style | and his advocacy of it cf. *Lyc.* 19–20 and the *Apophthegmata Laconica* (if genuine), and see further Wardman loc. cit. Evidently a case of attraction of opposites: nobody could accuse P. of *βραχυλογία*! The characterization of Brutus' Greek style is restricted in its application to the letters: the construction is *παράσημος* + participle (like *φανερὸς* / *δηλός*). Perrin misses this.

Λακωνικὴν: Brutus seems to have had a genuine love for the old Spartan ideal: a stream on his estate was called 'Eurotas' and he also had a 'Περσικὴ porticus' (Cic. *Ad Att.* 15.9 [387].1; for the *στοὰ Περσικὴ* at Sparta commemorating the battle of Plataea cf. Vitruvius 1.1.6, Pausanias 3.11.3). But this can hardly be used as corroboratory evidence for his 'Spartan' turn of phrase and hence the genuineness of the letters, since he also had a 'Parthenon' (Cic. *Ad Att.* 13.40 [343].1, quoted above on 1.5), and presumably had an 'Athens' as well as a 'Lacedaemon' (see *Ad Att.* 15.9 [387].1), and he had studied the speeches of Demosthenes in Athens under Pammenes (above). P.'s emphasis on Brutus' Greek letters might be further explained if P. was aware of Brutus' love for the Spartan ideal: this would give added point to his horror at Brutus' offer to allow his troops to sack Sparta (46.iff.). In that case, the emphasis on Brutus' Laconism maintains the anti-tyrant theme, for the Spartans were of course celebrated for their opposition to tyranny. Love of Sparta could be consistent with Brutus' Stoic interests; on the general phenomenon see E. N. Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity* II (1974), 41–48; P. A. Brunt, *PBSR* 43 (1975), 17f.; H. Cherniss, Loeb *Moralia* XIII, Part 2, 706, n. b. This would not, however, be an implication P. would want his reader to put stress on here, as I have already intimated in discussing the picture P. paints of Brutus' philosophy. For the Spartan ideal in Republican Rome in general see Tigerstedt 95–160, and for the age of Cicero in particular 144–60. Of this ideal the most bizarre | manifestation was undoubtedly the near 'wife-swapping' indulged in by Cato and Hortensius (*Cat. min.* 25), the rationale of which must lie in Spartan/Stoic ideas though no doubt there were baser motives at work as well.

44

παράσημος: sometimes pejorative in P. (as *Praec. ger. reip.* 823B, *Coriol.* 23.5), but clearly not so here. Voegelin's 'insignis', 'conspicuous' is a fair rendering; Perrin's 'striking' is also rather good. For the use of *χαρακτήρ* and related words in literary criticism cf. D.H. *Dem.* 9, *Pomp.* 1, *Demetr. Eloc.* 36 etc. *LSJ s.v.*, II.5). 'Mithridates' in his introduction to 'Brutus' letters similarly refers to their *χαρακτήρ*, cf. also the *Suda's* *θαυμάζεται δὲ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἰδέαν, ἣγουν χαρακτήρα. παράσημος* is picked up at 2.8: an example of P.'s partiality for 'ring' construction, though there is more to it than that—see on 2.8 below.

The three Greek letters P. quotes (2.6–8) give rise to a major historical problem: the genuineness or otherwise of the Greek letters of Brutus. Their authenticity is accepted by Gelzer 1011–12, following Rühl, and by some modern scholars (e.g. MacMullen 6, Wardman 227, {Clarke, *Noblest Roman* 61, 141 n. 4}). The two major recent studies are R. E. Smith, 'The Greek letters of M. Junius Brutus', *CQ* 30 (1936), 194–203, and L. Torraca, *Marco Giunio Bruto—Epistole Greche* (1959). {P. Goukowski, 'Les lettres grecques de Brutus: documents authentiques ou forgerie?', in N. Barrandon and F. Kirbihler, edd., *Les gouverneurs et les provinciaux sous la République romaine* (2011), 273–89, leaves the authenticity question open but seems to tend to scepticism, and Moles, *Letters* 143–8, elaborating some of the arguments formulated here. K. Tempest and A. Adonis are planning to publish a translation with introduction and commentary.} Cf. also Wilson 22–23. Smith's study, while open to attack on some details (see below), does not seem to have had the influence it deserves. Torraca is extremely uncritical. In what follows I shall give a general account of the controversy, and finish by arguing positively that P.'s evidence is of great significance for the resolution of the problem.

There is extant a series of seventy letters, attributed to Brutus, with conjectural answers to them from the various recipients. The whole collection has an introduction by a certain Mithridates, who addresses it to his nephew, also called Mithridates, and | apparently a king (*MSS* differ between *βασιλεύς* and *βασιλεῖ*). In it he says that, since his nephew has often found it difficult to imagine how the recipients would have answered Brutus' letters, he has written replies to them himself, basing them both upon Brutus' letters and the evidence of historians. The answers therefore are avowedly faked: what of the letters attributed to Brutus? Clearly there are three possible standpoints: (i) *all* the letters are genuine; (ii) *all* the letters are forgeries; (iii) many of the letters are forgeries, but there is a hard core of genuine ones.

The external evidence consists of three testimonia:

(i) Plutarch (the present passage);

(ii) Philostratus II, 258K = Hercher nr. IV, 14: Τὸν ἐπιστολικὸν χαρακτήρα τοῦ λόγου μετὰ τοὺς παλαιοὺς ἄριστα μοι δοκοῦσι διεσκέφθαι

φιλοσόφων μὲν ὁ Τυανεύς καὶ Δίων, στρατηγῶν δὲ Βροῦτος ἢ ὅτῳ Βροῦτος ἐς τὸ ἐπιστέλλειν ἐχρήτητο ...

(iii) Photius *Ep.*, nr. VI, p. 16 Hercher: ἔστι μὲν καὶ ἄλλο πλῆθος ἄπειρον, ἔχεις δ', ἵνα μηδὲ μακρὸν ἦ σοι τὸ τῆς γυμνασίας στάδιον, τὰς εἰς Φάλαριν ἐκείνον, οἶμαι, τὸν Ἀκραγαντίνον τύραννον ἀναφερομένας ἐπιστολάς, καὶ αἷς Βροῦτος ὁ Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς ἐπιγράφεται ...

{A. Nogara, *Aevum* 65 (1991), 111–113 adds a further testimonium from Photius (codex 158 p. 101a), quoting the second-century Atticist Phrynichus for a certain ‘Marcianus’ who thought Brutus’ letters stylistically superior to those of Plato and Demosthenes. Nogara is attracted by the notion of a hard core of authentic letters that could have been known to Marcianus and Plutarch.}

46 Smith 194–5 thinks that all these raise disturbing doubts. His difficulty with the P. *testimonium* is considered below. The Photius he considers ‘might reasonably be taken as an argument in favour of their forged appearance to Photius’, but this is going too far: although the association with the letters of Phalaris is hardly encouraging, Photius does not commit himself to the view that they are genuine, but neither does he to the view that they are false. καὶ αἷς Βροῦτος ... ἐπιγράφεται is simply agnostic. As for Philostratus, Smith finds Philostratus’ ἢ ὅτῳ Βροῦτος ἐς τὸ ἐπιστέλλειν ἐχρήτητο, taken in conjunction with Mithridates’ εἴτε ιδέας εἴτε τινὸς τῶν εἰς ταῦτα μισθοῦ δοκιμῶν, rather | suspicious. Yet neither Philostratus nor Mithridates actually say that Brutus used secretaries, still less that he used secretaries all the time: they are only surmising that he might have done. It is impossible to say whether this surmise has its origin in an unwillingness to believe that so distinctive a style belonged to Brutus, or simply in a construction of the way imperial governors operated in their own time. Use of secretaries need not in any case imply that the particular secretary wrote in his own style: there is abundant evidence to show that the letters sent by governors and other officials in the Late Republic contained their *ipsissima verba*, whether or not they were written in their own hand (see F. Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World* [1977], 214).

A priori arguments based on estimates of Brutus’ character are not helpful: to say ‘the letters are unworthy of Brutus’ or ‘they are out of character’ is simply question-begging. They are certainly inconsistent with P.’s characterization of Brutus, but that is a different (and more complicated) matter. It is hard to believe that Brutus’ treatment of the Greek cities of Asia Minor was really much superior to Cassius’. From that point of view, there is no reason why the unpleasant tone of many of the letters should be taken to disqualify them from authenticity. Hence there is no substitute for individual examination. But in view of the fact that the great majority of the letters of celebrated men in antiquity are faked, it is safe to say that the *onus probandi* is on those who uphold their genuineness, and therefore that those letters which provide chronological data which do

not cohere with the consensus verdict of the historical tradition can definitely be taken as faked. Quite a few of the extant letters come into this category (Smith 198–201, Torraca XXI–XXVIII). The letters quoted by P. are considered point by point below.

6. οἶον ἤδη ... Περγαμηνοῖς: *Epistologr. Gr.* 178 nr. 1 = | Torraca nr. 1.

47

οἶον: οἶαν Coraes. Voegelin disposes of this unnecessary ‘emendation’ as follows: ‘Cor. mutavit in οἶαν, quod Sch. recepit “quia mox sequitur ἐτέραν”. Sed nimis illud remotum est atque tam facile de suo quisque ibi supplet ἐπιστολήν ut propterea minime mutari velim vocabulum saepissime ita usurpatum nostroque loco plane aptum. Contra post οἶαν potius ἔγραφεν exspectarem’.

τὸν πόλεμον: i.e. when Brutus was in the East, late 44–spring 43.

Δολοβέλλα δεδωκέναι χρήματα: the implication is that the people of Pergamum have *just* given Dolabella the money (cf. ἀδικεῖν—present—below). Dolabella was in Cilicia by May 1, 43 (*Ad Fam.* 12.12 [387].5). He would only be given money if he was in the area at the time. Brutus, at Dyrrachium till mid-May (*Ad Fam.* 12.4 [363].8, *Ad Brut.* 1.6 [12].1, *Ad Fam.* 12.14 [405].1), would have been aware of Dolabella’s activities in Cilicia by end-May at the latest. Hence the *terminus ante* for this letter (if genuine) would be end-May, 43. The *terminus post* would be approximately March 15, when Brutus could have heard of the Senatorial decree making Dolabella an enemy (Cic. *Phil.* 11.15): hence ἀδικεῖν. So if the letter is genuine it was written about the end of May, 43. It does not conflict with any external evidence.

{In his revision of Ziegler Gärtner notes that some of the *MSS* of the letters, including the oldest (A), have the order χρημ. δεδωκ.}

7. Σαμίους ... ἐννοεῖσθε: *Epistologr. Gr.* 191 nr. 69 = Torraca nr. 69.

τί τούτων τέλος: clearly meant as a threat.

Smith 199 is sceptical of the authenticity of this letter because it is one of a group (19, 29, 31, 33, 41, 45, 47, 49, 59) all saying very much the same thing: they all caution the recipients to show greater enthusiasm in helping Brutus. ‘They read more like rhetorical exercises on a given theme than letters | from a Roman general’. But such a state of affairs is not absolutely incompatible with the theory that the collection is formed round a hard core of genuine letters: in this case the given theme could be Brutus’ own in nr. 69. Nor does the fact that the letter is internally dateless count either way. τί τούτων τέλος gives the letter a little punch. If genuine, Torraca LXIX is presumably right that ‘Essa fu scritta dopo la campagna di Licia, mentre Bruto era in marcia col suo esercito verso Sardi’ (i.e. about June 42). {Affortunati prefers to put it earlier, in the context of the communications with Smyrna, Miletus, Caunus, and Damas (28.3n.).}

48

8. καὶ ... ἑτέραν: *Epistologr. Gr.* 182 nr. 25 = Torraca nr. 25. If genuine, this letter was written after the subjugation of part of Lycia. The whole operation was completed by about April 42 (Smith 197, Torraca XXI).

Smith 194 thinks that the text here is strongly against the authenticity of the letter: ‘Plutarch seems to have been under the impression that the third letter which he quotes was sent to the Samians’. Whereas in the case of the first two letters quoted *γράφει* has no direct object, here it governs *ἑτέραν*, and ‘the reason for this is that the recipients are the same as in the foregoing example, namely the Samians, and *ἑτέραν* has its proper force of “a second letter”, instead of “another”, i.e. *ἄλλην*’ (the same argument in Paukstadt in his edition of the *Brutus*, Gotha 1891). The argument is quite unconvincing: (i) whatever one may think about ‘proper force’, *ἑτέραν* can certainly be used as = *ἄλλην*; (ii) [*περὶ Παταρέων*] was long ago rightly deleted by Voegelin as a marginal note which then got into the text (cf. Torraca VI). But that shows that an ancient scholiast took *ἑτέραν* as = *ἄλλην*, and then referred the letter to a different city from Samos; (iii) the letter makes best sense if it is supposed to be addressed to a town in Lycia which is being warned by what happened to its immediate neighbours: the collection’s *Λυκίοις* is likely therefore to be on the right lines. Needless to say, P.’s use of *ἑτέραν* instead of the precise *Λυκίοις* does not prove that he was drawing from a source independent of the collection of Brutus’ letters extant: such an imprecision would be typical.

Ξάνθιοι: see 30–31 below.

Παταρεῖς: see 32 below. The information about Xanthus and Patara contained in this letter coheres (as far as it goes) with the historical accounts.

ἐλέσθαι: the better reading, not because it has greater *MSS* authority, but because it is easier to take *ἐξόν* as = *ἔξεστι* (on the analogy of *δηλον* etc.) than to leave *ἐξόν* ‘hanging’ (a usage which, while natural looking, is hard to parallel).

So far, then, there is nothing specifically against the authenticity of these letters, but neither is there anything much for it.

Another possible approach is to try to discover P.’s source for these letters: if he is using simply the collection of Brutus’ letters still extant or a similar collection, then the question of authenticity would have to remain open (technically anyway; in practice I think scepticism should then carry the day). If not, this might well be an argument for genuineness. The problem has to be faced: to argue ‘Sull’ autenticità dell’ ep. I non possono sorgere ragionevolmente dubbi: la testimonianza di Plutarco ha un valore inoppugnabile’ (Torraca XXII, cf. Wilson 22) is simply an act of faith (nor does it do justice to the subtlety of P.’s persona at 2.5–8, as I argue below).

Unfortunately it is quite impossible to date the collection. Marcks, *Symbola Critica ad Epistolographos Graecos* (diss. Bonn 1883), 23ff., thought that it was forged by Stoic admirers of Brutus in the first century A.D. This

would allow P. to consult it, and would—in a general way—cohere with its ‘Laconic’ style. | However, the obvious and decisive objection to this theory is that many of the letters (e.g. 11 and 43) are anything but adulatory of Brutus. Cichorius, *Römische Studien*, 434ff., argued that if the collection is a forgery it must have been made at the latest in the first century A.D. since extracts from it are quoted by P., and that Mithridates—if the collection is genuine—must be looked for among the eastern dynasts of the first century, the *terminus ante* being the composition date of the *Brutus*. The first argument ignores the possibility of a nucleus of genuine letters, the second the awkward fact that there clearly was at least one other collection besides that of Mithridates himself, as his introduction shows. Most embarrassingly of all, it seems extremely likely that the author of the collection is a ‘Mithridates *personatus*’ (A. Westermann, *Marci Bruti Epistolae Graecae* [1885], 3). Torraca XXX–XXXI agrees that the Mithridates in question is *personatus*, but believes that the name must still have some specious reference. βασιλεῖ Μιθριδάτη, in his opinion, because βασιλεῖ is used *tout court*, suggests ‘the Great King’, hence perhaps a king of Parthia such as Mithridates IV, 130–147 A.D. Perhaps, but βασιλεῖ Μιθριδάτη is not *tout court*: ‘the Great King’ is just βασιλεύς. Smith 203 thinks that the general tone of the collection fits the hypothesis that it is a sophistic production, perhaps therefore first or second century. This may well be right, and would to some degree explain the Mithridates *persona*, for it is well-known that the Second Sophistic movement flowered especially in Asia Minor. But the dating would necessarily still be very vague. Torraca finds a more secure dating criterion in the passage of the introduction:

ἦν δὲ δυσεύρετος ἡ ἐπιβολὴ κατ’ ἀγνοίαν τῆς τότε περὶ τὰς πόλεις τύχης τε καὶ γνώμης· οὐ μὴν ταύτη γε ἀνήκα | τὴν ὀρμὴν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἱστοριῶν ἐπιλεξάμενος. ... 51

This, Torraca feels, reads as if the writer were referring to a period of the remote past. But even this, though true, is not very helpful, as ‘the remote past’ is an elastic term and the passage itself is merely a variation on the conventional literary theme of the peculiar difficulties confronting the particular writer. To sum up, it cannot be shown that P. could, or could not, have used ‘Mithridates’ collection on chronological grounds. Nor is the evidence of textual disparity decisive either way: I have already discussed the [περὶ Παταρέων] in P.’s text at 2.8. The only other discrepancy—P.’s ἀπονοίας instead of the collection’s τῆς ἀνοίας (also 2.8)—does not amount to much. In any case P. would not have needed to use ‘Mithridates’ particular collection, in view of the possibility of the existence of other collections raised by the introduction.

A final approach is to examine the way P. introduces the letters into his *Life*. Smith 202, n. 5, suggests that ‘the last part of the chapter, dealing with

the letters, seems to be rather loosely attached to what has gone before, which may suggest that it is not from the same source as the preceding part; though this is anything but conclusive'. It is hardly true that the last part is loosely connected, since discussion of Brutus' literary accomplishments follows naturally upon the mention of the *ρήτωρ* Empylus, but it may well be the case (of course) that the letters do come from a different source. But this proves nothing about the authenticity of that source. Finally, scholars have attempted to make something of P.'s remark at 53.7 *τὸ ἐπιστόλιον, εἴπερ ἄρα τῶν γνησίων ἐστίν*, which shows that P. was aware that there was an authenticity problem with some of Brutus' letters. Smith thinks that the remark may be significant, since (according to | him P. seems to suppose that the letter was written in Greek. But there is no reason to take P. as supposing that. But does his doubt at 53.7, whether over a Latin or Greek letter, help in 2.5–8? Some scholars have believed that it does, and shows that P. believed that he was on firm ground at 2.5–8. In that case, Brutus' Greek letters might have been made public either by Bibulus (Westermann 3ff.), or perhaps on the death of Junia, sister of Brutus and wife of Cassius, in 22 A.D., at a time when there was already considerable interest in certain (Stoic?) circles in the memories of Brutus/Cassius (cf. the trial of Cremutius Cordus in A.D. 25—Tac. *Ann.* 4.34). Speculation about the possible links between P. and the collection of 'Mithridates' could thus be neatly short-circuited. This reconstruction of P.'s thought processes might seem to put too much emphasis on P. the historian rather than P. the literary artist. P. (in my opinion) would be perfectly capable of using evidence which he considered interesting and intriguing at 2.5–8 without committing himself to its historical accuracy, and then raising the problem for the first time at 53.7, a much more 'historical' context. But in fact (I think) P. does himself give a clue to the historical value he puts on Brutus' Greek letters in *ch.* 2. His discussion at the start of the section (2.5) seems absolutely serious: Brutus' Greek epistolary style, he tells us, is in some cases 'striking'. The Greek is so phrased, with the interesting word *παράσημος* having to be taken roughly in the sense of *φανερὸς*, that the reader can have no suspicions. The introduction of the letter to the people of Pergamum continues this tone. But in sections 6 and 7 his own staccato phrasing seems almost to be a parody of Brutus' 'Laconic' style. He then repeats the word *παράσημος*, but this time attaches it to the letters themselves. In contrast with the first use of *παράσημος*, where the structure of the sentence is such as to render the word | innocuous, it is here thrust into prominence. The effect, surely, is to bring out another application of the word: 'counterfeit' (for this application see D. 24.213; Poll. 3.86; Plu. *Quom. adul. ab amico intermosc.* 65B). The letters also have undergone a metamorphosis from *ἐπιστολαί* in 2.5 to *ἐπιστόλια*. At first sight there is a simple explanation for this: P. uses *ἐπιστολαί* in 2.5 because he is dealing with a *genre* of literature, whereas

ἐπιστόλια in 2.8 is descriptive (the letters after all are indeed ‘little letters’). But P. often uses diminutive forms to show when he is not taking what he is recording very seriously (cf. 5.3, 5.4, 13.3), and the effect here is to ‘distance’ P. I believe that this whole passage is very cleverly put together indeed, and that P. is giving the reader a nudge, to show that he does not himself believe in the authenticity of these celebrated epistles.

If this analysis is accepted, what are the consequences? If P. were citing Brutus’ Greek letters in good faith, this ought not to be taken as strong evidence in favour of their authenticity. But if he is in fact implying that they are a fraud, then his evidence becomes very important indeed. To put it simply, P. might hold this belief for one of two main reasons: (i) he himself has carefully researched the problem; (ii) he is relying on a scholarly *communis opinio* of the first century. If he had researched the problem himself, then one might have expected him to announce the fact with a bit of bravura. The fact that he conveys his views in an allusive, knowing, way rather suggests that he is showing that he is aware what the informed view of the letters is, that he, Plutarch, is thoroughly *au fait* with the best contemporary Brutan scholarship.

To sum up. It cannot be proved to the last degree that Brutus’ Greek letters are *all* forgeries. But P.’s (as I believe) evident belief that the three he quotes are frauds must be regarded as an | important argument, especially as those three letters are ones that cannot be convicted on the ground of conflict with the historical tradition. P. is really making a general attack upon a whole corpus (which could well be the collection of ‘Mithridates’, or something very like it). Again, P.’s evidence is not in itself absolutely decisive. But when it is put together with what anyone must admit to be the outlandish tone of the letters, the case for rejecting their authenticity becomes very strong indeed.

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What then is the purpose of 2.5–8? At first sight it appears to give evidence that casts Brutus implicitly in rather a harsh light. (Ἐπιστολαί can of course be used as evidence of character—cf. *Eum.* 11.3.) If that really were the case, one would have to say that P. simply records the letters because he is generally greatly interested in βραχυλογία as a political style, and forgets, or does not care, that the letters to some extent undermine his characterization of Brutus as πρᾶος, φιλόανθρωπος, and ἐπιεικής. But in fact it is not the case, and to the perceptive reader 2.5–8 tells nothing about Brutus’ character at all. The section has some justification in formal terms, since discussion of a statesman’s literary and oratorical abilities is a standard element of Plutarchean biography. Its flavour is rather similar to the many passages recording notable *dicta* (cf. e.g. *Lyc.* 19–20, *Themist.* 18, *Cat. maior* 8–9, *Lys.* 22, *Gracchi* 25.4–6, *Flam.* 17, *Demosth.* 11.5–7, *Cic.* 25, 38, *Phoc.* 9). It may also remind the reader of Brutus’ Laconism, and help to maintain the theme of the struggle against tyranny. At the same time it enables P. to introduce some colourful and (even in his time) controversial

material popularly associated with Brutus, and quietly to pronounce his own opinion of its authenticity. There may also be a wider application. There are several occasions in the Brutus where P. seems to go out of his way to create a lighter, humorous tone | (cf. 5.3-4, 9.4, 13.3, 23.6, 34.4-7, 34.8). It is perhaps not too fanciful to see in this a deliberate technique for humanizing the great Republican heroes, for demonstrating that they possessed *χάρις*, and were not simply the dour figureheads of the political opposition to the Caesars. At any rate, from several points of view, 2.5-8 is an excellent illustration of the subtlety and elusiveness of P.'s literary art.

One may note in passing that P. says nothing about Brutus' poetry (not highly regarded—cf. Tac. *Dial.* 21.6, Pliny *Ep.* 5.3.5, ? Stat. *Silv.* 4.9.20-23). As these references indicate, some of it must have survived down to P.'s time. Either he did not know of its existence, or—equally possible—he did not consider it worth bothering about.

Chs. 3–5: First steps—Brutus’ relations with the three great Romans of his day

With 3.1 Ἔτι δὲ μειράκιον ὦν P. starts to organize his narrative on a chronological basis (cf. 4.1), but the real, though unstated, point of this and the next two chapters is to show how highly Brutus was esteemed by the three great Romans of his day (cf. 5.1, καὶ Καίσαρ: sc. as well as Pompey). This becomes clear in *ch.* 5, where P. breaks the chronological sequence in order to emphasize the closeness of the relationship between Caesar, Servilia, and Brutus. At the same time *chs.* 3–5 can also be read as Brutus’ ‘first steps’, with 3 marking his political début. The theme of Brutus’ incorruptibility, already perhaps hinted at in 1.4, is also introduced.

Ch. 3: Brutus in Cyprus

On the annexation of Cyprus see S. I. Oost, *CP* 50 (1955), 98ff.; E. Badian, *JRS* 55 (1965), 110ff., and *Roman Imperialism in the Late | Republic* (2nd. ed. 1968), 76ff. Cato’s expedition should be dated to late spring 58–spring/early summer 56 B.C. (Oost 101, 107–8). 56

The present chapter needs to be compared with the account in *Cat. min.* 35–38 (see below).

1. Ἔτι δὲ μειράκιον: the connection with what has gone before is thus technically chronological, but the real link is thematic (cf. above). P. proceeds to put flesh on the programmatic statement of 2.1.

μειράκιον: is this accurate? The word is defined by Hippocrates in *Philo Mechanicus* 1.26 as ἄχρι γενείου λαχνώσεως, ἐς τὰ τρις ἐπτὰ. That this definition has some validity is strikingly demonstrated by *Cic.* 28.2, where Clodius at the time of the Bona Dea scandal is described as μειράκιον καὶ μήπω γενειῶν. And P.’s customary usage conforms (examples from Porter on *Arat.* 4.1). Thus Julius Caesar at eighteen (*Caes.* 1.3), Philip V of Macedon at seventeen (*Arat.* 46.2), and Octavian at nineteen (*Brut.* 27.3) are all οὐπω πάνυ μειράκια, Alexander the Great is μειράκιον at twenty (*De fort. Alex.* 327D), and at the same age C. Gracchus (*Gracchi* 22.2) is μειράκιον παντάπασι. But this picture is disturbed by (e.g.) *Mar.* 3.4, when Marius is μειράκιον at above twenty-three, by *Alc.* 13.1: Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀφῆκεν αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν ἔτι μειράκιον ὦν, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους εὐθὺς ἐταπείνωσε δημαγωγούς, referring to a time when Alcibiades must have been in his early or middle thirties, and by *Dion* 7.2, where it is used very loosely, since in 367 B.C. Dionysius was about twenty-nine. Attempts have been made to explain away these apparent anomalies. Thus according to Hamilton on *Alex.* 2.2 the Marian reference is ‘due to the fact that Marius was doing his first military service, normally performed earlier’ (though the point rather is rhetorical: to emphasize that | ‘the youth is father of the man’) and 57

according to Russell, *Plutarch* 120, in the *Alcibiades* passage it is *εὐθύς* which is at fault, not *μειράκιον* (though again the point is rhetorical: Alcibiades, ‘a mere lad’, humiliated all the mature *δημαγωγοί*). But this sort of approach will not work with *Dion* 7.2, where the point is plainly rhetorical: because Dionysius is a *μειράκιον* he will be easily led astray. *Mar.* 3.4 and *Alc.* 13.1 are also better analysed as genuinely loose terminology, used in order to make a rhetorical point. For similar observations see also Pelling {D.Phil.} 175f.

Does the same apply to the present passage? Brutus’ date of birth is a matter of debate. Cic. *Brutus* 324 and 229, produces a dating of 85 B.C. (‘Annis ante decem causas agere coepit [sc. Hortensius] quam tu [Brutus] es natus’; Hortensius’ first appearance in court is fixed in 95: ‘L. Crasso Q. Scaevola consulibus’). This is supported by Brutus’ *cursus*: his praetorship in 44, his quaestorship in 53 (*De vir. ill.* 82.3–4 ‘Quaestor (Caesari) in Galliam proficisci noluit, quod is bonis omnibus displicebat. Cum Appio socero in Cilicia fuit, et cum ille repetundarum accusaretur, ipse ne verbo quidem infamatus est’; {this date for the quaestorship is further defended by L. Peppe, *Annali dell’Istituto Italiano di Numismatica* 43 (1996), 47–64}), and his projected consulship in 41 (Cic. *Phil.* 8.27, cf. Gelzer 987), for under the terms of the Sullan re-enactment of the *Lex Villia Annalis* the minimum age for the quaestorship was thirty, for the praetorship thirty-nine, and for the consulship forty-two (see A. E. Astin, *The Lex Annalis before Sulla* [1958]; Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* [1964], 140ff.). But {the MSS of} Velleius 2.72.1 give 78 B.C. (‘septimum et tricesimum annum agentis’ at Philippi, {but Woodman *ad loc.* follows J. J. Paterson in emending XXXVII to XXXXII, to bring the text into line with the other sources if Brutus’ birthdate was later than 23 October in 85}). A third dating offered by Livy *Epit.* 124 (‘Annorum erat circiter XL’ at Philippi) has been generally and rightly disregarded as being simply a round figure.

58 Some scholars (including Nipperdey, *Rh. Mus.* 19 [1861], 291; E. T. Bynum, *Das Leben des M. Iunius Brutus bis auf Caesars | Ermordung* (diss. Halle 1897), 6ff.; Seeck, *Rh. Mus.* 56 [1898], 631ff. and *Hermes* 42 [1908], 505–8; Douglas on *Brutus* 324) have argued in favour of Velleius’ date. Douglas’ arguments are typical, so they are the ones discussed here.

Douglas supposes Velleius’ date to be the more accurate. He follows Nipperdey in emending Cicero’s text to ‘sedecim’ and postulating that Caesar appointed Brutus praetor in defiance of the *Leges Annales*, for the reasons set out below:

- (i) the earlier dating makes Brutus’ entry into political life rather late;
- (ii) P. has *μειράκιον* in the present passage;
- (iii) Cic. *Brutus* 249.5–6 ‘hic (Caesar), cum ego iudicare iam aliquid possem, afit’ he finds surprising if Brutus was twenty-six when Caesar left for Gaul: surely a man in his early twenties could form a judgement of oratory.

The *De vir. ill.* passage he simply dismisses with the remark: ‘neither the text nor the interpretation is absolutely secure’. (This is of course the critical *cursus* argument, since the quaestorship would not have been obtained under the patronage of Caesar, who in 44 could naturally overrule the *Leges Annales* if he liked.) Douglas’ arguments do not convince: (i) is something of an imponderable anyway, but falls flat if the *De vir. ill.* evidence is accepted. Nor should Brutus’ service in Cyprus, as *comes* of Cato, be under-rated. (ii) counts for very little in view of *Mar.* 3–4, *Alc.* 13.1 and *Dion* 7.2. (It is a very small point, but Brutus’ description of himself as *νέος* in 46 at 40.7 below cannot be reconciled strictly with even the later dating of his birth. This again shows the flexibility of P.’s use of these terms.) (iii) does not amount to much in itself, but is even less convincing in view of the qualification ‘iam aliquid’: it is not a question of any old judgement. (One should also remember that among his | contemporaries 59 Brutus had the reputation of being hesitant: *Cic. Ad Att.* 16.5 [410].) Nor is the *De vir. ill.* passage nearly so garbled as Douglas implies: the sense, no matter about the exact text of the first sentence, is absolutely clear, and the second sentence looks solidly circumstantial (the passage is taken at face value by Broughton II, 229, and by many modern scholars). Thus it is a case of Cicero, backed by the *cursus*, versus Velleius, and whatever Velleius’ status as a historian (a topic at present hotly debated), there is no doubt whose evidence should be preferred.

Thus a dating of c. 85 B.C. should be accepted. (It does not, incidentally, conflict with the facts that, firstly, Cassius was older than Brutus—see on 29.1, and, secondly, that Favonius was older than both Brutus and Cassius—see on 34.6.) Here I find myself in agreement with (e.g.) Gelzer 973f.; Wilson 30ff., who has an excellent discussion of the problem; Badian, *JRS* 57 (1967), 229; G. V. Sumner, *Phoenix* 25 (1971), 365f. and *The Orators in Cicero’s Brutus: Prosopography and Chronology* (1973), 154, and n. 5; {Clarke, *Noblest Roman* 11; and Woodman on *Vell.* 2.72.1, who emends Velleius’ text to bring it into line with the other sources—see above}. Thus P.’s *μειράκιον* here (of a Brutus c. twenty-seven years old) is loose terminology, designed partly for rhetorical effect (to illustrate Brutus’ alleged precocity), partly in the interests of unity of time (there is a rapid movement from birth in 1.1–5 to ‘youth’ in 3.1), and mostly because in Plutarchean biography *ἔτι δὲ μειράκιον ὄν* is one of the set formulae of chronological division, used often to signal the political debut of the hero. (To be a *μειράκιον* was one of the recognized divisions of a man’s life [*ἔφηβος, μειράκιον, ἀνὴρ, γέρων*, *Men. Georg.* 18D {= 724 Körte}; *παῖς, μειράκιον, νεάνισκος*: *Arr. Epictet.* 3.9.8]. For the formula in P. cf. e.g. *Alc.* 7.3, *Coriol.* 3.1, etc. etc. Of course such formulae are used from the very beginning of Greek biography. Cf. already *Hdt.* 1.107–130 with | H. Homeyer, ‘Zu den Anfängen der griechischen Biographie’, *Philol.* 106 [1962], 75–85.) 60

It was always a problem for historians how to create an artistic unity out of a lengthy span of years, and the usual solution for historians with literary pretensions was to falsify the time scale and pretend (or give the impression) that it was less than it was. Thus Livy on the reign of Tullus Hostilius: 1.22–26 Alban war, 1.27 ‘nec diu’, 1.28 ‘tum’, 1.29 ‘inter haec’, 1.30 ‘interim’, 1.31 ‘devictis Sabinis’, 1.31.5 ‘haud ita multo post’, but 1.31.8 ‘Tullus ... regnavit annos duos et triginta’ (!), or Sallust, *BJ* 9.3 ‘statim ... adoptavit’, though the adoption took place in the period 121–118 B.C. and the events described immediately before ‘statim’ occurred in 133–32. P.’s technique here is similar, and can be paralleled throughout his work, e.g. *Mar.* 3.4 (above): loss of two years; *Alc.* 13.1 (above): loss of at least ten years; *Dion* 7.2 (above): loss of about eight years; *Sert.* 4.1 ὅτε δὲ πρῶτον, loss of about three years; *Sulla* 5.1 εὐθύς: loss of about six years; *Amat.* 771C ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ: telescoping of about twenty-eight years. Cf. below 21.1, and see further A. N. Sherwin-White, *CQ* n.s. 27 (1977), 177–8 and n. 28; {Moles, *Cicero* 37, category (d1), ‘telescoping of time scale’; Pelling, *Plutarch and History* 92, ‘chronological compression’}. It is (of course) both pedantic and misconceived to dismiss such literary devices as mere ‘chronological errors’. (Again the technique goes back to early Greek biography: cf. *X. Ages.* 1.6 ἔτι ... νέος ὄν of an Agesilaus already over forty.)

In using the expedition to Cyprus as evidence for Brutus’ activity as a *μειράκιον*, P. of course passes over several earlier important events in Brutus’ career, notably his adoption, his involvement in the Vettius affair, and (according to modern scholarship) his betrothal to Caesar’s daughter, Julia. Neither the adoption nor the betrothal to Julia (if historical—see on 61 4.3) would have been suitable material for this section of the *Life* | Both might also, naturally, have been beyond the ability of P. to unravel. The involvement in the Vettius affair would have been suitable from one point of view (the theme of the struggle against tyranny). But P. only mentions the Vettius affair once (*Luc.* 42.7–8) and then only as a device of Pompey’s supporters, so that it would have been difficult for him to reinterpret it in the way that would have been necessary to suit the theme of the *Brutus*. P. might also have felt that the whole business would simply have disrupted his narrative. The fact, then, that he does not mention it does not prove that he had no knowledge of the interpretation of it which inculcated Brutus. It is always difficult to decide with P. whether the omission of some important item stems from ignorance or is rather to be explained by formal or literary considerations.

συναπεδήμησεν: used, like *συνεκδημέω*, with the technical sense ‘be a comes of’, ‘go on a public mission with’. Cf. *Crass.* 3.7, *POxy.* 1122.10, *IG*² 2.641.15, *OGI* 196.5, *Ephes.* 3, nr. 29 (of the comes of an emperor). The implication of the narrative of 1–2 seems to be that Brutus accompanied Cato as far as Rhodes, then fell sick, and had to cross to Pamphylia to

recuperate, though P. is far from explicit. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by 3.4 (P.'s favourite 'ring' construction).

Πτολεμαῖον : *RE* 23.1755f. (Volkmann).

2. διαφθείραντος: by poison (*Cat. min.* 36.1), despite Cato's efforts to persuade him to give up his kingdom without a fight, and his promises of a future life of wealth and honour, complete with the priesthood at Paphos. It is worth noting here how the *Brutus* narrative differs from the account followed in the *Cato minor*. In the *Cato* Cato (i) sends Caninius to treat with Ptolemy; (ii) himself remains in Rhodes making preparations and awaiting Ptolemy's reply; (iii) on Ptolemy's suicide sends Brutus to Cyprus because of his suspicions of Caninius, while himself sailing to Byzantium. | The *Brutus* version (i) puts Ptolemy's suicide before/or contemporaneous with Cato's sojourn at Rhodes; (ii) leaves out Cato's voyage to Byzantium; (iii) conflates the original despatch of Caninius to treat with Ptolemy (35.2) and his guardianship of the king's treasure after his suicide. This does not show Plutarchean incompetence: it is a deliberate reorganization of material to suit the needs of the *Brutus*. (ii) is an irrelevant detail in the present context, and necessitates (i). (iii) is itself a natural simplification in *Brutus* but is also necessitated by (i). The differences between the two accounts do not, therefore, indicate *either* difference of common source *or* incompetence arising from ignorance of the detailed facts.

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Κανίδιον: who is this? Various individuals have been suggested: (i) a complete unknown. (ii) P. Canidius Crassus, *cos. suff.* 40, and Antony's great general. So Syme, *RR* 200, n. 3. His only argument for this is the great rarity of the *gentilicium*. This identification was rejected already by Münzer, *RE* 3.1475f. It seems a little unlikely that a close friend of Cato, with an impeccable moral character, should have wound up as a staunch partisan of Antony's, though there were of course great Republicans who transferred their allegiance to Antony after Philippi. (iii) J. Geiger, 'Canidius or Caninius?', *CQ* n.s. 22 (1972), 130–134, argues very convincingly that the text here should read **Κανίνιον** (as ζ and perhaps a later hand in *L*), and that the man should be identified with the tribune L. Caninius Gallus, who proposed a law that Ptolemy Auletes should be restored to Egypt by Pompey (*Pomp.* 49.10, reading **Κανίνιος** instead of the *MSS* **Κανίδιος**). I accept his arguments.

δείσας ... κλοπῆς: cf. *Cat. min.* 36.1. On Geiger's reconstruction of the career of Caninius Gallus, Cato may have been more worried by the fear that Caninius was acting on behalf of | Ptolemy king of Egypt (Geiger 131ff.). In the event Caninius proved scrupulously incorruptible and was treated by Cato with especial favour (*Cat. min.* 37.4). Cato's unwillingness to trust even close friends during the Cyprus operation caused much bad feeling and provided abundant ammunition for Caesar in his *Anticato* (*Cat. min.* 36.5).

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ἐκ Παμφυλίας ... διῆγεν: there is none of this detail about Brutus in the *Cato minor* (36.1–2). This is natural enough: similarly in the *Brutus P.* suppresses mention of Cato’s own expedition to Byzantium and his quelling of *στάσις* there (*Cat. min.* 36.2–3).

ἀναλαμβάνων: ‘vires recolligendo’, Voegelin, cl. *Aem.* 28.2, *Marc.* 6.7, *Flam.* 6.2, *Pyrrh.* 12.6 (and also—wrongly—13.11 below).

3–4. ὁ δ’ ... ἔπλευσεν: none of this has any parallel in the *Cato minor* account.

3. ὡς: this is intended to reflect Brutus’ own feelings, whereas ἄτε below is the reason P. himself gives for Brutus’ distaste for the task.

ἀπερριμένον: a strong word, suggestive of violent rejection, and extremely appropriate to Cato’s unamiable personal character. Cf. *Cat. mai.* 5.5, 16.8.

νέος: P. is criticizing Brutus for not taking his responsibilities, however mundane he may think them, sufficiently seriously, but his *νεότης* is a mitigating factor. ‘The Greeks were very susceptible to the pathos inherent in the rashness of inexperienced youth’, Dodds on *Bacchae* 973–6, cl. *Od.* 7.294, E. *Supp.* 580, *I.A.* 489, fr. trag. adesp. 538N {= Metrodorus, fr. 57 Körte}, Arist. *Rhet.* 2.12, esp. 1389B 7 (to which add Aes. *PV passim*). *νέος* can be used of a man up to the age of thirty (*X. Mem.* 1.2.35, cf. Philostr. *VA* 3.39), so there is no conflict with 85 as Brutus’ date of birth (whereas |
64 *νέος* at 40.7 is simply a slight rhetorical exaggeration: ‘when I was young and foolish’ v. ‘now that I am older and wiser’). (Of course P.’s use of *νέος* can sometimes be as elastic as his use of *μειράκιον*, e.g. in *Mar.* 4.3 Marius is *νέος* at the age of thirty-eight, and in *Cic.* 20.6 Caesar is *νέος* at the age of thirty-seven.)

σχολαστής: glossed by Coraes as *περὶ λόγους καὶ φιλοσοφίαν σχολάζων*, which is right, though it does not mean that Brutus was devoting himself to the *formal* study of philosophy and rhetoric at the time (he was convalescing in Pamphylia). For the theme see 4.8, 36.4 below. In context *σχολαστής* is slightly derogatory: Brutus preferred the *βίος σχολαστικός* to political activity (the pejorative implication is of course very common. In P. cf. e.g. *Solon* 22.3, *De tuenda san.* 135B).

One must wonder whether the faintly critical account of Brutus’ reluctance to concern himself with routine financial matters conceals an *apologia* for his unfortunately well attested financial rapacity. If so, one should not automatically hold P. responsible rather than his source. (See below.)

4. καὶ περὶ ταῦτα: i.e. as well as his intellectual interests.

συντείνας: Brutus had to exert himself: P. is hinting (rather in contradiction to the panegyric of 1.3) that perhaps Brutus was not

temperamentally disposed to the life of action (cf. οὐδ' ἑαυτοῦ ποιούμενος above).

ὑπὸ τοῦ Κάτωνος ἐπηνέθη: clearly meant as a great honour, especially in view of Cato's churlish treatment of his subordinates and practically everybody else (e.g. Cicero).

ἀναλαβών: 'excipiens, ad se in navem recipiens secum, adducens', Voegelin cl. Hdt. 6.115, *Alc.* 30.5, *Marc.* 6.5. Note the repetition after ἀναλαμβάνων in 2. Classical authors, | even such skilled stylists as P., do not regard such repetitions as infelicitous. Cf. *Marc.* 6.4, 6.6, 6.7, where P. keeps using ἀναλαμβάνω (once with a different sense).

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εἰς ... ἔπλευσεν: ring construction, picking up 3.1.

P.'s account of Brutus' activities in Cyprus is clearly to be treated with the utmost caution. At the very least, it must greatly exaggerate his role. Even when allowance is made for the different perspectives of the two accounts, there is no way that ἀναλαβών τὰ πλεῖστα ... can be reconciled with *Cat. min.* 38–39, where it is Cato's meticulous accounting, and careful conveyance, of the money that is emphasized. This raises the question of P.'s source for the episode. It is conceivable that the increased 'hard' detail about Brutus found in the *Brutus* account came from the same source as the *Cato minor*, and that P. simply cut it from the fuller account as being of no relevance to Cato. P.'s source in the *Cato minor* was Thræsea Paetus, who used Munatius Rufus (*Cat. min.* 37.1). P. himself probably did not consult Munatius (Peter 65–9; Geiger {D.Phil.}, intr. section 3, {*Athen.* 57 (1979), 48–72, and in intr. to Rizzoli *Focione–Catone Uticense* [1993], 288–310}; R. Flacelière, Budé ed. of *Phocion–Cato* [1976], 65–6). Munatius' account of Cato in Cyprus was evidently extremely detailed and could have provided the information about Brutus' illness and reluctance to act, and his earning the approval of Cato. Thræsea Paetus, himself greatly interested in Brutus (he celebrated the birthdays of Brutus and Cassius with his son-in-law Helvidius Priscus: Juvenal 5.36–7), would naturally have preserved such information. The increased 'soft' detail of the *Brutus* account (the attribution of motive: ἄτε ... νέος καὶ σχολαστής; the exaggeration ἀναλαβών τὰ πλεῖστα) could thus be P.'s own contribution. But the possibility of contamination by another source cannot be absolutely excluded, and here one might think of Empylus of *Rhodes*. |

Another question is the precise relation of the accounts of the *Brutus* and *Cato minor*. Although on the evidence of the cross-references the *Cato* is the later *Life* (Jones, 'Chronology', 68 [= Scardigli, *Essays* 111]), this should not be allowed to pre-judge the question of the relative priority of particular passages, the interpretation and meaning of the evidence of the cross-references being so great a matter of controversy. The *Brutus* account has naturally been abbreviated and streamlined to fit its context in the *Life* of Brutus. The question is whether the streamlining has been done in such a way as to suggest that P. has already booked up on Cato in Cyprus from

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the point of view of writing the *Cato*. The answer to such a question must to a considerable extent depend on subjective judgements, but (for what it is worth) I do get the feeling that P. is scaling down from greater knowledge. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the *Brutus* account is taken straight from *Cato* as it stands, or from a fairly full written draft, since there are no striking verbal parallels between the two accounts, while in the *Brutus* there is extra information about Brutus, some of it of a concrete nature. All this may be an argument for ‘simultaneous preparation’. Another point worth making is that, from the point of view of the reader, the *Brutus* account in 3.1–2 is really extremely allusive and would surely not make much sense without reference to the fuller account of the *Cato*. This again suggests a close chronological relationship between the two passages.

67 Finally, a problem of a rather different character. We all know about Brutus’ extremely dubious financial dealings with the inhabitants of Salamis (*Ad Att.* 5.21 [114], 6.1–3 [115–7]; {for recent discussion cf. V. Léovant in J. Champeaux and M. Chassignet [eds.] *Aere Perennius* [Fshr. H. Zehnacker, 2006], 247–62}; J. Muñiz Coello, *Latomus* 67 [2008], 643–61; C. Rosillo López, *Latomus* 69 (2010), 989–90}). Did P., and has he deliberately suppressed his knowledge? (Oost rightly finds the loss of Cato’s accounts highly suspicious [*Cat. min.* 38] and surmises that Cato was trying to shield someone, i.e. Brutus, from the charge of public peculation. This seems very likely, but P. | can certainly not be blamed for saying nothing about this, since his source clearly went to great lengths to explain the situation away.) The correct attitude for a modern historian to adopt to these dealings is, I am sure, to avoid the white-hot moral indignation of (e.g.) Tyrrell and Purser III, xxii f. and 337f., Badian, *Roman Imperialism*, 84ff., and Stockton, *Cicero* (1971), 239ff., and while condemning Brutus, to point out that in fact his behaviour was nothing out of the way for his time (Cicero was ‘green’ about the realities of Roman provincial administration in the Late Republic). But P. could not have happily adopted this attitude, for it is precisely with such questions of personal morality that he is largely concerned, and one of the areas of government he is most interested in is the handling of finance and the treatment of provincials. Thus if he did know of Brutus’ distasteful operations he is being deliberately dishonest in not mentioning them, and concealing his knowledge in order to avoid upsetting his characterization of Brutus as a man both of scrupulous integrity in financial matters and of conspicuous humanity in his dealings with those over whom he had power. It is true that P. is later extremely critical of Brutus for his willingness to allow his troops to plunder Sparta and Thessalonica (46.2), and that, although this is the only passage where Brutus is explicitly condemned, the general narrative of 45–6 hints (I believe deliberately) at a deterioration in Brutus’ character under the pressure of the exigencies of war. But this is no indication that P. would have included an account of the Scaptius affair had he known it, since 45–

6 is precisely a study of the deterioration of a character under stress (an important concern of P.'s: cf. the *Alexander* and *Sertorius*), and can, as it were, be detached from P.'s general characterization of Brutus.

It must of course be admitted that P. is quite capable of suppressing material if it redounds to | the discredit of the particular hero he is writing 68 about at the time (provided naturally that the hero is not one with whom P. is almost totally out of sympathy). Thus in the *Pompey* he omits the Vettius affair, though in the *Lucullus* he had mentioned it as a machination of Pompey's supporters. The *Cicero* does not record Cicero's unpleasant urging of Brutus to kill C. Antonius, but the *Brutus* does, using Cicero as a foil to set off the *φιλανθρωπία* of Brutus (26.6). But although certainty is naturally impossible, I am inclined to think that P. was not aware of the Salamis business, for two reasons: (i) (and this is admittedly highly subjective) I think that P. was in the main an honest recorder of events and that he would have regarded the Salamis business as *so* disgraceful that he would have felt bound to mention it; (ii) the Salamis business is only attested in Cicero's letters *Ad Att.* 5.21 [114] and 6.1–3 [115–7]. P. of course had access to, and often does use, the evidence of Cicero's letters. But it is not clear how consistently or methodically he used them, and his account of Cicero in Cilicia (*Cic.* 36.1–6) is notably thin, and shows no sign of the key letters which inculpated Brutus. It seems most likely that in researching for his account of Brutus in Cyprus P. contented himself with the same source as he employed in the *Cato minor*, with a possible biographical supplement like Empylus.

Ch. 4: Brutus at Pharsalus

P. moves rapidly from 56 to 49, saying nothing about such important events in Brutus' life as his marriage to Claudia, daughter of Appius Claudius Pulcher, *cos.* 54, his quaestorship in 53 (see on 3.1), and his vehement opposition to Pompey (see on 1.5 and 2.5: his coins and *De dictatura Pompei* respectively). P.'s failure to mention any of these probably simply reflects ignorance. Had he known of it, Brutus' political opposition to Pompey would | surely have been worth a mention.

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1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πράγματα διέστη: a Plutarchean formula. Cf. *Cic.* 36.4, *Ant.* 5.1.

ἐξενεγκαμένων τὰ ὄπλα: ἐκφέρειν πόλεμον is common enough (D. 1.21, Hdt. 6.56, X. *HG* 3.5.1, Plb. 2.36.4), but this is intensely vivid: 'quasi e vagina gladios educuntibus', Voegelin.

ἡγεμονίας: the *imperium Romanum*. Cf. *Mon. Anc. Gr.* 15.1, Αἴγυπτον δήμου Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονία προσέθηκα. P. regularly uses ἡγεμονία as = 'imperium'. Cf. *Mar.* 36.8, *Luc.* 30.2, *Sulla* 8.5. The usage is common in Imperial Greek. See further Magie 58; Mason 151.

ἐπίδοξος ... αἰρήσεσθαι τὰ Καίσαρος: this does not cast doubt upon *De vir. ill.* 82.3–4 (quoted above on 3.1)—disapproval of Caesar might be offset by greater disapproval of Pompey.

ὁ γὰρ πατήρ ... πρότερον: P. gives a full account in *Pomp.* 16.4–8. Brutus had put himself in the hands of Pompey but was slain by Geminius, who was sent by Pompey to do the deed. The incident got Pompey a bad press: he wrote one letter to the Senate telling them Brutus had surrendered to him voluntarily and then sent another, denouncing the man after he had had him put to death. For unsuccessful recent attempts to defend Pompey against the charge of being 'adulescentulus carnifex' see A. N. Sherwin-White, *JRS* 45 (1956), 1ff.; J. Leach, *Pompey the Great* (1978), 42.

ὁ πατήρ: *RE* 10.972f., *tr. pl.* 83; Broughton II, 91.

πρότερον: more precisely, early in 77 B.C. after the siege of Mutina. P. never indicates such chronology accurately. Cf. 2.1 ὕστερον.

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Brutus had other motives for his estrangement from Pompey as well, as evidenced by his fight for *libertas* in 59 (possibly), 54, and 52 (above). It is characteristic of P. to emphasize the personal motive, though he may not have been aware that there were | any others. In the circumstances the personal motive must of course have been very important.

2. ἀξίων δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπίπροσθεν ποιεῖσθαι: the conflicting claims of τὰ κοινὰ and τὰ ἴδια are a standard theme of Greek political jargon since at least Thuc. 1.82, 2.61 etc., cf. *Timol.* 5.1. Since they are naturally much canvassed in a civil war situation, where traditional and family loyalties are often split, P. may be intending to give a contemporary political flavour (cf. *Caes. BC* 1.8.3 'semper se rei publicae commoda privatis necessitudinibus

habuisse potiora'). The general theme—Brutus' pursuit of τὰ κοινά over personal interest—is heavily stressed by P. throughout the *Life* (cf. 1.4, below 4.2–3, 6.8–9, 7.6–7, 8.3–4, 8.5, 15.9, 18.4–6, 22.4–6, 28.4–5, 29.3–11, 35.1–6 etc.)

ὑπόθεσιν: 'ground', 'justification', cf. 28.5 below.

τῆς Καίσαρος: the *MSS τοῦ Καίσαρος* would be very slack Greek, though not quite impossible. Ziegler's τῆς is in fact stolen from Voegelin.

3. καίτοι πρότερον ... τῆς πατρίδος: closely similar is *Pomph.* 64.5, Βρούτος, υἱὸς ὢν Βρούτου τοῦ περὶ Γαλατίαν σφαγέντος, ἀνὴρ μεγαλόφρων καὶ μηδέποτε Πομπηϊὸν προσειπὼν μηδὲ ἀσπασάμενος πρότερον ὡς φονέα τοῦ πατρός, τότε δὲ ὡς ἐλευθεροῦντα τὴν Ῥώμην ὑπέταξεν ἑαυτόν. The two passages are hardly independent. On the evidence of the cross-references the *Pompey* is the later *Life* (Jones, 'Chronology', 68 [= Scardigli, *Essays* 111]). In addition, the incident is more likely to be part of Brutus' βίος rather than Pompey's, so the present passage is probably prior.

Can it be right that Brutus refused to speak to Pompey before this? There is no supporting evidence, but neither is there any explicit contradictory evidence. It is true that by his marriage to Claudia, probably in 54, Brutus had become connected with Pompey, | because Pompey's 71 elder son had married Claudia's sister (Gelzer 977), but this does not of itself prove cordial relations with Pompey (*pace* Gelzer), especially if at the same time Brutus was striking his 'libertas' coins as a gesture against Pompey's mooted dictatorship. {The date of these coins—Crawford *RRC* 443/1 and /2—is discussed by S. M. Cerutti, *American Journal of Numismatics* 5–6 (1993–5), 69–87 and A. Peppe, *Annali dell'Istituto Italiano di Numismatica* 43 (1996), 47–64: Peppe follows Crawford in favouring the 54 date, Cerutti prefers 55; Cerutti is reluctant to accept that the *libertas* slogan is aimed against Pompey and thinks it simply evokes the ancestral achievement of L. Brutus.} The *De dictatura Pompei* of 52 certainly shows open hostility. Again, the fact that Pompey exerted himself on behalf of Appius Claudius Pulcher, when the latter was being defended by Brutus and Hortensius in 50, falls far short of proving that it 'ist selbstverständlich, dass am Ende des Jahres Brutus gegen Caesar im Lager des Pompeius stand' (Gelzer 980): political obligations in Rome might cut across the greatest personal enmities. P.'s evidence here is consistent with at least one aspect of Brutus' character: his unbending self-righteousness. Because of that, and because there seems to be no explicit evidence against it, and although one can easily imagine motives for inventing, or exaggerating the bitterness of Brutus' personal bearing towards Pompey, it should perhaps be accepted at face value. But if it is, there is an important consequence. Münzer's suggestion (*RA* 338f.) that the Servilius Caepio to whom Caesar's daughter Julia was betrothed in 59 (Suet. *Caes.* 21; Plut. *Caes.* 14.7; *Pomph.* 47.10) is no other than Brutus under his adoptive name has been widely accepted by

modern scholars (e.g. Syme, *RR* 34 and n. 7; Stockton, *Cicero*, 185). But there is no way that *Brut.* 4.3 and *Pomp.* 64.5 can be reconciled with the description of *Pomp.* 47.10, where to appease Caepio's anger Pompey promises him his own daughter in marriage (a marriage which does not then take place). Münzer's identification is also hard to square with [a] Brutus' putative involvement in the Vettius affair; [b] Cicero's 'Aham Servilium aliquem aut Brutum opus esse reperiri'—see on 1.5; [c] Suetonius' 'Servilio Caepione, cuius vel praecipua opera paulo ante Bibulum impugnaverat'). (The very complicated problems surrounding the Servilii Caepiones of the Late Republic are outside the scope | of this commentary. For a comprehensive, but still not entirely convincing discussion see Geiger {D.Phil.} 396ff. {and in *Anc. Soc.* 4 [1973], 143–56. The identification of Julia's fiancé with Brutus is also rejected by Clarke, *Noblest Roman* 15.})

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Κιλικίαν: Voegelin. The *MSS* σικελίαν is no doubt a scribal error.

Σηστίου: *RE* 2A. 1886 (Münzer), Broughton II, 264: P. Sestius, who was probably assigned Cilicia *pro consule*.

4. ὡς δ' ἐκεῖ πράττειν οὐδὲν ἦν μέγα: the fraudulence of this as an attribution of motive is patent—see on *ἐθελοντής* below.

ἀγωνιζόμενοι: Ziegler's tentative *ἀγωνιούμενοι* is of course possible, but the present is more subtle—the struggle had already begun before the decisive battle.

περὶ τῶν ὅλων: P. is inordinately fond of the expression τὰ ὅλα in political and especially military contexts, e.g. *Themist.* 16.3, 16.6, *Fab. Max.* 14.2, *Art.* 8.4, *Ant.* 8.3, *Agis–Cleom.* 15.4, *Alex.* 17.3, *Caes.* 4.7. Here one might translate 'for possession of the whole world' (cf. *De fort. Alex.* 329C ἀρμοστῆς καὶ διαλλακτῆς τῶν ὅλων) or 'for ultimate mastery' (cf. *Ant.* 8.3 τὰ ὅλα κρίνασαν μάχην). Sometimes the usage seems closely related to the philosophical jargon, often it is more idiomatic (cf. D. 18.28 τὰ ὅλα πεπρακέναι, 9.64 τοῖς ὅλοις ἠττᾶσθαι; Plb. 18.33.1 τοῖς ὅλοις πράγμασιν ἐσφαλμένος; D. 1.3 παρασπάσηται τι τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων).

ἐθελοντής: emphatic and highly significant. Brutus, now no longer a *μειράκιον*, does not need the urging of his uncle Cato to choose the right course (there is an implicit contrast with his behaviour in Cyprus: P. is suggesting a development of character). But *ἐθελοντής* must also be meant as a tacit contradiction of the account of *De vir. ill.* 82.5 'Civili bello a Catone ex Cilicia retractus'. Which version of Brutus' intentions at the beginning of the Civil War is to be preferred? There can hardly be any doubt that the *De vir. ill.* is right. The mere fact | that Brutus went to Cilicia with Sestius and only decided there to proceed to Macedonia supports this account. *ὡς δ' ἐκεῖ πράττειν οὐδὲν ἦν μέγα* is a sad *apologia*. Lucan 2.234ff. also attests Cato's influence (albeit in a fictitious context). Reluctance to join Pompey is entirely consistent with Brutus' deep hostility

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to him, both personal and political, and also (alas) with his keen interest in his own financial affairs in Cilicia. The question therefore arises: is ἐθελοντής P.'s own word, or did he find the emphasis already there in his source? The former possibility cannot be excluded, for it certainly is a Plutarchean device to register a crisp disagreement with a source by a significant turn of phrase (see on 18.7 below). (This is of course a common device in encomiastic biography. Thus, among many instances in Xenophon's *Agésilas*, the best and most influential early example of the genre, 2.20 προθύμων ὄντων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, when Xenophon the historian knows full well—and has recorded in the *Hellenica*—that they were coerced.) In that case, ἐθελοντής would be based not on any source evidence but simply on P.'s own reluctance to accept such dishonourable behaviour from his hero. On the other hand, P. will not have been the only one with a need to combat the version recorded by the *De vir. ill.*, so it is equally possible that P. did find the emphasis in his source and accepted it gratefully without really being aware why it was necessary.

5. ὅτε καί φασι: the manner in which this is introduced suggests that P. is bringing in another source. For the tone cf. Pompey's reception of Tadius Sextius (*Pomp.* 64.8).

ἐξαναστήναι: the usual gesture of respect.

πάντων ὁρώντων: Holzapfel's πάντων τῶν παρόντων gives worse sense.

6. τῆς ἡμέρας ὅσα μῆ: this minor *MSS* divergency provides an opportunity for a brief mention of the problem of P.'s practice | with regard to hiatus. This has naturally been much discussed. See e.g. A. J. Kronenberg, *Mnemos.* 5 (1937), 311, n. 2; F. H. Sandbach, *CQ* 33 (1939), 197, *CQ* 34 (1940), 21; Ziegler 932–35; H. Cherniss, Loeb *Moralia* XII (1957), 28, n. a; D. A. Russell, *PCPhS* 92 (1966), 37ff.; Hamilton lxcii; Flacelière, *VIII^e Congrès de l'Association G. Budé* (1968), 498f.; Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 11, n. 3. P. himself seems to mention the problem three times: (i) he mocks Isocrates in *De glor. Ath.* 350E for his 'fear' of hiatus; (ii) he affects incredulity in *De vit. pud.* 534F at some people's concern to avoid hiatus in speeches; (iii) in *De Stoic. repugnant.* 1047B he *seems* to be criticizing Chrysippus for denying any importance to the problem. Ziegler follows Benseler in taking an extremely strict view of P.'s practice and effectively eliminates all hiatus in the Teubner texts. I take this opportunity to enter a *recusatio*, but would stress three points: (i) it is (I believe) naïve to put much stress on P.'s 'editorial' position (as is done by Flacelière and Brenk), in this sphere as in others (see my 'Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom'). Both *De glor. Ath.* 350E and *De vit. pud.* 534F are examples of easy point-scoring and tell us nothing about P.'s own practice; (ii) one must make allowances for difference of genre. Thus it comes as no surprise that there seems to be only one serious hiatus in the *Consolatio ad uxorem* (608B). Despite the warmth and intimacy

of the piece and the speed with which it was (probably) composed, a *consolatio* is a highly formal genre; (iii) where those who take a strict view have seen apparent manipulation of word order by P. in order to avoid hiatus it is often possible to detect another explanation. So in the present passage ὅσα and μή often go together and τῆς ἡμέρας is put in a strong position because there is a kind of implicit contrast with ‘night’. On the whole I tend to | agree with the view of Cherniss *loc. cit.* (and others) that: ‘To “emend” for the sole purpose of eliminating hiatus is to take unwarranted liberty with the text; but, on the other hand, to introduce hiatus by emendation is certainly inadmissible’.

The implication of this sentence, following ὡς κρείττονα, is almost that Brutus acted as Pompey’s right-hand man. This of course cannot be true. The flavour of 6.3 is rather similar, and deliberately so.

περὶ λόγους καὶ βιβλία διέτριβεν: Brutus’ perpetual studiousness is abundantly attested by Cicero. See e.g. *Orat.* 34 ‘iam quantum illud est, quod in maximis occupationibus numquam intermittis studia doctrinae, semper aut ipse scribis aliquid aut me vocas ad scribendum!’ (picked up by Quint. 10.7.27 ‘ut Cicero Brutum facere tradit, operae ad scribendum aut legendum aut dicendum rapi aliquo momento temporis possit’); *Brut.* 22 ‘Nam mihi, Brute, in te intuenti crebro in mentem venit vereri, ecquodnam curriculum aliquando sit habitura tua et natura admirabilis et exquisita doctrina et singularis industria’, 332 ‘tuis perennibus studiis’. Cf. also 4.8 below, 24.1, 36.4, Appian 4.133-561. In the present context, especially at 4.8, there is a distinct whiff of the well-known τόπος of the philosopher going about his business imperturbably despite scenes of the utmost chaos around him: one thinks of Socrates at Potidaea, Archimedes at Syracuse, or Cato at Utica. P.’s description of Brutus here is obviously authoritative, but it certainly contributes to the general portrayal of Brutus as φιλόσοφος. (15.9 below is a variation on the theme.)

[ἄλλης]: clearly repeated after ἄλλον. Madvig’s and Bernardakis’ suggestions are unnecessary: P. often refers to battles in this way. Cf. 33.2 (of Pharsalus) below, *Cat. min.* 67.1 (ditto), *Cam.* 2.1, *Lys.* 1.2, *Demosth.* 20.2. The effect is | evocative and dramatic. ‘Pharsalus’ was fought on August 9, 48. Studies of the battle include: J. P. Postgate, ‘The Site of the Battle of Pharsalia’, *JRS* 12 (1922), 187–91; F. L. Lucas, ‘The Battlefield of Pharsalos’, *ABSA* 24 (1920–21), 34–53; M. Rambaud, ‘Le Soleil de Pharsale’, *Historia* 3 (1954–55), 346–78; R. T. Bruère, ‘Palaepharsalus, Pharsalus, Pharsalia’, *CP* 46 (1951), 111–15; C. B. R. Pelling, ‘Pharsalus’, *Historia* 22 (1973), 249ff; {J. D. Morgan, ‘Palaepharsalus—the battle and the town’, *AJA* 87 (1983), 23–54}. The historical significance of the present passage is that it definitely suggests that the Pompeians were expecting battle on the following day.

7. ἦν μέν: this asyndeton is perhaps just about justifiable, but it seems better to follow Schaefer or Voegelin (again Ziegler fails to acknowledge

his source) in inserting <καὶ> or (better) <οὐν>.

P. is good at atmospheric topographical and climatological description. Cf. 6.1, 47.2, 51.1. Sometimes it seems to be a deliberate literary technique approaching ‘pathetic fallacy’ dimensions. See further P. Scazzoso, *VIII Congrès de l'Association G. Budé*, 569ff.; Russell, *Plutarch*, 133f.

[Βρούτω]: deleted by Sintenis, followed by Ziegler. In my opinion it is unnatural in the extreme not to retain the proper name. Ziegler is presumably worried by the hiatus, but hiatus often seems to occur after proper names (Kronenberg, *art. cit.* 311, n. 2).

8. περὶ ταῦτα: ‘in parando habitaculo, exercendo corpore animoque et salutando Pompeium’, Voegelin, presumably correctly.

μεσημβρίας μόλις: ‘non ante meridiem et vix tum quidem. Cum prandio et lavacro otium agere incipiebant, saltem negotia propria ante meridiem absolvebantur. In castris autem aestatisque calore premente non ipsum meridiei tempus exspectasse | videntur quo laborem finirent’, Voegelin, cl. 77
 Martial 4.8 for how the Romans divided their activities throughout the day. Brutus never took a siesta (36.2). See further there for the ‘use-of-sleep’-τόπος.

ἀλειψόμενος ... ὀλίγα: P. is evidently excellently informed on Brutus’ way of life. From his point of view such details as this are far from trivial, since even little things may be useful in indicating character (for the theme see 5.4 and n.), and gastronomic frugality is one of his favourite themes in his portrait of the ideal πολιτικός (cf. *De tuenda san.* 124D–E, *Sept. sap. conviv.* 158C, *Lyc.* 10.1–5, *Alex.* 23.3, *Caes.* 17.9–11, *Cat. mai.* 1.5, 4.2–4, *Crass.* 1.2, 3.1–2, *Pomp.* 2.11–12, *Pelop.* 3.4, *Dion* 52.3, *Agis–Cleom.* 4.2, *Gracchi* 2.4, *Sert.* 13.1–2 etc. etc.).

ἢ πρὸς ἐπινοία ... μέλλοντος: the tone is slightly poetic, as P.’s style often tends to be at moments of high tension in the narrative.

συντάπτων Πολυβίου: hence the *Suda*’s ἔγραψεν ... τῶν Πολυβίου τοῦ ἱστοκρικοῦ βίβλων ἐπιτομήν. Brutus also wrote epitomes of the annals of Fannius and Caelius (*Ad Att.* 12.5B [316], 13.8 [313]). From the beginning of the 15th century until at least the time of Casaubon at the beginning of the 17th century the *Excerpta antiqua* of Polybius still extant were widely believed to be the result of Brutus’ exertions: see A. Momigliano, *Polybius between the English and the Turks* (1974), 6.

It would perhaps be fanciful to see in this impressive description (4.7–8) a clever and paradoxical inversion of the ‘insomniac hero’-τόπος: Brutus is awake but calm, everyone else *either* asleep *or* consumed with anxiety. But it does seem in *ch.* 36 as if P. is deliberately recalling his earlier description and, as it were, turning it against Brutus: the calm, collected Brutus of Pharsalus becomes the insomniac, susceptible to | hallucination, at Abydus. This again reflects (in my opinion) P.’s interest in the deterioration of a character under stress. 78

Ch. 5: Caesar's solicitude for Brutus

1. Λέγεται ... προειπεῖν ... ἡγεμόσιν: the same information in Appian 2.112.467ff. (not closely similar verbally). Appian also attributes Caesar's solicitude to his relationship with Servilia. There seems no reason to reject the information.

Καῖσαρ: in itself there is nothing difficult in a switch from Καῖσαρ (subject of λέγεται) in the nominative to the accusative and infinitive of ποιεῖν ... χαριζόμενον (virtual *oratio obliqua*). But P. uses λέγεται with both personal and impersonal constructions (for the latter cf. 5.3, 8.7, 39.4), hence Ziegler *art. cit.* 77 prefers Καῖσαρ here. It is a tiny point, but he is not necessarily right—cf. 8.6–7, where a similar shift of constructions occurs. The attempt to regularize P.'s constructions is often arbitrary, and sometimes does not do justice to his easy and fluent stylistic *variatio*.

παρασχόντα: εἰαυτὸν δηλαδὴ (Coraes), or τὸ ἄγειν εἰαυτὸν, 'quod deinde idem est atque intransitivus verbi usus' (Voegelin's superior interpretation).

χαριζόμενον: Schaefer and Sintenis preferred χαριζόμενος, retaining Καῖσαρ in 5.1. I doubt if one should try to regularize the constructions either way (*pace* Schaefer, Sintenis, Voegelin, and Ziegler!)—see above.

1–2. καὶ ταῦτα ... γεγονέναι: the same motive, and information that Servilia was Caesar's lover and was thought to have borne Brutus by Caesar in Appian 2.112.467 (again not closely similar verbally).

79 Servilia's affair with Caesar is historically certain: *Ad Att.* 2.24 [44].3 (Servilia's nocturnal intercession on Brutus' behalf in the | Vettius affair), Suet. *Caes.* 50.2 (convincing details about Caesar's presents to Servilia and Cicero's *bon mot* 'tertia deducta'). It seems to have occurred in 60/59, and possibly slightly earlier, if one accepts the anecdote of 5.3–4 below. The story that Caesar was Brutus' father is clearly a romantic fiction, though the arguments of Münzer (*RE* 2A. 1819) and Balsdon, *Historia* 7 (1958), 87, fall just short of disproving it on chronological grounds (as any social worker could testify). It clearly would suit the propaganda of both Brutus' supporters (proving his incredible disinterestedness) and his detractors (adding the crime of parricide to the crime of gross ingratitude). It must have had its genesis in the fact of Servilia's relationship with Caesar and Caesar's evident favour for Brutus (perhaps also the tradition—if there was a tradition—that Brutus was Caesar's heir). It also appeared to harmonize excellently with the family tradition of the Iunii Bruti (the first consul's execution of his sons). One may speculate that there were three more specific incentives to its concoction. (i) the celebrated καὶ σύ, τέκνον story (see on 17.6) is usually connected with the tradition that Brutus was Caesar's son, and for that reason emphatically rejected by all modern scholars, as by Dio and Suetonius, perhaps for the same reason. But suppose Caesar actually did say καὶ σύ, τέκνον, using τέκνον simply as a term of affection from an older to a younger man (this of course is a very

common usage {cf. E. Dickey, *Greek Forms of Address: From Herodotus to Lucian* (1996), 65–72, esp. 68–9}). Scandal-mongers could easily have misunderstood his meaning. (ii) In *Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25].5 Brutus writes ‘Nulla cura ab aliis adhibetur, sed mihi prius omnia di deaeque eripuerint quam illud iudicium, quo non modo heredi eius, quem occidi, non concesserim, quod in illo non tuli, sed ne patri quidem meo, si reviviscat, ut patiente me plus legibus ac senatu possit’. Not an easy piece of Latin. Might not a careless reader have inferred from this that Brutus slew his father? (iii) *Ad Brut.* | 1.17 [26].6 runs: ‘sed dominum ne parentem quidem maiores nostri voluerunt esse’. Suppose the reference of ‘maiores nostri’ was misunderstood. The legend might then have grown up that L. Iunius Brutus, one of Brutus’ ‘maiores’, was the son of Tarquin the Proud (the genealogy of the Tarquins is confused and according to Diodorus 10.22 and Livy 1.56.7 L. Iunius Brutus was his nephew). From this it would have been easy to concoct the story that M. Brutus was the son of Julius Caesar.

2. ἐγνώκει: in the biblical sense, common in P. and later Greek generally.

ὡς ἔοικε: cf. *πως* below, and the note of caution implicit in 5.1 and 5.3 λέγεται. P. is being notably noncommittal about both Caesar’s relationship with Servilia and the tradition that Brutus was Caesar’s son. On his use of λέγεται see further 8.6, 36.1; cf. also 48.1 φασιν.

ἐπιμανέισαν: ‘when she was mad about him’.

If P. is sceptical of the romantic tradition linking Caesar, Servilia, and Brutus, why does he record it? Simply because it creates a general impression of closeness between Brutus and Caesar. He certainly attaches no significance to the tradition that Brutus was Caesar’s son, nor does he indulge in vulgar, sub-Freudian speculations that Brutus was ashamed of Servilia’s adultery (so Appian 2.112.469, and many modern scholars, including Syme, Radin, and MacMullen).

3–4. λέγεται δὲ καὶ τῶν περὶ Κατιλίαν ...: P. does not of course suppose that the incident of December 63 and Brutus’ birth occurred in the same period (so Wilson 41)—there is a move from when Caesar was νεανίας to τῶν περὶ Κατιλίαν πραγμάτων. P. relates exactly the same story in *Cat. min.* 24.1–3. The *Cat. min.* version is shorter, yet the *Brutus* crisper and more dramatic. The two accounts can hardly be independent, though it is very difficult | to decide their relative priority. One might argue that the *Brutus* version is a ‘written-up’ version of the *Cato*, yet on the other hand the allusiveness of *Cat. min.* 24.2 διαβάλλοντος εἶναί τινος τοὺς κοινουμένους could be taken as an argument in favour of the priority of *Brutus*. Again (see on 3.1–4) an argument for simultaneous preparation? {Cf. Pelling, *Plutarch and History* 49–53.}

3. ἐμπεπτωκότων: ἐμπίπτω can have the technical sense ‘come before’ (cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1300B, *Solon* 18.3), hence presumably Perrin’s ‘had come to the ears of the senate’. But it is better to take it here figuratively in the sense ‘burst upon’ to suit the vigour of P.’s whole narrative.

ἃ μικρὸν ... ἀνατρέψαι τὴν πόλιν: P. naturally accepts the Ciceronian version of events.

διαφερομένους περί γνώμης: Cato proposing death, Caesar merely life imprisonment, for the captured Catilinarians.

γραμματιδίου: cf. δελτάριον below and in *Cat.* P. uses the diminutives because this is a kind of ‘furtivus amor’ context and also because this is not a story he is taking too seriously (see on 2.8). The knowing tone makes a piquant contrast with the great affairs of state under discussion, and skilfully prepares for the puncturing of the high drama of 5.3.

τῶν πολεμίων: Cato used the term ‘hostes’, cf. *Cat. min.* 23.2, Sall. *Cat.* 52.25.

4. κράτει: not ‘“Vince”, familiaris formula iratis’ (Fabricius), since, as Voegelin observes, ‘non ... de Serviliae amore Cato cum Caesare certaverat’. Simply: ‘take it’.

οὕτω μὲν ...: so P. makes clear his purpose in recounting the story. By recording a story which illustrates Servilia’s passion for Caesar, even though he does not commit himself to its veracity, he implicitly emphasizes the closeness of the relationship between Caesar and Brutus. In the *Cato* his purpose is to illustrate | the character of Cato, according to the familiar doctrine that even small indications of character may be helpful in discovering the nature of the inner man (*Cat. min.* 24.1).

Ch. 6: Brutus earns the favour of Caesar

This section continues the theme of the close relations between Brutus and Caesar, but prepares also for *chs.* 7–9, where P. analyses the different attitudes, and prospects, of Brutus and Cassius under the rule of Caesar (6.6 is artfully slipped in).

1. Γενομένης ... ἡττης: picking up the chronological thread after the digression 5.2–4.

θάλασσαν: I have nothing to say on the orthographical problem of -σσ- and -ττ-. Cf. on 1.1 Καπιτωλίω.

διεκπεσόντος: P.'s liking for compound verbs has already been noted (1.1n.). He is also fond of double compounds. *διεκπίπτω*, though used by Aristotle (*Pr.* 910A 17), is on the whole a rather 'late' verb (examples from Epicurus, Philo Mechanicus, Galen, Onosander, Heliodorus), here used effectively enough. Use of double compounds is of course common in later Greek.

πολιορκουμένου: often, as here and 18.14 *πολιορκίαν*, the standard translation 'besiege' should be set aside in favour of 'storm'.

ἔλαθεν: this makes perfect sense. Solanus' *ἔφθασεν* is a quite arbitrary 'emendation'.

ἔρχεσθαι: clearly inserted by someone who did not see *ἔξελθών* at the end of the sentence.

πρὸς τόπον ... φερούσας: cf. 4.7 and n., though here of course there is the practical point that marshes are good to hide in (cf. Marius, and Octavian at the first battle of Philippi).

ἀποσωθεὶς εἰς Λάρισσαν: Larissa was also on Pompey's escape route. |

2. ἐκεῖθεν ... αὐτοῦ: thus far P.'s narrative has no parallel in any other source, though the information he gives is clearly of excellent quality. 83

Καίσαρ ἦσθη ... σωζομένω: cf. *Caes.* 46.4 where P. records that after the battle Caesar was extremely upset when Brutus failed to appear but rejoiced exceedingly when he was finally brought in safely.

οὐ μόνον ἀφῆκε τῆς αἰτίας: Caesar's pardoning of Brutus after Pharsalus is naturally much attested. See *Caes.* 62.3, Appian 2.111.464, Dio 41.63.6, Velleius 2.52.4, *De vir. ill.* 82.5, Zonaras 10.9, cf. Nicolaus 19.59. (Zonaras is a *verbatim* rendering of *Caes.* 46.4.) Apart from Zonaras' dependence on *Caes.* 46.4, there are no significant verbal parallels between any of the accounts.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ... περὶ αὐτὸν εἶχεν: for emphatic mentions of the favour bestowed on Brutus by Caesar see *Caes.* 62.3, Appian 2.111.464f., Dio 41.63.6, Vell. 2.56.3, 52.5, Nicolaus 19.59. P. puts greater emphasis than any other source on the personal character of Caesar's favour, and plays on the theme for all he is worth, partly because (following 5.1) it is in itself a proof of Brutus' supreme merits, partly because it serves to emphasize

Brutus' disinterested motives in joining the conspiracy, but historically there is no doubt of Caesar's favour, even if P. may be allowed a little exaggeration.

84 **3-4. ὀδόν ... συνέτεινεν:** this conversation with Brutus is not attested in any other source (not even the *Caesar*). If it is historical, then it would be both idle and small-minded to criticize Brutus for 'selling out' to Caesar. It is clear that P. sees nothing reprehensible in Brutus' conduct, and, given the political realities of the time, he is absolutely right. But how historical is it? P. is not claiming that Brutus knew any private plans of Pompey's (*pace* Wilson), only that he was in a position to | make conjectures about Pompey's likely course of action. This in itself is not totally unreasonable, since Brutus, a man to whom Caesar was personally close (I see no reason why we should reject P.'s testimony on this), had been in Pompey's camp, had followed Pompey as far as Larissa, and could conceivably have been quite well informed about Pompey's relations with the Egyptian court through his service in Cyprus and acquaintance with Caninius. On the other hand, there is nothing about Brutus' speculations in Caesar's own account (*BC* 3.102-106), which makes it clear that Caesar did not make his way direct to Egypt from Larissa, and states that he was alerted to Pompey's choice of Egypt by the news that he had been seen in Cyprus (106.1). Thus P.'s ἀφείς τὰλλα ... συνέτεινεν has to go. But, while such a story could naturally easily be made up and by its very nature offers no hard evidence in its support, it does not seem too improbable that Caesar did have a private conversation with Brutus when Brutus joined him, and it would surely have been the natural thing for Caesar to try to get whatever information he could from Brutus regarding Pompey's plans. Thus, while the emphasis of P.'s account is undoubtedly suspect and ἀφείς τὰλλα ... συνέτεινεν is not literally true, it would be rather rash to throw the whole thing out. Another objection to P.'s account could be raised: suppose Caesar and Brutus did have such a private conversation: how could its content be recorded? This does not seem so much of an objection when one has possible sources like Empylus who obviously enjoyed Brutus' confidence. As so often in P. the emphasis and some of the details of his evidence on a particular question are suspect, but one cannot be sure that he has not got hold of something of value.

3. ὀδόν τινα ... βαδίζων μόνος: again (4.6n.) Brutus is seen in effect as the right-hand man of a great Roman. |

85 **4. ἔκ τινων διαλογισμῶν:** no doubt chiefly the fact that it was through Pompey's influence that Ptolemy's father (Auletes) had been restored to the throne in 55—see *Pomp.* 76. It is typical of P. to use a vague cover phrase like this to avoid the intrusion of material not directly relevant to the

narrative in progress (cf. 3.1 *διατριβὴν ... ἀναγκαίαν*), though he is not always so economical. MacMullen 296, n. 5, misreading P.'s allusive technique, cites this passage as evidence of Brutus' hesitation.

5. Πομπήϊον ... ἐδέξατο: full details in *Pomp.* 76–79.

τὸ πεπρωμένον: for the general theme that the fall of the Republic was preordained cf. *Comparison of Cimon and Lucullus* 1.1, *Pomp.* 5.4–5, 75.5, *Caes.* 28.6, 57.1, 60.1, 66.1, 69.2–3, 69.6–13, *Brut.* 47.7, *Comparison of Dion and Brutus* 2.2, *Cic.* 44.3–7, *Ant.* 33.2–3, 55.6, 67.3. For discussion see Babut 480ff.; Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*, 100ff.; Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 159–165; {S. Swain, *AJPh* 110 (1989), 272–302, esp. 288–92}. Jones emphasizes the role in all this of Augustan propaganda (here *De fort. Rom.* 319E–320A is especially relevant). But emphasis should also be placed on the fact that the downfall of men like Brutus (and Pompey and Cassius to a lesser extent) posed P. a severe theological problem. How could the downfall of men like Brutus, of consummate virtue and by no means negligible military ability, be explained? For P., who believed devoutly in divine providence, the ultimate explanation could *only* be that monarchy had the blessing of heaven. Even this does not make him enthusiastic about the prospect, and it is abundantly clear that for all his intellectual and theological acceptance of the fact of monarchy P.'s political and emotional sympathies are much more fully engaged with the doomed Republic than with the victorious Empire.

6. Καίσαρα ... ἐπράυνε Βρούτος: cf. *Caes.* 62.3 πολλοὺς τῶν | ἐπιτηδείων 86
ἔσωσεν ἐξαίτησάμενος and *Comparison of Dion and Brutus* 3.4. There is no reason to doubt that Brutus was instrumental in securing Cassius' pardon.

Cassius commanded the Syrian squadron of Pompey's fleet in 49 (Caesar, *BC* 3.5.3, *De vir. ill.* 83.5), made successful attacks on Caesar's ships at Messana and Vibo (*BC* 3.101, cf. Dio 42.13.1) in 48, gave up the war on hearing of the defeat at Pharsalus (Dio 42.13.5, 44.14.2), and secured Caesar's pardon in the East (? Tarsus) in early 47 (*Ad Fam.* 6.6 [234].10, 15.15 [174].2, *Ad Att.* 11.13 [224].2, cf. *De vir. ill.* 83.6, and Appian 2.88 and 111, where he is confused with L. Cassius), becoming Caesar's *legatus*.

καὶ Δημοτάρῳ τῷ τῶν Γαλατῶν βασιλεῖ: the *MSS* καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ τῶν Λιβύων βασιλεῖ is clearly just an error (surely scribal rather than Plutarchean). Coraes' καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ τῶν Γαλατῶν seems too allusive, so it is best to accept Solanus' explicit and palaeographically not implausible Δημοτάρῳ ... τῶν Γαλατῶν.

On Deiotarus, tetrarch, and later king, of Galatia, see *RE* 4.2401ff. (Niese); F. E. Adcock, *JRS* 27 (1937), 12ff. He supported Pompey in the Civil War, providing troops at Pharsalus, but then changed sides and helped Caesar's *legatus* Cn. Domitius Calvinus in his Pontic campaign. He

was provisionally pardoned by Caesar (*BA* 67–68), but lost much of his territory to neighbouring tribes (*ibid.*, cf. Dio 41.63.3).

προηγερῶν: the speech was a famous one. According to Cicero, *Ad Att.* 14.1 [355].2, Brutus spoke ‘valde vehementer et libere’, and at *Brut.* 5.21 he is even more complimentary: ‘ornatissime et copiosissime’—two of the great Ciceronian oratorical requirements. But it is with this speech in mind that Aper in Tacitus, *Dialogus* 21.6, dismisses Brutus’ oratory with the damning words ‘lentitudo ac tepor’. But the conflict of opinion is more apparent than real: as Douglas on *Brut.* 5.21 points out, ‘ornatissime et copiosissime’ | is only attributed to Brutus in compliment (for Cicero’s real opinion of Brutus’ oratory see on 2.5), while ‘valde vehementer et libere’ simply refers to Brutus’ energetic delivery and free-spokenness. Cicero and Aper could probably have agreed on the stylistic inadequacies of the speech.

περὶ τούτου: Solanus is probably right to delete this—the words are almost certainly the feeble insertion of a scribe. Voegelin’s alternative—that of transposing to after *αὐτοῦ* in 6.7—raises interesting problems. P. (or his source, but more likely P. directly) is clearly working from *Ad Att.* 14.1 [355].2 ‘de quo (Bruto) ... Caesarem solitum dicere, “magni refert hic quod velit, sed quidquid vult valde vult”; idque eum animadvertisse cum pro Deiotaro Nicaeae dixerit; valde vehementer eum visum et libere dicere’. Cicero’s ‘solitum’ need be no more than the conventional lead-in for a celebrated *bon mot*, and does not necessarily imply that Caesar made the remark more than once, as P. sees. Hence Voegelin thinks that Caesar’s remark was made on the specific occasion of Brutus’ speech on behalf of Deiotarus, and that that is what P. is trying to convey (= ‘as soon as he heard him speaking on behalf of Deiotarus’). Neither conclusion is necessarily right. The remark would not have been out of place on that occasion: Caesar could have said ‘It’s a big question *what* Brutus wants’ (‘magni refert’ nearly = ‘magna quaestio est’, as Shackleton Bailey *ad loc.* points out, and as P. clearly understands), not because Brutus was being intolerably obscure, but simply because he had not yet come to his point (‘as soon as he heard him speaking’). But in Cicero’s letter ‘idque’ etc. merely refers to the second half of the *dictum*: ‘quidquid vult valde vult’, hence the explanatory ‘valde vehementer eum visum et libere dicere’. In other words, Caesar might have said: ‘It’s a big question *what* Brutus wants, but whatever he wants he wants it badly’, and then followed this | up with the observation (e.g.): ‘I was particularly struck by his earnestness when he spoke in defence of Deiotarus at Nicaea’. The *bon mot* itself could have been made in practically any context—even a political one (hence it *might* be evidence for 8.1 and 8.2 below). But P. does give it a speech context, under the influence (no doubt) of *Ad Att.* 14.1 [355].2. Yet he does not seem to refer the *bon mot* to the occasion of the speech in defence of Deiotarus. {But A. Dihle, *HSCP* 82 (1978), 179–86 argues for the reading ‘<non> magni

refert hic quid velit, sed quidquid volet valde volet' (the future *volet* ... *volet* ... as in the *MSS*), and interprets as 'whatever it may be that he wants, he will want it intensely', and thinks it a prophecy for Brutus' future (cf. P.'s *νεανίας*).}

ὅτε πρῶτον is ambiguous, and can mean either 'as soon as' (as Voegelin interprets it) or 'when for the first time'. The second reading is surely supported by *νεανίας*: the picture suggested is of the great *imperator* struck by the earnestness of some practically unknown young man. (So Perrin: 'And it is said that Caesar, when he first heard Brutus speak in public, said to his friends: "I know not what this young man wants, but all that he wants he wants very much".') If so, P. is supplying Caesar's remark with a specific context, which it does not have in *Ad Att.* 14.1 [355].2. But 'idque eum animadvertisse' etc. provides the remark with a *terminus post* of 47, and very nearly narrows the context down to the period between Caesar's return from Spain in autumn 45 and the Ides of March 44, quite possibly at a time when Caesar was becoming suspicious of Brutus (i.e. round about the time of the Lupercalia incident—see on 8.2 below). This, however, does not mean that P. stands convicted of a simple chronological error, for he is adept at transferring incidents to the contexts where he thinks that they will have the most impact. (A noteworthy instance is his placing of Caesar's dream of incest with his mother before his crossing of the Rubicon in *Caes.* 32.9.) Here the effect is to suggest the earnestness of Brutus' character from earliest youth.

7. οὐκ οἶδα ...: quite a good rendering of 'magni refert', which is not an obvious piece of Latin. {Alternatively, Pelling in Scott-Kilvert–Pelling 593 n. 44 suggests that P.'s 'mild change to "I do not know" may prepare Caesar's later and fatal failure to read Brutus's intentions'.} On the question of P.'s command of Latin see: *Demosth.* 2.2–4, *quaest. conviv.* 726Eff.; | A. Sickinger, *De Linguae Latinae apud Plutarchum et reliquiis et vestigiis* (diss. 89 Freiburg 1883), 64–87; H. J. Rose, *The Roman Questions of Plutarch* (1924), 11–19; F. C. Babbitt, *Loeb Moralia IV* (1936), 3f.; Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*, 81–7; H. Cherniss, *Loeb Moralia XIII, Part I* (1976), 115f.; {A. Strobach, *Plutarch und die Sprachen (Palingenesia 64, 1997)*}.

σφόδρα: for Brutus' earnestness see 2.5n. (Quintilian), Tac. *Dial.* 25.

8–9. τὸ γὰρ ... τελεσιουργοῖς: one of the three emphatic characterizations of Brutus in the *Life* (the others are 1.3–4, 29.3–11). The first is suitably general, the last concerned largely with the purity of Brutus' purpose. The present passage deals with his exercise of authority, and is well placed in the narrative: τὸ ... ἐμβριθές picks up πᾶν δ' ... σφόδρα βούλεται and the whole description prepares for the reference to his governorship. P. is in general highly skilled in his placing of these explicit characterizations: one thinks especially of the *Alcibiades* (see Russell, *PCPhS* 192 [1966], 37–47 {=

Scardigli, *Essays* 191–207}, *Plutarch* 122f.

8. τὸ ... ἐμβριθέες: cf. 1.3n.

προαιρέσεως: on Brutus' προαίρεσις see 29.4n.

9. πρὸς δὲ ... ἦν: cf. 14.7 and 35.1–6 for examples of this.

τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναισχύντως λιπαρούντων ἦταν: a workmanlike definition of the vice *δυσωπία*. P. wrote a Περὶ *δυσωπίας* (*De vitioso pudore*: 528C–536D), in which he describes it, shows that its effects are detrimental, and prescribes the cure for it. P. H. De Lacy and B. Einarson, Loeb *Moralia* VII (1959), 42–89, offer a useful edition. See also H. G. Ingenkamp, *Plutarchs Schriften über der Heilung der Seele* (1971), 54ff. De Lacy and Einarson well explain *δυσωπία* as a word that 'indicates the embarrassment that compels us to grant an unjustified request' (*op. cit.* 42).

90 ἦν ἔνιοι ... καλοῦσιν: this careful qualification (with which cf. 528D τὴν λεγομένην *δυσωπίαν*) is explained | by the fact that *δυσωπία* and its cognates in the sense used by P. was an unclassical usage, and was therefore condemned by fanatical Atticists. In early writers *δυσωπέω* is only used in the passive, with the sense 'to be put out' (as e.g. Plato, *Phd.* 242D), and sometimes means little more than *φοβοῦμαι*. The matter is put very succinctly by Phrynichus, p. 190, ed. Lobeck: *Δυσωπεῖσθαι· Πλουτάρχῳ μὲν ἔστι περὶ δυσωπίας βιβλίον, τοῦτο ὅπερ οὔεται δηλῶν, τὸ ἐντρέπεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀντέχειν δι' αἰδῶ. ἀλλὰ σημαίνει ἢ δυσωπία παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις τὴν ὑφώρασιν καὶ τὸ ὑποπτέειν*. See Lobeck's excellent note *ad loc.* and H. Erbse, *Untersuchungen zu den attizistischen Lexika*, Abh. d. deutschen Ak. d. Wiss. zu Berlin, Phil.-hist. Kl. (1949), 116. P. himself, both in the *De vitioso pudore* and elsewhere (e.g. *De amicorum mult.* 95B, *De tuenda sanit.* 124B), regularly uses the word unashamedly in this unclassical sense. He maintains in the *De recta ratione audiendi* 42Dff. that the quest for flawless Atticism is a waste of time and all too often diverts attention from the much more important question of the subject matter. This does seem to be one 'editorial pronouncement' that can be taken at face value, for P. does not scruple to use (e.g.) *συγγενίδες* (*Quaest. Rom.* 265D), described by Pollux 3.30 as *ἐσχάτως βάρβαρον*, and *ἀσοφία* (*Pyrrh.* 29.4), rejected by Pollux 4.13. See in general Ziegler 93f. This suggests that the qualification here, with the veiled reference to ἔνιοι, may be something of a private literary joke, especially as the *De vitioso pudore* must have been nearly contemporaneous with the *Brutus* (below).

αἰσχίστην ... μεγάλῳ: for the effects of *δυσωπία* on the administration of justice cf. *De vit. pud.* 529F.

91 εἰώθει λέγειν: *De vit. pud.* 530A is closely parallel: *κακὴ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη παιδικῆς φρουρὸς ἡλικίας, ὡς ἔλεγε | Βροῦτος οὐ δοκεῖν αὐτῷ καλῶς τὴν ὥραν διατεθείσθαι τὸν πρὸς μηδὲν ἀρνούμενον*.

μη̄ καλῶς ... διατεθεῑσθαι: practically a euphemism for ‘prostituted’. Cf. *κακῆ ... αὐτῆ παιδικῆς φρουρὸς ἡλικίας* in *De vit. pud.* (above), and Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.6.13, from which Brutus’ *dictum* must derive: ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπεν· ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ’ ἡμῶν νομίζεται τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. τὴν τε γὰρ ὥραν ἔαν μὲν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῆ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρονον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν... The closeness of the parallel between the present passage and 530A of the *De vit. pud.* (and indeed the mere fact of the citation of Brutus’ *dictum* in both works) must suggest interdependence. To try to decide which work was written first one must attempt to isolate the context of Brutus’ remark. In itself it hardly seems likely that Brutus accused those unable to refuse anything *in any context* of having prostituted their bodies (though Perrin apparently takes it this way: ‘he was wont to say that those who were unable to refuse anything, in his opinion, must have been corrupted in their youth’). This interpretation would also seem to be ruled out by the fact that both in Xenophon (the source) and in *De vit. pud.* the context is one of homosexual eroticism. It seems safe to infer that Brutus was simply echoing the Xenophontic Socrates in making a distinction between lofty philosophical friendships among males and shameful homosexual prostitution. Homosexuality was no mere literary phenomenon in Rome (see Nisbet and Hubbard on Horace, *C.* 1.4.19) and evidently aroused the distaste of the sexually austere Brutus (there is no good reason to accept the propaganda/gossip of *De vir. ill.* 82.2 ‘Cytheridem mimam cum Antonio et Gallo amavit’, even if—as is not certain—the information is right about Antony and Gallus). This means that in the present passage there is a rather sudden switch from discussion about general inability to | resist shameless petitions to specific inability to repulse homosexual advances. From this one might conclude that the present passage is based on the *De vit. pud.*: in the *De vit. pud.* Brutus’ *dictum* is properly integral to its context, here it is dragged in rather inappropriately. Against this, one might argue that it is unlikely that P. would have known of Brutus’ *dictum* unless he had already begun research on his *Life*. This is perhaps true, but it does not invalidate the inference that the present passage goes back in the first instance to the *De vit. pud.*: 25.4–6 below illustrates exactly the same phenomenon. If one seeks to explain the clumsiness with which Brutus’ *dictum* is brought in here, one may, if one likes, simply suppose that the sentiment so appealed to P.’s own dislike of homosexuality that he dragged it in without much regard for its appropriateness to the immediate context. But the true explanation is more complex. 6.9 sets in motion a chain of ‘sexual’ imagery of the utmost importance for the narrative from chs. 6–8. See on 7.7. This discussion may perhaps shed some light on P.’s art. Unfortunately, it tells nothing about the date of the *Brutus*, since all that can be said of the date of the *De vitioso pudore* is that ‘the topic ... would naturally have occurred to P. in his

maturer years, when his influence and reputation were established, and when he had friends of great wealth and power' (De Lacy and Einarson 45). {Also relevant might be P.'s habit of gathering quotations in his *hypomnemata* for use and reuse in several contexts: on this see various works by L. van der Stockt, e.g. *AJPh* 120 (1999), 575–99.}

Throughout the *Life* incorruptibility and financial probity are keynotes of Brutus' character (cf. 3.2–4, 6.11 below, 29.3, 32.4), in contrast to the rapacity of Cassius (29.5, 32.4).

10. μέλλων δέ: again a chronological link, picking up the thread of the narrative after the excursus on Brutus' character, though the central theme is still Caesar's regard for Brutus. Brutus seems to have stayed with Caesar in Asia, but left him to visit Marcellus in Mytilene (Cic. *Brut.* 71.250), while
93 Caesar | went back to Italy (Seneca, *Cons. ad Helv.* 9.8). This was in the late summer of 47 (*Ad Att.* 11.21 [236].2). Caesar left Rome towards the end of November, 47 B.C.

μέλλων + inf. is a common Plutarchean chronological formula. One may see in it a minor example of his constant preoccupation with highlighting the crucial moments of the narrative.

Κάτωνα: Broughton II, 298.

Σκιπίωνα: *RE* 3.1224ff. (Münzer), Broughton II, 297.

Βρούτῳ ... Γαλατίαν: Broughton II, 301. Brutus probably governed as *legatus pro praetore*. There are neutral and uninformative references to his governorship in Cicero, *Brut.* 171, *Ad Fam.* 6.6 [234].10, 13.10–14 [277–81], *Ad Att.* 12.19 [257].3, 12.27 [266].3, Appian 2.111.465, *De vir. ill.* 82.5 (erroneously 'proconsul Galliam rexit'). It lasted through 46 to spring 45 (in *Ad Att.* 12.27 [266].3, dated March 23, Brutus is expected back at the beginning of April, and by *Ad Att.* 12.29 [268].1, March 25, he has apparently already arrived). Caesar's magnanimity in employing his former enemies Brutus and Cassius impressed Cicero greatly: *Ad Fam.* 6.6 [234].10 (October 46) 'at nos quem ad modum est complexus! Cassium sibi legavit, Brutum Galliae praefecit'. In truth, the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul was a remarkable honour.

εὐτυχία ... ἐπαρχίας: no real evidence of the quality of Brutus' government of Cisalpine Gaul exists. Cicero's remarks in the *Orator* (34): 'ergo omnibus ex terris una Gallia communi non ardet incendio', need be no more than conventional compliment. Perhaps a little can be made of the anecdotes contained in the *Comparison of Dion and Brutus* 5.2–4 and Suetonius, *Rhet.* 6, where the Augustan rhetorician C. Albucius Silus of Novara 'ita excaudisset, ut deplorato Italiae statu, quasi iterum in formam provinciae redigeretur, M. insuper Brutum, cuius statua in
94 conspectu erat' (? the same statue as that of *Comp.* 5) 'invocaret | legum ac libertatis auctorem et vindicem', though the reference here is certainly

primarily to Brutus the Roman statesman, rather than to the provincial governor. 6.12 below *might* also reflect something of substance.

11. τὰς γὰρ ... διαφορούντων: this would of course apply to those provinces still in the war zone (Spain, Africa), but, while a fair enough description of provincial administration in general in the late Republic, was not particularly true of 46. P. Servilius Isauricus (Broughton II, 298), e.g., did good work in assisting the recovery of Asia after the war. P.'s description of Brutus' governorship is evidently greatly exaggerated, even if there may be some truth in the contention that his government was good. (This after all is likely enough: he had everything to gain by conciliating Caesar.) There is no need to stress the obvious fact that as a provincial himself P. is frequently concerned to assess the provincial administration of his Roman heroes. The question here is whether he is working from hard information or simply building on a few hints like the anecdote of *Comparison of Dion and Brutus* 5.2–4 and possibly even the passage in Cicero's *Orator*. One suspects that the exaggeration τὰς γὰρ ... διαφορούντων cannot come from any 'hard' source, and, though the move from οἱ ἄλλοι to the specific is of course extremely common in P. as elsewhere, it is rather tempting to suppose that P. was 'inspired' by Cicero's *Orator*. The fact that in Cicero the contrast is between the disturbed state of other provinces as opposed to the peacefulness of Cisalpine Gaul, whereas in *Brutus* it is between the gross maladministration of other provinces and the restorative quality of Brutus' government does not make against this supposition. P. perhaps does have a veiled allusion to the war situation (τῶν πρόσθεν ἀτυχημάτων), and he would be perfectly capable of changing the reference of Cicero's evidence in order to | make it suit one of his favourite themes: the need for just government of the provinces. One wonders also if P. may be relying on distant family memories of what life was like in Achaea at this time: nothing much is known of the government of Sulpicius Rufus, *cos.* 51, but Achaea must still have been in a very disturbed state.

95

παύλα ... παραμυθία: cf. 2.2n.

12. καὶ τὴν χάριν ... πάντων ἀνήπτειν: the underlying notion that the behaviour of a ruler's subordinates affects his own reputation depends on the common philosophical idea that the good βασιλεύς is responsible for having good φίλοι (cf. e.g. Tac. *Hist.* 4.7, D. Chr. 1.30ff., 3.86ff., 3.130ff., Ecphantus *ap.* Stob. IV, 765 [277 Hense], Themist. 1.17B, Synes. 1.11D–12C, *SHA Alex.* 65.4. For parallels in earlier literature see G. Barner, *Comparantur inter se Graeci de regentium hominum virtutibus auctores* [diss. Marburg 1889], 17f., 21, 23f.). And by and large Caesar's φίλοι were not 'good'. Cf. Balsdon, *art. cit.*, 89: 'It has always been recognized as a weakness of Caesar's position that from 49 onwards he had not better men at his disposal'. Thus the cooperation of a man like Brutus, in marked contrast to

the behaviour of established Caesarians like Antony (Broughton II, 286) or Dolabella (Broughton II, 287), could be regarded as a significant feather in Caesar's cap, and P. here seems to show some awareness of this. See further on 35.5.

μετὰ τὴν ἐπάνοδον: mid-september 45 (Cic. *Pro Deiot.* 14.38; Nicolaus 11.24) is the date of his return to Rome. Brutus, who had given up his province at the end of March (6.10n.), returned to it at the end of July to welcome Caesar (*Ad Att.* 12.27 [266].3, 13.44 [336].1).

96 **σύνοντα ... κεχαρισμένως:** at first sight rather a surprising description of Brutus' demeanour, but perhaps a justifiable one. | At *Orator* 34 Cicero uses 'dulcior' of Brutus, in *Brutus* 330 he speaks of his 'suavissimis' letters, and in *Ad Fam.* 9.14 [326].3 he refers to his 'suavissimos mores' (in a letter to Dolabella). Tyrrell and Purser VI, cxi–cxii, dismiss these remarks as official, or merely complimentary, judgements, but they *may* show that Brutus could display *χάρις* when he wanted to. Their attempts to show that Cicero found Brutus' company in general ungracious and difficult to take are unconvincing. Thus e.g. on *Ad Att.* 13.11 [319].1 'Ne magnum onus observantiae Bruto nostro imponerem ... Hoc autem tempore cum ille me cotidie videre vellet, ego ad illum ire non possum, privabatur omni delectatione Tusculani', their comment that 'Cicero left his Tusculanum ... plainly to avoid Brutus, who was constantly visiting him' is quite off the mark: 'failure to perceive the "mysterious obstacle" has fostered some misguided notions about C.'s feelings for Brutus'—Shackleton Bailey *ad loc.* Similarly at *Ad Att.* 12.29 [268].1 'nec ego Brutum vito nec tamen ab eo levationem ullam exspecto; sed erant causae cur hoc tempore istic esse nollem. quae si manebunt, quaerenda sit excusatio ad Brutum; et, ut nunc est, mansurae videntur', Cicero seems to be avoiding Rome and Brutus for mysterious reasons of policy, not out of personal distaste. In any case, it would presumably have been easier to display *χάρις* to Caesar than Cicero, particularly as Caesar's appointment of Brutus to the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul was not only a mark of high honour but also a considerate and friendly act, relieving Brutus of the obligation to fight against his former Pompeian friends. It is of course true that there was another side to Brutus (cf. especially *Ad Att.* 6.1 [115].7, 6.3 [117].7; the Elder Seneca, too, mentions his 'superbia': *Suas.* 6.14), but many a man has two sides to his character.

97 P.'s attribution of *χάρις* to Brutus, then, though clearly part and parcel of his whole emphasis on Brutus' philhellenism, | may well be right. Cf. also 23.6, 34.8, 51.4 for apparently authentic examples of Brutan *χάρις*.

Brutus' possession of *χάρις* is one of the respects in which his character differs sharply from Dion's (*Dion* 8.3–4, 52.5). At the risk of stating the obvious, it is perhaps worth sketching briefly the significance of *χάρις* as a quality in P. *χάρις* is an important element in all human relations. Friendship is based on *εὐνοία* and *χάρις* (*De amicorum mult.* 93F), *χάρις* is a

necessary ingredient in relations between the sexes (*Praec. coniug.* 142A, cf. *Amat.* 753C). τὸ κεχαρισμένως ἀνθρώποις ὀμιλεῖν stems from ἐπιστήμη and is κατὰ λόγον (*De poet. aud.* 31F). Accordingly, the need for approachableness and gracious association with one's peers and subordinates is an important part of statesmanship (*De fort. Alex.* 342F, *Ad princ. inerud.* 780A, *Praec. ger. reip.* 823A, *Publ.* 4.5, *Crass.* 7.4, *Galba* 20.5, *Coriol.* 15.4, *Pomp.* 1.4, *Demetr.* 3.3, 42.1, 42.4–6, *Mar.* 32.1–2, *Flam.* 17.3, *Alex.* 23.7, *Cimon* 16.5, *Dion* 52.5 etc. etc.). Lack of gracious association with others brings with it the danger of αὐθαδεΐα ... ἐρημῖα ξύνοικος (*quom. adul. ab amico internosc.* 70A, *Coriol.* 15.4, *Comparison of Coriolanus and Alcibiades* 3.3, *Dion* 8.4, 52.5). Dour or implacable characters would greatly benefit from 'sacrificing to the Graces' (*Praec. coniug.* 141F, *Amat.* 769D, *Mar.* 2.3–4). Thus the attribution of χάρις to Brutus strengthens the picture of him as a generally civilized being, a man unlikely to be led to ruin by self-destructive impulses, and of truly Hellenic character. If it is objected that this is to extract too much from a single fleeting reference, I should reply that the possession of χάρις links with Brutus' other virtues (his possession of παιδεία and λόγος, his φιλανθρωπία, and that P. often works to a considerable extent by implication and allusion, and that from that point of view there are very few details of his characterizations | in the *Lives* which are not ultimately didactic, to a degree sometimes overlooked. 98

Chs. 7–9: The different attitudes, and prospects, of Brutus and Cassius under the rule of Caesar

A very important section of the *Life*. P. puts flesh for the first time on the *σύγκρισις* between Brutus and Cassius announced at 1.4, and it is this *σύγκρισις* that dominates the organization of material. At the same time the narrative moves forward chronologically to the formation of the conspiracy against Caesar (7.6–7, 9.5–9).

Ch. 7: Rivalry over the urban praetorship—Cassius’ friends warn Brutus against succumbing to the charms of Caesar

1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ...: none of the curule magistrates of 45, except Caesar as sole Consul, were elected till after Caesar returned from Spain (Dio 43.47–48) and the elections for 44 were apparently held in December 45 (cf. *Ad Fam.* 7.30 [265].1–2). On the praetorships of Brutus and Cassius, see Broughton II, 320f.

πλειόνων: Caesar increased the number of praetors to 14 in 45 and 16 in 44 (Dio 43.47.2, 49.1, 51.4) in order to be able to recompense his supporters (Dio 43.47.2).

πολιτικῆν: ‘urbanam’, as at *Sulla* 5.1, Appian 2.112.466, 3.95.394. Other terms in the literary sources are ἡ ἐν ἄστει στρατηγία (Appian 3.6.19), ἡ στρατηγία ἡ οἴκοι (Dio 36.39), ἡ ἀστυνομία (Dio 42.22.2). See further Magie 82, Mason 158f. (less useful).

αὐτούς: emphatic—‘of themselves’; according to the other account their dissension was ‘Caesar’s work’.

αἰτιῶν: unspecified—if the account is true, as seems likely (the two accounts of their dissension are, *pace* P., not | mutually exclusive), then perhaps Cassius thought that Brutus’ cooperation with Caesar had been too enthusiastic, which compared with Cassius’ it certainly had been.

καίπερ οἰκείους ὄντας: cf. 1.4n.

Ἰουνία: one of Servilia’s two daughters by D. Iunius Silanus, *cos.* 62, also known as ‘Tertia’ (Suetonius, *Caes.* 50), or ‘Tertulla’ (*Ad Att.* 14.20 [374].2, 15.11 [389].1). Gossip had it that Servilia prostituted her to Caesar (Suet. *ibid.*), hence Cicero’s witticism ‘Tertia deducta’. She lived to over ninety and died in A.D. 22. Her will made no mention of Augustus and at her funeral procession the portraits of Brutus and Cassius were conspicuous by their absence (Tac. *Ann.* 3.76.1). Dio 44.14.2 also records Cassius’ marriage.

2. Καίσαρος ἔργον: this suggestion that Caesar himself played his part in fostering the estrangement of Brutus and Cassius is quite likely. Meyer 540 cites as a parallel the estrangement of Antony and Dolabella over the consulship of 44. (The suggestion of Appian 2.112.466 that Brutus and Cassius might have been dissembling a common understanding is

ingenious, but obtuse—see below.)

κρύφα ... ἐαυτόν: an intensely vivid expression, with slightly erotic undertones, which are chillingly reversed at 7.7, when the true nature of Caesar's relationship with Brutus is revealed. *διά* here denotes the sphere of τὸ ἐνδιδόναι ἐαυτόν. The expression is more difficult, but also more effective, than ἐλπίδας αὐτοῖς ἐνεδίδου κρύφα (*Alc.* 14.3).

προαχθέντας ... παροξυνθέντες: cf. 2.2n.

3–5. ἡγωνίζετο ... ἀπέτυχε: parallel accounts are *Caes.* 57.5, 62.4–5, Appian 2.112.466f., Dio 44.14.2.

3–4. ἡγωνίζετο ... τὴν πρώτην δοτέον²: the clear implication of this, as of the accounts in Appian and *Caesar*, is | that Brutus and Cassius urged their respective claims orally before Caesar himself. There is nothing difficult to believe in that: it would be fully in line with later imperial practice, and with Caesar's practice of 'commendatio' of his favoured candidates at the elections (Suet. *Caes.* 41.2). On elections under the early Empire see: A. H. M. Jones, *JRS* 45 (1955), 9ff. (= *Studies*, ch. 3); P. A. Brunt, *JRS* 51 (1961), 71f.; B. Levick, *Historia* 16 (1967), 207ff.; A. E. Astin, *Latomus* 28 (1969), 863ff.; E. S. Staveley, *Greek and Roman Voting and Elections* (1972), 217ff.; {R. J. A. Talbert, *CAH* X (1996), 326–7; B. M. Levick, *Augustus: Image and Substance* (2014), 122–5, with further bibliography}. 100

3. πολλὰ ... Παρθικὰ νεανιεύματα: 'spirited exploits', here in a good sense, though not always so in P. Cassius' *νεανιεύματα* against the Parthians were indeed πολλὰ καὶ λαμπρά. In 53 he served under Crassus in Syria as proquaestor, escaped from Carrhae, rallied the scattered survivors, and organized the defence of Syria (full references in Broughton II, 229). In 52 he was proquaestor in Syria, quashed a revolt in Judaea, and continued to organize the defence of Syria (Broughton II, 237). And in 51 he ambushed the Parthian invaders near Antioch and repulsed them with serious losses (Broughton II, 242). Although his achievements were belittled by Cicero (*Ad Att.* 5.18 [111].1, 5.20 [113].3, 5.21 [114].2; by contrast *Ad Fam.* 15.14 [106]—to Cassius!—is extremely warm), it is clear that Cicero in this instance was succumbing to φθόνος; Cassius' qualifications for the urban praetorship were better than Brutus'. For P.'s account of Cassius and the Parthians see *Crass.* 17–30. His sources for the Parthian campaign have been debated, especially with regard to the question of what supplementary source, or sources, he may have used. Suggestions have ranged from Nicolaus (Heeren, Gutschmid), Strabo (Heeren), Dellius (F. E. Adcock, *Marcus Crassus Millionaire* [1966], 59), Timagenes (K. Regling, *De belli Parthici Crassiani fontibus* [diss. Berlin 1899], 2–31, 44–53), or a military memoir of Cassius | (Flacelière, Budé ed. of *Nicias–Crassus*, 194 and 234). Such a source ought to satisfy two criteria: (i) it ought surely, in view of the 101

vividness and the mass of circumstantial detail of the narrative, to be an eye-witness account; (ii) it ought to explain the great prominence, and favourable portrayal, of Cassius, who keeps popping up with all the right advice at critical moments rather in the manner of the Herodotean ‘but-Croesus-the-Lyidian’ inserts. From both points of view Flacelière’s suggestion is extremely tempting (if less certain than supposed by Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 152, n. 8), despite the fact that it involves postulating the existence of an otherwise unevidenced work. If so, this must have been an additional stimulus to P.’s already avid interest in the character of Brutus’ great partner and rival. See on 1.2–3 above. {See also Pelling, *Plutarch and History* 38 n. 96; A. Zadorojniy, *Hermes* 125 (1997), 171–2.}

What can be said about the interrelationships of the sources at this point? *Caes.* 57.5 only mentions the bare fact of Brutus’ and Cassius’ praetorships, within the general context of Caesar’s honouring his former opponents in the Civil War. Dio 44.14.2 simply records the fact of Cassius’ praetorship. Neither therefore offers a valid basis for comparison with the other accounts. *Caes.* 62.4–5 also attests the *dictum*. P.’s *Brutus* version is obviously very similar to Appian’s, down to the explanation in both of the significance of the urban praetorship. Appian’s account is not so close as to suggest mere dependence on *Brutus/Caesar*. Consequently the similarities are best explained as mutual dependence upon a common source. For *a priori* reasons this is likely to be Pollio, and this supposition is strengthened by the fact that Caesar’s *dictum* about Brutus and Cassius was spoken ἐν τοῖς φίλοις. But Appian says nothing about Brutus’ and Cassius’ former differences. P.’s wording shows that this information came from some other source, and here one might think of one of his biographical sources | 102 (? Empylus; {so also Pelling, *Plutarch and History* 14–15}). Appian’s suggestion of duplicity by Brutus and Cassius in their apparent quarrel over the urban praetorship is more clever-clever than convincing. It conflicts with the evidence of οἱ μὲν and οἱ δέ in *Brut.* (7.1 and 7.2), both of whom, though differing over detail, accept the reality of the quarrel, with the source behind 10.3, and with Appian himself (since in accepting, as he does, the historicity of the anecdote of 10.3, he must also accept that Brutus before it was uncommitted to the conspiracy against Caesar, hence that he cannot have been πάντα συμπράσσων with Cassius two or three months earlier). It also ignores the not unreasonable suggestion (7.5n.) that Caesar’s slight to Cassius over the urban praetorship may have been a factor in his final disaffection from Caesar. Nor is it hard to believe that Brutus and Cassius could have had a genuine quarrel over who was to get the urban praetorship: Cassius in particular was a great stickler for what he believed to be his rights (cf. *Ad Att.* 15.11 [389].1f. on his furious reaction to the risible corn commission), and the relations between the two men were not always harmonious (7.1, 10.3, 28.2, 34.2–4, 35.2–4). Cassius’ anger will have been all the greater if (see on 9.5) he had only recently emerged from

philosophical retirement prepared to play his part in the Caesarian dispensation. From all this one may safely conclude that (a) the quarrel between Brutus and Cassius was genuine, and that therefore (b) it provides a useful *terminus post* for the formation of the conspiracy. Appian's suggestion of duplicity is (frankly) so bad that one is tempted to suppose that it is an Appian original (Appian is fond of the mechanical enumeration of all possible motivations—see 2.112.469).

5. ἐφ' ἑτέρα στρατηγός: 'praetor peregrinus', next in dignity to the 'praetor urbanus'.

οὐ τοσοῦτον ἀπέτυχε: for the form of expression (a familiar | type in charges of ingratitude) cf. 11.2. 103

ὀργῆς: a key word for P.'s interpretation of Cassius' character. See on 1.3–4, and cf. 8.5 ἀνὴρ θυμοειδής and 29.5 σφόδρον ἄνδρα καὶ θυμοειδῆ. It is significant that P. only twice in the *Life* attributes ὀργή to Brutus (34.3. 45.9) and that in 45.9 Brutus is showing signs of psychological disintegration. Latent here of course is the charge (rebutted by P. himself at 9.1) that Cassius' motives for conspiring against Caesar were highly self-interested. See further 8.5n. for discussion of P.'s fluctuating acceptance of the tradition hostile to Cassius.

ὦν: Solanus' and Coraes' tamperings with the text are unnecessary. One need only quote Voegelin: 'Schaefer recte defendit ὦν et soni et sensus causa; nam "attractio vocum" ὀργῆς ἦς' (or δι' ᾧ—ὦν) 'impediret intellectionem argutae oppositionis'.

6. καὶ τὰλλα ... ἐβούλετο: e.g. in his scheduled consulship of 41 (see on 3.1).

βουλομένῳ γὰρ ... πλεῖστον: this exaggeration (cf. 6.2n. and 8.3n.) goes beyond the general emphasis in the sources on the favour bestowed on Brutus by Caesar, and should be linked with P.'s statement at 8.3–4 (it follows that P.'s gloss on the *dictum* is not simply his own construction).

7. ἀλλ' εἶλκεν ἀπέστρεφεν: the first hint that it was Cassius who initiated the conspiracy (cf. 8.5n.). It is not immediately clear who ἡ περὶ Κάσσιον ἑταιρεία consists of. Probably P. just means 'the men who were to join the conspiracy at Cassius' instigation', who are regarded as ἡ περὶ Κάσσιον ἑταιρεία by virtue of the simple fact that Cassius was the leader of the conspiracy. So far as hard evidence goes the following description διακελευομένων μαλασσόμενον καὶ κηλούμενον fits Cicero rather well (see on 12.2), but Cicero was not invited to take part in the conspiracy (12.2 and n.), | and—though his personal relations with Cassius were generally 104

φιλοτιμίας: Ziegler's tentative φιλονικίας, cf. φιλονικίαν at 7.2, is arbitrary. φιλοτιμία is often the 'good' word for ambition in P. and

φιλονικία usually the ‘bad’ word, but this distinction is not always maintained, and often the two words are virtually synonyms (e.g. *De prof. in virt.* 80B; *De Pyth. orac.* 408C; *De cohib. ira* 459B; *De frat. am.* 487F; *De cupid. div.* 525D; *De laude ips.* 540A, 544A, 546C etc. etc. See further Wardman 117f., {P. A. Stadter, *Plutarch and his Roman Readers* [2015], 270–85, and various papers in G. Roskam, M. de Pourcq and L. van der Stockt, *The Lash of Ambition: Plutarch, Imperial Greek Literature and the Dynamics of Philotimia* [2012]}).

μαλασσόμενον ἐκτέμνοντα ... ἀλκήν: a very fine piece of imagery rich in meaning and association. The basic image is one of castration: ἐκτέμνοντα (the correction is certain). The only parallel given by LSJ for this use of ἐκτέμνω is Plb. 30.30.8 ἐξετέμοντο τῇ φιλανθρωπία. One imagines it must be commoner than that, as the general idea is immediately implicit in any accusation of ἀνανδρία. The image is maintained by μαλασσόμενον, for μαλακία and its cognate forms are often used of effeminacy (in P. e.g. *Cic.* 7.7, *Gracchi* 25.6). It also carries through to the description of Antony and Dolabella in 8.2, who are ‘fat and long-haired’—like eunuchs (and perhaps also to the description of Brutus and Cassius as ‘pale and lean’, for in popular thinking ‘paleness’ and ‘leanness’ are typical signs of sustained sexual activity. Thus Brutus and Cassius may be seen as still ‘potent’). But Caesar is also regarded as a ‘sorcerer’: κηλούμενον. Taken in isolation there is nothing very startling about that (for the image cf. *Dion* e.g. 14.1). Such an image is often used in bribery contexts (cf. Theopomp. *Com.* 30 {= fr. 31 K–A}, Pl. *Lg.* 885D), which is naturally appropriate to the present context, where Cassius’ friends are warning Brutus against succumbing to the | bribery of Caesar. But the combination of castration/sorcery/bribery creates interesting associations. (In passing, I merely mention the possibility that the ‘sorcery’ image can be connected to the image of Caesar as ‘doctor’—*Comparison of Dion and Brutus* 2.2. Perhaps P. is there implicitly correcting the view of Cassius’ friends by pointing out that the climate of the times required, not Caesar the sorcerer, as they wrongly interpreted him to be, but Caesar the good doctor, whose therapeutic surgery was necessary to save the state. The sorcerer ‘castrates’ (ἐκτέμνει) ἀλκή and creates μαλακία; the good doctor creates ἀλκή by ‘cutting out’ (τέμνειν) μαλακία [cf. *Cat. mai.* 16.7]. But this may be regarded as fanciful. It is, however, worth a mention.) One is reminded of the imagery of ‘Gryllus’ 987E–F: νεοσσοῖς δὲ καὶ σκύμνοις τούτων, δι’ ἡλικίαν εὐαγώγοις καὶ ἀπαλοῖς οὖσιν, πολλὰ καὶ ἀπατηλὰ μελίγματα καὶ ὑποπεττεύματα προσφέροντες καὶ καταφαρμάττοντες, ἡδονῶν παρὰ φύσιν γευόμενα καὶ διαίτης ἀδρανῆ χρόνῳ κατειργάσαντο, ἕως προσεδέξαντο καὶ ὑπέμειναν τὴν καλουμένην ἐξημέρωσιν ὥσπερ ἀπογυναίκωσιν τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς. Thus in the present context Caesar is portrayed as a sorcerer/castrator who tames wild animals by emasculating them. The source of this complex image is therefore by now quite obvious (and naturally gives a piquant paradoxical

point to *Gryllus* 987E–F, where the speaker Gryllus is himself a pig metamorphosed by Circe). It is *Odyssey* 10, especially 338–341:

ἢ μοι σῦς μὲν ἔθηκας ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἑταίρους,
αὐτὸν δ' ἐνθάδ' ἔχουσα δολοφρονέουσα κελεύεις
ἔς θάλαμόν τ' ἵεναι καὶ σῆς ἐπιβήμεναι εὐνῆς,
ὄφρα με γυμνωθέντα κακὸν καὶ ἀνήγορα θήῃς.

That is to say, by accepting Caesar's *φιλοφροσύνας* and *χάριτας* (a word often used of sexual favours—see on 13.8), Brutus is behaving as Odysseus would have done had he rushed into bed with Circe and been 'unmanned' or 'castrated'.

This chain of imagery brilliantly illuminates the narrative, | emphasizing the psychological degradation necessarily implicit in accepting office from Caesar. It also suggests the psychological development of Brutus himself, from the man who gladly accepted the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul from Caesar (and who was right to do so because it afforded him an opportunity to succour that hard-pressed province), to the man who can only further his own career and secure the urban praetorship by compromising himself with Caesar (the quasi-sexual 'furtivus amor' flavour of 7.2 has already been noted), and who then realizes, under the prodding of Cassius' friends (Cassius' friends, because Cassius, after his 'experience' at 7.2, now sees that further advancement under Caesar would involve 'selling himself'), that collaboration with the regime of Caesar will leave him no longer a 'man' but a political and psychological eunuch. In the *Caesar* P. points out the 'blunting' effects of acceptance of Caesar's favours upon Brutus (*Caes.* 62.2). In the *Brutus* he analyses Brutus' moral predicament in detail with a brilliant piece of writing, full of psychological depth and insight. The plight of the proud, independent, Roman aristocrat could not be put in clearer focus. This suggests a further reason for P.'s (admittedly clumsy) introduction of Brutus' views on homosexuality in 6.9. In private life Brutus is exemplarily chaste and rightly critical of those who refuse nothing to any of their suitors. He is now made to see that to accept the favours of Caesar is no different from the self-prostitution he himself condemns.

περιορᾶν: because the 'wooing' of a sorcerer is insidious and 'beguiling'.

τιμῶντα ... ἀλκῆν: the assonance, reinforcing the meaning, is extremely effective.

ἀλκῆν: poetic, much used in Homer. For the sensitive reader this will help to bring the Odysseus/Circe parallel to mind. |

**Ch. 8: Caesar's suspicions of, but trust in, Brutus;
the motives ascribed to Cassius by his enemies**

1. οὐδέ: not even Caesar', for all his 'beguilement' of Brutus.

ἀνύποπτος ... ἀδιάβλητος: cf. 2.2n.

φρόνημα: his 'high spirit'. P. is hinting at Brutus' innate intolerance of servitude.

ἀξίωμα: presumably his 'reputation' for virtue. P. has not yet developed this theme, but he is as it were giving in shorthand the grounds for Caesar's general suspicion of Brutus. The reference could of course be rather more concrete—to Brutus' political *status*.

τοὺς φίλους: primarily Cassius, possibly Cicero, despite the small part he plays in the *Brutus*, and possibly also the 'Catonian fold', to which Brutus had returned with his marriage to Porcia (2.1n.). Servilia had disapproved of this marriage (*Ad Att.* 13.22 [329].4), no doubt rightly divining its political significance. But P. is here being deliberately allusive.

ἦθει: presumably because it was *πρᾶον* and *ἐμβριθές*.

2. καὶ πρῶτον: this picks up οὐδὲ Καίσαρ ἀνύποπτος ...

Ἄντωνίου καὶ Δολοβέλλα: what is the reference to? It does not have to be to anything *very* specific (since nothing Antony or Dolabella ever did against Caesar came to much) but there has to be some *specious* reference to provide a context for Caesar's (no doubt) historical remark. Dolabella engaged in *νεωτερισμός* in 47 with his proposed cancellation of debts (Livy, *Epit.* 113; Plut. *Ant.* 9.1–2; Dio 42.29.1, 42.33.2; cf. Cic. *Ad Att.* 11.23 [232].3, 14.21 [375].4, *Phil.* 6.11, 10.22, 11.14, 13.26). But this cannot be what is referred to here as: (a) Caesar (of course) was out of Rome at the time; and (b) Dolabella's plans were eventually thwarted by Antony's armed intervention as Master of Horse. The assassination | attempt on Caesar of 46 was inspired by Antony, according to Cicero, *Phil.* 2.74 'Quin his temporibus domi Caesaris percussor ab isto deprehensus dicebatur esse cum sica; de quo Caesar in senatu aperte in te invehens questus est'. But the breezy confidence of this is refuted by the account of *Marc.* 21, which makes clear that Caesar's complaint in the senate mentioned no names, and that Cicero himself had in fact no idea who was behind the attempt. (Nor is there any link with Dolabella.) There is also the story that Antony was sounded out by Trebonius at Narbo in the summer of 45 (*Ant.* 13.2, Cic. *Phil.* 2.34, cf. 13.22). But (a) this does not provide a Dolabella link, and (b) this whole story, like that of the alleged attempt of Cassius in Cilicia in 47 (see on 8.5 below), is best regarded as one of the 'I-all-but-killed-himself-earlier' variety, designed to excuse Trebonius' *κολακεία* in accepting the suffect consulship from the beginning of October 45 (Broughton II, 305), and to discredit Antony. In any case, the second half of Caesar's quotation must (surely) date Antony and Dolabella's suspicious activity—whatever it was—to the period when Brutus and Cassius could

be regarded as cooperating dangerously. This can only be at the beginning of 44, when Brutus and Cassius had made up their quarrel over the urban praetorship, and when Cassius was beginning to show open hostility to Caesar (see on 8.5 and 10.3 below). There is no evidence that Dolabella knew anything in advance of the plot to kill Caesar, still less that he was in any way involved in it. It is true that immediately after the event he promptly identified himself with the Liberators by visiting them on the Capitol (Velleius 2.58.3, Appian 2.119.122, Dio 44.22.1). But this was hardly done out of conviction, rather to get his disputed consulship agreed to by all parties. The case of Antony is slightly more difficult. He had shown that he could oppose Caesar directly by his obstruction of Dolabella's election as consul | (on this see: Cicero, *Phil.* 1.31, 2.32–3, 2.79–83, 2.88, 2.99, 3.9, 5.9; Plut. *Ant.* 11.2–3, *Caes.* 62.5; Dio 43.51.8). His part in the Lupercalia incident could be interpreted as anti-Caesar, *if* it is true that he was assisted in his efforts to 'crown' Caesar by Cassius and Casca, who would certainly have been hostile to Caesar by this stage (see on 8.5). But this version is only attested by Nicolaus 21.71–5, and there is every reason to suppose it a malicious fabrication, directed against Antony, or Cassius and Casca, or both. If the Narbo story is discounted, as it should be, there is nothing to indicate that Antony knew of the plot against Caesar in advance. His flight from the senate-house on the Ides of March surely shows that the assassination came to him as a complete surprise. By a process of elimination, therefore, it seems likely that Antony and Dolabella's *νεωτερισμός* should be connected in some way with the dispute over who should be consul for 44. In that dispute the two men were rivals, but Caesar's compromise solution (that Dolabella should succeed to the consulship before he himself left Rome for Parthia) pleased neither (Dolabella because he wanted to be consul from the beginning of the year, Antony because he wanted Caesar as his colleague so that when Caesar left Rome he himself would be supreme). It is just possible therefore that the two men tried to negotiate some sort of deal between themselves against Caesar. (Certainly they cooperated fully after Caesar's assassination.) This *may* be the implication of the narrative at *Ant.* 11.5–6. If this should be regarded as unlikely, then it is worth pointing out that all that is strictly required by the context of Caesar's remark is that some of his friends feared collaboration between Antony and Dolabella, whether or not there actually was any. At any rate a dating of early in 44 for the remark seems certain, because of the link with the collaboration of Brutus and Cassius. (This is also of course the implication of P.'s narrative in the *Brutus*. While | it is often perilous to draw precise chronological inferences from the organization of Plutarchean narratives, the narrative from *ch.* 6 onwards does follow strictly chronological lines.)

οὐκ ἔφη ... Κάσσιον: the same anecdote is related in *Caes.* 62.10, *Ant.* 11.6, and the (spurious) *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* 206F, with some

variations. It does not appear in Appian. The *Caesar* account records *two dicta*. In the first the paleness of Cassius is singled out by itself; the second is as in the *Brutus*, though the emphasis is more on Cassius. The *Antony* account is the same as the *Brutus* in recording only one *dictum*, but closer to the *Caesar* verbally. Presumably Caesar did utter two *dicta* and P. has deliberately chosen to record only one in the *Brutus* because he is concerned particularly with Caesar's feelings towards Brutus at this point.

παχεῖς: also in the *Caesar* and *Antony*. *Mor.* 206F has the more explicitly contemptuous *βαναύσους*. In terms of P.'s narrative from 7.7, Antony and Dolabella are *παχεῖς* because (a) they have accepted feeding from Caesar, and (b) as a consequence, they are eunuchs. But this will not have been the original point of the remark. Fat people are traditionally regarded as stupid (for *παχύς* in this sense see Aristoph. *Clouds* 842; Lucian, *Alex.* 9 and 17; Heliodorus 5.18), and lazy and easy-going (as fat people are often felt to be even today). For the general associations of fatness see Hippocrates, *Aēr.* 49–50: where the land is rich, the inhabitants are 'fleshy, ill-articulated, moist, lazy, and generally cowardly in character. Slackness and sleepiness can be observed in them, and as far as the arts are concerned they are thick-witted, and neither subtle nor sharp' (trans. W. H. S. Jones). The other quite common association, 'wealthy', can hardly be relevant here, since Dolabella was notoriously insolvent. As far as the truth of the literal description goes, Antony at least was *παχύς* | (see *Ant.* 4.1, Cic. *Phil.* 2.63; 111 'strong as a gladiator'. Cf. the recently identified head [*Studio Sallis, Narbonne*]).

κομήτας: to Greeks this was often a sign of dissoluteness (Pherecrates 14; Aristophanes, *Clouds* 348, 1101), and the Romans considered careful combing of the hair effeminate (Cic. *Cat.* 2.22; Pers. 1.15ff.; Tib. 1.8.9). Antony was proud of his appearance and besides having long hair also had a *πώγων τις οὐκ ἀγεννήης* (*Ant.* 4.1f.). From the point of view of 7.7, eunuchs are also hairy.

<αὐτόν>: Ziegler's *αὐτόν*, though perhaps not absolutely necessary, is surely a commonsense insertion. *Caes.* 62.10, *Ant.* 11.6, and *Mor.* 206F all have *δέδοικα*.

ὠχροὺς καὶ ἰσχροὺς: *C* and *Mor.* 206F have *ἰσχροὺς καὶ ὠχροὺς*.

ὠχροὺς: paleness was especially a characteristic of thinking men, particularly philosophers (*Clouds* 103, 119f., 198f., 1112, 1171; Theocr. 14.6; Lucian, *Jup. Trag.* 1), either because of their general weediness, or because they were thought to spend most of their time studying indoors. Here the point must be that to be *ὠχρός* is a sign of much thinking—always a dangerous activity under an autocracy. In terms of P.'s narrative from 7.7 Brutus and Cassius are 'pale' because (a) they are perhaps still 'sexually active', in contrast to the emasculated Antony and Dolabella, and (b) they are not 'eating enough' of Caesar's largesse.

ἰσχνούς: λεπτούς in *Caes.* 62.10 and *Ant.* 11.6. In terms of P.'s narrative from 7.7 Brutus and Cassius are 'thin' because (a) they are perhaps still 'sexually active', and (b) they are not 'eating enough' from Caesar's table. The original point is that thinness is regarded as a sign of a restless nature. On the general associations see Hippocrates, loc. cit.: where the land is poor, the inhabitants are 'hard, lean, well-articulated, | well-braced ... such natures will be found energetic, vigilant, stubborn and independent in character and in temper, wild rather than tame, of more than average sharpness and intelligence in the arts, and in war of more than average courage'. Presumably one can accept Caesar's description as accurate; both Brutus and Cassius were austere, intellectual, ascetic types. Brutus' coin portraits show a rather knobby face. {For discussion of the coin portraits and various attempts to deduce character see Clarke, *Noblest Roman* 72–3.}

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ἐκείνους: probably demonstrative—cf. *Mor.* 206F δέξας, though the sometimes sinister connotations of ἐκεῖνος will also be relevant.

Βρούτον καὶ Κάσσιον: the reverse order in the *Caesar*, where more of the emphasis is on Cassius. {On the ordering of the names see 8.5n. and E. Rawson in I. S. Moxon, J. D. Smart, and A. J. Woodman, edd., *Past Perspectives* (1986), 101–19 = *Roman Culture and Society* (1991) 488–507.}

3. ἔπειτα: picking up ἐπίστευε ... ἦθει—a piece of evidence that is to be set against Caesar's apparent suspicions of 8.2. Many editors have failed to see this.

ἔπειτα ... σαρκίον: the same anecdote in *Caes.* 62.6, where the sequence of thought and the wording are closely similar to the present passage, although slightly more elaborate. Appian does not have it.

σαρκίον: δέρμα in *Caesar*. The self-depreciatory diminutive could be taken in two ways: (i) 'this poor flesh' in a philosophical sense (cf. the use of σαρκίδιον in Arr. *Epict.* 1.3.5); (ii) as a reference to Caesar's failing health (on which see Suet. *Caes.* 45; cf. the use of σωματίον in *PCair.Zen.* 254, Gal. 13.1025, Agathin. ap. Orib. 10.7.4). The two possibilities are not mutually exclusive, but the use of δέρμα in *Caesar* rather favours the second.

ὡς οὐδενὶ ... τοσοῦτον: this gloss has caused much difficulty. First of all, is it P.'s own or did he find it already in his source? P. of course often does use such glosses when he wishes to make clear the meaning of some notable phrase (cf. 44.2 | below, *Philop.* 1.4). But here it is more than a mere gloss in isolation—it goes closely with the emphatic statements of 7.6 and 8.4. One surely ought to conclude that P. is following a source in his interpretation of the remark. Secondly, the difficulties. Reiske and Voegelin found this interpretation impossible to square with the general context of *ch.* 8, but their difficulty arises only from failing to see that P. is here concerned with the topic of Caesar's trust in Brutus: there is no conflict with 8.2 simply because 8.3 picks up 8.1 ἐπίστευε ... ἦθει only.

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When Caesar is trustful of Brutus, there is no reason why he should not suppose that Brutus will be content with acquiring his inheritance in the normal course of nature. This, however, raises two fundamental questions: (i) did Caesar ever intend Brutus to be his heir? (ii) whether he did or not, could he have made this remark meaning to give the impression that he did? (This second question seems never to be asked, but it ought to be.) (i) O. E. Schmidt, *Verhandlungen der 40 Philologenversammlung* (1889), 177f. thinks that this anecdote shows that at one time Caesar considered adopting Brutus, hence his adoption of Octavian in the autumn of 45, immediately after his return to Rome (Suet. *Caes.* 83, Nicol. 13.28ff.), was an important additional reason for the formation of the conspiracy. Although an interesting historical curiosity, this argument is a shocker: (a) it is quite clear from their behaviour immediately after Caesar's assassination that none of the principal parties knew what Caesar's will contained (cf. Nicolaus' explicit *συνέκρυψε τὴν γνώμην*); (b) Caesar's remark has, in context, to be dated to the beginning of 44, because of the fact that suspicion has fallen on Brutus' loyalty (as is in fact confirmed by *Caes.* 62.6 *πραττομένης ἤδη τῆς συνωμοσίας*). On the general point modern scholars agree that Caesar could never have considered adopting Brutus. This judgement is based partly on Brutus' character and Caesar's likely estimation | of it, partly on the fact that Brutus did not in the event appear in Caesar's will at all. This view is no doubt right. (ii) It does not therefore *automatically* follow that Caesar could not have intended to give the impression that Brutus would be his heir. Antony and Dolabella (and others) were already jockeying for position: they and others must have felt that there was some chance that Caesar would not in fact return from Parthia alive. Any ageing person with a legacy to bequeath knows that it is good policy to play off rivals for the legacy against each other. From that point of view, it is not absolutely impossible that Caesar did mean to give the impression that he had adopted Brutus. But it is of course true that the usual interpretation of Caesar's remark—'Brutus, lover of liberty that he is, will wait for me to die in the normal course of events because I haven't long to live'—is equally possible, and rather more likely. *Either* therefore P.'s source is grossly misinterpreting Caesar's remark, *or* while in a sense interpreting the remark correctly it is taking it far too seriously. This, taken in the light of the fact that Appian does not record the remark at all, surely has interesting implications for the question of what source P. is following at this point. It must be a relatively *ill-informed* source, ignorant of the realities of Caesarian politics at the time. Empylus comes strongly into consideration.

4. καὶ ... δόξαν: P. proceeds to build on the gloss *ὡς ... τοσοῦτον*. The main point is to stress Brutus' incredible disinterestedness. It is no surprise that he omits any reflection like *οὐκ ἂν ἀχάριστον καὶ πονηρὸν γεγόμενον* of

Caesar 62.6.

ὀλίγον χρόνον ... δόξαν: for this idea of the decline of the power of the older man in proportion to the rise of the younger cf. *Pomp.* 14.4.

παρακμάσαι: P. has a highly developed concept of ascent, | ‘prime’, and decline in a man’s political career, which frequently provides him with a structural framework for a *Life*. See G. H. Polman, ‘Chronological biography and *Akme* in Plutarch’, *Class. Phil.* 69 (1974), 169–174. It is of course only a particular manifestation of the general philosophical concept of ascent, ‘prime’, and decline. 115

For such ‘prime’ metaphors in general cf. e.g. *Dion* 23.4, *Nic.* 13.11, *Caes.* 37.5, *Fab. Max.* 2.4 and 21.1 below.

μαρανθῆναι: a metaphor of which P. is extraordinarily fond. It can be used very generally of emotions, feelings, virtues or vices: *De poet. aud.* 20B, *De prof. in virt.* 76F, *De cohib. ira* 453B, *De cupid. div.* 527A, *Quaest. conviv.* 656F, 696F, *An seni sit ger. reip.* 792E, *Non posse suav. vivi* 1101D, *Coriol.* 19.1, 21.1 below; of storms (*Quaest. conviv.* 663D), winds (*Pyrrh.* 15.8), the sea (*Mar.* 37.6), wine (*Quaest. conviv.* 692D), heat (*Quaest. conviv.* 694F), disease (*Philop.* 18.2), luxury (*Lyc.* 9.4), sight (*Timol.* 37.8), philosophy (*Maxime cum princ. phil. diss.* 777A), souls (*De lat. viv.* 1129D), the arts (*Demosth.* 3.1). In a political context it can be used of statesmen themselves (*An seni sit ger. resp.* 804E), of their achievements (*Dion* 24.4), power (*De fort. Alex.* 337A, *Caes.* 3.1, *Nic.* 13.11, *Mar.* 31.3, *Pomp.* 14.4, *Gracchi* 32.5), and reputation (*Mar.* 31.3, cf. *De def. orac.* 411E, *De genio Socr.* 575E). P. uses the metaphor so often (the above examples are only a selection) that sometimes it has little force. Only rarely does he introduce it with the ‘apologetic’ οἶον or ὅσπερ (e.g. *De prof. in virt.* 76F, *Quaest. conviv.* 696F, *Non posse suav. vivi* 1101D). Here its full force is guaranteed by the link with παρακμάσαι. For the two metaphors together cf. *Quaest. conv.* 656F, and in a political context *Fab. Max.* 2.4, *Nic.* 13.11, and perhaps 21.1 below. Fuhrmann does not seem to have anything useful on these two metaphors. |

In the *An seni sit gerenda respublica* P. campaigns vigorously against the notion that δόξα and δύναμις need decline with age (e.g. 786F), but there he is describing the ideal, not the customary reality. 116

5. ἀλλὰ Κάσσιος ... κατήπειξε: for the content cf. *Caes.* 62.8 ὁ Κάσσιος αἰσθόμενος διακινούμενον ἡσυχῇ τὸ φιλότιμον αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ἐνέκειτο καὶ παρώξυνεν.

θυμοειδής: the key to the interpretation of Cassius’ character. See on 7.5. Clearly Epicureanism is not regarded as having the necessary softening effect on Cassius’ θυμός.

μᾶλλον ... μισοτύραννος: P. seems to state this as a fact (no λέγεται, of source opinion, possibly as opposed to P.’s own), but in the *Brutus* at least (contrast *Caes.* 62.8, quoted above), despite the present passage and despite the similar implications of 7.5, does not really accept this hostile view of

Cassius' motives (cf. 9.iff.). He is led to accept it here temporarily both by the source he is following (clearly anti-Cassius), and by the need to maintain the general contrast of character between Brutus and Cassius, which is particularly important in these sections. It is of course true that he covers himself to some degree by the insertion of *μᾶλλον* (cf. *οὐχ ὁμοίως* at 1.4). He is not denying Cassius *some* public principle. On the face of it, it could be argued that it is not then so inconsistent for him to defend Cassius in 9.iff.: he is only campaigning against the tradition that Caesar's theft of Cassius' lions was the *chief* cause of Cassius' disaffection. But in reality there is some inconsistency, for the purpose of the story of Cassius' fight with Faustus Sulla is to prove that Cassius was naturally hostile to tyrants from his earliest youth. When the reader gets to 9.5 (*Τοιοῦτος ... ὁ Κάσσιος*) he must feel— | and P. must intend him to feel—that Cassius' motivation has been *fully* vindicated. P.'s careful insertion of *μᾶλλον* at 8.5 and *μάλιστα* at 9.1 shows him to be alive to the dangers of inconsistency, but it would be wrong to claim that he avoids them altogether. Such inconsistencies are indeed characteristic of P.'s art. They are bound to occur when the moralist and literary artist join forces to set up a 'monumental' *σύγκρισις*: the historian has sometimes to intervene to point out that the truth is rather more complex.

κατήπειξε: the imperfect would be possible—Cassius inflames Brutus, and having inflamed him, keeps at him. But the two aorists give a snappy assonance which is perhaps intentional, and create a vivid picture of the onslaught of Cassian *θυμός* upon a rather passive Brutus.

I have already discussed some of the reasons for the great prominence of Cassius in the *Brutus* (see on 1.2–3). One may suggest another (with the hope that it is not too fanciful). Although Cassius is in general Brutus' inferior morally, so far as the narrative of chs. 6–9 is concerned, there is a certain sense in which he is Brutus' superior. In the terms of the narrative of chs. 6–9 it is 'right' to kill Caesar, for he is a tyrant and service under him involves the deepest moral degradation (see on 7.7). Cassius is the first to realize this, and although Brutus is himself already stirred in his soul it is Cassius who actually brings him to the point of action. Cassius in this part of the *Life* almost acts as the voice of Brutus' conscience: himself a man of too much *θυμός* (*θυμοειδής*), he nevertheless provides the necessary *θυμός* to provoke the appropriate *ὀρμή* in Brutus. This idea (it seems to me) is all but made explicit in the *Comparison* 1.2–3 (unfortunately though it is there rather weakened | by P.'s willingness to distance himself from the tradition that Cassius was the instigator of the conspiracy). Little wonder, if so, that P. found himself so deeply fascinated by this strange and complex man, or that his attitude to him was so fundamentally ambivalent. There is another sense in which the prominence, or rather, from 6.7–10.7, the dominance, of Cassius is important. From 5.1–8.4 P. has heavily stressed the closeness of Brutus' relationship with Caesar and his excellent prospects under Caesar's

rule. Within the *Life* as a whole this emphasis helps to highlight the purity of Brutus' motives in joining the conspiracy. But there is more to it than that. At 7.2ff. P. starts to imply that cooperation with Caesar is, for a man like Brutus, degrading and immoral, and it is Cassius who brings home this perception to Brutus. For Shakespeare, Brutus was a man 'with himself at war', torn between his Republican conscience and his close relationship with Caesar. (For further development of this view see Radin 231ff.) This interpretation of Brutus' inner conflict is surely deliberately implied by P. in these chapters. It is as if Caesar and Cassius are engaged in a struggle for the possession of Brutus' soul. Once Brutus decides to join Cassius' enterprise he has come to terms with himself, and Cassius is naturally no longer so prominent. Yet the idea of the conflict in Brutus' soul is brought up again in 36–37. Brutus is afraid that he has seen an avenging/prophetic *δαίμων* and it is to Cassius that he turns for support. Cassius delivers a rationalizing interpretation of the apparition, which the reader is meant to accept (see commentary *ad loc.*), but it still leaves Brutus having experienced an 'anxiety' or 'guilty conscience' dream. All in all, it must be said that P. shows considerably greater insight into the characters of Brutus and Cassius than the rather simplistic editorial framework would suggest. His insight | is in fact little short of profound. Against this claim it may be objected that P.'s insight into his characters is rarely great. This is true, but Brutus and Cassius by the very nature of the moral issue they confronted are something of a special case. The conflict between 'principatus' and 'libertas' was one that was very real to P., as to so many Greek and Roman aristocrats and philosophers in the first century. He could empathize with Brutus and Cassius to a high degree because in a sense their problem was his problem as well. And his emotional commitment to them was greater (and hence his portrayal of them more successful) than to Cato, for Brutus and Cassius were more than mere personifications of unyielding virtue (with which P. was ultimately rather out of sympathy): they were civilized men, of high culture, whose personal struggle was no simple matter. Hence (I would argue) the near profundity of his analysis of their characters. But to return to more solid ground ...

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The implication of the sentence *ἀλλὰ ... κατήπειξε*, as of *Caes.* 62.8, and of Appian 2.113.470–473 (with the same anecdote as 10.3–7 below), is that Cassius was the instigator of the conspiracy. In Dio 44.14 Brutus is assigned the primacy: *μετὰ τοῦτο* (Porcia's self-mutilation) *τὸν Κάσσιον ... προσέλαβε*. Nicolaus 19.59 is neutral, merely stating that the plot began with a few and was said ultimately to have included over eighty individuals, chief among whom were Decimus Brutus, Cassius, and M. Brutus. The version of P. and Appian has been challenged by (among others) Gelzer 998f. and Fröhlich 1730. Since the primacy of Cassius is so basic an element in P.'s analysis of the characters of Brutus and Cassius, and the

historical problem is of importance in its own right, one must ask which version is the true one?

120 Dio's account as it stands is intrinsically the less likely: it makes Porcia wound herself at a time when Brutus has not yet | become involved in the conspiracy, but is only upset and disturbed by the writings on the statues and tribunal. This is a little difficult to credit, particularly when set beside P.'s highly circumstantial narrative. And it seems extremely probable that Cassius, who saw that Caesar still intended to be 'dominus' as early as January 45 (see below on 9.5), whereas Brutus was still naïvely optimistic in August 45 (see on 1.5), would have assessed political realities more acutely than Brutus, particularly as he was much less committed to Caesar personally (in Plutarchean terms, not being under the 'spell' of Caesar the 'sorcerer'). And the writings on the statues and tribunal {cf. R. Morstein-Marx in C. Kuhn, ed., *Politische Kommunikation und öffentliche Meinung in der antiken Welt* (2012), 191–217; Pelling on *Caes.* 62.7}, which—as all sources agree—were what impelled Brutus in the first place, rather presuppose that the conspiracy was already in the air before Brutus got himself involved in it (cf. Cassius' words at 10.6 below). Further, these graffiti appeared in the aftermath of the Lupercalia incident, but Cassius and some others had already put their opposition on record by voting against the senate's final batch of honours to Caesar, probably to be dated to the end of 45 (Gelzer, *Caesar* [1968], 316f., nn. 1 and 3, on Dio 44.8.1). Even if this dating is not certain, the fact that Brutus is not mentioned among the *τινων ἄλλων* who supported Cassius tells its own story. These arguments are not spoiled by the obvious falsity of the tale that Cassius planned to assassinate Caesar in Cilicia in 47: *Phil.* 2.26 'qui' (Cassius) 'etiam sine his clarissimis viris hanc rem in Cilicia ad ostium fluminis Cydni confecisset, si ille ad eam ripam quam constituerat, non ad contrariam navis appulisset' looks much too good to be true—an example of what Balsdon 82 acutely calls the 'I-all-but-killed-him-myself-earlier' type of story. Cassius may have wanted to put his claim to primacy beyond dispute, or to excuse his apparent *κολακεία* in becoming Caesar's legate after Pharsalus (cf. Trebonius' 'plot' at Narbo—see on 8.2 above). |

121 If then it is as good as certain that Cassius was the instigator of the conspiracy, why the dominant role of Brutus in all sources, as well as the explicit (though unfounded) assertion of Dio 44.14? The answer partly is that Brutus did indeed play a prominent—perhaps the prominent—part in the conspiracy (cf. 10.1–2 below), though he had not started it himself. He got his way, for example, against the apparent opposition of everyone else, in the decision to spare Antony. But other—propaganda—factors are also important. Brutus, considerably more than Cassius, could be represented as the type of the philosopher-statesman, especially as in the following century his Academic philosophy, with its strong Stoic undertones, was much more in vogue than Cassius' Epicureanism. And while there could

be some doubt about Cassius' motivation (see on 9.5 below), there could be none about Brutus' (see on 8.6 below): he was the high-minded and disinterested tyrannicide *par excellence*. He was also closely associated with Cato, a great Republican and Stoic cult figure (see on 2.1). The romantic sub-plot provided a further piquant interest (see on 5.2ff.). Finally, there were the bouquets thrown Brutus by both Antony (29.7) and Augustus (*Comp.* 5), the victors who could afford to be generous to the less dangerous of their rivals, once he was defeated and dead. All these factors played their part in over-emphasizing the importance of Brutus in the formation of the conspiracy. Yet P. is not the only historian to record the truth. Tacitus insists on the word order 'Cassius et Brutus' (cf. *Ann.* 4.34ff.—three times; 3.76.2, 1.10.3), in implicit rejection of standard mythology (so Syme, *Tacitus* [1958] II, 557, n. 7. It is a pity he fails to cite *Ann.* 1.2.1, where Tacitus does adopt the usual order, but the general point is valid and important. {Cf. E. Rawson in I. S. Moxon, J. D. Smart, and A. J. Woodman, edd., *Past Perspectives* (1986), 101–19 at 103 = *Roman Culture and Society* (1991) 488–507 at 490}). So apparently too the historian Cremutius Cordus: *Ann.* 4.34 'laudato ... M. Bruto C. Cassium Romanorum ultimum dixisset' (see further on 44.2). And in Nero's reign a descendant of Cassius, | Longinus, was indicted before the senate for venerating among his family *imagines* one of Cassius inscribed 'Leader of the Cause' (*Ann.* 16.7). {See also A. M. Gowing, *The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio* (1992), 163–205; Welch (2015a), esp. 291–8.}

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6. λέγεται: a deliberate switch of construction, even though the *λεγόμενον* only restates in a different form what P. himself has just expressed so pithily. P. is preparing to refute the *λεγόμενον* (9.1). In general his use of *λέγεται* and similar terms means little and often may be regarded as mere scholarly pedantry (e.g. in supernatural contexts). In many contexts, and often even in supernatural contexts, he quickly drops the *λέγεται* construction and goes into straight narrative. But he does sometimes (as here) use *λέγεται* to dissociate himself from a tradition: cf. e.g. *Caes.* 8.3–4, *Cat. mai.* 12.5, and note the care with which he employs it in mythological contexts (as in the *Theseus*). The fact is of importance in his treatment of the apparition that appeared to Brutus (see on 36.1 and 48.1). {P.'s use of *λέγεται* is discussed by B. Cook, *GRBS* 42 (2001), 329–60.}

Βρούτος ... βαρύνεσθαι: the friendly personal relations of Brutus and Caesar hardly require further documentation, nor Brutus' excellent prospects of political advancement under Caesar's patronage. Hence his motivation *must* have been disinterested: once his resolve was made he made a clear distinction in his mind between Caesar his *familiaris*, whom he liked and respected, and Caesar the *τύραννος*, under whose rule 'he was not really a citizen until he had resolved to do the deed' (*Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25].3). If his father had plotted a tyranny he would have killed him (*Ad*

Brut. 1.17 [26].6); it would have been wrong to kill Antony because Antony embodied no *principle* (cf. *Ant.* 13.3). See further Gelzer 990.

Κάσσιος ... τὸν ἄρχοντα μισεῖν: on this (probably unjust) charge see on 9.5 below. Cassius certainly did not ‘hate’ Caesar in January 45 (*Ad Fam.* 15.19 [216].4: ‘veterem et clementem dominum’—see on 9.5 below). |

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ἄλλα ... ἐγκλήματα: in P.’s narrative only Cassius’ chagrin over the urban praetorship has been mentioned. Other complaints alleged include the deferment of his consulship (*Vell.* 2.56.3), and Caesar’s evident intention not to make use of his considerable expertise in the expedition against Parthia (a modern conjecture).

6–7. λεόντων ... γενέσθαι: this story is only attested by P. The emphasis he gives it does not show that he attaches the political significance to it assigned by Cassius’ enemies, for he immediately disagrees with them (9.iff.). Rather, it gives P. himself the opportunity to indulge in a little discreet evocation of *πάθος* in his readers (see further on *ch.* 31). A historical problem at once presents itself: is the story authentic? The fullest discussion is that of Wilson 59f., whose views are fairly typical. She rejects it for three reasons: (i) it is so trivial as surely to be malicious invention; (ii) there is no mention of it in Dio’s account of the siege and capture of Megara; (iii) there is no record of Cassius’ aedileship. (i) is fundamentally misconceived. It is well known what great importance Roman politicians attached to *ludi* as a means of advancement in popular favour. If Caesar did appropriate Cassius’ lions, this would have greatly angered Cassius. We all know the lengths to which Caelius went to try to get Cicero to procure him his panthers. I deal with (ii) and (iii) below. Garzetti’s suggestion (on *Caes.* 62.8, {cf. *Affortunati* on this passage}) that the Cassius in question ought really to be L. Cassius Longinus, brother of the tyrannicide and a Caesarian who fought in Thessaly (*Caes. BC* 3.34.2, 3.56.1) and later under Calenus in Achaea (*BC* 3.56.1) is much more worrying, for it *seems* to have the right man at the right place at the right time. But there are difficulties, the chief among which lie in the question of P.’s source at this point. He has obviously got hold of an item which lay outside the main historical tradition (there is no parallel therefore with Appian’s confusion of the |

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tyrannicide Cassius with L. Cassius—2.88.372, 2.111.464: {Gowing, *The Triumviral Narratives* 165–6}). One would have to suppose that his source, probably a biographical one and probably also contemporary, was guilty of a rather gross error of identification. Before accepting such a hypothesis, one ought first to see whether the account as given by P. can survive the attacks made upon it.

ἀγορανομεῖν μέλλων: a critical phrase for the authenticity of the whole story. Megara fell some time after Pharsalus (*Dio* 42.14.3); Athens and most of the rest of Greece fell or surrendered immediately after Pharsalus, but it was ‘much later’ that Megara was taken. It had been besieged before

Pharsalus (*Caes.* 43.1, Dio loc. cit.). How could Cassius the tyrannicide think before August 48—at a time when he was still actively campaigning against Caesar—that he was ἀγορανομεῖν μέλλων? One might suggest two explanations: (i) he had been promised an aedileship in some premature division of spoils like the one that took place before Pharsalus (*Pomp.* 67), had assumed that the Pompeians would win, and had already started to prepare for his aedileship by housing lions for the games in Megara. It might be objected that the hardheaded Cassius, unlike Ahenobarbus, Lentulus Spinther, and Scipio an experienced military commander, would not have been the type to anticipate victory in this manner, but optimism was not foreign to Cassius' nature: after all, the conspiracy itself was based on a complete misjudgement of the likely public reaction to Caesar's murder. And there was the solid Pompeian success at Dyrrachium and his own naval exploits to induce over-confidence over the eventual military outcome. (ii) as a Roman aristocrat of high standing Cassius could look forward with nearly absolute confidence to an aedileship in the normal course of events. To judge from the rest of his cursus (quaestor 54, praetor 44, consul to-be in 41) an aedileship would have fallen in 47. This fits his having lions in | Megara in 48. Cassius, with his connexions with Syria and Cilicia, was in fact in a good position for acquiring lions. One would have to suppose a time gap of perhaps two or three years between his acquiring the lions and their intended use in an aedileship. But this does not seem impossible: D. Brutus had a troop of gladiators in Rome in 44 with no immediate use for them (see on 12.5). Possibly Cassius' lions got held up at Megara because of the outbreak of the Civil War.

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Καλήνου: *RE* 7.204ff. (Münzer), Broughton II, 281. He had been sent to occupy Achaëa before Pharsalus (*Caes. BC* 3.106.1, *Caes.* 43.1, Dio 42.14).

7. ταῦτα ... θηρία: there is no mention of the lions in the only other account of the siege, that of Dio 42.14.3. Dio's account seems impressively detailed and circumstantial, but it is quite brief, and his failure to mention the lion story cannot be taken as evidence that it is fictitious. The eruption of the lions could have been a relatively minor factor in the capture of the city (cf. ἤδη τῆς πόλεως καταλαμβανομένης).

To sum up, the story of the lions cannot be disproved, and the fact that it may come from a source with a detailed knowledge of the personalities of the conspirators should be allowed some weight. I think, on balance, that the story should be accepted. If so, the incident certainly must have angered Cassius.

συμφορὰν ...: the rest of the story P. tells for its own sake.

εἰς αὐτούς: perhaps something of a conventional element—secret weapons from the animal world have a habit of backfiring on their inventors. Cf. the behaviour of the Carthaginian elephants at Zama: Livy 30.33.13. There are many parallels.

ἤρπασεν: ‘em. Hesse’, according to Ziegler. Ziegler is not the most sensitive of Plutarchean editors to the nuances of P.’s use of tenses. The imperfect is in fact more graphic. Voegelin’s | comment is characteristically acute: ‘Mihi vero etiam imperfectum non alienum videtur, quum τὸ ἀρπάζειν non ut priora διασπᾶν, ἀνιέναι, ὀρούειν, res unius momenti et semel peracta fuerit. Omnino Plutarchus in usu utriusque temporis accuratationem praestare videtur saepius ab editoribus ... non satis animadversam’.

καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις: this certainly is conventional as the ultimate criterion of piteousness. See on 31.3 and 31.6.

Ch. 9: The sincerity of Cassius' motives; Brutus at last aroused by the writing on the statue of his ancestor and his own tribunal

1. ὑπάρξαι: not just 'was' (Perrin). The word is punningly picked up by ἀρχῆς below. According to Cassius' detractors the incident was the ἀρχὴ κακῶν.

ἐπιβουλή: note the unabashed use of this, 'bad word' though it often is. Cf. on 1.4.

οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντες: to his credit, and somewhat to the detriment of his editorial σύγκρισις, P. goes out of his way to set the record straight. There must be a change of source at this point.

<έν>ῆν: some insertion is necessary. Ziegler's is the neater, though actually cribbed from Voegelin.

χαλεπότης: an appropriate word to use of Cassius (cf. on 29.2), though in context it obviously conveys no great disapproval. But the use of the word is clever: (i) there is a sort of paradox—χαλεπότης is a typical vice of tyrants (see on 29.2). Possibly P. is deliberately hinting at Cassius' own rather authoritarian nature; (ii) P. is setting up a contrast with the character of the story he is about to relate. Although, quite reasonably, he does think that such a story may indicate genuine innate hatred of tyranny, the manner in which he tells it is notably | light and humorous. In reading P. (and of course many Classical authors) one has to be ready to accept very rapid changes of tone and emotional intensity. This is especially noticeable in *ch.* 13. See on 13.3.

γένος: perhaps colloquial and contemptuous = 'breed', One may compare the colloquial use of φορά and the Latin 'genus' (e.g. Hor. *Epist.* 2.2.102, *Serm.* 1.2.2). The general point of γένος is 'non de stirpe sed de specie vel classi hominum' (Voegelin).

ἐδήλωσεν: a reflection of the familiar biographical 'character through deeds'-doctrine. Cf. Isoc. *Evag.* 29, 30, 33, 46, 65; X. *Ages.* 1.6, *Mem.* 1.3.1, *Cyrop.* 1.2; Arist. *Rhet.* 1.9.33; and in P. e.g. *De fort. Alex.* 328B, *Demosth.* 3.1, 11.7, *Arat.* 10.5, *Mar.* 2.4, *Pomp.* 8.7, *Eum.* 9.1, *Cimon* 2.2ff., *Flam.* 2.5, *Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa* 1.2 etc. etc.

ἔτι παῖς ὢν: a standard biographical chronological division, with the usual implication that the child already displays the characteristics of the mature adult, that occurs in Greek biography as early as Isocr. *De bigis* 46 (and possibly earlier). {On such assumptions see Pelling, *Plutarch and History* ch. 14.}

Φαύστῳ: *RE* 4.1515ff. (Münzer).

2. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ...: the story is also recorded by Val. Max. 3.1.3: 'Cuius (Sullae) filium Faustum C. Cassius condiscipulum suum in schola proscriptionem paternam laudantem, ipsumque, cum per aetatem

potuisset, idem facturum minitanti colapho percussit. dignam manum, quae publico parricidio se non contaminaret!’ P. is obviously not following Val. Max. here (9.3–4). Such discrepancies as there are between P.’s account and Val. Max.’s do not necessarily indicate the existence of more than one other source: P. would naturally change the specific reference to the proscription to the more general *μοναρχία*. It is natural to suppose a common source (? Livy). |

128 **3. ἐνέτριβεν:** the imperfect is effective. Cf. 8.7n. For the full expression cf. *Alc.* 8.1, *Luc. Prom.* 10, *D.H.* 7.45 (πληγὰς ἐντρίβεται). Cassius strikes Faustus with his fist rather than his palm, not for the silly reason adduced by Val. Max., but because he is a thoroughly aggressive little boy. {Shackleton Bailey takes that passage of Val. Max. differently in his Loeb edition [2000]: ‘Such a hand ought never to have defiled itself with a public parricide.’} Cf. Voegelin: ‘notabimus in verbo ἐντρίβειν violentiam simulque ridiculi quendam colorem’.

τῶν ἐπιτρόπων: clearly therefore the incident took place after Sulla’s death in 78. Faustus, born before 86 (see *Sulla* 22.2), was put under the guardianship of Lucullus by the terms of Sulla’s will (*Luc.* 4.6). According to P. Pompey was upset by this slight (in fact it was the ἀρχὴ κακῶν between Pompey and Lucullus), so presumably he felt that he had some stake in the welfare of the young Faustus, who later married his daughter (*Suet. Caes.* 27; *Plut. Pomp.* 47.4, *Caes.* 14.3), hence presumably his intervention here. τῶν ἐπιτρόπων might (or might not) therefore conceal a reference to Lucullus. It would be typical of P. carefully to avoid bringing another character into an already crowded narrative.

δικάζεσθαι: presumably for ‘iniuria’, on which see F. Schulz, *Principles of Roman Law* (1936, repr. 1956), 103ff., id. *Classical Roman Law* (1951), 593ff.; B. Nicholas, *Roman Law* (1962), 215ff.

4. ἵνα: ‘verissime pueri impetum exhibens’, Voegelin.

στόμα: = πρόσωπον according to Coraes. But the point is rather: ‘say it again, and I’ll smash your *mouth*’.

129 **5. τοιοῦτος ... ὁ Κάσσιος:** there seems no reason to disbelieve this story (9.3–4 is highly circumstantial), and P.’s inference from it may be justified; in the world today there are thousands of boys not yet in their teens who can reasonably be described as politically motivated. One would not, however, as P. is, be happy to absolve Cassius from the charge of being μάλλον ἰδίᾳ μισοκαίσαρ | on the strength of this piece of evidence alone. Clearly, it would be quite unrealistic to discount Caesar’s personal insults to Cassius (7.4–5, 8.6–7, and see on 8.6) as motives for Cassius’ disaffection. Cassius, like all other Roman aristocrats of the time, would undoubtedly have regarded such affronts to his *dignitas* with the utmost seriousness.

Balsdon 94 appears to class Cassius among the majority of the conspirators, who (according to him) were ‘mean men, jealous and self-seeking; men who thought that Caesar had not advanced them as fast as they deserved; men who hoped for better days if Caesar was dead; men who dreamed, some of them, of being cardboard Caesars themselves’. But this hardly does justice to the man. Though he gave up fighting for the Republican cause after Pharsalus and became Caesar’s legate (see on 6.6) in the East, he did not take part in the African and Spanish campaigns against the surviving Pompeians, and his letter to Cicero at the end of January 45 shows his political attitude quite clearly: *Ad Fam.* 15.19 [216].4 ‘peream nisi sollicitus sum ac malo veterem et clementem dominum’ (= Caesar) ‘habere quam novum et crudelem’ (= Cn. Pompeius) ‘experiri’. Cassius wants Caesar to win, but he is under no illusions about the nature of the contest: ‘dominus eligitur’ (the force of ‘dominum’ is often overlooked). During this period he seems to have withdrawn with Cicero into apolitical and unreal rhetorical studies (*Ad Fam.* 7.33 [192].2—mid-July 46). He also found in his Epicureanism an excuse for opting out of a state of public affairs with which he was clearly out of sympathy. *Ad Fam.* 15.18 [213].1 and 15.17 [214].4 make this point very obviously. But it is also clear enough that Cassius took his philosophy seriously and tried to apply its standards to contemporary politics: *Ad Fam.* 15.19 [216].2. He would have had no difficulty in seeing Caesar as the stock tyrant of philosophical-king literature. (For the view that it was in fact Cassius’ conversion to Epicureanism that sparked his disaffection from Caesar see | A. Momigliano, ‘Epicureans in Revolt’, *JRS* 31 [1941], 15iff. This view is seriously weakened by Momigliano’s misdating of Cassius’ conversion—see on 37.2, but the general point, that contrary to its reputation Epicureanism could have provided the philosophical framework for seeing Caesar as a textbook tyrant, is valid enough.) Cassius was also a member of a family which, like the Bruti, prided itself on its tyrant-slaying record: Sp. Cassius, consul for the third time in 486/5, had been executed for his monarchical ambitions by his father (cf. *Phil.* 2.26 ‘C. Cassius, in ea familia natus quae non modo dominatum, sed ne potentiam quidem cuiusquam ferre potuit’). Thus, with such a strong family tradition, P.’s story about the young Cassius and Faustus Sulla may indeed show something about Cassius’ political attitudes (and conceivably this is an additional reason for P. putting such weight on the story; he was thoroughly familiar with the *Second Philippic*). After the assassination Cassius maintained at least the *persona* of the dedicated tyrannicide (cf. Dio 44.34.7 and much more substantially 30.3 below). One must of course not be naïve about all this: one of the reasons Roman aristocrats hated tyrants was that they curtailed the hereditary privileges of the ruling classes. There is no hard and fast distinction between disapproval of tyranny on principle and anger at personal affronts at the hands of the putative tyrant: the one reinforces the

other. Nevertheless P.'s *considered* judgement of Cassius' motivation is in the main right and he deserves praise for going out of his way to revise his 'editorial' view. I would, however, stress that while P.'s considered judgement—that Cassius' motivation was largely disinterested—is hardly compatible with his editorial view, it is important for the narrative from 6.9 to 9.5, and for his general understanding of the psychology of Brutus. (See on 8.5.)

131 **Βρούτων ... οἱ πολῖται:** an impressively constructed sentence. | The rhetorical style effectively conveys the idea of pressure being applied on Brutus from all sides.

πολλοὶ ... συνήθων: strictly speaking this is rather misleading. Up till now Brutus' friends have not been pressurizing him about the conspiracy as such, but merely trying to detach him from his loyalty to Caesar. Brutus only has discussions with his friends about the actual conspiracy when he is already softened up by the writings on the statue and tribunal. See 10.3 and 11 below and *Caes.* 62.7. In the rhetorical power of the description exact chronology is unimportant.

φήμεις: cf. Dio 44.12.2 οἱ πολλοὶ ... συνεχῶς ἀνεκάλουν αὐτόν, “ὦ Βρούτε Βρούτε” ἐκβοῶντες, καὶ προσεπιλέγοντες ὅτι “Βρούτου χρῆζομεν”.

γράμμασιν: other sources for this are *Caes.* 62.7, Dio 44.12, Appian 2.112.469, Suet. *Caes.* 80.3, Zonaras 10.11. Dio has the extra information that pamphlets were scattered abroad, stressing Brutus' name and lineage. Suetonius records also the important item that *Caesar's* statue on the Capitol was inscribed: 'Brutus, quia reges eiecit, consul primus factus est: hic, quia consules eiecit, rex postremo factus est'. Source relationships are tricky to discern. A common source certainly informs the arrangement of the narrative in *Brutus*, Appian and Dio (P. and Dio are particularly close), despite the fact that Dio has the extra information about the pamphlets, and that Appian gives more quotations than either P. or Dio. Suetonius' account is too brief to make comparison possible. P.'s *Caesar* account is not based directly on *Brutus*.

The traditional interpretation of these pasquinades, following the view of the sources, has always been that they were directed towards (or against) Brutus. Gelzer's suggestion (990) that they were directed against Caesar can only (as far as I can see) strictly apply to the one on Caesar's own statue. For the general practice of pasquinades on statues see Jal 174, {A. Zadorojnyi in J. A. Baird and C. Taylor, edd., *Ancient Graffiti in Context* (2010), 110–33; R. Morstein-Marx in C. Kuhn, ed., *Politische Kommunikation und öffentliche Meinung in der antiken Welt* (2012), 191–217}. |

132 These writings appeared after the Lupercalia (Dio) and the loss of tribunician power of Caesetius Flavus and Epidius Marullus (Suetonius). Brutus can only finally have been converted to the conspiracy towards the end of February 44.

ἐξεκαλοῦντο ... οἱ πολῖται: Appian and Dio also stress that the pressure exerted on Brutus had mass public support. Cf. also *Caes.* 62.1, 62.7.

6. <τοῦ>: Solanus' particularizing article is clearly necessary.

[Βροῦτος]: Βροῦτος as vocative would be very odd, particularly in view of Βροῦτε at 9.7, and even Βροῦτε is suspect since Appian, Dio, and Suetonius all omit the vocative in this instance. Hence delete.

7. μεθ' ἡμέραν: 'the following day' (not 'daily', as Perrin). The writings were inscribed νύκτωρ (*Caes.* 62.7). The expression is common in P.

καθεύδεις: Reiske's punctuation finds no support in the sources, though Appian records two *different graffiti* in question form. {Pelling on *Caes.* 62.7 wonders whether the original graffito artist would really have been careful enough to add his punctuation.}

8. αἴτιοι ...: the rather elliptical argument is that Caesar's flatterers, wishing to have Caesar named as king, in fact provoked the opposite reaction among the people to what they intended. The blame for Caesar's unpopularity and the rise of opposition to him is again emphatically put on his κόλακες in *Caes.* 57.2–3. The thought is common in the sources, and goes back as far as Cicero (*Phil.* 13.41 'deceptum autem Caesarem a me dicere audes? tu, tu, inquam, illum occidisti Lupercalibus')

κόλακες: P. would have in mind Balbus (*Caes.* 60.5) and probably also Antony, since he believes that Antony and Caesar between them stage-managed the offer of the kingship at the Lupercalia to test public opinion. |

ἄλλας ... ἐπιφθόνους: convenient documentation in Broughton II, 308.

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ἀνευρίσκοντες: in context an excellent word. The implication is that in order to maintain influence with Caesar his κόλακες continually had to 'invent' new honours for him (cf. the pejorative use of ἐξευρεῖν in *Dion* 36.3). On the need of the flatterer always to provide some new delight for his master/victim see *Quom. adul. ab amico intemosc.* 55A.

καὶ ... ἐπιτιθέντες: other accounts are *Caes.* 61.8, *Ant.* 12.7, Suet. *Caes.* 79.1, Appian 2.108.449, Dio 44.9.2. On the chronological problems involved see Weinstock 319ff. They are hardly relevant to the present context.

διαδήματα: on the regal implications of diadems see Weinstock 320, 334ff. (very useful, whether or not one accepts his interpretation).

ὑπαξόμενοι: 'lead astray', possibly even 'seduce', like Lat. 'deduco'—cf. on πειρῶντι below.

ἀντί: Ziegler's tentative <αὐτὸν> ἀντὶ, while not absolutely necessary, is surely very plausible.

9. ὡς ... γεγράφται: the reference is to *Caes.* 60–61. The cross-reference is clearly integral to the present context: only by reference to the *Caesar* can

τοῦναντίον ... ἀπήντησεν be made sense of.

The question whether or not Caesar was aiming for kingship is only tangential to the *Brutus*, in contrast to the *Caesar*. For the view that he was see (e.g.): Meyer (1922); Carcopino, *Histoire romaine* II (1936); W. Burkert, *Historia* 11 (1962), 356ff.; V. Ehrenberg, *Harvard Stud. Class. Phil.* 68 (1964), 149ff.; G. Dobesch, *Caesars Apotheose zu Lebzeiten und sein Ringen um den Königstitel* (1966), S. Weinstock, *Divus Julius* (1971). Against (e.g.): F. E. Adcock, *CAH* IX, 718ff.; Syme, *RR* ch. 4, *JRS* 34 (1944), | 99f; H. Last, *JRS* 34 (1944), 119ff.; *Greece and Rome* 4 (1957)—various contributors; Balsdon (1958); {K. Kraft, *Der goldene Kranz Caesars und der Kampf um die Entlarvung des Tyrannen* (1952/3); E. Rawson, *CAH²* IX (1994), 463–5, observing (as already at *JRS* 65 (1975) 148–59 = *Roman Culture and Society* (1991), 169–88) that the evidence for Caesar’s aspirations to divinity is stronger than for his ambitions for royalty}. The review-discussion of Weinstock by J. A. North, *JRS* 65 (1975), 171–7, is very judicious; {see also his discussion of the Lupercalia, *JRS* 98 (2008), 144–60}. I take this opportunity to enter a ‘recusatio’, though I am more in sympathy with the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ approach of scepticism/disbelief, for it seems more true to the strictly contemporary evidence. From the point of view of the motivation of the conspirators (despite 10.3 below) it does not greatly matter what Caesar’s intentions were: they already had sufficient cause to kill him.

Chs. 10–12: The formation of the conspiracy

P.'s account of the formation of the conspiracy is quite excellent, allowing both for the exploration of motive in the chief conspirators and for the steady accumulation of dramatic tension. It is at one and the same time detailed and economical and can stand comparison with the more celebrated narrative of the *Pelopidas* and *De genio Socratis*.

Ch. 10: Cassius' reconciliation with Brutus; Brutus joins the conspiracy

1–2 Κασσίω ...: Cassius' clandestine negotiations are not attested by any other source.

1. πειρώντι: when used with the accusative of persons, *πειρώω* often means 'attempt to seduce' (see *LSJ*, A. IV). Perhaps this image is meant to be understood here, effectively characterizing Cassius' furtive sounding out of opinion. P. may be implying a parallel between the methods of Cassius and Caesar's *κόλακες* (*ὑπάγομαι* can be an equally disreputable word). The construction with *ἐπὶ Καίσαρα* is rather elliptical, and is perhaps meant to convey the delicacy with which Cassius put his proposition (if the text is sound). |

δόξης: the first emphatic reference to Brutus' great *δόξα*, on which see on 29.4. 135

καταρχομένου: used of beginning sacrificial ceremonies or consecrating the victim for sacrifice, hence the 'apologetic' *ῥσπερ*. The metaphor is clearly highly appropriate to the immediate context, for Brutus is to be the figure-head of the conspiracy, guaranteeing the probity of the enterprise. That this was in fact intended to be Brutus' role is highly likely, though in the event the figure-head took on a life of its own (as figure-heads tend to do) and dictated the terms of the assassination (18.4–6, 20.1). But is there more to it than that? The metaphor could perhaps have come into P.'s mind simply from thinking about Brutus' incredible virtue, or possibly have been inspired by a recollection of Cicero's unpleasant 'Vellem Idibus Martiis me ad cenam invitasses' (*Ad Fam.* 12.4 [363].1) and 'Quam vellem ad illas pulcherrimas epulas me Idibus Martiis invitasses!' (*Ad Fam.* 10.28 [364].1). But it reappears rather emphatically at *Caes.* 66.11 *ἅπαντας γὰρ ἔδει κατάρξασθαι καὶ γεύσασθαι τοῦ φόνου*; {cf. Pelling, *Caesar* intr., 65–6}. The use of sacrificial imagery to describe the act of murder is suggestive of Greek tragedy. The analogy between tragedy and Plutarchean biography is discussed by (e.g.) P. De Lacy, 'Biography and Tragedy in Plutarch', *AJP* 73 (1952), 159–171; D. A. Russell, 'Plutarch's Alcibiades', *PCPhS* 192 (1966), 37–47 {= Scardigli, *Essays* 191–207}, *Plutarch*, 123ff.; Wardman 168–179; J. Mossman, *JHS* 108 (1988), 83–93 = Scardigli, *Essays* 209–28, and in Beck, *Companion* 437–48; D. Braund, *CQ* 43 (1993), 468–74 and *Histos* 1 (1997),

113–27; A. Zadorojniy, *Hermes* 125 (1997), 169–82; Duff, *Plutarch's Lives*, index *s.v.* ‘Tragedy, similarity of some *Lives* with’, and *Hermes* 132 (2004), 271–91; Pelling in J. Opsomer, G. Roskam, and F. B. Titchener, edd., *A Versatile Gentleman* (Fchr. L. van der Stockt, 2016), 111–33}. Brenk, ‘Plutarch’s Caesar at the Rubicon: Roman General with Greek Dice’ (unpublished paper 1978) {and in *ANRW* II.36.1 [1987], 326} has some suggestive remarks.

In the description of Caesar’s murder in the *Caesar* the murder is represented as an act of divine retribution for the murder of Pompey (especially 66.1–3, 66.13; see further on 6.5 above; the theme is not developed, but is implicit, at 17.2 below). During the actual murder Caesar is compared to a wild beast that has been | cornered (*Caes.* 66.10 {with Pelling *ad loc.*}), and the feel of the description suggests imagery drawn from hunting (*ibid.*). Again, a tragic flavour is latent. One thinks particularly of Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon*, and its sustained use of imagery drawn from hunting and sacrifice. The *Agamemnon* parallel can be carried farther. The description of Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon is extremely interesting in this respect (*Caes.* 32.6–9). The moral dreadfulness of crossing the Rubicon is heavily emphasized (32.5, 32.9). Caesar’s resolution wavers to and fro, he consults his friends, he knows that the crossing will bring great evil but wants the consequent *λόγος*. But once his decision is made, he rushes to carry it out, and must bear responsibility for it (I am indebted to Brenk, *art. cit.*, for some of these observations). It is all highly reminiscent of Agamemnon’s inner struggle at Aulis, where whichever course he chooses will bring disaster, and yet Agamemnon can be said to have acted ‘willingly’ (see further A. Lesky, *JHS* 86 [1966], 78ff., for this sort of interpretation of decision-making and personal responsibility in Aeschylus). The *Agamemnon* parallel may be helped by the dream which (according to P.) Caesar had the night before he crossed the Rubicon: he dreamed that he was having incestuous intercourse with his mother. (In Suetonius, *Caes.* 7.2, and Dio 41.24.2 this dream is said to have occurred when Caesar was quaestor in Spain and is given a favourable interpretation; {cf. Pelling, *G&R* 44 (1997), 200–201 and on *Caes.* 32}.) The tone is rather Aeschylean (cf. the omen of the eagles’ feast at Aulis, or Clytemnestra’s dreams in the *Choephoroi* and Sophocles’ *Electra*). It might be fanciful to try to extend the Agamemnon analogy any farther, though there is a certain inertness about the doomed Caesar as he makes his way to the senate house in *Caes.* 64.6ff. which is not unlike the manner of Agamemnon’s entry into his palace. Nevertheless, it seems relatively safe to assert that P.’s use of *καταρχομένου* here is part of a chain of imagery which | must suggest a tragic parallel, the obvious one being the *Agamemnon*. This imagery naturally enriches the narrative by illustrious literary association, but it has a serious thematic function as well, for it inevitably reinforces the pattern of crime, counter-crime, and divine retribution: Caesar is slain for his responsibility for the

death of Pompey, his assassins pay the price for his murder (*Caes.* 69.6ff.), and the resolution is achieved with the divinely inspired establishment of the Empire (for references see on 6.5). It is of course true that the murder of Caesar is not represented as a crime in the *Brutus* (quite the reverse), but this is because of the usual Plutarchean tension between the broad scope of things—his conception of a pattern of retributive justice in the deaths of Caesar and the great leaders of the Republic, his conviction that the Empire could only have come into being in accordance with the divine will—and the smaller perspective—his belief that Brutus and Cassius were honourable men, who in a certain sense did indeed slay a tyrant. (See also the remarks on 8.5 above.)

There are of course other occasions in the *Brutus* where a parallel with tragedy may reasonably be drawn. I discuss them as and when they occur.

ἀὐτῷ τῷ παρῆναι: ‘by the mere fact of his participation’—Perrin.

3. συμφρόνησας: ‘after reflecting on this’, according to Perrin, and similarly LSJ. For P.’s use of *συμφρονέω* see Holden on *Themist.* 28.2 and Hamilton on *Alex.* 9.14. Here ‘agreeing with’, ‘accepting’ seems much the most natural rendering.

διαφορᾶς ἐκείνης: over the urban praetorship (7.1–5). Thus according to this account the quarrel between Brutus and Cassius lasted from the end of 45 to late-February 44.

The whole of the rest of this chapter has to be compared with Appian 2.113.470–473. The two accounts are extremely close, | particularly in the oral exchanges of Brutus and Cassius. The only small differences are as follows: (i) Appian sets the story in a situation where there is general talk of ‘kingship’ in the air; (ii) in his version there is no reconciliation between Brutus and Cassius, simply because when the story begins, they are apparently on reasonable terms; (iii) Appian does not have the *νουμηνία* reference of *Brut.* 10.3; (iv) Appian ends with the reflection ‘thus did they disclose to each other what they had been privately thinking about for a long time’ (trans. H. White). The closeness of the two accounts is such that *either* both writers are using a common source *or* Appian is using P. Only by trying to assess the differences can an answer to this question be given. (i) does not cut either way: it is consistent with Appian’s earlier narrative (2.110–111). (iii) is also inconclusive. Appian might well have omitted the *νουμηνία* reference, thinking it to be an error, or not understanding it, whether he was working from P. or from a common source. (ii) is critical and (in my opinion) suggests that Appian is using P. In P. the reconciliation element in the story follows on naturally from 10.1–2, an item which Appian does not have. In fact in P. 10.1–7 seems to be a continuous narrative. It therefore seems likely that the reconciliation element was in the original source. This is of course consistent with P.’s account at 7.3–7, where Brutus and Cassius quarrel over the urban praetorship (I do not mean that the account is from the *same* source, but if the quarrel was

genuine, then an account of the first meeting between Brutus and Cassius after it would naturally have to include a reconciliation). Appian does not have the reconciliation element in the story, though (according to this argument) it was in the original source. Why not? Simply because he is trying to avoid a conflict with his own narrative: his clever theory that the quarrel between Brutus and Cassius was a fiction. But if he was using the original | source for himself he would know that that theory was a complete non-starter. *Ergo*, Appian is here using P. The sequence of events goes as follows: (i) Appian uses Pollio for his account of the quarrel between Brutus and Cassius; because this is a relatively undetailed, historical account he is able to speculate that the quarrel might have been a pretence; (ii) seeing a lively little story in P. he decides to insert it into his main narrative; (iii) he makes adjustments accordingly. This means (a) cutting out the problematic reference of *Brut.* 10.3; (b) suppressing the reconciliation element in the story in order not to upset his own narrative; (c) ending with the safe reflection ‘thus did they disclose to each other what they had been privately thinking for a long time’, in order to give an impression of consistency and unanimity of sentiment between the two men. If these arguments seem fragile, then perhaps two more general arguments may be allowed some weight: (i) the flavour of the story seems in any case ‘biographical’, in which event it is more likely that P. is using the source than that Appian is; (ii) within the context of his narrative as a whole the story of 2.113.470–473 is conspicuous not only for its detail and vividness but also for its sheer bulk: it has every appearance of being an untypical insert. See also on 10.6 below. {Pelling, *Plutarch and History* 37 n. 86 tentatively follows Moles on this, suggesting also that App. may be following P.’s account from memory.}

Independent of P. or not, Appian’s version of the story is a good one. It does not have P.’s intensity, but it is written in a sprightly, engaging style. What is to be made of the historicity of the story? One must obviously assume that much of the dialogue is made up. Assessment of its content depends to some extent on what view is taken of the *λόγος ὑπὲρ βασιλείας*. That Cassius and Brutus did formally make up their quarrel and that Cassius used the opportunity to put pressure on Brutus need surely not be doubted. Wilson 72 goes too far in describing the *whole* interview as a ‘dramatic fiction’. |

140 **νομηνία**: a fascinating item. If the reference is ‘Greek’ for the Kalends, then it is a clear error, since the alleged proposal was supposedly going to be made on the *Ides* of March (see below). It is so interpreted by all early editors and by Gelzer 990. P. of course often does use *νομηνία* as = the Kalends (e.g. *Galba* 22.3. *Sulla* 14.10). But the present reference, in rather surprising fashion is correct. On the Ides of March was celebrated the festival of Anna Perenna, which fell on the first full moon of the new year in the old calendar. (For discussion of the festival see Frazer on Ovid, *Fasti*

3.523ff. That this suited the purposes of the conspirators is rightly emphasized by N. Horsfall, *G&R* 21 [1974], 196ff., for it meant that much of the urban populace would not be in the centre of Rome when the assassination took place. He does not, however, refer to the present passage.) In other words, P. has preserved an item of some importance for the purposes of the conspirators, though it is hardly clear that he himself understands its significance. There are reasons for supposing that much of the dialogue between Brutus and Cassius recorded here is of suspect historicity (below); nevertheless, it is clear that P. is working with a source that, however partial in its intent, is still very well informed about some factual details.

παρεῖναι: Coraes' 'emendation' is quite unnecessary. *παρεῖναι εἰς* is a very common 'pregnant' construction.

πυθάνεσθαι: if the story of the alleged proposal was faked, it is quite likely that Cassius and his friends were the originators of it (one may recall that Cassius, like L. Aurelius Cotta, was one of the *quindecimviri*). In that case, if there is any substance in P.'s narrative at this point, Cassius was deliberately abusing the story to win Brutus over. But Cassius in any case would hardly have needed to use it on Brutus (in contrast, that is, with marketing it for general public consumption, as even Brutus must have realized | when Caesar became 'dictator perpetuo' c. February 9, 44 that there was no further hope of the restoration of the Republic as he knew it. Thus, whether the story of the alleged proposal was faked or not, what is being purveyed here is a tyrannicide *apologia*, not a historical record. Again, one may think of a source close to the tyrannicides.

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ὡς λόγον ... καθήσοιεν: in most sources this story is mentioned as a mere rumour. See *Caes.* 60.2, Suet. *Caes.* 79.4, Dio 44.15.3, Appian 2.110.460–461. It takes on rather more substantial form in Plut. *Caes.* 64.3 (Decimus Brutus tells Caesar that the senate are ready to accede to the proposal). In P. *Brutus* and Appian, as we have seen, it leads to the formation of the conspiracy, whereas in Suetonius and Dio it makes the conspirators accelerate their plans.

From the point of view of the historicity of Cassius' conversation with Brutus when Brutus first joins the conspiracy, it does not matter whether the story was true or not, but it is of course an interesting historical problem in its own right. For what it is worth, my opinion is that the story falls convincingly into what Balsdon 85, with admirable scepticism, describes as the 'killed-in-the-nick-of-time' category. The conspirators' haste is adequately explained by Caesar's imminent departure for the East, scheduled for March 18 (Appian 2.111.462, 114.476): there is no necessity to invoke this story of the *λόγος ὑπὲρ βασιλείας* as an explanation for the speed with which the enterprise, once decided upon, was carried through. More positively, it is striking how sceptical even Dio is. And the story is emphatically rejected by Cicero (*De div.* 2.110), in a context where Cicero

has no apparent reason to conceal the truth. The story would have had a certain specious plausibility simply because there almost certainly was an oracle mentioning a king as the one who would lead the Romans to triumph over a barbarous foe, but the | specific names had to be supplied according to circumstances. This is the point of Cicero's further remark: 'hoc si est in libris' (this seems to admit that there was such an oracle: the argument is 'if it is in the books, so what?'), 'in quem hominum et in quod tempus est? Callide enim qui illa composuit perfecit, ut quodcumque accidisset, praedictum videretur hominum et temporum definitione sublata'. (For similar observations see Procop. *Hist. Bell.* 5.24.28f. and 33–34.) Given that he knows all this, Cicero's denial of the story carries considerable weight. For further discussion of the problem see Weinstock 34of. (totally uncritical); {K. Kraft, *Der goldene Kranz* (9.9n.), 56–8; Pelling on *Caes.* 60.2 and 64.3}.

καθήσοιεν: καθίσσειεν does not seem possible. Reiske's καθήσοιεν is excellent. To quote Voegelin: 'Notabilis ... locutio, sermonem de aliqua re afferre, pr. demittere, quasi in arenam, opinor, ut spectent atque iudicent rem quibus id convenit'. Changing the metaphor, one might render the Greek by 'put up' or 'float'.

4. παρείναι: Schaefer's 'emendation' has won widespread approval. It is hard to see why. There is no need to change the MSS παριέναι, and in fact a future tense makes better sense. 10.3 παρείναι is not a parallel and Appian supports a future.

For 'withdrawal' as the only means of protest open to a Roman senator who wished to oppose despotism see Wirszubski 14of. Cicero adopted a policy of silent inactivity under Caesar, which the latter rightly interpreted as a stricture on his regime and tried to persuade Cicero to end (*Marc.* 1; *Ad Fam.* 4.9 [231].2, 9.16 [190].3). Antony took it as a personal affront when Cicero failed to appear at the meeting of the senate on September 1, 44 (cf. *Phil.* 5.19). In the reign of Tiberius L. Piso declared that he would retire to a remote village to mark his disapproval of the state of public affairs, and Tiberius was much disturbed (*Ann.* 2.34.1f.). Under Nero (c. 64–66) Thrasea Paetus withdrew entirely from public life, in order to register his displeasure at Nero's tyrannical behaviour | in the only way open to him (*Ann.* 16.22.1). Cf. also on 2.3 (Brutus' *De virtute*).

ἔφη ... Βροῦτος: editors' attempts to change this text are dictated by the desire to avoid hiatus. It must be said that none of the 'emendations' on offer are very happy. A definite article should be retained. There is an almost demonstrative force in its use here (and note that Appian also maintains definite articles with the proper names throughout his version); this suits the vivid, dramatic, tone of the narrative well. I think the text should be left as it is. See on 4.6.

προαποθνήσκοντας: *προαποθνήσκω* is ambiguous (the same ambiguity resides in *προκινδυνεύω*—see on 49.10 and 51.2). Here Brutus says: ‘It will be *my* duty’ (ἐμόν is quite emphatic) ‘to die on behalf of freedom’. I.e. *he* will fight, whatever anyone else does. Cassius therefore replies: ‘What Roman will tolerate your (i) dying *on behalf of* freedom and (ii) dying *before* him?’, i.e. if Brutus will give a lead everyone else will follow. Such little word plays are common in P. but sometimes they have some meaning, as here.

6. ἄγνοεῖς ... σεαυτόν: cf. ὄφλημα πατρικόν below. The point that Brutus is τῇ φύσει opposed to tyranny and that in cooperating with Caesar he has not been true to himself is thus driven home. See on 8.5 above.

ὑπάντας ... καπήλους: aristocratic contempt for ‘the workers’. *κάπηλος* often has colloquial implications of profiteering and cheating (e.g. *Aes. fr.* 322N {= 322 R}, *Hdt.* 3.89), and perhaps does here (= ‘the *graffiti* aren’t a fraud’). In Roman political terms the reference will be to the disreputable political *collegia*. It is also possible that Cassius’ wording is meant to recall Plato, *Rep.* 369b–371e and *Arist. Pol.* 1291a14: the nice evocation of Greek political theory, reinforcing the meaning of Cassius’ argument, | would be Plutarchean, rather than source-derived.

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πρώτους: perhaps with contemporary Greek political colouring. Cf. P.’s use of οἱ πρόωτοι in *Praec. ger. reip.* 815A, *Quaest. conviv.* 679C with J. H. Oliver, *The Ruling Power* (1953), 953–8; Robert, *Hellenica* 13 (1965) 212f.; and E. Valgiglio, *Plutarco: Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae* (1976), 112f.

κρατίστους: perhaps also with contemporary political colouring. In the political terminology of the Imperial age *κράτιστος* may be in effect a technical term or title, = ‘egregius’ (*P Fay.* p. 33; *BGU* 891; *IG* 14.1346), or ‘clarissimus’ (*IG* 9 [1].61; *IG Rom.* 3.581; *P Oxy.* 2108.6), and in P. cf. *De tranq. animi* 464F with Jones, ‘Chronology’, 62 {= Scardigli, *Essays* 99}. But at other times P.’s use of the term seems rather to be evaluative, when he wants to make it plain that ‘the best’ really *are* the best. So 33.1, 49.10 below, *Ages.* 28.8, *Otho* 1.5, 3.2, *Coriol.* 13.4, *Mar.* 30.2, *Caes.* 14.12, *Cam.* 7.4. Both implications may be relevant here.

θέατρα: *θεάματα* (Bryan) or *θέας* (Schaefer, cl. Appian 2.113.472) are certainly easier, but on the principle *lect. diff. pot.* one ought to try to make sense of the text as given. It seems justifiable in the light of 1 *Ep. Cor.* 4.9 *θέατρον ἐγενήθημεν τῷ κόσμῳ*.

μονομάχους: for P.’s own dislike of gladiatorial shows see e.g. *De soll. anim.* 959C–960A, 963C, 965A; *De esu carn.* 997C; *Praec. ger. reip.* 802D–E, 822C, 823E; *Non posse suav. vivi* 1099B; *Flam.* 18.6f.; frag. 193 Sandbach = Loeb *Moralia* XV (1969), 360. See further H. Fuchs, *Der geistige Widerstand gegen Rom* (1938), 49, n. 60 (with whom I am inclined to agree).

It is of course perfectly possible that Brutus and Cassius despised the gladiatorial shows as much as P. did (though contrast 8.6–7, 21.3–6), but it

is difficult to resist the impression that this attack on demagogic praetors
 145 reflects P.'s own view. This | does not quite amount to a positive argument
 in favour of, but it is certainly consistent with, the hypothesis that P. is working
 up the narrative of a source and that Appian simply reflects P. direct.

πατρικόν: perhaps just a shade poetic and more emotive than *πάτριον*.
φανέντος: = *εἰ φαίνη*.

7. *περιβαλών*: 'embracing'. See Hamilton on *Alex.* 67.7, and cf. 4.5 above.

Ch. 11: Q. Ligarius joins the conspiracy

1–3. Ἦν ... ὑγιαίνω”: Appian 2.113.474 mentions Ligarius in his list of prominent conspirators, but apart from this P.’s narrative is without parallel in other sources.

Γάϊος: wrong—Quintus is assured by the many references in Cicero’s *Pro Ligario*. Appian gets it right, and so does P. in *Cic.* 39.6, a passage which shows some background knowledge of the Ligarius affair (though there is a slight contradiction with *Ad Fam.* 6.14 [228] over Caesar’s attitude to Ligarius’ recall). Presumably Γάϊος is a scribal error.

Λιγάριος ... ἀπέλυσεν: the main source is Cicero’s speech. Also: *Ad Att.* 13.12 [320], 13.19 [326], 13.20 [328], 13.44 [336], *Ad Fam.* 6.13 [227].3, 6.14 [228]; Plut. *loc. cit.* Secondary literature: *RE* 13.519ff. (Münzer), Schanz-Hosius I, 439f.; G. Walser, *Historia* 8 (1959), 90ff.; R. A. Bauman, *The Crimen Maiestatis* (1967), 142ff.; K. Kumaniecki, *Hermes* 95 (1967), 434ff.; {H. C. Gotoff, *Caesar’s Caesarian Speeches: a Stylistic Commentary* (1993); J. P. Johnson in J. Powell and J. Paterson, edd., *Cicero the Advocate* (2004), 371–399; A. Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence* (2008), 317–9}.

Q. Ligarius was legate in Africa to C. Considius Longus in 50. Left in charge at the end of the year, he surrendered the province to the Pompeian P. Attius Varus in 49, helping him to keep out L. Aelius Tubero, who had been appointed governor by the senate, despite the fact that his son Quintus, who was with him, was ill. Both Tuberos joined Pompey in Macedonia (*Pro Lig.* 27) and submitted | to Caesar after Pharsalus and were pardoned. Ligarius apparently stayed with the Pompeians in Africa, fought at Thapsus, and was captured by Caesar at Hadrumetum. He was spared but not yet allowed to return to Rome (*Ad Fam.* 6.13 [227].3). Cicero and his two brothers worked for his recall (*Ad Fam.* 6.14 [228]). When Q. Aelius Tubero, the aggrieved son of L. Aelius Tubero, accused him before Caesar on a charge of *perduellio* Cicero defended him successfully in October 46 in a speech which moved Caesar greatly (*Cic.* 39.6). 146

2. οὐχ ... βαρυνόμενος: for thought and form cf. 7.5. The charge of ingratitude against the conspirators was a commonplace, but it is not easy to decide here if P. is actually criticizing Ligarius.

τῶν ... περὶ Βρούτων: probably, in context (antithesis to Καίσαρι) = simply ‘Brutus’, in accordance with the common late Greek practice of using οἱ περὶ + acc. for the individual. See Kühner-Gerth I, 270f.; Porter on *Dion* 1.1; Hamilton on *Alex.* 41.5; Holden on *Themist.* 7.6; {S. L. Radt, *ZPE* 38 (1980), 47–56; and, more sceptical about the idiom, R. J. Gorman, *ZPE* 136 (2001), 201–13}. Naturally οἱ περὶ is often also a genuine plural.

συνήθης: Appian classes Ligarius as among the οἰκέλοι of Brutus and Cassius.

σεαυτοῦ ... ἄξιον: cf. 9.8, 10.6 for the theme.

3. ὑγιαίνω: a nice pun, = (i) ‘I am well, if you are worthy of yourself; (ii) ‘I am politically sound’. One wonders if Ligarius actually said (e.g.) ‘si vales, ego equidem valeo’, using the old ceremonial form of address much used in epistolary contexts (see Tyrrell and Purser I, 57f.).

Ch. 12: Recruitment of other conspirators

1. **Ἐκ ... καταφρονητάς:** Appian's account at 2.113.474 (the closest to P.'s) shares with *Brutus* the insistence on *τόλμα* as a qualification for recruitment, and the division of the conspirators into two categories: friends of Brutus and Cassius, and others | The 'others' are specifically described as 'friends of Caesar', a category which also appears in Livy *Epit.* 116, Vell. 2.56.3. But this does not show that P. is following a different source: he is working in a tradition which plays down the role of D. Brutus (12.5), and since the latter led 'the friends of Caesar', he cannot consistently give that category separate definition. P. and Appian are in fact following a common source: verbal parallels are close. 147

γνωρίμων: ambiguous = (i) 'known' to them, i.e. acquaintances; (ii) 'well-known' men, in the common political sense. Both meanings apply here. 'Acquaintances' is a wider term than *φίλοι*, as the sequel shows.

ἀνεκκοινοῦντο: sc. *τὴν πρᾶξιν*.

ὄσους: Suet. *Caes.* 80.4 gives over sixty, Eutrop. 6.25 sixty or more, Oros. 6.17.2 over sixty (both probably following Livy); Nicolaus 19.59 eighty (if the text is right). 'Over sixty' is probably right. Appian 2.111.464 and 113.474 lists fifteen. *RE* 10.255 gives the names of the twenty known conspirators.

καταφρονητάς: although the thought can be paralleled in other philosophies (most notably Epicur. *Sent. Vat.* *πᾶσα ἀλγηδὸν εὐκαταφρόνητος*, cf. Phld. *D.* 1.25), the general idea of 'contempt' for what are ordinarily considered great goods or evils is distinctively Stoic. Cf. *λόγων καὶ ἀνθρώπων κ.* (*De prof. in virt.* 83F), *χρημάτων κ.* (*De Stoic. repugnant.* 1044A), *νόμων κ.* (Arrian, *Epictet.* 4.7.33: implied attack on Stoic 'contempt'), Seneca, *Dial.* 2.2.1 'hos enim Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus, contemptores voluptatis', 6.25.1 'interque contemptores vitae et mortis beneficia liberos parens tuus'. For Stoic 'contempt' for death in particular see Griffin 384ff. Is the tone here, then, reconcilable with 1.2 and 2.2–3? Answer: no, not strictly, but P. is more ready to accept a Stoicized Brutus and his friends in an obviously heroic context. |

The general emphasis on the fearlessness of the conspirators (already in P.'s source) is of course a reply to the charge that their action was cowardly and unfair (cf. *Comparison* 4.5ff). 148

2. **διὸ ... δεομένην:** closely parallel is *Cic.* 42.1–2. Similarity of thought and wording is obvious. Whether the *Brutus* passage, from the twelfth pair (*Dion* 2.7), is directly modelled on the *Cicero*, from the fifth pair (*Demosth.* 3.1), depends on the answer to the question: is P. here following a source, or simply working from his own knowledge? Rice Holmes III, 340, thinks that the reasons given in the two passages for the conspirators' decision not to ask Cicero to join them are perhaps only P.'s own opinion. (He has his own reasons for wanting to think this—see below—but the possibility still has to

be considered on its own merits.) In favour of this hypothesis is the fact that other sources do not explicitly mention Cicero's being passed over, while the characterization of Cicero offered could be thought to bear the stamp of personal deduction by P. (particularly the emphasis on the cautiousness of old age, since P. was interested in the political role of old men). But it is more likely that P. is here following a source. His whole narrative from chs. 10–12 is well informed about who was, or was not, chosen to join the conspiracy. The underlying source might well have discussed the omission of Cicero. The characterization of Cicero corresponds just as much to the recorded opinion of Brutus (especially the scathing *Ad Brut.* 1.17 [26].4) as to that of P. The fact that other sources do not explicitly mention Cicero's being passed over may indicate either that they are not working with such intimate sources as P. or that they are not following the sources they do use in such detail—not that the omission of Cicero was not discussed in some accounts of the formation of the conspiracy. Consequently, rather than suppose that P. wrote *Brut.* 12.2 with Cicero open in front of him, the parallel between the | two passages is best explained by reliance on a common source. Is that source the same as that lying behind 12.1? One could argue that 12.2 and *Cic.* 42.1–2 is Pollian because of the *τόλμα*-theme and the rather unfavourable characterization of Cicero. But both these elements could be explained as much by the facts of the case as by literary considerations, and Appian's omission of this item tells against Pollio here. 12.2 *διό* also looks like a source-linking device, and the whole passage goes well with the intimate character of P.'s narrative in chs. 10–12, most of which must go back to some very detailed source indeed.

τοῦτο μὲν ... αὐτοῖς: on Cicero's relations with Brutus see on 6.12; with Cassius, 8.5 and 9.5.

τόλμης ἐνδεής: cf. e.g. *Ad Brut.* 1.17 [26].4.

γεροντικήν: accurate, for Cicero was born January 3, 106, and old age began about sixty (*Sen. de brev. vit.* 20.4; *Lyc.* 26.1 etc.).

εἶτ' ... ἀσφάλειαν: as e.g. in his handling of the Catilinarian 'conspiracy'.

ἄκραν ... ἀκμήν: light assonance reinforces the meaning. The imagery *ἀμβλύνη ... ἀκμήν* is commonplace in P., as elsewhere, but given point by the contrast with the proverbial *ἀμβλύτης* of old age (*S. fr.* 894 etc.), and between youthful *ἀκμή* and dull old age.

αὐτῶν: effectively displaced from its natural position for emphasis.

τάχους: because of Caesar's scheduled departure on March 18 (see on 10.3), and also because so dangerous an enterprise needs to be acted upon quickly to avoid detection.

P.'s evidence that Cicero was not asked to join the conspiracy is correct. *Phil.* 2.25ff. shows that Antony not only publicly accused Cicero of complicity in the conspiracy, but also saddled him | with the ultimate responsibility, using as evidence the fact that when the deed was done

Brutus called Cicero by name and congratulated him upon the restoration of liberty (*Phil.* 2.28 and 30). While not disputing that Brutus did do this, Cicero vigorously denies the charge. It is possible to take a cynical view of this evidence, but not of *Ad Fam.* 12.2 [344].1, 12.3 [345].1 (both to Cassius), 12.4 [363].1 and 10.28 [364].1 (to Cassius and Trebonius respectively), all of which take it for granted that Cicero was not involved. The reasons given by P., whether Plutarchean or source-derived, are perfectly convincing (one might add [i] Cicero's notorious inability to hold his tongue; [ii] the fact that were Cicero included, the efficacy of Brutus as symbol of justice and pure Republican sentiment would be lessened: Cicero would not have been able to take a subordinate role in the way that Cassius and D. Brutus were prepared to do). Against all this, Rice Holmes III, 340, argues that Cicero's remark in *Ad Brut.* 2.5 [5].1 ('You know I always thought that the Republic should be delivered not only from a king but also from royalty. Your view was more indulgent') suggest that he might have been admitted to the confidence of Brutus, even though he was not an active partner in the enterprise. But (i) Rice Holmes misdates the letter (actually written in April 43); (ii) the qualification is important—Cicero's words might only show (if they show anything at all) that Brutus and he had engaged in the sort of roundabout philosophical discussion which Brutus certainly had with Statyllius and Favonius (12.3). But it is very doubtful if they even show that: Cicero is simply saying (as was his wont) 'I told you so' at a time when Antony had already begun to seem dangerous. This does not mean that he had discussed the problem of Antony with Brutus beforehand—he is simply generalizing and exaggerating his own (*post eventum*) sagacity. From such evidence as *Ad Att.* 13.40 [343].1, *Brutus* 331 (see on 1.5), and *Ad Att.* 12.45 [290].2 (see on 14.1) it appears that Cicero | confined his recom- 151 mendations on the subject to veiled exhortations to kill Caesar—only. These passages also suggest that Cicero originally conceived of the problem in the same way as Brutus (not Cassius) did: no tyrant, no tyranny—therefore remove Caesar and all would be well, just as it had been after the assassination of Romulus and Spurius Maelius, and the expulsion of Tarquin.

That said, one should not deny that to some extent Cicero was morally responsible for the formation of the conspiracy: Dio 46.2.3—perhaps authentically—makes Q. Fufius Calenus describe Cicero as ὁ ... τὸν Καίσαρα διὰ Βρούτου φονεύσας, Cicero undoubtedly did try to bring pressure on Brutus in the *Brutus* and presumably in the *Cato* as well, and he played his part generally in keeping discontent with the Caesarian regime alive (see Boissier 351ff.; Meyer 456f.). This would be enough to explain Brutus' address to Cicero immediately after the assassination, and to provide Antony with a specious accusation.

{Cicero's shifting relations with Brutus during 46–44 are plotted by K. Welch, 'Cicero and Brutus in 45', in T. W. Hillard, R. A. Kearsley, C. E.

V. Nixon, and A. M. Nobbs, edd., *Ancient History in a Modern University. Volume 1* (1998), 244–56.}

3–6. ἐπεὶ ... προθύμως: none of this is paralleled in other sources.

3. ἐπεὶ: editors seem to find no difficulty in this. I do: what is the main clause? Surely ἔτι δὲ is right. {Scott-Kilvert–Pelling follow Perrin and others in seeing the co-ordinating main clauses as ὁ μὲν Φαώνιος ἀπεκρίνατο ... ὁ δὲ Στατύλλιος ἔφη ...; Moles perhaps wished to punctuate with a colon rather than comma after πεῖραν.}

Στα<τύ>λλιον: an interesting little problem. Ziegler's Στατύλλιον implies an identification with the philosopher mentioned in *Cat. min.* 65.10, 66.6, 73.7, and 51.5–6 below. On this problem see Münzer in *RE* 3A.2185; Ziegler, *Grosse Griechen und Römer* IV, 443; L. Moulinier in the index of the Latzarus translation of the *Lives*; del Re on the present passage; Zeller III.1, 388; Babut 188f. The identification is accepted without discussion by Geiger {D.Phil.} on *Cat. min.* 65.10 {Ghilli in their 1993 Rizzoli edition and Affortunati accept it too.} For the sake of accuracy, one may note that it was already suggested (though rejected) at least as early as Voegelin (1833). P. is the only source for the philosopher(s) in question. Zeller, Voegelin, and Babut argue against the | identification.

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In *Cat. min.* 65.10 Statyllius is described as ἀνὴρ τῇ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ νέος, ἰσχυρὸς δὲ τῇ γνώμῃ βουλόμενος εἶναι καὶ τοῦ Κάτωνος ἀπομιμεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπάθειαν. He refuses to leave Utica to escape the victorious Caesarians, being καταφανῆς μισοκαῖσαρ, and is mentioned in the same breath as Apollonides the Stoic and Demetrius the Peripatetic. At 66.6 he is still refusing to leave, and at 73.7 he decides to kill himself à la Cato, but is restrained by ‘the philosophers’, and lives on to give faithful and effective service to Brutus and die at Philippi. His exploits at Philippi are recounted at 51.5–6 below. Arguments against the identification spring from the *MSS* divergence at *Brut.* 12.3 (though Στάλλιον can hardly be left as it is), and—more important—from the apparent differences between the Statyllius of *Cat. min.* 65.10 and 51.5–6, and the Epicurean philosopher of *Brut.* 12.3. Babut 189, n. 3, argues that these alleged differences could only be explained by a philosophical ‘conversion’ to Epicureanism, but that it is difficult to hypothesize a ‘conversion’ between *Cat. min.* 65.10 and *Brut.* 12.3, as the time lapse was only two years. This is not a strong argument, but the ‘conversion’ theory (in itself rather a desperate expedient) would not explain the further ‘inconsistency’ between the behaviour of 12.3 and 51.5–6.

According to Babut, the description of Statyllius in *Cat. min.* 65.10, taken together with the mere fact of his membership of Cato’s philosophical entourage, strongly suggests a Stoic philosopher, but clearly it may or may not: admiration for, and emulation of, Cato’s qualities (which P. correctly

describes in Stoic terminology) do not *necessarily* make the admirer a Stoic. Not all philosophical adherents of Cato were Stoics (Demetrius the Peripatetic). Naturally enough, too, Epicureans might engage in apparently amicable philosophical discussions with philosophers of other | persuasions (Cassius with the Academics Cicero and Brutus), even with their traditional enemies, the Stoics: thus here the Epicurean is conversing on friendly terms with Brutus the Academic and Favonius the Stoic (probably—see below). Babut also emphasizes that Statyllius' view of suicide in *Cat. min.* is Stoic, not Epicurean (for the Epicurean attitude see on 40.9), and plays on the 'inconsistency' between the 'unknown' Epicurean's 'opting out' philosophy of *Brut.* 12.3 and Statyllius' loyal service to Brutus at Philippi and earlier. These 'inconsistency' arguments can be overplayed (on the general point see my 'Career and conversion of Dio Chrysostom'). Some allowance might be made for the all too often documented credibility gap between philosophical theory and political practice. The Epicureanism of Cassius (after an initial period of quietism) and L. Piso, for example, did nothing to deter them from pursuing their public careers, and Cassius' view of suicide was equally inconsistent with his avowed philosophy of life. The technical and formal gulf between rival philosophies, even between Stoicism and Epicureanism, was often much greater than the reality. {Cf. D. Sedley, *JRS* 87 (1997), 47.} More important, it is clear that Epicureans could find matter for praise in the life and death of Cato: Cicero's friend Fabius Gallus, who wrote a eulogistic *Cato* (*Ad Fam.* 7.24 [260].2), was an Epicurean (Momigliano 152). And on the human—as opposed to the philosophical—level, it is not impossible that Statyllius could have expressed the sentiment of *Brut.* 12.3 before the assassination—and then joined his friends once they had committed themselves irrevocably by killing Caesar. Such 'inconsistency' would be exactly parallel to Favonius' historically authenticated change of course. If all this sounds like special pleading, then it ought to be emphasized that the mere facts that Brutus considered approaching the Epicurean of 12.3 (whose Epicureanism he must have known about) at all, and that this same Epicurean was apparently a friend of | Favonius and Labeo, as well as a *ἑταῖρος* of Brutus, must be considered suggestive. Was he known to be *καταφανῆς μισοκαίσαρ*, for all his Epicureanism? Finally, the way P. talks about Statyllius at 51.5–6, without a word of introduction or explanation (contrast 51.2, 51.3, 52.1), rather implies that he does not need them: has Statyllius therefore already been introduced? {Duff, *Plutarch's Lives* 149–50 n. 63 notes that, if P. knew of Statyllius' connection with any philosophical school, it is odd that he did not say so in *Cato Minor* given that *Life's* philosophical concerns.}

To sum up. Given that the *MSS* text requires alteration anyway, that Plutarchean *MSS* are not good on proper names (e.g. 1.5), that the choice of identification is small, that the 'inconsistencies' between the behaviour of the philosopher here and in *Cat. min.* 65.10 etc. are not inexplicable, that

the philosopher of the present passage is clearly one of the Brutus–Favonius–Labeo set and is expected at least to consider joining the conspiracy against Caesar, that it is *a priori* improbable that there were two philosophers of such similar name and broad political conviction in the Cato–Brutus entourage, and that 51.5–6 seems to presuppose an earlier introduction of Statyllius, the identification proposed by Ziegler is as good as certain. (This discussion may seem rather long-winded. The excuse is that the relationship between philosophical theory and practice is a fundamentally important question, whose study must not be pursued by simplistic reliance on the letter of the particular philosophical creed in question.)

Ἐπικούρειον: confirmed by the impeccably Epicurean sentiment he actually expresses. If Statyllius' aid was canvassed, this may have been in relation to venues for the assassination other than the senate house.

Φάωνιον: *RE* 6.2074ff. (Münzer). For discussion of P.'s ambivalent portrayal of Favonius see Babut 169ff., and on 34.4 below; {Pelling on *Caes.* 21.8. On the man himself cf. J. Geiger, *RSA* 4 (1974), 161–70}.

ἔραστήν: not (of course) literally. For the meaning 'devoted adherent of' cf. 34.4 below, *Cat. min.* 25.3, *Quaest. conviv.* 734F, | and especially *De virt. moral.* 448 *νέοι διδασκάλους ἐπιτυχόντες ἀστείους ὑπὸ χρείας τὸ πρῶτον ἔπονται καὶ ζηλοῦσιν, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ φιλοῦσιν, ἀντὶ γνωρίμων καὶ μαθητῶν ἔρασταὶ καλούμενοι καὶ ὄντες.* The terminology is characteristically Stoic, which is why P. attacks it with distressing pedantry in the *De commun. notit. adv. Stoic.* 1073B–C, although the whole idea of course goes back to Socrates (*X. Mem.* 1.6.13 etc.). See further H. Cherniss, Loeb *Moralia* XIII, Part II, 768–9. It is here used appropriately of the relationship between Cato 'the philosopher' and Favonius, and does not in context convey censure. For the general relationship between Cato and Favonius cf. also Suet. *Aug.* 13.2 'ille Catonis aemulus'; Münzer 2077, with full references.

πόρρωθεν ... προσβαλόντος ... πείραν: a tricky piece of Greek. There are three problems: (i) *πόρρωθεν*; (ii) *κύκλω*; (iii) *προσβαλόντος*. (i) Perrin takes *πόρρωθεν* as = 'some time before'. But this (a) makes Brutus 'active' against Caesar too early in the narrative; (b) runs into difficulties of time scale. If his testing of Statyllius and Favonius was in the past, at what point does the chronological pick-up come? It ought to come at 4, *Λαβεῶνι κοινοῦται τὸ βούλευμα*, but on Perrin's interpretation P. ought to say, not *ὕστερον*, but *νῦν*, marking the resumption of straight narrative. Consequently, I think *πόρρωθεν* has to be taken as 'from afar', going closely with the verb, as if Brutus himself was distant from the discussion. This gives good sense. (ii) Interpretation here partly depends on what the correct participle is: if there is some sort of hunting/netting metaphor at work, *κύκλω* could be taken quite literally. If not, *κύκλω* must be rendered 'in a round-about-way'/'by circumlocution' (for this use of *κύκλος* cf. *De Pyth. orac.* 408F). {So Scott-Kilvert–Pelling.} (iii) The *MSS* reading *περιβαλόντος* implies a sort of

hunting/netting metaphor. This is perhaps just about possible | linguistically, but gives poor sense: Brutus ought to be ‘throwing’ Statyllius and Favonius a ‘test’, not seeking to envelope them in it. Wytttenbach’s *προβαλόντος* is quite good, but Ziegler’s *προσβαλόντος* is absolutely right (though his discussion in *Rh. Mus.* 84 [1935], 377, is rather oblique). In *Alex.* 47.1 Ziegler’s <πειραν> *προσέβαλε* = ‘he applied a test’ is correct (*pace* Hamilton *ad loc.*: cf. 47.4 *δεξαμένων ... τὴν πείραν*. This guarantees Ziegler’s *προσβαλόντος* in the present passage.

χειρὸν εἶναι: Favonius later went back on this opinion, and identified himself closely with the tyrannicides. He was one of those who ran, swords drawn, with the conspirators to the Capitol, wanting to share in the glory of the deed (Appian 2.119.500). He was present at the famous family conference of Brutus, Cassius, Servilia, and Cicero at Antium (*Ad Att.* 15.11 [389]), helped in the reconciliation of Brutus and Cassius at Sardis early in 42 (34 below), fought at Philippi, and was executed by the conquerors, being one of those who courteously saluted Antony as their *imperator* and abused Octavian to his face with the most obscene epithets (Suet. *Aug.* 13.2).

Στα<τύ>λλιος: see above. For a possible identity, Geiger {D.Phil.} 365 {and *Athen.* 57 (1979), 66 n. 80; cf. Geiger, *RSA* 4 (1974), 169–70}.

τῷ σοφῷ ... καθήκειν: a famous doctrine. Since the Epicurean sage tried to avoid *βλάβας ἐξ ἀνθρώπων* (D.L. 10.117), he kept aloof from public life. For the general principle *λάθε βιώσας* and its particularization—avoid politics—see e.g. Epic. *Sent.* 7, *Sent. Vat.* fr. 58 Bailey; Lucr. 5.1127f.; Hor. *Epist.* 1.17.10, 1.18.102f.; Philostr. *VA* 8.28; Themist. 26, p. 390, 21 Dind.; Julian *Ad Themist.*, p. 471 Pet. This view was completely opposed to Platonic/Aristotelian ideals and P.’s own beliefs and practice (1.3n.). For his attacks on it see e.g. *De poet. aud.* 37A; *De tranq. animi* 465Cff., 466A, *Praec. ger. reip.* 824B, *Non posse suav. vivi* 1098D, 1099D; *Adv. Col.* 1125C–D, 1126A–E; *De lat. viv. passim.* |

4. Λαβεών: *RE* 1.2557 (Klebs [confused]). Pacuvius Antistius Labeo, himself an eminent jurist and the father of the even more famous jurist and celebrated Republican who lived under Augustus and Tiberius. On his death at Philippi see 51.2 below and the variant tradition in Appian 4.135.571.

ἀπεσιώπησεν: ‘ceased speaking and fell silent’. Cf. *Alc.* 10.4 *μεταξὺ λέγων ἀπεσιώπα*.

5. τὸν ἕτερον: *RE* Suppl. 5.369 (Münzer).

Ἀλβῖνον: P.’s way of distinguishing D. from M. Brutus (cf. *Caes.* 64.1). Appian and Dio regularly use the plain *Δέκιμος* or *Δέκιμος*. The name Albinus, attested also on coins, shows that Decimus, the son of the consul of 77, was adopted by a Postumius Albinus. See further Münzer, *RA* 407;

{R. Syme, *Historia* 29 (1979), 426–30 = *Roman Papers* III, 1240–4; D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature*² (1991), 76}.

ἄλλως ... θαρραλέον: at first sight a remarkable characterization of D. Brutus, who up to March 44 had had a very successful career indeed. One of Caesar's best officers, he had distinguished himself by a naval victory over the Veneti in 56, commanded a Caesarian fleet successfully at Massilia in 49, and as governor of Transalpine Gaul had suppressed a rebellion of the Bellovaci in 46. Probably a praetor in 45 (Broughton II, 307) he was to be proconsul of Cisalpine Gaul in 44, and had been designated consul for 42. Cicero customarily refers to him in eulogistic terms (e.g. *Phil.* 3.1, 4.8; *Ad Brut.* 1.14 [22].7; 1.14 [22].9; and especially *Ad Fam.* 11.21 [411].4 'te constet excellere hoc genere virtutis, ut numquam extimescas, numquam perturbere'). According to Appian 2.124.518, Antony and Lepidus 'feared Decimus most' in the immediate aftermath of the assassination, and Antony classes him as *θρασύτερος* in 3.37.150. All of which suggests a character quite different from the present passage. But there was another side to the picture. Decimus did incur heavy criticism from Republicans after Caesar's assassination. He was accused of missing valuable opportunities by Brutus and Cassius | themselves (*Ad Att.* 15.11 [389].2—c. June 8, 44—'Multo inde sermone querebantur, atque id quidem Cassius maxime, amissas occasiones, Decimumque graviter accusabant'). Presumably they thought that he could have used his army to better effect. He was also blamed for failing to capture Antony after Mutina (*Ad Fam.* 11.10 [385].4, 11.11 [386].2), a charge Cicero considered justified (*Ad Fam.* 11.12 [394]; *Ad Brut.* 1.10 [17].3). Finally, Dio 46.53.3 attributes to him a querulous and unheroic death. Hence Decimus' career after March 44 provided ammunition for a tradition which represented him as innately weak and irresolute, to some extent to blame for the failure of the Republican cause as a whole, and consequently (in view of his 'proven' mediocrity!) at all times a mere tool in the hands of Brutus and Cassius. This is substantially how P. depicts him here (*Caes.* 64.1–6, describing his decisive intervention on the Ides, when he persuaded Caesar to attend the senate after all, allows him a degree of independence, but *Caes.* 66.4, where he is incorrectly said to have detained Antony outside the senate house, re-establishes him in his typical role as a sort of messenger-boy of Brutus and Cassius). Clearly this tradition was a grave distortion of the truth. The present passage offers a characterization based on post *eventum* knowledge, tailored as an *apologia* for Brutus and Cassius having made use of such an allegedly unimpressive ally. At the time, the acquisition of Decimus was of course a major political coup.

ῥέκτην: the usual form is *ῥεκτήρ*, itself a poetic word. *LSJ* only attest *ῥέκτης* in P., Aretaeus, and Synesius.

μονομάχων: P. says no more about them, and in general pro-tyrannicide sources (like Cicero) are discreetly silent about the use of such unsavoury

allies. P. has to mention them because he is following a source that excused Brutus' and Cassius' utilization of Decimus by pointing out that he did provide practical assistance, but the image of the principled Republican tyrannicides would be | soiled if more was made of their use of methods commonly associated with demagogue types like Clodius and Milo. Decimus' gladiators were of course an important ingredient in the success of the plot. Before the assassination he stationed them under arms between the senate house and the theatre in Pompey's colonnade, allegedly to catch a renegade gladiator in the theatre, but in reality to provide reinforcements if the tyrannicides met with resistance (Nicolaus 26A.98). After the assassination the gladiators ran out to the *cancelli* of the senate house (Appian 2.118.495 [confused]). When the conspirators occupied the Capitol they were 'stipati gladiatorum D. Bruti manu' (Vell. 2.58.2, cf. Appian 2.120.503). When they came down they still had a bodyguard of gladiators (Nicolaus *loc. cit.*). In their speeches Brutus and Cassius particularly thanked Decimus for his opportune provision of gladiators (Appian 2.122.513). Decimus' gladiators were obviously an important restraint upon Lepidus and Antony in the immediate aftermath of the assassination.

For more about Decimus' gladiators see A. W. Lintott, *Violence in Ancient Rome* (1968), 84, who suggests that he had been given them by Caesar himself, and Horsfall, *G&R* 21 (1974), 195f., who discusses their use before the murder in detail.

οὐς ... ἔτρεφε: cf. Nicolaus' (ἀγῶνες) ... οὐς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς δώσειν μέλλων (98). Possibly Decimus had made an electoral promise that he would give games in the future (see Horsfall).

παρὰ ... πιστευόμενον: evidenced both by his entire military and political career, which depended upon the patronage of Caesar, and by such signal marks of goodwill as Decimus' occupation, along with Octavian, of the second carriage in Caesar's retinue on the return to Rome in 45, and his adoption as Caesar's secondary heir (Suet. *Caes.* 83.2). It was Decimus who accompanied Caesar to the famous dinner-party at Lepidus' the night before the assassination and who eventually persuaded Caesar to attend the senate on the Ides. | The sources delight in emphasizing the trust and favour Decimus enjoyed with Caesar (e.g. *Caes.* 64.1; Nicolaus 19.59, 23.84; Appian 2.111.464; Dio 44.18.1), usually with the tacit purpose of convicting him of disloyalty in joining the conspiracy. That his motives were in fact not dishonourable is well argued by Meyer 538, and indeed supported by P.'s narrative here (12.6).

6. συμπράξειν: a little word play, to emphasize the enthusiasm of Decimus' cooperation.

7. καὶ ... προσηγέτο: one notes the consistent implication that it was Brutus who was responsible for all that was good in the conspiracy. Cf. 1.4 etc.

ἡ δόξα: see on 29.4.

προσήγετο: Ziegler's tentative aorist is insensitive—see on 8.7 ἤρπασεν.

καὶ ... πράξιν: closely similar is Appian 2.114.475 συνέθεντο μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἄνευ τε ὄρκων καὶ ἄνευ σφαγίων, καὶ οὐδεὶς μετέθετο οὐδὲ προὔδωκε. P. and Appian are following a common source. Their apparent divergence (from οὕτως in P.) is one of emphasis, not substance (both boil down to 'the conspiracy was kept a secret'). For Appian's emphasis recurring in P. see 52.4, *Comparison* 4.6.

συνδιήνεγκαν: 'Inest verbo συνδιαφέρω et celatae et ad finem perductae rei notio' (Voegelin, cl. 13.8). Voegelin also suggests that κατεσιώπησεν is a gloss on συνδιήνεγκαν, but the polysyndeton is effective.

μαντείαις ... φάσμασι ... ἱεροῖς: for these see *Caesar* 63 {with Pelling *ad loc.*}, Weinstock 342ff., {E. Rawson, *JRS* 68 (1978), 142–6 = *Roman Culture and Society* (1991), 307–12}, and 15.1 below. P. obviously accepts the validity of these phenomena (as, less excusably, among modern scholars Gelzer, *Caesar*, 325; and Weinstock 342). For his attitude to portents etc. see Brenk 184–213, with discussion of P.'s 'dramatic' exploitation of them.

161 **ἄπιστον:** the sentiment is at variance with *Caes.* 63.1 | ἀλλ' ἔοικεν οὐχ οὕτως ἀπροσδόκητον ὡς ἀφύλακτον εἶναι τὸ πεπρωμένον, ἐπεὶ καὶ σημεῖα θαυμαστὰ καὶ φάσματα φανῆναι λέγουσι (with which cf. Cic. *De div.* 1.119 'Quae quidem illi portendebantur a dis immortalibus ut videret interitum, non ut caveret' {with Wardle *ad loc.*}), and with *Caes.* 63.11, where Caesar himself is affected by suspicion and fear (cf. 15.1 below). Both these passages depend on acceptance of the validity of the portents and are hardly secure evidence for the view that news of the conspiracy really had leaked out. The discrepancy between the present passage and the *Caesar* arises because in the *Brutus* P. is naturally more interested in the conspirators than in their victim, and wants to emphasize the remarkable secrecy of the conspiracy, whereas in the *Caesar* he has necessarily to give greater weight to the portents, the profusion and impressiveness of which make it difficult in context to represent the conspiracy as ἄπιστον to Caesar or anyone else. P's. statement here is also flatly contradicted by the evidence of Flor. 2.13.94 'manaverat late coniuratio' and by Dio 44.15.1 καὶ ὀλίγου γε ἐφωράθησαν ὑπὸ ... τοῦ πλήθους τῶν συνειδόντων, but it is not so easy to see what hard evidence lies behind these assertions. Even among historians politically committed to Caesarism allowance must be made for the inevitable tendency to write with hindsight, to dramatize this most famous of assassinations. Gelzer, *Caesar*, 325, claims that 'Although those in the plot gave nothing away, it is certain that Caesar was warned'. But the only evidence he can adduce are the omens and the advice given Caesar by Hirtius and Pansa and a few of his closest friends to re-employ his body-guard of Spanish cohorts (Vell. 2.57.1; Suet. *Caes.* 86; Appian 2.109.455), which was not at all specific. Of course Caesar had his suspicions of Brutus and Cassius (8.1–4), though clearly not of D. Brutus, but the feeling can

only have been a vague one, and his general sense of security was reinforced both by the oath of allegiance, sworn perhaps by all the citizens | (Weinstock 225), which may even have occasioned his dismissal of his Spanish bodyguard, and by his own immense conceit (Suet. *Caes.* 86.2). On the Ides of March itself, the reactions of Antony, Lepidus, the senate as a whole (including Cicero), and Caesar, when he was about to be assassinated, do indeed suggest, that, despite the general oppressive, suspicious, political atmosphere, for most people the plot was indeed *ἄπιστον*. P. here is reshaping his material to suit the needs of the *Brutus*: what he says, however, is more worth consideration than the usual theatricals. 162

Ch. 13: Porcia proves herself worthy of Brutus' confidence

This famous story has two main justifications for its inclusion in the *Brutus*: (i) there is a thematic link with chs. 10–12—Porcia in a sense becomes a member of the conspiracy (cf. *Cat. min.* 73.6 αὐτὴ ... τῆς συνωμοσίας μετέσχε, and 13.11 below); (ii) it is part of P.'s general interpretation of Brutus' character to portray him as a man of flesh and blood, who achieved public virtue at the cost of private struggle (cf. on 4.1). In heroic contexts he may display suitably Stoic attributes, but he is no Stoic automaton: P. is keen to analyse the inner anguish of his virtuous hero, and the cost of the conspiracy that had to be borne by the human being closest to him. Of course, on a more general level, P. would never omit so promising a story, especially one that so appeals to his profound (and relatively enlightened) interest in the relationship between the sexes, and his frequent concern to demonstrate that women are capable of great deeds just as much as men.

For his views on the relationship between the sexes see his *Amatorius*, *Praecepta coniugalia*, and (to a lesser degree) *Mulierum virtutes*; modern discussion: L. Goessler, *Plutarchs Gedanken über die Ehe* (1962); P. A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical methods: An analysis of the Mulierum Virtutes* (1965), 5ff; | 163 Babut 108–110; {F. Le Corsu, *Plutarque et les femmes* (1981); K. Blomqvist in J. Mossman, ed., *Plutarch and his Intellectual World* (1997), 73–97; J. Beneker, *The Passionate Statesman: Eros and Politics in Plutarch's Lives* (2012), esp. ch. 1; G. Tsouvala in Beck, *Companion* 191–206; S. A. Xenophontos, *Ethical Education in Plutarch* (2016), ch. 4; and the various papers in S. B. Pomeroy, *Plutarch's Advice to the Bride and Groom and A Consolation to his Wife* (1999)}. The tone of the present story is similar to such famous stories as those of Valeria and Cloelia, or the stories of *Mul. virt.* 250F–251C; 253F–263C. For general comment see Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods* 7ff.

2. κατέχειν ... κατακοσμεῖν: Zeugma quoddam, quum mens, cogitatio ipsa tantum cohibeatur, componatur vere eius imago vultu expressa' (Voegelin). κατακοσμέω is a favourite word of P.'s, = 'reduce to order' (what is disordered). Cf. e.g. *Numa* 14.5, *Rom.* 23.2.

αὐτόν: Voegelin's correction is certain.

<έν>διατρίβων [έν]: Ziegler's 'emendation' is elegant, certainly not necessary, and perhaps untrue to an aspect of P.'s style (see on 5.1). Better to leave the text untouched.

οὐκ ... δυσεξέλκτον: the emotional tone becomes heightened. One may think in terms of the poetic 'insomniac-hero'-τόπος (see Pease on *Aen.* 4.522ff.; if so, the present passage can be seen as a structural device, tracing the movement of Brutus' psychological state—see on 4.8). There may be an evocation of the most famous 'insomniac-hero' description of them all: *Od.* 20.1–6 and 22–29, where Odysseus lies awake, tossing and turning, plotting the death of the Suitors (cf. P.'s imagery below).

κυκλεῖ: this metaphorical use of *κυκλέω* (or *κυκλόω*) is rather poetic, cf. e.g. Men. 378 Kock {= 320 Körte = 282 K-A}, Aes. Ag. 977. Cf. *Pyrrh.* 30.3 ἐλπίδας ἐξ ἐλπίδων ἀεὶ κυλίνδων.

δύσφορον ... δυσεξέλικτον: cf. 2.2n. Both words are consistent with the metaphor behind *κυκλεῖ*. *δυσεξέλικτον* has a poetic flavour—cf. Luc. *Trag.* 25 *δυσεξέλικτα κυματούμενος κλύδων*. For other imagery in P. based on ‘complication’ see Fuhrmann 182.

3-11. ἡ δὲ ... γυναῖκα: other accounts, in substantially similar form, are Dio 44.13.1-14; Val. Max. 3.2.15; Polyaeus 8.32; | Zonaras 10.20.

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Dio’s account shares with P. the emphasis on the facts that Porcia is both daughter of Cato and wife of Brutus, and that Brutus must act worthily of her. But it is naturally greatly inferior artistically (e.g. Porcia’s speech is much more of a standard rhetorical piece) and exhibits several differences of detail: (i) Porcia only resorts to wounding herself when she has already asked Brutus to confide in her and received no response (a more likely sequence of events than P.’s); (ii) she does so to test if she would be able to stand up to torture without giving anything away; (iii) when the conversation between husband and wife takes place, the initial pain has subsided and it is Porcia who accosts Brutus (whereas in P. 13.6 clearly implies an initial reaction on the part of Brutus); (iv) it is after this incident that Brutus takes on Cassius (see on 8.5). Val. Max. has the same precise detail about the barber’s scissors as P., but is otherwise very different: Porcia has already guessed Brutus’ purpose, wounds herself as a proof of love, and contrives to make it look like an accident; the incident occurs when Brutus goes out of the bedroom, but in the presence of her maids, whose screaming recalls Brutus, though they are ordered to leave before Brutus and Porcia converse together; above all, the whole incident is dated to the night before the Ides! Polyaeus’ brief account lays great stress on the trust required between husband and wife, and again makes Porcia half-aware of Brutus’ intentions before she does the deed, and seems also to imply that she acted on the night before the Ides. Zonaras’ is a very close rendering of P., who is explicitly acknowledged as the source.

From the fact that P. tells the story immediately after mentioning Bibulus’ work, which he refers to in a way that implies personal acquaintance (see *ad loc.*), it is reasonable to assume that Bibulus is his source (direct), though clearly P. has ‘written up’ | the incident in a dramatic and vivid way and added original touches (e.g. in Porcia’s speech). Equally clearly, the tradition was by no means stereotyped. Bibulus’ story must have found its way into at least one major historical source (Livy?).

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3. Πορκία: *RE* 22.216ff. (Miltner).

ὡσπερ εἴρηται: Ziegler (and others) refer this to 2.1 above, rather than to *Cat. min.* 73.6. This is almost certainly right. P.'s cross-references can be very imprecise indeed (cf. especially *Timol.* 13.10). If so, an indication of forgetfulness arising from rapidity of composition.

ἀνειψιός: by virtue of the fact that Servilia was Cato's half-sister.

τοῦ προτέρου: M. Calpurnius Bibulus, *cos.* 59, who died early in 48. {On him and his sons see R. Syme, *HSCPh* 91 (1987), 185–98 = *Roman Papers* VI (1991), 193–204.}

ἔλαβε: for the date see 2.1n.

κόρη: κόρη can refer to any young women, not just virgins. But despite the elasticity of Greek words implying 'youth', it is hard to see how Porcia could reasonably be called a κόρη in 44: the fact that her son could hold an augurate in 43 shows that he was born c. 60, hence Porcia herself was born in the early 70s at the latest and could easily have been over thirty five in March 44. The inaccuracy is partly attributable to P.'s concern for unity of time (see 3.1n.), but mostly to his desire to secure pathetic effect. {But R. Syme, *HSCPh* 91 (1987) 185–98 = *Roman Papers* VI (1991), 193–204, shows that L. Bibulus the augur is in fact likely to be a son by a previous marriage of Bibulus and distinct from the author. In that case Porcia may be younger than this, though still old enough to have had two children when sought as a bride by Hortensius in the mid-fifties, *Cat. min.* 25.4. The author Bibulus was probably one of those two.}

παιδίον: as the boy would be about sixteen {this again is doubtful, see above}, this is again not strictly accurate. The diminutive contributes to the pathetic effect, though there is another reason for it as well (below).

Βύβλος: L. Calpurnius Bibulus = *RE* 3.1367f. (Cichorius). {In fact this identification is doubtful, and the author is likely to be L. Bibulus' stepbrother: see above.}

βιβλίδιον: clearly one of P.'s. sources (cf. 23.7 below). The characterization indicates personal consultation (cf. C. Theander, *Eranos* 57 [1959], 120–8). More than that, the carefully qualified | phraseology, the picking up of the earlier μικρόν, and the pun on Βύβλος/βιβλίδιον (helped by the reference to Bibulus as παιδίον), suggest that P. is poking fun at Bibulus' work, especially as μικρός can be derogatory (cf. on 2.4). The abrupt change of emotional tone, from the poetic and pathetic to the decidedly ironical, is noteworthy (cf. on 9.1ff.), especially as the tone immediately reverts to the high style.

ἀπομνημονευμάτων Βρούτου: *HRR* II, lxvii; {*FRHist* 49, giving the present passage as T 1. See Drummond's discussion, *FRHist* I.407–9}. Solanus' correction is certain.

4. φιλόστοργος ... φίλανδρος: cf. 2.2n. φιλόστοργος (Sintenis' correction is certain) is often used of family affection (e.g. *X. Cyr.* 1.3.2; Theocr. 18.13), but φιλοστοργεῖν can be used of sexual love (*Clearch.* 49; *Gp.* 14.2.2), an

idea which is not inappropriate here, since P., reflecting his own convictions, does stress the strong physical bond between husband and wife at 13.7–8.

νοῦν ἔχοντος: the qualification is used because νοῦς is often precisely what φρόνημα is deficient in.

τῶν ἀπορρήτων: one may sense an image based on initiation into the Mysteries here, particularly as Brutus is the high priest of the enterprise (10.1), and *chs.* 10–13 are dominated by the *πέτρα*-theme.

ὀπαδούς: a poetical word, used also by P. at *Alc.* 23.7 in a somewhat similar context (the confessions of Timaea to her maids). Porcia's maids are a *datum* of the tradition, but P.'s clever poetical wording recalls the passions of Euripidean or Sophoclean domestic heroines.

5. ὥστε ... τραύματος: no other source has so much detail. P. is embellishing Bibulus' account.

νεανικός: 'σφοδράς' (Coraes). This is good medical usage (*ψύξις νεανικωτάτη*, Hp. *VM* 16; *αἰμορραγία* Id. *Prorrh.* 1.134; *νόσημα ν.* Arist. *HA* 602B 29). |

φρικαδεῖς πυρετούς: practically a technical medical term, cf. Hp. *Epid.* 1.2; Sor. 1.59. On P.'s acquaintance with the Hippocratic writings see F. C. Babbitt, Loeb *Moralia* II, 214 (on the *de tuenda sanitate*); {M. V. Ruffy in F. Klotz and K. Oikonomopoulou, edd., *The Philosopher's Banquet* (2011), 131–57}.

ἐπιλαβεῖν: Sintenis rightly, cf. *Ant.* 82.3 *πυρετῶν ἐπιλαβόντων*. *ἐπιλαμβάνω* is regular for the onset of disease, e.g. Hdt. 8.115; Hp. *Aph.* 6.51; Thuc. 2.51. Confusion between *-λαβ-* and *-βαλ-* is common in Plutarchean MSS.

6. ἀγωνιῶντος ... δυσφοροῦντος: see 2.2n. Perrin takes this to mean that Brutus was distressed at Porcia's condition. This seems right.

7. οὐχ ὥσπερ ... ἀνιάρων: the general thought is a commonplace of marriage literature, cf. e.g. *Praec. coniug.* 142F (with Babbitt *ad loc.*), D. Chr. 3.122.

κοινωνὸς ... κοινωνός: for this 'for better or for worse' idea cf. Musonius Rufus XIII A (Hense, p. 68, II. 5–6). Ideas of sharing/partnership etc. are of course the stuff of philosophical (pro-) marriage literature, cf. D. Chr. *loc. cit.*, *Praec. coniug.* 138C, Musonius (Hense, p. 11, I. 2). The catch is the standard one: the husband, being male, is naturally *ἰσχυρότερος καὶ ἡγεμονικώτερος* (D. Chr. 3.70; cf. *Praec. coniug.* 139D). It is noticeable that most of P.'s exhortations in the *Coniugalia Praecepta* are directed towards the wife.

εἶναι: the infinitive, in effect = ὥστε εἶναι, ἵνα εἴην (Voegelin), gives a poetic colouring. This, after all, is the *ρήσις* of a tragic heroine.

8. ἀπόδειξις ἢ χάρις: Perrin rightly takes this as a hendiadys = ‘how can I show thee any grateful service?’ Brutus is in all respects an excellent husband, but Porcia argues that she cannot be fully a wife to him, if he refuses to share his deepest troubles. *χάρις* here, as often (e.g. *Il.* 11.243, 168 *Aes. Ag.* 1206) | refers to sexual favours (cf. on 7.7).

9. ἀσθενής: P. would certainly agree that women are in general weaker by nature than men (cf. above, and for Brutus’ views see 23.7), but not that they are incapable of bearing a terrible secret. He held that the virtues of men and women are identical (*Mul. virt.* 242F–243A, cf. *Amat.* 769ff.), and that women no less than men should receive a philosophical education (below). But Porcia is only giving the conventional view (*δοκεῖ*), with which she (i.e. P.) disagrees.

τροφῆς: *τροφή* can be used in effect as a synonym for *παιδεία*, though for Plato it came to mean that first, essential, stage of education when the basis of a man’s character is formed (Jaeger, *Paideia* I, 4; II, 228, 426, n. 326). *φύσις*, *τροφή*, and *παιδεία* are the deciding factors in the formation of character (*Quom. adul. ab amico internosc.* 65F; cf. *Gracchi* 40.4, *Comparison of Agis, Cleomenes and the Gracchi* 1.2). For the corrupting effects of bad *τροφή* see *De sera num. vind.* 551D. The best *τροφή* is naturally *ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ* (*Quom. adul. ab amic. internosc.* 585D), which Porcia would have had from her father. Cf. the need for *παιδεία* (1.3n.).

ὁμιλίας: naturally a man’s character is greatly affected by the quality of his associates, e.g. *Theogn.* 31, 1165; *Aes. Pers.* 753f., *Hdt.* 7.16, *Eur. fr.* 1024; for the theme in P. cf. *De sera num. vind.* 551D, *Dion* 7.4, 9.2, 11.2, 13.6, 16.2, 17.3.

10. τὸ ... θυγατέρα: picking up *τροφῆς*.

τὸ ... γυναῖκα: picking up *ὁμιλίας*. Of course in the special case of *ὁμιλία* between husband and wife, the husband was (ideally) the wife’s *καθηγητῆς καὶ φιλόσοφος καὶ διδάσκαλος τῶν καλλίστων καὶ θειοτάτων* (*Praec. coniug.* 145C).

πρὸς ... ἀήττητον: the flavour is distinctly Stoic. This is because the context is strongly heroic, but perhaps also because P. | is trying a little to write ‘in character’ (note that *Dio* 44.13.3 makes Porcia ‘despise’ the wound). 169

εἶναι: branded as a *MSS* error by Ziegler, *Rh. Mus.* 81 (1932), 77, but retained by him in his present text. This is probably right, for P. sometimes uses infinitives where Attic Greek prefers participles. Voegelin compares 15.7 and 41.4. The style also coheres with 13.7 above.

ἀνελάμβανε: taken by all early editors and by Perrin as ‘look after’, ‘restore’. This is wrong. The meaning is: ‘took her into his confidence’ (24.2 and 33.3 below are roughly parallel). This is the whole point of the story, after all, and is the only rendering to explain the emphatic *τότε μὲν*.

Chs. 14–16: Events leading up to the assassination

P.'s handling of this narrative is very good indeed. He has described in detail the formation of the conspiracy (*chs.* 10–13); he now traces the events leading up to the assassination. All the Plutarchean story-telling virtues are in evidence: the careful selection of vivid detail (there is much *ἐνάργεια*), the sustained narrative thrust, and the psychological interest. Tension is increased steadily as he delineates the hopes and fears of the assassins: Brutus hears tragic news from home; all are presented with pieces of evidence that seem to indicate discovery of the plot; it is several hours before they know if Caesar will appear at all.

For a detailed analysis of events before, and on, the Ides itself, see the very useful discussion of Horsfall, *G&R* 21 (1974), 191–199; cf. Drumann–Groebe 3.654ff.; Gelzer, *Caesar*, 304f.

Ch. 14: Choice of location; early morning of the Ides of March

1. βουλῆς: this was the meeting of the senate at which it was | rumoured 170 that a decision was to be taken on the alleged Sibylline oracle (10.3n.)—hence the arguments of D. Brutus in *Caes.* 64.3. That was in fact the reason why this particular meeting was chosen by the conspirators according to Dio 44.15.4 (implausibly—see on 10.3). Caesar certainly wanted to discuss Antony's obstructions to the election of Dolabella as consul (*Cic. Phil.* 2.83, 88).

ἐπίδοξος ... Καίσαρ: the 'arrival of Caesar'-motif (cf. 14.6, 15.1, and 16.1), which contributes to the powerful build-up of tension before the description of the actual assassination.

ἔγνωσαν: other suggested locations were the Sacred Way (*Suet. Caes.* 80.4; Nicolaus 23.81), the *pons suffragiorum* (*Suet. Caes.* 80.4; Nicolaus 23.81), and a gladiatorial show (Nicolaus 23.81 [confused]; cf. 'in aditu theatri', *Suet. Caes.* 80.4). See Horsfall 192–194.

ἀθρόοι ... ἀνυπόπτως: this reason for choosing the senate house is not attested in quite this form in any other source, though it is a natural one. Dio's reasons (44.16.1–2) are that Caesar would least expect to be attacked in the senate, and would be easier to kill there, the conspirators could easily conceal their daggers in their document boxes, and 'the rest', being unarmed would be unable to help Caesar (this in total conflict with P. below and Appian). Nicolaus' reasons (23.81) are also strictly practical: Caesar would be alone, without his non-senatorial supporters, and the conspirators would be many, with their daggers concealed under their togas. Only Appian 2.114.476 remotely approaches the sympathetic view of P. (below).

καὶ ... ἐλευθερίας: Appian reflects the same fond hope, though with a pointed addition—*χωρίον δ' ἐπενόουν τὸ βουλευτήριον ὡς τῶν βουλευτῶν, εἰ καὶ μὴ προμάθοιεν, προθύμως, ὅτε ἴδοιεν τὸ ἔργον, συνεπιληψομένων, ὃ καὶ*

171 *περὶ Ῥωμύλον τυραννικὸν ἐκ βασιλικοῦ γενόμενον ἐλέγετο συμβῆναι.* | He then goes on to attribute motives to the conspirators more in line with the version in Nicolaus and Dio: *δόξειν τε τὸ ἔργον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνο καὶ τόδε ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ γενόμενον, οὐ κατ' ἐπιβουλήν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως πεπραχθαι ἀκίνδυνόν τε, ὡς κοινόν, ἔσεσθαι παρὰ τῷ Καίσαρος στρατῷ καὶ τὴν τιμὴν σφίσι μενεῖν, οὐκ ἀγνοουμένοις, ὅτι ἤρξαν.* For discussion of the Romulus parallel see on 22.4. It is reasonable to assume that P. and Appian are following the same source here, with P. being both selective (cutting out motives less favourable to the tyrannicides, and the rather involved Romulus parallel) and adding something of his own (that at least is the impression given by *πάντας ἄνδρας*, in contrast to Appian's plain *βουλευταί*).

πρώτους: see on 10.6.

2. ἐδόκει ... αὐτῶν: P. gives this as one of the reasons for the choice of the senate house (and he may be right). Other sources note the workings of *τὸ θεῖον* in Caesar's murder having taken place in the *Curia Pompei* (below), but do not include this in the motivation of the conspirators.

τὸ θεάτρον: for Pompey's theatre see *Pomp.* 40. He began to build it after his triumph of 61 and dedicated it in his second consulship in 55 (Dio 39.38.1; Vell. 2.48.2; Cic. *Ad Fam.* 7.1 [24].2f., *In Pis.* 65). See Platner–Ashby, 146, 428, 515ff.; Nash II, plates 1216–23; Leach 244, n. 44; {*Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae* V, 36–8}.

Πομπηίου ... εἰκόν: cf. 14.3 below. Caesar fell dead at the bloodstained pedestal of the statue. Sources which remark pointedly on the divine appropriateness of this and of the location in general include *Caes.* 66.1–3 and 12–13; Dio 44.52.1; Nicolaus 23–83. Cic. *De div.* 2.23 also emphasizes the fact, but with the slightly different purposes of gloating and emphasizing the insecurity of great power. Velleius 2.56.3 says nothing about the location, Suetonius merely states, in his usual matter-of-fact way,
 172 | that the meeting of the senate was to be held in the *Curia Pompei*, and it is impossible to say from Livy, *Epit.* 116, whether Livy himself made any great play with the theme (though one notes that Dio does). Appian 2.117.493 records the simple fact that Caesar fell at the foot of the statue, without drawing any large conclusions. No doubt the idea appealed particularly to, and was canvassed by, former Pompeians: cf. especially *Caes.* 66.2 and 17.2 below on Cassius' 'prayer' to Pompey's statue. As Cassius was not a superstitious man, it would appear that this gesture (if historical) was strictly for public consumption. There seems to have been a dispute among the conspirators as to what exactly their public *persona* should be: Pompeian or more widely based. Cf. Appian 2.114.478 and Plut. *Caes.* 66.12 (an interesting speculation). Here at least Brutus seems to have shown more political acumen than Cassius.

Augustus transferred the offending statue to a marble arch facing the main entrance of the theatre, and the Curia was declared a *locus sceleratus* and walled up: Suet. *Caes.* 88, *Aug.* 31.5; Dio 47.19.1.

3. δαίμων τις: for the theme of divine retribution see above and on 6.5.

4. Βροῦτος ... προῆλθεν: this detail of Porcia's complicity has some parallel in Polyae. 8.32.1 ἡ δὲ τοὺς χιτωνίσκους αὐτῇ προσεκόμισε τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῶν χιτώνων ἔνδον τὸ ξίφος. Source: Bibulus?

ὑπέζωσάμενος: i.e. 'putting it under his belt'. For different versions of how the daggers were concealed cf. Dio 44.16.1–2 (document boxes); Nicolaus 23.81 (agreeing with P.); Appian 2.117.490 (just σὺν λεληθόσι ξιφιδίοις).

4–5. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ... ἐμβαλόντες: no other source has these details. From the conspirators' point of view, Cassius' son's assumption of the *toga virilis* allowed them to foregather en masse at Cassius' house without attracting attention. {See also J. T. Ramsey, *In Pursuit of Wissenschaft: Festschrift ... Calder* (2008), 351–63.} Apart from its intrinsic interest, | the detail helps to suggest that for the conspirators it was still 'business as usual' (cf. 14.6). Cassius' son must have been sixteen in March 44. Nothing more is known of him, unless the anecdote of *Quaest. conviv.* 737B–C refers to the tyrannicide and his son (which seems unlikely). L. Cassius Longinus, *cos. suff.* 11 A.D., father of L. and C. Cassius, consul and suffect consul in A.D. 30, was perhaps the son of L. Cassius, the tyrannicide's nephew, who was killed at Philippi (Appian 4.135.571; *PIR* 2.119).

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5. ἐμβαλόντες: 'cum dilectu adhibuit vocabulum violentam veluti militum turbam', Voegelin.

6. ἔνθα δὴ ...: closely similar to Appian 2.115.482 οἱ δ' ἀμφὶ τὸν Βροῦτον ἔωθεν κατὰ τὴν στοὰν τὴν πρὸ τοῦ θεάτρου τοῖς δεομένοις σφῶν ὡς στρατηγῶν εὐσταθέστατα ἐχρημάτιζον. The contexts are slightly different and there are no verbal parallels. The two writers are obviously following a common source, with P. working it up appropriately. Given the slightly different context in Appian, it seems likely that P. is switching sources at 14.6.

τὸ ἀπαθές: the flavour is distinctly Stoic—cf. on 13.10.

παρά: Coraes, cl. *Comparison of Pelopidas and Marcellus* 3.6.

πολλοῖς: πολλοί is worse attested and wrong. None of the praetors of 44 apart from Brutus and Cassius can be shown to have been members of the conspiracy. L. Cornelius Cinna probably was not in from the start (despite *Caes.* 68.5–6; cf. Dio 44.50.4 and Zonaras 10.12. Even though P. thought he was, a total of three would hardly justify πολλοί. Note that Perrin reads

πολλοῖς but translates πολλοί.) But it is true that P. is carefully contriving to give the impression that the praetors who behaved in this admirable manner were more than just Brutus | and Cassius (and Cinna perhaps): οἱ δ' ἄλλοι / ἐκεῖθεν πάντες / τῶν ἀνδρῶν (now including Brutus). Appian's οἱ δ' ἀμφὶ τὸν Βροῦτον (= 'Brutus and Cassius', though with the emphasis on Brutus) is more precise and presumably more faithful to the common source.

ἐκάστοις: Voegelin—'id ipsum, *utrumque* hoc fecisse, adeo supervacaneum erat adici, contra tam apte res eo augeri videtur, si *cuique* illos ita se praebuisse narratur'. The important point is the balance with πολλοῖς.

7. ἐπεὶ δὲ ... κωλύσει": this nice anecdote is unattested elsewhere. Brutus' *dictum* would obviously suit a variety of contexts. But the story could be historical, in which case it is worth noting the strictly *ad hoc* character of the notorious 'appeal to Caesar'. Alternatively, though the context may be integral, the story is quite fictitious and represents a squeak of senatorial protest against that dubious constitutional innovation.

Ch. 15: False alarms; collapse of Porcia

1. τὸ βραδύνειν: the conspirators had gathered in the senate house at dawn and called for Caesar (Dio 44.16.2; Appian 2.115.482; cf. 14.4 above). {In fact Ramsey, *In Pursuit of Wissenschaft: Festschrift ... Calder* (2008), 351–63, shows that it could not have been literally ‘at dawn’}. D. Brutus called for Caesar about the fifth hour (Suet. *Caes.* 81.4), i.e. between ten and eleven. Caesar must have been murdered a little before noon.

δυσίεροῦντα: see *Caes.* 63.4, 12; Appian 2.116.488; 115.483; Dio 44.17.3; Suet. *Caes.* 81.4. P. follows the well-established tradition that dates the most notorious of Caesar’s unpropitious sacrifices to the Ides of March itself. Even if any credence is given to the whole tradition of the portents, this is clearly wrong: Cic. *De div.* 1.119 dates the heartless bull and other intriguing items to the Lupercalia and its immediate aftermath. See Weinstock 344ff. (unusually sceptical); {Wardle on Cic. *Div.* 1.119 and Pelling on *Caes.* 63.4, both with further bibliography}.

κατέχεσθαι ... οἴκοι: for Calpurnia’s dream and her attempts to keep | Caesar at home see *Caes.* 63.8–11 (quoting Livy); Nicolaus 23.83; Suet. *Caes.* 81.3; Obsequens 67; Dio 44.17.3; Vell. 2.57.2. Her attempts to keep Caesar at home are perhaps historical (below). One should think hard before accepting the historicity of her dream.

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μάντεων: regular Greek for ‘haruspices’. See Magic 22, 48; M. Crawford, *JRS* 67 (1977), 250. ‘*Haruspices* were experts in the Etruscan art of interpreting prodigies, and we find them attached to the households of Pompey, Sulla, and Caesar’, Horsfall 198 with references; {*OCD*⁴ s.v. ‘haruspices’ [J. Linderski], with further bibliography}.

Amidst all this mumbo-jumbo it is a relief to learn the truth of the matter: Caesar was indisposed, and his physicians forbade him to go out (Nicolaus 23.83; Suet. *Caes.* 81.4, cf. 16.1 below). On his failing health in general see on 8.3.

δεύτερον ... πράξιν: Appian 2.115.483–4 has the same two anecdotes, and the whole flow and content of his narrative at this juncture are very similar to P.’s. Thus he describes Brutus’ and Cassius’ imperturbable execution of their praetorial duties, then the conspirators’ apprehension at untoward events at Caesar’s home, and then the Casca and Popillius Laenas incidents. The structure of individual sentences is also close (especially at *Brut.* 15.4), but on the whole the resemblances between the two writers are better explained by close adherence to a common source than by Appian following P. (see on 14.6 above). Needless to say, P.’s rendering is the more impressive.

2. Κάσκα: *RE* 2A.1788f. (Münzer).

3. ἀποδύεσθαι: ‘quod faciunt luctatores pugnaturi, de omni praeparatione et conatu dicitur’ (Voegelin). Cf. *Demosth.* 6.2, *Agis–Cleom.* 6.1. The

metaphor here is perhaps helped by the natural associations of aedileships.

4. Ποπίλιος Λαΐνας: *RE* 22.54 (Volkmann).

¹⁷⁶ **5–9. ἐν τούτῳ ... παθοῦς:** no other source has this tale, whose | domestic character strongly suggests Bibulus as P.'s source, though P. has obviously worked the story up in his characteristic and inimitable style. Obviously the story gives P. the opportunity to stretch out in a ripe piece of narrative, but it also has a serious purpose: to demonstrate Brutus' willingness to put public duty before private grief, and his exemplary philosophical self-control. It matters to P. not at all that Porcia's behaviour here is quite the reverse of her Stoical heroism in *ch.* 13 (and no doubt the passionate Porcia historically was capable of both types of behaviour—cf. *ch.* 23 below). In fact, he may even be interested in tracing the development of Porcia's attitude to the great enterprise she so enthusiastically espoused in *ch.* 13, using her as a foil to set off the superior composure of Brutus: their respective positions are now reversed.

θνήσκειν: 'was dying' rather than 'was dead' (Perrin). By 15.9 the *λόγος* is that she is dead. This contributes to the intensification of emotion throughout the story: there is a move from *θνήσκειν* to *τεθνηκυίας*. P. does not make it clear whether the *τις* of 15.5 brings the same *λόγος* as that of 15.8, but he is after emotional impact, not narrative clarity.

6. ἐκπαθής: so much for her Stoic *ἀπάθεια* of 13.10.

ἑαυτήν ... ἐξήττουσα: for this sort of psychological realism one may think in terms of Sophoclean (Ajax) or Euripidean (Phaedra) tragedy, or the Greek romances.

ὥσπερ ... πάθεισιν: for the image cf. *De garrul.* 505E, *An seni sit ger. resp.* 791B–C, *Galba* 27.3—'représentation caractéristique de la déraison' (Fuhrmann 182, n. 5).

7. ἐξελύθη: the verb can be used in prosaic medical contexts (e.g. *Hp. Aph.* 2.41), but considering the context here it is better to think in terms of the Homeric *λύτο γούνατα* (cf. Voegelin). For the expression cf. also *Mar.* 36.7

¹⁷⁷ *τῷ σώματι πρὶν | ἐκκελύσθαι παντάπασι χήσασθαι βουλόμενος.*

κατεμαραίνετο: cf. on 8.4.

ἀλυούσης: poetic.

ἐν μέσῳ: not 'in the midst of her servants' (Perrin), since they had not yet surrounded her; rather 'in atrio vel cavaedio, sub dio' (Reiske), or 'idem est quod *παρελθεῖν ... οὐ φθάσασα*' (Voegelin).

λιποθυμία: on the orthographical problem see on 26.1.

θάμβος ἀμήχανον: the colouring is slightly poetic, as also the use of *περίσταμαι*. As for *θάμβος*: 'h. l. de corporis torpore, ubi animus et sensus ad percipiendum et membra ad agendum deficiunt' (Voegelin). There is

nothing difficult or unusual in this. From Homer onwards *θάμβος* seems often to be used ‘au sens physique’ (Chantraine, *s.v.*).

ἦ τε ... παντάπασιν: realistic to a degree, yet also a highly literary description of physical collapse. The prototype for this sort of description is of course Sappho 31L–P, cf. Cat. 51.9ff.; Lucr. 3.154ff., and often in the Greek romances.

ἀνωλόλυξαν: Sintenis’ correction is certain. This is a nice touch: richly evocative of the intense emotions of tragedy.

προήλθε ... λόγος: not just Plutarcean verbosity—*διεδόθη λόγος* is the more prosaic and factual element, while *φήμη* recalls the mysterious *φήμη* of epic and tragedy.

9. ἀναλάμψασαν: for similar ‘fire’ images see Fuhrmann 83, n. 1 (on p. 84), 102, n. 4 (on p. 103). Here *ἀναλάμψασαν* ‘answers’ 15.7 *κατεμαραίνετο*.

ὁ δὲ Βρούτος ... πάθους: the point of the story. Brutus’ reaction should be seen against the background of the long and rich tradition of philosophers who responded imperturbably to the news of the death of their nearest and dearest (cf. Ps.Plut. *Consol. ad. Apollon.* 118D; *De cohib. ira* 463D; *De tranq. animi* 474D; D.L. 2.54–55), by | calmly continuing 178 whatever business they were engaged in at the time.

One may well entertain the suspicion that in recording that there was a *λόγος* that Porcia was dead P. is exaggerating the already fraught character of the original story in order to emphasize Brutus’ truly philosophical response to personal tragedy. But it would be too cynical to dismiss the whole story as a total fabrication.

συνεταράχθη ... εἰκός: in this context P. is keen to depict Brutus as a man who does have strong feelings, but who does not allow them to interfere with his public duty. He deliberately does not credit Brutus with Stoic *ἀπάθεια* in a personal context such as this.

τοῦ πάθους: Brutus’ rather than Porcia’s.

**Ch. 16: Arrival of Caesar; Popillius Laenas
turns out to be harmless**

179 **I. ἤδη ... κομιζόμενος:** the wording is similar in Appian 2.115.481, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐκομίζετο φορτίῳ, and 2.116.485 φερομένου δὲ ἤδη τοῦ Καίσαρος. This might appear coincidental, for in source criticism allowance must always be made for the possibility that two writers may express the same simple thought in similar words quite independently (see, for a very sceptical view of the whole exercise of source criticism on just these grounds, Millar, *A Study in Cassius Dio* (1964), viii, 34f. Millar goes far too far, but such scepticism is always salutary). In this case, however, it is not coincidental: (i) the general closeness of P.'s and Appian's narratives has to be taken into account: one is not comparing the odd group of words here and there, but a whole series of parallels over pages and pages of text. From that point of view, even small parallelisms may be revealing: | (ii) there is close parallelism of content between Appian 2.115.481 *θυομένῳ τε πολλάκις ἦν τὰ σημεῖα φοβερά, καὶ πέμπειν ἔμελλεν Ἀντώνιον διαλύσοντα τὴν βουλήν. ἀλλὰ Δέκμος παρὼν ἔπεισε μὴ λαβεῖν ὑπεροψίας διαβολήν, αὐτὸν δὲ αὐτὴν ἐπελθόντα διαλύσαι. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐκομίζετο φορεῖω,* and *Brut.* 16.1 (*ἤδη ... προσιών ... ἐγνώκει γὰρ ... ἀσθένειαν*), and between Appian 2.116.487 *φερομένου ... τοῦ Καίσαρος* + accounts of last-minute efforts to warn Caesar) and *Caes.* 64.6 *καὶ μικρὸν μὲν αὐτῷ προελθόντι τῶν θυρῶν* + accounts of last-minute efforts to warn Caesar); though in this case P. is following more than one source (*ἔνιοι δὲ φασιν, Caes.* 65.4, of the version Appian reports, {though Pelling *ad loc.* suggests that a single shared source may have given both versions}), and gives very much more detail than Appian, the lay-out of the narrative is identical; (iii) there is again a parallelism of overall structure. Appian' *φερομένου δὲ ἤδη τοῦ Καίσαρος* (2.116.485) comes immediately after his description of the conspirators' consternation at the encouraging words of Popillius Laenas; in P. the two events are separated by the Porcia story, but this looks very much like an insertion from another source: it is introduced by *ἐν τούτῳ δέ* and its dramatic domestic character suggests Bibulus' *ἀπομνημονεύματα*. After *φερομένου δὲ ἤδη τοῦ Καίσαρος* Appian has the accounts of the various last-minute efforts to warn Caesar, and then the continuation of the Popillius Laenas story (2.116.487, quoted below); the present *Brutus* passage has nothing about the warning attempts (which are hardly relevant to a *Life* of Brutus: *Caes.* 64.6–65.4 is naturally a different matter), but does follow up with the continuation of the Popillius Laenas story. To sum up, the parallels between P. and Appian once again are so close that they can only be explained in terms of a common source (for Appian clearly is not following P.), though P. is here skilfully conflating his material to suit the needs of the biographical form. |

ἐγνώκει ... ἀσθένειαν: both P. in the *Caesar* and Appian state that before the intervention of D. Brutus Caesar intended to put off the senate by sending Antony, and here again they seem to be following a common source (*Caes.* 63.12 closely parallels Appian 2.115.481). Suet. *Caes.* 81.4 is less precise ('*diu cunctatus an se contineret et quae apud senatum proposuerat agere differret, tandem Decimo Bruto adhortante ... progressus est*'), but his account is brief. Later, however, Caesar decided to put off the senate himself according to Appian 2.115.481 (quoted above), and this is plainly the version P. is following here. *Caes.* 64 is less explicit: after ἢ τίνα τῶν φίλων ἀνέξεσθαι διδασκόντων ὡς οὐχὶ δουλεία ταῦτα καὶ τυραννίς ἐστίν; ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ πάντως, ἔφη, τὴν ἡμέραν ἀφοσιώσασθαι, βέλτιον αὐτὸν παρελθόντα καὶ προσαγορεύσαντα τὴν βουλὴν ὑπερθέσθαι (*Caes.* 64.5) Decimus simply leads Caesar by the hand, and it is left unclear exactly what Caesar's intentions were. In Nicolaus 24.86–87 Caesar yields to persistent entreaties from his friends to put off the senate because of the soothsayers' predictions, looks towards them enquiringly when told that the senate is full, and is led off like a lamb to the slaughter by D. Brutus (intervening for the second time)—*ομοῦ τῆς δεξιᾶς λαβόμενος ἤγεν αὐτόν· ὁ δὲ εἶπετο σιωπῇ*. Again, it is unclear whether Caesar went to the senate just to put it off or to hold a proper session: this and the apparent verbal parallelism (cf. *Caes.* 64.6 *ταῦθ' ἅμα λέγων ὁ Βρούτος ἤγε τῆς χειρὸς λαβόμενος*) suggest that in the *Caesar* passage P. is also using Nicolaus. (Suet. *loc. cit.* also leaves Caesar's intentions unclear, but no source deductions can be made from this, as Suetonius' account is very brief, and bears no obvious verbal resemblances to anyone else's. Dio 44.18.2–3 is also too brief to do much with.)

ἐπὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀθυμῶν: this is in line with *Caes.* 63.11, where P. cautiously surmises that *εἶχε δέ τις ὡς ἔοικε κάκεῖνον | ὑποψία καὶ φόβος* as a result of Calpurnia's ominous dream (alleged), but very much at variance with the general view of the sources, who stress Caesar's total cynicism in such matters (e.g. Suet. *Caes.* 77; Appian 2.116.488; Cic. *De div.* 1.119, 2.37; Pliny *NH* 11.186). But P. misses no opportunity of piling up the sense of foreboding. Shamelessly credulous also (and without the aesthetic justification) are Weinstock 27f.; Horsfall 198.

τῶν μειζόνων: this would include, according to the anti-Caesar tradition, the alleged proposal that Caesar should be made king, at least outside Italy (*Caes.* 64.3, cf. *Brut.* 10.3n.), and certainly the attempt to resolve Antony's obstructions to Dolabella's consulship (10.3n.).

ὑπερβάλλεσθαι: *pace* Ziegler and most editors, the aorist is better. Voegelin comments, with his customary acuteness: 'mihi hic quoque aoristo sua vis inesse videtur rei semel transactae: τὸ ἐπικυροῦν autem eo ipso quod in tempus incertum differebatur, deque rebus non iam definitis dicitur, latiore praesentis notione distingui. Accuratiorem esse in his temporibus distinguendis Plutarchum iam ad c. 8 extr. dixi' (cf. 8.7n.)

‘videturque in elegantius eius fuisse in coniunctis verbis variare, simulac notio id permitteret’. One notes that the aorist also goes better with σκηψάμενος.

σκηψάμενος: ‘quod ut esset probabilius ἐν φορείῳ ἐκομίζετο’ (Schaefer).

ἀσθένειαν: on Caesar’s probably genuine ἀσθένεια on the Ides see 15.1n. It is also mentioned by Nicolaus 23.85 and Suet. *Caes.* 81.4, whose authority might have been Livy (whom P. quotes for Calpurnia’s dream—*Caes.* 63.9), but such a trivial detail cannot of itself be used to argue that ‘P. is following “x” or “y” at this point’.

182 **2–5. ἐκβάντι ... ἔντευξιν**: Appian 2.116.487 describes the | incident as follows—ἄρτι δ’ ἐκβαίνοντι τοῦ φορείου Λαίνας, ὁ τοῖς ἀμφὶ τὸν Κάσσιον πρὸ ὀλίγου συνευξάμενος, ἐντυχὼν διελέγετο ἰδίᾳ μετὰ σπουδῆς. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἢ τε ὄψις αὐτίκα τοῦ γιγνομένου κατέπλησσε καὶ τὸ μῆκος τῆς ἐντεύξεως, καὶ διένευον ἀλλήλοις διακρήσασθαι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πρὸ συλλήψεως· προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου τὸν Λαίναν ὀρώντες οὐ μνηύοντι μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ του δεομένου καὶ λιπαροῦντι εὐκότα, ἀνέφερον, ὡς δ’ ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀσπασάμενον εἶδον, ἀνεθάρρησαν.

The general closeness of this narrative to P.’s, taken in conjunction with its similar placing in the overall narrative structure (16.10.), again supports the theory of a common source behind P. and Appian, and the specific verbal parallels (ἄρτι ... εὐκότα, also perhaps the use of the words σπουδῆ and ἔντευξις) make the inference decisive. P.’s account, much the longer, and more vivid and dramatic, has clearly been ‘written-up’, both for the purpose of increasing the dramatic tension, and for the greater glorification of Brutus. This last point is of course the major difference of content between the two versions: Appian has nothing at all about Brutus’ decisive role in the affair, and even his phraseology ὁ τοῖς ἀμφὶ τὸν Κάσσιον (contrasting with P.’s ὁ ... τοῖς περὶ Βροῦτον) reveals a striking difference of emphasis. It is fair to assume that if the common source contained the expression ‘(Laenas), the man who previously encouraged “x” and his friends’, as presumably it did, it is P., not Appian, who has changed the name of “x” to suit his artistic purpose. What of the whole section from Κασσίου to ἐθάρρηνε? If it is attested by a source other than P. at all, is it from the ‘common source’, or has P. brought it in from elsewhere? If from elsewhere, a biographical source would be likely. Against the hypothesis that P. has inserted it from another source, it could be argued that the story fits its context perfectly, and that the situation appears | to be similar to 14.6–7, where Appian again does not have the extra incident about Brutus (14.7), but where his uncharacteristic οἱ δ’ ἀμφὶ τὸν Βροῦτον could be taken to suggest that his source at that point did concentrate on Brutus, and that therefore he has ‘cut’. But this argument does not convince: (i) the fact that *Brut.* 16.4 fits its context well does not prove that it is integral: it is part of P.’s literary art to weld together disparate elements into a coherent

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and satisfying whole; (ii) the incident of 14.7 could well be an insertion, as (a) the *dictum* is of the kind to suit a multitude of contexts, and (b) it is anyway Brutus-linked; (iii) οἱ δ' ἀμφὶ τὸν Βροῦτον may be explained by the facts of the situation without having recourse to the hypothesis of a biographical source—Brutus was, after all, the senior praetor; (iv) in the present case Appian's ὁ τοῖς ἀμφὶ τὸν Κάσσιον goes against the theory of a source concentrating largely on Brutus at this point. Consequently, if *Brut.* 16.4 was attested anywhere else, it would almost certainly come from a biographical source separate from the 'common source'. *But*, it may well be doubted if it was attested anywhere else at all. It is (I think) fairly clear that P. has simply invented it. It is essentially a story of psychology, specifically of the difference in psychology between Brutus and Cassius, a major theme in the whole *Life*. The only 'facts' that are given are of elusive quality. Nobody could see Cassius and his friends drawing their daggers—they allegedly did so ὑπὸ τὰ ἰμάτια—nor is Brutus' φαιδρὸν πρόσωπον a very substantial historical phenomenon (see n. *ad loc.*). See further 16.4n.

2. προσρῦεις: a striking expression, which helps to emphasize the sycophancy of Popillius (cf. δεομένου σπουδῆν... τὴν δεξίαν καταφιλήσας), a feature of his behaviour latent in Appian (cf. ἄρτι δ' ἐκβαίνοντι ... μετὰ σπουδῆς ... δεομένῳ καὶ λιπαροῦντι) but less emphasized. P. plays it up to | point a contrast (as it appears) with the ἐλευθερία of the conspirators. P. is acutely conscious of the degradation an autocracy requires from all but the autocrat himself (cf. on 7.7). 184

προσρέω always implies eagerness—of Peisistratus' supporters from Athens joining his army (Hdt. 1.62), of a lover approaching his beloved (Parth. 7.1), of self-appointed guides in picture-galleries (Luc. *Am.* 8). It can be used of less than rapid movement—of a slave approaching the table to steal the wine (*Amat.* 760A), or—in a metaphorical sense—of attaching oneself to a philosophical circle (Philostr. *VS* 2.30), but the notion of eagerness is always there. P. catches the sliminess of Laenas' behaviour excellently.

ἐπιτυγχάνειν καὶ κατορθοῦν: it is a small indication of P.'s constant concern for stylistic *variatio* that whereas Appian simply repeats *συνεύχομαι* P. chooses different verbs the second time round, even though there is a *συνεύχομαι* 'pick-up'.

ἐπιτυγχάνειν: sc. ὧν κατὰ νοῦν ἔχουσιν (cf. 15.4).

3. (λεγέσθω ... οὕτως): see on 1.4.

ἀνέπεσόν: cf. D. 19.224, D.H. 5.53.

δι' αὐτῶν: emphatically placed in the sentence, and appropriately to the meaning.

Κάσσιον ... Βροῦτος: an example of Cassius' θυμός in action, in implied and unfavourable contrast with the steadiness (τὸ ἐμβριθές) of Brutus. This

in itself is not a positive argument against the authenticity of the story, but it is *consistent* with P. having invented it.

ὑπὸ τὰ ἱμάτια: cf. 14.4n. (divergences over exactly how the daggers were concealed).

ἐγκατιδῶν ... κατηγοροῦντος: this is clearly closely parallel to Appian's *προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου τὸν Λαίναν ὀρῶντες οὐ μὴνύοντι μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ*
 185 *του δεομένῳ καὶ λιπαροῦντι εἰκότα*, of the reactions of | the conspirators at large, and strongly suggests that P. has simply invented the details about Cassius' and his friends' hot-headed response and Brutus' decisively steady influence, and superimposed them upon the common source.

σπουδήν: the incorrect *σπουδῆ* is explained by inability to construe the text (= 'Brutus, seeing in Laenas' demeanour the eagerness of a man pleading ...'). The adverbial *σπουδῆ* makes no sense, leaving the genitives in the air.

οὐχί: the emphatic use.

φαιδρῶ ... προσώπῳ: it is part of a general's (or any leader's) duty to encourage his subordinates with the appropriate facial expressions (cf. e.g. X. *Anab.* 2.6.11, cited by P. at *Quem. adul. ab amico internosc.* 69A and *Quaest. conviv.* 620E, and *Ages.* 11.2), and in such men cheerfulness against adversity is a quality naturally much canvassed. In P. the description *φαιδρός* or *φαιδρὸν πρόσωπον* is practically a *τόπος* (cf. e.g. *De gen. Socr.* 595D, *Lyc.* 25.6, *Publ.* 2.2, *Cim.* 5.2, *Alex.* 19.7, *Crass.* 16.5, *Otho* 15.4, *Aemil.* 19.3, *Demosth.* 22.1, *Sert.* 20.3). Of course this does not mean that every example of the phenomenon is made up. Nevertheless, P. does sometimes attribute τὸ *φαιδρὸν* to his heroes when he can have no source justification for it. A particularly good example is *Caes.* 67.3, where P. roundly states that the Liberators went up to the Capitol *μάλα φαιδροὶ καὶ θαρραλέοι*, in implicit rejection of the Nicolaan *φεύγουσιν εἰκότες* (25.94). So (I think) also here.

τοῖς περὶ Κάσσιον: a true plural (cf. 16.2 above).

5. καταφιλήσας: on the various types of kiss in antiquity see Kroll in *RE*, Suppl. 5.511ff. Hand-kissing as an acknowledgement of social superiority flourished under the Empire (e.g. Suet. *Tib.* 72, *Calig.* 56, *Domit.* 12, shows that it was a regular form of greeting or farewell to the emperors), though
 186 such | passages as *Od.* 16.16 (Eumaeus kissing Telemachus' head, eyes, and hands in greeting), *Od.* 21.225 (Odysseus kissing Eumaeus' and Melanthius' heads and hands in greeting), *Od.* 22.498ff. (the maids kissing Odysseus' head, shoulders, and hands in greeting), *Od.* 24.398 (Dolius kissing Odysseus' hand in greeting) show that in Greece it was also an authentic folk usage, which—when used as a form of greeting—did not necessarily connote social, or other, superiority on the part of the person whose hands were kissed (cf. *Od.* 21.225; *Il.* 24.478, where Priam kisses Achilles' 'dreadful, man-slaying hands', is quite different: a case of *supplicatio*, not greeting). But these passages are not relevant to the Roman hand-kiss,

whose *προσκύνησις* associations, taken in the light of the evidence of X. *Cyr.* 7.5.32 (of Persian envoys—*ἔπειτα δὲ Κύρου κατεφίλουν καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας*), support Kroll's contention that 'In der römischen *Salutatio* ... der hand-kuss ... stammt anscheinend aus persischer Sitte', even if the emperors were not the first to be so honoured (e.g. Val. Max. reports that 'Scipionis dexteram adprehenderunt—sc. praedones—ac diu osculati'. Presumably these pirates might well have been from the East. Cf. also below). P., moreover, is well aware that in Roman terms the hand-kiss was something special (cf. e.g. *Luc.* 35.4, *Gracchi* 6.3, 11.2, 11.5, and above all *Cat. min.* 12.1, where he notes *καταφιλούντων τὰς χεῖρας, ἃ τῶν αὐτοκρατόρων ὀλίγοις μόλις ἐποίουν οἱ τότε Ῥωμαῖοι*. Put this together with the fact that Appian merely has *ἀσπασάμενον*, and it is clear that P. has deliberately invented *τὴν δεξίαν ... καταφιλήσας* as a vivid detail in order to emphasize Laenas' *κολακεία* by analogy with the imperial practice of his own day. (Nothing, surprisingly, on this topic in Weinstock.)

ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ: since P. and Appian between them contribute practically all that is known about Laenas (there is a chance that he is the man mentioned in *Ad Att.* 12.13 [250].2, 12.14 [251].1 | and 12.7 [244], but even if this is right, it hardly helps), it is impossible to discover what his request was. On the face of it, the fact that he bothered to make it at all suggests that he did not know that Caesar was going to be assassinated, though one would never guess that from P.'s account of his remarks to Brutus and Cassius at 15.4 (in Appian the words attributed to him are a little less positive, and could conceivably refer to something quite innocent, e.g. the petition for the return of the exile mentioned at 17.3). But this sort of inconsistency (as it probably is) is not one to bother P.: he very often aims for the effect of the moment (e.g. 8.5/9.1; 13.3–11/15.5–9), and at 15.4 he is determined to build up the tension, no matter if there is a consequent loss of realism.

ἐποιεῖτο: Sintenis' precise pluperfect is unnecessary and actually inferior; here, as often, the imperfect is the most vivid tense, for it helps to create a pictorial 'freeze' in the action.

Ch. 17: Assassination of Caesar

A very important section—the climax and the resolution of the tension that has steadily accumulated since *ch.* 8.

The most important sources besides the present passage are: *Caesar* 66; Appian 2.117.49ff.; Dio 44.19; Nicolaus 24.88–90; Suetonius *Caes.* 82 (Zonaras 10.11 contains a very close, though slightly abbreviated, paraphrase of *Caes.* 66). {For modern accounts and discussion see G. Woolf, *Et tu Brute?* (2007) and T. P. Wiseman, *Remembering the Roman People* (2009), 211–15; further bibl. in Pelling’s comm. on *Caes.* 66.} The *Caesar* account is the most exciting and dramatic of all, but the *Brutus* comes a good second.

The two P. versions require careful comparison, the similarities being many and obvious: (i) the sequence of the narratives is practically the same: Cassius prays to the statue of Pompey (*Brut.* 17.2; *Caes.* 66.2–3); Antony is kept outside (*Brut.* 17.2; *Caes.* 66.4); the conspirators surround Caesar’s chair and join in Tillius Cimber’s | petition (*Brut.* 17.4; *Caes.* 66.5–6); Tillius gives the signal for the attack (*Brut.* 17.4; *Caes.* 66.6); Casca is the first to strike (*Brut.* 17.5; *Caes.* 66.7); both Caesar and Casca speak (*Brut.* 17.5; *Caes.* 66.8); Caesar gives up when he sees Brutus drawing his dagger (*Brut.* 17.6; *Caes.* 66.12). *Brut.* 17.7 also parallels *Caes.* 66.11: both emphasize the fact that all the conspirators took part in the assassination; (ii) there are various close verbal parallels, which will be pointed out in the detailed commentary as and when they arise.

The *Caesar* passage is much longer than the *Brutus*. This is partly because the narrative is fuller and richer, as befits the culmination of a *Life* of Caesar, but also because it contains a few elements not in the *Brutus*: (i) *Caes.* 66.1 considers and accepts the proposition that the assassination was the work of some δαίμων, emphasizing the fact that it was in Pompey’s *curia*, containing Pompey’s statue, that the deed was done; (ii) *Caes.* 66.9 describes the reactions of the senators not in the conspiracy; (iii) *Caes.* 66.12 states that Caesar fell at the foot of Pompey’s statue; (iv) *Caes.* 66.14 gives the number of wounds Caesar received. All these extras are readily explained: (i) contains an element P. has used already in the *Brutus* at 14.2–3, and is anyway implicit in *Brut.* 17; (ii) is a natural piece of description, appropriate to the fuller account of the *Caesar*, but not particularly relevant to the *Brutus*, where the focus is mainly on the assassins; (iii) is a detail which is hardly required in the *Brutus*, especially as it is related to (i); (iv) is a mere detail, redundant in the *Brutus*. None, therefore, help in trying to answer the question: which of the accounts was written first? That can only be decided (if at all) by detailed comparison of the verbal parallels set out below and of the slight differences of order and emphasis thus revealed.

1. προεισελθούσης: i.e. before Caesar. |

189 οἱ μὲν ... αὐτῷ: cf. *Caes.* 66.5 τῶν δὲ περὶ Βρούτον οἱ μὲν ἐξόπισθεν τὸν

δίφρον αὐτοῦ περιέστησαν, Appian 2.117.490 Καίσαρα δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου προκαθίσαντα περιέστησαν, Nicolaus 24.88 οἱ δὲ μέλλοντες ἐγχειρήσειν περὶ αὐτὸν ἦσαν, Suet. *Caes.* 82 'assidentem conspirati specie officii circumsteterunt', and Dio's οἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι τὸν Καίσαρα ἐν τούτῳ ἀθροοὶ περιστάντες.

The wording of the *Caesar* is closely parallel, but there are slight differences of detail in the description of the behaviour of the conspirators: in the *Brutus* all the conspirators (Trebonius excepted) surround Caesar's chair before he enters the senate and then pile round him once he is seated; in the *Caesar* some surround Caesar's chair as he is actually entering the senate, but others go to meet him and plead for Tillius Cimber's brother while walking with Caesar towards the chair (*Caes.* 66.5–6). The difference in the timing—exactly when the conspirators surround the chair—is, by Plutarchean standards of chronology, quite trifling, and is simply to be explained by the way P. has organized his material in *Brut.* 17.1–3, dealing first with the conspirators in general, then Cassius and Trebonius, then Caesar. The failure in the *Brutus* to divide the conspirators into two groups—those who surround the chair at once and those who go to meet Caesar and follow him to the chair—might suggest conflation in the interests of brevity, but it might equally be that *Caes.* 66.5–6 shows P.'s vivid historical imagination at work: no other source has this sort of detail. Cf. also 17.3n., which suggests that it is P.'s intention in the *Caesar* to show the conspirators exerting psychological pressure on Caesar in a way that is not explicit in any other source's account of the assassination. Of course this is also true of the *Brutus*, but *Caes.* 66.5–6 could fulfill the same artistic function as the equally unparalleled *Brut.* 17.3–end (ἀπτόμενοί τε χειρῶν), and *both* could be made up for the purpose. The fact that P. clearly had access to detailed | accounts from which he drew information not always preserved in other extant accounts (e.g. 17.2 below) naturally means that it is often impossible to be categorical in hypothesizing original touches, though there are cases, as here, where they seem extremely likely. At any rate, there is in evidence plenty of Plutarchean ἐνάργεια (Wardman 10 thinks that P. was not much concerned with this effect: he is hardly right).

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Nicolaus' wording is too vague to allow any worthwhile source deductions. Appian, Suetonius, and Dio all refer to a surrounding of the chair when Caesar is actually seated (see on 17.3).

2. καὶ Κάσσιον ... αἰσθανόμενον: the *Caesar* account is much longer, and is used to substantiate the view that ὁ ... χώρος ... παντάπασιν ἀπέφαινε δαίμονός τινος ὑφηγουμένου καὶ καλοῦντος ἐκεῖ τὴν πράξιν ἔργον γεγόνεναι (*Caes.* 66.1), which is why the incident is taken out of chronological sequence. In the *Brutus* it is mentioned mostly because P. is dealing with the chief actors in the drama one by one (οἱ ἄλλοι, Κάσσιον, Τρεβόνιος, Καίσαρι, Τίλλιον Κίμβρον), though he may also be hinting at the 'divine

retribution' theme. Though in both cases P. affects to maintain a scholarly caution about the veracity of the tale (λέγεται, *Brut.* 17.2; ὡς ἔοικεν, *Caes.* 66.3), he slides into acceptance of it in the *Caesar*: he can hardly use it as evidence for his belief in divine interference if he does not, and he does attempt to justify it psychologically. No other source reports this incident but P. obviously got it from a detailed account of the assassination, perhaps one favourable to the Liberators. Cassius' action could be interpreted as a propaganda move (see on 14.2–3), and may therefore be historical. P.'s somewhat desperate explanation of Cassius' motivation in the *Caesar* shows him characteristically preoccupied with the philosophical bent of his characters, though he was aware of the practical possibility that the location of the assassination | could be used to the conspirators' advantage (see on 14.2).

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εἰκόνα: so also at 14.2, but ἀνδριάς in *Caes.* I doubt if this is significant. In so far as there is a difference between the two words, εἰκών might appear more appropriate to the theme of divine retribution, since (a) by its very meaning it better conjures up the idea of a sentient Pompey present at the scene, and (b) it can more readily be used of gods. But if P. were intending this, one would have expected him to use εἰκών in *Caesar*.

ὥσπερ αἰσθανόμενον: this draws attention (briefly) to the fact that Cassius' action, for Cassius, was *surprising*, and it was of course an un-Epicurean act, as P. notes in the *Caesar*, hence his psychological explanation. No explanation is given in the *Brutus*, partly because P. does not commit himself so heavily to the veracity of the story, but mostly because in the briefer account of the *Brutus* involved explanations would be out of place (and perhaps also because P. is deliberately keeping back mention of Cassius' Epicureanism till a more propitious moment: 37.2 below).

αἰσθανόμενον: sc. Πομπηΐον. This seems all right, though one might suggest αἰσθανομένου or αἰσθανομένην.

Τρεβώνιος ... κατέσχε: the incident is also recorded by Appian 2.117.490 and 3.26.101 (more vaguely at 3.15.52) and Dio 44.19.1, but not by Nicolaus or Suetonius. Neither Appian nor Dio have very obvious verbal parallels with P., nor with each other (both use the verb ἀποδιατρίβειν, but that is hardly significant).

Τρεβώνιος: *RE* 6A.2274 (Münzer). That it was Trebonius who kept Antony outside is confirmed by Cic. *Phil.* 2.14.34 and 13.10.22 and *Ad Fam.* 10.28 [364].1 (to Trebonius).

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Caes. 66.4 runs: Ἀντώνιον μὲν οὖν, πιστὸν ὄντα Καίσαρι καὶ ῥωμαλέον, ἔξω παρακατεῖχε Βρούτος Ἀλβίνος, The statement that it was D. Brutus who took charge of the job of occupying Antony is certainly wrong, both in the light of the | Ciceronian evidence and of Nicolaus 24.89 Δέκμος ... Βρούτος ὑπὸ ταῖς λαγόσι ... παίει. Nicolaus' evidence has to be given weight here, for he seems uncommonly well-informed about the

anatomical details of the wounds dealt. (It is thus impossible to argue à la Rice Holmes 343 that ‘Trebonius, Decimus, and a few other conspirators remained outside, detaining Antony in conversation’.) *Ant.* 13.4 is also different from *Brutus*: φοβούμενοι δὲ τὴν τε ρώμην τοῦ Ἀντωνίου καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀξίωμα, τάπτουσιν ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἐνίους τῶν ἐκ τῆς συνωμοσίας, ὅπως ὅταν εἰσὶν Καῖσαρ εἰς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ μέλλῃ δράσθαι τὸ ἔργον, ἕξω διαλεγόμενοι τι καὶ σπουδάζοντες κατέχουσιν αὐτόν.

Why ἐνίους? It is hardly a vague imprecision like Appian’s τῶν φονέων σε περισπασάντων περὶ θύρας at 3.15.52, nor can it be explained by the desire to avoid bringing another *persona* upon the stage in order to concentrate solely on Antony: at *Ant.* 13.2 P. has just told of Trebonius’ (alleged) sounding of Antony at Narbo and, as this was sometimes (below) given as the reason for Antony’s preservation, mention of Trebonius at 13.4 would be natural—if P. was sure that it was Trebonius who detained Antony. One might suggest one of two reasons for the vagueness of ἐνίους (both dependent on the fact that the *Antony* is a late *Life*, certainly later than the *Brutus* and *Caesar*): P. wanted to ‘fudge’ the issue either (i) because he was genuinely unsure who did detain Antony, or (ii) because he was trying to gloss over the fact that he had made a simple error in the *Caesar*.

The reference to D. Brutus in the *Caesar* is discussed by Pelling in his ‘Plutarch’s Method of work in the Roman *Lives*’ (= *Plutarch and History* 7; cf. his comms. on *Ant.* 13.4 and *Caes.* 66.4}. He considers the possibility that it can be explained by literary considerations: as a deliberate distortion of a known truth, because Decimus has already been prominent in the *Caesar*, and to avoid introducing Trebonius who has not been mentioned hitherto; but he is inclined to see it as a simple error, perhaps a lapse of memory | arising from P.’s not having the source open in front of him. He does not consider explicitly the possibility that P. found the reference to D. Brutus in a source. Is there anything to be said for this possibility? If it were correct, *Ant.* 13.4 could be explained as genuine perplexity as to the truth. There could be reasons why a source should have mistakenly (or possibly, designedly) named D. Brutus as the man who kept Antony outside the senate: the desire to depreciate the role of Decimus in the success of the conspiracy (see on 12.5)—the knowledge (or presumed knowledge) that Decimus did not go up to the Capitol with the rest of the conspirators (it is unclear whether he did or not: this partly depends on the dating of the famous letter *Ad Fam.* 11.1 [325]). But the difficulty with the hypothesis is that such a source would presumably have been pro-Brutus and Cassius at the expense of Decimus, and in that case P. ought to be using it in the *Brutus* rather than the *Caesar*. Certainty is not possible in a discussion of this kind, but on the whole I think Pelling is right to see *Caesar* 66.4 as a simple error and *Ant.* 13.4 as a consequent cover-up.

περὶ τὰς θύρας: this detail also in Appian 2.117.491 (πρὸ θυρῶν), 3.15.52 (περὶ θύρας) and 3.26.101 (περὶ θύρας). There are some verbal parallels

between P. here and Appian. The *Caesar* and *Antony* accounts simply have ἔξω. Dio has ἔξω που with deliberate imprecision. Cf. 17.3n.

κατέσχε: P. does not explain exactly *why* Trebonius did this, because his whole account here is relatively brief and allusive. But the question throws some light on the qualities of P.'s thought processes. The simple explanations given at *Caes.* 66.4 πιστόν ὄντα Καίσαρι καὶ ῥωμαλέον and *Ant.* 13.4 φοβούμενοι δὲ τὴν τε ῥώμην τοῦ Ἀντωνίου καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀξίωμα, |
 194 with the implication that because of these attributes Antony might try to stop the assassination, are all right as far as they go: despite vicissitudes in his relations with Caesar (8.2n.) Antony certainly qualified as an *amicus Caesaris*, he was a strong man physically (8.2n.), and his consulship was of course a real political asset. But P. fails to make the obvious additional point that once it had been decided to spare Antony he *could not* be allowed into the senate: if he was, and if he tried to stop the assassination, he might (have to) be killed anyway. Dio 44.19.1–2 and Appian 3.15.52 realize this. Naturally the point was not lost on Cicero (*Phil.* 13.22, *Ad Fam.* 10.28 [364].1), though he also attempted to argue that Antony was spared because of complicity in the plot (*Phil.* 2.34, cf. *Ant.* 13.2; this ramification is highly implausible: [i] the account of *Phil.* 2.34 makes Antony—absurdly—an actual partner in the plot, whereas *Ant.* 13.2 is much more circumspect; [ii] the whole story of the ‘Narbo plot’ is suspect anyway. Cf. 8.2n.).

3. Καίσαρι ... ὑπεξανέστη: closely parallel is *Caes.* 66.5 εἰσιόντος δὲ Καίσαρος ἢ βουλή ... ὑπεξανέστη θεραπεύουσα, though the rest of the sentence deals with the movements of the conspirators, already dealt with in the *Brutus*. The similarity of Nicolaus 24.88 εἰσιόντα δὲ αὐτὸν ὡς εἶδεν ἢ σύγκλητος ὑπανέστη εἰς τιμῆς ἀξίωσιν, which continues οἱ δὲ μέλλοντες ἐγχειρήσειν περὶ αὐτὸν ἦσαν. πρῶτος δὲ πάντων ἐπ’ αὐτὸν καθίετο Τύλλιος Κίμβρος, ᾧ ἔφευγεν ἀδελφὸς ἐληλαμένος ὑπὸ Καίσαρος, roughly along the lines of *Brut.* 17.3, is hardly accidental. Appian does not mention the rising of the senate at Caesar’s entrance, though his narrative has broad resemblances to P.’s at this point (below). The same applies to Dio and Suetonius.

καθεζόμενον ... ἀθρόοι: vaguely parallel is Appian’s Καίσαρα δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου προκαθίσαντα περιέστησαν οἷα φίλοι σὺν λεληθόσι ξιφιδίοις. His narrative has broad affinities with P. (detention of Antony by | Trebonius, the others surrounding Caesar in his chair, the individual contribution of Tillius Cimber). Suetonius’ ‘assidentem conspirati specie officii’, followed by ‘ilicoque Cimber Tillius’, is also suggestively similar to P. Dio’s οἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι τὸν Καίσαρα ἐν τούτῳ ἀθρόοι περιστάντες is also tantalizingly close. The fact that no other source describes the conspirators as either having surrounded the chair before Caesar entered (*Brutus*), or as having divided into two groups, some surrounding the chair and others going to meet him supporting Cimber’s plea while he was entering the senate (*Caesar*), rather

suggests that P. is embellishing a plain source statement ‘when Caesar sat down, the conspirators surrounded his chair’.

εὐθύς: not just Plutarchean dramatics—cf. Suetonius’ ‘ilicoque’. Dio’s view is markedly different (below).

Τίλλιον Κίμβρον: *RE* 6A.1038 (Münzer). Appian, Nicolaus, and Suetonius also say that Cimber made the first move and imply that there was no delay between Caesar’s sitting-down and the start of hostile operations. Apparently out on a limb is Dio 44.19.3–4 οἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι τὸν Καίσαρα ἐν τούτῳ ἀθροοὶ περιστάντες (εὐπρόσόδός τε γὰρ καὶ φιλοπροσήγορος ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἦν) οἱ μὲν ἐμυθολόγουν, οἱ δὲ ἰκέτευον δῆθεν αὐτόν, ὅπως ἤκιστα τι ὑποπτέυσῃ. ἐπεὶ τε ὁ καιρὸς ἐλάμβανε, προσῆλθέ τις αὐτῷ ὡς καὶ χάριν τινὰ γιγνώσκων. The digression on Caesar’s approachability is probably Dio’s own contribution, and so probably is the studied realism of οἱ μὲν ἐμυθολόγουν. The τις must be Cimber, but Dio is deliberately keeping names to a minimum to present an uncluttered narrative. ὡς καὶ χάριν τινὰ γιγνώσκων seems to be both another piece of ‘realism’ and a deliberate vagueness, to avoid giving a detailed account of Cimber’s plea. Thus the differences between Dio and the other accounts are to be explained by literary considerations. In fact there is a | certain structural similarity between Suetonius (82.2 ‘Cimber Tillius, qui primas partes suscepit, quasi aliquid rogaturus propius accessit’, Nicolaus (24.88 πρώτος δὲ πάντων ... Τύλλιος Κίμβρος ... ἐν προσχῆματι ... τοῦ ἀντιβολεῖν ... προσελθῶν) and Dio (44.19.4 προσῆλθέ τις αὐτῷ ὡς καὶ χάριν τινὰ γιγνώσκων) as well as a verbal resemblance between οἱ δὲ ... περιστάντες and P.’s *Brutus* account (above).

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The *Caesar* here is obviously different: P. having made some of the conspirators begin their suit before Caesar sits down now has to adjust accordingly (66.6 ὡς δὲ καθίσας διεκρούετο τὰς δεήσεις ...).

προβάλλοντες: the present gives better sense—the conspirators surround Caesar in a body in one decisive movement (περιέσχον), pushing forward Cimber as they do so. By the use of the participle P. subordinates the role of Cimber (given some prominence in Suetonius and Nicolaus), keeping ἐκεῖνοι as the subject, and thus emphasizing the idea of a concerted ‘crowding’ of Caesar by the whole group.

Τίλλιον ... πάντες: the *Caesar* wording is similar, but, given the identity of theme, not strikingly so.

ἀδελφοῦ: *RE* 6A.1038 (Münzer). {Cf. M. Toher, *CQ* 55 (2005), 183–9.}

δεόμενον: *Caesar*, Appian and Nicolaus also specify Cimber’s request, Dio is vague (and inaccurate), Suetonius is vague (but less inaccurate).

συνεδέοντο πάντες: also *Caesar* 66.5. The only other source to mention supplication by the conspirators as a body is Dio.

ἀπτόμενοί ... καταφιλοῦν<τες>: this serves the same artistic purpose as *Caes.* 66.5 οἱ δ’ ἀπήντησαν ὡς δὴ Τιλλίῳ Κίμβρῳ περὶ ἀδελφοῦ φυγάδος ἐντυγχάνοντι συνεδησόμενοι, καὶ συνεδέοντο | μέχρι τοῦ δίφρου παρα-

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κολουθοῦντες—that of emphasizing the (feigned) intensity of the supplication. This picture of what is apparently meant to be ritual (Greek) *ἰκετεία* has no *real* parallel in other sources and is strictly out of place in the description of the behaviour adopted by proud Roman senators to Caesar: there is a good chance that it is P.’s own elaboration. He is working from slight hints in the sources like Nicolaus’ ἐν προσχῆματι ... τοῦ ἀντιβολεῖν ... λιπαρῶς (24.88) and Appian’s ὁ ... Κίμβερ αὐτοῦ τῆς πορφύρας ὡς ἔτι δεόμενος ἐλάβετο ... {F. S. Naiden, *Ancient Supplication* (2006), 247–8 by contrast finds the supplication interpretation more marked in Dio 44.19.3–4, quoted above—note *ἰκέτευον* there—and wonders whether this is a distinctive elaboration of Dio himself.}

ἀπτόμενοί ... χειρῶν: in context this is clearly an action from the ritual of *ἰκετεία*, on which see J. Gould, *JHS* 93 (1973), 74–103 {repr. with an addendum in his *Myth, Ritual, Memory, and Exchange* (2001), 22–77; also Naiden, cited above}. Parallels for hand-touching in a supplication context are not numerous, but cf. *Il.* 24.477ff. (cited at 16.5n.), *Eur. Hec.* 344 (Odysseus hides his hand to prevent it), and in P. *Luc.* 35.4, *Gracchi* 6.3, 11.2, 11.5, *Cat. min.* 12.1 (all cited at 16.5n.).

στέρνα: parallels for this sort of kiss are hard to come by (eroticism excluded). Kroll, art. cit. (16.5n.), says ‘dagegen ist der K. auf die Brust ungewöhnlich and gehört in der Hauptsache erst dem späteren Zeremoniell an: Bittende küssen dem Caesar Haupt und Brust’ (= the present passage), ‘Nero seiner Mutter bei der letzten Begegnung die Brustwarzen (Suet. 34; cf. *Ann.* 14.4)’. But Nero’s kissing of Agrippina, whether serious (Tac.) or ribald-erotic (Suet.), is not an example of court ceremonial, though the breast-kiss did play its part in the court ceremonial of the later Empire (e.g. Procop. *Hist. Arc.* p. 133, reports that in Justinian’s time the breast-kissing of the emperor was granted only to high officials, who got a kiss on the forehead in return). Nor is the conspirators’ action here: it must be part of their *ἰκετεία*. There are no obvious parallels for this type of kiss in supplication ritual (Gould has no examples of breast-kissing, and does not cite *Brut.* 17.3), and the fact may be significant (below).

198 **κεφαλῆν:** examples of head-kissing in *Od.* 16.15, 17.35, | 21.224, 22.499, 23.207, and Eunapius 51 (475, 32 Did.). But all these are either greetings or farewells (Eunapius). Sophocles, *OC* 1130f., where Oedipus says gratefully to Theseus:

καί μοι χέρ’, ὠναξ, δεξιὰν ὄρεξον, ὡς
ψαύσω φιλήσω τ’, εἰ θέμις, τὸ σὸν κάρα,

gives the head-kiss a wider application, but again there seem to be no precise parallels for head-kissing in a supplication context. This is perhaps simply because few suppliants would be in a position physically to kiss the head of the supplicated.

Lack of parallels for either of these two types of kiss should not be made too much of: obviously one may take it as read that the ancients did kiss each other on both areas and that the same kiss would have different connotations on different occasions (eroticism, gratitude, supplication etc.). The point is that the relative dearth of parallels for such kissing in supplication contexts supports the hypothesis that P. has simply made the details up: he wants to paint a picture of *intense* supplication, so he makes the suppliants kiss Caesar in a way which is not technically approved but which suggests the greatest intensity of emotion (breast-kissing, whatever the context, is clearly an intimate form of kiss). The effect is intensely dramatic: the conspirators supplicate Caesar in the most fulsome and protracted manner possible, and it is his attempt to break free from the supplicatory pressure brought to bear on him that triggers the actual attack. The supplication is in a sense as psychologically crucial as the typical supplication scene of a Greek tragedy, and P. in this section of the *Brutus* may well be intending to evoke that resonance (see on 10.1). The effect is also rather ambivalent. In one way Caesar is made to look in the wrong for rejecting the supplication; one may also be meant to reflect on the degradation exacted of its subjects by autocracy. But in another, because the whole business is a sham, there is | created a certain latent sympathy for Caesar. Thus P. hints at his ambivalent attitude to the murder of Caesar—ambivalent not just on political grounds, but on humanitarian grounds as well. (This interpretation may be thought over-elaborate: but I do think that in the *Brutus*, something of a special case—see on 8.5—P. does display acute psychological insight and a political grasp which is little short of profound.)

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καταφιλοῦν<τες>: technically *κατεφίλουν* could be justified as a ‘levis anacoluthia, quales interdum habet Plutarchus’ (Voegelin, cl. 18.11). But Sintenis’ reading gives a good balance between *ἀπτόμενοί... χειρῶν* and *στέρνα καὶ κεφαλὴν καταφιλοῦν<τες>* and a much better flow to the whole sentence, reinforcing the meaning of what is being described.

4. ἀποτριβομένου ... βία: the *Caesar* reflects the same progression (66.6 *ὡς δὲ καθίσας διεκρούετο τὰς δεήσεις καὶ προσκειμένων βιαιότερον ἡγανάκτει πρὸς ἕκαστον*), though without verbal similarities, and with a slightly different situation necessarily envisaged. Appian’s *ἀνατιθεμένου δὲ καὶ ἀντιλέγοντος ὅλως τοῦ Καίσαρος* shows a progression of a rather different kind. Nicolaus has nothing at all about Caesar’s reaction to the plea, nor obviously has Dio (not having a plea at all). Suetonius’ ‘renuente et gestum in aliud tempus differenti’ seems to spring from the same source as Appian. P.’s statement here is presumably tailored to fit his elaborate description: Caesar must actually *refuse* the supplication before the attack begins.

ἐξισταμένου βία: P. is the only source to make Caesar react angrily at this point, though Nicolaus and Suetonius record anger immediately after Cimber's pulling of his toga, which was still technically part of the *ικετεία* (cf. Appian's *τῆς πορφύρας ὡς ἔτι δεόμενος ἐλάβετο*). This suggests that P. is tailoring an element in the tradition to suit the needs of his own narrative: his | version has the conspirators pleading for Cimber's brother an unconscionable length of time, so in the interests of realism he puts Caesar's outbreak of anger back a stage. Cf. also 17.5n. Caesar's attempt to break free, though of course perfectly comprehensible on a realistic level (he wants to escape the fawning pressure exerted by the conspirators), also corresponds to an established part of the *ικετεία*-ritual: the breaking of physical contact when the supplication is rejected (see Gould on this).

Τίλλιος ... ἰμάτιον: this important incident is also mentioned by Appian, Nicolaus, Dio and Suetonius, with interesting variations of detail. Appian says that Cimber seized hold of Caesar's purple robe as though still urging his petition and pulled it away so as to expose the throat, crying 'what are you waiting for, friends?', Nicolaus that he took hold of it and prevented Caesar from getting up or using his hands, Dio that he pulled it from the shoulder, thus giving the prearranged signal, and Suetonius simply that he pulled it from both shoulders. The *Caesar* account (*Caes.* 66.6) reports that Cimber took hold of the toga with both hands and brought it down from the throat, which was the signal for the attack. Thus there are parallels of sorts between Appian and *Caes.* 66.6 (throat exposed); between Dio and Suetonius (from the shoulders); between Dio and *Caes.* 66.6 (drawing the toga down; emphasis on this being the prearranged signal). The *Brutus* account bears some resemblance to the *Caesar* (both hands), and to Dio and Suetonius (drawing the toga down from the shoulders). None of these parallels are very startling. P., Appian, Dio and Suetonius all seem to have elements from a shared source, while Nicolaus is somewhat out on a limb.

ἀμφοτέραις ... χερσίν: P. wants to emphasize the violence of the act, here as in *Caesar*. No-one else says 'with both hands'. |

ἰμάτιον: several different words are used by the sources for Caesar's toga—P. has *ἰμάτιον* here, but *τήβεννον* at *Caes.* 66.6, Appian *πορφύρας*, *εἶμα*, and *ἰμάτιον*, Dio *ἰμάτιον* and Nicolaus *ἀναβολῆς*. No discernible significance attaches to this switching of terms.

A slight historical problem occurs here. Münzer, *RE* 4A.2231, saw a parallel between the signal for attack here (at least as attested by *Caes.* and Dio), and the events of the mysterious alleged conspiracy of 66, when there was supposed to be a plot to murder the consuls of 65 (on this 'plot' see Weinstock 347 and n. 1; add now references from Leach 241f., n. 6 {and J. Ramsey's comm. [2007] on Sall. *Cat.* 18–19 and his Appendix II}). It was alleged by Tanusius Geminus, the elder C. Scribonius Curio (*cos.* 76) and M. Actorius Naso that Caesar was involved, and was even to give the

agreed signal for the attack, which was to let his toga fall from his shoulder (though it is practically certain that the whole story of the conspiracy was a malicious piece of propaganda).

Does this go against the historicity of Cimber's action here? Weinstock 347 argues that it does: 'It is clear that one of the two versions was made up on the model of the other, either by the conspirators of 44, which is not likely, or by later writers. The model must be the sign of 65 (although it was never given) because this particular item comes from Curio who had died in 53 B.C. There is no doubt that facts and fiction were similarly mixed in the other parts of the description of the murder'. If so, the version of 44 would be a sort of 'hoist with his own petard'-motif. But the theory seems extremely thin. Cimber's seizure of the toga is attested in a rudimentary form as early as Nicolaus, emphatically not a pro-tyrannicide authority. And the 'parallel' between the two events is not really striking: if you pull someone's toga the chances are that it will be 'from his shoulders'; similarly, if you let fall your own toga, that will naturally be from your | shoulders. The seizure of the toga would have been an extremely obvious signal to use: both because to take hold of the toga in the first place could be represented as part of the continuing process of *ίκετεία* (as Appian records), and because it fulfilled the simple purpose of baring Caesar's throat. There is thus no case at all for rejecting the fact of Cimber's seizure of the toga; nor need one doubt that it was the conspirators' prearranged signal for attack. That being so, to interpret Dio's and the *Caesar's statement* that it was the signal as being a source 'reply' to the signal which was supposedly to be used by Caesar in 66 seems far too subtle.

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Κάσκας ... βάθος: all sources except Dio give this incident, though Nicolaus first introduces his description of the actual killing with a blanket *ὀργιζομένου δ' ἐπιστρεφῶς ἐκείνου, ἔργου εἶχοντο οἱ ἄνδρες, ταχὺ δὲ πάντες γυμνώσαντες τὰ ἐγχειρίδια, ἐπ' αὐτὸν ὤρμησαν* (24.88). Dio is again vague and brief about the whole business. The *Caesar* version differs slightly from the *Brutus*: *πρῶτος δὲ Κάσκας ξίφει παίει παρὰ τὸν ἀχένα πληγὴν οὐ θανατηφόρον οὐδὲ βαθεῖαν, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰκὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ τολμήματος μεγάλου παραχθείς*. The discrepancy between *παρὰ τὸν ὤμον* and *παρὰ τὸν ἀχένα* is trifling {but Pelling on *Caes.* 57.8, 60.6, and 66.6 attributes some symbolic importance to the choice of language in *Caes.*}, the psychological aside *ἀλλ' ὡς εἰκὸς ...* marks one of the differences between the *Brutus* and *Caesar*—the *Brutus* largely matter-of-fact, the *Caesar* much more an attempt to 'empathize' with the actors in the drama (Casca, the horrified reaction of those not in the conspiracy, the 'Caesar-eye' view)—and the fact that Casca was standing behind Caesar is implied in the following *τὸν Καίσαρα μεταστραφέντα*. Appian also records that Casca was the first to strike, that he was behind Caesar, and | that his aim misfired (the statement that he hit Caesar's *στηθος* could just be an inaccuracy, not indicating divergence from the main tradition). Nicolaus says that Casca was the first, that he

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aimed for the neck, and that in the confusion his aim misfired (24.89). He is idiosyncratically precise in his anatomical detail, but his version clearly shares elements both with P. (the *Caesar* in particular) and Appian. Suetonius' brief and precise 'alter e Cascis aversum vulnerat paulum infra iugulum' seems to be in the same tradition.

γάρ: a blow from behind could not be seen coming.

ξίφος: so also at 17.6, 17.7, 18.7, *Caes.* 66.7, 66.10, 66.12, and 67.3, though the same weapons are described as *ἐγχειρίδια* at 14.4, 16.4, and *Caes.* 66.7. In his account Appian uses *ξίφος* and *ξιφίδιον* indifferently, while Nicolaus uses both *ἐγχειρίδιον* and *ξίφος*. From this it appears that, though there is every difference between a 'sword' and a 'dagger' (as *ξίφος* and *ξιφίδιον*/*ἐγχειρίδιον* are usually translated), *ξίφος* can in fact be used quite vaguely, and often no distinction is felt between the two terms. (This is common in P.: cf. *Timol.* 16.6–7; *Ant.* 78.1; *Gracchi* 36.2/37.6; *Alex.* 16.8/16.11, 20.9, *Eum.* 7.5/7.7, *Cat. min.* 68.3 etc.) At the same time, one seems usually to conceal an *ἐγχειρίδιον* and to brandish a *ξίφος*: there is thus a difference of tone, but not of meaning.

οὐκ εἰς βάθος: Benseler's transposition, accepted by Ziegler, is made to avoid hiatus (see on 4.6). Cherniss, Loeb *Moralia* XII, 28, n. a, however, points out that in the *De Facie* 'final *ει* ... before an initial vowel may always be possible'. But there is something to be said for the transposition on grounds of sense: *οὐκ εἰς βάθος* at the end of the sentence would be emphatic, explaining how it was that Caesar was able to make a counter-attack. Benseler may be right. |

- 204 **5. ἀντιλαμβανομένου ... βοηθεῖν:** close but more pointedly dramatic is the *Caesar* version—66.7–8 ὥστε καὶ τὸν Καίσαρα μεταστραφέντα τοῦ ἐγχειριδίου λαβέσθαι καὶ κατασχεῖν. ἅμα δέ πως ἐξεφώνησαν, ὁ μὲν πλληγείς Ῥωμαῖστί· “μιαρώτατε Κάσκα, τί ποιεῖς;” ὁ δὲ πλήξας Ἑλληνιστί πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν· “ἀδελφέ, βοήθει.” Appian's account reveals some differences of detail: ὁ Καῖσαρ τό τε ἰμάτιον ἀπὸ τοῦ Κίμβερος ἐπισπάσας (not in P.) καὶ τῆς χειρὸς (on this slight difference see 17.6n.) τοῦ Κάσκα λαβόμενος καὶ καταδραμὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ θρόνου (not in P.) καὶ ἐπιστραφεὶς τὸν Κάσκαν εἴλκυσε σὺν βία πολλῇ (not in P.), and has nothing about Caesar's or Casca's cries. The report that Caesar got up out of his chair corresponds roughly with 17.4 ἐξισταμένου βία, but otherwise the differences are great enough to postulate difference of source. Dio's account runs (44.19.5): ὥσθ' ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶν μῆτ' εἰπεῖν μῆτε πρᾶξαι τι τὸν Καίσαρα δυνηθῆναι, ἀλλὰ συγκαλυψάμενον σφαγῆναι πολλοῖς τραύμασι. ταῦτα μὲν τᾶλθηθέστατα· ἤδη δέ τινες καὶ ἐκέينو εἶπον, ὅτι πρὸς τὸν Βρούτον ἰσχυρῶς πατάξαντα ἔφη “καὶ σύ, τέκνον;” μῆτ' εἰπεῖν does cohere with one tradition, but μῆτε πρᾶξαι τι seems to be a merely conventional element (see 17.6 n.), for Suet. 82.2–3 does credit Caesar with some activity and the parallels between Dio and Suetonius at this point are very striking (82.2–3 'utque animadvertit

undique se strictis pugionibus peti, toga caput obvolvitur ... atque ita tribus et viginti plagis confessus est uno modo ad primum ictum gemitu sine voce edito, etsi tradiderunt quidam Marco Bruto irruenti dixisse: “καὶ σύ, τέκνον”). Nicolaus, though brief, seems to bear some relation both to P. (Casca’s call to this brother in Greek) and Appian (Caesar’s getting up out of his seat to attack Caesar). Finally, | Suetonius also seems to show an affinity with Appian, though he does not allow Caesar actually out of his seat.

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Ῥωμαῖστί ἀνακραγόντος: I have no comment to make on Benseler’s suggested transposition (again to avoid hiatus). Russell thinks that Ῥωμαῖστί may be a gloss, since as the text stands it violates one of the (so-called) rules of hiatus, and there is in any case a natural presumption that (unless otherwise stated) P.’s Roman characters speak in Latin. But the appearance of Ῥωμαῖστί in *Caesar* also (without hiatus) supports it here, and in the *Caesar* particularly (but also here) there is a sharp rhetorical contrast between Caesar’s words and Casca’s, which is partly dependent on the Ῥωμαῖστί–Ἑλληνιστί antithesis.

Since Suetonius pointedly states that Caesar did not utter a sound after his groan at the first blow (a tradition also reflected in Dio), and since Nicolaus, who does have Casca’s remark in Greek, does not record a cry by Caesar in Latin, it could be argued that P. has simply made this remark up. But that would be a bold invention on P.’s part and Nicolaus’ silence counts for little—he is very brief. Suetonius’ statement does not impress either; it is obviously laudatory, designed to emphasize Caesar’s remarkable dignity in his last moments. *Caes.* 66.12 and Appian 2.117.493 both say that Caesar fought and shouted, and although here they are almost certainly following a common source (below), the statement is intrinsically plausible.

ἀνόσιε: μιανώτατε in *Caesar*.

Ἑλληνιστί: why Greek? A man like Casca would have been effortlessly bilingual; possibly here he was acutely conscious of his Hellenic tyrannicide-*persona*.

ἀδελφόν: *RE* 2A.1788 (Münzer).

ἤδη: the conventional trick for pruning a narrative. The *Caesar* at this point describes first the reactions of the senators | not in the plot (unparalleled elsewhere). Appian, after describing Caesar’s counterattack on Casca, continues οὕτω δ’ ἔχοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ πλευρὸν ἕτερος, ὡς ἐπὶ συστροφῇ τεταμένον, διελαύνει ξιφιδίῳ, and then details the blows delivered by Cassius (face), Brutus (thigh), Bucolianus (back). Dio has nothing. Nicolaus continues ὁ δ’ ὑπακούσας ἐρείδει τὸ ξίφος κατὰ τῆς πλευρᾶς, with slight narrative similarity to Appian, despite the imprecision of Appian’s ἕτερος and his failure to mention Casca’s appeal to his brother in Greek, and then details the various blows dealt by ‘Cassius’, D. Brutus, Cassius Longinus, and Minucius. Since Nicolaus says of ‘Cassius’ μικρὸν δὲ

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Κάσσιος ὑποφθὰς εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον ἐγκαρσίαν αὐτῷ πληγὴν δίδωσι (24.89), and then of Cassius Longinus ἐτέραν ἐπεκδοῦναι πληγὴν σπεύδων, it is clear that there is no contradiction here with Appian. Finally, Suetonius' 'conatus prosilire alio vulnere tardatus est' must refer vaguely to the wound inflicted by Casca's brother, and there is therefore some narrative similarity to both Appian and Nicolaus, though Suetonius differs in keeping Caesar from actually getting up (17.5n.), and also apparently in his location of the wound (82.4 'nec in tot vulneribus, ut Antistius medicus existimabat, letale ullum repertum est, nisi quod secundo loco in pectore acceperat').

παιόμενος ... βουλόμενος: shorter than, but substantially the same as, *Caes.* 66.10—ἐν κύκλῳ περιεχόμενος, καὶ πρὸς ὃ τι τρέψειε τὴν ὄψιν, πληγαῖς ἀπαντῶν καὶ σιδήρῳ φερομένῳ καὶ κατὰ προσώπου καὶ κατ' ὀφθαλμῶν, διελαυνόμενος ὥσπερ θηρίον ἐνειλεῖτο ταῖς πάντων χερσίν ... There is a fairly close relationship with Appian (below). Dio is still irrelevant, Nicolaus has nothing comparable, and Suetonius' 'utque animadvertit se strictis pugionibus peti' reflects a | different context.

ὡς εἶδε ... ταῖς πληγαῖς: in Suetonius and Dio Caesar gives up simply because he sees that the general situation is hopeless. Nicolaus has nothing about Caesar's reactions at this juncture. In the *Caesar* P. reports the tradition that Brutus' intervention was the deciding factor noncommittally: 66.12 λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινῶν, ὡς ἄρα πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπομαχόμενος καὶ διαφέρων δεῦρο κάκεῖ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κεκραγῶς, ὅτε Βροῦτον εἶδεν ἐσπασμένον τὸ ξίφος, ἐφεικύνετο κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς τὸ ἰμάτιον καὶ παρήκεν ἑαυτόν ... In the *Brutus*, where he has been at pains to stress the almost romantic link between Brutus and Caesar, it suits him to accept the tradition without question. Appian's account, despite a lacuna in the text at the critical point, seems very close to *Caesar*: ὥστε τὸν Καίσαρα ἐπὶ μὲν τι σὺν ὀργῇ καὶ βοῇ καθάπερ θηρίον ἐς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐπιστρέφειν, μετὰ δὲ τὴν Βρούτου πληγὴν, ... εἶτε ἀπογινώσκοντα ἤδη, τὸ ἰμάτιον περικαλύψασθαι ... The *Caesar/Brutus/Appian* account must be related to the famous καὶ σύ, τέκνον tradition, recorded but rejected by Suetonius and Dio (above 17.5n.; {cf. Pelling on *Caes.* 66.12, with further bibliography}). Why does P., although recording a version which does stress Brutus' decisive role, not have the even more colourful tradition? He could have recorded it, had he known of it, without committing himself to its historicity, and the story would have been highly germane to several important themes of the *Life* (the personal closeness of Brutus and Caesar, Brutus' great expectations under Caesar's rule, Brutus' triumph over purely personal considerations etc.). The explanation must surely be that he did not know of it. |

ξίφος: Schaefer's <τὸ> is not absolutely necessary (cf. *Caes.* 66.7 Κάσκαξ ξίφει παίει) but it is very plausible (cf. 1.16 above; *Caes.* 66.12—of Brutus).

τὴν χεῖρα: like Appian and Suetonius P. here has Caesar holding Casca's hand/arm, but that does not mean that 17.5 τῆς λαβῆς is from a

different source. The discrepancy is trifling, and Caesar obviously could have held both.

τῷ ἱματίῳ ... ἐγκαλυψάμενος: this is attested also in the *Caesar*, Appian, Dio and Suetonius, but not Nicolaus. Suetonius expands on the theme in detail to stress Caesar's dignity in his final moments (cf. Appian's *πεσεῖν εὐσχημόνως*). P. may be intending to evoke a parallel with the behaviour of Pompey as he is stabbed to death. One wonders if some such parallel was already part of the historical tradition, in view of the great similarity between *Pomp.* 79.5 and the descriptions of the death of Caesar in Suet. 82.2 and Dio 44.19.5.

7. ἀφειδῶς ... πίμπλασθαι ... ἅπαντας: for the general theme that all the conspirators had to take part cf. also *Caes.* 66.10–11, Nicolaus 24.89–90. Appian, Dio and Suetonius do not have it, though in other respects Appian and Nicolaus seem related here (below).

περὶ τὸ σῶμα: Reiske's and Ziegler's suggestions go well with *Caes.* 66.14 *εἰς ἐν ἀπεριεδόμενοι σῶμα πληγὰς τοσαύτας*. But the text is itself quite good: Caesar surrenders his 'body' to the blows; the conspirators keep wounding the '(now dead) body' with their swords. The implicit word play is thoroughly Plutarchean. For the theme that the conspirators continued to attack Caesar's body after it had fallen cf. Nicolaus 24.90 and Appian, whose accounts bear some structural resemblance, though Nicolaus is unique in giving thirty-five wounds. This theme is not explicit in the *Caesar*, which makes the point that so many | wounds were directed at *one* body, but the general flow of the narrative (66.12–end fall of Caesar's body by Pompey's statue; 66.13 *περισπαίροντος ὑπὸ πλήθους τραυμάτων*; 66.14 number of wounds) is similar to Nicolaus and Appian. See further below.

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ἀλλήλους ἐτίτρωσκον: cf. *Caes.* 66.14 *πολλοὶ κατετρώθησαν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων* (there is thus a fuller parallel between *Brut.* 17.7 *πολλοῖς ... ἐτίτρωσκον* and *Caes.* 66.14 *πολλοὶ ... πληγὰς τοσαύτας*); Appian's *πολλοὶ τε διωθιζόμενοι μετὰ τῶν ξιφῶν ἀλλήλους ἔπληξαν* (which follows *τριῶν ἐπὶ εἴκοσι πληγῶν* just as the *Caesar* phrase follows *εἴκοσι γὰρ καὶ τρία λαβεῖν λέγεται*); Nicolaus 24.89 (Cassius gets Brutus' hand; Minucius Rubrius' thigh). Cassius was said to have cried 'vel per me feri' in the heat of the moment (*De vir. ill.* 83.5).

καὶ Βροῦτον: the detail that Brutus' hand was stabbed is in Nicolaus and Appian. Nicolaus says it was Cassius who did it, and Appian perhaps implies this at 2.122.512.

συνεφαπτόμενον: Brutus dealt Caesar a blow on the groin (*Caes.* 66.11), or the thigh (Appian).

After this detailed commentary, what conclusions can be drawn about source relationships? The assassination of Caesar is one of the few occasions on which a line by line comparison of the various sources is possible. But the resultant picture is extremely confused, which is only

natural, considering the character of the event and the plethora of sources that must have been available to any historian who wished to stretch out on a climactic description. Historians of the first century B.C. (Pollio, Livy, Nicolaus, Empylus) could also of course have called upon numerous eye-witnesses. So far as P. goes, the following observations seem safe:

(i) The *Brutus* and *Caesar* accounts are based on exactly the same source material (cf. 17.2n.). |

210 (ii) They were both written directly from this material. The verbal parallels between the two accounts are not so close as to suggest that one was written directly from the other, there are several small differences of detail, and the erroneous mention of D. Brutus in *Caes.* 66.4 implies lapse of memory.

(iii) P. follows a well-established historical source for most of his narrative in both accounts. On the whole he is closest to Appian. The main difference with Appian lies in the material contained in *Brut.* 17.5 and *Caes.* 66.8.

(iv) P. shows some signs of original elaboration of traditional material: perhaps in his description of the precise movements of the conspirators in the *Caesar* (see on 17.1, 17.3); probably in his sustained *ικετέα* description in the *Brutus* (see on 17.1, 17.3, 17.4).

(v) He is using more than one source (cf. *Caes.* 66.12).

(vi) He preserves some material not elsewhere attested: Cassius' invocation of Pompey's statue, Caesar's cry to Casca in Latin, the reaction of the senate at large. The first two of these items, at any rate, suggest supplementation by some intimate source.

(vii) He has missed one major (though historically dubious) tradition: the *καὶ σὺ, τέκνον* story, preserved by Suetonius and Dio. One may think that this indicates lack of systematic consultation of Livy. It is true that only P. in the *Caesar* and Dio state explicitly that Cimber's pulling of the toga was the agreed signal for the attack, but it obviously was in fact the signal, and not too much should be made of this 'parallel' between P. and Dio.

(viii) One gets the feeling (it can hardly be stronger than that) that P. may have glanced at the account of Nicolaus (see on 17.3, 17.7), without, however, being greatly influenced by him. |

Chs. 18–22: Fluctuating Fortunes of the Liberators; Collapse of the Republican Cause in Rome and Italy

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This narrative proceeds (in the main) chronologically. The unifying thematic thread is the struggle for ascendancy between Caesarism and Republicanism.

Ch. 18: Immediate Aftermath of the Assassination

1. Βροῦτος ... σύγκλητον: Brutus' attempt to rally the panic-stricken senate is also recorded in *Caes.* 67.1 and *Cic. Phil.* 2.28 and 30, which confirms that Brutus took the lead and gives details of what he said and did (2.28 “Caesare interfecto”, inquit [sc. Antonius] “statim cruentum alte extollens Brutus pugionem Ciceronem nominatim exclamavit atque ei recuperatam libertatem est gratulatus”; 2.30 “Brutus, quem ego honoris causa nomino, cruentum pugionem tenens Ciceronem exclamavit”). P. seems to have been thoroughly familiar with the *Second Philippic* (see Pelling, ‘Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman *Lives*’ [= *Plutarch and History* 17–18; also comm. on *Antony*, 26–7}), using it in the *Cicero*, *Antony*, and *Caesar*, hence his failure to mention Brutus’ ‘congratulation’ of Cicero here must be deliberate. It is part of the downgrading of Cicero’s role in the Republican resistance to Caesar evident throughout the *Life* (12.2; 22.4–6; 28.2. Note, however, that Cicero is not mentioned in this context in the *Caesar* and *Cicero* either. P. is hardly well informed in general about Cicero’s role in fanning the ashes of Republicanism under Caesar {on which see K. Welch, cited at 12.2n.}). The *Brutus* and *Caesar* accounts are structurally parallel here, but not close verbally.

Other authorities are less informative about Brutus’ attempted speech. Appian 2.119.499 does not single out Brutus. Both Nicolaus and Dio appear to botch their accounts by conflating Brutus’ attempted speech with appeals he and other conspirators made in the forum. (Nicolaus 25.91–94 is a sorry mess. Dio 44.20.4 | has the conspirators continually call upon Cicero in the forum.)

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προελθών: Sintenis’ *παρελθών* is unnecessary. Cf. *Flam.* 10.5 *προελθὼν εἰς μέσον ὁ κήρυξ*. This non-Attic usage is common in P.

ἡ δ’ ... κατεπείγοντες: detailed descriptions of the panic of the senate and others in *Caes.* 67.1, Appian 2.118.494f. (a probably sensationalist account of indiscriminate woundings and killing), Dio 44.20.1–2, and Nicolaus 25.91, 26.95. P.’s *Brutus* account is naturally briefer than the *Caesar*. Suet. 82.3 just has ‘diffugientibus cunctis’.

καὶ περὶ ... τάραχος: this vivid picture of a traffic-jam at the doors (though no doubt historical) has no exact parallel elsewhere and could well be ‘ipsissimus Plutarchus’.

ὄθισμός ... κατεπείγοντες: typical Plutarchean style. (See 2.2n.) One wonders if the use of the much rarer form *τάραχος* reflects Nicolaan influence, though assonance must also be a factor. The point that the senate's flight was unjustified is also hinted in *Caes.* 67.1 *καίπερ ... Βρούτου* and in an indirect way reflects P.'s essential sympathy for the Liberators (and perhaps also his distress at the behaviour of 'homines ad servitutem parati'. He will not have forgotten the fond hopes of 14.1). Nicolaus 25.91, Appian 2.118.494 and Dio 44.20.1 all emphasize that it was fear of further killings that caused their flight: Appian is particularly sanctimonious in this respect.

2–6. ἰσχυρῶς γὰρ ... περιεποίησεν: the conspirators' decision to restrict their killing to Caesar alone is recorded by all the main narrative sources (not Suet.), with revealing variations of detail. Like P., both here and at *Ant.* 13.3 and 14.1, Appian 2.114.478 gives the impression that Antony was the only other prospective candidate, but Dio 44.19.2 cites both Antony and Lepidus, and Nicolaus 25.93 implies that they considered killing anyone | 213 οἱ ἔμελλον σφίσιν ἐναντιώσεσθαι καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτοῖς ἀγωνιεῖσθαι. Nicolaus' account may be dismissed as anti-tyrannicide prejudice. Dio's is more plausible, but still unlikely, both because Lepidus was Brutus' brother-in-law and the link was one Brutus took seriously (cf. *Ad Brut.* 1.15 [23].10f.)—a fact the other conspirators would have known—and because the combined weight of Cicero, P., and Appian is more impressive. In any case, whatever else they may have been, the Liberators were not butchers.

πάντας ... ἀνακαλεῖσθαι: for the various appeals to *libertas* after the assassination see on 18.5 and 7 below.

πάντας: i.e. including political opponents.

3. τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις: Velleius 2.58.2 explicitly states that this was Cassius' view. He is right in stating that Cassius opposed the measures of March 18 (cf. 20.1n.), and almost certainly right here too: Cicero's insistence on the personal responsibility of Brutus (18.4n.) and all that is known of Cassius' more practical character point the same way. Had P. been aware of Cassius' particular prominence, he would surely have said so (cf. 20.1).

μοναρχικὸν ... στρατιωτικόν: a subjective (= what the other conspirators thought) or objective (= P.'s own view) description? The whole sentence from *μοναρχικόν* to *ἀξίωμα* supports the case for killing Antony as well as Caesar, and to that extent represents the alleged view of the other conspirators, while *τότε Καίσαρι συνάρχων* is P.'s gloss on *τὸ τῆς ὑπατείας ἀξίωμα*. But the conspirators' characterization of Antony bears close resemblances to P.'s (below), and he seems here to be characterizing Antony both through the conspirators' eyes and his own, though he is not as damning as they allegedly were: he can also accept the Brutan view, without much inconsistency (below).

μοναρχικόν: whether, whatever else they thought of him, the conspirators really thought the Antony of March 44 a *μοναρχικὸς ἄνθρωπος* is open to doubt (especially if they really did consider asking him to join them, as P. believed: *Ant.* 13.1–2). But this is the Ciceronian bogey-man of summer 44 on. For P.'s acceptance of this view cf. 21.3 below, *Ant.* 15.5, 89.1, *Cic.* 43.1, and his interpretation of the Lupercalia incident (*Ant.* 12, *Caes.* 61). 214

ὑβριστήν: a judgement also accepted by P. Cf. *Ant.* 9.5–9 on Antony's dissolute way of life, and the various references to *ὑβρις* at *Demetr.* 1.8; *Ant.* 20.4, 21.3, 24.11, 90.

ἰσχύν: hardly physical 'strength' (Perrin), rather 'power', as e.g. *Per.* 39.4, *Ant.* 5.2.

ὀμιλία ... στρατιωτικόν: a fact much emphasized by P. in the *Antony* (e.g. 4.4, 6.5, 17.5, 40.8–9, 43.3–6, 68.4–5, 93.2).

σοβαρῶ: P. would agree with this too. Cf. e.g. *Ant.* 2.8, 4.4, 61.1; contrast 62.2.

μεγαλοπράγμωνι: cf. especially *Demetr.* 1.7–8, *Ant.* 3.5. For the dangers of being *μεγαλοπράγμων* cf. *Demetr.* 1.7–8, and below on ambition (18.5n.). In context the implication is pejorative, though P. does not necessarily regard being *μεγαλοπράγμων* as a bad thing: he is just keenly aware of the dangers involved.

τὸ ... ἀξίωμα: by virtue of which, as it turned out, Antony did seize the initiative. P. is right to give this most emphasis.

Other accounts offer rather different explanations for the proposal to kill Antony. At *Ant.* 13.3 the main reason apparently is that Antony (allegedly) rejected Trebonius' (alleged) overtures in the summer of 45 (and was therefore not to be trusted), though the conspirators also feared *τὴν τε ρώμην τοῦ Ἀντωνίου καὶ τὸ ... ἀξίωμα* (cf. the present passage), hence according to P. the decision to keep Antony out of the senate on the Ides. In Appian 2.114.478 the reasons are that he was consul with Caesar and his most powerful friend and the one held in most repute by the troops; in Dio 44.19.2 it is implied that Antony and Lepidus would both present a threat | to the actual carrying out of the assassination; in Nicolaus 25.93 sheer personal ambition on the part of the conspirators is to blame. Appian and P. are clearly derived from a common source, which P. has laced with his own observations. 215

4. ἀλλὰ Βροῦτος: also stated in *Ant.* 13.3, Appian 2.114.478, Nicolaus 25.93, Velleius 2.58.2 (but not by Dio, typically of his generalizing habits), and confirmed *ad nauseam* by Cicero (e.g. *Ad Brut.* 2.5 [5].1, 1.4 [10].2; *Ad Att.* 14.21 [375].3, 14.14 [368].2, 15.4 [381].2, 15.11 [389].2, 15.12 [390].2, 15.20 [397].2).

ἰσχυρίζομενος ... δικαίω: this moral motivation is spelled out more clearly at *Ant.* 13.3 *ἐκώλυσε δὲ Βροῦτος, ἀξίων τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν*

δικαίων τολμωμένην πράξιν εἰλικρινῆ καὶ καθαρὰν ἀδικίας εἶναι. The practical application was that only the tyrant himself should be killed: Vell. 2.58.2 ‘nihil amplius civibus praeter tyranny ... petendum esse sanguinem’ (cf. Appian 2.114.478 and Nicolaus 25.93). A favourable interpretation of Brutus’ motives naturally appeals to P. Both Appian and Dio less sympathetically portray the conspirators as more concerned with the public relations angle (Appian 2.114.478, Dio 44.19.2, cf. Velleius). That Brutus did take a moral line is supported by the picture emerging from Cicero’s letters on the subject (e.g. *Ad Brut.* 2.5 [5].1). P. may have worked this out for himself, from his reading of Brutus’ correspondence, or—perhaps more likely—he found the emphasis already in a particular source (below).

δεύτερον ... μεταβολῆς: no other narrative source gives this motivation. But the analysis of Antony’s character attributed to Brutus here corresponds roughly to that of the historical Brutus, and it looks as if P. is not inventing the idea, but drawing on a detailed and authentic source. It could *conceivably* be Bibulus, in whose interest it would clearly have been to defend Brutus against | the charge of making a mistake in sparing Antony, by emphasizing that in Brutus’ considered opinion Antony, under whom he himself served after Philippi, was basically a man of good parts.

ὑπο<τι>θείς: the aorist is defended by Voegelin on the ground that ‘eo Plutarchus hanc spem nonnisi semel a Bruto indicatam significaverit, quum iustitiam nunquam desineret’. Wrong—cf. ἀπεγίνωσκειν below.

5. οὐ γὰρ ... αὐτῶν: for the attitudes of Antony and Brutus to each other cf. 1.4 (perhaps). 8.5–6 (perhaps). 26.3–7 (perhaps). 29.7, 29.10, 50.2–3, 50.5, 50.8, 53.4, 58.1; *Ant.* 22.7–8 and 89.5; Gelzer 1003f.; Syme, *RR* 98, 106, 203, 206. Both Gelzer and Syme exaggerate the degree of friendship and Syme almost sentimentalizes it, but the general picture is persuasive. Antony seems to have felt sincere respect for Brutus, while Brutus did not by any means consider Antony a hopeless case in moral/political terms (cf. the present passage; 29.10—presumably authentic; *Ad Att.* 14.8 [362].1). Even when war seemed inevitable, Brutus correctly argued that it was Octavian, not Antony, who was the greater danger to the Republic (cf. *Ad Brut.* 1.16–17 [25–6]). Also more or less relevant to the attitude of Brutus and his circle to Antony are the courteous salutations of Favonius and company after Philippi (Suet. *Aug.* 13.2), and the fact that several prominent Pompeians and Catonians later joined Antony (Syme 222, 268–9, 282 etc.). Thus it seems likely that P. is again ‘on to something’ disregarded by the other narrative sources.

εὐφυσῶ ... αὐτῶν: this characterization of Antony is again partly ‘subjective’ (Brutus) and partly ‘objective’ (P.’s). It is being used to substantiate Brutus’ hopes for Antony’s μεταβολή but it is also a characterization with which P. himself to some extent agrees. (See below.)

The apparent inconsistency between 18.3 and 18.5 seems at first sight on a par with the sharp discrepancy between 8.5–6 | and 9.1–4, but this is the wrong way to look at it: the difference between 18.3 and 18.5 is not so much an inconsistency as a difference of emphasis: 18.3 highlights the bad qualities of Antony's character, 18.5 the qualities which could conceivably have led him along the path of virtue. This coheres with P.'s general attitude to Antony, which is mixed. Though the *Life* of Antony is avowedly an example of *κακία* (*Demetr.* 1.5), P. on occasion as good as concedes Antony *ἀρετή* (e.g. *Demetr.* 1.7; *Ant.* 17.4–6). Antony, like Demetrius, undoubtedly has good qualities: the reason for P.'s final condemnation is that he misuses them, and allows them to be overwhelmed by the bad (see further Wardman 34–36 {and Pelling, *Antony* 10–18}). P. is thus able to subscribe to both views of Antony, because (in his opinion) Antony was in fact a mixture of bad and good, and because it was open to Antony with his innate good qualities to attain virtue—as Brutus insisted in his arguments with his fellow conspirators.

εὐφυνά: P. himself nowhere uses such a word explicitly of Antony, so strictly this is more Brutan than Plutarchean, but given P.'s virtual concession of some degree of *ἀρετή* to Antony (above) he might have done.

φιλότιμον: for this aspect of Antony's character see *Ant.* 2.8, 3.8; *Demetr.* 1.7–8. In context, Antony's *φιλοτιμία* and love of glory are clearly felt to be legitimate inducements to virtue. This is normal Plutarchean doctrine (cf. e.g. *Agis–Cleom.* 2.1–2), though the invariable proviso is that ambition has to be regulated and controlled, and always regarded as a means towards a virtuous end and not an end in itself (cf. e.g. *Agis–Cleom.* 2.3; *De capienda ex inimic. util.* 92D; full discussion in Wardman 115–124 {and in works cited at 7.7n.}). Of course the emphasis on love of glory is equally Roman.

ἐπισηπασθέντα ... αὐτῶν: reflecting the basic Plutarchean doctrine of the beneficial effects of good *παραδείγματα* (*Aemil.* 1 etc.). |

6. ἐν δὲ ... ἔφυγεν: Antony's flight is also attested at *Ant.* 14.1, *Caes.* 67.2, Appian 2.118.496 (implicitly), and Dio 44.22.2 (not by Nicolaus). Cicero makes great play with the theme of Antony's alleged cowardice as revealed in the flight (*Phil.* 2.88). All the narrative sources, Nicolaus excepted, exaggerate the extent of Antony's loss of control on the Ides.

Least prejudiced is Appian (*Ἀντωνίος τε τὴν οἰκίαν ὠχύρου, τεκμαιρόμενος συνεπιβουλεύεσθαι*), who at least records that Antony and Lepidus began to work together quickly, and that negotiations between the Liberators and the two Caesarian leaders got under way on the evening of the 15th (confirmed by *Phil.* 2.89; Nicolaus 27.101), though he portrays an excessively fearful Antony (2.124.518), and has nothing about his skilful 'playing' of the conspirators until he had secured his own position (cf. Nicolaus 27.106—indirectly supported by Cicero). P.'s *Brutus* version gives the impression of a terrified Antony fleeing and then doing nothing until

the first meeting of the senate: no negotiations and no mention of the fact that it was Antony who summoned the senate. Of course it might be argued that P. is simply not bothered to record the details of Antony's activities in the *Life* of Brutus, but against this is the fact that depreciation of the part played by Antony in the immediate aftermath of the assassination is clear in the *Antony* and in the tradition at large, so it may be presumed that *Brut.* 18.6 is part of the general pattern. This presumption is strengthened by a comparison of *Ant.* 14.1 with Dio 44.22.2: *Ant.* 14.1, τούτων δὲ πραττομένων ὡς συνετέθη, καὶ πεσόντος ἐν τῇ βουλῇ τοῦ Καίσαρος, εὐθὺς μὲν ὁ Ἀντώνιος ἐσθῆτα θεράποντος μεταλαβὼν ἔκρυψεν αὐτόν. Dio 44.22.2 τούτων δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὄντων, ὁ Λέπιδος ... | ὁ οὖν Ἀντώνιος, καίτοι παραχρῆμα μετὰ τὸν τοῦ Καίσαρος θάνατον φυγῶν καὶ τὴν τε ἐσθῆτα τὴν ἀρχικὴν, ὅπως διαλάθῃ, ῥίψας καὶ τὴν νύκτα κρυφθεῖς ...

Dio's τὴν νύκτα κρυφθεῖς reflects a view of Antony's behaviour similar to P.'s—an Antony totally inactive for the rest of the Ides—and the parallelism of structure in the underlined words, taken together with the mention by both writers of Antony's 'disguise', indicates a common source (Dio is certainly not just following P.). (For *general* discussion of Dio's treatment of Brutus and Cassius from the Ides of March to Philippi see Millar 55ff.).

The *Caesar* version (67.2) is Ἀντώνιος δὲ καὶ Λέπιδος οἱ μάλιστα φίλοι Καίσαρος ὑπεκδύντες εἰς οἰκίας ἐτέρας κατέφυγον. εἰς οἰκίας ἐτέρας must mean 'into other people's houses'. This is possible Greek: cf. *Timol.* 30.9 πρὸς ἐτέρας βοήθειας = 'to the assistance of others', and coheres with ἔκρυψεν ἑαυτήν / κρυφθεῖς, if one can assume that κρύπτω implies 'concealment' (it usually does), rather than just 'lying low'. (Bowie suggests <σφ>ετέρας, to avoid the contradiction with other sources. But one might then expect a definite article, nor, if κρύπτω does imply 'concealment', would one 'conceal oneself' in one's own house.) That Antony fled to/concealed himself in someone else's house is obviously incorrect (how could Lepidus and conspirators alike make contact with a cunningly concealed Antony? Cf. also Cicero's 'te domum recepisti' and Appian 2.118.496). Yet it may form part of a major historical tradition (cf. Dio). The claim, however, that Lepidus also fled into hiding finds no parallel in the other sources (Appian 2.118.496, Dio 44.22.2 and Nicolaus 27.103 all stress his quickness in getting to his troops and rallying them for use against the conspirators), and suggests that at this point P. is using a | source that was rabidly anti-Caesarian, belittling the reactions of both Antony and Lepidus in a completely implausible manner. {Pelling on *Caes.* 67.2 argues that the Greek must mean 'other than the one(s) mentioned or implied already', i.e. other than the ones nearby that the panic-stricken householders had closed (67.1).}

μεταβαλόν: *Ant.* 14.1 has an unchallenged μεταλαβών, which Λ also has here, but both μεταβάλλω and μεταλαμβάνω can be used of changing clothing, so the majority *MSS* reading may stand.

δημοτικήν: it is likely enough that Antony threw away his consular robe in the interests of anonymity, as Dio 44.22.2 says, but the detail μεταβαλόν ἐσθήτα δημοτικήν and still more ἐσθήτα θεράποντος μεταλαβών (*Ant.*) seems designed only to exaggerate the ignominy of Antony's flight. Perhaps they were thought to gain colour from Antony's known propensity for lowly disguises (cf. *Ant.* 10.8 λαβών δὲ θεράποντος ἐσθήτα; 29.2, where Cleopatra joins in Antony's impersonations *θεραπεινιδίου στολήν λαμβάνουσα*). The fact that Cicero simply contents himself with 'clam' goes against the disguise-story: he would surely have availed himself of it had it been true (or even just well-known).

7. οἱ δὲ ... πολίτας: the (first) ascent to the Capitol is also described in *Caes.* 67.3–4, Appian 2.120.503, Dio 44.21.2, Nicolaus 25.94, Zonaras 10.12.

Most of Zonaras is clearly straight Dio 44.20ff., with perhaps a touch of Nicolaus and P. P.'s *Caesar* version runs: 67.3 οἱ δὲ περὶ Βροῦτον, ὥσπερ ἦσαν ἔτι θερμοὶ τῷ φόνῳ, γυμνὰ τὰ ξίφη δεικνύντες ἅμα πάντες ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου συστραφέντες ἐχώρουν εἰς τὸ Καπιτώλιον, οὐ φεύγουσιν ἐοικότες, ἀλλὰ μάλα φαιδροὶ καὶ θαρραλέοι, παρακαλοῦντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ προσδεχόμενοι τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων. This is obviously closely similar to the *Brutus*, both in overall structure (οἱ δὲ περὶ Βροῦτον picks up 67.2 Ἀντώνιος ... Καίσαρος, and here οἱ περὶ Βροῦτον follows the report of Antony's flight), and in verbal detail, though the | *Caesar* is a good bit more 'written-up'. It seems very likely that both passages stem from Nicolaus 25.94 ἐξαίξαντες δὴ τὸν τεύθεν οἱ σφαγεῖς ἔφευγον θέοντες διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς εἰς τὸ Καπιτώλιον, γυμνὰ ἔχοντες τὰ ξίφη, ὑπὲρ κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας ταῦτα βοῶντες εἰργάσθαι ..., especially as P.'s οὐ φεύγουσιν ἐοικότες, ἀλλὰ μάλα φαιδροὶ καὶ θαρραλέοι looks like a crisp rebuttal of Nicolaus' ἔφευγον (cf. on 4.5 above). Nicolaus' account requires no further discussion at this point—one of the difficulties in it has already been discussed (18.1n.). So also Dio.

ἡμαγμένοι ... χείρας: not in any other source. Plutarchean ἐνάργεια?

<τε>: clearly necessary.

γυμνά: this detail in *Caes.*, Nicolaus 25.94, Dio 46.22.4 (Calenus' speech), and Zonaras 10.12. The daggers are bloodied in Appian 2.119.499, Nicolaus 25.91, and Zonaras 10.12 (cf. Cic. *Phil.* 2.28, 2.30), but of course this comes to the same thing. Dio 44.20.3 simply says that the assassins rushed to the forum ὥσπερ εἶχον, which looks like characteristic avoidance of detail, but, taken together with *Caes.* 67.3 ὥσπερ ἦσαν ἔτι θερμοί, may come from a tradition that had this emphasis.

δεικνύντες: also at *Caes.* 67.3. P. is the only source explicitly to make the point that the drawn sword/dagger was a symbol of the restoration of

liberty. Cf. *Phil.* 2.28 and see 1.1n. This reflects his interest in the Liberators as upholders of Hellenic political traditions.

ἐπί ... πολίτας: for the various appeals by the conspirators to *libertas* immediately after the assassination (18.1 apart) see *Caes.* 67.3, Appian 2.119, Dio 44.21.1, Nicolaus 25.92. {For discussion see A. Balbo in C. Steel and H. van der Blom, edd., *Community and Communication* (2012), 322–4, with further bibliography.}

222 Both here and in the *Caesar* P. implies that they made their appeals while *en route* to the Capitol and does not seem to credit | them with a set speech in the forum at this point. Though he is careful to emphasize that they did not ‘flee’, he gives the impression that their progression from the senate-house, though orderly, was steady and uninterrupted. Appian 2.119.499ff. allows them a little more speech, and dilates upon their psychological state, but he also makes their progress rapid, and rules out a full *contio*. Nicolaus 25.92 seems to have something more substantial in mind, but the inconsistency with his own account that the conspirators ‘fled’ and the confusion here with Brutus’ attempted speech in the senate-house make his evidence on this question of doubtful worth. Dio 44.20.4 allows for a considerable passage of time for the conspirators’ appeals to Cicero to mollify the crowd (ὄψέ ... ποτε καὶ μόλις)—but again there seems to be a confusion with the speech attempted by Brutus in the senate-house (18.1n.)—and then credits the assassins with lengthy speeches of self-justification at a full-scale *contio*: 44.21.1 καὶ συνελθόντων αὐτῶν ἐς ἐκκλησίαν πολλὰ μὲν κατὰ τοῦ Καίσαρος πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας οἱ σφαγεῖς εἶπον, θαρσεῖν τέ σφας καὶ μηδὲν δεινὸν προσδέχεσθαι ἐκέλευον· οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ δυναστείᾳ οὔτ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλῃ πλεονεξίᾳ οὐδεμιᾷ ἀπεκτονέσθαι αὐτὸν ἔφασαν, ἀλλ’ ἵν’ ἐλεύθεροί τε καὶ αὐτόνομοι ὄντες ὀρθῶς πολιτεύωνται. But here again Dio’s evidence deserves no credence, there being a distinct possibility that, just as he has confused the conspirators’ first appeals with the speech Brutus attempted in the senate, so here he has unwittingly transferred the full-scale speech made *after* the (first) descent from the Capitol to *before* the (first) ascent, especially as he apparently knows nothing about the descent from the Capitol at all! This interpretation is supported by the manner in which Dio introduces the alleged speeches (συνελθόντων αὐτῶν ἐς ἐκκλησίαν), which seems much more appropriate to the formal meeting summoned after the descent from the Capitol—cf. | Nicolaus 26A.99
223 συγκαλέσαντες ... τὸν δῆμον of that meeting. And there are other pointers (18.9n.) which suggest Dionian error (or possibly Dionian ‘telescoping’: it is sometimes hard to know whether Dio is being careless or clever).

It is worth considering (*en passant*) the question: why did the assassins go to the Capitol at all? The sources offer various answers: flight (Nicolaus, cf. Flor. 2.17.2 ‘statim e curia in Capitolium confugerant’), generalized fear (Appian, Dio), to pray to the gods (Dio 44.21.2, making it clear that he regards this as a mere excuse), military occupation (Velleius, Livy *Epit.* 116),

or as a symbolic assertion of freedom: the Liberators occupy the Acropolis (P.'s implication here and at *Caes.* 67.3). Flight looks like hostile propaganda (perhaps partly to counter the claim that the Caesarian leaders 'fled' from the senate). The theory that they were simply frightened, though more plausible, is weakened by the fact that (*pace* Dio) they probably did not undertake any full-scale testing of public opinion before ascending to the Capitol. Military occupation is very unlikely. The idea of their going to pray to the gods (to thank them for deliverance from tyranny) might be right, though it would naturally have been largely a public relations exercise. The symbolic assertion of liberty is perhaps the most likely explanation of their conduct, given the Graeco-political outlook of Brutus and Cassius: 'their occupation of the Capitol was a symbolical act, antiquarian and even Hellenic' (Syme 99). This interpretation does not rule out the possibility that there might also have been an element of 'wait and see' (especially after the fiasco of the senatorial response to Brutus' attempted speech), or the probability that after the crowd's rough handling of Cinna the (second) occupation of the Capitol was considerably less symbolic. On the whole, then, it seems that the Plutarchean view of the matter is right. Of course he is prejudiced, | but nonetheless his understanding of the mentality of Brutus and Cassius is acute. 224

Finally, it is worth noting that, in accord with his largely sympathetic treatment of the cause of the Liberators, P. makes no mention of the gladiators who accompanied them, though he knew about their existence (see on 12.5).

8. τὸ μὲν ... ἐποίησαν: this brief description may possibly be influenced by Nicolaus 25.94 διαδρομαὶ ... μυρίαὶ ἦσαν ἔν τε ταῖς ὁδοῖς καὶ κατ' ἀγορὰν.

9. ὡς δ'... θαρροῦντες: Dio 44.20.4 contains the suspiciously similar ὁψὲ δ' οὖν ποτε καὶ μόλις, ὡς οὔτε τις ἐφονεύετο οὔτε συνελαμβάνετο, θαρσύναντες ἡσύχασαν (sc. ὁ ὄμιλος). The verbal parallel can hardly be accidental, though the contexts are different: in Dio this reaction occurs while the assassins are still in the forum and about (according to Dio) to hold their *contio* there, whereas in P. they are also about to hold their *contio* in the forum, but have first ascended to the Capitol. The facts that P. correctly records a descent from the Capitol on the Ides, but Dio does not, and that both authors record a similar audience reaction before the actual *contio* in the forum, reinforce the argument that Dio has mistakenly transferred the *contio* held *after* the descent from the Capitol to *before* the ascent (above).

The emphatic assertions of P. (cf. also *Ant.* 14.2 ὡς δ' ἔγνω τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπιχειροῦντας ... οὐδενί) and Dio (cf. also 44.21.2 καὶ μάλισθ' ὅτι οὐδένα ἠδίκουν) that there were no killings or confiscations of property contrast markedly with the picture of Appian 2.118.495 (even though he adds that the *φόνος* was οὐ προβεβουλευμένος, ἀλλ' οἶος ἐκ θορύβου πολιτικῶ καὶ

ἀγνωσίας τῶν ἐπιλαβόντων, and seems to blame Decimus' gladiators for the alleged carnage).

225 **9–10. θαρροῦντες ... πεπραγμένοι:** no other source records | the deputation, nor (necessarily) Brutus' speech to it on the Capitol, but P. is clearly following a detailed and circumstantial source (however prejudiced). Appian retails a complicated and quite different sequence of events: 2.120.503ff. the conspirators decide to bribe τὰ πλήθη, including discontented veterans, inconsistently supposing that the people could simultaneously be lovers of liberty and open to corruption; 2.121.508ff. considerable numbers of bribed riff-raff call for peace and an amnesty; Cinna arrives praising the assassins, but the unbribed part of the populace reject his views and the bribed therefore refrain from calling the conspirators from the Capitol and instead continue to clamour for peace; 2.122.511ff. after Dolabella's declaration of support for the assassins the bribed part is sufficiently emboldened to call for the conspirators to descend from the Capitol. This narrative is clearly extremely unsympathetic to the conspirators. One may make of it what one will. The only thing Appian has in common with P. here is that both writers record that Brutus and Cassius were asked to descend. Dio's account here is of course useless as he does not even mention the descent. In Nicolaus 26A.99 the conspirators descend unprompted, eager to test the mood of the people.

P.'s version here seems relatively unobjectionable, though he probably exaggerates the favourable reception accorded Brutus' speech (ἐπαινούντων καὶ κατιέναι βοώντων) and certainly exaggerates the composition of the deputation that went up to the Capitol. There is a further conflict with Appian in that Appian 2.123.515 says (after the *contio* in the forum) τῶν δ' οἰκείων σφίσι καὶ συγγενῶν τότε πρῶτον ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐλθεῖν ... δυνηθέντων, apparently making a controversial point, but this statement is dependent on the assumption that the conspirators were already in a state of great anxiety and effectively under siege, which seems | excessive. In any event, the deputation of senators and commons mentioned by P. is clearly to be regarded as an impartial embassy, not composed merely of οἰκείων and συγγενῶν of the conspirators, even if οἱ ... βουλευταί is an exaggeration.

The *Caesar* (67.7) simply records the fact of the descent without detailing the attendant circumstances (and misdates it to the 16th: {cf. Pelling *ad loc.*}).

ἀνέβαινον: Ziegler's tentative suggestion of a transposition to after Καπετώλιον does not impress. P. must be intending a balance between θαρροῦντες ἀνέβαινον (18.9) and θαρροῦντες κατέβαινον (18.11): all parties are filled with τὸ θαρρεῖν.

οἱ βουλευταί: the implication that the senate as a body was present is clearly an unhistorical exaggeration of the facts, part of the impression P.

designs to create that ‘all good men’ sided with the conspirators. He may have found this in his source.

ἐπαγωγά: with just a hint that Brutus extended a few propitiatory carrots to the people (likely enough—cf. Appian 2.140.581 and 3.2.5 on different occasions). P. was practical enough to see that the statesman was more likely to be successful if he had the ability to appear *δημοτικός* at the right moment (cf. *Nic.* 2.6, 11.2; *Crass.* 3.2; *Cat. mai.* 4.2), so this is not to Brutus’ discredit.

<πολλά> was suggested by Ziegler in 1932, art. cit. 77, cl. *Cat. min.* 22.5 ἐπαγωγὰ πολλὰ καὶ φιλόανθρωπα διαλεχθείς, 26.4 ἐπιεικῆ πολλὰ καὶ μέτρια παραινέσαντες and 29.1 ἄλλα τε πολλά ... ἐπίφθονα διῆλθε (his best parallels). The insertion is unnecessary and rather spoils the balance ἐπαγωγὰ τοῦ δήμου (seductive proposals) / πρέποντα τοῖς πεπραγμένοις (statesmanlike justification of the assassination). Nor does it seem likely that Brutus made *many* seductive proposals (or at least that P. would so represent him).

θαροῦντες: P. thus accepts that the assassins had been | occupying the Capitol in some trepidation, but that does not commit him to the view that they ‘fled’ there in the first place (see on 18.7). 227

κατέβαινον: μεθ’ ἡμέραν, *Caes.* 67.7 (wrongly).

οἱ μὲν ... Βροῦτον: the sources differ considerably in their descriptions of the descent. Nicolaus 26.99 simply refers to the conspirators *en bloc* (κατέβαινον), adding (plausibly) that they had Decimus’ gladiators καὶ ἄλλο οἰκετῶν πλῆθος with them; Appian 2.122.512 is clear that κατήεσαν ... μόνοι Κάσσιός τε καὶ Βροῦτος. Dio naturally has all the conspirators present: this proves nothing as in his incorrect account the conspirators have just come *en masse* from the senate. Like the *Brutus* the *Caesar* implies that they all came down together, focusing attention on Brutus (*Caes.* 67.1 τῶν περὶ Βροῦτον), whereas Appian rather stresses the role of Cassius (2.122.511 τοὺς ἀμφὶ τὸν Κάσσιον ... κατεκάλουν; 2.122.512 Κάσσιός τε καὶ Βροῦτος). Appian’s version deserves to be given some weight, since he seems to be making an emphatic point (μόνοι). It is true that P.’s *Brutus* account is vivid and looks like an eye-witness record, but it naturally would do, whether truly or not.

Βροῦτον ... ἐμβόλων: for all its vividness and apparently circumstantial detail, this description has an almost ‘adventus’-like quality that does nothing for its authenticity. It is presumably based on a source, though the general ‘snap-shot’ technique of catching an individual at a critical moment is thoroughly Plutarchean.

12. πρὸς δὲ ... σιωπῇ: Appian has nothing about the reaction of the crowd at this point; in Dio 44.20.4 they have just fallen quiet (ἡσύχασαν), and Nicolaus records an expectant silence as everybody wonders if total revolution is afoot (26A.100). But his subsequent description ἐν τούτῳ δὲ

- 228 **Μάρκος Βρούτος**, κατὰ πολλήν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ δήμου | τὸ μέλλον προσδεχο-
 μένου, σωφροσύνη τε βίου διὰ παντὸς τιμώμενος κατὰ τε εὐκλειαν προγόνων,
 καὶ τὴν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐπιείκειαν εἶναι δοκοῦσαν, ἔλεξε τοιάδε ... is very much
 in harmony with P., and again one wonders if there is Nicolaan influence
 at work in P.

μιγάδες: this allusive reference perhaps comes from the same source as Appian 2.120.505–7 (Appian’s analysis of the urban plebs and the conspirators’ schizophrenic attitude to them). {Pollio? So Pelling, *Caesar* 485.} Perhaps 21.2–3 below is also inspired by the same analysis: there is an uneasy tension between the people seen as a fickle mob and as lovers of liberty.

τῷ λόγῳ: nothing about its content. Why? P. has already covered what for him were the essential points of the conspirators’ arguments (18.7, 18.10) and in the present context has vividly described Brutus’ triumphant descent from the Capitol and the respectful hush which preceded his speech. Anything more would be jejune. The question: how many speeches were there?—is also relevant to his artistic purpose. Nicolaus unfortunately peters out at this point, though clearly he puts most emphasis on a speech by Brutus. Appian 2.122.513 records speeches by both Brutus and Cassius and Dio seems to have several speeches (44.21.1 καὶ συνελθόντων αὐτῶν ἐς ἐκκλησίαν πολλὰ μὲν κατὰ τοῦ Καίσαρος πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας οἱ σφαγεῖς εἶπον, θαρσεῖν τέ σφας καὶ μηδὲν δεινὸν προσδέχεσθαι ἐκέλευον· οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ δυναστείᾳ οὔτ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλῃ πλεονεξία οὐδεμιᾷ ἀπεκτονέειν αὐτὸν ἔφασαν). *Caes.* 67.7 τῶν περὶ Βρούτον ... ποιησαμένων λόγους is not very informative. The conclusion is that while there was a tradition that put particular emphasis on a speech by Brutus (Nicolaus/P.) his was not the only speech. But it is natural that in his *Brutus* P. should only mention the speech of his hero.

For the contents of the speech(es) see Appian 2.122.513f., Dio 44.21.1, and *perhaps* Nicolaus 17.49.

- 229 **13. οὐ ... πρὸς ἡδονήν**: thus P. implicitly concedes that | the speech was not a total success. *Caes.* 67.7 reasonably states that ὁ μὲν δῆμος οὔτε δυσχεραίνων οὔθ’ ὡς ἐπαινῶν τὰ πεπραγμένα τοῖς λεγομένοις προσεῖχεν, ἀλλ’ ὑπεδήλου τῇ πολλῇ σιωπῇ Καίσαρα μὲν οἰκτίρων, αἰδούμενος δὲ Βρούτον.

ἐδήλωσαν ... Κίinna: for the correctness of this report see the *Excursus* below.

Κίinna: *RE* 4.1287 (Münzer).

ᾧστε: P. is again right to make this causal connexion between the reception accorded Cinna’s speech and the retreat to the Capitol—see the *Excursus* below. No other source makes it, Nicolaus merely recording the fact of the return (27.101) and Appian 2.123.515 and Dio 44.21.2 attributing it to deep feelings of anxiety, despite the comparatively mollifying effect of the *contio*. All the narrative sources (with Nicolaus on the whole an

honourable exception) make a hash of the events of March 15–16, but P. is by no means the worst, comparing quite favourably with Appian and Dio.

14. ἀπέπεμπε: this picture of the calm consideration of Brutus for the safety of others contrasts strikingly with the reality of the feverish negotiations conducted with Antony and Lepidus (Cic. *Phil.* 2.89; Nicolaus 27.101; Appian 2.23.515).

τῶν συναβάντων: a loose pick-up of 18.9 ἀνέβαινον οἳ τε βουλευταί ... and 18.11 πολλοὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, who presumably are included in τοὺς ἀνδρας of 18.13. The qualification τοὺς ἀρίστους is important, as becomes clear from *Caes.* 67.3–6: ἐχώρουν εἰς τὸ Καπιτώλιον ... προσδεχόμενοι τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ συνανέβαινον αὐτοῖς καὶ κατεμείνυσαν ἑαυτοὺς, ὡς μετεσχηκότες τοῦ ἔργου, καὶ προσεποιούντο τὴν δόξαν ... οὗτοι μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀλαζονείας δίκην ἔδωκαν ὕστερον, ὑπ' Ἀντωνίου καὶ τοῦ νέου Καίσαρος ἀναιρεθέντες, καὶ μηδὲ τῆς δόξης δι' ἣν ἀπέθνησκον ἀπολαύσαντες ἀπιστία τῶν ἄλλων. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ κολάζοντες αὐτοὺς τῆς πράξεως, ἀλλὰ τῆς βουλήσεως τὴν δίκην ἔλαβον. |

P.'s remarks on the behaviour and subsequent fate of the 'glory-seekers' are closely paralleled in Appian 2.119.500: συνέθεον δὲ αὐτοῖς τινες χρησάμενοι ξιφίδια, οἱ τοῦ ἔργου μὴ μετασχόντες προσεποιούντο τὴν δόξαν ... οἱ τῆς μὲν δόξης οὐ μετέσχον, τῆς δὲ τιμωρίας τοῖς ἀμαρτοῦσι συνέτυχον and Dio 44.21.3–4 καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν πρώτων ἀφ' ἑσπέρας, τῆς μὲν ἐπιβουλῆς οὐ συμμετασχόντες, τῆς δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῆς δόξης, ὡς καὶ ἐπαινουμένους σφᾶς ἑώρων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἃ προσεδέχοντο μεταποιησόμενοι, συνεγένοντο. καὶ συνέβη γε αὐτοῖς ἐς τοῦναντίον τὸ πρᾶγμα δικαιοτάτα περιστῆναι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ἔργου ἅτε μηδὲν αὐτοῦ προσκοινωνήσαντες ἔλαβον, καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου τοῦ τοῖς δράσασιν αὐτὸ συμβάντος ὡς καὶ συνεπιβουλεύσαντές σφισι μετέσχον. There seem to be three marginally different accounts of when exactly the 'glory-seekers' ascended to the Capitol, though clearly one common source is latent:

(i) Appian says that the glory-seekers joined the assassins immediately after the murder in the forum but does not mention them as having ascended to the Capitol with them, and then at 2.123.515 he says that the conspirators' friends and relations were only first enabled to go up to the Capitol *after* the *contio* in the forum.

(ii) Dio puts the arrival and ascent of the glory-seekers in the evening.

(iii) P. has them *both* running to join the conspirators immediately after the assassination *and* apparently ascending the Capitol with them. (Appian *may* also be saying this, but he does not make himself clear.)

P.'s account seems the most reasonable (Dio's is obviously a conflation of two separate groups of men.) The point therefore of the qualification τοὺς ἀρίστους at *Brut.* 18.14 (cf. the careful προσδεχόμενοι τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ συνανέβαινον of *Caes.* 67.3) is that he is tacitly admitting, | though naturally not emphasizing, that in his view not all

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those who went up to the Capitol with the conspirators were disinterested patriots. However, in the *Brutus* he does not need to make explicit mention of the glory-seekers, since he is able to explain the presence of sympathizers on the Capitol by reference to the (otherwise unattested) deputation of senators and plebeians of 18.9, who imperceptibly become metamorphosed into overt supporters of the tyrannicides. A revealing, and thoroughly Plutarchean, little fiddle of the evidence of his sources.

τῆς αἰτίας ... κίνδυνον: thought and wording are presumably influenced by the motif of *Caes.* 67.4, Appian 2.119.500 and Dio 44.21.3—that, though the glory-seekers did not participate in the assassination, they did share the same dangers as the assassins.

Excursus: Specific Problems of *Brut.* 18; Events of March 15–16

The evidence is confused but important for source problems and for deciding the relative accuracy of P., Dio, Appian and Nicolaus, especially in questions of chronology. What follows is a summary and discussion of the four narratives and an attempt to explain the mistakes they make and the contradictions between them. For modern discussion see: Ferrero III, 309ff.; Gelzer 992; Rice Holmes III, 568, *Architect* 2; Drumann–Groebe 1.61–65, Groebe 407–415; Syme 97f.; Jacoby on Nicolaus 25.91ff; {Pelling's nn. on *Caes.* 67–8, with further bibliography}.

I do not always agree with the *communis opinio* on these problems.

(i) Plutarch

(a) the *Brutus*

232 Brutus attempts speech in the senate (18.1). Conspirators go to the Capitol exhorting the citizens to liberty (18.7). Confusion at first (18.8), but in the absence of any further murders or plundering of property senators and many of the *plebs* go to the | Capitol (18.9). Brutus makes speech on the Capitol (18.10). All the conspirators are encouraged to descend and Brutus makes another set speech (18.11–12), which is received respectfully, but the hostile reaction to Cinna's attack on Caesar indicates some displeasure at Caesar's death, so the conspirators return to the Capitol (18.13). Brutus sends away *τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν συναναβάντων* fearing siege, and not wanting those not responsible for the assassination to share the dangers of the conspirators (18.14). The following day senate meets for the first time (19.1).

The major difficulty (the Cinna problem apart) is that the first meeting of the senate definitely took place on 17 March (*Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1, 14.14 [368].2; *Phil.* 2.89). Yet there is nothing in P.'s *Brutus* narrative to indicate that all the events of *ch.* 18 did not take place on the 15th. In fact there are positive indications that they are all to be dated on the one day: *τῇ*

ὑστεραία (19.1), the first chronological indication since the description of the assassination, naturally suggests that *all* that went before took place on the 15th, Brutus' sentiments at 18.14 (δεδιώς πολιορκίαν ... οὐκ ἀξιῶν τῆς αἰτίας μὴ μετέχοντας αὐτοὺς συναποδύεσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον) imply a situation where the conspirators are still unsure how Antony and Lepidus will react, and where Lepidus' troops have not yet occupied the forum, i.e. the 15th, and τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν συναναβάντων has to be connected either with Favonius etc., who joined the conspirators immediately the deed was done, or with Cicero etc., who went up to the Capitol in the evening, in which case their departure should also be dated to the 15th. Finally, the reference to Cinna's ill-judged attack on Caesar also fits the 15th (as I argue below). Thus the only possible conclusion is that in the *Brutus* P. has simply lost a day—the 16th—and mistakenly dated the first meeting of the senate to the day immediately following the Ides—the 16th (this is clearly | perceived by Gelzer; the discussion of Rice Holmes is extremely poor). 233

(b) the *Caesar*

Brutus attempts speech in the senate (67.1). Conspirators go to the Capitol exhorting the citizens to liberty and taking with them τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν ἐπιτυγχανόντων (67.3). They are also joined by ambitious 'glory-seekers' (67.5–6). The following day (μεθ' ἡμέραν) Brutus and his friends (τῶν περὶ Βροῦτον) descend and make speeches, Brutus being respectfully received but Caesar's death lamented (67.7). The senate meets (67.8).

Thus the account of the *Caesar* differs radically from the *Brutus*, for the descent of the conspirators from the Capitol is here dated to the 16th. It is absolutely clear that *Caes.* 67.7 refers to the same speech as that of *Brut.* 18.12: both passages mention a 'descent' from the Capitol and both concentrate on the reaction of the people—respectful but guarded—to Brutus' speech (Gelzer wrongly supposes *Caes.* 67.7 to be a reference to the *contio Capitolina* of 16 March. Both because of the *Brutus* parallel and the fact that the speech is made in the forum, it cannot be a *reference* to the *contio Capitolina*, although there may be some sort of confusion with the *contio Capitolina*—see below). On the other hand, it is not completely clear in the *Caesar* what day P. imagines to be the date of the first meeting of the senate: 67.7 takes the narrative to March 16. But then P. merely summarizes events extremely briefly. The link between 67.7 and 67.8 (ὁ μὲν δῆμος... ἡ δὲ σύγκλητος) could be thematic and stylistic, not necessarily temporal, so it is possible that he does not here mean to date the meeting to the 16th, as he does in the *Brutus*. |

(ii) Dio

Conspirators rush to the forum, trying to reassure fleeing senators *et al.* (44.20.3). They also simultaneously call upon Cicero (44.20.4). As nobody is killed or arrested the crowd finally take courage (44.20.4). Conspirators make speeches (44.21.1–2). Fearing counterplots they go up to the Capitol (44.21.2) and (it is implied) do not come down again (*καὶ ἐκεῖ τὴν τε ἡμέραν καὶ τὴν νύκτα διέτριβον*). At evening the ‘glory-hunters’ arrive (44.21.3–4). After making a short speech Dolabella also goes up to the Capitol. Lepidus occupies the forum by night, and makes a speech against the conspirators at dawn. Antony, learning that the assassins are on the Capitol and Lepidus in the forum, assembles the senate (44.22.2).

Thus Dio has nothing at all about a descent from the Capitol. But, like P. in the *Brutus*, he clearly dates the first meeting of the senate to March 16: 44.22.2 *τούτων δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὄντων, ὁ Λέπιδος μαθὼν τὰ γεγενημένα τὴν τε ἀγορὰν μετὰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν τῆς νυκτὸς κατέλαβε, καὶ κατὰ τῶν σφαγέων ἅμα ἔω ἐδημηγόρει. ὁ οὖν Ἀντώνιος, καίτοι παραχρῆμα μετὰ τὸν τοῦ Καίσαρος θάνατον φυγῶν καὶ τὴν τε ἐσθῆτα τὴν ἀρχικὴν, ὅπως διαλάθῃ, ρίψας καὶ τὴν νύκτα κρυφθεὶς* (clearly that of March 15), *ὅμως ἐπειδὴ τοὺς τε σφαγέας ἐν τῷ Καπιτωλίῳ καὶ τὸν Λέπιδον ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ὄντα ἦσθετο, τὴν τε γερουσίαν ἐς τὸ τῆς Γῆς τέμενος ἦθροισε ...* This shows (what is anyway implicit in the narrative) that the references to Lepidus’ operations *τῆς νυκτὸς* and the arrival of the ‘glory-hunters’ *ἀφ’ ἡμέρας* are to the 15th, and hence, since the clause *ἐπειδὴ τοὺς ... ἦσθετο* does not allow of a day’s passing, that Dio dates the meeting of the senate to the 16th. (The only escape from this conclusion would be to interpret | *ἀφ’ ἐσπέρας* in 44.21.2–3 *καὶ ἐκεῖ* [sc. ἐν τῷ Καπιτωλίῳ] *τὴν τε ἡμέραν καὶ τὴν νύκτα ἐνδιέτριψαν. καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν πρώτων ἀφ’ ἐσπέρας, τῆς μὲν ἐπιβουλῆς οὐ συμμετασχόντες, τῆς δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς δόξης,* as referring to the *ἐσπέρα* after the *νύξ* mentioned. But this would be a misreading of the text. Dio is dealing with each of the main parties in turn, taking all of them—as far as possible—up to the time of the critical first meeting of the senate. With *τὴν νύκτα* he is simply going beyond the time schedule of the rest of the narrative as far as the conspirators are concerned.)

(iii) Appian

Conspirators wish to make speech in the senate but cannot (2.119.499). They run out and exhort the people to restore the government of their fathers (2.119.499). They are joined by ‘glory-seekers’ (2.119.500). Despite confidence in the senate they are alarmed by the lack of response of the people and apprehensive of the people, Caesar’s veterans, Lepidus and his army, and Antony, so they go to the Capitol (2.119.501–120.503). They decide to bribe the people into expressing Republican sentiments

(2.120.503). A considerable crowd thus bribed is brought into the forum (2.121.508). Cinna appears, but since the unbought part of the crowd clearly disagree with his attack on Caesar, the bribed part continue their calls for peace (2.121.510). However, the appearance of Dolabella with his pro-tyrannicide sentiments encourages the bribed part to demand that *τοὺς ἀμφὶ τὸν Κάσσιον* should descend (2.122.511). Only Brutus and Cassius descend and make speeches (2.122.512ff.). Not yet confident in the state of affairs, they return to the Capitol directly afterwards. Friends and relatives arrive and messengers are chosen to negotiate with Lepidus and Antony (2.123.515). | Antony replies that he will consult the senate (2.124.520). He summons the senate for dawn, sending out messages *νυκτός*. This is clearly the same *νύξ* as *ἀνὰ τὴν νύκτα* of 2.125.524 (the night of the negotiations with Antony and Lepidus). The senate meets (2.126.526f.).

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Thus Appian, for all the graphic detail of his narrative, commits the same error as P. in the *Brutus* and Dio, and misdates the first meeting of the senate to March 16, simply skipping a day (clearly perceived by Gelzer).

(iv) Nicolaus

The general panic is *ἄκριτος* till the panic-stricken see the conspirators in general, and Brutus in particular, trying to check the uproar (25.92). The conspirators rush out to the Capitol (25.94). They descend to test the reactions of the people and *τῶν ἐν τέλει* (presumably Antony and Lepidus in particular) to the assassination (26A.99). Brutus makes a speech (26A.100). The conspirators return to the Capitol (27.101). They send negotiators to Antony and Lepidus, who reply that they will give an answer the following day (27.101). It is now night (27.102). Next day Antony is in arms and Lepidus has occupied the forum (27.103). Antony conducts negotiations till his military preparations are complete, and then consults other Caesarian leaders (27.106). Elsewhere (17.49), Caesar's friends are referred to as being *καταπεπληγμένων* for the first two days, i.e. the 15th and 16th.

Thus Nicolaus, alone of the narrative sources, seems to have dated the first meeting of the senate correctly, and he gives a coherent account of what took place on the 16th, whereas P. (certainly in the *Brutus*), Appian and Dio simply lose it somewhere along the way. |

(v) Analysis

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Since a descent from the Capitol on the 15th is mentioned by P. (in the *Brutus*), Appian and Nicolaus, it must be assumed to be historical, despite Dio's total silence on the subject. The first problem, therefore, is to explain *Caes. 67.7 μεθ' ἡμέραν*. It is clear that this is meant to refer to the same

event as *Brut.* 18.11, and equally clear that the dating is wrong, for it is contradicted by P. himself in the *Brutus* and by Nicolaus and Appian, and is highly improbable in itself: by the early morning of the 16th Lepidus had occupied the forum, the conspirators did not know how he or Antony were going to react, and on the evening of March 17, even after the meeting of the senate that proposed the decree of amnesty, the conspirators still required the exchange of hostages before they could be prevailed upon to descend. For all these reasons a descent from the Capitol on the 16th can be ruled out.

One possible explanation for μεθ' ἡμέραν of *Caes.* 67.7 is that after writing the *Brutus* (i.e. on the assumption that the *Brutus* predates the *Caesar*) P. became aware that he had missed out the 16th in his account, and therefore hypothesized that the speech made after the descent from the Capitol must have occurred on the 16th. He could have been influenced also by learning that Brutus did in fact make a speech on the 16th. Cicero *Ad Att.* 15.1a [378].2 records that 'Brutus noster misit ad me orationem suam habitam in contione Capitolina' (and then proceeds to discuss its merits—elegant and Attic, but lacking in fire). Cicero's remarks show that Brutus later wrote up and published this speech. Appian 2.137.570–142.592 records a speech made by Brutus on the Capitol. The fact that he dates it to March 16 of course proves nothing (since he also mistakenly dates the first meeting of the senate to March 16), but the actual contents of the speech are decisive for a dating of March 16: 2.137.570 ἐνταῦθα ὑμῖν ἐντυγχάνομεν, | ὧ πολῖται, οἱ χθὲς κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐντυχόντες, οὔτε ὡς ἐς ἱερὸν καταφυγόντες (οὐ γὰρ ἠμάρτομεν) οὔτε ὡς ἐπὶ κρημνόν, οἱ τὰ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιτρέπομεν ὑμῖν. ἀλλὰ τὸ Κίinna πάθος, ὀξύτερόν τε καὶ ἀλογώτερον αὐτῶ γενόμενον, οὕτως ἠνάγκασεν. The phrase οἱ χθὲς κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐντυχόντες must refer to the speeches the conspirators made in the forum on March 15 (whether before they went up to the Capitol or after the descent), and as Appian's narrative stands, the reference to τὸ Κίinna πάθος is quite meaningless. It cannot refer to the events of 2.126.526f. (Cinna's near lynching and rescue by Lepidus), for they took place on the day of the first meeting of the senate, and Brutus is arguing that it was τὸ Κίinna πάθος which drove them to take refuge in the Capitol in the first place. It must therefore refer to Cinna's speech and its reception on the 15th: again the reference is to what happened on the previous day (see discussion below of the problem of Cinna the praetor). It seems certain that Cicero's reference applies to this speech recorded by Appian, and it is even possible that what is reproduced by Appian bears at least some relation to the real thing, more particularly as it shows some contradictions with Appian's own muddled narrative! This speech could reasonably be described as a *contio*, since according to Appian 2.137.570 Brutus and Cassius sent messages to the people and invited them to come up to the Capitol, and some of Brutus' remarks in the speech are addressed to colonists and veterans. If

there is anything to be said for the hypothesis that P. was trying to plug the gap of March 16 in the *Caesar*, why did he not mention the *contio Capitolina* instead of (wrongly) advancing the speech made after the descent from the Capitol by one day? Perhaps because he thought that there would then be a clash with the speech he attributes to Brutus on the Capitol on March 15 in *Brut.* 18.10. | (One may pose the question: is this speech in any case a confusion with the *contio Capitolina* of March 16? If it is, it is hardly P.'s own confusion, for, whether suspect or not, it is at least integral to the narrative of *Brut.* 18.9–12. It may be argued against its authenticity that Appian knows nothing of it, nor of the deputation of senators and commons that evoked it. But Appian's narrative of March 15–16 is itself far from being above reproach. The sequence: brief speech on Capitol March 15; formal speech in forum March 15; formal speech on Capitol March 16 is not absolutely impossible: the Liberators had little else to do other than make speeches in an attempt to justify their cause.) However one looks at it, if *μὲθ' ἡμέραν* of *Caes.* 67.7 is meant as a repair job, it is a poor one, since it involves misdating the descent from the Capitol, and P. could always have found out most of the truth by closer study of Nicolaus, whom he actually seems to have used in *both* the *Brutus* and *Caesar*. 239

Another problem arises: why does Appian synchronize a speech of Brutus' on the 16th with an alleged meeting of the senate on the same day? One suggestion (Gelzer) is that the key lies in Dio 44.34.1–3 (where the conspirators attempt to win over Caesar's troops even before news of the vote of amnesty by the senate has come). The argument seems to be that Dio has preserved a correct piece of information—that on the day of the first meeting of the senate the conspirators did try to mollify the troops—and that Appian has confused this speech with that of the 16th and misdated the meeting of the senate to suit. The difficulty with this suggestion, however, is that Dio too has misdated the meeting of the senate, and seems to be making exactly the same mistake as Appian. Dio in fact implies (44.34.1–2) that the alleged attempt to win over the troops on the day of the meeting of the senate was the first time the conspirators directed their attention to this | problem, but that goes against the probabilities of the case and the evidence of Brutus' speech on the 16th as recorded by Appian. It is therefore extremely likely that Dio is himself referring to the speech of the 16th (his speech similarly takes place on the Capitol and contains substantially the same provisions as Appian's, though he has exaggerated some of the details—e.g. in the case of the alleged promise *μηδὲν τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος πραχθέντων καταλύσειν*—in order to bring the speech into close correspondence with what he knows to be happening in the senate at the same time). The explanation for Appian's error can only be that on the one hand he knew that Brutus' Capitol speech was delivered on the day after the Ides, but on the other he thought 240

(like Dio and P., at least in the *Brutus*) that the meeting of the senate also took place on the 16th.

This raises the question: why do all three writers make that mistake? Various explanations could be offered: the lack of real incident on the 16th as contrasted with the 15th and 17th, the sheer difficulty of piecing together the events of such a confused period, but perhaps more particularly the lack of credit given to the skilful manoeuvring of Antony: March 16, the day that gets swallowed up in P., Appian and Dio, was the day when Antony kept the conspirators on tenterhooks until he had secured his own position (cf. especially Nicolaus 27.106 οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀντώνιον πρὶν μὲν παρασκευάσασθαι διεπρεσβεύοντο καὶ διελέγοντο) and sounded out the opinions of the various Caesarian leaders. The only writer who does anything like justice to all this is Nicolaus, both P. and Dio following the tradition of ‘official’ Cicero (*Phil.* 2.88) in laying undue emphasis on Antony’s flight from the senate, while Appian does record more substantial information about Antony’s activities, but still has nothing about his skilful ‘playing’ of the conspirators. It is hardly accidental therefore that Nicolaus is the only one who gets the essential chronology right, though it is |
 241 probably also true (as e.g. Groebe 408) that he was helped by his friendship with Augustus (e.g. the report of the conference of the Caesarian leaders on the 16th could obviously have been told Octavian on his arrival in Rome).

The Problem of Cinna the Praetor

P., *Brut.* 18.13, seems to imply that Cinna made a speech against Caesar which was angrily received by the people on March 15: is this right? (The consensus view is that it is not: cf. Groebe 415; Münzer, *RE* 4.1287.) The further reference at 20.11 ἐκέλευσεν ὁ Καίσαρ πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἔναγχος λουδορήσας does not say what the people felt about the speech *at the time*. Appian 2.121.509f., in a detailed account, says that Cinna advanced unexpectedly into the forum, laid aside his praetorian robe as the gift of a tyrant, called Caesar a tyrant and his killers tyrannicides, claimed that the assassination was ὁμοιότατον μάλιστα τῷ προγονικῷ, and proposed public honours for the assassins. There is nothing here to suggest that Cinna was roughly handled on this occasion, though clearly most of the assembled crowd did not agree with his speech (καὶ Κίνας μὲν οὕτως ἔλεξεν, οἱ δὲ τὸ καθαρὸν τοῦ πλήθους οὐχ ὁρῶντες ἐπιμιγνύμενον αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐκάλουν τοὺς ἄνδρας οὐδέ τι πλέον ἢ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης μόνης αὐτοῖς παρεκάλουν). Appian dates this incident to March 15, when the conspirators have gone up to the Capitol and are trying to drum up support among the urban *plebs*, but have not yet made their descent to the forum. Later (2.126.526f.) on the day of the first meeting of the senate (the 17th, though Appian thinks it is the 16th), Appian describes how Cinna, now back in his praetorian robe, was

nearly lynched, and only saved by the armed intervention of Lepidus. He refers once again to Cinna's unpopularity in the speech of Brutus at 2.137.570 in an important passage which will be considered later. Val. Max. 9.9.1, describing the lynching of Helvius Cinna on the day of Caesar's funeral, says that | 'discerptus est pro Cornelio Cinna, in quem saevire se existimabat iratus ei, quod, cum adfinis esset Caesaris, adversus eum nefarie raptum impiam pro rostris orationem habuisset'. This must be the same speech as the one referred to by P. and Appian, but though it is again made clear that the people disliked Cinna's speech *in retrospect*, it is not made clear whether they tried to attack Cinna at the time it was actually made. The same applies to Suet. *Caes.* 85 'quem graviter pridie contionatum de Caesare requirebat' (where note that 'pridie' is being used as = 'a short time before'. It is not an 'error', *pace* Garzetti 246 on *Caes.* 68.6: cf. *Brut.* 20.11. {At *Rh. Mus.* 130 (1987), 125 n. 3 Moles also raises the possibility of emending to *pridem*}). Other references (*Caes.* 68.6; Dio 44.50.4) shed no further light.

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At first sight, therefore, *Brut.* 18.13 could be written off as an amalgam of the incidents on March 15 and March 17 (so Groebe and Münzer). P. would then be making not so much a chronological mistake as a deliberate conflation of two separate events in order to substantiate the (anyway correct) proposition ὅτι ... οὐ πᾶσι πρὸς ἡδόνην ἐγεγόνει τὸ ἔργον, while Appian would be preserving historical accuracy in stating, of the near lynching of Cinna on the 17th, (2.126.526f) τοῦτο ... δὴ πρῶτον ἔργον παρρησίας ἤρξεν ἐπὶ τῷ Καίσαρι. But Appian 2.137.570 is decisive against this view. The speech Appian puts into Brutus' mouth was made on the 16th (οἱ χθὲς κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐντυχόντες—cf. above). Brutus says that they went to the Capitol because of τὸ Κίinna πάθος, ὀξύτερόν τε καὶ ἀλογώτερον αὐτῷ γεινόμενον. He is not saying why they intend to *stay* on the Capitol: he is explaining why they took refuge there in the first place (οὔτε ὡς ἐς ἱερὸν καταφυγόντες ... οὔτε ὡς ἐπὶ κρημνόν ... ἀλλὰ τὸ Κίinna πάθος, ὀξύτερόν τε καὶ ἀλογώτερον ... οὕτως ἠνάγκασεν). Τὸ Κίinna πάθος cannot therefore be the attack on Cinna on the 17th. The pattern of cause and effect is identical to that in P. (18.13, ὅτι δ' οὐ πᾶσι πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐγεγόνει τὸ ἔργον, ἐδήλωσαν ἀρξαμένου λέγειν Κίinna καὶ κατηγορεῖν Καίσαρος, ἀναρρηγνύμενοι πρὸς | ὄργην καὶ κακῶς τὸν Κίinna λέγοντες, ὥστε πάλιν τοὺς ἄνδρας ... ἀπελθεῖν.

Appian has mistakenly referred τὸ Κίinna πάθος to the events of March 17, not realizing that Cinna got into trouble twice. Cinna made an anti-Caesar speech on the 15th, throwing away his praetorian robe, and was roughly handled by the crowd, and it was this that impelled the conspirators to take refuge in the Capitol. On the 17th Cinna had learnt his lesson and put his robe back on, but he was again attacked. This sequence of events has confused Appian but not P., despite the fact that it is clear that, so far as the basic information about Cinna is concerned, the two writers are following a similar, if not the exact same, source.

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{Moles revisited this, with similar arguments, at *Rh. Mus.* 130 (1987), 124–8.}

A brief summary. Nicolaus' account of March 15–17, despite an unimpressive beginning (18.11n.), is by far the best as a record of the essential facts. P., Appian, and Dio are incompetent to an almost equal extent. Of the incompetents, Dio is the most cavalier in his reworking of the basic material. Appian preserves much detailed (and presumably mostly authentic) information, but shows inability to synthesize it properly. P.'s account in the *Brutus* is highly selective and fairly prejudiced, though some of that prejudice must stem from a minor source with which he has contaminated his major source (or sources: there are several places where he is closer to Dio than to Appian); it cannot be claimed that his general handling of the material is any worse than Appian or Dio.

Ch. 19: Temporary Reconciliation

This brief section also poses acute historical problems, of a highly intricate kind. I cannot discuss them in detail.

1. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλά: ‘not but what’, corrective of the ominous impression left by 18.14 (πολιορκίαν/κίνδυνον). Ch. 19 as a whole is concerned with events in the senate that | went the conspirators’ way.

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τῇ ὑστεραία: in context = March 16, though the correct date is March 17. See the *Excursus* above.

τῆς βουλῆς: divergent information on this first meeting of the senate on March 17 in Appian 2.126–129, 132–136 (long, detailed, and idiosyncratic); Dio 44.22.3–34.7 (largely taken up with Cicero’s speech); Zonaras 10.12 (effectively = Dio); Cic. *Phil.* 1.1–2, 1.31 2.89–90; Livy *Epit.* 116; Vell. 2.58.3–4. P. deals further with the topic at *Caes.* 67.8–9, *Cic.* 42.3, and *Ant.* 14.3–4. The meeting was summoned by Antony *qua* consul (Appian 2.126.525; Dio 44.22.3; Vell. 2.58.3; Cic. 42.3; *Ant.* 14.3), by means of a notice sent round by night (Appian 2.126.525), and took place at dawn (Appian 2.126.526).

τὸ τῆς Γῆς ἱερόν: this detail also in Appian 2.126.525; Dio 44.22.3; Cic. *Phil.* 1.1, 1.31, 2.89. The venue was explained by the fact that it was very near Antony’s house (Appian).

Ἄντωνίου: Antony’s part in the proceedings is variously described. That he did indeed speak *περὶ ἀμνηστίας καὶ ὁμονοίας*, as the *Brutus* states, is the view P. also propounds at *Cic.* 42.3 and *Ant.* 14.3, in all three cases rather giving the impression that it was Antony who set the dominant tone of the debate. This view is strongly supported by Cicero (cf. the enthusiasm—naturally somewhat overdone—of *Phil.* 1.2 and 1.31, and the vaguer implications of 2.90) and by Velleius’ characterization of Antony as ‘pacis auctor’ (2.58.3), and is almost certainly right. In Dio’s account, while by far the greatest emphasis is laid on the effect of Cicero’s speech (44.23–44), Antony also plays a very conciliatory role (44.34.4), though according to Dio this was only because he was afraid of the power of Lepidus (44.34.6). Appian 2.128.534f., 2.130.542f., and 2.132.554f. paints a much more Machiavellian picture, no doubt informed | by hindsight. The Livian *Epitome* gives no details.

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Πλάγκου: *RE* 16.545 (Hanslik). No other source mentions Plancus’ speech. No doubt P. is right: Plancus was the ultimate fence-sitter.

Κικέρωνος: for Cicero’s important contribution see Dio 44.23–34 (very lengthy and ostensibly Cicero’s *ipsissima verba*), Cic. *Phil.* 1.1 (‘*ieci fundamenta pacis*’ etc.), and *Cic.* 42.3. The speech certainly was a long one (*Cic.* 42.3, cf. Dio), enjoined the senate to follow the example of the Athenians (*Phil.* 11; *Cic.* 42.3, cf. Dio 44.26.1–6 and Vell. 2.58.4), and actually contained the Greek words *ἀμνηστία* or *ἄδεια* (*Phil.* 1.1: {see Ramsey *ad loc.*}). Cicero later (*Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1, 14.14 [368].3, *Phil.* 2.89)

claimed that he was forced to dissemble because of the presence of armed troops. Appian does not even mention Cicero's speech. Pollian prejudice!?

ἀλλὰ καὶ ... ὑπάτους: this extraordinary statement is in keeping with the general tenor of the chapter—depicting everything as going well for the conspirators—but finds no support in the other sources and is quite certainly incorrect. In context *γνώμην ... προθεῖναι* must mean 'to lay a proposal before the people' (so, rightly, Perrin) and the *τιμαί* in question here must be honours for the slaying of Caesar: there is no parallel with *Cic.* 42.3, *Κικέρων δὲ πολλὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν οἰκείως διελθὼν, ἔπεισε τὴν σύγκλητον Ἀθηναίους μιμησαμένην ἀμνηστίαν τῶν ἐπὶ Καίσαρι ψηφίσασθαι, νεῖμαι δὲ τοῖς περὶ Κάσσιον καὶ Βροῦτον ἐπαρχίας*, where the *ἐπαρχίαι* are what Brutus and Cassius would receive in the normal course of events, not special honours, and not much with *Caes.* 67.9 *τοῖς δὲ περὶ Βροῦτον ἐπαρχίας τε διένειμε καὶ τιμὰς ἀπέδωκε προεπούσας*, where the *τιμαί πρόπουσαι* are perhaps only a vague amplification of the *ἐπαρχίαι* (provincial governorships, {i.e. those treated more fully at *Ant.* 14.3}). Appian 2.127.530 records that some senators extolled the assassination openly, called the assassins tyrannicides, and proposed that | they should be rewarded, and at 2.127.532 that some argued that if an amnesty were granted the assassins ought in the interests of their own safety to be honoured as public benefactors, and at 2.127.528 he implies that most senators agreed with this. {For discussion see K. Welch, *Magnus Pius*, 123–5, with further bibliography.} Suet. *Tib.* 4.1 specifies that it was T. Claudius Nero who 'cunctis turbarum metu abolitionem facti decernentibus, etiam de praemiis tyrannicidarum referendum censuit'. But of course the whole point is that nothing came of these proposals even on the very day they were made (cf. *Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1, 14.14 [368].3). Thus for P. to end on the happy note *ἀλλὰ καὶ γνώμην ὑπὲρ τιμῶν προθεῖναι τοὺς ὑπάτους* is totally misleading and shows that *either* he himself is twisting the record to suit his schematic presentation of events (19: triumph; 20: disaster), *or* he is following a source which presented an extremely one-sided account of what happened in the senate on March 17, actually stating that the strongly pro-tyrannicide sentiments of Nero and others carried the day. The first possibility cannot be totally excluded, but the second is more likely in view of the other misrepresentations noted below. Of course to say 'P. is here following a non-main line source' does not absolve him from responsibility for pushing a particular line: one must ask the question—'why does P. choose *that* source?' And the answer here is that it suits him to follow a source strongly prejudiced in favour of the tyrannicides. The question: does he 'really believe' in the authority of this source?—is not relevant (cf. on the problem of Brutus' alleged descent from the first consul).

καὶ ταῦτ' ... διελύθησαν: thus nothing is said about the key measure of ambiguous import to the Republican cause—the all-important ratification

of Caesar's *acta*. Appian lays great stress on it, using it as evidence for his portrayal of a dangerously hostile Antony (2.125.535ff., 2.132–135), and Dio also | alludes to it, both in Cicero's speech at 44.33.3–4 and in the promises of the conspirators themselves at 44.34.1 and 3. P. mentions the ratification of the *acta* at *Caes.* 67.8 (with the intriguing addition *Καίσαρα ... ὡς θεὸν τιμᾶν ἐψηφίσατο*, cf. pp. 212ff. below) and at *Ant.* 14.3 (though not in the Cicero—*Cic.* 42.3), so the omission here is part of his schematic treatment of the material. It is a remarkable liberty to take with the evidence.

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2–3. Ἄντωνίου ... φιλοφροσύνης: the giving of hostages and the final descent of the conspirators are described also at *Ant.* 14.2 (not *Cic.* 42.3 nor *Caes.* 67.9); Livy *Epit.* 116; Nicolaus 17.50 (without details); Vell. 2.58.4; Appian 2.142.594, cf. 3.15.55; Dio 44.34.6–7. Cf. *Cic. Phil.* 1.2, 1.31, 2.91.

The *Antony* carelessly implies that these events took place before the first meeting of the senate (14.2–3 ὡς δ' ἔγνω τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπιχειροῦντας μὲν οὐδενί, συνηθροισμένους δ' εἰς τὸ Καπιτώλιον, ἔπεισε καταβῆναι λαβόντας ὄμηρον παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸν υἱόν· καὶ Κάσσιον μὲν αὐτὸς ἐδείπνισε, Βροῦτον δὲ Λέπιδος. συναγαγὼν δὲ βουλήν, αὐτὸς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἀμνηστίας εἶπε...), while Appian incorrectly refers them to the day after the first meeting of the senate, i.e. the 18th (cf. 2.142.593f. ἅμα δὲ ἡμέρᾳ οἱ μὲν ὕπατοι τὸ πλῆθος ἐς ἐκκλησίαν συνεκάλουν, καὶ ἀνεγινώσκετο αὐτοῖς τὰ δόξαντα, καὶ Κικέρων πολὺ τῆς ἀμνηστίας ἐγκώμιον ἐπέλεγεν· οἱ δὲ ἠδόμενοι κατεκάλουν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοὺς ἀμφὶ τὸν Κάσσιον. καὶ οἷδε ἀναπέμπειν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοσῶδε ὄμηρα ἐκέλευον, καὶ ἀνεπέμποντο οἱ παῖδες Ἄντωνίου τε καὶ Λεπίδου. 17th is fixed by the combined evidence of Dio, Plutarch *Brutus*, Livy, Velleius, and *Cic. Phil.* 1.2 and 2.90, all of whom imply that the giving of the hostages and the final descent occurred on the same day as the first meeting, i.e. the 17th (Nicolaus just has ὀλίγον ὕστερον), and by the fact that Brutus and Cassius were present in the senate on the day that Caesar's will and burial were discussed, i.e. the 18th (see 19.4n.). |

τὸν υἱόν: that Antony sent only one son is confirmed by *Ant.* 14.2; *Cic. Phil.* 1.31 and 2.90; and Dio ('liberos' of *Phil.* 1.2 and Vell. 2.58.3 is rhetorical. {Ramsey on *Cic. Phil.* 1.2 points out that the use of the plural *liberi* for only one child is 'not uncommon': *OLD* s.v. *liberi* ad fin.}). Like Cicero, P. both here and at *Ant.* 14.2 omits to mention that Lepidus also sent a son, a fact recorded by Livy, Appian and Dio. But P. is uninterested in Lepidus (below).

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ἀσπασμοί ... φιλοφροσύνης: this picture of almost warm and friendly reconciliation is practically unique to P. Appian only records a friendly reception from the people, though he notes that at their insistence Antony and Dolabella shook hands with the conspirators. Of course it suits P.'s purpose to give the impression he does, but there may be something in it: Dio 44.34.7 suggests a similar sort of atmosphere when he retails the

bantering exchange between Cassius and Antony: *συνδειπνούντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἄλλα τε, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, πολλὰ ἐλέγετο, καὶ ἐπήρετο τὸν Κάσσιον ὁ Ἀντώνιος “ἀρά γε καὶ νῦν ξιφίδιον τι ὑπὸ μάλης ἔχεις;” καὶ ὁσ “μάλα” ἔφη “μέγα, ἂν γε καὶ σὺ τυραννῆσαι ἐπιθυμήσης.”*

Κάσσιον ... Λέπιδος: this socializing is also recorded at *Ant.* 14.2 (verbally similar) and by Dio.

Λέπιδος: only mentioned in the *Brutus* here and at 27.6 below, both references P. could not well avoid. P. does not want to clutter the scene with intrusive characters who would obscure the essential struggle between Caesarism and Republicanism, and the further internal contrasts between the two Republican leaders Brutus and Cassius, and the two Caesarian leaders Antony—a man at odds with himself (18.3–5, 29.10)—and Octavian—the faceless personification of Caesarism. Hence as little about Lepidus as he can reasonably get away with.

τοῦς ... φιλοφροσύνης: a detail that does not occur elsewhere. Likely enough, it clearly suits P.’s artistic purpose in this section.

- 249 **4. ἄμα δ’ ἡμέρα:** P. is the only source to attest this | session of the senate on the 18th. Is he right? Scholars have differed on this question: against, e.g. Sternkopf, *Hermes* 47 (1912), 340–9; B. R. Motzo, *Ann. Fac. Fil. Lett. di Cagliari*, 1933, 26–31; Pelling ‘Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman Lives’ [= *Plutarch and History* 37 n. 90; Ramsey on *Cic. Phil.* 1.32]; for, e.g. Gelzer 993, *Cicero* (1969), 327; Syme 98, 103; Stockton 281; {Gotter, *Der Diktator ist tot!* 25–6 n. 98; K. Matijević, *Marcus Antonius* (2006), 47 n. 60}. I restrict myself to a few observations. The view that P. is wrong has to work with some such hypothesis as this: P.’s senate meeting on the 18th is principally concerned with honours of the tyrannicides; what has happened is that P. found in a minor source (perhaps Empylus) a notice of such an honorific session; he tried to combine this with the (correct) Pollio-source, as retailed by Appian. He knew from the Pollio-source that the assassins were not present at the meeting of the 17th. Given that he wanted to insert a reference to an honorific session in the presence of some of the Liberators, he had to postulate a separate session on the 18th. (This is clearly set out by Pelling.) I do not find this convincing. It is true that considerable distortion must be conceded in P.’s account of the alleged meeting of the 18th. This is certainly the case at 19.5. But the extent of distortion should not be exaggerated. There was *some* discussion of *ἐπαρχιῶν διανομαί* immediately after the Ides (there had to be). Nor does 19.4 necessarily imply formal honours (see *ad loc.*). More important, it has been demonstrated that there is already distortion in 19.1. If this comes from the minor source (as is likely), then this would mean, supposing the session of the 18th to be non-historical, that this minor source has not only (i) given a prejudiced and inaccurate account of the meeting of the 17th, but also (ii) completely invented a meeting of the 18th. It is not clear why it

should do this, having already attributed false honours to the Liberators on the 17th. Nor is it clear why it should state that Brutus and Cassius were present on the 18th, if the whole meeting was made up. | The meeting of 19.4 and 20.1–2 is clearly not just invented by P. to fit his minor source with the main Pollian account: it must stem from the minor source itself. And 20.1–2 is obviously not ‘honorific’ of the Liberators: why record it, if it were not true? One may, of course, prefer to accept the evidence of Appian, who in a sense records two meetings of the senate but has both on the one day (2.127–136; the ‘second meeting’ starts at 2.136.567, with Piso’s agitation over Caesar’s will). But Appian’s narrative of March 15–17 is, as I have argued already, no less confused than P.’s. It is especially interesting to note that Appian 2.142.593 misdates the meeting of the assembly, by putting it a day after the (first) meeting of the senate (it was in fact held on the same day as that first meeting: cf. Cic. *Phil.* 1.32, 5.10): one wonders if Appian 2.142.593 is a confusion of the date of the meeting of the assembly with that of the second meeting of the senate!?

To sum up. While it is comprehensible that the account of the minor source of a meeting on the 18th should distort the importance of those Liberators present at it and the reception they received, and should muddle the complicated assignment of provinces, it is not clear why it should fabricate the whole incident. And since the rival account, that of Appian, while it may go back to an authoritative source, is as it stands itself very far from authoritative, one ought (I think) to accept P.’s account more or less at face value.

πρῶτον ... ἔδοσαν: naturally not attested elsewhere, but perfectly likely. Again, why record it, if not because it is true?

ὡς ... ἀρχήν: for this praise of Antony’s actions on the 17th cf. *Ant.* 14.4 ἐξήκει δὲ τῆς βουλῆς λαμπρότατος ἀνθρώπων ὁ Ἀντώνιος ἀνηρηκέναι δοκῶν ἐμφύλιον πόλεμον καὶ πράγμασι δυσκολίας ἔχουσι καὶ ταραχᾶς οὐ τὰς τυχούσας ἐμφρονέστατα κεχρηῆσθαι καὶ πολιτικώτατα | and passages quoted at 19.11. above. P. himself of course does not necessarily accept the underlying interpretation of Antony’s behaviour (ὡς here, δοκῶν at *Ant.* 14.4), being inclined to regard all Antony’s actions in the light of hindsight.

ἔπειτα ... παρόντων: also unrecorded elsewhere, but not impossible: (i) the ἔπαινοι are not necessarily formal honours; (ii) the implication seems to be that the ἔπαινοι were not conferred on the conspirators *en bloc* but only on those present, i.e. in recognition of the fact that they had public-spiritedly resumed their duties in political life.

τῶν παρόντων: clearly implying that some of Brutus’ followers were not present. Brutus and Cassius were (20.11.), and the source obviously implies the presence of Trebonius, Cimber, and D. Brutus, which is probably correct.

4–5. ἐπαρχιῶν διανομαί: the ancient evidence on the provinces and governorships of 44 is very confused. The basic discussions remain O. E. Schmidt, *Jahrbücher für cl. Phil.*, Suppl. 13 (1884), 665ff.; E. Schwartz, *Hermes* 33 (1898), 185ff.; W. Sternkopf, *Hermes* 47 (1912), 327ff. Cf. also Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 196f.; Syme 102f.; Wilson 105ff; {for more recent bibliography see K. Welch, *Magnus Pius*, 157–8 n. 28}. The extent of P.'s error here is debatable, and I cannot make any authoritative pronouncement on it. But the following few observations seem safe.

The appointments of Decimus, Trebonius, and Cimber appear to have been made originally by Caesar (Appian 3.2.4). Decimus set out for Cisalpine Gaul early in April (*Ad Att.* 14.13 [367].2). Trebonius seems to have left Rome about the same time (*Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1), and so presumably did Cimber (cf. Appian 3.2.4). Their appointments would have needed ratification by the senate in March. P. here dates it to the second meeting of the senate, on March 18. On the other hand the *Caesar* (67.8), *Cicero* (42.3), and *Antony* (14.3) all imply the 17th. Neither Appian nor Dio
 252 has anything about the provinces | at all at this point. The 18th is possible, and perhaps more likely than the 17th. This gives the sequence: on the 17th the passing of the immediately necessary measures, the amnesty and broad ratification of Caesar's *acta* on the 18th sorting out of administrative details; and makes the allotment occur *after* the full public reconciliation of the evening of the 17th, and not—less probably—*before*, at a time when at least some of the chief beneficiaries were still shut up on the Capitol. Of course it is possible that some discussion about the provinces did take place on the 17th—recognition of Caesar's *acta* would have had some repercussions on the provincial appointments. {Pelling on *Ant.* 14.3 wonders whether a separate decree was needed at all: all the appointments might have been embraced in those *acta*.} But the version of the *Caesar*, *Cicero* and *Antony* could be explained as typical Plutarchean chronological telescoping. Thus far, there is nothing against P.'s *Brutus* account. Where he definitely goes wrong is in his statement that Brutus and Cassius were assigned their provinces in March 44: the question of the praetorian provinces seems to have been raised in June (*Ad Att.* 15.9 [387].1). The subsequent complicated question of when the assignment actually was made need not concern us here: the essential point is clear—P. (or his source) has 'anticipated' by saying that Brutus and Cassius were assigned their provinces at the same time as Trebonius, Cimber, and D. Brutus. This seems a natural enough error, not in itself sufficiently great to reject the whole tradition of provincial assignments on March 18. As for P.'s source at this point, one must think in terms of a source which is well informed to a degree, but yet prejudiced in favour of the tyrannicides and capable of error of detail. Empylus seems the obvious candidate.

Κρήτην: confirmed by Cic. *Phil.* 2.97, 11.27; Appian 3.8.29, Dio 47.21.1, 45.32.4, 46.23.3.

Λιβύην: Appian 3.8.29 agrees with this, P.'s Λιβύη signifying the same as Appian's Κυρήνη (cf. P. *Ant.* 54.3 | with Dio 49.41.3); Nicolaus gives 253 Illyricum (28.112) and Dio 47.21.1 Bithynia. P. is probably therefore right here. Again his source preserves some good information despite bias and inaccuracy of detail.

Ch. 20: Disaster—Caesar’s Will and Funeral

1. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα: P. puts the debate about Caesar’s will in the session of March 18, cf. *λόγων ἐμπροσόντων*. Neither *Caesar* (67.8–9), *Cicero* (42.4), nor *Antony* (14.3–4) mentions the debate about the will and funeral. P. includes it in the *Brutus* because of its disastrous consequences for the conspirators, while it also serves as a further illustration of the contrast between the unworldliness of Brutus and the realism of Cassius (20.1–2). Appian 2.135.566–136.569 has the debate on the 17th. In choosing between his testimony and P.’s the essential arguments have already been rehearsed (above). If P. is right that Brutus and Cassius actually participated in the debate, then there is no doubt that the 18th is the correct date. Dio does not have the debate at all.

διαθηκῶν: the main sources for Caesar’s will are *Caes.* 68.1 (cf. 20.3 below); *Cic. Phil.* 2.109; *Livy Epit.* 116 (inaccurate); Nicolaus 13.30 and 17.48; Velleius 2.59.1; *Pliny NH* 35.7.21; *Tac. Ann.* 2.41; *Suet. Caes.* 83.2; Appian 2.143.595f., 3.17.63; Dio 44.35.2–3 (cf. Zonaras 10.12).

τῶν περὶ ... Ἀντώνιον: this emphasis on Antony’s active role in the debate about Caesar’s will is not found in Appian or Cicero, which might appear to cast doubt upon its reliability, given the view both take of Antony’s motives and behaviour at this time—the emphasis would help their case, so it could be argued that the fact that they do not make it means that it is incorrect. Appian 2.135.566–136.568 says that L. Piso was the prime mover, supported here by *Suet. Caes.* 83.1. P.’s τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀντώνιον | (= ‘Antony and his friends’) can hardly refer to Piso, especially in view of ὃν ὁ Ἀντώνιος ... τρόπον at 20.2, so there is a case for supposing that P. has simply inferred that it was Antony and his friends who demanded τὰς τε ... μὴδ’ ἄτιμον (20.1) from the fact that both events worked out in their favour. But P. is supported indirectly by Appian 2.128.535 and 2.134.559, where Antony is made to point out that technically if Caesar was an unlawful ruler, his body should be cast out unburied, emphasizing the danger from Caesar’s veterans if this procedure were followed, and by *Suet. Caes.* 82.4 ‘fuerat animus coniuratis corpus occisi in Tiberim trahere, bona publicare, acta rescindere, sed metu Marci Antoni consulis et magistri equitum Lepidi destiterunt’, which presumably refers vaguely to the senatorial debates of March 17 and 18. What has happened is this. L. Piso demanded the publication of Caesar’s will (Suetonius, Appian), and perhaps also that Caesar’s body should receive proper burial (Appian). Antony was involved in the argument that Caesar’s body should have proper burial (Suetonius, Appian). P. has taken the two issues (will and burial) together and made Antony prominent in both. Technically, the procedure is slightly untrue to the facts, but only technically, for no doubt Antony as much as Piso did want Caesar’s will published. (It has often been conjectured that he hoped to benefit from it

himself.) P. is simplifying his narrative to suit the schematic contrast between Antony and the Liberators, but the result is hardly misleading.

μὴ κεκρυμμένην ... ἄτιμον: according to Suet. *Caes.* 82.4 (quoted above) the conspirators had planned to throw Caesar's body into the Tiber; the existence of this plan is very likely. Since they held that Caesar was 'iure caesus' (Cic. *Phil.* 13.2; Suet. *Caes.* 76.1), the stock phrase for the slaying of a tyrant, it would have been logical for them to try to prevent his funeral (see | further Weinstock 348, n. 1, for full references for this kind of punishment 255 of tyrants), and there are several pointers in the sources to support Suetonius. *Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1 'meministi te clamare causam perisse, si funere elatus esset' shows that Atticus thought that Caesar should have had no funeral at all, while in Appian Antony points out that this was the technically correct procedure if Caesar was a tyrant (2.128.535), and the way in which he speaks at 2.134.559 suggests that in Appian's view this punishment was being canvassed at the time, an impression which is reinforced by Piso's remark (οἱ τύραννον λέγοντες ... ἀνηρηκέναι ... θάπτειν με κωλύουσι) at 2.136.567. Dio 44.35.1 also says that *τινες καὶ ἄταφον τὸ σῶμα ... ῥῖψαι ἐπενόουν*, and though he implies that these did not include the conspirators, too busy enjoying their reputation as liberators and tyrannicides (according to Dio), it is more important that he records the proposal than that he denies that it came from the Liberators, his bias against them being obvious. Finally, it is known that Cassius argued for the equally extreme but logical annulment of Caesar's will (Vell. 2.58.2, cf. Suetonius' 'bona publicare' and the present passage). It thus seems certain that the conspirators did intend to cast out Caesar's body unburied in proper anti-tyrant style. Is this what P. has in mind here? His wording is discreet, but the answer seems to be 'yes': *τοῦ σώματος ἐκφορὰν γενέσθαι ... μὴδ' ἄτιμον* does not just refer to a secret and dishonourable 'private' funeral—*ἄτιμον* has its full technical sense of 'deprived of civic rights', and the twin demands of *οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀντώνιον* in P. exactly match the demands of Piso in Appian (2.135.566f.). Further, there is a rough parallelism of thought between *Brut.* 20.1 and Antony's arguments in Appian 2.134.559, where the underlying argument is that the people and the troops, incensed already, would not tolerate Caesar's body being denied burial. |

ὡς μὴ ... δῆμον: this argument, perhaps from Antony's speech in the senate on the 18th (above), at first sight seems to strike a discordant note in the overall context of P.'s view of Antony, the consistent monarchist and opponent of the tyrannicides, but P. is not himself ascribing this reasonable motivation to Antony: it is merely the argument Antony uses to justify his position. 256

The counterargument was the exact reverse: Appian 2.135.566 *παρεκάλουν [Πείσωνα] μῆτε τὰς διαθήκας προφέρειν μῆτε θάπτειν τὸ σῶμα φανερώς, μὴ τι νεώτερον ἕτερον ἐκ τούτων γένοιτο.*

Κάσσιος μὲν: that Cassius wanted Caesar's will annulled is supported by Velleius 2.58.2. P. makes him actually speak on the subject in the senate, which is probably correct. The whole emphatically stated narrative from **Κάσσιος** to **σφαλῆναι** relies on the supposition that both men took part in the debate on the 18th. This is perfectly possible, since after the acceptance of hostages and rapprochement with Antony and Lepidus on the 17th their safety was technically guaranteed, while they had an obvious stake in what would be decided in the senate on the 18th. True, the evidence of Velleius and Appian contradicts P. here, but this is not of great significance. Velleius seems to imply that Cassius' insistence on the annulment of the will belonged only to the planning stage of the conspiracy, along with the proposal to kill Antony as well as Caesar ('consul Antonius, quem cum simul interimendum censuisset Cassius testamentumque Caesaris abolendum'), but (i) it could be argued that 'testamentumque Caesaris abolendum' is chronologically misplaced, since the continuation is 'Brutus repugnauerat dictitans nihil amplius praeter tyranni ... petendum esse sanguinem', which only covers the proposal to kill Antony; (ii) it is quite conceivable that Cassius insisted on the annulment of Caesar's will *both* at the planning stage of the conspiracy *and* | (the conspirators having lost the initiative in the immediate aftermath of the assassination) at the meeting of the senate which debated the question. The contradiction with Appian obviously raises the whole question whether there were two senatorial debates, about which enough has been said.

δεύτερον ... δόξας: for the concept of the 'critical mistake', cf. *Ant.* 38.1, 38.4, *Pomp.* 84.2ff., *Crass.* 17.8, etc. The archetype is the 'great mistake' of Patroclus in *Il.* 16.685f. The ἀρχὴ κακῶν motif (on which see Nisbet and Hubbard on *Hor. C.* 2.13.2) is also relevant. Is P. criticizing Brutus? As far as his sparing of Antony goes, obviously not, for P. regards that as δίκαιον. The P. who regards Caesar as a tyrant (as opposed to P. the reluctant monarchist) may feel that Brutus should have insisted on the casting out of Caesar's body. Yet the thought is veiled. From one point of view, P. is demonstrating that Brutus' concessions to Antony were not practical politics, which coheres with his general interest in making the *Lives* relevant to his readers, not only as guides to morality, but also as political case-histories. From another, P. himself is keenly interested in 'might-have-been' history (see E. H. Carr, *What is History?* [1961], 99, n. 2; {and e.g. N. Ferguson, ed., *Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals* (1997); R. Cowley, ed., *What If?* (1999) and *More What If?* (2001); A. Powell, ed., *Hindsight in Greek and Roman History* (2013)}). His stance here is ambiguous. He is only retailing a source view (δόξας), without committing himself to acceptance of it, yet on the other hand the mere mention of this view does suggest certain typically Plutarchean trains of thought. P. is able, as so often, to 'have it both ways'. Allusiveness and ambiguity are characteristic

of P. This is not so much a sign of muddled thinking as of an ability to see and suggest several different points of view at once.

δευτερον: unsurprisingly, P. knows nothing of (or pays no heed to) Cicero's hysterical belief that the initiative was lost irrevocably once Brutus and Cassius disregarded his dubious | constitutional advice to summon the senate to meet on the Capitol on the 15th (*Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1, 15.11 [389].2). 258

2. ἐπιτειχίσαι: a fine image. For discussion and parallels in P. see Fuhrmann 106. It is found also in Demosthenes, Josephus and others: see *LSJ* {and R. Brock, *Greek Political Imagery from Homer to Aristotle* (2013), 145 n. 155}. *βαρύν* and *δύσμαχον* maintain the image here.

διαθήκας ... εἶλεν: the inflammatory effect of the reading of the will, which took place in Antony's house (Suet. *Caes.* 83.1), is also attested at *Caes.* 68.1; Appian 2.143.596f.; Dio 44.35.2–3, all agreeing that Caesar's public benefactions were an important cause, while Appian and, to a lesser extent, Dio also stress the especial indignation felt against D. Brutus, a leader of the conspiracy and a second degree heir.

ἐβδομήκοντα πέντε: this figure also in Nicolaus 17.48 and Appian. It agrees with Suetonius' 'trecentos sestertios' (*δράχμη* = 'denarius'). Dio notes that though others gave the figure as seventy-five drachmas Octavian himself said it was thirty (!). (The *Res Gestae*, perhaps dishonestly, gives three hundred sesterces—15.1 {with Cooley's comm. (2009) *ad loc.*}.) *Caes.* 68.1 simply refers to a *δόσις ἀξιόλογος*.

καὶ ἀπελελειμμένην: the bequest of the gardens (Platner-Ashby 265; {*LTUR* III, 55–6; Ramsey on *Cic. Phil.* 2.109}) is also mentioned by Tacitus, Suetonius, Appian and Dio.

οὐ ... ἱερὸν: one of countless up-datings for the benefit of contemporary reader to be found throughout the *Lives*.

Τύχης ἱερὸν: cf. Tac. *Ann.* 2.41 (under 16 A.D.) 'aedes Fortis Fortunae Tiberim iuxta in hortis quos Caesar dictator populo Romano legaverat (dicatur)'.

θαυμαστή: without being as dramatic as P., Appian and Dio also imply that the reading of the will brought about a *change* in the people's attitude to the conspirators.

4. ἔπειτα ... Ἀντώνιος: this section raises the vexed question of the nature and character of Antony's funeral speech. | The main sources, besides the present passage, are *Ant.* 14.6–7; Suet. *Caes.* 84.2 ; Appian 2.144.600–145.606; Dio 44.36–49; *Cic. Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1 and *Phil.* 2.90–91 are also relevant. Other Ciceronian evidence has been canvassed (below). Modern discussions include E. Schwartz, *RE* 2.230; M. E. Deutsch, *Univ. Calif. Publ. Cl. Phil.* 9.5 (1928), 127ff.; Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 3 and n. 7; Syme 98, n. 1; I. Borzac, 'Caesars Funeralien und die Christliche Passion', *Acta Antiqua* 10 259

(1962), 23–31; Weinstock 351–55, 360f.; {Pelling on *Ant.* 14.6–8; Ramsey on *Cic. Phil.* 2.91; Gotter, *Der Diktator ist tot!* 26–7, 39–40, 267; Welch, *Magnus Pius*, 125–6; K. Hölkeskamp in C. Steel and H. van der Blom, edd., *Community and Communication* (2013), 11–13; J. Hall, *Cicero's Use of Judicial Theater* (2014), 134–40; H. van der Blom, *Oratory and Political Career in the Late Roman Republic* (2016), 264–7, with further bibliography}. Any attempt at resolution of the many complicated problems is outside the scope of this commentary. But a few observations may not be out of place.

Excursus I—The Historical Problem

Older discussions (Schwartz, Rice Holmes, Deutsch, Syme) tend to see the problem within a rather narrow political framework, concentrating on the questions (i) was Antony's speech long or short, or a formal *laudatio* or not? (ii) was it designed to arouse popular feeling against the Liberators? Within that restricted perspective, the evidence has been variously assessed. (a) The attempt of Weinstock and others to use *Ad Att.* 14.11 [365].1, 14.22 [376].1 and 15.20 [397].1 as evidence that Antony referred to Caesar in the funeral speech as a 'tantus vir', 'clarissimus vir' and 'clarissimus civis' is unconvincing: (i) though 'contio' can be used of the assembly that gathered to listen to a 'laudatio', it is not normally used of the 'laudatio' itself without a qualifying adjective like 'funebri' (so Drumann–Groebe 1.418; Deutsch 132). Weinstock quotes three parallels for 'contio' = 'laudatio' (351, n. 8). Only one, *De leg.* 2.62, helps his case, but even there the funeral context has an important bearing on the application of 'contione'; (ii) *Ad Att.* 14.11 [365].1 indicates a whole spate of pro-Caesar 'contiones', obviously normal 'contiones' It is hard to believe that the specific 'contio' Cicero had in mind was an exception; (iii) if Cicero was not present | at Caesar's funeral (Weinstock 351), *Ad Att.* 15.20 [397].2 'audivi' is strange; (iv) if Cicero was referring to Antony's allegedly provocative funeral laudation, surely Cicero would have done more than 'subdiffidere' (*Ad Att.* 15.20 [397].2). (b) *Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1 (19 April) 'Meministi te clamare causam perisse, si funere elatus esset? At ille in foro combustus, laudatusque miserabiliter, servique et egentes in tecta nostra cum facibus immissi' has been interpreted in radically different ways. Syme and Deutsch see it as not definitely incriminating Antony; Rice Holmes and Weinstock think it decisive for a contemporary reference to an inflammatory speech by Antony. Rice Holmes and Weinstock are clearly right, if only in the sense that Cicero (writing somewhat hysterically) believed Antony to have been provocative. Deutsch's counterarguments are very weak. (c) *Phil.* 2.90f. also incriminates Antony, and the attempts of Syme and Deutsch to argue that it represents a polemical progression from *Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1 are disingenuous: the tone is naturally more exaggerated, but the essential content is identical. But again, one may ask:

what value should be placed on Cicero's evidence? (d) All scholars, both those who believe that Antony made a long and formal speech and those who dispute this, seem agreed that Suet. 84.2 'quibus' (i.e. the senatorial decree and oath) 'perpauca a se verba addidit' offers a radically different tradition from that enshrined in Appian and Dio. Syme and Deutsch stress Suetonius' evidence as being deliberately 'cool' and iconoclastic, Rice Holmes and Weinstock simply dismiss it. It seems to have escaped notice that Suetonius' words are exactly paralleled in Appian 2.144.602 ἐπεφθέγγετο δὲ πού τι καὶ βραχὺ ἐκάστω (of the decrees). The inference is inescapable that Suetonius and Appian reflect a common source, and it seems likely that Suetonius has misunderstood it to mean 'Antony added a very few words *at the end of the reading of the decrees*' instead of 'Antony added a few | words *continuously throughout the reading of the decrees*' (Appian). In any event, Suetonius' evidence is *not* independent. This question aside, it is quite fraudulent for Syme to use Suetonius as evidence that Antony's political intentions were not provocative: *if* the whole problem is viewed within the narrow political perspective of Antony versus Liberators (I stress this qualification), then there is no way that the reading of the decree and oath could not have been provocative. Within this narrow political perspective, Cicero, Appian, Suetonius, Dio, and P. all support the conclusion that Antony was up to no good.

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Discussion has, however, been greatly advanced by the analyses of Borzac and Weinstock. Naturally some details remain obscure, but their analyses demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that the highly elaborate tradition recorded in Appian, but also paralleled in Suetonius and Dio to some degree, can be made sense of in religious or cult terms. Already in his life Caesar was to be a god (Weinstock *passim*; cf. the sober remarks of North in *JRS* 65 [1975], 175; E. Rawson, *ibid.*, 149 [= *Roman Culture and Society* 171–2]). Thus, that his funeral should be designed for the creation of a cult (Weinstock) or should contain suggestive liturgical parallels with Near Eastern and Egyptian cults of 'dead' gods (Borzac) is not surprising. Such a procedure was logical, perhaps even inevitable, after the uneasy political compromise of March 17, which guaranteed an amnesty, but also ratified Caesar's *acta* and on March 18 granted a public funeral. Inevitably, this put the tyrannicides in the unenviable situation of being theocides. It follows that the question: was Antony being provocative?—is the wrong question. The focus is too narrow. His behaviour should rather be seen against the wider context of the religious purpose of the funeral. Inevitably, this was against the interests of the tyrannicides: this does not mean that it was specifically directed against them. The funeral and the interests | of the tyrannicides were logically incompatible, but this incompatibility stemmed from the essence of the thing, not necessarily from Antony's behaviour at it. Such a formulation of the problem would explain why (Cicero aside) Republican protest at Antony's behaviour seems to have

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been surprisingly muted. If the letter of D. Brutus (*Ad Fam.* 11.1 [325]) can be dated to after March 20 (so S. Accame, *Riv. di Fil.* 62 [1934], 201ff.; *perhaps* the most plausible dating—see Shackleton Bailey *ad loc.*), it is striking that all he has to say is ‘adeo esse militum concitatos animos et plebis’ and that his chief worry is that he and his partisans will lose their provincial appointments. It would also explain why reasonable relations (on the whole) were possible between Antony and Liberators for at least a month after the funeral, and why in the *First Philippic* (1.32) Cicero can maintain that ‘proximo, altero, tertio, denique reliquis consecutis diebus non intermittebas quasi donum aliquid cotidie adferre rei publicae’—of course this is exaggeration, but there would not even have been specious justification for it had it been widely believed that Antony’s behaviour at the funeral was a deliberate attack on the Liberators. It would also to some extent explain the apparently startling inconsistencies in Appian’s and Dio’s accounts. Thus in Appian 2.145.604f. Antony pledges himself to avenge Caesar but then quickly recants when he sees senatorial reaction (2.145.605), and in Dio 44.51.2 ‘the consuls’ overthrow the altar set up to Caesar as god, even though one of the consuls, Antony, had helped to provoke the cult into being. And, given that the funeral did in fact end in violence, violence which was actually at odds with its religious purpose (see Weinstock 355), Antony’s behaviour, when viewed in the narrow political context of Antony versus Liberators, could easily be represented as, and—in the case of the excitable and mercurial Cicero—no doubt genuinely believed to be, deliberate arousal of | the Roman mob against the Republicans. It is also of course true that very early in the historical tradition suspect elements were introduced into the narrative of the funeral to play up its inflammatory aspect. (In this connexion Weinstock’s suggestion [354] that the historical tradition as represented by Appian is contaminated by a Praetexta called *Iulius Caesar* is particularly attractive.)

Excursus II—Source Relationships; P. in Relation to Other Sources

This discussion is also ruthlessly simplified and directed largely to assessing P.’s position within the tradition.

(a) Parallels between Appian and Suetonius

(i) reading of the senatorial decree and oath (Appian 2.144.600ff.; Suet. 84.2; different in that in Suetonius the reading is done by a herald, in Appian by Antony himself);

(ii) singing/chanting of lamentations, including verse from Pacuvius (Appian 2.146.611; Suet. 84.2; different in that Appian does not specify Pacuvius and Suetonius also cites Acilius’ *Electra*); Suetonius also misplaces this item (cf. Weinstock 350);

(iii) similar description of cremation of pyre and offerings of bystanders (Appian 2.148.616; Suet. 84.4); some close verbal parallels;

(iv) some connexion between Suetonius' robe on top of a pole (84.1) and Appian's robe on top of a spear (2.146.610);

(v) direct verbal parallel over Antony's 'few words' (above).

These are the most obvious parallels, sufficient to indicate a latent common source, though probably not a direct one, even allowing for Suetonian inaccuracy and Appianian melodrama.

(b) Parallels between Appian and Dio

(i) ? Dio 44.50.1 reflects knowledge of the tradition that reading | of the decree and oath played important part in the proceedings; or is this just source/Dionian 'psychologizing'? 264

(ii) general emphasis on the impressiveness of Antony's speech and its provocative character; different in that Dio attributes to Antony a very long speech (44.36–44), which has been rightly seen as largely made up by Dio (cf. F. Vollmer, *Laudationum funebrium historia et reliquiarum editio* [1891], 468; Deutsch 136ff.), and, unlike Appian's, as following Greek rhetorical theory (cf. e.g. S. MacCormack in T. A. Dorey, *Empire and Aftermath: Silver Latin II* [1975], 147); this difference surely says more about Dio than about source relationships; different also in that Dio seems to regard Antony's behaviour as marked by stupidity and recklessness (44.35.4) rather than a deliberate desire to manipulate popular opinion—? the judgement of Dio the political sophisticate;

(iii) contents of 44.49 closely resemble a dirge (cf. Deutsch), hence some parallel with Appian 2.146.607–9.

One may infer a latent common source, at some level.

(c) Parallels between Suetonius and Dio

The main parallel is the quite closely similar wording in Suet. 84.3 and Dio 44.50.2 on the mob's desire to cremate Caesar either in the *Curia Pompei* or on the Capitol (Appian 2.148.615 only mentions the Capitol). Common source?

(d) P. in relation to other sources

The two crucial Plutarchean passages are the *Brutus* and *Ant.* 14.6–7: *ἔτυχε μὲν οὖν ἐκκομιζομένου Καίσαρος ὥσπερ ἕθος ἦν ἐν ἀγορᾷ διεξιῶν ἐγκώμιον· ὁρῶν δὲ τὸν δῆμον ὑπερφυῶς ἀγόμενον καὶ κηλούμενον, ἐνέμειξε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις οἶκτον ἅμα καὶ δεινῶσιν ἐπὶ τῷ πάθει, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ τελευτῶντι τοὺς χιτωνίσκους τοῦ τεθνηκότος ἤμαγμένους καὶ διακεκομμένους τοῖς ξίφεσιν ἀνασειῶν, καὶ τοὺς εἰργασμένους ταῦτα καλῶν | παλαμναίους καὶ ἀνδροφόνους ...* 265

Cic. 42.4 also puts great emphasis on Antony's holding aloft the bloodstained clothing (ὁ γὰρ δῆμος αὐτὸς μὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς οἶκτον ἐξαχθείς, ὡς εἶδε τὸν νεκρὸν ἐκκομιζόμενον δι' ἀγορᾶς, Ἄντωνίου δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα δείξαντος αὐτοῖς αἵματος κατάπλεων καὶ κεκομμένην πάντῃ τοῖς ξίφεσιν), but *Caes.* 68.1 perhaps belongs to a slightly different tradition (below).

The *Brutus* and *Antony* accounts are closely similar in structure and content, though the *Antony* is longer and more detailed simply because it occurs in Antony's βίος. There are a few small differences: (i) the *Brutus* states outright that Antony 'changed' (μετέβαλε) the tone of his address, whereas the *Antony* only implies this (ὁρῶν ... ἐνέμειξε); (ii) the *Antony* says that the display of the bloodstained garments occurred at the end of the speech (τῷ λόγῳ τελευτῶντι), whereas the *Brutus* only implies this; (iii) the *Antony* adds that he commented adversely on the tyrannicides as he displayed the garments. But these differences amount to nothing; together the two passages present a consistent and harmonious view.

How does P. square with the Cicero/Appian/Dio tradition? He regards the speech as a 'laudatio' (ἔπαινος/ἐγμώμιον), in agreement with *Cic. Phil.* 2.90 (Deutsch's arguments here are inadequate), Appian 2.144.600 and Dio (by implication). (This is no doubt correct—Deutsch's confidence in Suetonius is misplaced—see above.) He does not specify its length but implies that it was fairly substantial (this too no doubt correctly). He represents it as intensely provocative and still more so Antony's display of the bloodstained toga. However, he also portrays Antony as 'changing' his tune in response to the evident passions of his audience, though the implication is that his speech up till that point had contributed | to their emotional state.

The display of Caesar's bloody toga by Antony is definitely paralleled in Appian 2.146.610. (Belonging to a slightly different tradition are Nicolaus 17.50; Dio 44.35.4; and perhaps *Caes.* 68.1, all of which refer in varying ways to a state of affairs before the delivery of the speech; note here the fairly striking verbal parallel between Nicolaus and *Cic.* 42.4, suggestive again of Nicolaan influence on P.). The idea of the 'change' in Antony's speech is more interesting, and is without exact parallel in the other sources. In Appian he is bent on mischief from the start (2.143.599), as also in Dio 44.35.4. Does this idea spring from a source other than that/those underpinning the Appian/Dio version? Almost certainly not. Appian shares with P. not only Antony's displaying of the bloodstained toga but also the theme of the 'mixture of pity and indignation'; (Appian 2.144.602 / *Ant.* 14.7 / *Brut.* 20.4, cf. *perhaps* Suet. 84.2—a different context), and to some extent makes Antony perform in accordance with what his audience expect of him (2.143.599 καὶ ὁ Ἀντώνιος ὧδε ἔχοντας ἰδὼν οὐ μεθῆκεν, cf. 2.145.605 θορύβου δ' ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς ἐπὶ τῷδε μάλιστα προφανῶς ἐς αὐτὴν εἰρημένῳ γενομένου, ἐπικαταψήχων αὐτὴν ... καὶ παλινφθῶν ...). P.'s

μετέβαλε does not necessarily imply that Antony altered his speech radically, merely that he changed the emotional tone. He is not suggesting the Tolstoyan idea of the statesman at the mercy of events quite beyond his control: Antony rather, a skilled (if vulgar) orator, is able to αὐτοσχεδιάζειν to manipulate the emotions of his audience. What P. describes at *Brut.* 20.4 seems to correspond roughly with Appian 2.146.610 εὐφορώτατα δὲ ἐς τὸ πάθος ἐκφερόμενος. All in all, it seems virtually certain that *Brut.* 20.4 (εἰς οἶκτον μετέβαλε) and *Ant.* 14.6 (ἐνέμειξε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις οἶκτον ... καὶ δείνωσιν) are nothing more than an amalgam of the material contained in Appian 2.144.602 | (ἐπεφθέγγετο δὲ πού τι καὶ βραχὺ ἐκάστω, μεμιγμένον οἶκτῳ καὶ ἀγανακτήσει) and 2.146.610 εὐφορώτατα δὲ ἐς τὸ πάθος ἐκφερόμενος. This means that P.'s failure to record the reading of the decree and oath mentioned by Suetonius and Appian cannot be taken as significant, any more than the omission of the dirge attested by Appian and (indirectly) by Dio: neither in the *Brutus* nor in the *Antony* is Antony's speech, although politically important, a literary set-piece; it seems clear that in the *Brutus* and *Antony* P. is drawing upon a tradition that is essentially that reflected in Appian. But he is reshaping the material in an interesting and individual way, to portray Antony as a man of unstable impulses (cf. esp. *Ant.* 14.5) and a political opportunist. The characterization flows naturally from the debate about Antony's true character at *Brut.* 18.3–5. It is of importance that P. suppresses all element of ritual or liturgy: we are dealing here with rampant political δημαγωγία. To return to the text ...

4. ἔπειτα: March 20 (Drumann–Groebe 1.417).

κομισθέντος: by Piso according to Appian 2.143.598, Antony according to Dio 44.35.4, 'magistratus et honoribus functi' according to Suetonius (correctly).

ὡσπερ ἔθος: noted also at *Ant.* 14.6; it defines the character of the speech: up to a certain point it was just a conventional and unobjectionable 'laudatio'.

εἰς ... μετέβαλε: Ziegler's punctuation is right anyway, but cf. *Ant.* 14.7.

καὶ πλήθος: for this cf. *Ant.* 14.7, *Cic.* 42.4 and Appian 2.146.610, where (differently from P.) ritualist symbolism is latent.

ἀνέπτυσεν: ἀνασεῖω is used in *Ant.* 14.7 and Appian, who is verbally close to all three Plutarchean passages. The lurid detail of this description is decidedly unrealistic. |

5–7. ἦν οὖν κίνδυνον: *Caes.* 68.1–2 is very closely parallel. The only slight discrepancy is that *Caes.* 68.1 seems to refer to a marginally different tradition from *Brut.* 20.4 (above). The *Caesar* also has a little extra detail, naturally enough. There are no grounds for deciding the relative priority of the two accounts.

5. **ἀνδροφόνους**: pejorative, but this is the *oratio* of the crowd.

ὥσπερ ... πρότερον: no other source draws this parallel, so it may be P.'s own, to suggest a demagogic *διαδοχή* between Clodius and Caesar. {On the parallel cf. Wiseman, *Remembering the Roman People* (2009), 232: 'The precedent was evidently in people's minds'.}

Κλωδίου: *RE* 4.82 (Fröhlich). Clodius was killed on 18 January, 52.

οἱ δ' ... καθήγγιζον: other descriptions of Caesar's cremation and the riot of the crowd in *Caes.* 68.1–2, *Ant.* 14.8, *Cic.* 42.4; *Cic. Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1, *Phil.* 2.91; Nicolaus 17.50 (very brief); Livy *Epit.* 116 (likewise); Suet. *Caes.* 84.3–5; Appian 2.147.613–148.618; Dio 44.50.1–4. All Plutarchean accounts are similar. Parallels between Suetonius and Dio, and between Suetonius and Appian, have already been noted. Otherwise the resemblances between the various accounts, all containing essentially the same information, are not startling.

συγκομίζοντες: Ziegler's tentative suggestion is redundant.

6. **ἐν μέσῳ ... τόπων**: no other source puts this emphasis on the location of the cremation. P. is suggesting that the people's behaviour was sacrilegious. The use of *καθήγγιζον* is agreeably paradoxical. There is something of the indignation of Cicero's 'At ille in foro combustus' (*Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1). One may perhaps connect this with the Plutarchean distaste for the imperial cult inferred by K. Scott, *TAPA* 60 (1929), 117ff.; R. Flacelière, *REG* 61 (1948), 97; *CRAI* (1971), 181; {S. Price, *Rituals and Power* (1984), 116–7; G. W. Bowersock, *Entretiens ... Hardt* 19 (1972), 187–90}. |

269 7. **ὡς ... κίνδυνον**: for other descriptions of the attacks on the conspirators' houses see *Caes.* 68.2, *Ant.* 14.8, *Cic.* 42.4–5; *Cic. Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1, *Phil.* 2.91; Nicolaus 17.50 (bare reference); Suet. *Caes.* 85.1; Appian 2.147.614; Dio 44.50.4 (bare mention). Cicero in both passages claims that Antony urged them on (!). Appian gives most detail.

8–11. **ἦν δέ ... διεσπίασθη**: this fine story raises the notorious problem of 'Cinna the poet', which requires separate treatment.

Excursus: Cinna the poet?

At *Brut.* 20.8 P. describes the Cinna lynched by the mob on the day of Caesar's funeral, in mistake for the Cinna who attacked Caesar in a speech, as a *ποιητικὸς ἀνὴρ*. In his account in the *Caesar* (68.3) P. describes him as *τις τῶν Καίσαρος ἐταίρων*. All other sources (Val. Max. 9.9.1; Suet. 85, cf. 52.3; Appian 2.147.613; Dio 44.50.4, 44.52.2, 46.49.2, cf. 45.6.3 and 47.11.3; Zonaras 10.12 and Xiphilinus 34.1.5 [Dindorf]—both straight Dio)

state that the lynched Cinna was the tribune of 44 (Broughton II, 324); Dio adds that he was a friend of Caesar.

P.'s wording in the *Brutus* suggests an identification with the famous 'neoteric' poet and friend of Catullus. Scholarly controversy over the problem has been considerable: for the identification e.g. Kiessling, *Comm. phil. in hon. Th. Mommseni*, 351ff.; Schwabe, *Philol.* 47 (1889), 169f. (without arguments); Page on *Eclogues* 9.35f. (without arguments); Van der Mühl, *RE* 8.226; Rice Holmes III, 347, n. 2 (without arguments); Teuffel 517; Schanz–Hosius 1.307; Syme 79 (without arguments); Rose, *Eclogues of Virgil*, 69 (without arguments); Rostagni, *Scr. Min.* II.2 (1956), 95ff.; Fordyce on Catullus 10.29f., Gelzer, *Caesar*, 319, n. 7 (without arguments); Williams, *Tradition and originality*, 43 | (without arguments); J. Granarolo, *Aufstieg und Niedergang* 1.3 (1973), 301f. (without arguments); T. P. Wiseman, *Cinna the Poet* (1974), 44ff. (the best discussion hitherto); {Clausen on *Eclogue* 9.35; J. D. Morgan, *CQ* 40 (1990), 558–9, reviving the suggestion of A. E. Housman, *JPh* 12 (1883), 167 and 35 (1920), 335–6 that Ov. *Ibis* 558–9 refers to the poet's *sparagmos*; A. S. Hollis, *Fragments of Roman Poetry* (2007), 18 ('unquestionably'); E. Courtney, *The Fragmentary Latin Poets* (1993), 212; J. L. Lightfoot, *Parthenius of Nicaea* (1999), 13}; *agnostic*: Drumann–Groebe 1.420; *against* the identification e.g. J. H. Voss on *Eclogues* 9.35f.; F. Plessis, *La poésie Latine* (1909), 182ff.; Deutsch, *CJ* 20 (1925), 326ff. (the fullest discussion); Ziegler, *Rh. Mus.* 81 (1932), 81ff. (Ziegler has apparently since changed his mind); Vretska, *Altspr. Unterr.* 6.2 (1962), 40; *KP s.v.* Helvius Cinna (the poet).

The attempt of Ribbeck, *Röm. Dicht.* I, 343, to sidestep the problem by rejecting the entire ancient tradition, supposing that it was the praetor Cinna who was lynched, is refuted by Cic. *Phil.* 3.26, which proves that Cinna to have been alive on 28 November, 44 (Schwabe).

Some may feel that Wiseman's arguments have finally put paid to the problem, but discussion in a Commentary on the *Brutus* seems inevitable, especially as interesting questions arise about P.'s source and his artistic purpose. What follows was written before the appearance of Wiseman.

The most commonly advanced argument against the identification is the alleged unlikelihood of a friend of Catullus becoming a friend and political associate of Caesar (e.g. Deutsch 334f.), but clearly there is nothing difficult about this: Catullus himself seems to have been reconciled to Caesar at least to the extent of accepting a dinner invitation (Suet. *Caes.* 73; cf. Cat. 11.10: ? sincere), Asinius Pollio, a friend of Catullus, Cinna and Caesar, could have brought Caesar and Cinna together, and it is obviously dangerous to rule out possible political associations in the 40s on the basis of alliances in the middle 50s. Caesar in the late 50s and early 40s may already have begun to play the part of the great patron of poets à la Augustus (Williams 42f.), and the sincerity and durability of feelings

271 expressed in Roman literary | or political invective should not be exaggerated—no more in Catullus than in Cicero.

Another common argument is the fact that none of the (fairly uninformative) sources on the poet mention his tribunate. This, too, amounts to nothing (cf. Ziegler 81 ‘bei so spärlichen und zufälligen biographischen Notizen ist das nicht verwunderlich’; and the trenchant comments of Wiseman 46). Nor at this period is there any improbability in the same man pursuing both a literary and political career, especially as, if the identification theory is accepted, Cinna would have had his *magnum opus*, the *Σmyrna*, at least ten years behind him when he started his political career fairly late in life (see now Wiseman 47f.).

Deutsch 331 and Ziegler 82f. find it significant that Valerius Maximus, Suetonius, Appian and Dio all fail to mention that the lynched Cinna was a poet. (This is on the assumption that they would have had access to that information, had it been true—an assumption that should not be automatic.) But why should they? For them the horror of the incident is enhanced by the fact that Cinna was a tribune of the *plebs*, i.e. sacrosanct. Again, they maintain (Deutsch 331; Ziegler 84) that if the poet Cinna had been lynched in 44 at least one of the various references to him in Virgil, Ovid, Martial, Quintilian, Suetonius (*De gramm.* 11 and 18) etc. would have mentioned the fact. But again Ziegler’s own observation (above) has force, particularly as the context of these *testimonia* is not strictly biographical at all, but literary or literary historical. It would be astounding if Virgil, for example, had inserted after *Ecl.* 9.35f. ‘but alas, Cinna was murdered’. Thus neither general arguments nor arguments from silence convince. Some other objections to the identification are more closely P.-based.

272 Deutsch 331 thinks that the terms in which P. refers to Cinna (*Brut.* 20.8 ἦν δέ τις Κίννας; *Caes.* 68.3 Κίννας δέ τις) | suggest an obscure person, who cannot therefore be Cinna the poet. But of course *τις* so used does not necessarily connote obscurity: it is the regular formula of introduction, particularly in an anecdotal context. The classic example is X. *Anab.* 3.1.4, cf. *Brut.* 18.8, *Caes.* 68.6. Even if Deutsch’s reading of P.’s terminology were correct, it would not make against the reference of ποιητικός ἀνὴρ: to P. and most educated Greeks of his time the poetry of Roman Cinna would have meant little or nothing (the Greeks of Gellius 19.19.7 were exceptionally erudite in Latin literature). And even in Roman terms Cinna was hardly a household name: Catullus, Virgil and Ovid praise him, but thereafter (Martial, Quintilian, Suetonius, Gellius) he is regarded as a sort of embodiment of pedantic obscurity. It seems clear that he was a ‘poets’ poet’—with all that that implies.

Ziegler 86 objects to the phraseology of *Brut.* 20.8 on the ground that in P. ποιητικός is usually used of things, but he allows *De esu carniū* 996B as an exception (cf. also *Quaest. conviv.* 698A, of Alcaeus), and such parallels as ποιητικούς ἄμα καὶ μουσικούς ἀνδρας (Plato, *Laws* 7.802b), τοῖς ποιητικοῖς

(*Laws* 2.656c), ἀπὸ Ὀμήρου ἀρξαμένοις ... τοὺς ποιητικούς (*Rep.* 10.600e), and in P. *De aud. poet.* 20A, *De Pyth. orac.* 407B, *Quaest. conviv.* 744E also show that the phraseology is justifiable. If this is ‘high style’ (Ziegler, cf. Rostagni 99), that is very appropriate to the *Brutus* passage. He also points out that in P. ἀνὴρ + various attributes is commonly used in apposition to proper names and feels that the absence of a connective before οὐδὲν τῆς αἰτίας μετέχων is suspect. If that were true, one could always insert καί (so also Russell). But the asyndeton is justifiable: οὐδὲν ... μετέχων goes closely with ποιητικός ἀνὴρ—Cinna was a poet (i.e. he was totally ‘unengaged’ politically); it was not only that he had no share at all in the crime. |

Deutsch 331 and Ziegler 83–84 make much of the fact that in the corresponding account in the *Caesar*, which Ziegler argues was written after the *Brutus*, and which is obviously similar in structure and wording, P. does not say that Cinna was a ποιητικός ἀνὴρ. Ergo, in *Brutus* ποιητικός is a gloss. But it is not clear that any special explanation for the omission is necessary: P. often has a detail in one passage which he omits in another, not always for any discernible reason. Here, however, there surely are artistic considerations. By the description of Cinna as a poet P. ‘videtur ... indicare voluisse, quantum homo studiis deditus ab his turbis civilibus abhorruerit’ (Voegelin); the general context—the dream and its eschatological flavour—are also redolent of high epic. The lofty ποιητικός coheres with this. But in *Caesar* the eschatological aspect of the dream is almost entirely absent and the balance between *Caes.* 68.2 and 68.3 is simply (i) Caesar’s enemies; (ii) Caesar’s friends; no reference to Cinna as poet is needed.

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Two more specific arguments have also been used against the identification.

The first depends on the dating of Cinna’s ‘Propempticon Pollionis’. If it was written on the occasion of Pollio’s departure against the Parthini in 40/39 (so Voss and Plessis), then the identification cannot stand (Page’s idea that the lynched Cinna was only ‘nearly killed’ is untenable). But a much more likely context is Pollio’s trip to the East in March 56, attested by Cicero, *Ad Fam.* 1.6 [17].1: a date in the 50s fits Cinna’s poetical ‘floruit’, and the surviving fragments of the poem cohere better with a first trip to Greece than with a military campaign in 40/39 (Schanz–Hosius 308; Kiessling; Rostagni 59–64; {A. S. Hollis, *Fragments of Roman Poetry* (2007), 21}).

The second revolves round the famous words at *Ecl.* 9.35f. (‘nam neque adhuc Varius videor nec dicere Cinna / digna, sed argutos | inter strepere anser olores’), written in 41/40. The question is: do these words necessarily imply that Cinna was still alive at the time of writing (as Varius was)? Of course the answer is that they do not: it is a standard trick to refer to great men from the past as if they were still alive, paralleled in everyday English (e.g. ‘John Betjeman is not as great a poet as Ted Hughes or T. S. Eliot’).

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This remains true whatever the exact implications of Virgil's model: Theocr. 7.39–41 'I am no match yet for Sicelidas of Samos or Philitas, but like a frog that tries to outsing the crickets'. But if the parallelism between Theocritus and Virgil is pressed, then it favours Cinna being dead in 40, since when *Idyll* 7 was written Philitas was almost certainly dead (Kiessling 351–55, whose dating is generally accepted). Ziegler 82, n. 1, tries to get round this by arguing that Theocritus' poem 'eine Begebenheit aus der Jugendzeit des Dichters erzählt' and that 'zu der Zeit, da die oben zitierten Verse gesprochen werden, ist Philitas ohne allen Zweifel noch lebend gedacht'. But the introductory words of the poem ἦς χρόνος ἀνίκ' do not justify the inference that the allusion is to an incident of Theocritus' youth: they are a conventional opening formula, of the 'once upon a time' type ('time—the present', Dover), and the bold assertion 'ist Philitas ohne allen Zweifel noch lebend gedacht' is simply a bold assertion. Thus Theocr. 7 does not go against the identification—if anything, it favours it (though Rostagni 95f. and Wiseman 56f. perhaps go too far here).

Thus far the identification is immune from attack. Two arguments positively support it.

The poet is Helvius Cinna (Gellius 19.13.5), so is the lynched tribune (Suetonius, Dio). The tribune is C. Helvius Cinna (Val. Max.); the reading of Cat. 10.30 (*MSS* 'cuma est gravis') can hardly be anything other than 'Cinna est Gaius', accepted by practically | all modern editors. Naturally Deutsch 334 fights against this, arguing that 'Cinna est Gaius' merely depends on the identification, hence that reliance on Cat. 10.30 to support it is circular. But it is hard to oust 'Cinna est Gaius': the *MSS* reading is nonsense and an amplification of 'Cinna' (10.29), picked up by 'is' (10.30), is required. If 'Cinna' is accepted as the first word of 10.30 (what else?), clearly 'gravis' must go, and 'Gaius' becomes practically inevitable. And if this reading is right, then the identification is very hard to reject. (A similar argument in Wiseman 46.)

Secondly, it is very difficult to dismiss ποιητικός as a gloss (a point unwittingly made clear by Deutsch 335, when he says that were it not for the words ποιητικός ἀνὴρ nobody would have been likely to think of the Cinna in P. as being the poet). If the identification is as unlikely as Deutsch maintains, who would have thought to insert <ποιητικός> as a gloss? It cannot, according to Deutsch, be a gloss based on Cat. 10.30, for that is itself (according to Deutsch) based on the identification in *Brut.* 20. Therefore it is independent. But how likely is it that someone would deduce that the man of *Brut.* 20 was the same as the poet? P. only gives the name as 'Cinna', and if the anonymous glossator took the trouble to check other sources for the lynching of Cinna, he would find that the man was called 'Helvius Cinna' or 'C. Helvius Cinna', if he got as far as Val. Max. But this would not help him. From Catullus he could only get 'Cinna' (according to Deutsch)—'Helvius' of the poet comes from Gellius (or,

worse, from Charisius in *Grammatici Latini* 1.80.22K). For the gloss theory to be right, therefore, the glossator has to be either extraordinarily stupid, making the identification on the sole ground that both men are called ‘Cinna’, or else extraordinarily industrious, having gone to the trouble to verify that both men were called ‘Helvius Cinna’. Even then, the identification would be a bold one, especially as | other sources go to great pains to characterize the lynched Cinna as a tribune. It all seems very implausible. Finally, what sort of glossator is this, with an intimate knowledge of the obscurer reaches of Latin poetry? No doubt it is considerations such as these that prompt Deutsch to suggest that perhaps ποιητικός should be retained, and the text taken to mean ‘a bit of a poet’, but not (of course) ‘Cinna the poet’; this is desperate. 276

To sum up. The identification is certain. Where, then, did P. get his information? P. is unique not only in recording that Cinna was a poet but also in preserving his dream, his physical condition, and his mental debate whether or not to attend the funeral. Does he know of Cinna’s political significance? One cannot be *sure*, but it would seem likely, simply because the story was obviously retailed in simplified form in the main historical tradition. Perhaps *Brut.* 21.2 implies a knowledge of Cinna’s political significance over and above the mere fact that he was a personal friend of Caesar. If so, P. has deliberately suppressed a relevant political fact in the interests of artistic effect. But P. cannot be working merely from the main historical tradition in *Brut.* 20.8–11 and *Caes.* 68.3–6 (such verbal parallels as there are between P. and other accounts should be explained by contamination with the main historical tradition, or possibly as an indication that the main historical tradition was itself working with P.’s main source). One might conjecture that his knowledge of the dream comes from the commentary on Cinna’s *Zmyrna* written by the freedman L. Crassicius of Tarentum (Suet. *De gramm.* 18 {= F 7b Hollis: so also F. Brenk in *ANRW* II.36.1 (1987), 323–4 with n. 147}), or from a dream-book, dreams before death being particularly assiduously collected. Perhaps P. was put on to this *recherché* item by learned Roman friends. {On P.’s treatment see also A. Zadorojnyi (as Zadorojniy) in C. Schrader, V. Ramón, and J. Vela, edd., *Plutarco y la Historia* (1997), 500–2, suggesting that P. may have found the item in Pollio after all.} To return to the text ...

8–11. ἦν δέ ... διεσπάρθη: for other accounts see references cited above. *Caes.* 68.3 is closely similar, but leaves some details | out, and adds others. Ziegler’s attempts to prove that the *Caesar* account was written second (art. cit. 83ff.) are unconvincing (especially as *Caes.* contains some extra information); on the other hand the allusive treatment of the dream in *Caesar* perhaps presupposes the priority of the fuller account in the *Brutus*. 277

8. οὐδέν: = οὐ μόνον οὐκ (Voegelin, rightly).

οὐδέν ... γεγονώς: similar wording in Dio 44.50.4.

9. οὗτος ... νυκτός: not elsewhere recorded, *Caesar* apart.

On P.'s use of dreams see Brenk, 'The Dreams of Plutarch's Lives', *Latomus* 34 (1975), 336–349 {= *Relighting the Souls* (1998), 104–17}; *In Mist Apparelled*, 214–235; on the present passage *ibid.* 221f. (confused). {Also Pelling in L. van der Stockt, F. Titchener, H. G. Ingenkamp, and A. Pérez Jiménez, edd., *Gods, Daimones, Rituals, Myths and History of Religions in Plutarch's Work* (Fschr. Brenk, 2010), 315–32, discussing this dream at 326.}

The meaning of the dream is plain: Caesar invites Cinna to dine with him in Hades; Cinna is to be initiated into the life of the underworld. Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 221, n. 7, points to ἀχανῆ τόπον as an evocation of χάσμι' ἀχανές in Parmenides, *DK B* 1.18—a celebrated description of the underworld. See on this J. S. Morrison, *JHS* 75 (1955), 59–68.

ἄναρ: note the more cautious ὡς φασι in *Caes.* 68.3, a less vivid account.

αὐτόν: an easy switch of construction after the previous accusatives.

10. ἐκκομιζομένου: the context is slightly different in *Caes.* 68.4 to suit the narrative of 68.1–2.

11. δόξας ... λοιδορήσας: verbal parallels in Suet. *Caes.* 85, Appian 2.147.613.

ἔναγχος: March 15 (18.11).

**Ch. 21: Departure from Rome; hopes of return;
Brutus' meticulous preparations for the *Ludi Apollinares***

The theme of this section is really Brutus' attempts to reinstate himself in popular favour (finally quashed by the arrival | of Octavian—22.1), but P. is reluctant to make this too explicit, lest he expose Brutus to the charge of *δημαγωγία* (see on 21.4). 278

1. τοῦτο ... πόλεως: closely parallel is *Caes.* 68.7 (with a cross-reference to the *Brutus* for the Liberators' subsequent careers and deaths). Other accounts of the departure from Rome are *Cic.* 42.5, *Ant.* 15.1; Nicolaus 17.50 (all very brief); Appian 2.148.615 (characterizing it as 'flight' and wrongly implying that it immediately followed the attack on their houses on March 20), 3.2.5 (more accurately recording that Brutus and Cassius stayed in Rome after others left); Dio 44.51.4 (vague).

τοῦτο ... μάλιστα: practically formulaic—cf. *Caes.* 68.7, *Dion* 45.1; the set phrase exemplifies P.'s constant anxiety to pinpoint the really significant event, as an essential part of his didactic method. Similar techniques are his emphasis on the 'critical mistake' (20.1), his 'snap-shot' portrayal of a statesman in his finest hour (18.11, cf. *Ant.* 14.4, *Camill.* 39.6, *Dion* 28.3, *Mar.* 4.6), his careful underlining of the event that disturbs the status quo (22.1), and his classification of several *Lives* into the scheme: ascent, prime, decline (see on 8.4).

Though Cinna's lynching frightened other magistrates whose *cognomina* were the same as certain prominent conspirators (Dio 44.52.2–3, 47.11.3–4), the lynching of a sacrosanct tribune being particularly shocking, it is of course an exaggeration to represent it as almost (*μετά γε τὴν Ἀντωνίου μεταβολήν*) the decisive factor in the Liberators' departure from Rome. P.'s narrative is streamlined and simplified in order to present a tight sequence of cause and effect. Cinna's lynching exemplifies the general popular frenzy against the Liberators.

μεταβολήν: picking up *μετέβαλε* at 20.4—Antony's 'change' in his speech is symptomatic of a much wider 'change' of | policy. 279

δείσαντες: again part of P.'s simplified and schematic view of relations between Antony and Brutus and Cassius—*Ad Att.* 14.6 [360].1 ('Antoni colloquium cum heroibus nostris ... non incommodum'—April 12) and 14.8 [362].1 ('optime iam etiam Bruto nostro probari Antonium'—April 16) show that the truth was rather more complex, though Antony's real aims, and attitude towards the Liberators, remain (of course) a matter of controversy.

ἀνεχώρησαν: ἀποχωρέω in *Caes.* and *Ant.*, but ἀνεχώρησαν here is good, for the word is especially used of political 'withdrawal' (e.g. D. Chr. 20.1), and this narrative is written from Brutus' point of view.

The implication is that Brutus and Cassius left Rome very soon after the funeral of Caesar, at which Antony's *μεταβολή* was made manifest, and the

lynching of Cinna (March 20). This is only slightly misleading: Brutus was still in Rome on April 7 (*Ad Att.* 14.1 [355].2), and on April 11 (*Ad Att.* 14.5 [359].1 and 3) and April 12 (*Ad Att.* 14.6 [360].1), Cicero, who himself had left Rome on the 7th, still thought him to be in Rome. He had been seen near Lanuvium by April 15 and was clearly on the move (*Ad Att.* 14.7 [361].1), but Cicero was still able to hope that he might get back to Rome (*Ad Att.* 14.8 [362].3), and only by April 19 (*Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1) was it certain that he would have to stay out of Rome indefinitely. The *Caesar* (68.7), a slightly more sober account, says more circumspectly that the Liberators left *οὐ πολλῶν ἡμέρων διαγενομένων*. {On the timetable of these movements see also Ramsey on *Cic. Phil.* 2.31, M. Toher, *CQ* 54 (2004), 180–1, and Pelling on *Caes.* 68.7.}

Ἀντίω: Nicolaus 17.50 also makes Antium the first stop. Brutus actually went first to his estate at Lanuvium (*Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].1, cf. 14.7 [361].1), but the famous conference of Brutus, Cassius, Cicero, Servilia and Favonius took place at Antium (*Ad Att.* 15.11 [389]). Gelzer 993 hypothesizes the following sequence of events: (i) retirement to Antium after March 20, (ii) return to Rome after order | restored; (iii) retirement to Antium after second outbreak of rioting. This schema receives no support from Cicero and underestimates the literary technique of Nicolaus and P.—a *slight* simplification of events. In any case, *ἐν Ἀντίῳ τὸ πρῶτον* is not really inaccurate: Lanuvium was virtually *suburbana*.

παρακμάση: see on 8.4.

αὐθις ... κατίοντες: for Brutus' yearning to return to Rome cf. *Ad Att.* 14.16 [370].1 (May 2—'mihi quidem videtur Brutus noster iam vel coronam auream per forum ferre posse'), 14.18 [373].3 (May 9—'Brutus noster, singularis vir, si in senatum non est Kal. Iuniis venturus, quid facturum sit in foro, nescio'), 14.20 [374].3 (May 11—'Atque utinam liceat isti contionari! cui si esse in urbe tuto licebit, vicimus'), 15.11 [389].1 (June 8—'Romam ... si tibi [Ciceroni] videtur': Brutus' *ipsissima verba*), and 15.11 [389].3 ('noster cito deiectus est de illa inani sermone quo Romae velle esse dixerat').

2. πλήθει ... φερομένοις: this characterization of the *plebs Romana* seems Plutarchean rather than Brutan/Cassian, reflecting both his well-attested distaste for rapid and illogical changes of attitude and his belief that the people were naturally easily swayed. The blithe optimism of *ὁ ῥαδίως ...* also looks like Plutarchean interpretation of motive rather than accurate reportage of the real feelings of the Liberators: only Brutus set such great store by the possibility of a change in popular feeling but even he did not suppose it would happen 'easily'. The point is that P. wishes to explain why the Liberators hung around the outskirts of Rome for so long in the hope of gaining popular favour, but is unwilling to make an explicit connexion between that hope and Brutus' (in effect) *κολακεία* of the people in arranging his games so magnificently, hence his explanation takes the form

of a generalized sentiment on the | fickleness of the masses. It is very striking that while P. is quite prepared to document the care taken by Pericles, whom he warmly admires, to secure the goodwill of the people, he slides over Brutus' efforts in the same direction, interpreting them in quite a different way (below). A good example of how strongly idealized is his portrait of the philosophical Brutus. 281

φορὰς ... φερομένοις: the cognate accusative gives a slightly poetic flavour.

ἢ ... συνελάμβανεν: no other source has these details.

τούς ... ἔασασα: 'scilicet quia Caesaris amicus fuerat' (Voegelin, rightly).

ἐκείνων: one might have expected *ἑαυτῶν*, but *ἐκείνων* marks a transition from 'subjective' to 'objective' narrative, and seems all right.

3. ἤδη δὲ ... ἀχθόμενος: with *ἤδη* P. effectively slides over the complex events from mid-April to the start of July. Though there were sporadic popular demonstrations in favour of the Republican cause (e.g. *Ad Att.* 14.2 [356].1, 14.16 [370].1, 14.17A [371A].6 = *Ad Fam.* 9.14 [326].6), it is misleading to imply that Antony had lost the support of the people because of his (alleged) monarchical tendencies: his difficulties with the people arose partly because he was not sufficiently *anti*-Republican and partly because of his disagreements with Octavian, the two factors naturally being connected. But P. is schematizing and moulding the narrative to fit the preconceptions of the *Life*: Antony the monarchist falls into disfavour with the sovereign people (the *πλήθη* of 21.2 become the *δῆμος* at 21.3), and the consequence has to be that the liberty-loving people long for Brutus, the true Republican, even if the truth of the matter was that if Brutus had returned to Rome his life would have been in danger at the hands of ... the people!

Ἄντωνίου ... καθισταμένου: for this view of Antony cf. 18.3n. and | Livy *Epit.* 117; Nicolaus 29.115, 29.118; Velleius 2.61.1; Dio 45.24.2 etc. Such a charge was often trotted out against a strong consul in a crisis (e.g. Cicero in 63). 282

3-4. καὶ προσεδοκᾶτο ... περιπτῶς: as *praetor urbanus* Brutus ought to have presided at the *Ludi Apollinares* (7-13 July), but he was finally persuaded by Cicero that it would be too dangerous for him to go to Rome and he left the task to C. Antonius (Antony's brother), though the games were celebrated in his name and at his (very considerable) expense. Brutus himself (but not Cicero nor Cassius) had great hopes of the political fruits of the games. Sources on these games: *Ad Att.* 15.10 [388].1, 15.11 [389].3, 15.12 [390].1, 15.18 [395].2, 15.26 [404].1, 15.28 [405], 15.29 [408], 16.2 [412].3, 16.4 [411].1, 16.5 [410].1 and 16.5 [410].3, *Phil.* 1.36, 2.31; Appian 3.23.87 and 3.24.90; Dio 47.20.2 (error-ridden). See Weinstock 156f.

4. αἰσθόμενος ... πόλιν: for contemporary evidence of the increasing political importance of the views of veterans and their active opposition to the Liberators, cf. e.g. *Ad Att.* 15.5 [383].2.

Καίσαρι: Sintenis' correction (ὑπό + dat. = 'under the command of') is necessary. The *MSS* make the same error at 22.3.

οὐκ ἐθάρρησεν: in fact it was Cicero who made Brutus see reason (*Ad Att.* 15.11 [389].1, 15.12 [390].1). The phraseology does not imply criticism of Brutus for faintheartedness, however, for τὸ θαρρῆν is not necessarily a good thing. Perrin's 'he had not the courage to come' creates quite the wrong impression in a section concerned with Brutus' devotion to the duties of his office in the face of considerable practical difficulties.

ἀλλ' ... ἐθεᾶτο: again Perrin's 'the people had their spectacles' is pejorative and inappropriate since P., so far from emphasizing the barbarity of the games as an institution or their importance as a form of political bribery, wishes rather to stress the punctiliousness with which Brutus made the arrangements for them, | despite being absent from Rome himself. Random sneers à la Tacitus are hardly alien to P. (cf. e.g. 39.6 and the perceptive remarks of L. Pearson, Loeb *Moralia* XI [1965], 3f.), but they are certainly not present here.

τὰς θέας: for the importance of *ludi* as a political barometer see on 8.6–7.

ἀφειδῶς ... περιττῶς: confirmed by *Ad Att.* 15.18 [395], *Phil.* 1.36; Appian 3.24.90; Dio 47.20.2. Atticus helped out (*Ad Att.* 15.18 [395]).

Though P. intensely disliked the Roman gladiatorial shows (see on 10.6), he is here by implication giving Brutus a good mark for assiduously carrying out the duties of his office (cf. 21.3) even when away from Rome. Of course the two attitudes are hardly consistent, but such inconsistency is not confined to P.: Cicero also privately deplored the barbarity of the games (e.g. *Ad. Fam.* 7.1 [24].3, *Tusc. disp.* 2.41) but considered it 'honestum' for Brutus to give the *Ludi Apollinares* (*Ad Att.* 15.26 [404].1).

P. does not state whether or not the games were a political success (though he perhaps implies that they were), the reason being that he is reluctant to make explicit the connexion between Brutus' hopes of a return to Rome and the munificence of the games he presented to the Roman people. (Of course he is well aware of the political importance of *ludi*—cf. e.g. 10.6, *Caes.* 5.9.) The gist of the more reliable Ciceronian evidence (*Ad Att.* 16.2 [412].3, 16.5 [410].1 and 3) is that they were successful to a degree but not spectacularly so. This is not really inconsistent with Appian, who says that a certain number of bribed spectators shouted for the recall of Brutus and Cassius, thereby arousing the pity of the rest, but that crowds rushed in and stopped the games until they checked the demands for the Liberators' recall: it is obviously possible that it was the crowds who ran in who were bribed and not those who shouted for the recall (or perhaps both groups were). In any | event, the temporary swing in popular feeling towards the Liberators was not sufficient to allow their return and it was

effectively snuffed out by Octavian's celebration of the *Ludi Victoriae Caesaris* (July 20–30).

5–6. θηρία ... εἰσαγάγωσιν: no-one else (not even Cicero) provides these details. They could be from a biographical source or (perhaps more likely) simply from a lost letter of Brutus (cf. 22.6).

καὶ τῶν περὶ ... προσήκειν: though P. does mention the more bestial aspect of the games he puts more emphasis on the *Greek* games, as befits his insistence on Brutus' Philhellenism and his own national prejudice. In fact the Greek games were poorly attended (*Ad Att.* 16.5 [410].1).

Κανουτίου: *RE* 3.1485 (Münzer). Only mentioned here.

Ἑλλήνων: Latte's *Ῥωμαίων* is obviously wrong. 'Canutius' does not of course necessarily refer to a Roman. Apart from the fact that there are no arguments against *Ἑλλήνων* the statement that Brutus went to Naples in search of the best *τῶν περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνιτῶν* and the emphasis on Brutus' sentiment (as [i] revealing Brutus' Philhellenism and [ii] reflecting P.'s own strong patriotism) clinch the *MSS* reading. {In his revision of Ziegler Gärtner notes Campe's suggestion *τεχνιτῶν* (1863).}

προσήκειν: Dacier is right. The whole clause picks up *πείσαντες* (emphatic) and represents Brutus' own argument. Whether Brutus did write this may be argued (perhaps he did, if he was writing to Greeks).

ἔγραφε ... Κικέρωνι: this is confirmed by *Ad Att.* 15.26 [404].1. The letter from Brutus to which Cicero there refers may well be the one P. cites. Brutus pestered Cicero to go (cf. 'idem illud, ut spectem'), but he refused, because it would be both dangerous and undignified to return to Rome after so long an absence. The point of this sentence in P. is obscure. As Cicero makes clear, Brutus | wanted Cicero to attend in order to be able to report back on the success of the games in political terms, but it seems unlikely that this is what P. is suggesting here: this would be out of keeping with the whole tenor of the chapter and would have to be taken as a realistic afterthought which P. has just casually stuck on at the end. Perhaps the point is that Cicero is to attend the games because they are of such a high standard aesthetically, or it may just be that P. has added this piece of information simply because his mind was running on letters Brutus wrote to his friends about the games asking people to attend them, so that *περὶ δὲ ... προσήκειν* automatically spawned *ἔγραφε δὲ καὶ ... δεόμενος*, though the first sentence is highly relevant to P.'s purposes and the second an incidental detail. Just possibly, P. intends the detail as another indication of Brutus' conscientiousness over the whole business of the games. However interpreted, the sentence (in my opinion) reads slightly oddly.

**Ch. 22: Republican hopes dashed by the advent of Octavian;
the difference between the response of Brutus and Cicero to
the new δεσπότης**

1. *ἐν τοιαύτῃ ... ὄντων*: this, or a similar phrase like *ἐνταῦθα δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων* (*Ant.* 16.1), is another common Plutarchean narrative formula, serving to sum up the situation before the introduction of an important new element—here Octavian.

ἑτέρα ... μεταβολή: the second *μεταβολή*, after the *μεταβολή* of Antony (21.1). *μεταβολή* here = ‘change in the political situation’. The archetype is of course Thuc. 1.1.

2. See also Russell 130f. One may liken the technique, if one wishes, to tragic *περιπέτεια*, though the analogy is hardly directly relevant to P.

286 *ἐπελθόντος*: for Octavian’s arrival in Italy and | entrance into Rome see *Ad Att.* 14.5 [359].3, 14.6 [360].1, 14.10 [364].3, 14.11 [365].2, 14.12 [366].2, 14.20 [374].5, 14.21 [375].4, *Ad Brut.* 1.17 [26].5; Livy *Epit.* 117; Nicolaus 17.44–18.57; Vell. 2.59.5–6; Suet. Aug. 8.2; Appian 3.10.33–12.40; Dio 45.3–5.2; in P. also *Cic.* 43.8 and *Ant.* 16.1.

P. implies that Octavian went straight to Rome (below). On the detailed chronology of Octavian’s movements see Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 12f; {M. Toher, *CQ* 54 (2004), 174–84, with further bibliography.}

Octavian entered Rome at the beginning of May, though *Cic.* 43.8 very carelessly implies that he did not do so until after the famous meeting of the senate on September 1, 44. {Toher makes it likely that Octavian in fact arrived in Rome on or around 11 April.} The *Brutus* is nearer the truth, though still—from a strictly historical point of view—not above reproach (below).

With the phrase *τοῦ νέου Καίσαρος ἐπελθόντος* P. resumes the straightforward chronological narrative he had temporarily dropped at 21.3ff., a passage which looks forward to July 44. The effect of his discussion of Brutus’ preparations for the games is slightly to obscure the fact that the chief political significance of Octavian’s arrival was that it presented the first serious challenge to Antony’s pre-eminence—a point made as early as *Ad Att.* 14.10 [364].3 (April 19) and frequently repeated thereafter—though it is true that P. later picks up this theme at 22.3. In *ch.* 21 he has already begun to deal with the situation when Antony’s prestige was considerably impaired (21.3), partly because of his uneasy relationship with Octavian, though P. has to supply a quite different explanation, implausibly alleging that the cause was the people’s longing for the constitutionally-minded Brutus (cf. 21.3n.). Thus in its present context *ἐν τοιαύτῃ ... ὄντων* does not refer—as historically it ought to—to the time when Antony was completely preeminent but rather to the time when Antony’s authority was already somewhat eroded. Such inaccuracies are an occupational hazard of a narrative which is not ordered by strictly

chronological | criteria. (I do not agree with the interpretation of this chapter advocated by Wilson 139.) 287

ἀδελφιδῆς Καίσαρος: i.e. Atia. On Octavian's connexion with Caesar, through his mother Atia, Caesar's niece, see Suet. *Aug.* 4.1.

γράμματι ... ἀπολελειμμένος: on Caesar's will see 20.3 and n. Wilson, *loc. cit.*, offers a clear discussion of the legal problems raised by the will. They are not relevant here.

2. ἐν δ' ... προσμένων: other accounts of Octavian in Apollonia are Livy *Epit.* 114; Nicolaus 130.16; Strabo 13.4.3; Vell. 2.59.4; Sen. *Ep.* 15.2.46; Quint. 3.1.17; Suet. *Aug.* 8.2 and 89.1; Appian 3.9.30; Dio 45.3.10.

εὐθύς: accurate—cf. 10.3n.

3. ἄμα ... Ῥώμην: in fact Octavian landed first at Brundisium and spent nearly a month in Italy sounding out Philippus, Balbus and Cicero before making his way to Rome itself (references in 22.1n. above {but see also Toher, cited there, for a probable brief stay in Rome in mid-April before moving on to Puteoli}), but it is readily comprehensible that P. should greatly simplify these manoeuvrings and telescope the time scale accordingly, since he wants to emphasize the great significance of Octavian's arrival upon the political scene and therefore feels no compunction about exaggerating the speed with which he made his presence felt. The conflation of time scale is a typical Plutarchean device (see on 3.1).

δημαγωγίας: this emphatic editorial pronouncement, taken in conjunction with the subsequent details P. records of Octavian's unscrupulous conduct (*καὶ διανέμων ... στρατευσαμένων*) and the weight he gives to Brutus' strictures on Cicero for his support of Octavian's ambition, seems to show P. unreservedly accepting Brutus' view of Octavian as the complete demagogue. This of course is the line P. himself takes on Caesar (*Caes.* 4–5 etc.); it is noteworthy that he is less willing to accept the logical corollary | of Brutus' condemnation of Octavian: his not so unfavourable 288 view of Antony (cf. 18.4–5n. and *Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25].4, where Brutus characterizes Antony as a 'bonus dominus'): here the Ciceronian tradition was (in the main) too strong for him. If his considered judgement on the young Octavian really was so disapproving, there would be no necessary contradiction with the fact that the tone of his *Life of Augustus* seems to have been generally laudatory, since 'the notion that Augustus' reign changed with time, growing "more kingly and public-spirited", was a commonplace' (Jones 79). As so often in P., however, some consideration must be given to the bias of the individual *Life*: Octavian is portrayed harshly here and elsewhere (cf. 27.1, 27.4–6, 39.8, 46.2) in the *Brutus partly* because P. identifies himself emotionally with the views and opinions of Brutus himself. In the corresponding *Antony* passage, though Antony also accuses

Octavian of *δημαγωγία* (*Ant.* 16.5), P.'s portrayal of Octavian's behaviour is not so nearly unsympathetic, the emphasis being rather on Antony's high-handed treatment of Caesar's legitimate heir (*Ant.* 16.1–5). Thus though the bulk of the evidence (cf. also *Cic.* 46.1, 46.6, *Ant.* 19.1, 19.4, 22.1–2, 53.1, 89.2) confirms P.'s generally unfavourable view of the young Octavian, it has to be borne in mind that he was prepared to adjust this belief—like so many others—to suit the needs of the particular dramatic situation.

δημαγωγίας: pejorative in context, as of course very often in P. (though by no means always).

τοῦνομα ... ἐαυτῷ: for Octavian's formal acceptance of his adoption (early May) see Appian 3.14.49, and cf. Livy *Epit.* 117; Vell. 2.60.1–2; Suet. *Aug.* 8.2, Dio 45.3.2, *Cic.* 43.8. Brutus refused to concede Octavian the use of the name Caesar (22.4n.).

289 *καὶ διανέμων ... πολίταις*: for Octavian's protracted efforts, persistently hindered by Antony, to fulfill the bequests of Caesar's | will, see *Cic.* 43.8, *Ant.* 16.2; Nicolaus 28.198; Vell. 2.60.3–5; Appian 3.14.50–3.21.77, 3.22.86, 3.23.88f.; Dio 45.6.3.

κατεστασίαζε: Perrin's 'deposed Antony from public favour' is rather inappropriate (apart from anything else P.'s last mention of Antony—21.3—has left him *unpopular* with the people), the correct translation being 'overpowered by forming a counter-party'. Ziegler accepts Schaefer's 'correction' but Voegelin argues strongly for the aorist: 'videtur aoristi sensus esse, favorem civium, quem Antonius in funere Caesaris sibi conciliaverat, ipsa illa pecuniae largitione iam ad Octavium transisse. Non aequè celeriter apud milites res processit: de his igitur imperfectum adhibet auctor'. I agree with the *basic* argument here.

{For discussion of Antony's attitude towards the Liberators in July 44 see J. T. Ramsey, 'Did Mark Antony contemplate an alliance with his political enemies in July 44 B.C.E.?', *Class Phil.* 96 (2001), 253–68. Ramsey's answer to his question is 'no'.}

καὶ στρατευσαμένων: for this see *Cic.* 44.1, *Ant.* 16.6; *Ad Att.* 16.8 [418].1, 16.11 [420].6, *Ad Fam.* 10.28 [364].3, *Phil.* 3.3, 4.3, 5.23, 5.44; *Res gest.* 1.1–2; Nicolaus 29.115 and 31.131–139; Vell. 2.61.1–2; Tac. *Ann.* 1.10; Suet. *Aug.* 10.3; Flor. 2.15.4; Appian 3.40.164f., 3.43.176, 3.44.179; Dio 45.3.2 and 45.12–13. Octavian's corruption of the veterans took place in October 44, immediately after Antony's departure from Rome for Brundisium on the 9th.

συνίστη ... συνείχε: cf. 2.2n.

στρατευσαμένων: Sintenis' correction is right. Cf. 21.4 above in conjunction with *Cic.* 44.1 τῶν ὑπὸ Καίσαρι στρατευσαμένων.

4–6. *ἐπεὶ δὲ ... τύραννον*: the whole passage refers directly to the famous letters *Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25] (Brutus to Cicero) and 1.17 [26] (Brutus to Atticus), strongly reinforcing the impression that P. must have had access to a

collection of Latin letters to Brutus. Two questions may be asked: (i) are these two letters genuine? (ii) when, if genuine, were they written? For discussion of both questions see Tyrrell and Purser VI, cxxv–cxxviii (with extensive bibliography) and commentary *ad loc.*; Rice Holmes III, 340 n. 4 and *Architect*, 56 n. 2; Loeb ed. *Ad Fam.* III, 616–19 (Cary); | Stockton 326, n. 69. {A year after Moles' dissertation Shackleton Bailey's thorough and sceptical treatment appeared in his comm. on *Ad Q. Fr.* and *Ad Brut.* [1980]; Moles' own later discussion in *Letters* 148–61 is framed as a response to Shackleton Bailey. For further bibliography see that discussion. P. B. Harvey, *Athen.* 79 (1991), 22–9, supports Shackleton Bailey; Gotter, *Der Diktator ist Tot!* 286–98 rejects the arguments against authenticity and regards the letters' content as a true reflection of the political atmosphere, but is content to plead 'not for their authenticity but for their usability' for historical reconstruction (298).}

Tyrrell and Purser cover most of the essential arguments in their introduction, as well as dealing with various minor difficulties in the commentary proper.

(i) It seems superfluous here to rehearse all the old arguments. The defence of the authenticity of the letters by Tyrrell and Purser is in the main excellent and there is now a scholarly consensus that the letters were written by Brutus. (ii) remains more controversial and is relevant to the present context, providing a test of P.'s chronology.

Ad Brut. 1.17 [26] is securely dated to about the middle of June, perhaps in the first half of the month (Tyrrell and Purser *ad loc.*, following Müllemeister, *Bemerkungen zur Streitfrage über die Echtheit der Brutusbriege* I.16 und 17 [1879], 9). There are two pointers: (i) Brutus had not yet heard of the death of Porcia, though he knew she was (dangerously) ill (1.17 [26].7). Porcia died during the first half of June (Cicero's famous 'Consolation to Brutus', *Ad Brut.* 1.9 [18], which must refer to the death of Porcia, was written c. June 18, 43), so *Ad Brut.* 1.17 [26] must have been written before c. the end of June; (ii) Cicero had complained that Brutus had not congratulated him on the (apparently) successful outcome of the Mutina campaign (1.17 [26].1 etc.). Cicero could not have expected to get these congratulations much before the last week in May, as the news of the victory at Mutina only reached Rome on April 26 (*Ad Fam.* 11.14 [413].3) and Brutus had started to move eastwards about May 13. Time must then be allowed for Atticus to write to Brutus and for Brutus to get the letter and reply, which again gives a *terminus* of about the middle of June, or a little earlier.

The dating of 1.16 [25], however, is much more difficult. Ruete argued for end-December 44 on the grounds that: (i) the context of the letter is given by P. as after Octavian's corruption of the veterans (October 44), and this can be tightened up by the fact | that it was on December 20 that Cicero delivered his Third Philippic, which set in motion his public

campaign of support for Octavian; (ii) Brutus does not mention any of his military exploits.

(ii) is clearly without force: ‘it ought not to surprise us that Brutus did not make any mention of his military actions: for he was entirely absorbed in his censure of Cicero’s indulgence towards Octavian, and concentration of purpose was a marked feature of the character of Brutus’ (Tyrrell and Purser *ad loc.*). (i) is more important. Ruete is right in thinking that *Brut.* 22.3f. strictly implies a dating of post-October 44, but it is quite another question whether P. is correct in this dating, or whether indeed he fully understood what period *συνίστη καὶ συνῆγε πολλοὺς τῶν ὑπὸ Καίσαρι στρατευσαμένων* referred to. Nor can it be automatically assumed that *ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* must refer to the period *immediately* after Octavian’s corruption of the veterans; given that Ruete’s second argument does not provide a *terminus ante* of any kind, *ἐπεὶ δὲ ...* could cover *any time* after December. Tyrrell and Purser remark reasonably: ‘It is best to suppose that P. was once more inaccurate in chronology, being led into this error because such warnings and censures, as Brutus here utters, would seem more effective and more worthy of the supposed devotion to principle on the part of their author if they were represented as being made immediately on Octavian’s appearance in politics’ (by which they presumably mean ‘Octavian’s seizure of the initiative against Antony in October 44’). Even more cogent than this observation, which does not of itself *refute* Ruete’s position, is the fact (also pointed out by Tyrrell and Purser) that P.’s chronology at this point is self-contradictory: if *ἐπεὶ δὲ Κικέρων ...* refers (approximately) to December 44 P. then goes off the rails completely in *ch.* 23, which implies that Brutus’ departure from Italy and arrival at Velia occurred *after* the events | of 22.3–4, whereas in fact they occurred several months before, Brutus reaching Velia in the middle of August 44. Thus P.’s evidence on the dating of the letters is totally unreliable. Ruete’s arguments for December 44 can therefore be rejected.

Stockton, however, also wants a dating of December 44/January 43, on the quite different ground that ‘the whole tenor of the letter seems to fit ... a date around January when Antony was *in armis* in the North and still a potent and undefeated threat’. It is true that throughout the letter there is a general implication that Antony is still a danger (hence Cicero’s over-enthusiastic support of Octavian), as well as the specific statement 1.16 [25].8 ‘*Antonius vivat atque in armis sit*’. Nor is Tyrrell and Purser’s argument that Cicero could not have received *Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25], because if he had ‘he could not have written to Brutus ever again in such a friendly tone as *Ad Brut.* 1.3 [7] exhibits’ at all convincing: ‘he had to put up with a lot of brusque rudeness from Brutus (as years earlier from Appius Claudius and Cato), yet he still came back for more’ (Stockton). And the ‘*vivat*’ of ‘*Antonius vivat atque in armis sit*’ does not imply ‘(defeated but) still alive’: the contrast is between a ‘live’ Antony and a ‘dead’ Caesar. But there *are*

sound arguments against Stockton's position: (i) In their first edition Tyrrell and Purser plausibly maintain: 'it is more probable ... that *Ad Brut.* 1.16 was written *about*' (my emphasis) 'the same time as *Ad Brut.* 1.17, owing to the identity of subject'. This is a very general argument, but has some force, given the similar preoccupations of 1.15 [23] (July 43)—Cicero defends his policy of support for Octavian, in answer to 1.4 [10].1–3 (c. May 7, 43) and 1.4 [10].3–6 (May 15, 43), in which Brutus had attacked it. It does make a dating sometime in the middle of the year somewhat more likely than the beginning.

(ii) January 43 is not the only time which would provide a | suitable context for references to Antony 'in armis' and 'still a potent and undefeated threat': the middle of July or slightly earlier would do just as well. This is the date argued for by Mullemeister 7ff., and accepted by (among others) Rice Holmes, Tyrrell and Purser, and more tentatively Syme 184, n. 5 ('early July?') and Watt (*OCT*, vol. III—'7 July'). {Shackleton Bailey, comm. on 1.16 [25]: 'If genuine ... probably written in mid July'.} The reasoning is as follows: the letter Cicero wrote to Octavian which was so savagely criticized by Brutus (1.16 [25].1ff.) must, *ex hypothesi*, have been written when Antony and Lepidus had joined forces, a fact known in Rome by June 9, and when for the senate everything depended on Octavian's support (cf. *Ad Brut.* 1.15 [23].6). If Cicero wrote to Octavian in mid-June, therefore, Brutus could have heard of it in the first half of July. This gives a loose *terminus post*. A loose *terminus ante* (hardly needed, for it could be assumed without argument that Brutus would react quickly) is provided by 1.18 [26] (July 27), in which Cicero makes no allusion to Brutus' daunting accusation.

(iii) A final—all but clinching—argument is that 1.16 [25].7–8 (e.g. 1.16.8 'Octavius is est, qui quid de nobis iudicaturus sit expectet populus Romanus') looks very much like as if it refers obliquely to the time when Brutus believed that Octavian had been, or was about to be, elected consul (Gelzer 1009, Rice Holmes).

Argument (ii) gives a possible alternative context for 1.16 [25] of mid- or early July and this date not only explains the phrase 'Antonius vivat atque in armis sit' but is also more consistent than a date six months earlier with the undisputed dating of 1.17 [26], 1.15 [23], and 1.4 [10].1–3 and 3–6 (argument [i]). Argument (iii) practically decides the matter. Mid- or early July 43 is very likely the correct dating. {Gotter, *Der Diktator ist tot!* 288–9 prefers June.}

To return to P. P. also mentions the letters at *Cic.* 45.2 and 53.4 (= *Comp.* 4.4), both of which show a disregard/ignorance of | accurate chronology similar to *Brut.* 22.4ff. 294

Cic. 45.2 ἐφ' ᾧ σφόδρα Βροῦτος ἀγανακτῶν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Ἀττικὸν ἐπιστολαῖς καθήψατο τοῦ Κικέρωνος, ὅτι διὰ φόβον Ἀντωνίου θεραπεύων

Καίσαρα δηλός ἐστιν οὐκ ἐλευθερίαν τῇ πατρίδι πράττων, ἀλλὰ δεσπότην φιλάνθρωπον αὐτῷ μνώμενος.

This gives a date of some time in the autumn of 44.

Cic. 53.4 (= *Compr.* 4.4) ἔγραφε δὲ καὶ Βρούτος ἐγκαλῶν ὡς μείζονα καὶ βαρυτέραν πεπαιδοτριβηκότι τυραννίδα τῆς ὑφ' αὐτοῦ καταλυθείσης.

Gelzer and Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 56, n. 2, use this as additional evidence for their (otherwise correct) dating of *Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25] to early July 43, but P.'s comparison between the disinterested opposition of Demosthenes to the Macedonians and the less worthy motivation of Cicero is quite general, and it is wrong to try to pin him down to a strict chronology at this point—quite apart from the fact that the contradiction this reading would entail with the (apparently) alternative chronologies offered by *Brut.* 22.4 and *Cic.* 45.2 would mean that P.'s authority would anyway count for little.

To assess P.'s chronology in the *Brutus*. The first important point is that at this juncture P.'s handling of his narrative is essentially thematic: he is dealing with each of the main protagonists separately. Thus *ch.* 21 deals with the activities of Brutus, 22.1–3 with Octavian, 22.4–6 with the contrasting attitudes to Octavian of Cicero and Brutus, and *ch.* 23 again with Brutus. So at first sight there appears to be a case for taking 22.4–6 Ἀντώνιον τε κατεστασίαζε ... στρατευσαμένων as a deliberately unchronological insert, with 22.3 a brief résumé of *all* Octavian's activities in |
 295 Rome, and 23.1 ἤδη a resumption of chronological narrative, thereby absolving P. of all error. But not only does the narrative give the *impression* of proceeding chronologically (22.4 ἐπεὶ δὲ Κικέρων, 23.1 ... ἐν μὲν οὖν ... ἤδη δὲ ...), but the precise wording is designed to back this up. ταῖς πρώταις ἐπιστολαῖς completely rules out a dating of the letters to as late as July 43 and τῶν μὲν ὡς Καίσαρι, τῶν δ' ὡς Ἀντώνιον ... picks up the notion of Ἀντώνιον κατεστασίαζε and πρὸς Ἀντώνιον ... τὰ Καίσαρος. Hence, while it is true that P.'s arrangement of his material here is essentially thematic, it has to be conceded that he still attempts to represent it as chronological and in so doing makes what from a historical point of view can only be regarded as chronological errors. But in P.'s defence one may say; (i) it is unlikely that he himself would be much bothered by these errors; (ii) the dating of these letters is, after all, a rather tricky business.

4. τῷ μίσει: for P.'s acceptance of this view cf. also *Cic.* 45.1 {with Moles' comm. *ad loc.* and *Hermes* 120 (1992), 240–4} and *Ant.* 16.6. It derived of course from Brutus: *Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25].4 'quod autem tibi cum Antonio privatim odium?', 1.17 [26].1 'videtur (Cicero) ambitiose fecisse, qui ... Antonium suscipere ... non dubitarit inimicum', and below.

γράφων ... φιλανθρώπου: cf. *Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25].7 'deinde quod pulcherrime fecisti ac facis in Antonio, vide ne convertatur a laude maximi animi ad opinionem formidinis. nam si Octavius tibi placet, ... non

dominum fugisse sed amiciosem dominum quaesisse uideberis', 1.17 [26].2 'ut iam ista quae facit (Cicero) dominationem an Antonium timentis sint? Ego autem gratiam non habeo, si quis, dum ne irato seruiat rem ipsam non deprecatur', and 1.17 [26].4 'servitum, honorificam modo, non aspernatur'; *Cic.* 45.2 (above).

γράφων ... Καίσαρ: Ziegler takes this as a reference to *Ad Fam.* 10.28 [364].3 (c. February 2, 43) 'puer egregius Caesar, de quo spero equidem reliqua', but it is much more likely that P. has in mind | 'quamvis sit vir 296 bonus, ut scribis, Octavius' (Tunstall's certain correction of the *MSS* 'Antonius') of 1.17 [26].6, where the epithet 'bonus' is not Cicero's but Atticus' (so, apparently, Tyrrell and Purser)—see below. {But Shackleton Bailey prints 'scribit' [sc. Cicero], citing Plutarch in support, and this was accepted by Moles in *Letters*, 142 and 162–3 nn. 9 and 11.}

χρηστός: the natural Latin equivalent is 'bonus', not 'egregius'; cf. above.

Καίσαρ: this nomenclature also was a matter of dispute between Cicero and Brutus, who refused to call Octavian 'Caesar', even by implication ('Octavianus'), referring to him always as 'Octavius' or (à la Antony) 'puer' (e.g. 1.17 [26].1). His usages at *Ad Brut.* 1.4 [10].4 'Caesar tuus' and 1.4 [10].5 'Caesarem' are in ironic mimicry of Cicero. Cf. 29.10 (a verbatim quote).

“οἱ δὲ ... ὑπέμενον”: cf. *Ad Brut.* 1.17 [26].6 'sed dominum ne parentem quidem maiores nostri voluerunt esse'. An exemplary sentiment, but what is the reference to? Ziegler, who cites 1.16 [25].5 'concesserim ... ne patri quidem meo, si reviviscat, ut patiente me plus legibus ac senatu possit' as well as 1.17 [26].6 as a parallel, seems to take 'parentem' as referring to direct blood relationship. So apparently does P., though πατέρας is perhaps 'playing safe' as far as possible. If one excludes the possibility of an obscure tradition that the first consul was a son of Tarquin the Proud (see on 5.2), then there is nothing in the history of the Iunii Bruti to justify Brutus' boast. Presumably the reference must be to the assassination of Romulus. The parallel between the assassination of Caesar and that of Romulus was drawn in 44 B.C. (cf. Appian 2.114.476: the conspirators chose the Curia because of the Romulus parallel; Weinstock 347f.) and Romulus was 'parens patriae' (Weinstock 201f.).

πατέρας: guaranteed by Brutus' 'parentem'.

5. αὐτῷ ... δουλεύειν: there is no precise parallel for this statement in Brutus' letters, though the general thought | is implicit throughout, and 297 comparisons may be made with *Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25].8 'aut longe a servientibus abero mihi que esse iudicabo Romam ubicumque liberum esse licebit', 1.16 [25].9 'sed certe non succumbam succumbentibus nec vincar ab eis qui se vinci volunt, experiarque et tentabo omnia neque desistam abstrahere a servitio civitatem nostram', and 1.17 [26].6 'vivat Cicero ... supplex et obnoxius ... ego certe, quin cum ipsa re bellum geram, hoc est

cum regno et imperiis extraordinariis et dominatione et potentia quae supra leges esse velit, nulla erit tam bona condicio serviendi qua deterrear’.

μήτε πολεμείν ... δεδόχθαι: this was perhaps still true as late as July 43 (Gelzer 1003f.; Syme 183), but it is more obviously applicable to Brutus six months or so earlier, which would fit P.’s apparent dating of the letters, or even before that. There must therefore be a strong presumption that P. has adapted the thought of Brutus’ letters slightly to suit what he imagines to be their correct date, and if so this strengthens the supposition that P. has positively misdated *Ad Brut.* 1.16 [25] and 1.17 [26].

θαυμάζειν ... φοβεῖται: this is in effect little more than elegant variation on the theme *ὡς οὐ δεσπότην ... φιλανθρώπου*.

τοῦ δ’ ... τύραννον: cf. *Ad Brut.* 1.17 [26].2 ‘quid hoc mihi prodest si merces Antoni oppressi poscitur in Antoni locum successio?’, 1.17 [26].5, ‘quid enim nostra victum esse Antonium, si victus est ut alii vacaret quod ille obtinuit?’ and more generally, for the theme of the substitute tyrant, 1.16 [25].1 ‘ut prorsus prae te feras non sublatam dominationem sed dominum commutatum esse’, 1.16 [25].2 ‘vindici ... alienae dominationis non vicario’, 1.16 [25].4 ‘ut illo prohibito rogaremus alterum, qui se in eius locum reponi pateretur’, *Cic.* 45.2 (above) and 53.4 *μείζονα καὶ βαρυτέραν πεπαιδοτριβηκότι τυραννίδα τῆς ὑφ’ αὐτοῦ καταλυθείσης*.

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A brief assessment of P.’s use of these letters. Clearly P. | has taken them from an extant collection of Brutus’ letters. He understands fully their historical significance. Of course, they also supply overwhelmingly persuasive evidence for one aspect of Brutus’ character that P. stresses throughout the *Life*: the purity of Brutus’ purpose. Exactly how is P. using them? Clearly he does not follow Brutus *ad verbum*, “οἱ δέ ... ὑπέμενον” excepted. On the other hand, his arrangement of Brutus’ thought is far from random: 22.4 *ὡς οὐ δεσπότην ... φιλανθρώπου* follows naturally upon the conjunction of Antony and Octavian in 22.3; the next step in the argument is naturally the attack upon the very concept of despotism; the reference to the *μισθός* (22.6) prepares for the venality of 23.1 (and links back to 22.3, in typical ‘ring’ fashion). It does not therefore follow from the mere fact that 22.4–6 is an amalgam of two Brutus letters that P. is relying on memory to reproduce them. What, however, does perhaps suggest use of memory is the reference *ὡς χρηστός ... Καίσαρ* if (as I believe) this comes from *Ad Brut.* 1.17 [26].6 rather than *Ad Fam.* 10.28 [364].3. {At *Letters*, 141–2 Moles expresses a firmer preference for ‘conscious re-writing’ rather than use of memory.} That P. has misdated the letters (through ignorance rather than deliberate purpose) seems clear, but, unless one is applying impossibly perfectionist standards, no discredit attaches to this.

Ch. 23: Brutus decides to leave Italy

This moving narrative marks the turning-point in Brutus' career after the assassination of Caesar. Brutus has now no choice but to leave Italy and prepare for war in the provinces (rightly or wrongly P. assumes that Brutus intended war from the outset after his departure from Italy). Several major themes are again emphasized: the conflict between public duty and private grief (Brutus must leave his wife and home to go off to the wars), the love between husband and wife, the conflict between passion and | reason, the Hellenic *χάρις* of Brutus. The tone is lightened by Brutus' affectionate, yet drily humorous, remarks about Porcia, but, although the evocation of *Iliad* 6 is a *datum* of the tradition, one is bound to feel that it colours the whole narrative. Brutus, like Hector, is doomed to die in defence of his fatherland. P. brings out the pathos of the situation with effortless ease. One cannot say what changes or expansions he has wrought on his main source, Bibulus, but on the whole the narrative gives the impression of being quite 'straight'.

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1-4. ἤδη ... ἔκλαιεν: the whole passage is excerpted by Phot. *Bibl.* p. 393, with minor textual variations, plus *Dion* 36 (on the correct attitude for the historian to adopt towards the tyrant Philistus) under the rubric: Ἀνεγνώσθη ἐκ τῶν Πλουτάρχου παραλλήλων διάφοροι λόγοι, ὧν ἡ ἔκδοσις κατὰ σύνοψιν ἐκλέγεται διάφορον χρηστομαθίαν ('lu, parmi les "Vies parallèles" de Plutarque, divers morceaux dont mon ouvrage, en manière de vue d'ensemble, donne un choix', Henry in the Budé translation).

1. τῶν μὲν ... δισταμένων: this continues the idea of conflict between Octavian and Antony begun at 22.3 Ἀντώνιον ... κατεστασίαζε and 22.4 Κικέρων τῷ πρὸς Ἀντώνιον μίσει τὰ Καίσαρος ... The reference is general, though a distinction is being made between these people and the troops.

ὠνίων: Q's reading cannot be justified. ὠνίων etc. picks up 22.4 and 6.

ὥσπερ ... κήρυκι: 'praecone licitationem publice proclamante' (Voegelien, cf. Lat. 'sub hasta'). Brief discussion in Fuhrmann 52 and 157 n. 1.

προστιθεμένων: Kronenberg's *προστιθεμένων* is weaker. The idea of venality is already well conveyed by ὠνίων and ὑπὸ κήρυκι etc., and a word suggestive of actual movement is | required (cf. also *δισταμένων*).

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τῷ ... διδόντι: a vague allusion to the period (October/November 44) when Antony and Octavian simultaneously were offering donatives and counter-donatives to secure the loyalty of their troops (cf. 22.3n.). The description of the behaviour of the legionaries is conventional and to a limited extent misleading, since on several notable occasions they actually exerted a moderating influence on the rivalry of Antony and Octavian.

παντάπασι ... Ἰταλίαν: for Brutus' departure from Italy see Cic. *Phil.* 1.9, 10.8, *Ad Att.* 16.5 [410].3, 16.7 [415].5ff., *Ad Brut.* 1.10 [17].4, 1.15 [23].5, Nicolaus 31.135; Vell. 2.62.3; Appian 3.24.91; Dio 47.20.3. P. naturally sees

nothing reprehensible in Brutus' departure, though for a different view cf. Cicero's sarcastic *Ad Brut.* 1.15 [23].5. Brutus left Italy towards the end of August, after his meeting with Cicero at Velia on the 17th (*Phil.* 10.8, *Ad Att.* 16.7 [415].5). The movements of Cassius are less clear (below).

The datings of *ὀνίων ... διδόντι* (October/November) and *παντάπασιν ... Ἰταλίαν* (August) show that P. has again got the chronology wrong, and consequently the motive he gives for Brutus' decision to leave is also misleading (though it is of course true that Caesarian veterans began to be an important factor immediately after Caesar's assassination and continued so thereafter), the precise reason being the breakdown in negotiations with Antony (cf. e.g. *Ad Att.* 16.7 [415].5). But he is in line with a certain historical tradition. Nicolaus' account is similar both in the dating and the motivation of the departure, with the minor difference that it explicitly makes Cassius leave at the same time as Brutus, a point not dealt with by P. Dio also makes them go together but it is not exactly clear when he thinks this happened: 47.20.3–4 *αὐτὸς [Κάσσιος] δὲ οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀπέπλευσεν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ Καμπανίᾳ μετὰ τοῦ Βρούτου χρονίσας* [note: either Dio or a scribe has got Brutus and Cassius the wrong way round] | *ἐπετήρει τὰ γιγνόμενα. καὶ τινα καὶ γράμματα ἐς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἅτε καὶ στρατηγούντες, πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἔπεμπον, μέχρις οὗ ὁ Καίσαρ ὁ Ὀκταουιανὸς τῶν τε πραγμάτων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ πλῆθος σφετερίζεσθαι ἤρξατο.* This is a flash-back from the year 42 to explain why Brutus and Cassius came to be in the East in the first place. The chronology is characteristically vague, but seems to fit August better than October. *καὶ τινα ... ἔπεμπον* is definitely July/August and *τὸ πλῆθος σφετερίζεσθαι* suits Octavian in July/August (the *Ludi Victoriae Caesaris* etc.). *τῶν ... πραγμάτων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι* need not necessarily imply the violence of October/November (*pace* Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 44, n. 7). But the motivation attributed to Brutus and Cassius—fear of Octavian—is the same as Nicolaus' and similar to P.'s. Velleius is slightly more accurate (2.62.3 'nunc metuentes arma Antonii, nunc ad augendam eius invidiam simulantes se metuere'), but it is hard to say if he gets the dating right, since 2.62.2–3 is a flash-back. Appian (surprisingly!) gets the chronology roughly right, putting the departure after the failure of Brutus' games, but he does highlight the part played in this by Octavian.

Thus P.'s version at 23.1 is paralleled closely by Nicolaus (chronology and motivation) but is also to some extent in line with Appian and Dio (motivation). His faulty chronology is partly to be explained by the manner in which he organizes his material (cf. 22.4–6n.), but it seems clear that there must have been a historical tradition that Brutus left Italy in October through fear of Octavian's troop mobilization. This tradition could be explained in two ways:

(i) through a confusion of Octavian's activities in July and October, given an overemphasis of the importance he had for the decision to leave anyway;

(ii) through the belief that Cassius left in October, hence if | Brutus left with him (as Nicolaus, Velleius, Appian and Dio all imply), it would also have been in October and presumably as a consequence of Octavian's military activities in that month. 302

Many modern scholars (e.g. O. E. Schmidt, *Rh. Mus.* 53 [1898], 325; Ferrero III, 107n.; Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 44, n. 7; Tyrrell and Purser on *Ad Fam.* 12.2 [344] and 3 [345], and apparently Syme 119 and Stockton 292) believe that Cassius left in October, in contrast to the older view (Drumann–Groebe 1.431, 4.34, n. 13; Gelzer 999; Denniston, *Cic. Phil.* I, II [1926], 118) that it was in August, only shortly after Brutus. October is simply inferred from *Ad Fam.* 12.2 [344] and 12.3 [345] (late-September–early October), which are taken to imply that Cassius was still within easy reach of Rome; end-August 44 derives from *Phil.* 10.8 'Cassi classis paucis post diebus conseqebatur (Brutum), ut me puderet, patres conscripti, in eam urbem redire ex qua illi abirent'. The inference from *Ad Fam.* 12.2 [344] and 3 [345] is very shaky (cf. also the sane discussion of Wilson 162). At 12.2 [344].3 'quare spes est omnis in vobis; qui si idcirco abestis, ut sitis in tuto, ne in vobis quidem' the second person plural is not 'you—Cassius and your friends', but 'you—Cassius and Brutus'—cf. 12.2 [344].2 'vestro anno'—and this at a time when Brutus at least was definitely in Athens. Advocates of October have to dismiss *Phil.* 10.8 as rhetorical exaggeration. This would not be unreasonable in itself were it not for the weakness of the 'evidence' of *Ad Fam.* 12.2 [344] and 3 [345], taken in conjunction with the fact that *Phil.* 10.8 dates Cassius' departure to the end of August not just by the phrase 'paucis post diebus' but also by the implication that both Brutus and Cassius had left before Cicero himself returned to Rome at the beginning of September. (They had of course left Rome itself months earlier, but Cicero is interpreting their departure from Italy as signifying a *final* departure from Rome with no hope of return. Hence Cassius did | leave Italy about the same time as Brutus (cf. also 24.1n.). {So also Gotter, *Der Diktator ist tot!* 196. Ramsey, comm. on *Cic. Phil.* 1–2 p. 9 has Cassius leave a few days after Brutus, but 'he appears to have lingered in the waters off Sicily until at least the end of Sept.': cf. his note on *Phil.* 2.33.} 303

The faulty chronology of *Brut.* 23.1 has therefore to be explained as a confusion of Octavian's activities in July and October. It is, however, not just P.'s own confusion.

ἀπογνοῦς: only in *C* and Photius but clearly right. There is a *slight* parallel with Dio's τότε ... ἀπογνόοντες, *perhaps* significant, given the emphasis Dio puts on Octavian as motivating the decision to leave Italy.

2–7. ὄθεν ... Βύβλος: this story comes from Bibulus (23.7) and is not elsewhere attested. On its significance within the *Life* see introductory note to *ch.* 23. It is unclear why Ziegler cites *Ad Brut.* 1.9 [18].2 in his *testimonia* (from Cicero’s ‘Consolation to Brutus’). Cicero’s exhortations to Brutus to control his grief in public provide only the vaguest of parallels to Porcia’s behaviour here. And the point of 23.7 is not that Porcia is sick but that she is a woman.

ἀποτρέπεσθαι: presumably preferred by Ziegler because of the general authoritativeness of *C* (cf. Ziegler viii–ix). The use of the aorist, condemned by Phrynichus, is found in Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides, and Demosthenes, and cannot be discounted as un-Attic (not that that would worry P.—cf. 6.9n.). But a cursory check through P. reveals no parallels for μέλλω + aorist. Wyttenbach only cites *Reg. et. imp. apoph.* 175D but the work is spurious and the reading anyway disputed. P. seems to confine himself to the present (e.g. *De virt. mor.* 441E, *Quaest. conviv.* 724E, *Praec. coniug.* 144C, *Demosth.* 5.1, 29.4, 30.6, *Gracchi* 14.3, *Timol.* 8.1, cf. *Brut.* 6.10, 27.1, 36.1) and the future (e.g. *Nic.* 18.1, 20.1, 23.4, *Per.* 5.3, 23.1, 35.1, 36.1). Despite *C*, the aorist seems unlikely. {Searching the online *TLG* now makes it possible to confirm Moles’ ‘cursory check’. The only possible exception is *Demetr.* 36.4, where Ziegler, like Perrin and Flacelière, prints ... ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πότῳ μελλόντων αὐτὸν ἀνελεῖν; but the *MSS* tradition is there split, and on Ziegler’s own view of the tradition (stemma at Teubner vol. III.1, p. X) ἀναιρεῖν (*KL*) carries more authority than ἀνελεῖν (*PR*). In the light of Moles’ observation, we should probably read ἀναιρεῖν there.}

λανθάνειν ... οὔσαν: this mild criticism of Porcia is in the Stoic mould, for the acceptance of whose πάθος-ethics in | certain instances by the normally humane P. see on 13.3–11 and 14.6; but—given that Porcia πολλάκις φοιτῶσα τῆς ἡμέρας ἔκλαιεν (23. 4)—P. here probably does genuinely agree with them. Cf. *Consol. ad ux.* 609A, a sentiment which would of course be accepted by more reasonable Stoics (e.g. Sen. *Consol. ad Marc.* 3.4 ‘est enim quaedam et dolendi modestia’).

γραφὴ ... προὔδωκε: this must be historical. Nevertheless one may well recall the long literary tradition of outbursts of emotion triggered by representations in art—in the Greek novel, epic (e.g. *Aen.* 1.459ff.), and tragedy (Arist. *Poet.* 16.1455a1ff.). The archetype is Odysseus in *Od.* 8.521ff.

3. ἦν ... προσβλεπούσης: this was a popular subject in Classical art, both vase and painting. Cf. the *Enciclopedia Dell’ Arte Antica* I (1958) s.v. ‘Andromaca’ and II (1960) s.v. ‘Ettore’; and for reproductions of the Würzburg *krater* see Charbonneaux, Martin, Villard, *Archaic Greek Art* (1971), 83; and of the painting in Nero’s Domus Aurea see Borda, *La pittura Romana* (1958), 223. {See now *LIMC* s.v. ‘Andromache’, I.I, 768–9 and A. Drummond, comm. on *FRHist* 49 F 1 with further bibliography, and ctr. B. Graziosi and J. Haubold, *Homer: Iliad VI* (2010), 49 and 51: ‘[Greek] vases

do not display much interest in the episode', though 'the scene was popular in Roman art'. The *Brut.* scene is discussed by Graziosi and Haubold at pp. 51–2, by K. G. Lorenz, *Bilder machen Räume: Mythenbilder in pompeianischen Häusern* (2008), 49–50, and by J. Mossman in L. Athanassaki and F. B. Titchener, edd., *Plutarch's Cities* (forthcoming).}

διάθεσις: 'arrangement', 'composition'. See Sandbach, Loeb *Moralia* IX (1961), 290 and n.

Ἀκιλίου: *RE* 1.251 (Klebs). Probably identifiable with the Acilius who escaped the proscriptions (Appian 4.39.163).

Ἐκτωρ ... παρακοίτης: these famous lines (*Il.* 6.429f.) are also quoted by P. at *Praec. coniug.* 145C, in the general context of the need for the husband to teach his wife philosophy. They were extensively imitated in tragedy (e.g. Soph. *Ai.* 514ff.; Eur. *Hel.* 278, *Hec.* 280, *Heracl.* 229; {see Graziosi and Haubold, 49–50}) and found their way into Latin literature (e.g. Propert. 1.11.23 with Enk *ad loc.*), so Acilius' quotation of them is unremarkable.

6. <ἀλλ' ... κέλευε: these (*Il.* 6.490f.) were also famous lines (repeated at *Od.* 1.356f., and 21.350f.), and also imitated in tragedy (e.g. Aes. *Sept.* 200 {with Hutchinson *ad loc.*}, Eur. *Heracl.* 711). |

< ἀλλ' ... κόμιζε >: reinstated rightly by Cobet.

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7. σώματος ... ἀριστεύσει: the sentiment is impeccably Stoic, though P. would agree with it himself (e.g. *Praec. coniug.* 145). Cf. 13.10n. and Musonius III, p. 8, 15–9, 16H.

σώματος ... φύσει: cf. 13.9.

γάρ: the reason Hector's advice would be inapposite for Porcia is not that it would have been anachronistic for a Roman matron (it would not have been: see G. Williams, *The Third Book of Horace's Odes* [1969], 87 and n.; Balsdon, *Roman Women* [1962], 270), but that Porcia does not deserve to be treated as an inferior.

ἀριστεύσει: the future gives superior sense.

ταῦτα Βύβλος: *HRR* II, 51 {= *FRHist* 49 F 1}. Bibulus, about sixteen at the time (13.3n.), must have been present, as Astyanax was, at the parting of husband and wife, so the whole affecting anecdote may be accepted as authentic.

Chs. 24–28: Brutus prepares for war

The narrative follows chronological lines, although P. takes time off for a typical digression at 25.5–6.

Ch. 24: Brutus in Athens; first preparations; an unfavourable omen

{Moles does not discuss the nature and extent of Brutus' and Cassius' *imperium* in the East. On this contested question cf. esp. K. M. Girardet, *Chiron* 23 (1993), 207–32, and F. Kirbihler, 'Brutus et Cassius et les impositions, spoliations et confiscations en Asie mineure durant les guerres civiles (44–42 A.C.)' in M. C. Ferrière, ed., *Spolier et confisquer dans les mondes grec et romain* (2013), 345–66, with further bibliography.}

1. Dio 47.20.4 also correctly names Athens; Nicolaus 31.135 has the vague *εἰς Ἀχαΐαν* and Appian 3.24.91 the premature *εἰς Μακεδονίαν*.

δεξαμένου ... αὐτόν: cf. Dio's *καὶ αὐτοὺς* (Brutus and Cassius) *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι λάμπρως ὑπεδέξαντο*. {On Brutus in Athens see A. E. Raubitschek, *Phoenix* 11 (1957), 1–11.}

εὐφημίας ... ψηφίσμασι: elaborated in Dio (*οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ... καὶ εἰκόνας σφίσι χαλκᾶς παρά τε τὴν τοῦ Ἄρμωδίου καὶ παρά τὴν τοῦ Ἀριστογείτονος, ὡς καὶ ζηλωταῖς αὐτῶν γενομένοις, ἐψηφίσαντο*). The detail | given effectively supports his statement that Cassius was with Brutus in Athens at the beginning and provides another argument for rejecting October 44 as the date of Cassius' departure from Italy (cf. 23.11.). For the (altogether exceptional) honours given Brutus and Cassius at Athens see Weinstock 143, 145f. Nicolaus' (31.135) *Κάσσιος ... εἰς Συρίαν* is inaccurate, as also Appian's *εἰς Συρίαν*.

P. is *possibly* scaling down his account here from a historical source shared with Dio.

διητᾶτο ... συμφιλοσοφῶν: no other source has these details. P. is naturally interested in emphasizing Brutus' prestigious philosophical connexions (2.1–3 etc.).

Θεομνήστου: *RE* 5A.2036 (Modrzej); Zeller (4th ed.) III/I, 630, n. 4. Little is known of this man, except that he was the successor of Aristus (2.3n.), and that—if the identification is right—he came from Naucratis in Egypt and used language in a style worthy of a sophist (Philostr. *VS* 1.6).

Κρατίππου: *RE* 11.1658 (von Arnim). The foremost Peripatetic of his age, he came from Pergamum, and was a close personal friend of Cicero, whose son also studied under him. In Cic. *Brut.* 250 Brutus characterizes Cratippus as a 'doctissimus vir'. For P.'s knowledge of Cratippus cf. also Cic. 24.7 and *Pomp.* 75.

ἀργεῖν ... σχολάζειν: not quite synonyms—*σχολάζειν* of intellectual pursuits.

2. ἔπραττε: Vell. 2.62.3–4, Appian 3.24.91 and Dio 47.21.1 also assume that, whatever the façade (in Velleius the last edict before the departure from Italy, in P. Brutus’ philosophical studies), both Brutus and Cassius were intent on war from the outset. For the contrary view that Brutus, at least, only | wanted to secure his position as a basis for negotiation—even after his annexation of Macedonia—see Syme 183f. 307

ἀνυπόπτως: probably true, the reason being the last edict of the Liberators: Vell. 2.62.3 ‘libenter se vel in perpetuo exilio victuros, dum res publica constaret et concordia, nec ullam belli civilis praebituros materiam’.

καὶ γὰρ ... στρατοπέδων: this preliminary reconnaissance is not attested elsewhere, though it must be historical. The detail of P.’s narrative is impressive.

Ἡρόστρατον: *RE* 8.1145 (Münzer). Obviously a Greek agent of Brutus, probably to be identified with the Ἡρόστρατον Δορκαλίωνος referred to in an inscription from Eski Manias (Mysia), probably ultimately from Cyzicus, where Brutus in 42 equipped a fleet (28.3 below). The identification is posited by Munro, *JHS* 17 (1897), 276, and seems safe.

τούς: vague. Effectively just Hortensius (25.3).

καὶ συνέιχεν: nor is this elsewhere attested in the historical sources. The most famous νέος was Horace, who became a *tribunus militum* in Brutus’ army (Hor. *Serm.* 1.6.47f., 1.7.18f.; *Epist.* 2.2.46ff.; Suet. *Vit. Hor.* 6; Nisbet and Hubbard, *Horace Odes II*, 106ff.).

Dio 47.21.2–3 gives a rather different picture of the sort of support Brutus got: Βρούτος ... τὴν τε Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν συνίστη. ἄλλως τε γὰρ ἔκ τε τῆς δόξης τῶν πεπραγμένων καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐλπίσι τῶν ὁμοίων προσείχον αὐτῷ, καὶ διότι καὶ στρατιώτας συχνούς, τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Φαρσάλῳ μάχης ἐκεῖ που καὶ τότε ἔτι περιπλανωμένους ..., though the second half of this description deals with the time when Brutus had already begun to campaign actively (cf. 25.1). P. naturally emphasizes the superior (cultural) quality of Brutus’ first recruits. |

ἄσται: Athens (*LSJ* II).

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ἀνελάμβανε ... συνέιχεν: ‘accurate et distincte: ad se ut accederent efficiebat, quumque sibi adessent eos apud se retinebat’ (Voegelin).

3. ὧν ... μισοτύραννον: for Brutus’ enlistment of the younger Cicero see *Cic.* 45.3 {with Moles *ad loc.*} (no parallels).

Κικέρωνος υἱός: *RE* 7A.1282 (Hanslik); *PIR* 3.333.

ἐπαινεῖ διαφερόντως: supported by *Ad Brut.* 2.3 [2].6 and Cicero’s reply in *Ad Brut.* 2.4 [4].6.

φησιν: clearly from a lost letter of Brutus’.

εἴτ' ... ἐνυπνιάζεται: this clause is rightly referred to Cicero (the younger) by Coraes. 'Nam qui poterat Bruto Cicero tanti momenti esse ut *νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν* de eo cogitaret?' (Voegelin).

4. ἀναφανδόν: The meetings with Appuleius and Antistius must naturally be put towards the end of the year, but it is impossible to be any more precise than that. For the dating of Brutus' annexation of Macedonia see 25.3n.

καὶ πυθόμενος ... Κάρυστον: for this see also Appian 3.63.259, 4.75.316; Dio 47.21.3; Cic. *Phil.* 10.24, 13.32, *ad Brut.* 1.7 [19].2 (Brutus commends Appuleius to Cicero). There are no striking parallels with P. in any of these.

πυθόμενος: P. ascribes the initiative to Brutus (cf. 24.5 *πείσας*), Brutus himself *apud Phil.* 10.24 rather to Appuleius, and Dio apparently to Trebonius. Though it is natural for P. to make Brutus the instigator, it is probably also right: Dio's evidence counts for nothing by itself and Brutus could have been modest/cautious and/or disingenuous in giving Appuleius the credit.

<Ἀπουλήιον>: the context cries out for the name of the *στρατηγός* characterized as an *ἀνὴρ χαρίεις καὶ γνώριμος* (cf. on 20.8). Ziegler's Ἀπουλήιον is right. {Gärtner notes that it was already suggested by Campe in 1863.} On M. Appuleius | see *RE* 2.258 (Klebs), Broughton II, 327, *PIR* r². 2185. {An inscription from Aezanoi mentions a [Μάρκ]ω Ἀππουληίω who may well be the same man: see M. Wörrle, *Chiron* 39 (2009), 441–2 and F. Kirbihler in M.C. Ferriès, ed., *Spolier et confisquer dans les mondes grec et romain* (2013), 353 n. 37.}

χαρίεντα: hardly 'accomplished' (Perrin)—rather 'eo sensu qui seriore aevo invaluit: probus, muneri suo aptus, h. l. libertatis partibus non alienus' (Voegelin, cl. *Cat. mai.* 20.5, *Agis–Cleom.* 8.3, 32.3). Cf. also Geiger {D.Phil.} 326, Pelling {D.Phil.} 109, n. 7 [= *Plutarch and History*, 218 and 231 n. 71].

Κάρυστον: no-one else records the venue or the following details. ?biographical source.

5–7. καὶ γάρ ... φώνησιν: this anecdote is also found in a very similar form in Val. Max. 1.5.7 (*de omnibus*) and Appian 4.134.564. Though P. knew and apparently used Val. Max. he cannot be the direct source here (below). Appian, despite some closeness of detail, differs from P. in setting the incident in Samos, which would date it to autumn 42. This suggests use of a different source. Which account is right? P.'s account is more detailed but some of the detail (e.g. *ἔτι μᾶλλον ... βουλόμενος*) could well be Plutarchean amplification. On the other hand Appian's version might be explained by the need to sharpen the impact of the omen by bringing it closer in time to the event it was meant to foreshadow. On balance, P. is

more likely to be right, despite his ‘error’ at 24.7, since Brutus’ outburst would have more point in the late summer of 44 than in 42 and this version is less obviously sensational. Cf. below.

Ultimate source: Bibulus?

{App. 4.134.564 describes Brutus as οὐδὲ εὐχερῆς πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα, which White in the Loeb translates ‘not a ready man with such quotations’. In *LCM* 9.10 (1984), 156 Moles is attracted by a suggestion of Clarke that it means instead that Brutus could not cope with heavy drinking. Was Brutus tipsy on his birthday? If so, ‘this increases the likelihood that he did in fact utter the inopportune but (in my view) profoundly apposite quotation from the *Iliad*.’}

5. καὶ γὰρ Βρούτος: if P. is right about the year this means that Brutus was born late autumn/winter.

ἔτι μᾶλλον ... βουλόμενος: P. is keen to emphasize the strangeness of Brutus’ words by pointing out that Brutus ought to have been encouraging his followers.

ἤγησε ... μεῖζον: not in Val. Max. or Appian and probably a Plutarchean touch. On the practice see Plat. *Symp.* 213e.

ἀπ’ οὐδεμίας προφάσεως: cf. Appian’s ἀλόγως (a | disputed reading, but secured by the parallel with P.). Neither writer seems to understand *why* Brutus said what he did: of course it was a peculiar thing to say, but there *was* a point ...

ἀλλὰ ... υἱός: *Il.* 16.849 (the dying Patroclus to Hector).

Ἀητοῦς ... υἱός: Apollo (ἀπόλλυμι). The point? Early editors conjectured that Brutus meant that Caesar was killed not by men but by God. Against this highly oblique interpretation is the fact that Brutus *seems* to be referring to himself and the evident perplexity of P. and Appian. One could argue that the context has been ‘turned against’ Brutus for ominous effect. Yet this seems unlikely in the case of P., who is presumably working directly with the ultimate source. Had Brutus been referring to Caesar’s death he would surely have said something quite different. I believe that the introspective Brutus did cause consternation among his friends by a Delphic utterance which referred cryptically to his own deep distress at the failure of the *Ludi Apollinares*. Brutus’ taste for literary allusion was sometimes obscure (cf. 45.1, 51.1) and for a similar burst of depression one can compare his (nearly) *ultima verba* after the second battle of Philippi (see on 51.1).

7. αὐτοῦ: in contrast Val. Max. says ‘a Caesare et Antonio’, no doubt rightly. Hence Schaefer’s ‘emendation’ Ἀντωνίου, but this seems arbitrary if Apollo was the *signum* of *both* Caesarian leaders (so Voegelin) and it would be odd for P. to write ‘when *Brutus* went forth to battle the password given by *Antony* was ...’ P. may simply have made a mistake, or (more likely) he

has written *αὐτοῦ* deliberately to tighten the parallelism between 24.6 and 24.7. Though P. typically maintains a theoretical reserve about the relevance of the omen (*ἱστοροῦσιν ... τίθενται*), the general effect of his recording it is ‘ominous’ and | intentionally so.

311 Apollo seems to have been a political football between Liberators and Caesarians. Brutus had set great store by the *ludi Apollinares* and in Greece the Liberators issued coins with the bust of Apollo and his symbols (Crawford 503–4; 506; for the association of Apollo and *Libertas* see Crawford II, 741), the Caesarians countered by using ‘Apollo’ as their password at Philippi, and in 40 Octavian (according to Antony) dressed up as Apollo at a banquet (Suet. *Aug.* 70)!

{Moles returned to this episode in ‘Fate, Apollo, and M. Junius Brutus’, *AJPh* 104 (1983), 249–56, with similar arguments; A. Gosling responded in *AJPh* 107 (1986), 586–9, with valuable material on coinage.}

**Ch. 25: Further gains; Brutus promised Macedonia;
suffers from βουλιμία**

1. ἐκ τούτου ... δίδωσιν: for this see Cic. *Ad Brut.* 2.3 [2].5 (April 1, 43) and 1.11 [16] (June 43), which gives much detail. No other narrative source mentions Antistius explicitly, though Vell. 2.62.3 has ‘pecunias etiam, quae ex transmarinis provinciis Romam ab quaestoribus deportabantur, a volentibus acceperant’.

ἐκ τούτου: the relative chronology is right. Cf. *Phil.* 10.24 on the priority of Appuleius.

πεντήκοντα ... μυριάδας: confirmed by *Ad Brut.* 1.11 [16].1.

Ἀντίστιος: *RE* 1.2558 (Klebs—confused, as also Perrin *ad loc.*); Broughton II, 327; *PIR* 1². 146. C. Antistius Vetus, an ex-Caesarian, was quaestor of Syria.

καὶ αὐτὸς ...: the implication seems to be that Antistius—unlike Appuleius—needed no persuading. Support in *Ad Brut.* 1.11 [16].1 ‘ultro pollicitus est et dedit’.

ἄσοι ... αὐτόν: cf. Dio 47.21.3 (see 24.2n.) and *Phil.* 11.27 ‘legiones exceptit veteres’.

ἰππεῖς ... Ἀσίαν: for this see Cic. *Phil.* 10.13 (detailed) and 11.27, and Dio *loc. cit.*

πεντακοσίους: this figure is not in Cicero. The detail of | P.’s narrative is again impressive. 312

Κίinna: not of course the pro-tyrannicide praetor, but Cornelius Cinna, Dolabella’s quaestor (*Phil.* 10.13). See Broughton II, 325; *PIR* 1². 314.

Δολοβέλλαν: *RE* 4.1299 (Münzer); Broughton II, 317.

2. ἐπιπλεύσας ... ἐκράτησεν: the only other account is Appian 3.63.259 (quite closely similar).

3. Ὀρθησίου ... Μακεδονίαν: for Brutus’ annexation of Macedonia see also Appian 3.24.91–2, 3.79.321–323, 4.75.317, Dio 47.21.1–7; Cic. *Phil.* 10.13 and 11.26; Livy *Epit.* 118 (bare statement), and Vell. 2.62.3 and 2.69.3–4.

It is difficult to date precisely. (Useful discussion in Wilson 163ff.) Gelzer 1000 thinks that he did not act until he heard of the meeting of the senate of November 28, when Antony deprived Brutus and Cassius of the praetorian provinces which they had refused to take up. Syme 184, n. 1, argues that this date is probably too late, on the ground that it does not allow enough time for the passage of news and the movements of troops in winter. The point of this objection is that a *terminus ante* for at least some activity by Brutus is provided by the arrival of C. Antonius early in January (for the date see *Jahrb. f. cl. Philol.* 1894, 612–20, generally accepted by modern scholars), and time has to be allowed for Brutus to get himself into a fit state to deal with him. {Cf. Gotter, *Der Diktator ist tot!* 104 n. 76.}

Syme's own view is that Brutus was motivated by 'the news of armies raised in Italy and Caesar's heir marching on Rome' (mid-October–early November), whether or not the possession of Macedonia and an army meant that Brutus was finally bent on war (Syme thinks not).

On the whole, the ancient evidence supports Gelzer's dating, at least in the sense that it was late in the year before Brutus made his position clear. ³¹³ *Phil.* 10.24 appears to indicate that | Brutus' first *overt* military move was the acquisition of the money and ships of Appuleius—presumably near the end of the year. P.'s narrative clearly puts Brutus' 'take-over' of Macedonia *after* his meetings with Appuleius and Antistius, and the narrative at this point is detailed and 'straight'. Dio connects the annexation of Macedonia closely with the arrival of C. Antonius. On the other hand, if P. is right (24.2), Brutus had begun to make advances to Hortensius as early as August/September 44, and the process of persuading Hortensius, a close relation of Brutus (*RA* 342ff.) and hereafter a loyal Republican but hitherto a Caesarian, to say nothing of his officers and troops, must have been a protracted business. Perhaps the best formulation therefore is that Brutus had begun to make contingency plans from the very beginning of his stay in Greece, but did not actually take over in Macedonia until December, when he learned that Macedonia had been allotted to C. Antonius. This scheme fits Syme's general view of a Brutus who was no fool but who was nevertheless reluctant to take concrete military action until forced to do so, in contrast to the unanimous view of the sources, who assume that Brutus intended war from the very beginning. (Cf. also 28.6 n. below.)

{Gotter, *Der Diktator ist tot!* 201–2 puts Brutus' move to vigorous preparations earlier, 'probably already in November, and at the latest at the beginning of December'; so also K. Matijević, *Marcus Antonius* (2006), 201–2}

Ὀρθησίου: *RE* 8.2468 (Münzer), Broughton II, 328. Son of the orator. An inscription of his in honour of Brutus is preserved from Delos (*ILS* 9460).

Μακεδονίαν: naturally a key military province, of vastly more importance than the one Brutus had actually been assigned, Crete.

καὶ τῶν ... προστιθεμένων: presumably the rulers of Illyricum and Thrace are meant. During the civil war the Illyrians had sided with the Pompeians and so had the Thracians, whose king Rhascuporis later gave Brutus and Cassius assistance against Antony and Octavian. |

³¹⁴ **Γάϊος ... ἀδελφός:** *RE* I. 2582 (Klebs); Broughton II, 319.

[καὶ]: better to delete this rather than read *βαδίζων*.

ἀγγέλλομαι: can take infinitive *or* participle but the infinitive is more forceful here. That C. Antonius was making straight for Vatinius' troops needs to be stressed.

Βατίnius: Voegelin—a scribal rather than Plutarchean error. *RE* 8A.495 (Gundel); Broughton II, 330f.

25.4–26.2. βουλόμενος ... ἐχρήσατο: this whole passage has to be compared with *Quaest. conviv.* 6.8, 694Cf., where P. is discussing the causes of βουλιμία:

Ἐπειδὴ δ' ἠπτόμεθα τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ πάθους, πρῶτον μὲν ἠπορήθη τὸ μάλιστα βουλιμιᾶν τοὺς διὰ χιόνος πολλῆς βαδίζοντας, ὥσπερ καὶ Βροῦτος ἐκ Δυρραχίου πρὸς Ἀπολλωνίαν ἰὼν ἐκινδύνευσεν ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἦν δὲ νιφετὸς πολὺς καὶ τῶν τὰ σιτία κομιζόντων οὐδεὶς ἐξηκολούθει· λιποθυμοῦντος οὖν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπολιπόντος, ἤναγκάστησαν οἱ στρατιῶται προσδραμόντες τοῖς τείχεσιν ἄρτον αἰτῆσαι παρὰ τῶν τειχοφυλάκων πολεμίων ὄντων· καὶ λαβόντες εὐθὺς ἀνεκτῆσαντο τὸν Βροῦτον· διὸ καὶ φιλανθρώπως ἐχρήσατο πᾶσι κύριος τῆς πόλεως γενόμενος.

The verbal resemblances (especially from λιποθυμοῦντος to γενόμενος) to the present passage are obviously very close. The cross-reference to the *Quaest. conviv.* suggests the priority of that account, and although that account is naturally briefer and simpler so far as the historical narrative is concerned, the *Brutus* account of βουλιμία and the circumstances that cause it looks as if it has been pared down from the *Quaest. conviv.* (see 25.5 and 6nn.). But it is significant that in the *Quaest. conviv.* discussion P. uses Brutus' experience at all: the obvious historical example for a Greek or even a Roman to use would be Xenophon's encounter with βουλιμία in the *Anabasis*. This must suggest that the two passages are roughly contemporaneous, and that while he may have written the *Brutus* account with the *Quaest. conviv.* before him, when he wrote the *Quaest. conviv.* account he had already researched Brutus' *Life*. (See further 26.2n. {and Pelling in F. Klotz and K. Oikonomopoulou, edd., *The Philosopher's Banquet: Plutarch's Table Talk in the Intellectual Culture of the Roman Empire* [2011], 224–7, taking a similar view of the 'cross-fertilization in both directions' between *Quaest. conviv.* and *Brutus*.) |

This, however, hardly helps the dating of the *Brutus*, since the first six books of the *Quaestiones convivales* can only be put within the limits 99–c. 116 (Jones, 'Chronology' 73 {= Scardigli, *Essays* 121}).

4. ἐξαίφνης: not just literary embellishment. Cicero also stresses the speed of Brutus' operations (*Phil.* 11.27 'in Macedoniam ... advolavit') and it is supported by the facts of the case (25.3n.).

τοὺς κομίζοντας: the accusative is apparently a late Greek construction. Cf. *Ev. Marc.* 6.33.

κόπον: similarly Galen 7.136K singles out ἀτονία as one of the causes of βουλιμία. Cf. also *Quaest. conviv.* 694B.

ψῦχος: generally agreed to be a major cause of βουλιμία. Cf. Ps.-Arist. *Pr.* 887b39; X. *Anab.* 4.5.7–9; Erasistratus *apud* Gell. 16.3.9–10; *Quaest. conviv.* 694C (above); Galen 7.136K, 17B.501K.

ἐβουλιμίασε: ‘had an attack of βουλιμία’ (or βούλιμος, the form of the noun favoured by Erasistratus, P. and Galen, whereas βουλιμία is the choice of Ps.-Aristotle and Timocles). What is it? ‘Bulimia’ is still a recognized medical term, defined by the *British Medical Dictionary* as ‘perpetual and voracious appetite for food in large quantities, as a result of increased hunger sense, to a morbid degree’. But this is clearly not what is meant here, for when Brutus is smitten by it he is without food (25.4, cf. *Quaest. conviv.*, 26.1) and immediately recovers when he is given some (26.2 implied; explicit in *Quaest. conviv.*). The word is generally translated ‘ox-hunger’/‘voracious appetite’, on the assumption that βού- derives from βούς. This derivation is accepted by Chantraine, *Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Grecque I–II* (1968), 187, citing as parallel usages the French ‘une faim de loup’, ‘une fièvre de cheval’ etc. It was doubted by W. Schulze, *Kühns Zeitschrift* 33 (1895), 243. In *Quaest. conviv.* | 693Eff. P. argues that βούλιμος has nothing to do with βούς, citing as evidence the ritual βουλίμου ἐξέλασις. He bases his belief that βούλιμος means λιμὸς μέγας ἢ δημόσιος on the public character of the ritual and on the existence of the Aeolic (Boeotian) form πούλιμος. The basic application of the word has been extended (cf. ‘nausea’) and it can apply to a disease caused by hunger: ἐπεὶ ... πᾶς ... ἔοικεν ... λιμὸς νόσῳ. (For P.’s interest in βου- etymologies cf. also *Quaest. Gr.* 299B and *Frag.* 71 Sandbach = Loeb *Moralia* XV, 167.)

Yet whether P.’s etymology is right or not (surely not), it hardly affects the essential meaning of βούλιμος, which is ‘great/much hunger’ (cf. Gell. 16.3.9; Paulus ex Festo, *De Significatu verbor.* 32M). But here and in the *Quaest. conviv.* P. is using the word in a specialized medical sense, also found in Ps.-Arist. *Pr.* 887b39, X. *Anab.* 4.5.7–9, Erasistratus (cf. Gell. *loc. cit.*), and Galen. This specialized sense refers to a state of collapse (cf. ps.-Arist. *loc. cit.*, Xenophon, *Quaest. conviv.* 694D, Galen 17B.501K), brought about by hunger (ps.-Arist., Xenophon, Erasistratus, P. and Galen all agree on this), and cold (this too is generally agreed—25.4n. on ψῦχος). Galen 17B.501K makes the point that βούλιμος in its medical sense does not actually mean hunger, firstly because hunger is only one element in the sickness, secondly because though it is a cause of the sickness it does not co-exist with it. In the *Quaest. conviv.* Cleomenes the physician argues along similar lines (695A). P. and his friends find this reasonable but not conclusive (695B). In sum, βουλιμία denotes a state of collapse brought about by malnutrition and exposure.

5–6. συμπίπτει ... ἠπόρηται: a typical Plutarchean digression on a subject quite irrelevant to the narrative but evidently of great interest to himself. |

5. *σμπίπτει ... οὔσης*: snow is also mentioned as an important factor in the occurrence of *βουλιμία* in X. *Anab.* 4.5.7–9 and *Quaest. conviv.* 694C, 694E, 695B–C. Snow is of course only one manifestation of *ψῦχος*, but P.'s great emphasis on it, which includes consideration of its special properties, is something of an individual touch, explained no doubt by his preoccupation with the particular case of Brutus.

καὶ ... καὶ ...: the point that animals and men are equally affected is also made at *Quaest. conviv.* 694C–D, and 695A.

εἴτε ... ἀναλίσκοντος: this corresponds to part of the argument of ps.-Arist. 888a, a part that is accepted by Socrus in *Quaest. conviv.* 694E (P. accepts the genuineness of the *Problems*: cf. 696D).

εἴτε ... διασπειρόμενον: an abbreviated version of the theory put forward by *ἡμῶν* at *Quaest. conviv.* 695B–C.

Schaefer notes the change of construction from genit. absol. and compares 31.4.

6. *τὰς γὰρ ... σβεννύμενον*: cf. 695C.

ὑπὲρ ὧν ... ἠπόρηται: Perrin refers this to *Quaest. conviv.* 691F, where there is a discussion of the cooling effect of the fine vapour of snow. But Ziegler is right to refer it to the discussion of the causes of *βουλιμία* starting at 693F: P. has just mentioned two possible explanations of why *βουλιμία* occurs particularly in snowy conditions, but his treatment has been brief, and the cross-reference has a point—it is for the benefit of the reader who wishes to find out more about the whole subject.

Ch. 26: Brutus recovers; defeat and capture of C. Antonius

318 **1. Λιποθυμοῦντος:** an old orthographical problem—λιπ- or λειπ-? On the general problem see Choerob. in *An. Oxon.* 2.239, Dind. in *Steph. Thesaur.* (neither much help) and *LSJ s.v.* | λειπανδρία. *LSJ* state that while metrical evidence favours λιπ- (certain in e.g. λιποτελέω and various passages in tragedy, e.g. Aes. *Ag.* 212, Eur. *Or.* 1305), there are cases when λειπ- must be read (e.g. λειπογνώμων), and for many words the *MSS* evidence is confused and no trustworthy spelling exists. It is, however, conventional to read λιπ- wherever possible.

In P. also the *MSS* regularly disagree. Here QZL²P² read λειπ-, as also in 15.7 above; at *Themist.* 10.10 some *MSS* have λειπ-; at *Alex.* 63.12 QL²H² have λειπ-; at *Gracchi* 36.5 and *Pomp.* 49.8 the *MSS* all read λειπ-, but in both cases Sintenis, followed by Ziegler, emends to λιπ-. In the parallel *Moralia* passage here (694C and 695A) *T* has λειπ-, λειπ-, and λειπ-, though Cobet emended to λιπ- (with some subsequent *MSS* justification). λιπ- it may be by convention, but it is not possible on the evidence of the Plutarchean *MSS* to feel confident that that is definitely correct.

τοὺς πολεμίους: i.e. Vatinius and his troops at Epidamnus. Cf. 26.2n.

ἄρτον: the regulation cure—cf. *Quaest. conviv.* 694C–D.

2. παρήσαν ... κομίζοντες: this detail is not in the *Moralia* account, which rather implies that the provisions were brought to Brutus by his own troops.

319 **αὐτοί, καί:** the general point is clear—the *enemy* bring Brutus provisions instead of giving them to his troops to convey to him. The difficulty Coraes sees in αὐτοί is presumably that this would mean that it was the enemy φύλακες who brought the provisions, whereas ἀτίκα allows a more general reference to οἱ πολέμοι (26.1). In strict military terms the *MSS* reading suggests the height of folly by Vatinius' φύλακες, but that is to be pedantic: P. is embroidering the theme of the reverence in which Brutus was held even by his enemies | and realism is forgotten. This reading of the text is confirmed by the specific τούτοις/τούτους below. Note also that as a mark of esteem the φύλακες bring *both* food *and* drink, though only food was medically necessary.

ὡς ... παρέλαβεν: other accounts of Brutus' defeat (in effect) of Vatinius in Livy *Epit.* 118; Appian 4.75.317 (very brief); Dio 47.21.6 (more detailed); Vell. 2.69.3–4 (not unlike Dio); Cic. *Phil.* 10.13. Velleius and Dio make it plain that Vatinius was unable to prevent his troops from changing sides (contrast *Phil.* 10.13). P. is the only authority to mention Brutus' βουλιμία on the campaign.

τὴν πόλιν: Epidamnus (cf. 25.4), confirmed by Cicero and Dio. The *Moralia* version implies that τῆς πόλεως was Apollonia, making Brutus set out from Dyrrachium (694C); i.e. in the *Moralia* P. is associating Brutus'

βουλιμία with the campaign against C. Antonius, not Vatinius. It must be assumed that the *Brutus* version is the right one—chronology and detail are self-consistent, and the picture of Brutus, in dire straits himself, capturing the city by siege, is inappropriate to his defeat of Antonius at Apollonia, for on that occasion his adversary was in much the worse military situation and was compelled to try for a decision outside the city (26.5 and n.). P., his mind running on Brutus' general *φιλανθρωπία*, confused his humane treatment of Vatinius with his equally humane treatment of C. Antonius, and switched towns accordingly. This suggests reliance on memory of Brutus' *βίος* in the *Moralia* (but not necessarily that the *Brutus* was already written up in full).

φιλανθρώπως: 'humanely'. For general studies of this important Greek philosophical/political concept see S. Lorenz, *De progressu notionis φιλανθρωπίας* (Diss. Leipzig 1914); Heinemann in *RE* Suppl. 5.282–310 *s.v.* 'Humanitas'; S. De Ruyter, 'De vocis | quae est *φιλανθρωπία* significatione atque usu', *Mnemos.* 59 (1932), 271–306. All three contain useful material on *φιλανθρωπία* as a political virtue much canvassed in P.'s own time. For *φιλανθρωπία* as an imperial attribute see Menander on the βασιλικὸς λόγος in *Rhet. Graec.*, ed. L. Spengel (1856), III, 368ff.; Charlesworth, 'The virtues of a Roman Emperor', *PBA* 23 (1937), 105–35. For *φιλανθρωπία* in P. see Hirzel 23–32 and H. Martin, 'The Concept of *Philanthropia* in Plutarch's *Lives*', *AJP* 82 (1961), 164–175, besides the material contained in Lorenz, Heinemann and De Ruyter. I do not intend to go over such well-worn ground here. For Brutus' *φιλανθρωπία* see also 30.6 and 1.3n. on his *πραότης*: the two virtues are often linked. The true extent of Brutus' *φιλανθρωπία*, as of his *πραότης*, is naturally debatable. He himself set great store by his *clementia* (the Roman equivalent)—see *Ad Brut.* 2.5 [5].5, 1.2a [6].2, 1.15 [23].10—and it is solidly embedded in the tradition (besides P. cf. Vell. 2.69.6, Appian 3.79.323). On the other hand, the Scaptius affair reveals a less amiable side to his nature. Nonetheless, there are no grounds for the hysterical denunciation of Tyrrell and Purser VI, cxxxi f.

3–5. Γάιος ... εἶναι: other accounts of the defeat and capture of C. Antonius in Cic. *Phil.* 10.9–10, 10.10–12, 10.12–13, 11.26; Livy *Epit.* 118 (no details); Vell. 2.69.3–4 (no details); Appian 3.79.321–323, 4.75.317 (no details); Dio 47.21.5 and 7. P. is unique in the precision of detail he gives and preserves information not elsewhere attested. One is bound to wonder whether he is using a biographical supplement to his main historical source.

3. ἐκεῖ ... ᾗχοντο: cf. Velleius' 'M. Brutus *volentis* legiones extorserat'.

ἐκλιπὼν ... πόλιν: for Antonius at Apollonia see *Phil.* 10.13 and 11.26; Dio 47.21.7. |

εἰς Βουθρωτόν: not elsewhere attested.

4. **καὶ πρῶτον ... κατακοπέϊσας**: not elsewhere attested.

ἔπειτα ... νικᾶται: nor is this explicitly mentioned in any other source. The young Cicero had also received the surrender of L. Piso, one of Antonius' lieutenants (*Phil.* 10.13) and in his despatch to the senate on his victory over Antonius Brutus mentioned his achievements by name (*Ad Brut.* 2.5 [5].2). For his later achievements see *Ad Brut.* 1.6 [12].1 (May 19, 43).

Βυλλίδα: when Cicero delivered the Eleventh Philippic (c. March 6), he thought that Antonius held Byllis.

πολλὰ κατώρθωσε: cf. 24.3 and n., and for the wording *Cic.* 45.3.

5. **λαβὼν δὲ ... στρατηγόν**: despite differences of detail and scope the spirit of Appian's account at 3.79.321–323 is much the same. Dio's account (47.21.7) appears divergent.

μακρὰν διεσπασμένον: very clipped style = 'cuius copiae erant μακρὰν διεσπασμέναι' (Voegelin). So also *οὐκ εἴασεν*: sc. *τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ*.

μεγάλην: five legions (*Ad Brut.* 1.2 [14].1). Brutus finally defeated and captured Antonius in (early) March 43 (cf. *Ad Brut.* 2.3 [2].2—April, 43—'Antonius adhuc est nobiscum', whereas when Cicero delivered the Eleventh Philippic—c. March 6—he believed that Antonius was still at large: *Phil.* 11.26).

ὡς ... ἐσομένων: a rather uncharacteristic flash of realism.

6. **χρόνον ... ἦγε**: paralleled in Appian.

καὶ τὰ ... ἀφήρει: cf. *Ad Brut.* 1.4 [10].2, Dio 47.23.1. In the despatch which the senate received from Antonius on April 13 he styled himself 'Antonius Procos.' and at the same time Brutus' own letter was 'in Antonium admodum lenes' (*Ad Brut.* 2.5 [5].3). P. does not make clear (and *perhaps* hardly understands) the political significance of this: he is interested only in Brutus' *φιλανθρωπία* | to a fallen foe.

ὡς φασιν: an interesting parenthesis. One may suggest three ways of interpreting it: (i) there are times in P. when 'they say' etc. is not used to suggest scepticism/agnosticism, but has rather the flavour 'they say—and it is true' (cf. 29.3, or 46.3, where P. thinks *οἱ πολλοί* are right). So *ὡς φασιν* *might* be strengthening, 'as the sources tell us'; (ii) the qualification may indicate that P. has no documentary evidence for the letters of both *ἄλλων πολλῶν* and Cicero; (iii) *ὡς φασιν* goes simply with *ἄλλων πολλῶν*: P. only has documentary evidence for the letters of Cicero on the subject. I think (iii) is probably right.

ἄλλων πολλῶν: not attested elsewhere, but likely enough, cf. *Ad Brut.* 2.5 [5].6, where 'homines' expect tough action from Brutus, and 1.3 [7].3, where the senate and people of Rome are united in their demand for the punishment of Antonius, even allowing for the customary Ciceronian hyperbole. Whether true or not, P. has not just invented it (*ὡς φασιν*).

καὶ Κικέρωνος ... ἀναιρεῖν: at the beginning Brutus professed himself willing to accept Cicero's advice, whatever it might be (*Ad Brut.* 2.3 [2].2—April 1). Cicero's first advice was to keep Antonius prisoner till the fate of Decimus was known (2.4 [4].3—April 12, cf. 1.2.5), but his view rapidly hardened (2.5 [5].5, 1.2 [14].5, 1.3 [7].3, 1.3 [7].4). Nothing of this in the *Cicero*, which suggests *either* (i) P. did not then know of it, *or* (ii) he there suppressed it deliberately (more likely, I think).

Brutus' motivation for keeping Antonius alive and allowing him to retain his official title may be debated: personal obligation—Antonius had presided at his *Ludi Apollinares* (Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 50, n. 3); preference for *lenitas* (*Ad Brut.* 2.5 [5].3 and 5, 1.2 [14].3 and 6) over *iracundia* and the desire to avert civil war | rather than wreak vengeance on the vanquished (1.2 [14].6); constitutional propriety (1.4 [10].2); hope still of a rapprochement with Antony (Gelzer 1003f.; Syme 183 and n.). But P. is right to praise it. 323

7. ἀρξάμενον ... ἐφύλαττε: cf. Appian 3.79.323 τὸν στρατὸν πολλάκις διαφθείρων and for a very detailed account Dio 47.22.4–24.2.

ἀρξάμενον ... νεωτερισμόν: details in Dio 47.22.4 and 23.1, cf. also *Ad Brut.* 1.2 [14].3.

ἐνθέμενος εἰς ναῦν ἐφύλαττε: this in disagreement with Dio 47.24.1–2, where it is the quaestor and lieutenants of Antonius who are put into boats, while Antonius himself is left under the guard of a certain C. Clodius in Apollonia.

8. τῶν δ'... ἔδωκε: the incident is described at length by Dio 47.23.2–4.

καλούντων ἐκεῖ: a detail not in Dio, where the soldiers, unable to find Antonius, whom they had intended to set free, simply seize a hill above Apollonia and Brutus makes the first approach.

οὐκ ἔφη ... ἔδωκε: Dio 47.23.4 merely says καὶ αὐτοὺς ὁ Βρούτος ἐς ... ὁμολογίαν ὑπαγαγόμενος.

ἐλθοῦσι ... ἔδωκε: in Dio 47.23.4 Brutus by contrast takes stern practical measures, executing some ring-leaders and dismissing others, and obtaining the surrender of Antonius' quaestor and lieutenants, who are then put on board ship for their own safety.

The divergences between P. and Dio are thus as follows: (i) disagreement over who is put on board ship; (ii) disagreement over the motivation: in P. Antonius is kept under guard, in Dio the officers are snatched away to save them from their own soldiers. This of course goes with (i); (iii) disagreement over how Brutus dealt with the rebellious troops; (iv) disagreement over chronology—in P. the ship incident is kept separate from the revolt of the soldiers, in Dio it is an essential part of it; (v) difference of | emphasis overall: in Dio much less about Brutus' magnanimity and much more about his practical measures. Do these differences 324

suggest difference of source, or are they the result of Plutarchean error/simplification? Much could be explained away in terms of difference of purpose (Dio—to record the facts; P.—to put the best possible construction on them so far as Brutus is concerned). But (i) is a fairly substantial disagreement and taken together with the apparent disagreement at 26.5 does suggest difference of source. One may feel that 26.8 has something of a Greek source flavour.

Ch. 27: Events in Rome: Octavian's *coup d'état* and reconciliation with Antony; condemnation of Brutus and Cassius; the proscriptions

This section brings the narrative up to date over what has been happening in Italy, but it also encapsulates a *μεταβολή*: since 24.2 things have been going well for Brutus but he is now confronted with the brutal realities of civil strife.

1. Μέλλοντι ... διαβαίνειν: there is a considerable simplification of events here, for Brutus was very active in the months after the capture of C. Antonius, training and raising troops and acquiring money and allies (details in Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 77f.), and actually crossed into Asia *twice* (Dio 47.24.2–25.1, rightly accepted by Gelzer 1007, cf. 28.3n.). The sources for Brutus' activities between April 43 and his final crossing into Asia are *Ad Brut.* 1.5 [9].3, 1.4 [10].6, 1.6 [12].4, and 1.2 [14].2; Livy *Epit.* 122 (very brief); Appian 4.75.319–20 (detailed) and Dio 47.24.2–25.2 (the fullest account). P. could obviously have given more information if he had wanted to, for Appian and Dio provide two different sets of information. In the interests of narrative clarity he omits minor details. On the date of the crossing into Asia to meet Cassius see 28.3n. |

τῆς μεταβολῆς: cf. 22.1n. and above.

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ὁ γὰρ ... Ἀντώνιον: a vague reference to the specific measures of January 4, 43, by which Octavian got the title pro-praetor and the joint command with Hirtius and Pansa against Antony. P.'s other treatments of this topic are *Cic.* 45.4 and *Ant.* 17.1 (close to each other but independent of the present sentence; {see Moles and Pelling's comms. on *Cic.* and *Ant.* respectively}).

ἐμβάλων ... ἐκεῖνον: brief accounts at *Cic.* 45.4 and *Ant.* 17.2. The final battle of Mutina probably took place on April 21, 43.

αὐτὸς δεομένης: P.'s other account of these events is *Cic.* 45.4–6 (no real parallels).

ὕπατείαν: for Octavian's ambitions in this direction see *Ad Brut.* 1.4 [10].4 (May 15), 1.10 [17].3 (mid-June), and 1.18 [24].4 (July 27); Appian 3.82.337ff.; Dio 46.42.2; *Cic.* 45.5–46.1 (very similar to Appian).

μνώμενος: poetic.

παρὰ νόμον: one of the measures carried on January 4 allowed Octavian the right to stand for the consulship ten years before the legal age (forty-two), but in the summer of 43 he was still only nineteen (his birthday was 23 September).

τρέφων: regular for 'maintaining' an army, but given force by the close conjunction of *μνώμενος*—Octavian (I think) is an unnatural 'suitor' who 'rears' wild beasts. Perhaps one can connect this with the activities of his father (7.7 and n.).

καὶ ... δεομένης: another vague summarizing remark, which covers considerable historical detail. When the news of Mutina reached Rome on April 27, the senate decreed that the armies which the Consuls had commanded should be transferred to Decimus Brutus and that he should have sole charge of the further course of the War (Livy *Epit.* 120; Appian 3.74.302 and 3.76.311; Dio 46.40.1; cf. *Ad Fam.* 11.19 [399].1, 11.20 [401].4 and 11.14 [413].2). But Octavian would not cooperate with Decimus (*Ad Fam.* 11.13 [388].1, 11.10 [385].5, cf. Appian | 3.73.298–300) and did not allow any of Pansa's legions to join him (*Ad Fam.* 11.20 [401].4), while the Fourth and Martian legions refused to serve under one of Caesar's murderers (*Ad Fam.* 11.14 [413].2).

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τῆς ... δεομένης: for the general sentiment cf. *Cic.* 45.5 (not close).

2. καὶ ... ἔξω: before the end of May, when Antony had secured his retreat from Mutina, the senate passed a resolution calling upon Brutus to return with his army to Italy (*Ad Brut.* 1.10 [17].1—early June; Appian 3.85.350; Dio 46.51.5). Cicero personally repeatedly appealed to Brutus (*Ad Brut.* 1.10 [17].1, 1.9 [18].3, 1.12 [21].2, 1.14 [22].2, 1.18 [24].1).

καὶ ψηφίζομένην ... ἐπαρχίας: other sources for this are *Cic. Phil.* 10.25, *Ad Brut.* 2.4 [4].4; Vell. 2.62.2 and 2.73.2; Appian 3.63.258 and 4.58.248 and 4.75.317; Dio 46.40.3 and 47.22.2. Brutus' usurpation of Macedonia, Illyricum and Achaia was ratified by the senate in February 43 (cf. *Phil.* 10.25). {See Welch, *Magnus Pius*, 145–6 and 160 n. 77.} Technically P.'s dating here is incorrect, but it arises naturally from *καὶ πρὸς τὸν Βροῦτον ἀφορῶσαν*, and this is, after all, a summary of the relevant events in Italy since Brutus' departure. Other narrative sources, with less excuse, are no improvement. Velleius and Dio 46.40.3 (but *not* 47.22.2) also mistakenly date the ratification to after Antony's defeat at Mutina, though in their case the reason clearly is that they have associated it with the honours paid Decimus, Sextus Pompeius and Cassius at that time. Appian 3.63.258 and 4.58.248 makes the opposite error—getting the dating of Brutus' legitimization right but wrongly synchronizing Cassius' with it.

ἔδεισε: on the various motives offered by the sources for Octavian's decision to come to terms with Antony see Rice Holmes, *Architect* 214f.

327 **3. καὶ τὸν ... προὔκαλεῖτο:** P. is no doubt right in his | implication that Octavian made overtures to Antony *before* becoming consul (circumstantial backing in Appian 3.80.326 and 329; Dio 46.51.2).

τὰς δὲ ... ἔλαβεν: sources for Octavian's *coup* are Livy *Epit.* 119; *Res gestae* 1.7–8; Vell. 2.65.2; Suet. *Aug.* 26.1, 31.2, 95; Tac. *Ann.* 1.10; Appian 3.88.361–94.388; Dio 46.42.4–46.1; Eutrop. 7.2; Macrobius 1.12.35; Obsequens 69 (vultures); *CIL* 1.310 (= Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.* 108). Octavian marched on Rome in July 43, after sending a preliminary delegation of troops, and was elected consul on August 19.

οὐπω ... εἰκοστόν: a text-book use of *μειράκιον* (3.1n.).

εἰκοστόν ... ἔτος: this point also made in the *Epitome*, Velleius, Suetonius and Eutropius, all presumably like P. reflecting Augustus' own emphasis in the *Autobiography* (cf. also Dio 46.46.2).

αὐτός: *HRR* II, 57 fr. 8 = Malcovati frs. 8–10, 12, 17 {= *FRHist* 60 F 6}. P. also cites the *Autobiography* at 41.7 below, *Cic.* 45.6 and 52.1, *Ant.* 22.2 (cf. *Brut.* 41.7) and 68.2, perhaps using a Greek version (Jones 86), though the present case is more likely 'inherited'.

4. εὐθύς ... δικαστῶν: other sources for the condemnation of the tyrannicides are Ps.-Cic. *Ad Oct.* 8 (useless); *Res gestae* 1.10–11; Livy *Epit.* 120; Vell. 2.69.5; Suet. *Aug.* 10.1 (chronologically misleading {cf. Wardle *ad loc.*}), *Nero* 3.1, *Galba* 3.2; Appian 3.95.392–393, 4.27.118–119 and 5.48; Dio 46.48.1–4, 46.49.1–5 and 47.22.4.

εἰσήγεν: the actual proposer of the law was Q. Pedius, Octavian's close relative and fellow-consul. P., the Epitomizer, Suetonius (though he knows of the *Lex Pedia*), Appian and Dio all attribute it to Octavian 'loosely but with substantial truth' (Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 68, n. 4, cl. *Res gestae* 1.10–11).

κατήγορον ... Κορνιφίκιον: this detail is not given in any other source. |

Κορνιφίκιον: L. Cornificius. *RE* 4.1623 (Münzer); *PIR* 2². 373.

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Κασσίου ... Ἀγρίππαν: the only other source to record this is Velleius (for personal family reasons).

Ἀγρίππαν: *RE* 9.1226 (Hanslik); *PIR* 3.439.

ὠφλίσκανον ... δικαστῶν: P. seems to imply that the voting was unanimous, which is probably incorrect (below), but he needs to give this impression as he has adopted a deviant version of the behaviour of P. Silicius Corona (below).

5. λέγεται ... δακρύσαντα: this pathetic scene, described with characteristic Plutarchean vividness, is not elsewhere recorded, but—whether authentic or not—cannot just be P.'s own contribution.

τὸ πλῆθος ... στενάξαι: perhaps not *quite* as unlikely as it looks at first sight. Brutus was surprisingly not unpopular with the people. Cf. 21.4n. on their response to his games and 29.3 below. Note that Dio 46.48.1–2 states that before setting the condemnation of the tyrannicides in motion Octavian saw first to the payment of (the balance of) the bequests made by Caesar to the people *μή πη τὸν ὄμιλον διὰ τοῦτ' ἐκταράξῃ*.

στενάξαι: highly poetic diction to suit the heightened emotional tone of the narrative.

Πόπλιον ... γενέσθαι: the other sources are Appian 3.95.392 and 4.27.118–119; Dio 46.49.5.

Σιλίκιον: *RE* 3A.60 (Münzer). Dio gives the name as *Σιλίκιος Κορώνας*, so his full name was P. Silicius Corona. Appian at 3.95.392 refers simply to

one of τῶν ἐπιφανῶν but at 4.27.118 the MSS reading is Ἰκέλιος (a scribal error presumably).

ὀφθῆναι: a standard appeal to ὄψις in vivid narrative. Cf. 14.6 and 31.5. Frequent in P.

329 Appian and Dio agree with P. that Corona was later proscribed | and executed for his behaviour at the trial but state that he was one of the jurors and that he alone actually dared to vote for the acquittal of Brutus (?and Cassius). P. does not make it clear that he was a juror and implies that his only crime was to burst into tears. Presumably this represents a divergent tradition from a strongly Republican source. One may feel a contemporary evocation by P. of the horrors of treason trials under the Empire (cf. on 45.9).

θανάτω: details of his (dishonourable) death in Appian 4.27.118–119.

6. μετὰ ταῦτα ... ἀπέθανε: for much fuller accounts see *Cic.* 46.2–48.6 and *Ant.* 19.1–20.4.

Καίσαρ ... Λέπιδος: effective asyndeton, suggesting the terribleness of the triumvirate.

σφαγίς: poetic—heightened emotional tone.

διακοσίων: *Cic.* 46.2 has ὑπὲρ διακοσίων, but *Ant.* 20.2 τριακόσια. Livy *Epit.* 120 (cf. *Oros.* 6.18.10, *Flor.* 2.16.3) gives 130 senators and a great number of *equites*. Appian 4.5.20 gives about 300 senators and about 2,000 *equites*. Livy's figure is too low in the light of the evidence of the other sources (especially as the names of nearly 100 proscribed are known: Drumann–Groebe 1.470ff.), and is probably a mistake (cf. Appian 4.7.28). Three hundred senators is presumably right. The discrepancy between the *Cicero/Brutus* and *Antony* seems just a typical Plutarchean inaccuracy. One notes that P.'s figures cover only senators: he is interested in the proscriptions in relation to their effect on the governing class.

330 **ἐν οἷς ... ἀπέθανε**: lengthy descriptions of Cicero's death in *Cic.* 47.1–49.2 and *Ant.* 20.3–4 {see Moles' and Pelling's nn. respectively}, and in Livy (*Sen. Suas.* 6.17) and Appian 4.19.73ff. (cf. Dio 47.8.3–4, *De vir. ill.* 81.6). A lengthy treatment here would be inappropriate because (i) Cicero | is not an important figure in this *Life*; (ii) this section is anyway only a summary; and (iii) Brutus' own reaction to Cicero's death was low-key (28.2).

Ch. 28: Execution of C. Antonius; Brutus' judgement on the death of Cicero; he reprimands Cassius; they meet at Smyrna

1. Τούτων ... προσήκοντι: sources for the execution of C. Antonius are *Ant.* 22.6; Livy *Epit.* 121 (no details); Seneca *Consol. ad Polyb.* 35 (on the fortitude with which Antony bore the news); Appian 3.79.323 (brief); Dio 47.24.3–4. On the date see 28.3n. {K. M. Girardet, *Chiron* 23 (1993), 217, 226 discusses the nature of this communication, and argues that it was a request rather than a command: that fits his argument that Brutus never possessed *maius imperium* over other provincial governors.}

οὖν: resumptive after *ch.* 27.

ἀπαγγελέντων: P. uses the (later) strong aorist form. Cf. *Galba* 25.7 and *Ant.* 68.8 (both unchallenged).

ἐκβιασθείς: strongly apologetic—P. goes out of his way to emphasize that the φιλάνθρωπος Brutus had no choice. Appian and Dio accept the justification for the execution without a second thought.

ἔγραφεν: Appian has nothing about the details of the execution; in Dio Clodius (cf. 26.7n.) kills Antonius, either on his own responsibility or following instructions from Brutus. P.'s version is superior: it seems to derive from a letter of Brutus which P. has access to (below), and it explains Antony's behaviour at Philippi (below).

ὡς ... προσήκοντι: the brief reference in the *Antony* just has Κικέρωνι τιμωρῶν. Appian implies that Antonius was executed because of his repeated attempts to corrupt Brutus' troops, Dio that it was either because Clodius, under pressure from the intrigues of Gellius Publicola and Mark Antony, could no longer keep Antonius in custody alive, or because Brutus no longer cared | about his fate after the death of Decimus. P.'s δῆ here implies (I think) that he is quoting Brutus direct (for this use of δῆ cf. D. Chr. 13.1).

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Βρούτῳ: startlingly allusive—Decimus has not been mentioned since 19.5; the sort of carelessness which arises inevitably from working with a vast amount of historical material.

κατὰ γένος: on the distant relationship see Münzer, *RA*, 407; *RE* Suppl. 5.369ff. Brutus was highly sensitive to family relationships (cf. e.g. *Ad Brut.* 1.15 [23].10f.).

διὰ ... προσέσφαξε: slightly more detailed is *Ant.* 22.6. The allusiveness of that account, which fails to make clear the connexion between Hortensius and C. Antonius' death, suggests (what is anyway likely) the priority of the *Brutus*. The item may come from Livy: cf. *Epit.* 121 and 124 with Syme, *Harvard Studies* 64 (1959), 35f. {= *Roman Papers* I (1979), 409}.

προσέσφαξε: perhaps partly conditioned by σφαγᾶς (27.6) but also poignant, for Antony's execution of Hortensius was a 'sacrifice' to his brother. On the ritual see Weinstock 398f.

2. Βρούτος ... ἀνεκτὸν ἦν: no other source records this (or any) reaction of Brutus to Cicero's death. The sentiment is wilfully misunderstood by Tyrrell and Purser VI, cxxi: Brutus' shame has nothing to do with his refusal to respond to Cicero's appeals to him to come to Italy, nor is he failing to express grief: it is just that his feeling of shame is greater (μᾶλλον—cf. Voegelin *ad loc.*).

φησίν: where? Presumably in a lost letter, perhaps the one to Hortensius?

δουλεύειν ... τυραννούντων: from Thucydides {1.99.3} on, a frequent criticism of the tyrannized, much invoked in the political conditions of P.'s own time (e.g. *Praec. ger. reip.* 814E–F; D. Chr. 31.111; Aristid. 26.64K etc.).

αἰτία: a punning pickup of αἰτία above. |

332 **3. Περαιώσας ... Ἀσίαν:** when?

The chronology of this period is notoriously vague (Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 78, does not try to be precise at this point). The use of the death of Decimus, Octavian's reconciliation with Antony, or the formation of the triumvirate and the proscriptions as *termini* can only provide a loose dating like 'towards the end of the year 43' (Syme 203). Whether a more precise dating is possible depends on the trustworthiness of P.'s evidence here.

P. and Dio agree that Brutus crossed over to Asia after the execution of C. Antonius (Dio 47.25.1–2; this is also implied in Livy *Epit.* 121–122, for what that is worth). Dio offers two possibilities for the dating of that event: (i) after the attempted intervention of men sent by Antony; (ii) after Brutus had heard of the death of Decimus. (i) gives a date of post-August 43 (by which time Antony was no longer under any threat from Plancus and Decimus), but this is not only extremely vague, but also unreliable as it depends on the suspect version that Antonius' execution was ordered by Clodius (above). (ii) gives a dating of *about* September 43. P. agrees with Dio (ii) that the news of the death of Decimus was a factor, but also makes Cicero's death (7 December) relevant. If he is right (surely yes—cf. n. on δῆ), Antonius' execution must be dated December/January. Slight support for this dating is provided by Seneca's evidence, which makes Antony learn of his brother's death when he is already a member of the triumvirate (voted on November 27). Thus Brutus probably crossed into Asia at the beginning of 42.

ναυτικὸν ... ἐχρημάτιζε: no other narrative source has these details, though Livy may have had something (*Epit.* 122 'omnibus ... transmarinis provinciis exercitibusque in potestatem eius et C. Cassii redactis coierunt Smyrnae'). If so, he could be a source, direct or indirect, here. But P. (also

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seems to be using | epistolary evidence at this point (below).
ναυτικὸν ... ἐχρημάτιζε: cf. the Greek letters nos. 33 (to Damas, a δυνάστης), 35–40 (to and from the Cyzicenes), 41–42 (to and from the Smyrnaeans), 47–50 (to and from the Milesians), 59–68 (to and from the

Bithynians) = *Epistologr. Gr.* 183ff. Most of these are regarded as definite forgeries by Smith 201. Torraca XXVII accepts the authenticity of nos. 61 and 63, for inadequate reasons. In general see 2.5n. Though it is virtually certain that all these letters are forgeries they may reflect a broadly correct tradition about Brutus' activities, and P. could well have inferred the statement *ναυτικὸν μὲν ... τοῖς δυνάσταις ἐχρημάτιζε* from them.

Κύζικον: for Brutus' earlier dealings with Cyzicus (supporting Dio's *two* crossings into Asia—27.1n.) see Appian 4.75.320, and for Herostratus' possible activities there see 24.2n.

3–5. καὶ πρὸς καταβαίνοντας: this picture of dissension between Brutus and Cassius is in strong contrast with Dio 47.32.1, which stresses, perhaps rather defensively, the close harmony between the two men. Appian is much nearer P.: 4.63.270 οὕτω δὲ αὐτὸν ὀρμῆς καὶ ἐλπίδος ἔχοντα καὶ καιροῦ ὁ Βροῦτος ἐκάλει κατὰ σπουδῆν, ὡς ἤδη Καίσαρος καὶ Ἀντωνίου τὸν Ἴόνιον περὸντων. ἄκων ... Κάσσιος, though the condemnation of Cassius' cupidity is much less explicit and the explanation given for Brutus' recall of Cassius practical rather than moral. But the two explanations are naturally not incompatible and the strong moral slant in P. is entirely predictable. Thus the ultimate source for both writers is probably the same, though P. may have added to it from elsewhere (below). Presumably P. and Appian are right about the rift between Brutus and Cassius.

4–5. οὐ γὰρ ... πολίταις: this is clearly meant to represent the gist of Brutus' communication with Cassius. Does it | do more? Does it in fact reproduce the terms of Brutus' letter more or less *verbatim*? The argument is precise and specific, the high moral tone and the blunt readiness to rebuke even close friends for their failings are typical of Brutus as revealed in the letters *Ad Brutum*, and the sense of urgency reflected in 28.5 is consistent with Brutus the immature military strategist (cf. 28.5n.). Before accepting the conclusion that P. is actually quoting from a letter of Brutus direct, one must compare this section with 29.5. Which is the model? Despite 29.5 ὄντο, surely the present passage, from which P. is working for his altogether excessive attack on Cassius in 29.5 (an attack which goes beyond anything in the other sources). I think the present passage is *ipsissimus Brutus*.

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4. αὐτοῖς: Ziegler's correction (cl. 29.5) is certain.

πλανᾶσθαι: a conventional appeal to the humiliation of 'wandering'.

5. μεμνημένους ... ὑπόθεσιν: for the theme of Brutus' constancy of purpose cf. 29.3–4 and n.

σπεύδειν: roughly paralleled by Appian's *ὡς ἤδη Καίσαρος καὶ Ἀντωνίου τὸν Ἴόνιον περὸντων* (a rhetorical exaggeration of 4.65.276). There is

evidence that Brutus was unable to take a longterm view of military strategy (cf. 39.9 and 47.6 below and Appian 4.65.276). There is no necessary conflict with his refusal to return to Italy at Cicero's requests (*pace* Wilson 199 and others); with the formation of the triumvirate and the proscriptions the political situation had changed radically.

6. καὶ περὶ Σμύρναν: for the meeting at Smyrna see Livy *Epit.* 122; Appian 4.65.276–279; Dio 47.32.1–3. {For discussion, Welch, *Magnus Pius*, 175–8.}

πρῶτον: typically, P. emphasizes the uniqueness of the occasion (cf. 21.1 and 22.1nn.) and gives it added weight by an | impressive rhetorical description of their military strength.

ἐν Πειραιεῖ ... Μακεδονίαν: does this reflect superior knowledge? The implication is that Brutus and Cassius set out on their separate missions by mutual agreement at the same time. When? (Cf. also 25.3n.) Precise dating of Cassius' departure for Syria is practically impossible, though a *terminus ante* is provided by *Ad Fam.* 12.4 [363] and 5 [365] (early February 43). Appian 3.24.91 and Dio 47.21.1–2 (cf. Vell. 2.62.3) agree with P. in synchronizing Brutus' operations in Macedonia with Cassius' in Syria, but this is little help, given the difficulty of dating Brutus' movements precisely. Gelzer 999 infers from *Ad Fam.* 12.3 [345].2 (early October 44), where Cicero complains that Antony has deprived one of Cassius' legates of his *viaticum*, that Cassius departed for Syria with the sanction of the senate. Even if this inference were correct, it is not clear what date it would imply for Cassius' departure, since at the time of writing Cassius was still clearly within relatively easy reach (though not actually in/around Italy—23.1n.). But it is of course wrong: *Phil.* 11.28 'qua lege, quo iure' (of Cassius' seizure of Syria) *et al.* There is no way of proving that 12.3 [345].2 refers to Cassius on his way to Syria, even without senatorial approval. The only semi-solid piece of evidence is *Ad Att.* 15.13 [416].4 (October 25) 'narrat (Servilia) eadem Bassi servum venisse, qui nuntiaret legiones Alexandrinas in armis esse, Bassum arcessi, Cassium expectari', which, though only a rumour, suggests a dating of the beginning of October, but not before. Cassius, therefore, seems to have gone into action rather earlier than Brutus. If so, P.'s wording here is best explained not as deriving from superior knowledge, but as part of the whole impressive rhetorical structure of 28.6–7: Brutus and Cassius both set out with nothing, now they are reunited with an armament fit to challenge the Caesarians for the possession of the empire. |

Chs. 29–30.2: Smyrna; reflections on the contrasting characters of Brutus and Cassius

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The conference at Smyrna provides a static point in the narrative, allowing a full exploration of the contrasting characters of the two great Republican leaders. The discussion follows naturally on the description of their separate preparations for war (28.7), and especially on Brutus' recall of Cassius from Syria (28.3–4) and his imputation that Cassius is interested in waging a war of self-aggrandizement, although the transition to this general discussion at 29.1–2 is a little awkward. The treatment of the *σύγκρισις* between Brutus and Cassius practically develops into a discussion of the virtues of the ideal *πολιτικός*.

29.1–30.2. Ἐβούλετο ... ἀπάντων: neither Appian 4.65.276 nor Dio 47.32.1–3 contain any of the apparently circumstantial detail P. has here (29.1–2, 30.1–2), nor—unsurprisingly—anything approaching P.'s lengthy discussion of the contrasting characters of the two men.

1. Ἐβούλετο ... Κάσσιος: one of several instances (cf. 9.1–4, 30.2, 34.7–8, 37.6, 40.1–3, 40.5–11) where Cassius behaves rather well, in some contradiction with P.'s overall editorial view. Cf. in general 1.4n., 8.5n., 9.1n.

ἔφθανε ... χρώμενον: since P. believed that the old still had something to contribute to public life (cf. esp. the *An seni sit gerenda respublica*), he is naturally keen to point out occasions when younger men defer to their elders (though of course Cassius does not qualify as a 'senex'). Cf. e.g. *Pomp.* 19.8, *Cat. min.* 14.2. He will have been the more appreciative of Brutus' behaviour for knowing that Brutus was the psychologically dominant partner.

ἡλικία ... προὔχοντα: attested also by Appian 4.89 (a different context) and consistent with Cassius' *cursus*, for Cassius was *proquaestor* in 53: see J. Linderski, *Class. Phil.* 70 | (1975), 35ff. Cassius was quaestor in 55 or 54 (Linderski) and was probably born in c. 86 (Linderski 36, cf. G. V. Sumner, *Phoenix* 25 [1971], 365). His birthday was October 23 (cf. Appian 4.113.475 and 40.4n. below), and Brutus' birthday was *about* the same time of year (24.6n.). Cassius was thus a year or two older than Brutus.

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σώματι ... χρώμενον: there is no other explicit evidence for this. But Brutus' physical endurance on campaign was remarkable (cf. 4.6–8, 36.2–3) and P. knows that Cassius' eyesight was poor (43.4), so one may presume that he is here retailing authentic information.

2–7. ἦν ... φθονούντας: the fullest manifestation of the Brutus–Cassius *σύγκρισις* in the *Life*. P.'s wording here (as at 1.4 and 8.6) implies that it already featured strongly in the historical tradition, which is confirmed by the analyses of Vell. 2.69.6 and 2.72.2 (essentially similar to P. here),

Appian 4.123.518, 4.133.561. It would have been an obvious talking point among e.g. Antony and his friends (cf. 29.7 below), or the Republicans who survived Philippi, men like Bibulus and Messalla. Possibly it became a theme for declamation in the schools. It would also have fitted nicely into the category of thought ‘what would have happened if “x” instead of “y” had won?’ (cf. Vell. 2.72.2. Tacitus’ ‘capax imperii nisi imperasset’ is a kind of reversal of this theme). P.’s full-scale analysis goes far beyond anything found elsewhere and is also notably more hostile to Cassius than the analysis in Appian, though not that in Vell. 2.72.2. Simply *because* this is the fullest and most explicit manifestation of the *σύγκρισις* in P. it offers a gross oversimplification of Cassius’ character, an oversimplification of which P. himself is not unaware (cf. 8.5n.): P. the moralist is strongly to the fore at the expense of P. the historian.

338 **2. δόξα:** cf. 29.3 *λέγουσι*. P. is reporting the | *communis opinio*, but that of course does not mean that he himself is maintaining a position of scholarly reserve: the characterization of both Brutus and Cassius soon reveals familiar features, and one must suspect that P. is attributing to the *communis opinio* more than it in fact contained.

δεινὸν ... πολεμικοῖς: cf. 7.3, 40.11, 54.2 (= *Comp.* 1.2), the *Crassus* references given in 7.3n., Vell. 2.72.2, Appian 4.123.518, 133.516. Cassius was widely recognized as a good general. The report of his death allegedly prompted Antony to an exultant ‘Vici!’ (*De vir. ill.* 83.7).

ὀργῇ ... τραχύν: cf. 7.5 above, and 30.3ff. below, where Cassius’ lack of *ἐπιείκεια* is contrasted with Brutus’ (implied) *φιλανθρωπία*. Cassius is here described in almost *τύραννος*-like terms (cf. also *φόβω ... ἄρχοντα*)—e.g. at *Rom.* 31.3 *χαλεπότης*, an analogous vice, is seen as characteristic of the tyrant (cf. also *De sera num. vind.* 553A).

Little contemporary evidence of Cassius’ *τραχύτης* or otherwise has survived (*Ad Fam.* 15.16 [215].3 ‘si ... stomachabere et moleste feres’ is a joke), but it is perhaps fair to assume that P. is oversimplifying and overstressing Cassius’ *τραχύτης* in the interests of the *σύγκρισις* between him and Brutus (who certainly *could* be *τραχύς*—cf. 29.3n. *πρᾶος*). Even in his own narrative (35.3) Cassius remits punishment (admittedly of friends, but P. is not restricting the application of *ὀργῇ ... τραχύν* just to Cassius’ relations with *οἱ ἀρχόμενοι*), for the sake of *πολιτεία* and *φιλανθρωπία* (!). Vell. 2.69.6 reluctantly concedes Cassius’ ‘clementia’. In Appian, though his rapacity (e.g. 4.62.268) and sternness towards subordinates (4.123.518, cf. Vell. 2.69.6) are stressed, he can still feel pity at the sufferings of the Tarsians (4.64.275) and shame at the entreaties of Archelaus, his old tutor (4.69.291). And in Dio he gets a | strikingly different press: his reason-
339 ableness is heavily emphasized (47.28.4, 47.30.6–7, 47.31.3). Some of Dio’s evidence is strongly apologetic and carries no conviction (e.g. he cannot conceal Cassius’ rapacity—47.31.3 and 47.33.4—and his version of the fall

of Rhodes is highly idiosyncratic—47.33.4, cf. 30.3n. below), other bits of it seem to record hard fact (47.28.4, 47.30.6), which does reflect well on Cassius. {For further comparison of Appian and Dio on Cassius, see Gowing, *The Triumviral Narratives* 163–80, esp. 172 n. 30 contrasting Appian and Plutarch.} The lame conclusion is that Cassius, undoubtedly an ἀνήρ θυμοειδής and ruthless in his exactions (29.5 below) was often τραχὺς but sometimes not: he himself professed a horror of ‘crudelitas’ (*Ad Fam.* 15.19 [216].2) and some of his actions reveal φιλανθρωπία. P.’s judgement, then, is substantially correct but simplistic.

φόβω ... ἄρχοντα: this judgement also suits P.’s book, enabling him to point a sharp contrast between the right and wrong way to rule—the good ruler rules by εὐνοία, not φόβος (cf. 29.4)—but seems to be right. It is supported by Appian 4.123.518 (an authentic-looking description {on it see Gowing, *The Triumviral Narratives* 173–4}).

πρὸς ... φιλοσκώπτῃν: the main purpose of this remark is to highlight the difference in Cassius’ behaviour towards those he ruled and his personal friends. But it also seems to be pejorative in itself: Brutus was loved by his friends δι’ ἀρετήν and it looks as if Cassius is being accused of a lack of seriousness (cf. e.g. *Sulla* 2.3). At 29.3 Brutus is credited with being πρὸς πᾶσαν ὀργήν καὶ ἡδονήν καὶ πλεονεξίαν ἀπαθής—a general description of his virtue but one which also implicitly continues the σύγκρισις with Cassius: ὀργήν ‘answers’ Cassius as ὀργῇ τραχύν and σφοδρὸν ἄνδρα καὶ θυμοειδῆ, πλεονεξίαν Cassius as πολλαχοῦ πρὸς τὸ κερδαλέον ἐκφερόμενον τοῦ δικαίου (29.5) and ἡδονήν Cassius (presumably) as πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις ὑγρότερον τῷ γελοίῳ καὶ φιλοσκώπτῃν. And not only is Cassius’ propensity τῷ γελοίῳ regarded as | ὑγρότερον (i.e. excessive) but also the actual quality of τὸ γελοῖον itself is suspect: in context, with Brutus resoundingly characterised as πρὸς πᾶσαν ... ἡδονήν ἀπαθής, φιλοσκώπτῃν suggests that Cassius’ humour was of a fairly broad kind. How, then, to assess P.’s evidence here? Cassius certainly did reveal a sense of humour among his close friends (cf. e.g. *Ad Fam.* 15.18 [213].1, 15.19 [216].1) and specimens of his humour are to be found at *Ad Fam.* 15.19 [216].1 (frigid philosophical banter), Appian 4.69–70 (sarcastic speech to Archelaus and the Rhodians), Dio 44.34.7 (spirited repartee with Antony), 34.7 (sense of the absurd) and 40.9 (? tolerant amusement, but it is hardly authentic). There is nothing here to contradict (or support) P.’s account of his sense of humour, but the particular disapproving slant he gives it probably reflects his own unease about certain types of humour (cf. his strictures on Aristophanes, *Quaest. conviv.* 711A, *Comp. Aristoph. et Men.* 854A), and perhaps more specifically his dislike of what he conceived to be the typical Epicurean brand of humour (cf. *Non posse suav. vivi* 1095Cff.). For P.’s attitude to wit in general see Wardman 228ff.

ὕγρότερον: here, as at *Sulla* 30.5 and Appian 5.8 = ‘prone to’. Not a difficult usage but attributed first to P. by *LSJ* (nothing either in Wyttenbach).

3. Βρούτον ... πολεμίων: a standard encomiastic arrangement of material, detailing the various types of people who admired the hero in question. Cf. e.g. X. *Ages.* 6.8.

Βρούτον: Drumann–Groebe 4.45ff., gives a useful general sketch of Brutus’s character as seen by contemporaries and later writers.

δι’ ἀρετήν: bouquets to Brutus’ virtue include Cic. *Ad Fam.* 9.14 [326].5, *Orat.* 33; Vell. 2.72.1, 2.72.2; Sen. *Controv.* 10.1.8, Appian 4.132.553 (of Brutus and Cassius). For the theme in the | *Brutus* e.g. 29.8, 46.3, 52.5, 53.3, 54.2.

φιλεισθαι: cf. 46.3, 27.5 and 21.3n. for Brutus’ standing with the people. On the wording *φιλεισθαι/ἐράσθαι* Voegelin well remarks ‘dicit φίλους fuisse etiam alienos: quos autem aliis dicas φίλους, hos illi fuisse ἐραστάς’.

ἐράσθαι: a Stoic touch (see 12.3n.). There is hardly need to substantiate the strong affection in which Brutus was held by e.g. Cicero (e.g. *Orat.* 33, *Ad Fam.* 9.14 [326].5) or Cassius (10.3–7, 32.2–7, 40.5–9), despite the vicissitudes in both relationships.

θαυμάζεσθαι ... ἀρίστων: cf. 33.1.

μισείσθαι ... πολεμίων: cf. 53.4 (Antony), 58.1 (= *Comp.* 5.1) (Antony and Octavian), 29.7 below and 1.4n.

πρῶτος: cf. 1.3n. Brutus’ *πρῶτης* is not P.’s own contribution (e.g. Appian 3.79.323, 4.123.517f.—both independent of P.).

<ῆν>: Ziegler’s addition is plausible, if not absolutely necessary. The important thing is that the ὅτι clause clearly contains P.’s own reflections on Brutus’ character and no longer just what λέγουσι in the tradition (Voegelin’s <ἐστί> is surely wrong).

μεγαλόφρων: used of high-minded indifference to relative trivia; also of Brutus at *Pomp.* 64.5 (where he joins Pompey at Pharsalia, despite his previous hostility to him for killing his father). The importance of *μεγαλοφροσύνη* as a political virtue is constantly invoked in P., e.g. *De fort. Alex.* 336E, 339B, *De laude ips.* 541C, *Maxime cum princ. phil. diss.* 776F, *Rom.* 30.5, *Solon* 27.1, *Publ.* 10.5, 19.9, *Per.* 14.2, 16.7, 17.4, *Fab. Max.* 30.5, *Dion* 4.3, *Pyrrh.* 20.10, *Sert.* 22.5, 23.1, *Eum.* 9.2.

πρὸς ... ἀπαθής: Stoic terminology, evidently used with complete approval.

ἡδονήν: for Brutus’ exemplary private life see 6.9n. | (rejecting the scurrilous tradition of *De vir. ill.* 82.2) and for his general asceticism 4.8, 36.1–3.

πλεονεξίαν: for Brutus’ immunity to *πλεονεξία* see esp. 6.9–11, 28.4, and 32.4. For the other side of the coin see 3.4n.

ὄρθιον ... πίστις: for the general theme of Brutus’ consistency cf. esp. 6.8 and 56.11 (= *Comp.* 3.11). Cicero pays tribute to Brutus’ ‘singularis

constantia' (*Ad Fam.* 9.14 [326].5), which was widely canvassed (e.g. Tac. *Hist.* 4.8). Consistency as a political virtue is constantly lauded in P. (e.g. *Dion* 2.6, *Themist.* 2.7, *Arist.* 3.4, *Fab. Max.* 5.5, 19.3, 28.5 (= *Comp.* 1.5); *Art.* 27.9, *Timol.* 6.1, *Aemil.* 13.6, *Demosth.* 13.1–6, *De genio Socr.* 581C etc. See below on Brutus' προαίρεσις.

ἄκναπτον: L'Q's ἄκναπτον prompts Ziegler to suggest tentatively ἄγναμπτον, cf. *Cat. Min.* 11.4, a rather similar passage. But the majority MSS reading is good (cf. e.g. *Cat. min.* 4.2, *Lyc.* 11.6). The tone of the word is quite strongly poetic (cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 4.128, *Isthm.* 4.89) and thus appropriate to an encomiastic context.

4. εὐνοϊαν: for P.'s insistence on the need for the ruler to rule not by flattery (as a demagogue) nor by fear or force (as a tyrant) but by εὐνοϊα see e.g. *Flam.* 17.1, *Timol.* 39.4, *Pomp.* 1.2, *Luc.* 45.3 (= *Comp.* 2.3), *Arat.* 25.7, *Dion* 10.4, *Aemil.* 39.7, *Demetr.* 8.3, 30.5ff. etc. and in general Wardman 68ff. A standard item in ruler ideology.

δόξαν: for Brutus' δόξα cf. 46.3, 52.5, 54.2. Its existence was recognized by Cicero (*Orat.* 33), and by Brutus himself (52.5, Dio 47.49.2) and is given appropriate weight by Appian (3.79.323). P. is prepared to concede the usefulness of δόξα to secure advancement in public life (cf. esp. *De capi. ex inim. util.* 92D, *Praec. ger. reip.* 804D, 805C, *Agis-Cleom.* 2.1–3, *Flam.* 20.1–2, etc.), subject always to the proviso that it never | degenerates into φιλοτιμία for its own sake (general discussion in Wardman 115ff.).

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ἦ ... πίστις: cf. 6.8 and 35.6.

προαιρέσεως: ('considered choice') is a very important element in P.'s ethical thought. As a moral concept it had long been established both in philosophical (Arist. *EN* 1111b) and ordinary literary usage (e.g. Aeschines, *Contra Timarchum* 74f.), but to P. it is central. He sets out his general position clearly at the start of the *Praec. ger. reip.*, e.g. 798C, 798E, 799B. All true statesmen must base their actions on an underlying προαίρεσις and hold firm to it whatever the pressures, frequently the competing claims of πάθος (cf. *Timol.* 41.11 (= *Comp.* 2.11) and δόξα (e.g. *Pomp.* 67.7)). Abandonment of one's προαίρεσις is naturally a matter for criticism (e.g. *Pomp.* 67.7). Particular actions, especially those of a controversial kind, are regularly assessed in the light of the question: how do they square with the hero's general προαίρεσις? A typical example of an analysis along these lines in *Timol.* 6.1–4 (re his withdrawal from public life after killing his brother)—cf. *Timol.* 41.11 = *Comp.* 2.11—where P. concludes that Timoleon's assassination of his brother, though in itself a good action, was not taken in accordance with Timoleon's προαίρεσις and therefore Timoleon deserves no credit for it. A more straightforward case is *Marc.* 28.—cf. 33.6 = *Comp.* 3.6—re Marcellus' unbalanced desire to fight Hannibal. It is obvious that a distinction has to be made between what occurs by choice and chance—cf. *Dion* 2.1, *Aemil.* 1.6. The usual test of προαίρεσις is, not surprisingly, its

length of duration—cf. 6.8, 29.3, 56.11 and 57.6. A key text here is P.'s defence of the consistency of Demosthenes (*Demosth.* 13). Of course a man can make a 'consistent choice' which is *bad*, depending on his ἀρετή or lack of it (cf. Arist. *loc. cit.*)—cf. e.g. *Ant.* 89.1—or *mixed*, | e.g. Caesar's desire to become μόναρχος (*Caes.* 28.3), which, though τυραννική, is mitigated by Caesar's ἐπιείκεια and the political needs of the time. For further discussion see Wardman 107ff. For προαίρεσις in Aristotle see W. F. R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (1968) 160ff.

One may emphasize the fact that Brutus here is made to wear an Aristotelian hat, for προαίρεσις did not become a Stoic concept until Epictetus (Sandbach 165). The tension in P.'s philosophical portrayal of Brutus has already been sufficiently noted: he is prepared to concede him Stoic attributes but strenuously resists classifying him as a Stoic *tout court*.

οὔτε γὰρ ... δῆμον: this is P.'s considered view of Pompey's ultimate political ambitions, for all the sympathy which he lavishes upon him. Cf. e.g. *Caes.* 28.1 and 6–7, *Pomp.* 25.3ff., 75.5, 82.3 (= *Comp.* 2.3). Of course it was also a common view among contemporaries (Cicero, Favonius) and later thinkers (Lucan, Seneca, Tacitus).

παραμυθούμενος: anxiety to conciliate the people is one of Pompey's salient characteristics in P. (*Pomp.* 1.1, 2.1, 14.11, 21.7 etc.).

5. τούτων: colloquial and contemptuous.

σφοδρὸν ... θυμοειδῆ: cf. 8.5 and n.

τὸ κερδαλέον: Cassius' rapacity is well attested. Cf. 28.4 and 29.2n. above, 30.1–3 and 32.4; Val. Max. 1.5.8 (Rhodes); Appian 4.62.268 (Laodicea), 4.64.273ff. (Tarsus), 4.73.310f. (Rhodes); Dio 47.31.3 (Tarsus), 47.33.4 (Rhodes); Oros. 6.18.13 (Rhodes); *De vir. ill.* 83.3 (Syria before the Civil War). *Ad Fam.* 8.10 [87].2 shows that this was a contemporary view, {though there may also have been some attempt to balance this by stressing his concern to minimize loss of life: Welch, *Magnus Pius*, 166.}

πολεμεῖν ... πολίταις: the *communis opinio* is adapted to fit Brutus' criticisms of 28.4 (see n.). It has often been observed that P.'s criticism here is quite unjust: Cassius' proposed | expedition against Egypt was technically justifiable (Cleopatra had attempted to send aid to Dolabella), somebody had to incur the 'invidia' of ruthless exactions to finance the war (cf. 30.2), and Cassius' impeccably correct political stance is demonstrated (i) by his refusal of the title 'king' at Rhodes (30.3) and (ii) by his adherence to Republican tradition in the issue of coinage: there are no coin-portraits of Cassius, unlike Brutus. P. has succumbed to the requirements of the monumental σύγκρισις.

6. τὰ ... ἐπολέμησαν: this sort of wide-ranging historical σύγκρισις is very common in P. (e.g. *De fort. Alex.* 330D, 343A–E, *Sulla* 12.9–12, *Ages.* 15.4–6,

Pelop. 4.3, *Timol.* 36.1–2 etc.)—an indication (were one needed) that P. here is not composing directly from a ‘source’. {Cf. Duff, *Plutarch’s Lives* 251–2 and index, s.v. ‘*Synkrisis*, internal’; Pelling on *Caes.* 15.2–5.}

Κίνναι ... Κάρβωνες: it is indicative of P.’s instinctive anti-*popularis* feeling that he does not include Sulla in this list, even though he clearly regarded him as a *τύραννος* (*Pomp.* 9.3, *Sulla* 39.7 = *Comp.* 1.7). Brutus is in an altogether different category from the disreputable *Populares* of old (cf. on 1.8 on P.’s perfunctory treatment of Brutus’ *Popularis* father).

Κίνναι: for Cinna as *τύραννος* see e.g. *Pomp.* 5.4, *Sulla* 22.1, *Caes.* 1.1, *Mar.* 41.2.

Μάριοι: for Marius e.g. *Mar.* 46.6.

Κάρβωνες: for Carbo e.g. *Pomp.* 5.4, *Sulla* 22.1.

ἄθλον ... λείαν: for the conventional imagery see Fuhrmann 244 and cf. *Timol.* 9.7, *Dion* 54.3. But it has structural significance, being part of the general theme of 6.11, 22.3, 23.1, 29.5 etc.: only Brutus’ motivation is uncorrupted.

7. μηδὲ ... διαβολήν: for the general theme see on 1.4 and 29.3.

προβαλεῖν: Ziegler’s aorist is far from certain. *προβάλλειν* (‘imperfect’) is perfectly possible. |

ἀλλ’ ... πράξεως: cf. 1.4 and 8.5–6nn. above.

προαχθέντα: ‘optime pingit progredientem vix sua sponte magisque externa vi sensim sensimque promotum’ (Voegelin, excellently). This is true to P.’s conception of Brutus’ ‘development’ before he joins the conspiracy (see on 8.5). The phrasing is similar to that applied to Antony in 18.5, perhaps deliberately so (though if 29.7 approximates to Antony’s *ipsissima verba*, it will be the model). P. may be implying a *σύγκρισις* between Antony and Brutus: Brutus rightly follows τὸ καλόν, Antony is untrue to himself (or one part of himself) in failing to respond to the challenge.

τοὺς ... ἄλλους: on Cassius’ motivation see on 9.5; on D. Brutus’ 12.5n. For other attributions of motive to the conspirators at large see Nicolaus 19.59–65 and Balsdon 94 (both almost equally unsympathetic).

9. γράφει ... τεθνήξεται: Val. Max. 6.4.5 (‘graviter dicta aut facta’) retails a story of similar import: ‘M. Brutus suarum prius virtutum quam patriae parentis parricida—uno enim facto et illas in profundum praecipitavit et omnem nominis sui memoriam inexpiabili detestatione perfudit—ultimum proelium initurus negantibus quibusdam id committi oportere “fidenter”, inquit, “in aciem descendo: hodie enim aut recte erit aut nihil curabo”. praesumpserat videlicet neque vivere se sine victoria neque mori sine securitate posse’.

But the contexts are different: *dictum* v. *scriptum*; Valerius’ account also implies a context of the second battle of Philippi—Brutus’ letter to Atticus

was surely written before the *first* battle, a battle which he did want to fight (39.8n.), unlike the second (49.1n.). The sentiments attributed to Brutus by Val. Max. are strictly conventional (cf. 40.7ff., esp. 40.9) and presumably reflect a bogus apologetic version of Brutus' feelings | before the second battle.

{Moles, *Latomus* 763–7 discusses this passage again: his phrasing is there more cautious about dating this before the first battle. Cf. also his general discussion of the letters in *Letters* at 142–3 and 154. Affortunati dates it before the second battle.}

τύχης: for Brutus' philosophically irreproachable attitude to *τύχη* see 40.9 (52.5 is a different category).

ἐν: Bryan's correction is excellent—for the figure cf. 22.5 and 33.4 below. Conceivably this fine sentiment influenced P.'s rather loose paraphrase of the Brutan letters at 22.5.

10–11. Μάρκων ... **μαχέιται:** a valuable authentic insight into Brutus' attitude to Antony, for which cf. 18.4n.

προσθήκη: Antony is also referred to as a *προσθήκη* of Cleopatra (*Ant.* 62.1; {Pelling *ad loc.* suggests that that passage, like this, is influenced by Dem. *Third Olynthiac* 31, ὑμεῖς δ' ὁ δῆμος ... ἐν ὑπηρέτου καὶ προσθήκης μέρει γεγένησθε [to the politicians]}). The striking image is perhaps designed by P. as a structural device to trace the decline and fall of Antony: first a *προσθήκη* of Octavian, then of Cleopatra, never true to his own better nature. Antony himself is said to have lamented his fate along similar lines to Brutus' observations here (Appian 4.130.547—obviously bogus and based ultimately on Brutus' letter to Atticus. {More on that in Moles, *Latomus* 766.}

11. ἀποθεσπίσαι: for another similar 'prophecy' about Antony cf. Vell. 2.71.2 (Varro).

Chs. 30.2–33: Brutus' φιlanθρωπία and just punishment of wrongdoers

The narrative proceeds chronologically but the unifying theme of 30.2–32.4 is Brutus' humane treatment of the Greek states which he has to subjugate (contrasting with the ruthlessness of Cassius); there is then a natural transition to an example of the justice of Brutus' punishments (33.iff.). The whole section develops from the characterizations of Brutus and Cassius so emphatically established in *ch.* 29, though P. does indulge himself in a dash of 'tragic history' (*ch.* 31). |

Ch. 30: Smyrna continued; Rhodes, Lycia

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1–2. Ἐν ... ἀπάντων: not elsewhere attested, but presumably authentic. ?Messalla.

τῶν χρημάτων: for discussion of the relative finances of Brutus and Cassius (supporting P.'s account) see Wilson 201.

κατανηλωκένοι: a natural transition to *oratio obliqua*, reflecting Brutus' arguments for getting some of Cassius' money. Here, as at 30.2, it is not to be inferred that P. is relying on an account that retailed Brutus' and Cassius' friends' *ipsissima verba*, but the basic detail is impressive.

ναυπηγούμενος: cf. 28.3.

τὴν ... θάλασσαν: i.e. the Mediterranean, as opposed to Ocean. Normal Greek. Cf. Str. 2.5.18.

λέγοντες ὡς: this kind of leap into direct speech (a device of Greek historiography since Hecataeus F 30, T 20) is common in P. (e.g. 35.5 below, *Caes.* 35.7, 37.6–7, *Cat. min.* 66.1–2, etc.) and naturally does not imply exact reproduction of what was actually said.

2. δημαγωγεῖν ... χαρίζεσθαι: an interesting (and virtually unparalleled) indication of how Brutus' *πραότης* might be interpreted by unsympathetic observers. Brutus' discipline with his troops was not good: cf. Appian 4.123.518, 4.110.462, 4.128.532, 41.4 below.

χαρίζεσθαι: the usual behaviour of the demagogue (Wardman 52ff.).

3. προσηκούσας: at the meeting at Smyrna Brutus' first thought was to occupy Macedonia but Cassius argued (correctly) that they ought first to secure their rear and so they decided to reduce Rhodes and Lycia (Appian 4.65.276, 4.76.321, Dio 47.33.iff.).

Κάσσιος ... πράγμασι: sources for Cassius' reduction of Rhodes are Vell. 2.69.6, Val. Max. 1.5.8 (tortuous omen of Cassius' death), | Appian 4.65.277–74.313 (very detailed), Dio 47.33.1–4 (perfunctory and apologetic—no killings); and Oros. 6.18.13. Cassius struck coins commemorating his victory over the Rhodian fleet (Crawford, no. 505/1–3).

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οὐκ ἐπιεικῶς: Cassius practically cleaned Rhodes out (cf. 32.4), apart from the famous chariot of the Sun (Dio, cf. Val. Max.), executed fifty citizens and banished twenty-five (Appian), and requisitioned ten years' tribute from all the other communities of Asia (Appian). On ἐπιείκεια see 30.6n.

καὶ ... κολαστήσ'': this anecdote is not recorded elsewhere, though Appian gives Cassius and Archelaus quite lengthy speeches at the start of the campaign. But it is strikingly confirmed by Cassius' coins, one of which (Crawford no. 505/3) portrays a loosened diadem. The rhetorical point here is of course that as a βασιλέως φονεὺς καὶ κολαστήσ' Cassius ought to have behaved more humanely than he did.

30.4–31.7: Βρούτος ... διέφθειραν: sources for Brutus' subjugation of Lycia are Vell. 2.69.6 (bare statement), Appian 4.76.321–4.80.338 (very detailed), Dio 47.34.1–6, and the Greek letters 11–12 (Brutus to the Rhodians and their reply), 25–28 (Brutus to the Lycians and their replies), and 43–44 (Brutus to the Myrians and their reply).

The relative chronology of the campaigns against Rhodes and Lycia is not easy to establish, but there are grounds for believing that Cassius finished his task first (cf. Smith, *art. cit.* 196f., whose arguments are essentially adopted here):

(i) There is no presupposition that Brutus' campaign would have been over more quickly:

(a) If Brutus and Cassius left Smyrna about the same time to carry out their respective assignments Brutus would have had further to go.

(b) Brutus' campaign was clearly not a short one, at least according to 350 the evidence of P. (30.4—negotiations about χρήματα ... στρατόν; | 30.4–6—preliminary skirmishings; 30.6–32.2—sieges of Xanthus and Patara; 32.3–4—capitulation of rest of Lycia) and Dio (47.34.1—pitched battle with Lycian army; 47.34.1—capitulation of other Lycian cities; 47.34.1–6—sieges of Xanthus, Patara, Myra) (By contrast Appian concentrates greatly upon the siege of Xanthus.) On the other hand Cassius' operations were shorter than anticipated (cf. Appian 4.74.313).

(ii) There are positive arguments for the priority of the capture of Rhodes:

(a) Something can perhaps be made of the fact that P., Appian and Dio all narrate Cassius' reduction of Rhodes before Brutus' subjugation of Lycia. Although P.'s penchant for 'paratactic' narrative makes chronological inference hazardous in his case (considered in isolation), Dio has previously recorded Brutus' activities before Cassius' (47.21ff.) and the three writers show some independence of source (to a debatable extent—see below).

(b) The phraseology of Appian 4.81.341 is suggestive: the point *seems* to be that (i) Brutus did not act in the barbarous manner Cassius had at

Rhodes, and (ii) that in raising money Brutus took a leaf out of Cassius' book. Cf. (d) below.

(c) Appian 4.82.345 (after the final subjugation of Lycia) says that Brutus ordered his fleet to go to Abydus, where he himself would bring his land army and await Cassius' return from Ionia, so that they could cross to Sestus together. In *Brut.* 32.4, after fining the Lycians, he goes to Ionia. Though Appian implies that Brutus had completed his military operations first it is clear that Cassius was no longer engaged with *Rhodes* (perhaps with collecting his ten years' tribute or some less justifiable plundering—cf. *Brut.* 34.1, which has a slight flavour of 28.3ff.).

(d) Lentulus was one of Cassius' admirals at Rhodes (Appian 4.72.305) but also helped Brutus in the reduction of Myra (Appian 4.82.344), | which 351 apparently occurred soon after that of Patara (Dio 47.34.6, cf. Appian 4.82.344). Again, Appian's phraseology at 4.82.344 *ὁμοίως* must mean 'in the same way as at Patara' (i.e. à la Cassius—cf. (b) above), and Smith brightly conjectures that it was from Lentulus, Cassius' admiral, that Brutus got this tip on successful extortion, which had already proved so successful at Rhodes.

This relative chronology seems secure and has dire implications for the authenticity of letter 11, though there are other reasons for regarding this letter, as well as 25, 27 and 43, as spurious (Smith 199, Wilson 209ff.). (Cf. also 2.5–8n. and 32.2n. below.)

4. Βροῦτον ... στρατόν: these preliminary soundings, no doubt historical, are not mentioned in Appian, who plunges straight into the siege of Xanthus (4.76.321), or Dio, who records a pitched battle with the Lycians, the winning over of other cities, and then the attack on Xanthus (47.34.1f.).

Ναυκράτης: *RE* 16.1952 (Münzer). Not in Appian or Dio and otherwise unknown.

δημαγωγός: pejorative. P. would no doubt interpret Naucrates' behaviour as similar to misplaced Greek independence of spirit in his own day (cf. e.g. *Praec. ger. reip.* 814A). There are similar contemporary resonances in *Pyrrh.* 13.4 (Tarentum).

4–5. καὶ λόφους ... ἔθνος: naturally not in Appian or Dio, though apparently authentic (perhaps *ἀριστοποιοιμένοις* strikes a conventional note).

5. [τὰ]: to retain this is certainly possible.

ἄνευ λυτρῶν: cf. 32.1 and n.

εὐνοία: cf. 29.4n.

6. ἐπιεικείας ... φιλανθρωπίας: for the general theme see 26.2n. *ἐπιεικεία*, 'reasonableness', covers the same general area as *πραότης* and

352 *φιλανθρωπία*, with both of which it is | often linked. For *ἐπιείκεια* as a political virtue much invoked in P. cf. *Sept. sapi. conviv.* 152C, *Mul. virt.* 251A, 259E, *Quaest. Gr.* 295C, *De vit. pud.* 534E, *Praec. ger. reip.* 821D, *Thes.* 6.4, 16.1, *Arist.* 23.2, 25.10, *Cat. mai.* 3.2, *Per.* 39.1, *Fab. Max.* 30.2, *Nic.* 9.6, *Dion* 7.5, *Timol.* 1.5, *Demetr.* 4.5, *Ant.* 23.2, *Pyrrh.* 8.8, 23.3, *Flam.* 24.4, *Sert.* 25.6, *Caes.* 15.4, 54.4, 57.4; for *ἐπιείκεια* as a political virtue in P.'s time see Robert, *Hellenica* 13 (1965), 223.

ἄχρι ... συνελάσας: Appian 4.76.321 gives a detailed description of the various stratagems employed by the Xanthians to hold Brutus off from the city and how he skilfully overcame them.

ἄχρι: it is an old orthographical problem P. uses *ἄχρι* or *ἄχρισ* (probably both: Wyttenbach *s.v.*). With the Attic form *ἄχρι* hiatus is permissible even in the strictest Attic prose (Phryn. 6, Moer. 34). The text should stand.

7. *τοῦ ... ἐνοσχεθέντα*: this detail is not in Appian or Dio either, though Appian 4.77.324ff gives quite a detailed description of the preliminaries of the siege. It seems to be too circumstantial to be pure invention by P.

τοῦ ποταμοῦ: Ziegler's tentative inversion is unnecessary.

καθιεμένων: more natural than Schaefer's *καθειμένων*—'est enim haec actio pars τοῦ ἀλίσκεσθαι, itaque temporì eidem tribuitur' (Voegelin).

8. *μηχαναῖς ... βοθηεῖν*: a confusing passage. The essential differences between the accounts of Appian, Dio, and P. are as follows:

(i) Appian 4.77–78 has the Xanthians make *two* sallies: one by night to set fire to the siege engines, which results in the death of many of their men when they are shut out of the city by the guards for fear the Romans get in with them; another shortly afterwards about midday, in which they successfully set fire to the siege engines, but | on their return to the city are followed in by about 2,000 Romans, which triggers off the final assault, as Brutus and the rest of the army desperately try to get in to save them. In both cases Brutus deliberately tempts the Xanthians into making the sally.

(ii) Dio 47.34.2f. only has one sally, but so far from it being a trap carefully laid by Brutus it brings the Romans into the greatest danger, as the Xanthians set fire to the siege engines and use arrows and javelins; the Romans only save the day by pushing through the fire, unexpectedly attacking the Xanthians, hurling them back within the walls, rushing into the city with them, and setting it on fire.

(iii) P. also only has one sally—by night—which does not catch the Romans off guard to the same extent as in Dio, but which still does not appear to be a carefully prepared trap as in Appian. This sally is the direct cause of the firing of the city (*καὶ πνεῦμα κ.τ.λ.*).

P. and Dio agree that there was only one sally, which they link to the final capture of the city and in which fire plays a prominent part. Appian has two, and though the second is linked to the final capture of the city fire

only becomes important when the city is actually taken and the Xanthians kill each other and set their (previously prepared) funeral pyres and some buildings alight. But it is not a simple case of P. + Dio v. Appian: Dio and Appian agree that pursuing Roman soldiers follow the retreating Xanthians inside the city walls, though Appian makes it only a body of 2,000 men and Dio (apparently) the whole army (? typical Dionian carelessness/conflation), while there seems to be certain (obscure) resemblances between P.'s sally and Appian's *first* sally, both of which suggest *some* community of source.

μηχαναῖς ... ἐμβalόντων: Dio 47.34.2 καὶ αὐτῶν ἐξαίφνης ἐκφραμόντων καὶ πῦρ ἐς τὰς μηχανάς ἐμβalόντων is verbally similar—suggestively so? Appian 4.77.326 has νυκτὸς ἐξέδραμον | μετὰ λαμπάδων ἐπὶ τὰ μηχανήματα 354 (see further below).

ὡς ... τεῖχος: it is hard to be sure exactly what this sentence should be saying. Perrin translates it as it stands—‘they were perceived by the Romans and driven back to their walls’. As Greek this seems just possible, though the meaning given ἀπεκλείσθησαν is strained and αἰσθομένων rather weak. Sintenis and Erbse tried to resolve the slight linguistic difficulty by emending αἰσθομένων to ὠθουμένων and προσκειμένων respectively. {Gärtner also notes Wytttenbach's hesitant suggestion of ἀπεκρούσθησαν and Campe's of moving πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος, followed by an added καὶ, to follow ἀνερρίπιζεν.} Ziegler posits a lacuna and senses a parallel between P. and Appian—sally no. 1 (4.77.326): νυκτὸς ἐξέδραμον μετὰ λαμπάδων ἐπὶ τὰ μηχανήματα. ταχὺ δὲ ἐκ συνθήματος αὐτοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπιδραμόντων, συνέφευγον αὐθις ἐς τὰς πύλας· καὶ τῶν φυλάκων αὐτὰς προαποκλεισάντων ὑπὸ δέους, μὴ συνεσπέσοιεν οἱ πολέμιοι, φθόρος ἦν Ξανθίων πολὺς ἀμφὶ ταῖς πύλαις ἀποκεκλεισμένων. All three scholars are surely right to take ἀπεκλείσθησαν as = ‘they were shut out’. Sintenis' and Erbse's suggestions (Erbse's especially) are not plausible palaeographically. Ziegler is surely right in sensing a parallel with Appian and right also in positing a lacuna in the text. P. is like Appian here in that the sally is said to have been made at *night*, the foraying Xanthians are *shut out*, and (as a logical consequence) no Romans get inside the town. There is perhaps also some parallelism between their descriptions of the Romans' state of mind in coping with the foray (below). Whatever the exact nature of the lacuna, the conclusion must be that in P. there is a confusion/conflation of sally no. 1 with sally no. 2.

αἰσθομένων ... Ῥωμαίων: this, if not as strong as Appian (4.77.326), still allows the Romans to retain their composure, unlike Dio's ἐς πᾶν κινδύνου ἀφίκετο κἂν πασσυδὶ ἀπώλετο, εἰ μὴ ... (47.34.2). Dio's description at least suggests a radical difference of source. On the other hand P. cannot be following *only* | the same source as Appian, as his emphasis on the firing of the city shows some affinity with Dio (see above), and the fact that he has no Roman troops *inside* Xanthus shows independence of a different kind. 355

καὶ πνεῦμα ... ἀντιλαμβανομένην: this makes the firing of the town accidental and contrary to Brutus' wishes (δείσας ὁ Βροῦτος ...), whereas in Dio the Roman army fires the city deliberately. One must suspect that (at best) Brutus' troops acted *αὐτοκέλευστοι* and his apologists needed to improve on this, blending the possibly true (Brutus did not want Xanthus burned) with the probably false (the fire started accidentally).

ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως: in Dio nothing is said about Brutus' reactions. In Appian 4.78.330 he is distraught over the fate of the 2,000 Romans inside Xanthus and at 4.80.336 he orders his army to stop plundering, misinterpreting the cries of lamentation uttered by the self-destructive Xanthians, and later tries to save as many of the temples as possible from the fire.

Ch. 31: Mass suicide of the Xanthians

The fall of Xanthus allows P. to give full rein to his powers of dramatic description and evocation of pathos—to a degree naturally at odds with the historical importance of the event.

1–7. τοὺς δὲ ... ἑαυτοὺς διέφθειραν: P.'s account of the fall of Xanthus centres round the mass suicide of its inhabitants and the grief this causes Brutus. These themes are also present in Appian (4.80.335–8), but the most important element in his version is the desperate effort made by the Romans and their allies outside to save their comrades within (4.78–79). Dio 47.34.3 simply records that after the incursion of the Romans the Xanthians thought the town was captured: *καὶ ... τὰ λοιπὰ ἐθελονταὶ συγκατέπρησαν καὶ ἀλλήλους οἱ πλείους ἀνεχρήσαντο.* |

P.'s narrative here has to be read in the light of a number of parallel passages: Hdt. 1.176 (? 546 B.C.; Persian conquest of Xanthus); Diod. 17.28.1–5 (334 B.C.; resistance of people of Chandir in Pamphylia to Alexander); Diod. 18.22.4–7 (322 B.C.; resistance of Isaurians to Perdiccas); Justin 13.6.1–3 (322 B.C.; resistance of Cappadocians to Perdiccas, ? doublet of Perdiccas v. the Isaurians); Strabo 14.5.7 (77/76 B.C.; resistance of Zenicetus the pirate to Servilius Isauricus). In all cases, the besieged, seeing further resistance is hopeless, burn themselves and everything belonging to them rather than fall into the hands of the enemy. There is no reason to doubt the fundamental historicity of any of these accounts (except possibly Justin 13.6.1–3): they are sufficiently localized to show that self-destruction by fire was an established practice among the Lycians and their neighbours in times of extreme crisis. But it is clear also from the probable existence of 'doublets' (? Justin 13.6.1–3, cf. 31.7n. below), as well as from the close parallels in the actual descriptions, that the subject became something of a literary *τόπος* and there are clear signs of this in P. The subject is simply a variation on the *τόπος* of the captured city favoured by Hellenistic and 'tragic' historians generally. (For P. and 'tragic history' see 10.1n.)

1. δεινὴ τις ... προσεικάσειεν: it suits the highly wrought emotional tone of P.'s narrative and his stress on the humanity of Brutus that the Xanthians should be represented as possessed by an irrational, mad, impulse. Appian's narrative is also excited, but he notes (4.80.336) that the Xanthians had already prepared funeral pyres, and stresses their *ἐλευθερία*, an emphasis P. naturally omits.

2. γυναικῶν: Appian 4.80.338 records that *γύναια ὀλίγα* survived.

δοῦλοι: the literary *τόπος* takes over (cf Hdt., | Justin, and perhaps Diod. 18.22.4; Strabo) at the expense of the truth: Appian 4.80.337 *μόνους θεράποντας εἶλε* which, being much the less sensational account, is to be preferred.

πᾶσ' ἡλικία: poetic flavouring.

τοὺς μὲν ... ἔβαλλον: for similar actions cf. Diod. 18.22.6 and Appian 4.80.336. There may be a nugget of truth somewhere, but this is part of the *τόπος*.

ὀρέγοντες: poetic flavouring, here = 'porrigentes, praebentes' (Voegelin).

3. περιπαθῶν ... γενομένοις: see 8.7n. Here, as at 31.6, Brutus gives way to *πάθος*; a Stoic automaton would be quite inappropriate in this situation.

ὁ Βρούτος ... παρίππυε: in Appian 4.78.330 Brutus is *περιθέων* in his anxiety for the 2,000 Romans trapped inside the city. This presumably is the model for P.'s description here. When Brutus feels pity for the Xanthians in Appian (4.80.336), the city is already taken. One may compare the description in *Lucull.* 19.4–5.

ὀρέγων: still poetic, but with a different sense. Cf. on 3.2 and 4.

τοῖς Ξανθίοις ... πόλιν: cf. Appian 4.80.336, where Brutus sends messengers to the Xanthians to offer them terms, though at that stage in his narrative Brutus and his men are already in the city.

4. ἀλλὰ καὶ ... παίειν: hard to believe, to put it mildly. {Clarke, *Noblest Roman* 62–4 agrees: 'a little too good to be true'.} The literary *τόπος* allows P. to pull all the stops out.

κελεύοντα ... παίειν: the point is made more generally in Appian 4.80.335, τὰ φίλτατα ... ἐκόντα τὴν σφαγὴν ὑπέχοντα. Cf. also Dio.

5. ὠφθη ... ἀκούσας: a very vivid, but wholly conventional, appeal to a particularly ghastly *ὄψις*. Note the similar description of the Cimbrian women in *Mar.* 27.2–3, esp. 27.3. |

³⁵⁸ **6. τραγικοῦ:** often used by P. abusively of the bloated, pretentious and unreal (e.g. *De fort. Alex.* 329F; *De Pyth. orac.* 400C; *De exil.* 600E; *De facie* 926C; *Adv. Col.* 1123B, cf. 1119C; *Luc.* 21.3, 21.6, etc.), but not so here—P. enters into the spirit of the 'tragic history' he so often affects to despise with gusto. We may perhaps think of Jocasta, Medea, or Phaedra. {See further L. van der Stockt, *Twinkling and Twilight* (1992), 162–5; Pelling in J. Opsomer, G. Roskam, and F. B. Titchener, edd., *A Versatile Gentleman* (2016), 113–33, with further bibliography, discussing this passage of *Brut.* at 122–3 and citing Moles.}

καὶ γέρας ... περισῶσαι: nothing corresponding to this in Appian. Credulity is strained to the utmost here.

φασὶ ... σωθῆναι: rather more detail in Appian 4.80.338: Βρούτος δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν περισῶσας ὅσα ἐδύνατο, μόνους θεράποντας εἶλε Ξανθίων καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γυναῖα ὀλίγα ἐλεύθερα καὶ ἀνδρας οὐδὲ ἐς ἑκατὸν καὶ πεντήκοντα πάντας. He also says Brutus restored the surviving Xanthians to their land soon afterwards (Appian 4.82.345).

τούς ... σωθῆναι: an odd expression. τὸ σωθῆναι picks up περισῶσαι, but P. is not using a snide phrase to hint darkly at what τὸ σωθῆναι would really entail. It is, rather, a highly compressed paradox: for the fanatical Xanthians τὸ σωθῆναι would be δουλεία and the expression is ‘subjective’ rather than ‘objective’. Such paradoxes are of course the stuff of funerary writings (e.g. Gorgias, fr. 6—the dreadful, but enormously influential, *Epitaphios*). The implied idea that ἐλευθερία can consist of θάνατος is of course also standard in such contexts (e.g. *Lys. Epit.* 62 θάνατον μετ’ ἐλευθερίας αἰρούμενοι ἢ βίον μετὰ δουλείας, and more generally *Soph. Ai.* 692). P. may attack Gorgianic excesses (*Philostr. Epp.* 73 = Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*, 131; *Isidore of Pelusium, Epp.* 2.42 = fr. 186 Sandbach), but he naturally makes use of them in the appropriate context.

7. Ξάνθιοι ... διέφθειραν: Appian 4.80.338 has a similar excursus on the behaviour of the Xanthians, though he says that | 42 B.C. was the *third* time the Xanthians destroyed themselves, the other two being against the Persians (cf. below) and against Alexander (but in the latter case he covers himself by introducing the story with *φασί*). There is no other evidence for it, and the presumption is strong that it is a doublet of Diodorus 17.28.1–5 (Alexander v. the Marmarians), transferred to the Xanthians because of their previous history.

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ὥσπερ ... ἀποδιδόντες: this reflection does not appear in Appian. It can hardly be taken as evidence for P.’s belief in the cyclical theory of history: P. is simply entering into the spirit of ‘tragic history’ (*Sert.* 1.1–8 is a different case—surely largely ironic).

ἐπὶ τῶν Περσικῶν: against Harpagus in ? 546/5 (*Hdt.* 1.176, above 31.1–7n.).

It is now time to try to assess P.’s account from 30.4 to 31.7 against those offered by Appian and Dio. It is obviously historically dubious. So far as source relationships are concerned, it seems tolerably clear that P., despite the apparent differences, is in fact mainly following the same source as Appian. In the interests of making a set-piece of the Xanthians’ self-destruction he has telescoped the two sallies attested by Appian into one, thus avoiding the entry of the 2,000 Roman soldiers into the city. It is thus possible for him to keep Brutus outside the city when the Xanthians destroy themselves, to represent the firing of the city as entirely the work of the inhabitants, and to make Brutus distressed not for trapped Roman troops but for the suicidal Xanthians. Most of the rest is the embellishment of ‘tragical history’. But it is perhaps also possible that P. has glanced at the source underlying Dio (cf. 30.8n.) and is also using a further supplement (cf. 30.4n. and—more substantially—30.7n.).|

Ch. 32: Fall of Patara and the rest of Lycia

1–2. Βροῦτος ... πόλιν: sources for the fall of Patara, besides the present passage, are Appian 4.81.339–343, Dio 47.34.4–6, and the Greek letters 11–12 (Brutus to the Rhodians and their reply), and 25 and 27 (Brutus to the Lycians).

On letter 11 see 30.4–31.7n. and 32.2n. On letter 25 see 2.5–8n.

{For discussion see F. Kirbihler in M. C. Ferrière, ed., *Spolier et confisquer dans les mondes grec et romain* (2013), 345–66, esp. 357, 362–3, with further bibliography.}

1. Βροῦτος ... ἀπόνοιαν: Appian 4.81.339 paints a notably different picture—Βροῦτος δὲ ἐς Πάταρα ἀπὸ Ξάνθου κατῆει, πόλιν ἐοικυῖαν ἐπινείῳ Ξανθίων, καὶ περιστήσας αὐτοῖς τὸν στρατὸν ἐκέλευσεν ἐς πάντα ὑπακούειν ἢ τὰς Ξανθίων συμφορὰς προσδέχεσθαι. Dio 47.34.4 is more neutral: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πρὸς τὰ Πάταρα ὁ Βροῦτος ἦλθε, καὶ προεκάλεσατο μὲν αὐτοὺς ἐς φιλίαν, ὡς δ' οὐχ ὑπήκουσαν (οἱ τε γὰρ δοῦλοι καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων οἱ πένητες, οἱ μὲν ἐλευθερίας οἱ δὲ χρεῶν ἀποκοπῆς προτετυχηκότες, ἐκώλυόν σφας συμβῆναι), τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους τῶν Ξανθίων ... ἔπεμψέ σφισιν. P.'s statement here could stem either from a supplementary source (31.7n. above) or just be P.'s own representation of Brutus' motives, made flush with his account of the fall of Xanthus. The latter seems more likely, if 30.4–31.7 is mainly P.'s re-working of a historical account.

1–2. ἔχων δὲ ... πόλιν: this account bears a certain generic resemblance to Dio's, despite considerable differences of detail (47.34.4–6). Appian agrees with P. and Dio that Brutus used captive Lycians to try to persuade the people of Patara to surrender and with Dio that these were Xanthians, but otherwise his account is quite different (4.81.339). Is the difference between P. and Dio and Appian over the identity of the captive Lycians sufficient to indicate difference of source? Not (I think) necessarily. The discrepancy could either be carelessness or simply streamlining. It is difficult to resist the impression that P. is offering a simplified version of the account to be found in Dio, suitably touched up. |

361 **ἄνευ λύτρων:** cf. 30.5. A paraphrase of the more complicated sequence in Dio 47.34.5? P.'s account is naturally the most favourable to Brutus, but both Appian 4.81.343 and Dio 47.34.6 imply that he behaved well. Brutus seems to have made a policy of releasing prisoners without ransom (cf. also Dio 47.34.6).

σωφρονέστατος: for *σωφροσύνη* as a political virtue of P.'s time see *Praec. ger. reip.* 800F, 807A, 823A; Robert, *Hellenica* 13 (1965), 222. The narrow application of the term will be particularly relevant here (the captives being *women* of good birth).

εἶξαι ... πόλιν: Appian 4.81.341 and Dio 47.34.6 state that Brutus inflicted a fine on them. Smith 199 wrongly supposes this to be implied by

Brut. 32.4 also: Brutus inflicted a fine *both* on the people of Patara individually (Appian 4.81.341) *and* ἐσφοραί on τὸ κοινόν in general (Appian 4.82.345, cf. *Brut.* 32.4). P. either does not know of this or (more likely) has suppressed it in the interests of a further σύγκρισις with Cassius. The fact that Brutus imposed a fine disposes of letter 11 outright (not that πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἐχαρισάμεθα requires refutation!).

3. ἐκ δὲ ... ἐκείνω: details in Appian 4.82.345 and Dio 47.34.6.

4. ὅς γε ... Κασσίου: the further σύγκρισις may have been inspired simply by the general σύγκρισις of *ch.* 29. But Appian 4.81.341 (cf. also 30.4–31.7n.) notes Brutus' imitation of Cassius' methods of extortion, and P. here may be reacting against this tradition in polemical (and unconvincing) style.

Κασσίου ... ζημιώσαντος: the description is roughly in line with Appian's (4.73.311–2), though Appian gives no figures.

ἐκατὸν καὶ πεντήκοντα: Appian 4.82.345 notes that Brutus imposed taxes on them but does not specify the amount. |

Ch. 33: Punishment of Theodotus the sophist

1. Πολλὰ ... ἀξίων: a rather oblique link to the previous section, picking up the veiled notion of ‘punishment’ in 32.4 *αὐτὸς ... ἀδικήσας*. The chronological pick-up comes at 33.6 *τότε*. P.’s phraseology is consciously Herodotean (e.g. Hdt. 1.14.1): Brutus’ *ἔργα* can be classed with the *κλέα ἀνδρῶν* of Herodotean historiography.

ἄξια ... ἀξίων: deliberate word-play, not entirely without point—*especially* memorable are Brutus’ punishments of wrongdoers.

διηγήσομαι: again an evocative term; after the general remarks of 33.1 comes the fuller treatment of the scientific historian (cf. Thuc. 6.54.1).

2–6. Πομπηίου ... βίου: closely parallel is the account at *Pomp.* 77.1–5 and 80.7–9. The *Pompey* account is naturally fuller and naturally also not exclusively concerned with Theodotus. The two accounts are not particularly close verbally. Other sources: Caes. *BC* 3.103–104, 106, 108; Strabo 16.2.33, 17.1.11; Livy *Epit.* 112; Vell. 2.53.1–2, and 2.54.1; Sen. *Ep.* 4.7; Lucan 8.456–636; Quint. 3.8.55–57; Appian 2.84.352–2.85.359, 2.90.377; Dio 42.3.1–4.5, 42.7.1–8.1 (both showing close resemblances to Plut. *Pomp.* in their accounts of the killing of Pompey); *De vir. ill.* 77.9; Florus 2.13.52; Oros. 6.15.28. {Moles discusses the accounts of Pompey’s death in ‘Virgil, Pompey, and the Histories of Asinius Pollio’, *CW* 76 (1983), 287–8.}

The story reflects a characteristic Plutarchean desire to demonstrate that punishment inevitably follows crime, evident throughout the Lives (cf. Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 256ff.) and not infrequently in the *Moralia* (especially, of course, the *De sera numinis vindicta*). It also reflects his loathing of the unprincipled abuse of rhetoric.

μάχην: Wyttenbach’s emendation is certain. Cf. 4.6 and n.

ὑπό: also certain (scribal *ἀπό* after *ἀποβαλῶν*).

βασιλέως: Ptolemy XIV ‘Philopator’, *RE* 23.1759 (Volkman). |

363 **ἔτι παιδός:** probably born in 59 (Joseph. *Ant. Iud.* 15.89; *contra* Appian 2.84.354).

ἐν ... ἀνδρα: only P. gives a detailed account of the debate in the council. Cf. 33.3–4n. below.

3. Θεόδοτος: *RE* 5A.1956 (Münzer).

Χίος: Appian 2.84.354 says *Σάμιος*. P. is more likely to be right, as he appears unusually well informed about Theodotus (below) and in the same passage Appian makes a bad slip, referring to ‘Sempronius’ instead of Septimius (Caesar, P., Dio, Florus etc.). Cf. also 33.6n. below.

μισθῶ: with a pejorative tone, as often in P. Cf. e.g. *Maxime cum princ. phil. diss.* 777Dff.; *Praec. ger. reip.* 798E, 819E, 823B, cf. 820E; *De soll. anim.*

973B; *Quaest. Plat.* 999E; *De Stoic. repugnant.* 1043F, 1047F; *Stoic. absurd. poet. dic.* 1058C. A conventional philosophical attitude.

ῥητορικῶν: in context contemptuous. For P.'s attitude to rhetoric see Ziegler, *RE* 21.928ff.; Hamilton xxii f.; Wardman 221ff.; Moles, *JHS* 98 (1978), 80, 93; {Duff, *Plutarch's Lives* index s.v. 'rhetoric'}.

διδάσκαλος: 'praeceptor', Livy; **ῥήτωρ** and **διδάσκαλος**, Appian; 'magister' (Florus) is quoted by Münzer but is irrelevant ('magister auctorque totius belli').

P.'s tone here (cf. *Pomp.* 77.3) and at 33.5 **σοφιστής** (cf. *Pomp.* 89.9) is full of contempt for rhetoricians and sophists and all they stand for, as it usually is.

ἡξιωμένους ... βελτιόνων: there is no necessary conflict with Livy *Epit.* 112 'cuius (Theodoti) magna apud regem auctoritas erat' (as Münzer)—the abrasive comment is P.'s, not the view of the Egyptians.

3-4. ἀμφοτέρους ... δάκνει: P. makes Theodotus the instigator of the decision to kill Pompey, as do Appian, Quintilian, and Florus (by implication). Livy singles out both Theodotus and Pothinus, | Velleius Theodotus and Achilles, and Dio just *τινες τῶν Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Λεύκιος Σεπτίμιος*. P.'s account seems likely to be the most accurate in the light of the detail he gives about Theodotus' speech, even allowing for the particular slant of his version.

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3. διαμαρτάνοντας: Ziegler's tentative *διαμαρτάνειν* is presumably deduced from *Pomp.* but the infinitives there are less directly dependent on the verb, and the text should stand.

ἀπέφηνε: clearly right—Theodotus' proposal *was carried* (cf. also *Pomp.* 77.6).

3-4. καὶ τοὺς ... δάκνει: cf. *Pomp.* and 33.5 below. No other authority records the gist of Theodotus' speech. Note that the more cautious *Pompey* account introduces the *dictum* with *ὡς φασιν*. {Pelling on *Caes.* 48.2 observes that the *ἀπόφθεγμα* works better in Latin (e.g. *mortui non mordent*), though Theodotus is unlikely to have been speaking Latin: Pollio as source?}

5. παράδειγμα ... ἀπροσδοκῆτων: similar reflections in Vell. 2.53.3, Dio 42.4.

ῥητορείας καὶ δεινότητος: again the context shows that the tone is strongly pejorative.

ἔργον: hardly 'victima' (Schaefer) but 'work', as Perrin and other editors.

σοφιστής: in context highly pejorative, as very often in P. (But it is *not* true that 'In Plutarch *σοφιστής* is always derogatory'—Hamilton on *Alex.*

4.9. Cf. *JHS* 98 [1978], 90, n. 105—a list which could be greatly extended. See also Pelling {D. Phil.} 185.)

μεγαλαυχούμενος: traditionally a sophistic characteristic. Cf. e.g. *Quaest. Plat.* 999E, *Luc.* 7.4, *Cic.* 51.1, *Alex.* 4.9.

6. οἱ μὲν ... κακῶς: cf. *Pomp.* 80.8 and Appian 2.90.377 (cf. 2.86.361). The implication that Pothinus and Achillas were killed in revenge for Pompey's murder is not strictly accurate: they perished in the Alexandrian War (*BC* 3.112, *BA* 4). The question whether Caesar should punish Theodotus was debated in the rhetorical schools (Quintilian). Here *κακοὶ κακῶς* gives a rather poetic flavour. Cf. *De sera num. vind.* 552A. |

365 **Θεόδοτος ... ἐπιδανεισάμενος**: cf. Florus' 'diversa per mare et terras fuga' (wrongly of Pothinus and Achillas), and in P. the similar description of Scipio Nasica in *Gracchi* 21.6. The theological point is that wrong-doers are in fact punished by the misery of their lives even before the final retribution (cf. *De sera* 554Bff.).

ἐπιδανεισάμενος: 'empruntant à la Fortune, sur sa vie déjà hypothéquée, assez de temps pour mener une existence lamentable' (Fuhrmann 91, n. 1). For similar imagery cf. *De sera num. vind.* 548E, 551A, 554C, and 31.7 above.

Βρούτον: Cassius according to Appian 2.90.377. P. might of course have transferred the punishment to Brutus, but given Appian's carelessness at this juncture (33.3n.) and the confidence with which P. introduces the whole story (33.1), one may perhaps prefer his version.

πλέον: = *μεῖζον*. Editors remark on the rarity of this usage. The point (I think) is that P. is punning on *πλεονεξία*: the greedy sophist Theodotus is aptly requited by winning more renown by his death than by his life.

Ch. 34–35: The meeting at Sardis

This section marks another static moment in the narrative and balances *ch.* 29 structurally (cf. esp. 28.3/34.1). P. uses it to explore three main themes: (i) the dissension between Brutus and Cassius; (ii) the superior philosophical character of Brutus (and Cassius) contrasted with that of Favonius; (iii) the superior *προαίρεσις* of Brutus contrasted with that of Cassius.

Ch. 34: Quarrel and reconciliation of Brutus and Cassius

1–7. Κάσσιον ... διελύθησαν: the only other account is Dio | 47.35.1, again 366
(32.1–3n.; ? 30.8n.) interestingly similar to P.’s—*ταῦτ’ οὖν ἀμφοτέρωι πράξαντες ἔς τε τὴν Ἀσίαν αὐθις ἦλθον, καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα ἐκ διαβολῶν, οἷα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις φιλεῖ συμβαίνειν, ὑποπτα πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἶχον, ἔς τε τὸ μέσον καὶ κατὰ μόνας προενεγκόντες καὶ διαλυσάμενοι ἔς τὴν Μακεδονίαν ἠπείγοντο*. Common source, or Dionian indebtedness to P.? One cannot be sure, but in P. *chs.* 34 and 35 go together (35.1 *τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ*), and hardly have the feel of a mainline historical source. Dio’s *ἔς ... τὸ μέσον* (the only discordant item) could be a gloss on *Brut.* 35. This is a case where Dio *may* be following P.

1. ἐκάλει: the implication—that this was an unscheduled meeting—is consistent with Appian 4.82.345; it was presumably called by Brutus to resolve his differences with Cassius (cf. 28.3).

πᾶς ... προσηγόρευσεν: Brutus had already been hailed as *Imperator* in the campaign against the Bessi of Thrace in 43 (Dio 47.25.2), so this will have been his second salutation; Cassius had also been hailed as *Imperator* before (Crawford, nos. 499–500), so this was his second salutation also. For the coins see Crawford, no. 505.

2. αἰτιῶν ... διαβολῶν: unspecified, as in Dio, but presumably 34.1 and *ch.* 35 offer a clue—Cassius thought Brutus’ general behaviour in the war excessively (and no doubt dishonestly—cf. 30.2) *νόμιμος* and *δίκαιος*, while Brutus deplored the crudity of Cassius’ exactions.

μέμψεσι ... κατηγορίας: not synonyms—the three words mark carefully the progression of the argument. *μέμψις* ‘reprehensione quae rem tangit modo neque in ea commoratur: ἔλεγχος rem aperte adit totamque arguit: κατηγορία denique non modo rem sed hominem spectat eiusque culpam profert. Quibus omnibus accedere potest παρρησία, quae in verbis et vocibus versatur improbandi sensum exaggerantibus’ (Voegelin).

ὀργῆς: ‘ira’ rather than ‘affectus’ (*pace* Voegelin)—cf. | *τὴν τραχύτητα*. 367/1
One notes with relief that P. here makes no distinction between Brutus and Cassius.

τι: ‘anything (bad)’. This idiomatic use is common. Bryan’s <δεινόν> is redundant.

4–8. Μάρκος ... κατεκλίθη: a revealing and closely-observed portrait of Favonius (on whom see 12.3n.), indicating that the source P. is using here is a very good (contemporary?) one. Possibly P. himself has contributed something, but even so the detail of the whole passage is impressive.

4. ἐραστής: 12.3n. In 12.3 the characterization is neutral, but here possibly not: everything here about Favonius is excessive and ἐραστής may hint at this too.

οὐ λόγῳ ... φιλοσοφῶν: for the description cf. *Cat. min.* 46.1. P. clearly conceives of Favonius as a Stoic (for which there is no explicit evidence, though his association with Cato and his general behaviour make it likely). He regarded exaggeration as characteristically Stoic (*De Pyth. orac.* 400C, *De def. orac.* 416A), and his description of Favonius here (cf. 34.5) is somewhat reminiscent of his warning of the dangers of Stoicism at *Agis–Cleom.* 2.6, taken in the light of his characterization of Cleomenes at 1.5.

φορᾶ: ‘de motu nulla ratione recto et temperato’ (Voegelin, cl. 21.2 above).

πάθει ... φιλοσοφῶν: practically a contradiction in terms—cf. *Dion* 11.1, 16.2–4 on the unnatural passion of the younger Dionysius for philosophy. Why this emphasis on the limitations of Favonius’ philosophy? Surely one may sense an implicit σύγκρισις with the philosophy of Brutus (and Cassius)—although their bitter quarrel is only resolved by the intervention of Favonius, the effect of the anecdote is to convey that Brutus and Cassius were fundamentally better balanced men.

367/2 **5. ἀλλ’ ἔργον ... ὀρούσαντας:** the tone is colloquial, | lightly humorous and indulgent—not unlike P.’s description of Cassius’ fiery behaviour as a lad (9.1–4).

σφοδρός: cf. βία at 34.6 and 34.8. Vehemence and violent physical movement are characteristic of Favonius as described by P. Cf. *Cat. min.* 46.6, *Caes.* 21.8, *Pomp.* 67.5. Even his general deportment is deficient philosophically.

Ῥωμαίων: ‘emphasin habet quasi dixerit: populi Romani, rei publicae Romanae’ (Voegelin).

κυνικῶ ... παρρησίας: for κυνικὴ παρρησία see G. A. Gerhard, *Phoenix von Kolophon* (1909), 34f.; D. R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism* (1937), 28, cf. D.L. 6.69. {This became a major theme in the late work of M. Foucault: cf. his *Discourse and Truth* (1983), esp. 43–51.}

τὸ ἄκαιρον: also stressed at *Pomp.* 60.8, 67.5 (cf. 84.4), *Caes.* 41.3.

6. πλάσματος: for other examples of a similar use of πλάσμα cf. Theophrast. *HP* 4.11.5 (of trills on the αὐλός); Soranus 1.49 (of readings); *Per.* 5.1, *Demosth.* 11.3 ('intonation'/'modulation' of the voice), *De Pyth. orac.* 405D, 407A (of the delivery of the Pythian priestess), *Quaest. conviv.* 711C (of young boys reciting the dramatic dialogues of Plato); Persius 1.17 'sede leges celsa, liquido cum plasmate guttur/mobile collueris'; Quint. 1.8.2 'lectio plasmate effeminata'. Theophrastus, Persius and Quintilian clearly use the term pejoratively, referring to an affected style of delivery. *Per.* 5.1, *Demosth.* 11.3 and *Moral.* 711C are quite neutral. The *De Pyth. orac.* passages refer to ornate delivery but are obviously not pejorative. But in the present context πλάσμα must mean something along the lines of 'in an affected voice' (Perrin), as in Theophrastus and the Latin writers; the point is that Favonius cuts a ridiculous figure.

ἀλλ' ... ἐμέεο: *Il.* 1.259 (Nestor to Achilles and Agamemnon).

νεωτέρω: Favonius was slightly older than Brutus and Cassius, being born c. 90 (Münzer, *RE*) or (better) 92 or earlier (Shackleton | Bailey on *Ad Att.* 1.14 [14].5). 368

τὰ ἐξῆς: in which Nestor documents his influence with greater men of the past. Favonius will have been referring to his association with Cato (especially) and perhaps also Pompey.

7. ἀπλόκυνα ... ψευδόκυνα: variations on stock Cynic puns. {The *MSS* ψευδόκυνα is defended by F. X. Ryan, *Glotta* 71 (1993), 171–3, against Geiger's ψευδοκάτωνα.}

ἀπλόκυνα: a small puzzle—what exactly does this mean? Perrin's (and other editors') 'a mere dog' is difficult, if not impossible, etymologically. The starting point is the statement of Diogenes Laertius 6.13 that Antisthenes was nicknamed Ἀπλοκύων (good discussion in Wyttenbach, *Moralia* VIII, 189). The context shows that this must have something to do with the way he wore his ἱμάτιον/τρίβων. Cynics usually wore their cloaks double, dispensing with the use of a χίτων (references in Wyttenbach and cf. D.L. 6.13); to wear them single would therefore imply that they also wore a χίτων underneath, i.e. a ἀπλοκύων must be a 'delicatus et mollis Cynicus' (Wyttenbach; no need here to discuss the illogicality of the D.L. passage, which is resolved by Wyttenbach). This interpretation is confirmed by the coupling ψευδόκυνα. Brutus, then, is using what must have been a standard philosophical jibe, which would have had force against any Roman senator with Cynic pretensions, but especially one with a partiality for Tusculan figs.

διελύθησαν: in context 'were reconciled' rather than 'separated' (Perrin). Cf. 10.3.

8. ἐκάλει ... Βροῦτος: for this practice cf. the elaborate discussion in *Quaest. conviv.* 706Fff.; Hor. *Serm.* 2.8.22, *Epist.* 1.5.28.

λελουμένος: i.e. Favonius assumed he had been invited too. Cf. Plat. *Symp.* 174a.

ἀπάγειν: sc. τοὺς οἰκέτας, or (better) take as intransitive (Brutus said ‘ἄπαγε’!).

369 **ἄνωτάτω:** i.e. the most lowly position. Instead Favonius | sits himself in the position of greatest honour. For the hierarchy cf. Hor. *Serm.* 2.8.20.

παιδιὰν ... ἀφιλόσοφον: a ‘Table-Talk’ like scene. Cf. *Cat. min.* 67.2.

παιδιάν: for the association of παιδιὰ and φιλοσοφία cf. *Quaest. conviv.* 613B, 686D, and the Platonic παιδιὰ (*Phaedr.* 265c, *Tim.* 59c).

ἄχαριν: cf. 6.12n.

οὐδ’ ἀφιλόσοφον: P. retails this with evident approval (cf. *Quaest. conviv.* 612Eff., 716Dff.). Given Brutus’ and Cassius’ intellectual interests it may be true, but true or not, one suspects that P. has invented it.

Ch. 35: Brutus justifies strict observance of the law

1–6. Τῆ δ'... ἦν: P. is the only authority for this story.

Τῆ δ' ὑστεραία: a clear indication that *ch.* 35 comes from the same source as 34.

Ῥωμαίων: certain—'quum non aliorum nisi Romanorum praetor esse potuerit' (Voegelin).

Ῥοκέλλαν: Ῥοκέλλαν is Cichorius' emendation of the *MSS* Πέλλαν, based on a careful disentangling of several apparently separate persons. See *Röm. Stud.* 253–257, and cf. *RE* 13.887, nos. 25, 26 (Münzer), Broughton II, 464.

CIL 6.1446 (cf. 31656) = Dessau 936 and Suet. *Galba.* 3.4, 4.1, attest the existence of a L. Livius Ocella and a son of the same name in the late Republican period. These are to be identified with the 'L. Cellae patri et filio' who were pardoned by Caesar after Thapsus (*BA* 89.5), and with the Republican 'L. Iulium Mocillam praetorium et filium eius' helped by Atticus after Philippi (*Nep. Att.* 11.2), and the father no doubt with the praetorian of the | present passage.

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The father, L. Livius Ocella, very likely is the Ocella mentioned at *Ad Att.* 10.10 [201].4, 10.13 [205].3, 10.17 [209].3 (May 49), and 16.12 [421] (November 44)—but not the Ser. Ocella of *Ad Fam.* 2.15 [96].5, 8.7 [92].2. He may have been the son of L. Livius Salinator (Münzer, *RE* 13.890f.).

2. δύο φίλους: unknown and unguessable.

3. πολιτείας: 'statesmanship'.

φιλανθρωπίας: 26.2n. It is interesting to find P. making Cassius appeal to *φιλανθρωπία*. Brutus' reply (represented by P. as altogether admirable) is that the demands of τὸ δίκαιον are greater. Naturally P. accepts the Brutan point of view, though he could have argued the case the other way (cf. e.g. *Philop.* 16.2).

4. ἐτέρων ... πρασσόντων: a crux, though not a very important one. The text can hardly stand (though Perrin retains it), but the general meaning is clear. Which of the suggested remedies is best? Van Herwerden's *πρύτανιν ὄντα* is not bad, Ziegler's *ὑπομένοντα* can be justified grammatically by a similar use of the genitive of the participle in *Ael. VH* 12.1, but both it and *ἀμελοῦντα* involve an unacceptable verbal clash with *ὡς εἴ τις ἔστι* (presumably Ziegler means this to be deliberate, but though *Caesar's* failure to restrain his friends is obviously not *δίκαιον*, what is at issue in *ὡς εἴ τις ἔστι* is not *his* failure but Brutus' and Cassius'), Kronenberg's *συναινοῦντα* is rather strong, and Lindskog's *δύναμιν δόντα / διδόντα* seems the most appropriate, keeping as close as possible to the meaning and reading of the text. One ought also to consider *ἐταίρων* for *ἐτέρων*, in view of the

emphasis on *φίλοι* at 35.2 and 35.5 (so also Pelling, ‘Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman Lives’ [= *Plutarch and History* 34 n. 65]).

371 **6. ἐκείνους ... πρόσεστι:** repair of this obviously unsatisfactory sentence must start from the recognition that the two | alternatives spelled out respond exactly to *τοὺς Καίσαρος ἀδικοῦντας*—there is no contrast between *ἐκείνους* in the sense of ‘those men’ and *ἡμῶν*. A ‘then’–‘now’ balance is required, and most economically provided by *ἐκείνως μὲν γὰρ ἀνανδρίας μόνον* (or, more tightly, Ziegler’s *μετ’ ἀσφαλείας*) *νῦν δὲ <καὶ> ἀδικίας*. Brutus would then be saying that failure to act against *Caesar’s* friends would only have incurred a *δόξα ἀνανδρίας* (because they were too frightened to do anything about them) but failure to act against *their own* friends (whom they *could* control) would incur a *δόξα ἀδικίας*, as well as the *κίνδυνοι* and *πόνοι* they have had to undergo as tyrannicides.

προαίρεσις: 29.4n.

P.’s source for 35.4–6? Has he a source, or is he just producing *τὰ δέοντα* out of his head? The passage reads authentically, the style and thought cohering well with the Brutus of *Ad Brut.* On the other hand, what sort of source could this be, going into such detail over the exchange between Brutus and Cassius? One might think of a letter, but the context *seems* to rule this out. The idea that Caesar was destroyed by the bad behaviour of his friends is an important element in P.’s political analysis in the *Caesar*, cf. *Ant.* 6.7, whereas in the present passage it is incidental (and not altogether compatible with the *τύραννος*-theme of the *Life*). Is P. then just exploiting a theme taken from the *Life* of Caesar {cf. Pelling, *Plutarch and History* 11}? One cannot say for sure, but I am inclined to think that a source *is* latent.

Chs. 36–37: Brutus sees an apparition but Cassius reassures him

This section, taken together with *Dion* 2.3–6, poses formidable theological and philosophical problems, which are discussed in the | *excursus* after the commentary on *ch.* 37. From a literary point of view it has several functions. Although (to anticipate) P. seems to be advocating a rational explanation of the apparition, this does not prevent his account of the story from having an *effect* of tragic foreshadowing. This is naturally implicit in the story itself and in P.'s handling of it, but lest the reader forget it, P. immediately undercuts Cassius' persuasive rationalism at 37.7. The story also implies divine displeasure at the murder of Caesar—this connects with P.'s belief that the fall of the Republic was divinely ordained. But from another point of view, that of the rationalist rejection of the tradition of the apparition, *chs.* 36–37 have interesting implications for the psychology of Brutus. If Cassius' interpretation is right, then Brutus has had an 'anxiety' or 'guilty conscience' dream. It has already been suggested (see on 4.8, 13.2) that 4.8, 13.2, and *ch.* 36 are structurally linked. Thus 36 marks a further stage in P.'s analysis of the evolution of Brutus' character and his fluctuating struggle in the realization of his Republican identity. More specifically, *ch.* 36 looks back to the tension in Brutus' makeup between Republicanism and Caesarism (see on 8.5). P. often does not make it clear exactly where he himself stands on a particular question. This is particularly true of his dialogues but even in the *Lives* the problem of interpretation is sometimes acute. In *chs.* 36–37 he does opt for a rationalist explanation of the apparition, but simply because he does not spell out his position in so many words, he is able to put the story to several different (and logically contradictory) uses. It is at one and the same time dramatically ominous, an indication of divine displeasure at Caesar's murder and a manifestation of the divine plan for the institution of monarchy, a sign of the psychological disturbance in Brutus' soul, and an illustration of Brutus' philosophical superiority to *πάθος* (36.7). Similarly Cassius is at once | the spokesman for a rationalism of which P. profoundly approves and a symbol of the inadequacy of the Epicureanism P. so dislikes (37.7, 39.6). These things cannot logically coexist, but in P. what is lost in intellectual rigour is gained in richness and allusiveness.

Ch. 36: The first visitation of the apparition

1–7. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ... εἶπεν: other accounts of this famous story are *Caes.* 69.6–11, Appian 4.134.565, Florus 2.17.8, Zonaras 10.20. Also important is Val. Max. 1.7.7, which has a very similar story about Cassius of Parma after the battle of Actium, the main difference being that Cassius is unequivocally asleep and that the second visitation of the apparition occurs on the same

night. The differences are not great; accounts of apparitions that appear in dreams and those that appear in waking visions are often closely similar (often no clear distinction was made between the two types of apparition: cf. 37.4–5n.), and in *ch.* 37, which is P.'s own comment upon the supernatural interpretation (see *excursus*), it seems to be implied that Brutus also was asleep (cf. 37.4–5n.). As for the second visitation of the apparition, it is natural in the case of Brutus that the first should occur before the first battle of Philippi and the second before the second battle. Dio has nothing about the apparition at all, despite much about portents at 47.40.1–41.4 similar to *Brut.* 39.3ff. Zonaras simply paraphrases *Brut.* 37.5–7 in detail. P.'s version in the *Caesar* is closely parallel to the *Brutus*, though naturally much shorter and less elaborate, and with a different theological perspective.

Historically, the tradition must be rejected. No doubt Brutus' true state of mind before Philippi is revealed in his letter to Atticus (*Brut.* 29.9, cf. 374 Gelzer 1014, Syme 204f.). The apparition | story is to be regarded as part of the general *post eventum* mythology of the divinely-inspired vengeance of Caesar. The stories in Val. Max. of the apparitions that appeared to Cassius of Parma (1.7.7) and to Cassius, on the battle-field at Philippi (1.8.8), must certainly be explained as distasteful manifestations of Caesarian propaganda. It is reasonable to assume that the Brutus story had its genesis in the same need to demonstrate the alleged inevitability of the victory of Caesarism. It has, however, been suggested that the Brutus story was invented by P., inspired by the story of Cassius of Parma (so, tentatively, e.g. Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 186, in a very confused piece of argument). It is true that the stories of Brutus and Cassius of Parma are very similar indeed, so similar (even allowing for the conservatism of the literary tradition dealing with the visitations of apparitions) that some special explanation may be required. But the suggestion that P. invented the *Brutus* story is manifestly untenable, since (i) he *rejects* the story of the second visitation of the apparition (48.1) and (ii) the wording of *Dion* 2.3–6 must imply the prior existence of the tradition. It may indeed be the case that the Brutus story is a doublet of the Cassius of Parma story, since Cassius was traditionally (although not in fact) the last of the conspirators to be killed, but it is clear that P. is not responsible for that reworking. Given (i) that Dio does not have the story, (ii) that Appian does, and (iii) that Val. Max. has a very closely similar story about Cassius of Parma, it must be regarded as likely that the ultimate source of the Brutus story is Asinius Pollio. {Cf. also E. Rawson in J. D. Smart, I. S. Moxon, and A. J. Woodman, *Past Perspectives* (1986), 105 = *Roman Culture and Society* (1991), 493; Pelling on *Caes.* 69.6–11.}

P., while rejecting the supernatural element in the story (*excursus*), does at any rate believe that Brutus himself thought that he had a vision (cf. *Dion* 2.5, *Brut.* 37.1; Cassius' speech—P.'s own reply to the tradition—of course

also depends on this assumption). One might regard this as a revealing comment on P.'s | inadequacies as a historian: his tendency towards rationalism can only take him so far—to rejection of the supernatural element without enabling him to dismiss the story entirely as unfounded Caesarian propaganda. This is *perhaps* a fair criticism, but one must make allowance for the fact that as a philosopher P. is greatly concerned by the problem of evil in a universe ordered by a beneficent God and particularly with the question whether it could be solved by the hypothesis of the existence of evil *δαίμονες*: P. has a vested interest in taking the traditions of the apparitions that appeared to Dion and Brutus seriously simply because they chime with one of his own deepest philosophical concerns. And of course from a literary point of view P. could hardly bring himself to omit material so rich in ominous significance and so well suited to exploitation by his imaginative powers. As a piece of writing, *Brut.* 36 is extraordinarily skilful: replete with literary allusion, it at one and the same time preserves the spirit of the tradition (indeed for Western literature it *became* the tradition) and subtly prepares the way for a rationalist rejection of it.

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{Moles returned to this in 'Plutarch, Brutus, and the ghost of Caesar', *Proceedings of the Classical Association, London* 82 (1985), 19–20.}

1. **Ἐπεὶ δὲ ... ἔμελλον**: this detail also in Appian, *ἐξ Ἀβύδου Caes.* Florus gives the impression that the scene is Philippi. The date is the beginning of 42.

λέγεται: thus P. does not commit himself to the veracity of the story. On his use of *λέγεται* see 8.6n. By contrast *Dion* 55.1 has *φάσμα γίνεται*, which suggests that when he wrote up the Dion story P. either (i) still accepted it at face value or (ii) was prepared at any rate still to maintain the illusion of *Dion* 2.3–6, pending a fuller discussion in the *Brutus* (more likely, I think).

2. **φύσει ... παρείχε**: the general feel of this description (reminiscent of the picture drawn at 4.6–8) suggests a sort of 'insomniac hero' context, highly appropriate for the | visitation of an apparition (for parallels see Pease on *Aen.* 4.522ff.).

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Caes. 49.8 also stresses that Brutus needed little sleep, the phraseology showing that use of sleep was one of the criteria for assessing the worth of a *στρατηγός*. For this *τόπος* cf. e.g. *X. Ages.* 4.5.2; *Luc.* 16.5, *Alex.* 23.2, *Caes.* 17.4, *Sert.* 13.2. A similar idea is the readiness of the statesman to stay awake all night at moments of crisis, e.g. *Il.* 9.325f., *De fort. Alex.* 326E, 337B, *De laude ips.* 544C, *Cat. mai.* 8.15, *Lucan* 2.239–241. The true ruler is often distinguished by his ability to work when others are asleep (e.g. *Philostr. VA* 5.31, *Dio* 71.6.1). Philosophers are also distinguished by their ability to get by with little sleep (e.g. *X. Mem.* 1.5.1, *Plat. Smp.* 223c, 220d) and *νοκτογραφία* is a traditional characteristic of the philosopher (e.g. *Quaest. conviv.*

634A). The present description illustrates both Brutus' devotion to duty and his philosophical temperance.

Although *Brut.* 36.2–4 is on one level laudatory of Brutus' use of his time, it also has another purpose: to suggest that in fact Brutus did not get enough sleep, so that Cassius' contention that Brutus is in poor physical shape (37.5) is given added force. Physical condition may affect the quality of Brutus' *αἴσθησις* (cf. e.g. *Arist. Met.* 1010b), or account for a bad dream.

3. τότε ... μέλλον: the emphasis on Brutus' anxious state of mind (somewhat at odds with 29.8–9, cf. 36.1–7n.) also helps to prepare the ground for the rational, 'psychological' arguments of Cassius at 37.5. Anxiety may affect the quality of *αἴσθησις* and ominous dreams were recognized by the Hippocratics as often being anxiety dreams (cf. 37.5n.).

τῶν ὄλων: cf. 4.4n. The whole participial phrase is typically Plutarchean in its abstract quality.

377 **τεταμένος:** poetic (cf. e.g. *Pind. Isthm.* 1.70, *Pyth.* 11.82), as | befits the 'insomniac hero' context.

ὀπηγίκα ... αὐτόν: no other source has such details about Brutus' habits, which must come from the personal recollections of someone close to Brutus.

ἀνεγίνωσκε: again cf. 4.8.

τρίτης φυλακῆς: when is this? The answer depends on whether P. is using a Greek or Roman system of watches and whether there was any difference between them, and what time of day one would expect the centurions and *tribuni militum* to turn up. The Romans certainly divided the night into four 'vigiliae' (Lewis and Short *s.v.* 'vigilia' {and *OLD s.v.* 2}; cf. Vegetius, *De re militari* 3.8, *Caes. BG* 1.40, 5.13 etc.). It is usually said that the Greeks divided the night into three parts. Such a division is clear in Homer (see Leaf {or Hainsworth} on *Il.* 10.253, cf. *Od.* 12.312) and is elsewhere attested (schol. on *E. Rhés.* 5, cf. Pollux 1.70, though this part of the text is corrupt). But there appears also to have been a division of five parts (Stesichorus 139 *PMG*, Simonides 268 *PMG*, *E. Rhés.* 543 {with Liapis' n. on *Rhés.* 538–45}), and Pollux 1.70 seems to yield a division of four closely similar to the Roman system (so, persuasively, Macan on *Hdt.* 9.51). Some such system is certainly sometimes used by the writers of the New Testament (*Matt.* 14.25, with McNeile *ad loc.*) and is mentioned in the *Suda*, where it is not made clear whether it is a Greek or Roman system that is referred to. Thus if *Brut.* 36.4 is based on a Greek system it is not necessarily different from the Roman. But *μέχρι τρίτης φυλακῆς, καθ' ἣν* can hardly refer to (about) midnight, since (i) the time envisaged must be posterior to 36.3 *ἤδη τὸ λοιπὸν ... πραγμάτων*, and (ii) the officers are surely meant to be arriving at about dawn. Thus *τρίτης φυλακῆς* is almost certainly 'Greek'. This rather suggests that P. is following a Greek source at this point; it does not seem likely that P. would have bothered here to

‘translate’ Roman terminology into Greek, despite his | general preference for using Greek measurements, currency, etc., since both races used a system of ‘watches’. (I originally thought that P.’s statement that centurions attended Brutus’ *consilium* might also be a sign of a Greek source, for several early editors supposed this to be unlikely, and if that were the case, then one might think in terms of a source that was well informed about Brutus’ way of life, yet ignorant of the niceties of Roman military protocol. But I am assured by Professor A. E. Astin that it was regular practice for senior centurions to attend the general’s *consilium* in the Late Republic. Nonetheless, the argument from the use of ‘Greek’ watches seems fairly strong for supposing a ‘Greek’ source at this point. Since, however, one wants to avoid hypothesizing unknown Greek sources unless it is absolutely necessary, one wonders if the ‘Greek’ watches could be the work of a Roman writing in Greek. In that event, there would be no difficulty in taking these details as Bibulan or possibly Messallan.)

5. νύξ ... βαθυτάτη: ‘it was dead of night’ (*βαθύς* referring to the time, rather than the degree of darkness—see Holden on *Sulla* 30.1). This corresponds approximately to the Roman ‘nox intempesta’ (c. 10 P.M., F. K. Ginzel, *Handbuch der Mathematischen und Technischen Chronologie* II, 164). Cf. Soph. *Ai.* 285 {with Finglass *ad loc.*}, where ἄκρας νυκτός is glossed by the scholiast as *περὶ πρῶτον ὕπνον*, which in Roman terms is ‘nocte concubia’ (Tac. *Ann.* 1.39) or ‘secunda vigilia’ (c. 9 P.M., Ginzel 164f.).

If one asks why P. did not make the ghost appear at midnight, a particularly fruitful time for apparitions (e.g. *Aen.* 5.738, 835, 7.414, 10.215 etc.), the answer simply is that the tradition agreed that it was earlier (below). Dreams during the *πρῶτος ὕπνος* are of course common (e.g. Ar. *Wasps* 31).

It is hard in context to read νύξ ἦν without being reminded of the Virgilian ‘nox erat’ formula, which often introduces a divine apparition, but there does not seem to be an exact equivalent for it in earlier literature, though Ap. Rhod. 3.744 and | 4.1059 are rough parallels.

φῶς ... σκηνή: if one pursues the ‘insomniac hero’ analogy, then it may be relevant that darkness is a stock element in the related theme of formal descriptions of the calm of night (e.g. Fr. Adesp. 976 *PMG*).

The more precise detail of *Caes.* 69.9 τοῦ λύχνου καταφερομένου and Appian 4.134.565 μαραινομένου τοῦ φωτός again confirms that the time is the *πρῶτος ὕπνος*, since ‘luminibus accensis/prima face’ occurred at about 8 P.M. (Ginzel 164), and in *Ajax* ἄκρας νυκτός is defined by the following (*Ai.* 285f.) ἦνικ’ ἔσπεροι λαμπτήρες οὐκετ’ ἦθον. Florus’ ‘inlato lumine’ is roughly consistent with the general picture. In Val. Max. Cassius of Parma’s vision occurs ‘concupia nocte’.

Atmospheric effect aside, the emphasis on the darkness perhaps helps to characterize Brutus’ psychological state. It is also clearly relevant to the

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question of the validity of Brutus' *αἴσθησις*, for *αἴσθησις* can naturally be impaired by bad light. Possibly one should also bear in mind that 'the ancients laid special stress on the clearness with which objects were seen in a vision ... It was this distinctness which constituted the difference between an ordinary dream and a vision' (Henry on *Aen.* 3.51). Often no distinction was made between the two (see 37.4–5n.), but when it was, this was the criterion, so that the emphasis on the darkness is a preparation for that part of Cassius' rationalizing interpretation which asserts that Brutus has simply had a bad dream (37.4f.). But it would be wrong to suppose that the timing of the apparition casts doubts on the authenticity of the dream: although dreams that came after midnight were commonly held to be true or more certain (Hor. *Serm.* 1.10.33, Philostr. *VA* 2.37 etc.), this is not relevant here, because the timing is a *datum* of the tradition and the tradition asserted the truthfulness of the apparition. |

380 **σωπή:** another stock element in descriptions of the calm of night (E. *IA.* 9–12, Theocr. 2.38f., Ap. Rhod. 3.749ff., Varr. *Atac. Argon.* 3.1–2, Virg. *Aen.* 4.425ff., Ov. *Met.* 7.186, 10.446 etc.). Here it prepares for the 'sound' that heralds the arrival of the apparition.

6. ὁ δὲ ... ἑαυτόν: so Dion also is alone and pensive (*Dion* 55.1). Solitude is a common prerequisite for the occurrence of waking visions: see in general Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (1951), 117.

ἔδοξεν ... εἰσιόντος: the context shows that *αἰσθέσθαι* means 'heard', cf. *Caes.* 69.9. Sound also portrays the arrival of the apparition in *Dion* 55.2. From Hesiod onwards divinities often announce their presence aurally.

ὄρῃ ... φοβεροῦ: *Caes.* 69.9 mentions the great size of the apparition (cf. *Dion* 55.2, Val. Max. 1.7.7)—another conventional touch (e.g. Hdt. 5.56, 6.117, 7.12).

παρεστῶτος: apparitions regularly come close to those they visit, especially in dreams (e.g. *Il.* 2.20, 23.68, *Od.* 4.803, 6.21, cf. *Il.* 10.496; Hdt. 1.34.1, 2.139.1, 2.141.3, 5.56, 7.12). Cf. Appian's *ἔφεστῶσάν οἱ*, *Caes.* *ἔστῶτα ... παρὰ τὴν κλίνην*, Val. Max. 'ad se venire'.

7. πολμήσας: cf. *οὐ διαταραχθεῖς* below and *Caes.* 69.11, though there Brutus (being less philosophical) is *ἐκπλαγείς ... τὸ πρῶτον*. P. and Appian agree on Brutus' pluck. Appian could be following P. or conceivably this *could* have been an element in the story from the beginning: even Caesarian propaganda (cf. 36.1–7n.) conceded that Brutus was a worthy adversary. Naturally this detail is reversed in the case of the less resolute Cassius of Parma, who is very frightened indeed in Val. Max. Dion is also very frightened in *Dion* 55.3. Presumably, this is in accordance with the version of the original source (? Timaeus—see Porter 47, 97), | but in P. there may also be an implied *σύγκρισις* between Dion and Brutus.

τίς ... ἡμᾶς: such urgent questionings are naturally a conventional reaction to apparitions, whether in dreams or waking visions, when the apparition says nothing (e.g. *Aen.* 2.281ff.).

ὁ σὸς ... κακός: these words, essentially reproduced in all sources, show that in the tradition the role of the apparition, a sort of malevolent personal *δαίμων* or *ἀλάστωρ*, was to foretell Brutus' death (cf. *Caes.* 69.13 *συνεὶς ὁ Βροῦτος τὸ πεπρώμενον*). The point is explicit in Appian and Florus, cf. Val. Max. The apparition seen by Dion must similarly have been intended in the tradition to foretell the extinction of Dion's family in retribution for the murder of Heracleides (*Dion* 53).

The fact that the apparition in Val. Max. speaks in Greek has prompted the reasonable inference that Val. Max. is following a Greek source (Nilsson, *Geschichte der Griechischen Religion* II, 213). P. can hardly be following the same source, as that source would surely not have contained two such very closely similar incidents as the apparitions that appeared to Brutus and Cassius of Parma.

7. καὶ ... εἶπεν: no other source (apart from Zonaras following P.) records that Brutus said anything in reply, nor does Cassius of Parma in Val. Max. Since the detail is also against the spirit of the tradition (cf. esp. Florus' "Tuus", inquit, "malus genius", ac sub oculis mirantis evanuit'), one may suppose that P. has invented it, to stress Brutus' *ἀπάθεια*.

**Ch. 37: Cassius reassures Brutus,
but another unfavourable omen occurs**

382 **1. Ἀφανισθέντος ... ἐπηγγύπησεν:** these details are not recorded in *Caesar*, Appian, or Florus. But they must have been in the tradition—cf. the confident ὥστε φράσαι πρὸς ἑτέρους | of *Dion* 2.5 and the similar behaviour of Cassius of Parma in Val. Max. Cassius' behaviour, despite small differences of detail, presents close parallels to that of Dion in *Dion* 55.3. One wonders if the story of the apparition that appeared to Cassius of Parma and Brutus was modelled on one of Timaeus' sensational episodes.

παῖδας: so also 'servos' in Val. Max. Dion calls his φίλοι.

2–6. ὁ δὲ ... Βρούτων: not recorded elsewhere. Its content is so surprising that one may assume that the fact of the speech, as well as its content, is P.'s invention.

τοῖς ... χρώμενος: Cassius became an Epicurean towards the end of 48 B.C. (for the date see Shackleton Bailey on Cic. *Ad Fam.* 15.16 [215].3 and 15.17 [214].3), perhaps influenced by the Republican defeat at Philippi (Shackleton Bailey). His previous allegiance is unknown. On Cassius and Epicureanism see further A. Momigliano, 'Epicureans in Revolt', *JRS* 31 (1941), 151ff. (dating incorrect); L. Paratore, 'La problematica sull'epicureismo a Roma', *Aufstieg und Niedergang* 1.4 (1973), 116–204, esp. 184f. (dating incorrect); Moles, *JHS* 98 (1978), 79; {D. Sedley, *JRS* 87 (1997), 41–53 (ethics); F. Brenk, *Relighting the Souls* (1998), 118–27; P. M. FitzGibbon in A. G. Nikolaidis, ed., *The Unity of Plutarch's Work* (2008), 455–9}; cf. above 9.5n. P. could have got this information from the letters of Cicero and Cassius but καὶ περὶ τούτων implies another source (unless it is simply part of the dramatic fiction of 37.2–6).

χρώμενος: ambiguous, either 'using Epicurean arguments' (cf. *De sera num. vind.* 549A, *Quaest. conviv.* 726C, *De Herod. malign.* 871D, *De Stoic. repugn.* 1034E), or being a follower of the teachings of Epicurus' (e.g. *Quaest. conviv.* 635A—exactly parallel to the present passage). The sequel here (καὶ περὶ τούτων ...) favours the second interpretation. In any event, Cassius' speech is clearly being represented as Epicurean (ἡμέτερος ... λόγος, cf. 39.6), though in fact the essential argument, as opposed to some of the detail, is not Epicurean at all. |

383 **ἔθος:** cf. 34.8.

ἡμέτερος ... αἴσθησις: as a general statement nothing could be less Epicurean than this. The Epicureans believed that the senses were veracious and that sensation was the basic criterion of truth (e.g. Epic. *Ad Hdt.* 38–39, *KD* 22–24; D.L. 10.31, Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 8.9, Lucr. 1.422–25, 1.693–97, etc.). The Stoics also accepted the general reliability of sense activity (e.g. *SVF* 1.62, 2.71–75, 78; Cic. *Acad. Post.* 1.41; *De Stoic. repugn.* 1055F, *De commun. notit. adv. Stoic.* 1058E, with Cherniss *ad loc.*, etc.). The

attack on *αἴσθησις* here is rather too strong for Aristotle, who held that sensation was either true or for the most part true (*De an.* 428a–b; cf. also his discussion of sense-perception difficulties in *Metaph.* 1009a38ff., though many other passages are also relevant). Cassius' statement comes closest to the position of Sceptics like Pyrrho and Timon, or Academic Sceptics like Arcesilaus and Carneades (on all of whom see the useful general discussion of A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 75–106 {and Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (1987) I.13–24 and II.1–17}). {For Epicurean views see also Long and Sedley, I.78–86 and II.83–91; C. C. W. Taylor, 'All perceptions are true', in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes, edd., *Doubt and Dogmatism* (1980), 105–24; G. Striker, 'Epicurus on the truth of sense-impressions', in *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics* (1996), 77–91; and E. Asmis in K. Algra, et al., edd., *Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (1999), 264–76.}

ἡμέτερος: Xylander's correction is essential to the context. {This is questioned by F. E. Brenk, *Relighting the Souls* (1998), 122.}

ἀληθῶς: emphatic—'we do not feel or see everything truly: perception is deceitful'.

ὕγρον: taken together with the analogy from the impressions made on wax (37.3), this is perhaps a reminiscence of Plato, *Theaet.* 191c θὲς δὴ μοι λόγου ἔνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δ' ἔλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου, ἔστι δ' οἷς μετρίως ἔχοντος.

2–5. ἔτι ... παρατρέπει: a tricky passage, with a number of textual *crucis*, important for the exact progression of Cassius' argument, though the general drift is clear.

διάνοια: 'intellect' is perhaps the best translation, though *διάνοια* is not a clear-cut term. |

αὐτήν: Ziegler's correction of *αὐτήν C* or *αὐτὸ cet.* *αὐτὸ* (= *ὕγρον ... 384* *χρῆμα καὶ ἀπατηλόν, τὴν αἴσθησιν*, Voegelin) is strained stylistically, so the choice lies between *αὐτήν* and *αὐτήν*. *αὐτήν* makes the reference restricted to the *διάνοια* itself rather than the *διάνοια* in relation to *αἴσθησις*, and *appears* to bring its activities into line with those of the *ψυχή* and of *τὸ φανταστικόν*. In the immediate context Ziegler's interpretation *seems* difficult: in what sense can the *διάνοια* be said to change *ἀπ' οὐδενὸς ὑπάρχοντος ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἰδέαν*? These terms *seem* much better suited to *αἴσθησις* (cf. below). The reading *αὐτήν* (i.e. *τὴν αἴσθησιν*) involves positing a 'slide' from *αἴσθησις* = 'perception' in 1.19 to *αἴσθησις* = 'thing perceived' later in the same line. In itself this is not difficult; *αἴσθησις* can be used as *αἴσθημα* in Plato (e.g. *Phd.* 111e8) and Aristotle (e.g. *Poe.* 1454b16) and the ambiguity between the act of sensation or perception and the passive sensation or perception received is common in Epicurus. On this interpretation the argument from 37.2 goes: 'perception is a moist and

deceitful thing. In addition, the intellect is rather quick to transform the thing perceived from being nothing that is existent into every shape or form'. But I *think* that Ziegler's *αὐτήν* is right, for two reasons: (i) *ἔτι ... ἰδέαν* ought to be saying essentially the same thing as 37.3 *ψύχη δ' ἀνθρώπου ... αὐτήν ... δι' ἑαυτῆς ὑπάρχει* (37.3 *κηρῶ ... γὰρ ...*); (ii) the imagery set in motion by *ὑγρόν* and *ἀπατηλόν* and maintained in *κινεῖν, μεταβάλλειν*, and *ἰδέαν* is interesting: surely P. is picturing the *διάνοια* as a sort of Proteus? Thus the argument seems to go: (i) 37.2 *αἴσθησις* is 'moist' and deceitful; (ii) the *διάνοια* and the *ψυχή* have a life of their own and are capable of Protean conjuring tricks without any real external stimulus. The apparent difficulty of the terminology *ὑπαρχόντος* | and *ἰδέαν* can be resolved. 385 *αἴσθησις* is 'moist' and deceitful; *διάνοια* is *even* more so (*ἔτι* in the sense 'even' + *ὀξύτερα*, rather than *ἔτι* of an additional argument—'in addition'); to emphasize this point *διάνοια* is paradoxically referred to in terminology that is properly appropriate to *αἴσθησις*. The difficulty of interpreting P.'s argument arises not from imprecision of thought, but from the richly imaginative imagery in which he expresses himself.

ὑπαρχόντος: in philosophical terminology *ὑπάρχω* is often used of that which really exists as opposed to that which appears to exist (*φαίνομαι*). Cf. Arist. *Cael.* 297b22, *Metaph.* 1046b10, *GC* 316a9, *SVF* 2.25 etc. The vocabulary used is thus extremely appropriate to the meaning of the passage, where it is maintained that Brutus did not see a *δαίμων* and that anyway *δαίμονες* do not exist.

ἰδέαν: one must think here, not of course of the Platonic Forms, but of the idea of appearance as opposed to reality (cf. e.g. *Theogn.* 128). At the same time the word also covers the 'shapes' into which the Protean *διάνοια* metamorphoses itself.

3. κηρῶ ... τύπωσης: in discussions of sense-perception it is a commonplace that external objects acting upon the sense-organs cause an 'impression' to occur in the mind. Cf. e.g. *Theophr.* *De sensu* 52 (on Democritus), *Plato Theaet.* 192a, 194b, *Arist. De mem.* 450a34, *De an.* 424a19, 435a2, *Epicur. Ad Hdt.* 1.49, *SVF* 2.56, *Sext. Emp. Adv. Math.* 7.227ff., etc. P. is clearly alluding to this idea here, though in fact he rejects it (below).

ἔξωθεν: an early anonymous correction of the *MSS* *ἔοικεν*, accepted by nearly all editors since Bekker (Voegelin and Perrin are exceptions). The *MSS* reading can be justified linguistically, taking *κηρῶ* as *κήρου τυπώσει* (Voegelin). Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 125, n. 14, thinks that it is validated by the parallels | at *Arist. De an.* 428b and *De somn.* 460–461, where the image of the wax tablet is extended to include internal sensations produced indirectly in the imagination. It is true that these passages underlie P.'s treatment of the activities of the soul and dreams (below), but this does not justify the *MSS* reading here. It does not seem possible to take the *μέν* and *δέ* as anything other than emphatic: what happens to the *ψυχή ἀνθρώπου* is 386

quite different from what happens to wax, because, whereas the *τύπωσις* in the case of *wax* comes from the outside, the *soul*, inside man, does its own *τύπωσις* (the imagery is continued in *πλαττόμενον*, *πλάττον*, *ποικίλλειν*, and *σχηματίζειν*). Thus P. highlights his attack upon *αἴσθησις* by recalling—and pointedly rejecting—an image dear to its most enthusiastic adherents, the Stoics and Epicureans. The provocative and polemical use of opponents' terminology is a favourite Plutarchean trick, exemplified repeatedly throughout his work (e.g. the *De profect. in virt.*—the very title!; *Amat.* 767B with Helmbold *ad loc.*; 769F; *De facie* 924D, 940D; *Non posse suavi vivi* 1088B, 1088E, 1091B–C with Einarson and De Lacy *ad locc.*; *Adv. Col.* 1118E; *De Stoic. repugn.* 1033A, etc. etc.).

ψυχῇ ... ὑπάρχει: the doctrine here seems to be borrowed from Aristotle, *De an.* 428b (the movement of the imagination without external stimuli).

ῥᾶστα: i.e. hallucination is frequent because of the mobile quality of the soul. The implication that sense perception frequently runs into difficulty is of course highly unEpicurean.

αὐτήν: so Ziegler, following P and Reiske. All other MSS read *αὐτήν* (followed by Sintenis, Bekker and Voegelin). MSS authority for distinctions of breathing in a case like this is worthless. The general sense is the same whichever is read. With *αὐτήν*, (*τὸ ποικίλλειν αὐτήν καὶ σχηματίζειν* is a | periphrasis for *τύπωσις*. With *αὐτήν*, *αὐτήν* (sc. *τὴν τύπωσιν*) is an internal accusative. *αὐτήν* is bolder but also better since the *word* (as opposed to the concept of) *τύπωσις* is rather far away.

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ὑπάρχει: picking up and 'answering' *οὐδενὸς ὑπάρχοντος*. It is the natural function of the soul to do its own *τύπωσις*: this is what 'really' happens.

4–5. δηλοῦσι ... νόησις: 'Cassius ... aliena refert ut Epicurea', Usener, *Epicurea* 328 (p. 225), anticipating the analyses of Brenk (below). The correct Epicurean doctrine on dreams producing *παντοδαπὰ ... πάθη ... εἶδωλα* would be that the dreamer really does see something that is there, but is mistaken in thinking that it represents an actual physical object (cf. e.g. Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 8.63ff.; *Adv. Col.* 1123Bf.); in other words the *αἴσθησις* is true but the *δόξα* is *ψευδής*.

Cassius here seems delicately to imply that Brutus has been dreaming (note the pick-up *σοὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ σῶμα*, 37.5). Although interpreters of dreams do not seem to have made any clear distinction between a waking vision and a vision in a dream (cf. e.g. Chalcidius, *Comm. in Tim.* 256 = p. 265 Waszink) and in certain contexts (such as incubation) it would be practically impossible to tell the difference, while (as already noted) the literary accounts of the two phenomena are often closely similar, it is clearly relevant here that in ordinary life dreams were often regarded as unreliable and unsubstantial (cf. e.g. *Od.* 11.207, 222, cf. 19.581; Plat. *Lg.*

695c, *AP* 9.234 (Crinagoras). Thus to the arguments that *αἴσθησις* is deceitful, that the *διάνοια* has a Protean life of its own, and that in the case of outlandish apparitions it is the *ψυχή* inside man that performs the *τύπωσις*, Cassius adds the down-to-earth observation that Brutus has probably been dreaming anyway. It only remains for him to | dispose of the prophetic interpretation of dreams (37.4–6) and to stress Brutus’ physical exhaustion (37.5) and P. will have built up a formidable indictment of the whole supernatural tradition.

4. δηλοῦσι ... κινούμενον: this analysis of disturbing dreams seems to be essentially Aristotelian (*De somn.* 460–461). It is emphatically unEpicurean.

ὀνείρων: perhaps, like 37.3 *κηρῶ* ... *τύπωσις*, another provocative touch, since interpreters of dreams divided dreams into *ἐνύπνια*, non-predictive dreams, and *ὄνειροι*, predictive dreams—see *LSJ* s.v. *ἐνύπνιον*, cf. A. H. M. Kessels, ‘Ancient systems of dream-classification’, *Mnemos.* 22 (1969), 392 and n. 1, 407, n. 1.

ᾄς: cognate accusative—‘the transformation which τὸ φανταστικόν undergoes’.

τὸ φανταστικόν: the imaginative faculty.

βραχείας: examples of how dreams may magnify and distort from an *ἀρχὴ βραχεία* are given in Aristotle, *De div. p. somn.* 463a10ff.

<πρὸς> ... κινούμενον: Ziegler’s *πρὸς*, Reiske’s *ἐπί*, and Kronenberg’s *εἰς* all rely on the assumption that the *MSS* *γινόμενον* cannot stand. If that is true, Solanus’ *γεννώμενον* is much neater. Schaefer and Voegelin think that *γινόμενον* is justifiable. I rather think it is good: the bold expression maintains the ‘Protean’ imagery of 37.2. It is not necessary to introduce a *verbal* reference to *κίνησις* in 37.4.

εἶδωλα: naturally a completely unEpicurean use of the term. This has nothing to do with the ‘films’ formed from emissions from external objects, but with the internal workings of τὸ φανταστικόν.

κινεῖσθαι ... κίνησις ... νοήσις: the pre-Socratic doctrine of *κίνησις*, accepted by many philosophical schools, is implicit here. For definitions of *φαντασία* see Arist. *De an.* 428b12, | *De somn.* 459a17–18. Cassius’ interpretation here is based on these two passages.

σοὶ ... παρατρέπει: Cassius gives a psychosomatic explanation of Brutus’ dream. For broadly similar interpretations of dreams cf. e.g. Hdt. 7.16, several passages in the Hippocratic corpus (e.g. *Virg.* I, 8.466L; *Epidem.* 1.10, 2.670L; *Hum.* 4, 5.480; *Hebd.* 45.9.460; *Morb.* 2.72, 7.110; *Int.* 48, 7.286), Plato, *Rep.* 571c ff; Arist. *De somn.* 460b28ff., *De div. p. somn.* 463a25; Cic. *De div.* 1.45, 2.62.127–128 (Carneades); *Artemid.* 1.1, Tert. *De an.* 47.1–3, Chalcidius *Comm. in Tim.* 256, Macrobius *Comm. in Somn. Scip.* 1.3.4–6 etc. Particularly relevant here are the ideas that dreams were a continuation of one’s activities during the day (Hdt., Arist., Carneades, Cic., cf. Plat.), that they can often be connected with illness or mental trouble (‘Hippocrates’,

cf. Arist. *De div. p. somn.* 463a4), and that dreams or visions of angry *δαίμονες* can often be signs of mental disturbance (*Virg.* I etc. Note that in the *De superstitione* 165F *δεισιδαιμονία* has a similar effect).

In the general context of *Brut.* 37.2–5 the view taken here may be regarded as naturally Aristotelian or Academic. But it was an attitude that was widespread among rationalists of many creeds (and even dream interpreters like Plato and Artemidorus gave it some weight), and it should be borne in mind that the Epicureans too believed that dreams were often to be explained as ‘the day’s residues’ (Lucr. 4.962ff., Petronius fr. 30 etc.).

Of course physical condition may affect ordinary *αἴσθησις* in a waking state: cf. 36.2n.

6. δαίμονας ... διήκουσαν: having advanced a rational explanation for Brutus’ dream Cassius now proceeds to deal directly with the argument that such dreams were *θεόπεμπτοι*. The assertion of the non-existence of *δαίμονες* has of course equal force even if Brutus’ experience is regarded as a waking vision, | though the tendency of the argument from 37.4 suggests that Cassius is still talking about dreams. In effect P. deals fully with both possibilities. 390

Russell, *Plutarch*, 78, appears to imply that this argument is unEpicurean. It would be more accurate to say that while the statement *δαίμονας ... πιθανόν* is impeccably Epicurean in itself, the use to which it is put is unEpicurean. The Epicurean position should rather be that *although δαίμονες* do not exist you can still see what you falsely suppose to be *δαίμονες*, whereas Cassius is arguing that *because* they do not exist you simply cannot see them or converse with them.

δαίμονας ... πιθανόν: in Epicureanism there could be no place for *δαίμονες*, whether as intermediaries between gods and men, or as agents of an evil power (cf. e.g. Plut. *De def. orac.* 420B–D, Usener 393–94 = p. 260).

οὔτ’ ὄντας ... διήκουσαν: a rhetorical turn of a familiar type—*Pelop.* 21.6 is very similar.

ὡς ἔγωγ’ ... ὄντες: a neat and elliptical argument. Suppose that *δαίμονες* do exist as agents of the gods: they would help us because our cause is just. Thus Cassius dismisses at one fell swoop the inferences that the *δαίμων* foreboded divine vengeance or that it was an agent of an evil power. This is more Cassius than P., for, though P. sometimes rebelled against the notion of evil *δαίμονες* as being a negation of divine providence and undoubtedly sympathized with the cause of the Liberators, in so far as he takes *δαίμονες* seriously in the *Dion–Brutus* it is primarily as a possible explanation of the problem of evil. The general implication that in fact the gods are remote from men is characteristically Epicurean.

391 7. *ἐμβαινόντων ... ἀποπτάμενοι*: this omen also in Appian 4.101.425, in closely similar form. Appian makes the eagles appear | after the lustration of the army at the Gulf of Melas—it is less clear what P. does (below).

ἐμβαινόντων: Reiske's 'emendation' has won nearly unanimous approval (Voegelin excepted), and coheres with Q's *ἐπεμβαινόντων*. On the other hand, *ἐκβαίνόντων* coheres with Appian's account. An omen on the point of embarkation is just as good as an omen on disembarkation on the 'terra sibi fatalis' (*pace* Voegelin), and it is *possible* that P. has set the omen at the moment of embarkation in order to undercut Cassius' rationalizing dismissal of the apparition as sharply as possible. But this does not seem very likely (since after all the full point of the omen only becomes clear the day before the first battle of Philippi). On balance, *ἐκβαίνόντων* is superior.

ὑπὸ ... τρεφόμενοι: interestingly different is Appian's *δημοσίας τροφῆς ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἡξιοῦντο*. P. could have suppressed this, or simply be following a slightly different tradition: Appian makes it clear that he had more than one source for this incident (none of them P.).

Excursus: Brutus 36–37—problems of 'demonology'

I divide the discussion into the following sections: (i) the literary and philosophical significance of Cassius' speech; (ii) the philosophical significance of *Dion* 2.3–6; (iii) the relationship of *Dion* 55.1–3 and *Brutus* 36.1–7 to *Dion* 2.3–6; (iv) the attempt to define P.'s own attitude to 'demonology' in the *Dion–Brutus*. I do not attempt to discuss the place of the *Dion–Brutus* in the possible development of P.'s thought concerning *δαίμονες* throughout his work, as this is a topic too large and complex for the scope of the present commentary. |

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The most helpful studies of Cassius' speech are those of Brenk, *Congrès Budé*, 588ff., *In Mist Apparelled*, 33–34, 110 and n. 25, 124–25, 152–53, 272 and n. 13; Russell, *Plutarch*, 77–78; {Brenk, *Relighting the Souls* (1988), 118–27; P. M. FitzGibbon in A. G. Nikolaidis, ed., *The Unity of Plutarch's Work* (2008), 455–9}. Misconceived are the discussions of G. Soury, *La Démonologie de Plutarque* (1942), 147, and Babut 393–95. The main points have already been set out in the commentary. In general I have followed Brenk, while differing over some of the detail. But the essential picture is clear enough.

First, the content of Cassius' speech. It is represented as Epicurean, as befits Cassius' philosophical convictions (37.2, cf. 39.6). On the face of it its general air of scientific rationalism and the implicit attack on *δεισιδαιμονία* cohere with this description. More specifically Epicurean are the implicit rejection of prophecy and omens and denial of divine providence, and the

explicit rejection of the existence of *δαίμονες* and emphasis on the remoteness of the gods. But the core of the speech—the attack on *αἰσθησις*, the contention that the soul can produce its own *τύψεις* internally, the explanation of hallucination in terms of physical and psychological factors—is Aristotelian/Academic, and flatly opposed to Epicurean tenets. P. of course was well versed in Epicurean sense-perception theory (cf. e.g. *Adv. Col.* 1121D), and could easily have constructed an Epicurean explanation of the apparition based on harmless atomic phantoms. The fact, therefore, that he puts into a speech to which he gives great prominence, and which he represents as Epicurean, material that is largely unEpicurean suggests that he must have had an ulterior purpose, and that purpose must surely have been to use Cassius as a mouthpiece for an Aristotelian/Academic response to the supernatural tradition. {Similarly S. Swain, *Hermes* 118 (1990), 202–3: ‘Plutarch’s insensitivity [i.e. his giving Cassius a non-Epicurean speech] is no doubt due to a feeling that a rationalist Aristotelian explanation ... was what was called for in the circumstances’} The sharp incongruity between what Cassius is *said* to be doing and what he is *actually* doing immediately suggests | that P. is using Cassius as a vehicle for his own Aristotelian/Academic beliefs. This presumption is strengthened by the facts that (a) in retrospect the narrative of *ch.* 36 is seen to be very carefully written, in order to dovetail closely with Cassius’ rationalist argument (see commentary on *ch.* 36), and (b) various elements in Cassius’ speech can be closely paralleled in P.’s other works, in contexts where there is little doubt of P.’s position. In so varied and complex a writer as P. one needs to use arguments from ‘consistency’ of doctrine with circumspection, but in this case the parallels seem convincing:

(i) for P.’s general dubiety concerning the validity of *αἰσθησις* cf. e.g. *De E Delph.* 392E, *De Pyth.orac.* 400D, *De curios.* 521D, *Quaest. conviv.* 718D–F, *De Stoic. repugn.* 1037C, 1058Eff., *Adv. Col.* 1109A. ff., fr. 215 Sandbach (= Loeb *Moralia* XV, 391). This of course is only what one would expect of P. the Academic. Cf. further P. De Lacy, ‘Plutarch and the Academic Sceptics’, *CJ* 49 (1953–54), 79–85;

(ii) for the hypothesis of the autonomy of *τὸ φανταστικόν* to explain an apparently supernatural event, drawing a similar parallel with what happens in dreams, cf. *Coriol.* 38.4. Here P. gives a rationalist Aristotelian explanation of speaking statues very similar to that propounded for Brutus’ vision in *Brut.* 37;

(iii) the thought that distorted visions occur because of a disturbed physical condition is paralleled in *Quaest. conviv.* 734D–736B, where the question ‘why we trust our dreams least in the autumn’ is answered in Aristotelian terms as due to physical causes of the body. Cf. in similar vein *De poet. aud.* 15B, *De def. orac.* 437E–F;

(iv) the thought (implicit in Cassius' tactful observations) that terrible visions and dreams can be induced by anxiety or guilt is common in P. Cf. 394 e.g. *De virt. et vit.* 199F, *De superst.* | 165E–166C, *Adv. Col.* 1123A–C. In general, 'anxiety' dreams are not rare in the *Lives*—see Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 220ff.

(v) *Brut.* 37.6 οὐτ' ὄντας ἀνθρώπων ἔχειν εἶδος ἢ φωνήν ἢ δύναμιν εἰς ἡμᾶς διήκουσαν is similar both to P.'s contention that statues cannot speak or communicate with men in *Coriol.* 38 (Brenk) and to his assertion that δαίμονες which delight in human slaughter either do not exist, or—if they do—have no power and should therefore be disregarded, in *Pelop.* 21.6.

Second, one may profitably consider the literary and artistic advantages P. gains by discussing the apparition through the medium of a speech attributed to Cassius. It is dramatically fitting that if the discussion is to be done through the medium of a speech at all Cassius should be the speaker, for (i) he was a close friend of Brutus—in the *Life* Brutus' closest friend—to whom Brutus could naturally be represented as turning for a solution to his perplexity over his apparently supernatural experience, and (ii) he was an Epicurean, and thus (a) of a particularly appropriate philosophical persuasion to offer words of comfort to the distressed Brutus—much 'consolatio' material is Epicurean in content or tone—and (b) of a sect which prided itself especially on its ability to assuage the distress caused by superstition. (No doubt P. also recalled the discussions between Cassius and Cicero about Epicurean εἶδωλα: *Ad Fam.* 15.16 [215], 15.19 [216], which provides him with a certain 'historical' justification for representing Cassius as engaged in discussion about sense perception problems. He may also have been influenced by the fact that after seeing his apparition Dion hastened to consult his φίλοι, and by the variant tradition of Val. Max., where the apparition appears to Cassius of Parma.) The device of using Cassius as his spokesman necessarily meant putting into his mouth arguments that were not Epicurean at all, but rather the sort of arguments 395 that P. the Academic himself thought appropriate. This entails a rather extreme case of Thucydidean τὰ δέοντα, though the general technique of allowing dramatic figures to speak out of character in order to put across the author's own views is thoroughly Plutarchean: cf. e.g. the anachronistic political sentiments of the sages in the *Convivium Septem Sapientium*, as analysed by G. J. D. Aalders, 'Political thought in Plutarch's *Convivium Septem Sapientium*', *Mnemos.* 30 (1977), 28–39, esp. 29f., 32ff. At the same time it ought to be observed that (as in the *Convivium*) P. does make some attempt to maintain the dramatic illusion. His success can be gauged by the fact that in the past almost all scholars took the 'Epicureanism' of Cassius' speech at face value and only recently (Brenk, Russell) has the full significance of the speech begun to be appreciated.

One must also ask the prior question: why does the discussion in *Brut.* 37 take the form of a speech? One reason is that P. has already said something

about the problem ‘in propria persona’ in *Dion* 2.3–6, and—given that he wishes to change his ground in *Brutus* 37—it is less disruptive that further discussion should be essayed in a speech of a figure in the *Life*. Another is that, though the arguments advanced by Cassius are meant to be taken seriously and to a considerable extent actually represent P.’s own considered view, the fact that in strict theory P. does not commit himself to them allows all sorts of ambiguous literary and philosophical effects (see introduction to *ch.* 36). From that point of view, *Brut.* 36–37 is a triumph of Plutarchean artistry, simultaneously fulfilling weighty philosophical and important thematic literary functions.

{P. M. FitzGibbon in A. G. Nikolaidis, ed., *The Unity of Plutarch’s Work* (2008), 455–9 suggests instead that P. ‘takes advantage of the situation to ... construct a speech which sounds Epicurean but actually destroys the credibility of the one who delivers it’: the effect is ‘to further demean a character already seriously flawed, especially in contrast to Brutus’.

(ii)

For discussion of *Dion* 2.3–6 see Soury 146ff.; Ziegler, *RE* 21 (1951), 941 {=*Plutarchos von Chaironeia* (1949), 304}; W. H. Porter, *Life of Dion* (1952), 47f; Babut 393f.; | Brenk, *Congrès Budé*, 588ff., *In Mist Apparelled*, 62–63, 106–11.

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In *Dion* 2.1–6 P. is discussing the similarities between the careers of Dion and Brutus. He writes:

Αἱ δὲ τύχαι, τοῖς συμπτώμασι μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς προαιρέσεσιν οὔσαι αἱ αὐταί, συνάγουσι τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς βίους εἰς ὁμοιότητα. προανηρέθησαν γὰρ ἀμφοτέροι τοῦ τέλους, εἰς ὃ προϋθέντο τὰς πράξεις ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ἀγώνων καταθέσθαι μὴ δυνηθέντες. ὃ δὲ πάντων θαυμασιώτατον, ὅτι καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἀμφοτέροις ὑπεδήλωσε τὴν τελευτήν, ὁμοίως ἑκατέρῳ φάσματος εἰς ὅψιν οὐκ εὐμενοῦς παραγενομένου. καίτοι λόγος τίς ἐστι τῶν ἀναιρούντων τὰ τοιαῦτα, μηδενὶ ἂν νοῦν ἔχοντι προσπεσεῖν φάντασμα δαίμονος μηδ’ εἶδωλον, ἀλλὰ παιδάρια καὶ γύναια καὶ παραφόρους δι’ ἀσθένειαν ἀνθρώπου ἐν τινι πλάνῳ ψυχῆς ἢ δυσκρασίᾳ σώματος γενομένου, δόξας ἐφέλκεσθαι κενὰ καὶ ἀλλοκότους, δαίμονα πονηρὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς [εἶναι] δεισιδαιμονίαν ἔχοντας. εἰ δὲ Δίων καὶ Βρούτος, ἄνδρες ἐμβριθεῖς καὶ φιλόσοφοι καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀκροσφαλεῖς οὐδ’ εὐάλωτοι πάθος, οὕτως ὑπὸ φάσματος διετέθησαν, ὥστε καὶ φράσαι πρὸς ἑτέρους, οὐκ οἶδα μὴ τῶν πάνυ παλαιῶν τὸν ἀτοπώτατον ἀναγκασθῶμεν προσδέχεσθαι λόγον, ὡς τὰ φαῦλα δαιμόνια καὶ βάσκανα, προσφθονοῦντα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐνιστάμενα, ταραχὰς καὶ φόβους ἐπάγει, σείοντα καὶ σφάλλοντα τὴν ἀρετήν, ὡς μὴ διαμείναντες ἀπτῶτες ἐν τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀκέραιοι βελτίονος ἐκείνων μοίρας μετὰ τὴν τελευτήν τύχωσιν.

P. finds the envy of τὰ δαιμόνια a difficult doctrine to accept (cf. ἀτοπώτατον, ἀναγκασθῶμεν), but—while not committing himself absolutely (cf. οὐκ οἶδα μὴ ...)—feels that the evidence of Dion and Brutus, men of weight and philosophical disposition, who were so affected by the apparitions as to tell other people about them, must incline the scales in favour of tentative acceptance. That at any rate is what he *says*—whether he really means it is another question.

The first problem is to try to find a parallel for this ‘most strange doctrine’ elsewhere in P. In what follows I deliberately restrict the scope of the discussion to this problem, in the hope of keeping the discussion within manageable proportions. For general treatments of P. and ‘demonology’ see e.g. T. Eisele, | ‘Zur Dämonologie des Plutarchs von Chäroneia’, *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos.* 17 (1904), 28–51; F. Bock, *Untersuchungen zu Plutarchs Schrift ‘De genio Socratis’* (1910), 46ff.; H. von Arnim, *Plutarch über Dämonen und Mantik* (1921); Soury; H. Erbse, ‘Plutarchs Schrift Περὶ Δεισδαιμονίας’, *Hermes* 80 (1952), 296–314; Babut 367–440 {and ‘La doctrine démonologique dans le *De genio Socratis*: cohérence et fonction’, *L’Information Littéraire* 35 (1983), 201–5}; J. G. Griffiths, *De Iside et Osiride* (1970), 25–26; Brenk, *Congrès Budé* loc. cit.; ‘A most strange doctrine: *Daimon* in Plutarch’, *CJ* 69 (1973), 1–11, *In Mist Apparelled, passim*, {*ANRW* 2.36.1 (1987), 275–94, and *Relighting the Souls* (1998), 170–81}; Russell, *Plutarch*, 75–78; J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (1977), 223f.; {Y. Vernière, *Symboles et mythes dans la pensée de Plutarque* (1977), 249–62 and ‘Nature et fonction des démons chez Plutarque’, in J. Ries and H. Limet, edd., *Homo religiosus 14: Anges et démons*, Actes du colloque de Liège et de Louvain-la-Neuve, 25–26 novembre 1987 (1989), 241–52; F. Casadesús Bordoy, ‘La concepción plutarquea de los daímones’, in A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Casadesús Bordoy, edd., *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Misticismo y religiones místicas en la obra de Plutarco* (2001), 23–34; W. Deuse, ‘The “doctrine of *daimones*”’, in H.-G. Nesselrath, ed., *Plutarch: On the Daimonion of Socrates* (2010), 191–3; and several papers in L. van der Stockt, F. Titchener, H.-G. Ingenkamp and A. Pérez Jiménez, *Gods, Daimones, Myths and History of Religions in Plutarch’s Works* (Fshr. Brenk, 2010)}.

Discussion of evil δαίμονες features prominently in the *De defectu oraculorum*, the *De facie in orbe lunae*, and the *De Iside et Osiride*, although many other texts can also be invoked.

At *De def. orac.* 417Cff. Cleombrotus speaks of δαίμονες φίλοι who extort human sacrifice and of the necessity of appeasing them. The description of these is thoroughly unfavourable (417D, cf. 417E), but there are no close resemblances to *Dion* 2, while there are at least two contradictory elements. Firstly, there is the assertion that, bad as they are, they may still on occasion be instruments of good (417A). Secondly, the idea that human sacrifice can in any way be justified or even be unavoidable is totally alien

to the natural promptings of P.'s humane temperament: cf. *Pelop.* 21.6, *De superst.* 171B–D, esp. 171B, whose phrasing resembles *Pelop.* 21.6, and *Ages.* 6.6–11 and *Marc.* 3.5–7 for more general expressions of P.'s horror of human sacrifice.

Later in the same dialogue Philip attributes belief in the existence of *φαῦλοι δαίμονες* to Empedocles, Plato, Xenocrates, Chrysippus and Democritus (419A), and in two passages (*Quaest. Rom.* 277A, *De Stoic. repugnant.* 1051C–D) P. discusses Chrysippus' views on τὰ φαῦλα δαιμόνια. In the first they are described as punishers of wicked men (277A). In the second P. argues that Chrysippus' views, which are intended to defend the | existence of divine providence, in effect deny it: if the *φαῦλοι δαίμονες* 398 hold sway over mankind as wicked satraps/governors dominate the provinces entrusted to them by a king, there is no divine providence in that. The *Quaest. Rom.* passage fits ill with *Dion* 2, the *φαῦλα δαιμόνια* being agents of good. The other Chrysippian passage is not excluded by the mere fact that P. there rejects Chrysippus' doctrine, since obviously he could have expressed a different opinion on another occasion (nor is his real opinion in *Dion* 2 so clear, as will be seen). But on the face of it, *Dion* 2 reflects a more thorough-going dualistic doctrine than *De Stoic. repugnant.* 1051C–D, where the *φαῦλα δαιμόνια* have after all been appointed by a somewhat negligent Divinity. Brenk however, is inclined to think that the doctrine of *Dion* 2 is Chrysippian, on the ground that P.'s usual form of the word is *δαίμων*, but *δαιμόνιον* is used in *Dion* 2, *Quaest. Rom.*, and *De Stoic. repugnant.* This seems a very slender pointer: at *Dion* 2.6 τὰ δαιμόνια is 'conditioned' by 2.3 τὸ δαιμόνιον, while at *De E Delph.* 394A ἐτέρω ... θεῶ, μᾶλλον δὲ δαίμονι is followed indifferently by 394C τὰ θεῖα πρὸς τὰ δαιμόνια, and in *De Stoic. repugnant.* τὰ φαῦλα δαιμόνια immediately become *φαῦλοι δαίμονες* (1051D). The hypothesis of the influence of Chrysippian doctrine on *Dion* 2 is attractive only because in the last resort it is unverifiable (P. being the only source for Chrysippian *φαῦλα δαιμόνια*)—that apart, it seems to have nothing to commend it.

Rather more promising at first sight is a passage in the myth of the stranger recounted by Sulla in the *De facie in orbe lunae*. At 944C–D *δαίμονες* descend from the moon to perform certain tasks upon the earth and at 944D 'for any act that they perform in these matters not fairly but inspired by wrath or for an unjust end or out of envy they are penalized, for they are cast out upon earth | again confined in human bodies'. This shares 399 with *Dion* 2.5–6 the *φθόνος* motivation, and the sense of competitiveness the *δαίμονες* feel against good men like Dion and Brutus could be understood against the background of the belief expressed in *De facie* 944Cff. (cf. *De Is. et Osir.* 361E, 362E)—that *δαίμονες*—like the souls of men (in the *De facie* they *are* the souls of men)—have the possibility, after a period of purification, of being promoted to a higher state. Brenk devalues the parallelism on the following grounds (*Congrès Budé*, 59of.):

(i) ‘bien que capables de faire le mal, ils ne sont pas décrits comme des démons ...’. This makes little sense: the description of the *δαίμονες* at 944C–D is a typical ‘daemonic’ one (cf. *De def. orac.* 417A–B, *De gen. Socr.* 591C). It is not an objection that in the *De facie* the *δαίμονες* have previously been *ψυχαί* (944C).

(ii) ‘... et ne sont envoyés que pour exécuter des actes justes dont l’un est la punition des méchants’. This is true, but 944D does allow for the possibility of unjust independent action motivated by *φθόνος* and there is therefore *some* parallel.

(iii) Lamprias in the introduction to the *De facie* (920B–C) and Sulla in his conclusion (945D) both indicate that the myth must be regarded as highly speculative and hypothetical.

(iv) In the *De sera numinis vindicta* 567C, speaking ‘in propria persona’, P. locates the activities of the *δαίμονες* as agents of retribution in Hades, not on earth.

(v) is an argument from ‘consistency’, which can be overplayed: P.’s treatment of the whole problem of *δαίμονες* is obviously confused and a parallel is still a parallel even if it is contradicted elsewhere. As for (iii), the myth in its entirety is highly speculative and hypothetical, but that is not an excuse for ignoring possible parallels of detail, if they exist. It must be admitted that the parallelism is not very striking—*φθόνος* is only | one of three possible motivations in 944D but the main one in *Dion* 2.5–6 and the reason for the *φθόνος* in 944D is left quite unspecified but precisely explained in *Dion* 2.5–6—but despite that 944D may be said to show some affinity with the thoroughgoing dualism of *Dion* 2.5–6.

Another suggested candidate is *De Is. et Osir.* 369Bff.:

διὸ καὶ παμπάλαιος αὐτῆ κάτεισιν ἐκ θεολόγων καὶ νομοθετῶν εἰς τε ποιητὰς καὶ φιλοσόφους δόξα, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδέσποτον ἔχουσα, τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ δυσεξάλειπτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον οὐδ’ ἐν φήμαις, ἀλλ’ ἐν τε τελεταῖς ἐν τε θυσίαις καὶ βαρβάρους καὶ Ἑλλησι πολλαχοῦ περιφερομένη, ὡς οὐτ’ ἄνουν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ πᾶν, οὐθ’ εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ κρατῶν καὶ κατευθύνων ὥσπερ οἶαξιν ἢ τισι πειθηνίοις χαλινοῖς λόγος, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ μεμιγμένα κακοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς μᾶλλον δὲ μηδὲν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄκρατον ἐνταῦθα τῆς φύσεως φερούσης οὐ δυεῖν πίθων εἰς ταμίας ὥσπερ νάματα τὰ πράγματα καπηλικῶς διανέμων ἀνακεράννουσιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ δυεῖν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν καὶ δυεῖν ἀντιπάλων δυνάμεων, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ κατ’ εὐθεῖαν ὑψηλομένης, τῆς δ’ ἔμπαλιν ἀναστρεφούσης καὶ ἀνακλώσης ὅ τε βίος μικτὸς ὅ τε κόσμος, εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶς, ἀλλ’ ὁ περίγειος οὗτος καὶ μετὰ σελήνην ἀνώματος καὶ ποικίλος γέγονε καὶ μεταβολὰς πάσας δεχόμενος. εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀναιτίως πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, αἰτίαν δὲ κακοῦ

τάγαθόν οὐκ ἂν παράσχοι, δεῖ γένεσιν ἰδίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν.

Καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτο τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ σοφωτάτοις· νομίζουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν θεοὺς εἶναι δύο καθάπερ ἀντιτέχνους, τὸν μὲν ἀγαθῶν, τὸν δὲ φαύλων δημιουργόν· οἱ δὲ τὸν μὲν [γὰρ] ἀμείνονα θεόν, τὸν δ' ἕτερον δαίμονα καλοῦσιν, ὥσπερ Ζωροάστρης ὁ μάγος, ὃν πεντακισχιλίους ἔτεσι τῶν Τρωικῶν γεγονέναι πρεσβύτερον ἱστοροῦσιν. οὗτος οὖν ἐκάλει τὸν μὲν Ὀρομάζην, τὸν δ' Ἄρειμάνιον· καὶ προσαπεφαίνετο τὸν μὲν εὐοικένας φωτὶ μάλιστα τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τὸν δ' ἔμπαλιν σκότῳ καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ, μέσον δ' ἀμφοῖν τὸν Μίθρην εἶναι· διὸ καὶ Μίθρην Πέρσαι τὸν μεσίτην ὀνομάζουσιν ... |

This is suggested by Porter 47–49 and rejected by Brenk (*Congrès Budé* 589, n. 1, cf. *In Mist Apparellé*, 107, n. 22). Brenk argues that it is excluded by the fact that in *Dion* 2 P. speaks of δαίμονες, and not of a supreme δαίμων. But this is pedantic: later P. clearly does attribute the creation of evil δαίμονες plural to Areimanius (369F–370A). It is true that these are referred to as θεούς, but this is loose usage: Areimanius himself is a δαίμων (369D) and Angra Mainyu (= Areimanius) is the *Daeva* of the *Daevas* and is associated with six chief *Daevas* in Zoroastrianism (for references see *Sacred Books of the East*, ed. F. Max Müller [1910], Vol. 50, s.v. *Daevas* and ‘Demons’). It seems to me that a good case can be made for regarding *Dion* 2.5–6 as Zoroastrian.

In the *De Is. et Osir.* as a whole P. takes a fundamentally dualistic view of deity (Griffiths 20–25), which is made quite explicit in the present passage. *Dion* 2.5–6 is also clearly fundamentally dualistic. Moreover, Zoroaster was greatly preoccupied by the evils of the *Daevas* and P. must be regarded as relatively well informed about his teachings (cf. J. Hani, ‘Plutarque en face du dualisme Iranien’, *REG* 77 [1964], 489–525; E. D. Phillips, ‘Plutarque, interprète de Zoroastre’, *Congrès Budé*, 506–510; Griffiths 47off.). The dating P. gives Zoroaster in *De Is. et. Osir.* 369D, absurd though it is, fits the reference in *Dion* to τῶν πάνυ παλαιῶν τὸν ἀτοπώτατον ... λόγον far better than any of the other possible candidates mentioned by P. as originating or propounding a system of demonology (i.e. Thracian Orphism, Egypt, Phrygia—*De def. orac.* 415A–B; Empedocles, Plato, Xenocrates, Chrysippus, Democritus, *ibid.* 419A, Pythagoras—*De Is. et. Osir.* 360D). Further, the idea in *Dion* 2 that the δαίμονες systematically attack virtue and try to undermine it clearly resembles the thought of 369C, 370A etc., and is abundantly canvassed in Zoroastrian writings, while the motivation attributed to the | δαίμονες by P. is necessarily implicit in the Zoroastrian dualistic concept of deity, and often explicit, e.g. Yasna 51.13 ‘The ethical law or character of the vicious one, whose willing-self, having destroyed the paths of virtuousness by its own actions and words, is afflicted’ (or ‘hardened’) ‘by its own actions and words at the *Chinvato Peretū*’ (transl.

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Maneckshaw Navroji Dastur). Finally, *Dion* 2.6 *σείοντα ... τύχωσιν* raises an intriguing possibility. The general notion of ‘falling’ in virtue is familiar enough (in P. e.g. *Timol.* 6.1, *De profect. in virt.* 78A, *De frat. am.* 490E), but, given the general Zoroastrian flavour of the passage and the particular eschatological context, the precise use of the imagery here seems to suggest that P. was familiar with, and is deliberately evoking, the famous Zoroastrian concept of the *Chinvato Peretû*, the Bridge of Judgement to the next world, which was broad for the righteous, but narrow as a razor for the wicked, who fell off it into hell. The *δαίμονες* try to make Dion and Brutus *fall*, to prevent their arriving at the ‘House of Song’, when they would enjoy a ‘better lot’ than the *δαίμονες* themselves, who would either be confined to hell (their natural home), or—after the last battle between Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu—expelled from the world altogether. For the trials and terrors awaiting the soul at the hands of ‘demons’ as it crosses the *Chinvato Peretû* cf. *Pahlavi Texts*, 144–53 = R. C. Zaehner, *The Teachings of the Magi*, 110; *Menok i Khrat*, ed. Anklesaria, 1.74–123 = Zaehner 133–38.

Thus there seems little doubt that *Dion* 2.5–6 is consistent with a viewpoint more fully developed in the *De Is. et. Osir.*, deriving ultimately from the teachings of Zoroaster. (I may add that this interpretation of *Dion* 2.5–6 was assented to by the late Professor Phillips.) The only slight problem is why P. characterized the belief as ‘most outlandish’. Porter 49 suggests that P. is simply adopting the standpoint of the ordinary Greek. It is more | helpful to surmise that, in the light of the fact that when P. wrote the *De Is. et. Osir.* he would certainly have accepted the doctrine of *Dion* 2.5–6 without reservation, the half-critical characterization *ἀτοπώτατος* reflects a stage in P.’s development when his views on evil *δαίμονες* had not yet been fully formed. But this is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

One must now return to the general question of the interpretation of *Dion* 2. The Zoroastrian basis of 2.5–6, consistent with Zoroastrian dualistic doctrine in the *De Is. et. Osir.*, is not in itself sufficient to prove that *Dion* 2 as a whole can safely be taken at face value. One must ask: does *Dion* 2 display any traces of the kind of ambiguity found in *Brut.* 36–37? The answer (I think) is that it does. Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, argues that 2.4 is written in ‘an amazingly witty and piercing style for a gullible believer in these tales’. There is something in this (despite the exaggeration: no-one who suggests that 2.5–6 should be taken at face value supposes that P. is being ‘gullible’). The pun on *δαίμων* / *δεισδαίμονία* seems Plutarchean (cf. *Numa* 8.4; *De superst.* 168C, 171C, with Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 52f.). And the explanation suggested by the *λόγος ... τῶν ἀναιρούντων* is in fact reflected in Cassius’ speech at 37.5. One might say that this shows only that P. was aware of the Aristotelian view but rejected it when he wrote *Dion* 2 and later decided to accept it when writing *Brut.* 37. Yet who are ‘those

who try to do away with such notions’? The *concrete arguments* they use are Aristotelian/Academic, but surely Babut 395, n. 2, is right to feel that ‘le vocabulaire, le style de l’argumentation ... font penser aux Épicuriens’ (even though Babut mistakenly takes Cassius’ speech to be straightforwardly Epicurean): the *tone* of contemptuous dismissal is suggestive of Epicureanism (and perhaps also *δοξὰς ... κενάς* is meant to evoke the Epicurean concept of *δοξὰ ψευδής*). |

To sum up. *Dion* 2 seems to reveal traces of the ambiguity found in *Brut.* 36–37. The emphasis is naturally different (P. is hardly going to adduce as a parallel between the lives of Dion and Brutus the apparitions that appeared to them and then dismiss the authenticity of that tradition in the introduction to both *Lives*), but *Dion* 2 contains the seeds of the rejection of the tradition that is made more or less explicit in *Brut.* 36–37. *Dion* 2 is as cannily and cleverly written as *Brut.* 36–37. 404

{H. Görgemanns, *Drei religionsphilosophische Schriften* (2003), 352f., accepts the Zoroastrian interpretation.}

(iii)

The doctrine of *Dion* 2.5–6 is fundamentally dualistic and specifically (if I am right) Zoroastrian, reflecting the contest between the good souls and the malevolent ‘demons’ at the *Chinvato Peretû*. This is, as it were, P.’s ‘editorial framework’ for his treatment of the apparitions that appeared to Dion and Brutus, even though in *Dion* 2 he is already making subtle preparations for rejecting that interpretation in favour of Aristotelian/Academic rationalism. One must now consider how far he attempts to integrate his actual descriptions of the appearances of the apparitions into that framework. One expects a certain disjunction, simply because P. intends to reject the framework, but at the same time, simply because P. is a highly skilled literary artist, one anticipates that the transition from one philosophical position to another will be achieved as smoothly as possible. One must bear in mind that P. has essentially to do three things: (i) maintain a certain continuity between the framework of *Dion* 2.5–6 and his descriptions of the apparitions; (ii) achieve a smooth transition from the philosophical position of *Dion* 2.5–6 to that of 2.4; (iii) achieve both these two purposes while working with a tradition which asserted the guilt of Dion and Brutus, that is, with a tradition whose philosophical rationale was flatly opposed to both the dualism of *Dion* 2.5–6 and | the rationalism of 2.4. If P.’s purpose is understood along these lines, then it seems to me that many of the difficulties and apparent illogicalities of P.’s treatment of the *φάσματα* can be resolved. But another factor must be taken into consideration—the purposes of P. the literary artist. As a philosopher P. may reject the theme of prophecy and divine vengeance implicit in the tradition, but as a literary artist he may be prepared to hint at that theme for ominous dramatic effect. 405

Take first the description of the *φάσμα* that appears to Dion (*Dion* 55.1–4). P. states that the *φάσμα γίνεταί*. This implies acceptance of the tradition, i.e. P. is still maintaining the *general* framework of *ch.* 2, which *seems* to accept the supernatural tradition. But when the *φάσμα* appears, Dion is sitting alone and pensive (and depressed)—detail that is susceptible of the rational interpretation of 2.4, as expounded by Cassius in *Brut.* 37. The *φάσμα* is described as being like a tragic Erinys in clothing and aspect, sweeping Dion’s house. In the tradition the function of the *φάσμα* was obviously to forebode divine vengeance for the murder of Heracleides, and P.’s description of it, whether taken straight from his source, or adapted by himself for his own purposes, clearly reflects that function. The theme of divine vengeance is *implicit* in P.’s general organization of the narrative (cf. A. Garzetti, *Plutarchi Vita Caesaris*, xxxix; Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 107, n. 23; *contra* Porter 48). Thus: 53.5 murder of Heracleides; 54.3ff. organization of conspiracy; 55.1–3 *φάσμα*; 55.4 death of Dion’s son; 56.1–57.4 further conspiracy and murder of Dion. But this is the implication of P. the literary artist who wishes to establish a pattern of ominous foreboding, and it remains true—and important—that P. does not make the theme *explicit* (cf. Porter, and Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 110). Why not? The reason surely is that divine vengeance implies that Dion has | committed a terrible crime, but P. does not want to admit this, for within the dualistic framework of *Dion* 2 the *φάσμα* is an evil *δαίμων* intent on subverting Dion’s virtue.

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To what extent, then, does *Dion* 55 harmonize with the dualistic and specifically Zoroastrian standpoint of *Dion* 2.5–6? The *φάσμα* attempts to shake Dion’s composure—its visitation can be regarded as a sort of test, a test which Dion (in contrast to Brutus) fails because he gives way to *φόβος*. And the visitation of the *φάσμα* *qua* evil *δαίμων* can be regarded as prophetic (without conceding that Dion has committed a crime) because (i) one of the ways in which the dualistic/Zoroastrian *δαίμονες* of *Dion* 2.5–6 obviously can assault the virtuous is by ominous prophecy; prophecy is a common function of *δαίμονες* (cf. e.g. Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 9.19; *De def. orac.* 418D, *De facie* 944C, *De Is. et. Osir.* 361C, and in general Flacelière’s ed. of the *De defectu*, 40ff.), both good and bad (*De facie* 944C, *De def. orac.* 417Cff.); (ii) the imagery of *Dion* 2.5–6 is designed to recall the struggle between the souls and the *δαίμονες* on the *Chinvato Peretú*: hence the visitations of the apparitions to Dion and Brutus can be regarded as a sort of dress rehearsal for their conflict after death. All in all, the description of the apparition in *Dion* 55 (a) is consistent with the doctrine of *Dion* 2.5–6, (b) makes use of (but carefully does not emphasize) the theme of divine retribution for literary effect, and (c) just hints at the grounds for rejecting the supernatural tradition which are set out ambiguously in *Dion* 2.4 and fully developed in *Brut.* 37.

P.’s description of the apparition that appears to Brutus has already been analysed in detail. His rejection of the supernatural tradition is

spelled out in Cassius' speech in *ch.* 37 (though not without fruitful ambiguity—see above on the function of Cassius' speech), the ground being carefully prepared in *ch.* 36. But in terms | of the case for accepting the authenticity of the supernatural tradition, *ch.* 36 is consistent with the doctrine of *Dion* 2.5–6. 407

In the tradition the *δαίμων* is obviously meant to portend divine vengeance for the murder of Caesar. This implication is not forgotten in P.'s narrative: the visitation of the apparition is followed on both occasions by omens portending disaster (37.7, 48.2–5), and Cassius' speech is partly geared to refuting the unfavourable prophecy of the *δαίμων*. But P. does not emphasize it and this is consistent with *Dion* 2.5–6, according to which Brutus has not done anything wrong at all. Again, as in *Dion*, the prophetic aspect of the *δαίμων* can be reconciled with the Zoroastrian dualism of *Dion* 2.5–6 because evil *δαίμονες* can prophesy to attack the virtuous and because again this confrontation between *φάσμα* and human prefigures the final struggle after death. And again, the visitation of the *δαίμων* is a test of, and an attack upon, Brutus' virtue, in which he acquires himself admirably. Of course any difficulty that there is in marrying the Zoroastrian dualism of *Dion* 2.5–6 with the traditional prophetic role of the *δαίμονες*, without conceding that Brutus and *Dion* have done wrong, ceases to matter once P. begins to make it clear that in his opinion there is no truth in the supernatural tradition at all (*ch.* 37).

I end this section by discussing briefly two further questions: (a) what is the significance of the words of the *δαίμων* to Brutus? (b) why does P., in so far as he is prepared to consider that there may be some truth in the supernatural tradition, advance as a possible defence of it the dualistic doctrine of *Dion* 2.5–6? This question is worth asking, even though P.'s considered position is a rejection of the tradition.

(a)

The *φάσμα* tells Brutus that he is *ὁ σὸς ... δαίμων κακός* | (cf. *Caes.* 69.11). 408
The wording must come from the tradition, not from Plutarch's imagination (cf. 36.7n.). Nevertheless, one can still try to make sense to it from the point of view of the narrative of the *Brutus*. (Discussion in Babut 433f.; Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 110, 146 and n. 1, 151, 152f.; {on *Caes.*, Pelling on *Caes.* 69.2}; here I try to be as brief as possible.)

In the *Caesar*, where the theme of divine vengeance is heavily stressed (69.2ff.), Babut 433 is clearly right in his contention that 'on constate que le fantôme apparu à Brutus après le meurtre du dictateur, et qui se présente lui-même comme "le mauvais génie" du meurtrier, ne peut être dissocié du "grand démon" qui avait assisté César durant sa vie ... et lui resta attaché, en qualité de vengeur ..., après sa mort' (cf. Brenk 151). But this idea, if present at all, is certainly not of any significance in the *Brutus* account, where, to avoid conflict with the dualistic doctrine of *Dion* 2.5–6, the theme

of divine vengeance is considerably underplayed. Nevertheless, the words of the *φάσμα* in the *Brutus* have point. The doctrine that a man has his own personal *δαίμων* is set out in *De genio Socratis* 593Dff. Here the *δαίμονες*, souls which have been through life themselves, are all noble guardians of their respective human charges. But in *De tranq. animi* 474B P. postulates two *δαίμονες* for each individual, one good and one bad. (On the basis of this and Philo, *QE* 1.23, Dillon 221 deduces that ‘it does seem that somewhere in the lower reaches of Middle Platonism the notion of an evil guardian as well as a good one was floating about’.) Thus the words of the *φάσμα* in *Brutus* have a point of contact with Plutarchean doctrine elsewhere. More important, P. often uses the terms *δαίμων* and *τυχή* interchangeably (cf. in general Brenk 146ff.), and the two are equated in *De tranq. animi* 474Bff. Hence the *δαίμων* of *Brutus* 36 may be taken as symbolizing Brutus’ *τυχή*, especially because the theme of divine vengeance is downplayed. Cf. Brenk 110: ‘This evil *daimon* | of *Brutus* 36, because of the suppression of the vengeance theme, and because of the preoccupation of Plutarch with the *tyche* of Brutus at the time of Philippi, actually seems like Brutus’ own *tyche* appearing before him’. The twin aspects of the *δαίμων* (Brutus’ bad guardian spirit/Brutus’ *tyche*) seem to be deliberately recalled at *Brut.* 47.7, where God thwarts Brutus’ good *tyche*, by not allowing him to learn of the Republican victory at sea which ought to have decided the campaign of Philippi in Brutus’ favour. One may object that this interpretation cannot be justified because P. in fact rejects the visitation of the apparition; so he does, but this does not stop him using it to suggest various themes, one of which is Brutus’ defeat at the hands of Fate. The ambiguity is characteristic.

(b)

Why does P.’s attempted defence of the supernatural tradition take the form of the dualistic doctrine of *Dion* 2.5–6? He could have tried to defend the tradition in other ways consistent with some aspects of his thought, e.g. as a sign of divine displeasure (as in the *Caesar*), or as a genuinely prophetic dream (a possibility P. certainly believed in—cf. e.g. fr. 177 Sandbach = Loeb *Moralia* XV, 312f.). The answer lies partly in the philosophical bias of the *Dion–Brutus*: if Dion and Brutus are men of consummate virtue, then if the tradition of the visitations of vengeful prophetic *δαίμονες* is to be accepted at all, it *can* only be in terms of dualistic doctrine: any other interpretation would involve conceding that Dion and Brutus were morally guilty. (Even as it is, the murder of Heracleides presents P. with a difficult problem: the account of it in *Dion* 53.5 is awkwardly apologetic. But Dion is, as it were, ‘attracted’ into comparison with Brutus in the interests of the broader parallelism.) It is no surprise that the parallel account in the *Caesar* shows P. adopting the emphasis and interpretation of the tradition. Yet the doctrine of *Dion* 2.5–6, if finally rejected, | is put forward seriously and

does reflect one of P.'s most pressing concerns—the problem of evil in the universe, and one may well feel that P. floats it not just because it is the only one to suit the brief of *Brutus* as opposed to *Caesar* but because in his heart of hearts P. does not believe that the murder of Caesar was a crime.

(iv)

In this very short section I summarize the conclusions reached about P.'s attitude to 'demonology' in the *Dion–Brutus*. In *Dion* 2 P. represents himself as accepting the supernatural tradition of the appearance of *φάσματα* to Dion and Brutus, and explains it in terms of dualistic and specifically Zoroastrian demonological doctrine. He does so both for literary and philosophical reasons—literary, because in the introduction to the *Dion–Brutus* he is not going to express outright disbelief in the most striking parallel between their two careers; philosophical, because any other philosophical explanation would impair his portrayal of Dion and Brutus as men of consummate virtue. Certainly in the case of Brutus, he does in fact believe him to have been such a man. But his introduction is subtly ambiguous and P. also sketches out the position of Aristotelian/Academic rationalism to which he really inclines. The supernatural illusion is maintained in the *Dion* but effectively ruptured in *Brutus* 37, where Cassius' speech reflects P.'s own point of view. This interpretation is confirmed by P.'s account of the second visitation of the apparition. He notes (48.2) that Publius Volumnius, a philosopher (i.e. a reliable witness) and an eye-witness, does not mention it. This must cast further doubt upon the whole tradition, since on its first visitation the *φάσμα* had announced that it would see Brutus at Philippi. (In themselves these words could perhaps be taken to mean simply 'you will be killed at Philippi', but in the tradition as reflected by P. and Appian, | with its two visitations, they are clearly meant to be taken quite literally.) P.'s attitude to 'demonology' in the *Dion–Brutus* is essentially coherent: where difficulties arise they do so because P. is not just operating on one level: although he rejects the tradition, he uses it as a literary device and as a means of exploring several serious philosophical concerns. The whole is a marvellously complex piece of writing, subtle and richly allusive, and yet at the same time far from flabby intellectually.

Chs. 38–40: Preparations for the First Battle of Philippi

The narrative proceeds chronologically, the tone a mixture of the ominous and the optimistic. Although the former naturally predominates, particularly as the narrative moves towards the night before the battle, P. knows well how to exploit the ‘principle of hope’ in order to create and sustain dramatic tension.

Ch. 38: The two sides take up their positions on the battlefield

1. Τὰ ... προῆλθον: details of the march in Appian 4.87–102. Nothing in Dio.

Τὰ ... πεπονημένοι: i.e. in his Thracian campaign (see on 27.1).

εἰ δὲ ... προσαγόμενοι: one suspects that P. is being deliberately vague here, to create an impression of the victorious advance of the Liberators, and to exaggerate the extent of their support. (Rhascus, brother of Rhascuporis, in fact fought for the Caesarians.)

1–2. μέχρι τῆς ... χωρία: this smooth narrative conceals a far more complicated sequence of events. (For a useful summary see Schmidt in *RE* 19.2214f.) The Caesarians had despatched L. Decidius | Saxa and C. Norbanus Flaccus with their advance guard to hold off the Republican army. Norbanus and Saxa blocked the Via Egnatia, Norbanus occupying the pass of the Sapaei (east of Kavala), Saxa that of the Corpili (near Chirka, north of Dede Agatch). Brutus and Cassius sent forward the Republican fleet under Tillius Cimber to outflank them. Norbanus then recalled Saxa, leaving the pass of the Corpili open to the Republicans. Meanwhile Norbanus and Saxa prepared to hold the pass of the Sapaei. On the advice of Rhascuporis the Republicans marched north through the mountains to outflank Norbanus and Saxa. The latter, warned by Rhascus, fell back on Amphipolis. This, in essence, is the account of Appian 4.87.368–371, 4.102.426–104.438. Dio’s account is more detailed than P.’s, but like his in not recording the Caesarians’ preliminary occupation of the pass of the Corpili (Dio 47.35.2–36.3). Only Dio and P. mention Symbolum. One may *perhaps* infer a common source, even though P.’s account is much abbreviated.

Νωρβανόν: *RE* 17.127of. (Groag), Broughton II, 366.

τοῖς Στενοῖς: i.e. the pass of the Sapaei.

Σύμβολον: between Neapolis and Philippi.

3. μικροῦ ... Βροῦτον: many details in Appian 4.106.444–108.453. Dio 47.37.2–3 is brief. P.’s very concise account shows points of contact with Appian: (i) ‘they nearly captured Norbanus and his troops’ looks like an exaggeration of the statement in Appian that they did not advance against

Norbanus because they heard that Antony was approaching; (ii) both note that Octavian was delayed by sickness (also Dio 47.37.2); (iii) the statement that Antony came to Norbanus' aid with such astonishing swiftness that Brutus and his friends were incredulous looks like a conflation of Antony's general approach and his bold advance on the plain of Philippi and encampment near the Republicans, to the *κατάπληξις* of the latter. |

4. κατεστρατοπέδευσεν: descriptions of the rival encampments in Appian 413
4.106–107, Dio 47.37.4.

Φιλίππους: strictly speaking an adjective is called for (Nep. *Milt.* 4.2 'copias in campum Marathona deduxerunt' is not a parallel), hence Ziegler's tentative emendations *Φιλιππίους* cl. Vell. 2.86.2, Manil. 1.909, or *Φιλιππικούς* cl. Plin. *NH* 33.39, Flor. 2.13.43. But P. is not good with Roman names, and the *MSS* reading cannot be excluded. {Flacelière prints *φιλιππ<ικ>οὺς*, 'recte' according to Gärtner in his revision of Ziegler.}

5. μέγιστα συνεφέροντο: presumably this is the well-known Thucydidean motif and means in effect 'Roman forces of such size had never before encountered one another' (Perrin). Dio seems to be campaigning against this view at 47.39.1ff., where, though conceding the uniqueness of the contest, he dismisses with much rhetorical exaggeration the claim that the number of combatants was greater than in any previous civil conflict of the Romans—this is simply Dio being different (and wrong!). Appian makes the same claim as P. (4.137).

πλήθει ... Καίσαρα: despite the apparently precise references to *τῶν περὶ Καίσαρα* and *τὸ Βρούτου στρατεύμα* this must refer to the total forces on each side—a standard feature of pre-battle descriptions (cf. also 39.2 and 7, which appear to pick up 38.5). The precise references are to be explained by the fact that P. is focussing on the two main characters of the political drama—Brutus the Republican, Octavian the Caesarian. Appian 4.108.454–455 says that both sides had nineteen legions but that those of Antony and Octavian were fuller than those of Brutus and Cassius. Dio 47.38.2 says that Brutus and Cassius had more troops, though of poorer quality. On the other hand Appian 4.108.454 says that Brutus and Cassius had 20,000 cavalry as against 13,000. (Appian gives Brutus and Cassius 17,000 cavalry and apparently seventeen legions at the review of their army at the Gulf | of Melas, 4.88.373. The increase in numbers at 4.108.454–455 414 is to be explained by the arrival of fresh troops from the East, cf. Dio 47.38.2–3, and from Thrace, cf. *Brut.* 38.1.) On balance one may prefer the evidence of P. and Appian, but their disagreement with Dio is perhaps more apparent than real, because Brutus and Cassius certainly had more cavalry and allied troops and Dio appears to be thinking of them (47.38.2, 38.4) when asserting that the tyrannicides had larger forces.

κόσμῳ ... λαμπρότητι: ‘ancient armies sought to dazzle the beholder’—Nisbet and Hubbard on Horace *C.* 2.1.19, with parallels.

6. χρυσὸς ... περιεχομένους: P. plainly does not criticize Brutus’ pragmatic behaviour (alleged), though it requires explanation because of the apparent contradiction with the principles Brutus stood for. But Pliny the Elder, *NH* 33.12.39, records that Brutus wrote a letter from Philippi expressing disapproval of the fact that the military tribunes wore gold brooches. Although 38.5 rather gives the impression that the whole of Brutus’ army wore gold and silver upon their armour, this is simply rhetorical exaggeration (arising naturally from the *τόπος* of *κόσμῳ ... στράτευμα*) and 38.6 *καίπερ ... ἐθίζοντος* shows that P. is really talking only about the officers, so that he and Pliny are agreed about the facts. If the letter cited by Pliny is genuine, then presumably either Brutus was prepared to suppress his true feelings in the interests of pragmatic advantage, or P.’s account is a rationalization, designed by P. or a source to excuse the manifest ‘luxus’ in the forces of the Republic, and to suggest that Brutus’ control over his officers was greater than in fact it was, by arguing that he deliberately encouraged such display. The latter is much more likely, and if so, the rationalization may well be P.’s own: he could have known of Brutus’ letter, and the thought that | the astute general indulges his subordinates’ weakness for display to fire their spirits is standard in P. (e.g. *Lyc.* 22.1, *Philop.* 9.7–14, *Sert.* 14.2, *Eum.* 4.3–4).
 415 {Gärtner notes Campe’s <εἰς> τὰ πλεῖστα.}

7. φιλοτιμοτέροις: Ziegler’s tentative *φιλοτίμοις* spoils the elegance of P.’s chiasmic arrangement.

**Ch. 39: Lustrations; further unfavourable omens;
the decision to fight**

1. Οἱ μὲν ... θυσίαν: also recorded, with a similar emphasis on the fact that it was held inside their camp, by Dio 47.38.4, though without the details *μικρὸν ... θυσίαν*. Appian does not record it (below).

οἱ ... περὶ Καίσαρα: cf. *οἱ ... περὶ Βρούτων* below. For the reason for the precision of reference see 38.5n.

2. οἱ δὲ ... διαδόντες: this lustration is also not recorded in Appian, but is described in Dio 47.40.7–8 and hinted at in 47.38.4. Appian records a lustration at the review of the army held at the Gulf of Melas (4.89.374). One can (and should) accept both accounts: it is perfectly possible that Brutus and Cassius held lustrations both at the Gulf of Melas and at Philippi; Appian 4.134.563 (below) probably refers to the latter, as Jul. Obsequ. 70 (below) almost certainly does.

καταγνόντες: Ziegler suggests that either this should be emended to *καταφρονούντες* in line with Dio 47.38.4 or that *τῆς* should be deleted. On the principle *lect. diff. pot. καταγνόντες* should stand. The definite article is surely justifiable = ‘their ἀπορίας/μικρολογίας described above’.

ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ: often (but not exclusively) used in sacral contexts, as here.

ὥσπερ ἕθος: also implied in Dio 47.38.4 (above).

ἔπειθ' ... διαδόντες: these details are not in Dio. |

εὐνοία ... εἶχον: picking up 38.5 *πλήθει ... ἐλείποντο*, cf. 39.7 and 38.5n. As against this, Antony’s and Octavian’s troops were more trustworthy and of generally better quality (Appian 4.108.454, Dio 47.37.6, 38.2, cf. *Brut.* 39.9).

εὐνοία: see 29.4n.

3. οὐ μὴν ... προσήνεγκε: other accounts of this omen in Appian 4.134.563, Dio 47.40.7–8, Jul. Obs. 70 (not in Flor. 2.17.7). Zonaras 10.19 paraphrases *Brut.* 39.3–4 closely with an admixture of Dio. P., Appian and Dio agree that the omen concerned Cassius’ garland during the purification. P. and Appian say it was upside down (there is no distinction between *κατ-* and *ἀν-εστραμμένων*), Dio wrong end foremost. Julius Obsequens says that it was the fasces that were reversed. The general message is clear whatever the differences of detail. The incident *may* be historical. {The various versions of these omens are compared and discussed by B. Manuwald, *Cassius Dio und Augustus* (1979), 209–10.}

4. λέγεται ... φέροντες: this omen in Appian *ibid.*, Dio *ibid.*, Jul. Obs. *ibid.*, Zon. *ibid.* (see above). Again it is not in Florus. Julius Obsequens’ account differs from the others in that it is a boy in the costume of Victory who falls; Dio has the boy but agrees with Appian and P. in having the Victory.

On the cult of Victory see Weinstock 91ff. (with full references) and on the present incident, Latte in Roscher's *ML VI*, 298.

καὶ πρότερον: not in any other account.

5. ἔτι ... στρατοπέδῳ: this omen in Appian *ibid.*, Dio *ibid.* (in some detail), Flor. 2.17.7, Jul. Obs. *ibid.*, Zon. *ibid.* (this time based more on Dio).

καὶ ἐντός: this omen in Appian *ibid.*, Dio *ibid.*, Jul. Obs. *ibid.* (very similar to P.). It is not in Zonaras, nor Florus (who has the omen of 48.2 below).

417 Editors explain this omen by reference to *Dion* 24.4, where a seer interprets a swarm of bees to mean that Dion's enterprise will prosper for a while, then fail (? because the bees will only follow Dion's enterprise when it is 'in flower'). But this can hardly be the point here. The *Dion* passage shows that such an interpretation of the swarming of bees would have been open to Brutus' and Cassius' *haruspices* at the time, but it cannot be the point in the historical tradition, simply because the Republican cause did not 'prosper' in the event. Nor can this interpretation be applied to 48.2 below. An alternative interpretation is needed.

On the ominous significance of bees in general see e.g. Cic. *Har. Resp.* 25 'Si examen apium ludis in scaenam caveamve venisse, haruspices acciendos ex Etruria putaremus: videmus universi repente examina tanta servorum inmissa in populum Romanum saeptum atque inclusum, et non commovemur? Atque in apium fortasse examine nos ex Etruscorum scriptis haruspices ut a servitio caveremus monerent'; Artem. 2.22, trans. R. J. White, *The Interpretation of Dreams—Oneirocritica by Artemidorus* (1975), 102f.: 'Bees mean good luck for farmers and beekeepers. But for other men they signify confusion because of their hum, wounds because of their sting, and sickness because of their honey and wax. If they settle upon the head of the dreamer, they are auspicious for generals and handicraftsmen. For other men, they are bad luck and generally indicate that the dreamer will be destroyed by a mob or by soldiers. For bees are analogous to crowds and armies since they obey a leader. They mean death because they settle upon lifeless corpses. Confining bees and killing them is likewise good for all men but farmers' (cf. the action of the *haruspices* in *Brut.* 39.6). Cf. also Cic. *Div.* 1.73 with Pease {and Wardle} *ad loc.*, and for the association of bees with corpses see also Virg. *Georg.* 4.296–314. {See also D. MacInnes, 'Dirum ostentum: bee swarm prodigies in Roman military camps', in C. Deroux, ed., *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* 10 (2000), 56–69, discussing this omen at 63–4; Drummond *FRHist* III.509 on Volumnius *FRHist* 47 F 1 (= *Brut.* 48.1–4), with further bibliography.} Thus the present omen, as well as that of 48.2, is best interpreted to mean death or (possibly) submission to monarchic rule.

6. ὄν ... μάντεις: this detail also in Jul. Obs. The | point is to divert the omen away from the camp. 418

ἀτρέμα ... λόγων: there is nothing quite like this in any other source. It can hardly be true in the form stated (though no doubt Cassius could have been worried about loss of morale among his troops, if there is any truth in these incidents at all). I think P. has invented this, taking a characteristic swipe at Epicureanism, and at the same time undercutting Cassius' speech in *ch.* 37 for dramatic reasons.

τοὺς δὲ δεδουλωμένην: in rather sharp contrast with 39.2. In Dio 37.38.5 the troops under Brutus and Cassius are also said to have been encouraged by the circumstances of their enemies' lustration, whereas at 47.40.8 the significance of the omens is apparent to both sides. The disjunction springs from the necessity of marrying two disparate sets of information—the historical facts with omens portending the destruction of the Republicans, omens either completely made up (swarms of bees in October in Philippi strain credulity), or at least greatly exaggerated in the aftermath of the Caesarian victory. But rapid and rather improbable changes of mood are also a general characteristic of heightened emotional narrative in P.

δεδουλωμένην: on the imagery see Fuhrmann 159, n. 2.

ᾔθεν: this motivation plays no part in Appian's or Dio's accounts. P. (it seems) is using ᾔθεν as a narrative linking device to switch sources.

39.7–40.4. οὐδ' ... οὔσαν: P. is the only authority to record a difference of opinion between Brutus and Cassius over whether to join battle or not. According to Appian 4.108–109 Brutus and Cassius had decided against battle, hoping to wear out Antony and Octavian by want of supplies. Dio 47.38.2–5 says that though Brutus and Cassius had no objection to battle in principle, they decided for various reasons to delay and eventually joined battle for | fear their troops would disperse. As will be seen, his narrative bears quite close resemblances to P.'s. The question to decide here is: is P. right in saying that Brutus and others constrained Cassius to fight, and that Brutus had for some time wanted a military decision? 419

It is not sufficient to put Appian and Dio against P. and simply assume their superiority (as e.g. Rice Holmes, *Architect* 85, n. 1; Wilson 220), because Dio's account does present some parallels to P.'s and because P.'s testimony is at least partly dependent on the eye-witness account of Messalla (40.1–4). Messalla's evidence may be suspect, but at least it is the evidence of an eye-witness who was present in Brutus' and Cassius' camp, and enjoyed their confidence, advantages not enjoyed by Asinius Pollio. How then to assess Messalla's evidence? It is perhaps not absolutely inconceivable that Messalla could have invented the story of the council of war the day before the battle in order either to defend the Liberators against the charge of being forced into battle by Antony's provocative sallies, or possibly to exonerate Cassius from the responsibility of making

an (arguably) dubious military decision (Cassius and Messalla were personally close, despite the great difference in age: 40.11.). But this would be to attribute to Messalla a very gross fabrication, and the evidence on the other side, particularly that of Appian, is not so compelling as to make this hypothesis necessary or likely. There are difficulties with Messalla's account, just as there are with Appian's, but the best way to make sense of the conflicting evidence (in my opinion) is not to say that Appian/Pollio is 'right' and P./Messalla 'wrong', but to suggest that the discrepancies arise because the narratives are written from different perspectives. If then the evidence of Messalla (characterized by Gelzer 1018 as 'natürlich zuverlässig') is taken more or less at face value ('more or less' because it is impossible to be certain *exactly* | how much of P.'s narrative is Messalla, and because there may be *some* distortion in Messalla's narrative, without being sufficient to impugn its general authority), then there is no very serious conflict with the evidence of Appian (thus Gelzer 1015 and 1018). But P., while to a certain extent conceding the influence of the immediately prevailing circumstances (39.8 καὶ τότε), asserts more than this, for he maintains that even before this (39.8 καὶ ... πρότερον) Brutus wanted to fight as quickly as possible. It is a very poor argument to dismiss this on the ground that such a desire is inconsistent with Brutus' actual conduct after the first battle, when all sources agree that he tried to avoid a further engagement (so Gelzer, Rice Holmes, Wilson): the circumstances were radically different—Brutus now knew the dangers of fighting the Caesarians from experience, Cassius was dead, and the morale of the troops doubtful. There is *no a priori* reason to prefer Appian and Dio to P., especially as P. seems to think that he is on firm ground and appears to have 'inside' information. The fact that Appian and Dio make no distinction between the views of the two Republican generals may simply reflect the fact that they (or their sources) are deducing motive from actual behaviour. So far from P.'s record of Brutus' general attitude being a mistaken generalization from the evidence of his *ad hoc* arguments at the council of war, it may again derive from Messalla or some other 'inside' source. Of course it might be objected that if 39.8 Βρούτος ... κακῶν comes from a source, that source may not be correct: if it is Messalla (say), then the statement might be part of his general purpose to exonerate Cassius by inventing the story that he was overborne by a Brutus who had always wished to fight. Such a hypothesis is always possible, but it is only necessary if one is determined, as an act of faith, always to prefer the evidence of Appian to P. If one does not have that faith, then P.'s evidence seems reasonable enough, and the | discrepancy between him and Appian/Dio is easily explicable. Further, the evidence of 39.8 in fact coheres quite well with the sentiments of the historical Brutus, in his letter to Atticus (29.9) and his communication to Cassius in Syria (28.5). In sum, P.'s account of Brutus' views on the desirability of joining battle should

certainly not be dismissed out of hand, probably derives from a well-informed source (and if so almost certainly Messalla), and may well be accepted.

{See also Drummond, *FRHist* I.468–9 (citing Moles).}

39.7. οὐδ' ... λειπομένους: Dio 47.38.2 is similar verbally, though saying the opposite, and rather looks like a 'reply' to P. One suspects that (as often) Dio is just being cattily iconoclastic, though he does mention that tactical considerations induced the Liberators to hold off for a while.

ἐρρωμένους χρήμασιν: this theme receives fuller treatment in Appian 4.108 and Dio 47.38.2–3.

ἐρρωμένους: Ziegler suggests something like ὄντας αὐτοὺς μὲν before ἐρρωμένους. ἐρρωμένος is often used just as an adjective and can be used with εἶναι (e.g. *Lys.* 24.7), but in the present pithy context its original participial force is strengthened by the parallel λειπομένους. (ἐρρωμένος as participle is common in P. anyway; e.g. 12.5 above, *De fort. Alex.* 333C, *De virt. mor.* 445B, *Anim. an corp. aff.* 500E, *Consol. ad ux.* 610A.) A μὲν is not needed either.

8. Βροῦτος ... κακῶν: in general cf. 39.7–40.4n. Dio 47.38.3 gives equally lofty motives for the decision to delay—the desire to avoid bloodshed and to win safety and liberty for all. Here, as in 47.39.1–3, Dio gives the impression of uncritically reproducing a source favourable to the Republicans, though he suddenly remembers himself at 47.39.4–5.

ἀπαλλάξαι κακῶν: slight poetic colouring (*Aes. Ag.* 1 etc.) to suit the heightened emotional tone of the narrative. |

καὶ τότε ... κρατοῦντας: for the preliminary skirmishes see Appian 422 4.108–109, Dio 47.37.5 (brief).

ἰππέις: Appian 4.108.454 mentions cavalry skirmishes, but not Brutus' success.

9. καὶ ... πολεμίους: not in Appian or Dio, though Dio 47.38.5 records that the allied troops talked of dispersal if there were more delay.

9–11. πολλοὺς ... ὑστεραίᾳ: this council of war is only mentioned by P. but its historicity should (in my opinion) be accepted (39.7–40.4n.). Presumably Messalla is the source for all this and not just 40.iff.

10. Ἀτέλλιος: Ziegler suggests Γέλλιος, identifying Brutus' friend with the disreputable L. Gellius Publicola, half-brother of Messalla, for whose dubious dealings with Brutus and Cassius see Dio 47.24.3–6. Apart from the facts that this man was a friend of both Brutus and Cassius, and a half-brother of Messalla, and that he deserted his benefactors to join Octavian and Antony, none of which is very compelling, there seems no good reason

to introduce him here. The usual approach, following Coraes, has been to read Ἀτίλλιος, in which case the man is either a complete unknown (so Krebs, *RE* 2.2076), or to be identified with the Sextus Atilius Serranus found in the *consilium* of L. Cornelius Lentulus, *cos.* 49 (Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* 14.237f.), and ? son of the *trib. pl.* Sex. Atilius Serranus Gavianus of 57, as suggested by Cichorius, *Römische Studien* (1922), 245. Cichorius' identification is interesting but in the nature of things speculative, Ziegler's has practically nothing to commend it. It is surely best to retain the majority reading, since the form 'Atellius' is found (e.g. Dessau 2.2.8407). |

Ch. 40: The night before the battle—conversation of Cassius and Messalla; the morning of the battle—conversation of Brutus and Cassius; the Republican right wing takes up its position

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A beautifully written section, full of elegiac and pathetic effect. The tone of 40.1–4 was evidently set by Messalla's record, but the still more impressive 40.6–9 must be very largely P.'s own invention.

1–12. καὶ ... παρενέβαλλον: no other source has anything like this. The substantial historicity of 40.1–5 and 10–12 should (in my opinion) be accepted because of the authority of Messalla, though 1–2 and 3–4, giving Cassius' (in effect) 'ultima verba', strike a typical philosophical martyrological note. This is still more true of the conversation between Brutus and Cassius at 40.6–9, but even here one should not necessarily assume that the content is completely unhistorical, still less that no conversation took place at all (see below).

1. καὶ ... ὄντα: the description has the sort of 'Last Supper' feel characteristic of the philosophical martyrology; the tone of *Cat. min.* 67.1–2 (or even *Ant.* 75.2–3) is similar. (On the general theme see MacMullen, ch. 2, esp. 76.)

λογισμοῖς φιλοσόφους: cf. 34.8. The fact is no doubt true, but the emphasis is in keeping with the general context.

Μεσσάλας: *RE* 8A.131 (Hanslik); *PIR* 3.363.

φησί: *HRR* II, 65 {= *FRHist* 61 F 1}.

συνήθων: Cassius and Messalla were close friends (Dio 47.24.5), a fact of which Messalla was publicly proud even under the Principate (*Tac. Ann.* 4.34).

οὐ ... ὄντα: cf. 29.2.

2. ὥσπερ ... φιλοφρονούμενος: 'referendum ad 'Ἑλληνικῆ φωνῆ' (Schaefer). {On this use of Greek cf. Drummond on *FRHist* 61 F 1.}

3. μαρτύρομαί ... Μάγνῳ: Brutus is said to have made a similar remark before the second battle of Philippi (Appian 4.124.520). Certain questions arise: are both *dicta* completely made up to stress the parallel between the defeat of the Republicans at Pharsalus and at Philippi? Or is one authentic, and the other modelled on it? Is P. here following Messalla, or has he just attributed τὰ δέοντα to a depressed Cassius? Before these questions are dealt with, one must first consider the imagery below.

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ἀναρρῖψαι ... κύβον: for closely similar imagery cf. *Caes.* 32.8 (the famous ἀνερρῖφθω κύβος before Caesar crosses the Rubicon); *Caes.* 40.1 (Pompey refuses ἀναρρῖψαι μάχην and prefers a war of attrition against Caesar); *Dion* 54.7 (Dion ἀνέρριψεν ἑκὼν κίνδυνον τοσοῦτον ἐπὶ τῷ σῶσαι Σικελίαν); *Nic.*

11.8 (it would have been better for Nicias εἰ τὸν περὶ ὀστράκου κίνδυνον ἀνέρριψε); *Coriol.* 3.1 (Tarquin, after many battles and defeats, is described as ἔσχατον κύβον ἀφιέντι); *Fab. Max.* 14.2 (the reckless Terentius Varro in his rash desire to fight Hannibal is τὸν περὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀναρρίψων κύβον); *Demosth.* 20.3 (at Chaeronea Philip is about to τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναρρίψαι κύβον; cf. *Quom. adul. ab amico internosc.* 70D, *De exil.* 606C). In all cases the imagery is used of decisive moments in great conflicts, and in all but one (*Nic.* 11.8) of crucial military decisions. (For war as a gamble cf. *Aes. Sept.* 414, and see Nisbet and Hubbard on Horace *C.* 2.1.6.) The interpretation of Caesar's remark, which was supposedly spoken in Greek (cf. *Pomp.* 60.4), is disputed: discussion in E. Hohl, *Hermes* 80 (1952), 246ff.; A. W. Gomme and F. H. Sandbach, *Menander: A Commentary* (1973), 69of.; Brenk, *In Mist Apparrelled*, 226, n. 11; 'Plutarch's Caesar at the Rubicon: Roman General with Greek Dice' {cf. *ANRW* II.36.1 (1987), 326}; {and Pelling on *Caes.* 32.8}. But Sandbach's rendering 'let the die be cast', i.e. 'the perfect imperative orders the acceptance of what has been done' (cf. *Menander* fr. 59 Sandbach {= fr. 64 K–A}, *Suet.* | *Caes.* 32, *Petr.* 122) is (in my view) virtually certain (despite the arguments of Brenk). Nevertheless, the translation 'alea' remains a little odd: perhaps Caesar actually said 'iacta alea/ἀλέα est/sit', indulging his well-known propensity for bilingual puns!?). *Caes.* 40.1 seems deliberately to evoke *Caes.* 32.8, and so also may *Brut.* 40.3—this remains probable even if the application of the image in *Caes.* 32.8 is rather different from the other two examples, which look forward rather than back. One may well suspect that the imagery Cassius uses is put into his mouth by P. in order to highlight another critical moment in the downfall of the Republic. This of itself, however, does not disprove the authenticity of the comparison Cassius makes between himself and Pompey. The parallel with Pompey is convenient for P., who wishes to establish a διαδοχή of defeated Republican generals against the background of the unfolding of the divine plan for the founding of the Empire, but it would be equally possible that (a) P. made up both the comparison with Pompey and the appropriate image to go with it, or (b) that P. found the comparison with Pompey already in Messalla and tacked on to it an image designed to recall the pattern of cause and effect in the overthrow of the Republic—the Rubicon, Pharsalus, and Philippi. {Drummond on *FRHist* 61 F 1 similarly raises both possibilities, citing Moles.} Thus the *dicta* containing the comparisons with Pompey can be considered on their own merits.

The possibility that both *dicta* are fraudulent can naturally not be dismissed out of hand, but it is possible that some such remark *was* made: the parallel between the state of the Republican leaders in 48 and 42, in both cases forced to fight against their better judgement, must have been as obvious to the participants as it was to subsequent generations. The possibility that P. has invented Cassius' remark, either on the model of

Brutus' remark (alleged) or independently, can likewise hardly be excluded. On the other hand P.'s wording at 40.2 gives the impression that he is | following Messalla (*τοσοῦτον εἰπέειν*) and this may be because he really is 426 (Messalla after all must surely have recorded *something* of what Cassius said on his last meeting with him). If so, one may *perhaps* accept the comparison with Pompey at face value (and take Appian 4.124.520 as supposititious, although it is not *absolutely* impossible that Brutus also invoked the Pompey parallel). On the whole, I am inclined to think that the Pompey comparison does come from Messalla, and that it is therefore probably authentic, though others may regard this as simply credulous, especially if they think that the whole story of the military council the night before the first battle of Philippi, and the decision finally to accept the Caesarian challenge to battle, is an elaborate fiction, created by Messalla in honour of the memory of Cassius, the friend and hero of his youth. {Moles, *Latomus* also suggests that Messalla's testimony, whether or not authentic, gave Pollio the idea of elaborating the Pharsalus–Philippi parallel further: Appian will then presumably be drawing from that account when he gives Brutus a similar *dictum* before the second battle.}

εἰς τὴν ... δίκαιον: on the correct philosophical attitude to *τύχη* see 40.8 below. Of course Cassius' brave words are already ironically undercut by 36.5–7, 37.7, 39.3–6. The theme that the cause of the tyrannicides was fated to fail now becomes very important in the *Life*. This reflects P.'s philosophical conviction, but it also enables him to evoke much *pathos* for their plight, since (by and large) his tyrannicides accept the blows of Fate cheerfully and with good grace.

ταῦτ': P. likes to create the illusion (cf. e.g. 13.11) that he has been retailing speeches *ad verbum*.

κεκλημένος: Schaefer's emendation, implying that the following day was Cassius' birthday. This is consistent with *ὑπ' αὐτοῦ* and—much more important—is supported by Appian 4.113.475 (? independent of P.). The arguments of Xylander and Voegelin for retaining *κεκλημένον* must therefore be rejected. {So also Drummond on *FRHist* 61 F 1.} (However, there is no certain independent evidence for the date of Messalla's birthday—see Smith and Putnam on Tib. 1.7. {But see D. Porte, *REA* 96 (1994), 483, arguing that Messalla's birthday can be dated a few days after 25 September; the battle took place in early October.}) |

5. ἅμα ... χιτών: this statement must be accepted if the historicity of the council of war (39.9ff.) is accepted. In Appian 4.108.454 Brutus and Cassius draw up their forces a few days before the battle but do nothing; battle is joined because of the charge of Brutus' troops without orders in response to Antony's advance against Cassius' camp. Dio, however, again seems to show some resemblance to P., for 47.38.5 seems to imply that Brutus and Cassius had made a considered decision to join battle, and at 47.42.1 Dio 427

says that, though no formal arrangement had been made, as if by some compact the two armies took up their positions against each other. This is a prelude, it is true, to a highly ‘literary’ and conventional set-piece battle description, but at least it does seem to imply that Brutus and Cassius had decided on battle. {For comparison of Appian’s and Dio’s narratives see Gowing, *The Triumviral Narratives* 173–6 and the tabulation at 311–8.}

40.5–9. αὐτοὶ ... φοβησόμεθα: while one may accept without question the bare statement that Brutus and Cassius had a conversation before the battle (it would be astounding if they had not), what should one think of its content? In the general literary context, where Brutus and Cassius are cast in the role of tyrannicides and Cassius’ suicide is imminent, the conversation inevitably acquires something of the same flavour as the conversation about life and death engaged in by Socrates, and, following him, Cato, Seneca, and Thrasea Paetus and others, before their suicides. But this of itself does not mean that it is without historical foundation, for Brutus and Cassius, perhaps even more than Cato, were highly conscious of being influenced by Greek philosophical thought, especially in relation to the problem of the correct philosophical response to tyranny. And when the adornments are stripped away, the basic question posed by 40.6–9 is: ‘what shall we do if we lose?’ In the circumstances this was a natural question to raise, the more so if Cassius really was very apprehensive about the outcome of the battle. Nor is it unlikely that Brutus would have told his friends | of the content of his last conversation with Cassius, particularly in the light of the fact that Cassius did in fact commit suicide. One notes that according to Florus 2.17.14 (evidently independent of P.) Brutus and Cassius had arranged a suicide pact in the event of defeat, which (a) agrees with P.’s general contention that they *had* decided to fight, and (b) presupposes that *some such* discussion as the present passage records had taken place. Thus, although the literary resonances of 40.6–9 within the general martyrological tradition are striking and significant, one need not reject the essential historicity of the account.

{Moles returned to this passage in *Latomus* 42 (1983), 767–71. Cf. also Pelling in M. T. Griffin and J. Barnes, edd., *Philosophia Togata* I (1989), 225–7; D. Sedley, *JRS* 87 (1997), 52.}

7–9. νέος ... ἔνδοξον: the basic treatment of ancient attitudes to suicide is R. Hirzel, ‘Der Selbstmord’, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 11 (1908), 75–104, 243–84, 417–76; {cf. also Y. Gris , *Le Suicide dans la Rome Antique* (1982); A. J. L. van Hooff, *From Autothanasia to Suicide: Self-killing in Classical Antiquity* (1990).} Discussions of Stoic attitudes include E. Benz, *Das Todesproblem in der Stoischen Philosophie* (1929), 54–59; J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (1969), 233–55; F. H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (1975), 48–52; M. T. Griffin, *Seneca: a Philosopher in Politics* (1976), 367–88 {and *G&R* 33 (1986), 64–77 and 192–

202; B. Inwood and P. Donini in K. Algra, et al., edd., *Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (1999), 735–6; Gris , 180–5, 193–223}. Useful references also in MacMullen 296, n. 3, and 310, n. 23.

λόγον ἀφήκα μέγαν: this striking metaphor could be interpreted as either (i) ‘I gave up a great doctrine’, i.e. the Stoic justification for suicide; for this use of ἀφίημι cf. *De Stoic. repugnant.* 1055B νεύσεις ἐκείνας ἀφήκας, or (ii) ‘I uttered a big word’, the interpretation originally offered by Coraes, and accepted by most subsequent editors. This is no doubt right, and to the parallels he adduces one may add the exact parallel at *De sera num. vind.* 548C. νέος here thus refers to the proverbial boastfulness of youth (e.g. *De Is. et. Osir.* 360C, cf. Plat. *Laws* 716c). Of course P. is exaggerating, for in 46 Brutus was very far from being ἀπειρος. Yet he seems to have had a reputation for youthful impetuosity: in this respect Lucan’s portrayal of Brutus (2.323–25, 7.588–92) is especially | interesting. The tone of ἀφήκα is 429 poetic, cf. ἀ. φθόγγην, E. *Hipp.* 416; γλώσσαν ἀ. *ibid.* 991; ἔπος ἀ. S. *OC* 731.

ἡτσιασάμην: the asyndeton is excellent after λόγον ἀφήκα μέγαν.

Is this the view of the historical Brutus in 46? That the rights and wrongs of Cato’s suicide were matter for contemporary debate is clear (see Cicero’s discussion of it in *Tusc. Disp.* 1.74, cf. *De Off.* 1.112, and Appian 2.101.420). The normal Academic attitude to it would have been one of disapproval (see below). It is not inconceivable that *Tusc. Disp.* 1.74, where Cato’s suicide is justified as a parallel to Socrates, is a direct reply to Brutus (to whom the work was dedicated). Thus again it would be unsafe to dismiss the present narrative as merely inspired invention.

οὐχ ὄσιον: the familiar argument that it is impious to take the life that God has given you. The basic text is *Phaedo* 61b–62d, esp. 62a (μὴ ὄσιον), cf. *Laws* 873c–d.

τῷ δαίμονι: Perrin’s ‘to one’s evil genius’ is too precise, for δαίμων is being used as = τύχη (cf. the *excursus* above, on the words of the φάσμα to Brutus), as the balance with τὴν τύχην ἐπαινεῖν shows). Nevertheless, P. may well also be intending a veiled reference to the δαίμων of Brutus, in order to keep alive the general idea of the inevitability of the Republican defeat at the hands of ‘demonic’ Caesarism.

οὐδ’ ἀποδιδράσκειν: the charge of cowardice is naturally a common argument against suicide (e.g. Arist. *EN* 1116a12ff.; *De commun. notit.* 1069E).

8. καὶ θεοῦ ... βραβεύσαντος: Brutus hints at the standard argument that a person is justified in committing suicide if he receives a sign from God (*Phaedo* 62c7, cf. 67a6). This was | orthodox Stoic doctrine (Rist 242ff., 430 Griffin *Seneca* 373ff.). The argument here rests on the assumption that if God does not give him victory, that in itself constitutes the divine sign that he may end his life.

ἀπαλλάξομαι: slightly—and appropriately—poetic. Perhaps P. is playing with the notion that Brutus’ personal ἀπαλλαγὴ κακῶν (39.8) will consist of βίου ἀπαλλαγῆ.

ἀλλ’ ... ἐπαινῶν: the general statement that one should depart from life gracefully in gratitude for the good things one has received is not peculiar to any one school of philosophy (see e.g. Ps.-Plat. *Axiochus* 365b, Dio Chrys. 30.24 and 43, Lucr. 3.931ff.), though in context there is probably also a Stoic argument implicit here (below). Of course ‘counting of blessings’ is a traditional consolatory topic (cf. also 52.4–5 below), e.g. *De tranq. animi* 469A–E, and P. is constantly to be found urging a cheerful philosophical acceptance of what Fortune brings (e.g. *De tranq. animi* 474ff., *Consol. ad ux.* 610E–F, *De exil.* 600D). Philosophical acceptance of τύχη is especially canvassed before death (e.g. *Mar.* 46.1–5, *De tranq. animi* 469D). Brutus may, however, also be regarded as appealing here to the Stoic idea that the wise man follows fate willingly (e.g. Sen. *Ep.* 107.11, *De provid.* 5.4; Rist 127–28).

ὅτι ... ἔνδοξον: one may see here the implied argument that if they are defeated they will no longer be able to live a βίος ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἔνδοξος. Many Stoics recognized this as sufficient justification for suicide (see e.g. Cramer, *Paris Anecdota* 4.403 = *SVF* 3.768, and in general Griffin *Seneca* 379ff.).

ὅτι: Reiske’s conjecture, accepted by Coraes, Bekker and Ziegler. On any reading the following clause gives the ground for the praise of fortune; ὅτι (or ὡς—Voegelin) makes the transition most easily. *Pace* Voegelin, an asyndeton does not seem possible. |

431 **9.** {“ταῦτ”}: Flacelière printed ταῦτ’, ‘sed non necessarium videtur’ (Gärtner).}

ἦ γὰρ ... ἦ ...: for the sentiment cf. 29.9 and n. Cassius’ approval of Brutus’ sentiments is strictly unEpicurean (the Epicureans were in general extremely reluctant to allow any justification for suicide—see e.g. *Vit. Epic.* 119, Cic. *Fin.* 1.49, Sen. *Ep.* 12.10, 24.22, *De vit. b.* 19.1; Plut. *De poet. aud.* 36B), but not therefore unhistorical: his own death and much of his life show that in practice he was not greatly influenced by his avowed philosophical creed.

10–11. Μετὰ ... ἔδωκε: this description is perhaps the most vulnerable item in the Messalla account of the first battle of Philippi, stigmatized by Wilson 221 as ‘an attempt to explain an arrangement which needs none: for as they were encamped Brutus already commanded the right’. One might also wonder, supposing the discussion were historical, whether it did not in fact take place the night before, at the military council, as is implied in the narrative of P. Bentley, *Freedom Farewell* (Penguin 1950), 373. If the description is fraudulent, then it must be an attempt to give verisimilitude to the whole contention that Brutus and Cassius had actually decided to

fight. But it need not be fraudulent. In the first place, Cassius may never have intended to fight at all, hence the placing of Brutus' camp on the right *ab initio*. The situation was then given an unexpected turn by Antony's bold and unexpected encampment on the plain far closer than the Liberators had anticipated. Nevertheless, their position was still technically all but impregnable, and for the first ten days or so Antony's forays made no impact. But if they then really did decide to fight, it would have been possible for them, given their secure position, to switch around. In the event they did not. This was also reasonable, as it left Cassius pitted against Antony. And in the light of their still highly favourable strategic situation they could have considered making the switch as late as the actual day of battle. I | do not see that Messalla's account is impossible. {Moles in *Latomus* prefers to take Wilson's view.} 432

11–12. *καὶ ... παρενέβαλλον*: detail not elsewhere attested.

Chs. 41–43: The First Battle of Philippi

41.1–43.9. Ἐτυχον ... ἀπέσφαξε: the date of the First Battle of Philippi is October 23, 42, as fixed by the Calendar of Praeneste (*The Year's Work in Classical Studies* 1922–3, 108; 1923–4, 33; *L'ann. ép.* 1922, 96; C. Hülsen, *Strena Buliciana* [1924], 193ff.). {In fact the Calendar seems to fix this as the date of the *second* battle ('[imp. Caesa]r Augustus vicit Philippis posteriore proelio Bruto occiso'); but the association with the first battle is also accepted by Syme, *Roman Revolution* 205 and Affortunati on 47.4–6.} The principal sources, besides *Brut.*, are: *Ant.* 22, *Caes.* 69.12, Appian 4.109.457–113.475, Dio 47.42.1–46.5, Livy *Epit.* 124, Vell. 2.70.1–3, Val. Max. 1.7.1, 6.8.4, 9.9.2, Pliny *NH* 7.45.148, Suet. *Aug.* 13.1, 91.1, Flor. 2.17.9–13, Lact. *Div. Inst.* 2.7.22, Eutrop. 7.3.1–2, Oros. 6.18.15, *De vir. ill.* 83.6–7. Of these by far the most important are *Brutus* and Appian. Dio's account is extremely poor (cf. 40.5n.). The relative merits of Appian's and P.'s accounts are debatable. One must in general accept Rice Holmes' verdict on P.'s as 'characteristically vague', and certainly some of the narrative is carelessly written (esp. 42.2–4). On the other hand, some of the discrepancies between P. and Appian are probably to be explained in terms not only of difference of source, but also of difference of perspective, arising from the fact that P.'s main source obviously gives a 'Republican-eye-view' and Appian's a Caesarian.

Useful modern discussions of the battle include G. Ferrero, *The Greatness and Decline of Rome III* (Eng. transl. 1908), 203–5; Kromayer–Veith, *Schl.-Atl.* III, 116ff.; Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 85f.; *RE* 19.2214–2227 (Schmidt, with maps); J. F. C. Fuller, *The Decisive Battles of the Western World* (1954), 207ff.; {Pelling, *CAH* 10² (1996), 7–8}. |

Ch. 41: Battle joined; initial success of Brutus; escape of Octavian and capture of his camp

1. Ἐτυχον ... περικόπτοντες: on Antony's operations in the marshes see the detailed account of Appian 4.109.

2. ἐφήδρευε ... ἀσθένειαν: not an anticipation of 41.7. It merely means 'Octavian was not with his troops', i.e. he was in his camp.

2–3. ἀλλ' ... προσφερομένην: in stressing the passivity of Octavian's troops before they were attacked by Brutus', P. is in essential agreement with Appian 4.110.

2. ἡ δύναμις: sc. παρήν. If the ellipse is rather strained, that is perhaps because the whole narrative of the battle, some characteristic amplifications aside, is rather scrappily written.

3. ἐθαύμαζον ... προσφερομένην: this seems already to imply hostile contact between Antony's and Cassius' troops (not necessarily in contradiction with 43.1–2). But the general implication of P.'s narrative—here, as at 39.9ff., 40.5 and 41.4—is that it was Brutus and Cassius who began the action, whereas Appian 4.110.461 says that Antony was the first to attack, in response to Cassius' having built a transverse wall from his camp to the sea to cut Antony's marsh works in two. It must at least be conceded to P. that Brutus and Cassius had decided to fight. But this means that Appian's belief that Antony began hostilities cannot be dismissed by the argument 'it is difficult to understand from Appian's account how Antony could have forced Cassius to give battle' (Ferrero 203, n. 2): if Brutus and Cassius had in fact already made their decision, there would have been no question of Antony having to 'force' a battle. Thus P.'s and Appian's narratives, apparently so divergent, can be reconciled to some extent by the hypothesis that Antony actually initiated hostilities, | unaware of the fact that Brutus and Cassius had decided to respond. And in the event the fact that Brutus' troops charged without orders would have meant that it need never have become clear to the Caesarians that the Republicans had in fact made a considered decision to fight.

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4. ἐν ... παρεγγυωμένων: no such details in Appian, whose account is written from the perspective of the Caesarians. But Dio 47.43.1 is roughly parallel.

οἱ δὲ ... πολεμίοις: Appian 4.110.462 agrees that Brutus' troops charged without orders (cf. 4.117.489), but adds that they charged through Antony's front line first, which was advancing obliquely against Cassius' cross-wall. Of course Brutus' discipline was not good.

5–6. γενομένης ... στρατόπεδον—8. ἦν ... συγκατεκόπησαν: the details of this description have no parallel in Appian or anywhere else. Messalla is likely to be the main source.

7. καὶ ... διήλασαν: other accounts of Octavian's absence from his camp are *Ant.* 22.2, Appian 4.110.463 (careless), Dio 47.41.3–4, Vell. 2.70.1, Val. Max. 1.7.1, Pliny *NH* 7.45.148, Suet. *Aug.* 13.1, 91.1, Flor. 2.17.9, Lact. *Div. Inst.* 2.7.22, Oros. 6.18.15. That Octavian in fact fled the camp is clear from Pliny (on the authority of Agrippa and Maecenas), the present passage (cf. 42.3), *Ant.* 22.2, and Suet. *Aug.* 13.1. The story of the dream is obviously a *post eventum* excuse. P. here synthesizes the last-minute exit with the providential dream, though he rightly keeps the two versions distinct at *Ant.* 22.2; perhaps this is deliberate, to maintain the theme that the Caesarians have God (or at least *τύχη*) on their side.

ἱστορεῖ: *HRR* II, 58 fr. 10 {= *FRHist* 60 F 7 (a)}.

435 **Ἄρτωρίου Μάρκου:** *RE* 2.1461 (Wellmann); *PIR* 2.236; {Wardle on Suet. *Aug.* 91.1}. M. Artorius Asclepiades was Octavian's doctor, and one of the most | celebrated physicians of his age. Neither here nor at *Ant.* 22.2 does P. seem to realize that Octavian's friend was the celebrated physician, of whom he must surely have known. Perhaps he is not using Augustus direct!?

ὄψιν: details of the dream in Dio, Velleius, Val. Max., Lactantius and Orosius.

8. τὸ διήλασαν: closely similar detail in Suet. *Aug.* 91.1.

δισχίλιοι ... συγκατεκόπησαν: a touch of Greek interest. Not elsewhere recorded, the detail could come from Messalla (cf. 45.2), or conceivably from Greek tradition picked up by P. (similar to the material in *Ant.* 68?).

{The dream is discussed by M. B. Flory, *Rh. Mus.* 135 (1992), 283–6, G. Weber, *Kaiser, Träume, und Visionen in Prinzipat und Spätantike* (2000), 375–6, and Wardle on Suet. *Aug.* 91.1, with further bibliography. B. Manuwald, *Cassius Dio und Augustus* (1979), 212–5 discusses the various versions: Dio's version might in itself come from Livy (*Epit.* 124), but the rest of his account of Philippi does not. P.'s accounts are discussed by C. Smith in *FRHist*, comm. on 60 F 7 and by Pelling on *Ant.* 22.2–4 and in A. Powell and C. Smith, edd., *The Lost Memoirs of Augustus* (2013), 52–7. Pelling suggests that the *Ant.* version more accurately reproduces Augustus' original than the *Brutus*; for a qualification see Wardle.}

Ch. 42: Total success of Brutus; his fears for Cassius

1. Οἱ δὲ ... Βροῦτον: none of this detail in Appian, or anywhere else, though according to Appian 4.117.487 (Brutus' speech to his army) Brutus' troops conquered the famous Fourth Legion.

{[ἀπ]ετρέψαντο: Gärtner notes that the emendation was already made by Campe (1863).}

οἱ ... συμπεσόντες: i.e. in contrast to τὸ Μέσσαλα and τὰ συνεζευγμένα [τάγματα] (41.5).

2–4. οἱ δ' ... ἀντιτεταγμένοις: this narrative is carelessly written and not easy to follow. P. starts to talk about the Liberators' army at large, anticipating 43.1ff.

οἱ νικῶντες: i.e. Brutus' troops.

τοῖς ... ἡττημένοις: i.e. Octavian's.

τὰ ... φάλαγγος: that is, the Republican line as a whole.

τὸ δεξιόν: clearly Brutus' wing.

τὸ μέσον: 'scil. Cassii', says Ziegler breezily, presumably on the assumption that τὸ δεξιόν covers *all* Brutus' activities. On this reading, τὸ μὲν ... συνέιχοντο anticipates the description of Cassius' operations at 43.2, and a distinction | is being made between τὸ εὐώνυμον, which is caught in ἀταξία and ἄγνοια, and τὸ μέσον, whose commander, Cassius, is aware of what is going on (cf. 43.1). In the nature of things, when we are only told that Brutus commanded the 'right' and by implication (40.10–11, 42.2, 43.2) Cassius the 'left', it is hard to know who is held responsible for the command of 'the centre'. Nevertheless, a case can be made for referring τὸ μέσον to Brutus' forces. Although the immediate context seems to favour a reference to Cassius, it is surely natural to take τὸ μέσον here as being the same as τὸ μέσον at 42.4, where τὸ μέσον *seems* to refer to troops under the command of *Brutus* (see 42.4n.). Further, it is far from clear that 42.2 squares with 43.2, if Cassius is thought to be in control of τὸ μέσον. Although this reading appears both (a) to put Cassius in the right position in the line (because at 43.2 περιλαμβάνετο) and (b) to provide a satisfying contrast between the ἄγνοια of the left wing and the hesitant knowledge of Cassius, the narrative of 43.2–3 hardly seems to allow for an ἀγὼν μέγας: the general impression given, even though 43.2 μέλλησει ... στρατηγῶν admits some passing of time, is of a fairly rapid collapse. Hence, without much enthusiasm, I take τὸ μέσον here to refer to some of Brutus' troops. (Other sources do not help—cf. 42.4n., nor do discussions of early editors.)

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τὸν χάρακα: i.e. Cassius' (cf. 43.4).

3. Ἀντώνιος ... ἀνεχώρησε: the story of Antony's absence is found also in *Ant.* 22 and Florus 2.17.10. In *Ant.* P. is agnostic about it, whereas here he seems to accept it, no doubt from a desire to depreciate the Caesarian

leaders. Presumably the story is a malicious fabrication of a familiar type (cf. Marius' alleged absence from the battle of Vercellae, *Mar.* 26–27, and Caesar's from Thapsus, *Caes.* 53.5–6), concocted either by Republicans, or
 437 by | Octavian's friends to minimize Antony's role and perhaps to provide a twin for Octavian's well-authenticated sojourn in the marshes (Pliny).

ἀλλ' ... ἡλικίαν: not elsewhere attested.

4. τὸ μέσον: Caesarian, or Republican? 'Utrius videtur incertum', opines Ziegler. ἐξεώκει clearly picks up ἐξέωσαν in 42.2, but this does not guarantee that the subject of the verb is the same in both cases, since stylistic symmetry would then be broken by the change of reference of τὸ μέσον from the Republican to the Caesarian centre. On neither interpretation can exact symmetry be maintained. The critical question is whether the δέ is simply copulative, in which case the clause refers to another of Brutus' successes, or adversative, in which case it refers to another of Cassius' failures (i.e. besides the immediate collapse of the left wing). Other sources do not help. Conceivably the φόνος πολὺς referred to *might* correspond to ἔκτειναν ... ἀθρόους of Appian 4.110.462, of the battle between Brutus' men and Antony's troops as they advanced against Brutus' front, but the parallel is far from close, and anyway there was φόνος ... ποικίλος on both sides (Appian 4.112.469). The immediate context, however, surely favours a reference to Brutus' troops. The whole emphasis is on Brutus' successes: he has defeated Octavian's troops and captured his camp, soldiers claim Octavian is dead, and—to crown all—the centre finally repels its opponents with great slaughter. The narrative seems to build up to an emphatic παντελῶς ἐδόκει κρατεῖν ὁ Βρούτος (this remains the case even though παντελῶς has also to be understood in the following ὄσπερ-clause). Further, while it is true that both interpretations involve some stylistic irregularity, it seems more natural that τὸ μέσον should be the constant element, since the entire narrative is written from the
 438 Republican point of view, literally, as well as metaphorically. If, | then, τὸ μέσον here refers to Republican forces, then they must be Brutus', and τὸ μέσον in 42.2 must have the same reference.

5. καὶ τοῦτο ... περιμείναντος: broadly similar reflections in Dio 47.45.2–3, Livy *Epit.* 124, Flor. 2.17.11–12, cf. perhaps Eutrop. 7.3.2. At the time Antony also made much of Cassius' death (Appian 4.119.501, *De vir. ill.* 83.7).

Μέσσαλας: *HRR* II, 66 fr. 2 {= *FRHist* 61 F 2}.

τρεις: presumably of the three legions mentioned in 42.1. {See Drummond, comm. on *FRHist* 61 F 2, with further bibliography.}

6–9. ἀναχωρῶν ... βοηθήσων: no other source has anything like this. The narrative here makes a pleasingly circumstantial impression: Messalla the source?

8. οὐ μὲν ... τοσούτων: the reference here must be to the lack of signs of defeat of *Antony* (not Cassius). The argument goes: (i) the troops in Cassius' camp do not look like the *φύλακες* Cassius left there; (ii) on Antony's side there are not as many dead bodies as one would expect if he had been routed as Octavian was; *both* factors give Brutus cause for alarm. Perrin misses this.

Ch. 43: Defeat of Cassius; his premature despair and suicide

439 **1–2. οὔτε ... στρατηγῶν:** no other source has any such details of Cassius' thought and behaviour. Presumably they are not just made up by P. The only (at first sight) slightly discordant note is οὐθ' ἀμελήσαντες. Most sources, with the exception of one story recorded by Appian 4.113 (cf. 43.4–9n.), state that Cassius died ignorant of Brutus' success. This is also the natural implication of P.'s narrative from *Brut.* 43.4ff. (and is explicitly stated in *Ant.* 22.4, though this is of course not necessarily relevant to *Brutus*). But the wording οὐθ' ἀμελήσαντες does not necessarily imply that Cassius knew of Brutus' final | victory, though one may suspect that P. is indulging in a bit of 'psychologizing' without too strict regard for consistency.

ἀρπαγῆν: P. cannot well avoid this reference as he has to explain why Brutus' troops failed to wheel against the enemy, but it is worth noting what little prominence he gives this aspect of the behaviour of Brutus' troops. Appian 4.112.470 paints a much more realistic picture of the pillaging on both sides.

2–3. ὑπὸ ... συμμενόντων: no other source has these details. In Appian 4.111–112 Cassius' troops are amazed by Antony's audacious advance (here perhaps a slight parallel with *Brut.* 42.2 τὸ εὐώνυμον), and the troops outside the camp flee when they see the camp taken.

καὶ τῶν ἵππων: Ziegler tentatively suggests deleting the καί and reading ὄρῶν δέ (as ζ). This gives a slightly more orderly narrative, but the difference is minimal.

3–4. μηδὲ <δὲ>: Sintenis' reading. Ziegler prefers to insert <οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ > before μηδέ, which again gives a more orderly narrative, though in the circumstances this is not necessarily a relevant consideration.

440 **4–9. οὕτω ... ἀπέσφαξε:** other accounts, more or less detailed, of Cassius' suicide in *Caes.* 69.3, *Ant.* 22.4, Appian 4.113.472–4, Dio 47.46.3–5, Livy *Epit.* 124, Vell. 2.70.2–3, Val. Max. 6.8.4, 9.9.2, Flor. 2.17.13, *De vir. ill.* 83.6–7. There is a considerable degree of unanimity in the tradition. The accounts of Appian, in particular, and Dio are very close to P., though Appian shows himself to have had access to another tradition by including a version in which Cassius learns of Brutus' success from a messenger, but kills himself through shame, though again it is Pindarus who administers the blow. *Caes.* 69.3 records as a highly remarkable circumstance the fact that Cassius used the same ξιφίδιον as he had used against Caesar. The theological implication may be | depressing, though it is of course fundamental to P.'s conception of the death of Caesar and the deaths of his assassins, but, given that ξιφίδιον = 'dagger', it is perfectly possible that

Cassius did in fact use the same dagger (despite Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 260, n. 4).

4. αὐτὸς ... πορθούμενον: Appian and Dio say that Cassius knew of the loss of his camp. P.'s observation here reads a little oddly: surely Cassius' followers, their sight unimpaired, could have offered an opinion on the state of the camp. (The qualification ἡ μόλις, however, is regular Greek idiom.) P. seems to be deliberately emphasizing Cassius' bad sight, in order to suggest what a trifling circumstance it was that brought about the downfall of the Republicans.

ἦν ὄρᾶν: not elsewhere attested, but presumably authentic. Bentley 375 surmises that Cassius' sight had been impaired by the Parthian sun. Other sources adduce as reasons for Cassius' ignorance of the course of the battle the dust (Appian 4.113.472, Vell. 2.70.2, Flor. 2.17.13, cf. Dio 47.45.5) or the approach of night-fall (Val. Max. 9.9.2, Flor. 2.17.13). P. may well have got this item from a source outside the main historical tradition. Messalla!?

ἵππεῖς: accusative, as 43.9 makes clear (Perrin wrongly translates 'the horsemen about him'). {Scott-Kilvert–Pelling have it both ways: 'the few horsemen who were with him saw a large body of cavalry riding towards them'.} P.'s narrative is exactly parallel to the versions recorded by the other sources, in which the men approaching are cavalry-men. (Plutarchean MSS attest both ἵππεῖς and ἵππέας as the accusative plural.)

5. οὓς: Ziegler punctuates with a colon after *προσελαύνοντας*, which is of course good, but it is no better than the traditional punctuation. The sequence of thought is: (i) Cassius' friends saw many cavalry-men approaching, who were *actually sent* by Brutus; (ii) *but* (δ') Cassius thought they were enemies; (iii) *nevertheless* | (ὅμως δέ) he sent Titinius to find out. This accords with the versions of Appian, Dio, and Florus, since in Appian and Dio it is expressly stated that the cavalry were sent by Brutus, and in Florus' version (garbled or independent—more likely garbled) they do at least belong to Brutus' army. I do not understand why Ziegler objects to the traditional punctuation, for the relative clause οὓς ὁ Βροῦτος ἔπεμψεν can easily be 'editorial' rather than in *oratio obliqua*.

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Τιτίτιον: RE 6A.1547 (Münzer). Τιτίτιον is the reading of AZ in P., supported by Appian 4.113.474. Val. Max. 9.9.2 offers 'Tineus', 'Tineius', and 'Tinius' (edd. {including now Shackleton Bailey} emend to harmonize the text with P. and Appian). Dio, Velleius, and Florus do not give his name. Val. Max. 9.9.2 and Dio make the man a centurion (hence Dio is not just using *Brutus* as his source), Velleius an *evocatus*, Florus a *speculator*. Münzer toys with identifying P.'s and Appian's 'Titinius' with C. Titius (or 'Tidius'—see Shackleton Bailey *ad loc.*) Strabo, mentioned by Cicero in *Ad Fam.* 12.6 [376].1 (end-March, start-April, 43) as a partisan of Cassius who went east to join him. One may well say that the identification is purely

speculative (not that the evidence of P. and Appian really counts against it), but one ought to be looking for a man who was close to, and important to, Cassius, hence his despairing reaction when he thought him to have been captured by the enemy and the joy with which the man was greeted by Brutus' troops.

7. τοῦτο δῆ: with the implied claim that these were Cassius' *ipsissima ultima verba*. They are slightly different in Appian.

ὑπεχώρησεν: Ziegler's suggestion ('corr. Zie.' is exaggerated) for the *MSS* ἀπεχώρησεν, based on the belief that ἀποχωρέω is not the 'mot juste' and on the better reading in Appian 4.113.474. The version Appian records is sufficiently close | to P.'s to make this reasonable.

ἐφελκυσάμενος: of course Pindarus was an unwilling accomplice of Cassius' suicide, but P. may also be suggesting the unbalanced character of Cassius' decision to kill himself.

Πίνδαρον: *RE* 20.1698 (Münzer). According to Val. Max. 6.8.4 Pindarus had only been recently manumitted; according to Appian 4.113.472 he was Cassius' shield-bearer.

ὄν ... παρεσκευασμένον: not elsewhere attested. Antony also had a slave trained for such an exigency (*Ant.* 76), as also Labeo (Appian 4.135.571, even if this tradition is bogus). {Cf. Y. Gris , *Le Suicide dans la Rome antique* (1982), 99–103.}

8. ἀλλὰ ... διέφυγε: one may condemn this observation as ψυχρός, which it is, but P. is suggesting a διαδοχή of events in the fall of the Republic.

τότε ... ἀναγαγών: similarly this description, while *perhaps* authentic in the sense that P. has got it from a source (whether it is in fact authentic is impossible to say, since Cassius' suicide took place inside his tent), may be designed to recall the similar behaviour of Pompey and Caesar at their last moments.

εὐρέθη ... σώματος: not elsewhere attested. It is a justification of the preceding description (which describes what could not be seen), but again P. may intend wider resonances, conjuring up the decapitations of Crassus and Pompey.

τὸν δὲ κελουθεΐς: exactly the same observation in Appian. Val. Max. (under the rubric 'De fide servorum') offers a radically different version: 'Pindarus C. Cassium iussu ipsius obtruncatum insultationi hostium subtraxit seque e conspectu hominum voluntaria morte abstulit ita, ut ne corpus quidem eius absumpti inveniretur'. This pleasant fairy-tale is presumably (i) a doublet of the suicide of 'Titinius' and (ii) a reply to the hostile tradition about Pindarus.

ἐνίοις: unknown, but presumably partisans of Cassius who | wished to defend him against the charge of succumbing inappropriately to πάθος. Among modern scholars the theory that Cassius was assassinated has

found little favour (for a cautious formulation see Ferrero 204). It is unnecessary and unconvincing. In the circumstances it was perfectly intelligible that Cassius should choose suicide, since after all he had been comprehensively defeated and had a suicide compact with Brutus in the event of defeat. Pindarus' subsequent disappearance, even when we discount the romantic story in Val. Max., was obviously not necessarily a sign of guilt (cf. Radin 220). The opportunistic behaviour of Demetrius (45.2) does not prove conspiracy.

P. clearly does not accept the theory (cf. also *Ant.* 22.4, where Pindarus is τῶν πιστῶν τις ἀπελευθέρων).

9. πάθος ... ἄγνοιαν: natural enough words, but perhaps designed partly to suggest τὸ θυμοειδές in Cassius' suicide (cf. Appian 4.114.476), partly to emphasize the 'tragic' quality of the narrative: Cassius' μετάβασις to ill fortune resulted from a ἀμαρτία (in the sense of 'mistake of fact').

πολλά: predictably supplied by Val. Max. 9.9.2.

ἀπέσφαξε: Ziegler tentatively suggests the more colourful ἐπέσφαξε or ἐπαπέσφαξε on the basis of the readings ἐπαπέκτεινεν in Zonaras, who is working from P. and Dio combined, ἐπαπέθανεν in Dio (either working partly from P. or at least sharing a common source), and ἐπισφάξαντος in *Gracchi* 38.3 (a similar context). He is very likely right.

P.'s narrative of Cassius' suicide is historically rather implausible: Cassius had been totally defeated and this must have weighed with him more than *ch.* 43 allows. In placing such stress on the role of 'Titinius' P., however, achieves two things. Firstly, he implies that Cassius' suicide was the act of an ἀνὴρ θυμοειδής; this is delicately done because to be sanctimonious or censorious at | this point in the narrative would arrest the tide of sympathy flowing strongly in favour of the Republicans, but it is implicit—P.'s description of Cassius' suicide lacks the sympathetic involvement he brings to bear on the suicides of Brutus, Cato, or even Antony. Secondly, he contrives to suggest that it was only by a hair's breadth that Cassius' cause was lost. The effect is highly dramatic.

Chs. 44–48: Between the battles

An enormously impressive section, combining tragic foreshadowing of the eclipse of the Republic with a keen sense of the dramatic—how very near Brutus came to final victory!—and a shrewd awareness of the deterioration in Brutus’ character under the pressure of warfare and of the bankruptcy of the ideal of ‘libertas’ even if he had won the second battle.

Ch. 44: Burial of Cassius; encouragement of Cassius’ troops; how Brutus might have secured total victory in the first battle

2. καὶ ... κηδευόμενον: parallel accounts in Appian 4.114.476f. and Dio 47.47.1. Dio does not have the details καὶ ... δυναμένου and shows no verbal parallels to P. Appian records the weeping and salutation but does not state the destination of the corpse. He is clearly using sources other than P. as he has two details P. lacks.

προσαγορεύσας ... δυναμένου: Tac. *Ann.* 4.34.1 records that the historian Cremutius Cordus ‘laudato M. Bruto C. Cassium Romanorum ultimum dixisset’. Furneaux (closely followed by Koestermann) *ad loc.* rightly assumes that this version is more precise than Suet. *Tib.* 61.3 ‘Brutum Cassiumque ultimos Romanorum dixisset’, and infers that Cremutius had quoted Brutus’ *dictum*, since ‘if he had spoken in his own person he would doubtless have also included Brutus himself in | the expression’. In itself this inference is hardly secure, but it is supported by the fact that Cremutius was evidently familiar with Messalla’s work (*Ann.* 4.34 presumably allows this inference, even if it is true that Cremutius’ speech as given is pure Tacitus: see e.g. M. Columba, ‘Il processo di Cremuzio Corda’, *Atene e Roma* 4 [1901], 361–83; Syme, *Tacitus* [1958], 337 and n. 10). And Messalla could well be P.’s source here. {Moles discusses Tac. *Ann.* 4.34 at length in *Histos* 2 (1998), 95–184.}

Philop. 1.4 (cf. *Arat.* 24.2, Paus. 7.52.1) records that Philopoemen was similarly praised by an unidentified Roman as ‘the last of the Greeks’. This description is discussed extensively, though not very persuasively, by R. M. Errington, *Philopoemen* (1969), 216ff. (Nothing in W. H. Porter, *Plutarch’s Life of Aratus* [1937], 66.) The general implication of both remarks is clear. A man may be the last of his line. (For this use of ἔσχατος cf. Soph. *Ant.* 599f. {with Griffith *ad loc.*}. This interpretation is supported by P.’s imagery at *Philop.* 1.4, cf. *Arat.* 24.2 γενομένου. *Brut.* 44.2 τῇ πόλει ... ἐγγενέσθαι. For ‘ultimus’ so used in Latin cf. *ILS* 935 ‘ultimo gentis suae’.) And this fact may be fittingly stressed in funerary contexts (the Plutarchean passages and Appian 4.114 are all encomiastic/funerary). So Philopoemen and Cassius are regarded as the last true representatives of their respective races. To the question: in what way are they the last true representatives of their respective races? the answer obviously is: because after their deaths the

political conditions in both countries did not allow men like them to come into prominence. Both Greece and Rome are felt to be incapable of ‘begetting’ such men because they are politically ‘dead’ (cf. esp. the imagery of *Philop.*). For the general thought one can compare Propertius’ ‘Perusina ... patriae sunt nota sepulchra’ (1.22.3) and Lucan’s ‘Romani bustum populi’ (7.862), both of which are symbolic in this sense. (The point hardly seems to be grasped by Errington *loc. cit.*: it is quite incorrect to say that | ‘the real point of the description Plutarch clearly found difficulty in understanding’, even though the question how far Philopoemen deserved the characterization remains.) 446

Brutus may have well made this remark about Cassius with the Philopoemen parallel in mind, arising from his studies in Polybius (4.8). P. naturally does not explicitly endorse the description, but the mere fact of recording it, together with the explanatory gloss *ὡς ... δυναμένου*, helps to stress Brutus’ isolation and to suggest that the days of the Republic are rapidly drawing to a close. {In *Histos* 2 (1998), 119–20 Moles suggests that Tacitus too may have Polybius’ Philopoemen in mind at *Ann.* 4.34.}

Appian adds the information that Brutus also reproached Cassius (for his haste) and pronounced a *μακαρισμός* (both of course standard elements in funerary utterances).

3–4. αὐτὸς ... γεγεννημένον: parallel accounts in Appian 4.114.476 (4.117–118 refers to a later occasion, *pace* Ziegler and others) and Dio 47.47.2. Appian differs in detail, nor can Dio, though close to P., have been working from P. alone. Zonaras p. 395, 25 Dind. is a mix of P. and Dio.

3. τοὺς στρατίωτας: in context this must refer exclusively to Cassius’ troops—the lack of specification is a bit careless, but the application is clear; cf. Appian and Dio.

δοσιλίαις: Dio does not state the amount. Appian 4.118.497, cited by Ziegler, alludes to a donative of 1,000 drachmas, but this is to *all* Brutus’ troops, not just Cassius’, who needed more money because they had lost all their possessions when Antony’s troops had captured their camp. Thus the contexts are distinct.

4. οἱ δὲ ... γεγεννημένον: nothing of this in Appian or Dio .

ἀήττητον: a reference to the cult of Victory (39.4n.). See further Weinstock, ‘Victor and Invictus’, *HTHR* 50 (1957), 211–247. |

5. ἐμαρτύρει ... ἀήττητον: this seems to be P.’s own emphatic view, based on the verdict of Messalla (42.5, 45.1f., cf. 43.1). 447

6. ἀήττητον: a deliberate pick-up of 44.4 ἀήττητον—had Brutus been *fully* victorious he would have defeated *all* of them. Such at least seems to be the thought, but one is bound to admit that P.'s rhetorical paradoxes are sometimes frigid in the extreme.

Ch. 45: Losses on both sides; Brutus rejects the offer of a further engagement; massacre of captured enemy slaves; execution of Volumnius and Saculio

A grim section. Strip away the editorial panegyric of Brutus, and one perceives that P. is tacitly exploring what he rightly perceives to be the deterioration of Brutus' character under the strain of warfare. He cannot make this theme too explicit, because it would undermine his overall portrayal of Brutus' philosophical character, but it clearly does interest him and it is an important, if deliberately underplayed, aspect of his description of the last days of his Republican hero.

1. Ἔπεσον ... διπλασίους: the same figures in Appian 4.112.471, though without the source (Messalla) or Brutus' nickname for the camp servants.

οὓς Βρίγας ... ἀνόμαζε: apparently an erudite literary joke, based on Hdt. 7.73 (on the tribes in Xerxes' army): 'The Phrygians, so the Macedonians say, were called *Briges* for as long as they lived in Europe beside the Macedonians, but when they crossed to Asia, they changed their name along with their country'. The allusion here is rather obscure: to Thracians or Asiatic Greeks (given the extent of the original Phrygian conquest of Asia Minor)? The common association 'Phrygian' = 'slave' must also be relevant. { 'There would be a further irony if Brutus knew that among the Lydians the word supposedly meant "free" (as Juba *FCrHist* 275 F 98 (= Hesychius s.v. Βρίγες), Drummond on *FRHist* 61 F 3. }

The forms *Briges*, *Bruges*, and *Brugoi* are all found: W. M. Ramsay, | *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia* I (1895, repr. 1975), 222, n. 3. For Macedonian 448 β instead of φ see *Quaest. Graec.* 292E.

Voegelin supposes, reasonably, that P. is here following Volumnius.

Μεσσάλας: *HRR* II. 66 fr. 3 { = *FRHist* 61 F 3; cf. Drummond's n. }

2. διὸ ... ἐθάρρησαν: nothing of this in Appian or Dio.

Δημήτριος: *RE* 4.2803 (Münzer).

ἄμ' ... δύναμιν: also recounted by Appian 4.114.478 and alluded to in 4.119.499.

3. Βρούτῳ ... νενικηκός: there is nothing of this in Appian, but Dio 47.48.3 (cf. 45.4-5 below) mentions that there were many captives in Brutus' camp.

ἐκατέρου: Dio 47.47.2 records (no doubt rightly) that Brutus transferred all his forces to Cassius' camp.

σαλεύοντος: for the imagery see Hamilton on *Alex.* 32.5.

ὀπλίται ... ἀπέσχετο: cf. Dio 47.47.3 (general). Appian 4.114.478 and 4.119.499 gives essentially the same information, even if the spirit of 4.114.478, where it is Antony and Octavian who back down, is different.

4–5. τῶν δ' ... ἔσωζεν: nothing of this in Appian. Dio 47.48.3 is less detailed (and has nothing about the ἐλευθέροι), though also apologetic in tone. How far P.'s version is idealization by P. or (?) Messalla, or simply an accurate record of events, it is difficult to say. Though P.'s account is strongly apologetic, it is still of significance that he has bothered to record the massacre of the slaves at all: it is still part of his picture of an ever grimmer regime in Brutus' camp.

4. τοὺς μὲν: picked up loosely by 45.6 ἦν δέ τις (so, rightly, Voegelin).

φάσκων ... ἠλωκέναι: a standard philosophical sentiment—cf. 50.5–6. |
 449 **αὐτοὺς ... ἠλωκέναι:** Ziegler's transposition, designed to avoid hiatus. But the *MSS* order has more punch and the hiatus is unobjectionable: see Cherniss, Loeb *Moralia* XII, 28 and n.

6–9. Ἦν ... ἀπαγαγόντες: only P. has this story. Messalla is presumably the source (cf. 45.7). Why does P. include it? Partly no doubt simply because it is a vivid enough anecdote in its own right. But the emphasis given it suggests that there must be other reasons. Although the tone of the anecdote is apologetic (cf. 45.7 ἐπεὶ ... φροντίσι; Volumnius and Saculio also represent types of whom P. normally disapproves—cf. e.g. *Ant.* 24.1–2, *Sulla* 2.3–4), its general character helps to build up to the grimness of Brutus' promise to his troops in *ch.* 46 (even though the tone of that also is apologetic to some extent). It *may* also hint at Brutus' inability to stand up to his subordinates against his better judgement, foreshadowing the mistaken decision to fight in *ch.* 47 (the flavour of 45.8–9 is such as to suggest that Casca does not consider Brutus a worthy στρατηγός). {Affortunati puts this reading more strongly and generously: it perhaps shows 'come fossero complessi i rapporti fra Bruto e i suoi subordinati e come spesso Bruto si trovasse costretto ad assumere certi atteggiamenti'.} But the story has more sinister connotations. Brutus at the start of the episode is silent and then loses his temper when pressed by Casca: up till that point his subordinates are left in the dark as to his true intentions. His anger could be construed as irritation at their failure to divine what he wanted. Surely P. intends us to perceive in the story depressing contemporary resonances: the difficulty of reading the mind of an autocrat and the way in which somewhat ambiguous utterances from the man in supreme power may indicate that he wants his subordinates to carry out some terrible deed. One is painfully reminded of such scenes from Imperial history as the trial of Cremutius Cordus (*Ann.* 4.34.1), where, according to Tacitus, one of the factors fatal to the accused was 'the grimness of Tiberius' face as he listened to the defence'. With whom are Tiberius and Brutus angry? With the accusers or with the defendants? With an autocrat |
 450 one cannot *know*, and one simply has to make a guess from whatever ambiguous signs he deigns to make. Thus does P. in *ch.* 45 hint at the

degeneration of the Republican cause: in reality the position (and to some extent the behaviour) of Brutus is no different from the monarchists he is fighting against.

6. Βολούμνιος: apparently not in *RE*. One may assume that he was a freedman of Antony's partisan Volumnius Eutrapelus, just as the celebrated Cytheris/Volumnia, Antony's (later Gallus') mistress, was his freedwoman. If *De vir. ill.* 82.2 'Cytheridem mimam cum Antonio et Gallo amavit' were authentic, one would have to consider the unpleasant possibility that Brutus knew Volumnius personally, but it is probably bogus (6.9n.).

Σακκουλίων: *RE* 1A.1689 (Münzer). Evidently a stage name.

προσ<αγ>αγόντες: so Coraes, followed by Schaefer, Ziegler, and most editors. The *MSS* reading is, however, well defended by Voegelin: 'optime ... praesentis participio τὸ προσάγειν et τὸ κατηγορεῖν tanquam una actio exhibentur'.

7. οἶων ... συνήθων: Voegelin compares the similar behaviour of Surena in *Crass.* 32.4.

9. πρὸς ... δισχεράνας: Brutus gives way to anger—cf. 34.3.

ἀπαγαγόντες: 'answering' 45.6 *προσ<αγ>αγόντες*, and setting up the ring construction of which P. is fond.

Ch. 46: Brutus pays his troops a donative, reproaches them for lack of discipline, and promises them Thessalonica and Sparta for plunder

45¹ **1.** Ἐκ τούτου ... Λακεδαίμονα: the same essential facts in Appian 4.117.489–118.498 (with the implication that the promise of Thessalonica and Sparta comes from a different source). For the discrepancy about the size of the donative see 44.3n. No doubt | Appian is right to stress that Brutus counselled his troops against a further battle, whereas P., both here and later, is thin on Brutus' attitude to this question, for obvious apologetic reasons.

Θεσσαλονίκη: evidently as having sided with the Caesarians (being on the 'Via Egnatia').

Λακεδαίμονα: the reference to Sparta has been understandably queried by Coraes, Voegelin, van Herwerden, and others on two grounds: (i) Sparta seems very far away from Philippi; (ii) can *Λακεδαίμων* be referred to as a *πόλις*? It is defended by Ziegler, Ehrenberg in *RE* 3A.1446f., and others, who point out that Sparta *had* sent troops to fight for the Caesarians (41.8) and that the same reference occurs in Appian. Appian may be following P. here (it is simply impossible to say one way or the other), but at the least this shows that *Λακεδαίμονα* appeared in P.'s text at a very early date. The objection that Sparta seems an odd choice as a city to plunder from the point of view of Brutus' troops in Philippi obviously has some force—on any view such a promise would be a promise of desperation, to assuage the passions of the troops at almost any cost. But clearly this is not impossible. The linguistic objection—*Λακεδαίμων* as a *πόλις*—is not decisive either. In all periods of Greek literature the distinction between *Λακεδαίμων* and *Σπάρτη* is not always maintained. Thus e.g. in P. at *De Herod. malign.* 870D and *Thes.* 34.1 *Λακεδαίμων* is used where strictly one might expect *Σπάρτη*. Consequently, the text is not indefensible. To the positive arguments in its favour (41.8 and Appian), one may surely add P.'s extreme horror at the proposal—he would not have reacted to the same extent if Brutus had not promised his troops *Sparta*, not only one of the two most venerable cities in Greece, but also a city especially dear to Brutus' heart (2.5ff.). The text is right.

45² **τούτω ... ἀποδειλιῶντες:** for such emphatic editorial | interventions cf. e.g. *Sert.* 10.6–7, *Ant.* 19.3–4, *Demosth.* 22.4, *Arat.* 24.2, *Luc.* 36.6f., *Cat. mai.* 5.1ff., *Lyc.* 28.12–13, 30.3ff. For the technique of singling out a single wrong act cf. also *Timol.* 33.2.

These are clearly P.'s own anguished comments, perhaps very faintly echoed in Appian's agnostic (? reluctant) *δοκεῖ δέ τισι ...* P. regards Brutus' promise as an extremely barbarous proposal, but it is obvious that his source left him unable to dispute its historicity. How can he explain or justify so barbarous a proposal from so good a man? (He has a similar problem in explaining Sertorius' killing of his native hostages in *Sert.* 10 and

25, though there his approach is less desperately apologetic, since he himself is less committed to his subject.) He does the best he can: (i) by stating that the behaviour of Antony and Octavian in satisfying their victorious troops was much worse (46.2); (ii) by arguing that in the absence of a general of his own stature to control Cassius' troops Brutus had little choice if he wanted to restore their confidence (46.4–5); (iii) by hinting that Brutus simply gave in to a suggestion made to him by his fellow commanders (46.5). These arguments are fair enough as far as they go, and P. may be right to imply (and may have hard evidence from his sources behind him) that Brutus acted under pressure from his peers—P. does exaggerate Brutus' *φιλανθρωπία* but Brutus' idealization of Sparta is historically certain. But for P. they do not add up to an acquittal and his distress is clear.

2. ἐξέτεισαν: 'revera dederunt, non tantum, ut Brutus, promiserunt' (Voegelin).

3. ἀλλὰ ... δικαίου: cf. 29.6–7. For the progress of the argument it is important to see that P. *agrees* with the standards demanded of Brutus: 46.2 has pointed out that the behaviour of Antony and Octavian was much worse, but P. then goes on | to emphasize that this still does not justify Brutus' promise, because people rightly expected superior conduct from him, especially when Cassius was dead. Some editors have missed this. 453

δόξαν ἀρετῆς: cf. 29.3 and n.

ὅς ... βιαιοτέρων: cf. 1.4 and n.

4. ὥσπερ ... χρείαν: an impressive simile, despite its conventional content. See Führmann 50 and 237, n. 2. The image is well sustained in the following narrative—cf. *μετεώροις* (a word used of ships at sea), *ἰσορροποῦντα* (? suggesting the idea of a rower pulling on the other side), and *χρησθαι τοῖς παροῦσι* (covering the idea of using whatever material comes to hand for repairs).

5. ᾤοντο: Schaefer's correction is clearly right.

δυσμεταχείριστοι ... ἀποδειλιῶντες: essentially a repeat of 45.3, but no doubt this was an important military factor. Cf. Appian 4.123.518 and Frontinus 4.2.1 on the stricter discipline of Cassius.

**Ch. 47: Plight of the Caesarians; naval victory of the
Republicans; Brutus' decision to fight the second battle of
Philippi explained by the fact that he providentially failed to
learn of the Republican success at sea**

1–2. Οὐδὲν ... ψῦχος: parallel descriptions of the plight of Antony and Octavian in Appian 4.117–118 and 121.508–122.513 and Dio 47.47.3–4. All three accounts contain some material peculiar to themselves. There are no obvious verbal parallels.

ἀγορᾶ ... ἀναγκαία: mentioned by all sources.

ἀναγκαία: ‘barely sufficient’. *Contra* 47.6, just as *διαγίγνομαι* in 47.3 = ‘survive’ but = ‘intervene, elapse’ in 47.5.

καὶ διὰ ... ψῦχος: parallel, though very much less detailed, is Appian 4.122.513.

454 **2. εἰλούμενοι ... ἔλεσι:** probably a typically Plutarchean | play on words—‘bogged down beside marshes’.

3–4. ἐν ... κριθῆναι: Appian 4.112.513–515 and Dio 47.47.4 agree that Antony and Octavian learned of their defeat at sea and that this was an additional spur to their attempts to force a second battle on land.

3. ἐξ ... διεγένοντο: descriptions of the engagement also in Appian 4.115.479–116.488 (very detailed) and Dio 47.47.4. Neither is working from P.

ὑπὸ ... διεγένοντο: similar details in Appian. P. records this no doubt partly as picturesque material for its own sake but partly also to emphasize the general theme of ‘hunger’ on the enemy side.

παρὰ Καίσαρος: difficult to justify. Vogel’s interpretation ‘iussu Caesaris’ is hardly possible; *LSJ s.v. A.II.2* (‘issuing from a person’) offers no real parallels for this sense of *παρά* without a suitable main verb. Equally forced is Voegelin’s ‘a Caesaris partibus’. Latte’s *ἐπικουρίαν* is too great a change. *Pace* Ziegler, a reference to ‘Caesar’ seems desirable. Schaefer’s *πρὸς Καίσαρα* (cf. Appian’s *ἦγεν ... Καίσαρι*, Dio’s *τὴν δύναμιν ... ἐπιδιαπλέουσιν*) gives excellent sense, but does not explain the *παρά* sufficiently. I am inclined to think that *παρασκευήν* has fallen out.

4. πρὶν ... εὐτυχίας: implying that Brutus never learned of his success at sea. Cf. 47.5–9n.

5. καὶ γὰρ ... κριθῆναι: so also Appian 4.115–116 (not in Dio). Presumably one may accept this at face value (Appian 4.116.488 is perhaps circumstantial to a degree), as apparently all modern authorities do, though there are many suspicious parallels for this kind of synchronization

(e.g. Hdt. 7.166 and D.S. 11.24 on the battles of Himera and either Salamis (Herodotus) or Thermopylae (Diodorus), on which see the sapient comments of Bury in Bury/Meiggs 303–4). P., of course, is greatly interested in such coincidences: | cf. e.g. *Camill.* 19, *Quaest. conviv.* 717B–D, 455 and fr. 100 Sandbach = Loeb *Moralia* XV, 207. He discussed them in the lost *Περὶ ἡμερῶν* (Lamprias Catalogue no. 150). He shows commendable restraint here in not embarking upon a digression upon the subject. (He might also have made something of Cassius' death on his birthday in this context—cf. *Quaest. conviv.* 717C, *Camill.* 19, and *Pomp.* 79 on Pompey.) Writing the *Lives* to some extent as a unified opus, he may have felt that his treatment of the topic in *Camillus* 19 was sufficient. (The *Camillus* probably antedates the *Brutus*: Jones, 'Chronology', 68 {= Scardigli, *Essays* 111}). But literary considerations are more important: a digression on such coincidences would hold up the flow of what since *ch.* 38 has been a very tight and impressively controlled narrative, as the Republican forces advance to their inevitable doom.

5–9. τύχη ... ἀπαγγέλλων: P. is emphatic that Brutus never knew of the success of his navy and he *seems* to be supported by Dio 47.47.5ff., vague as it is. Appian 4.122–123 by contrast says that he did know of it. It must at once be conceded that it is convenient for P. to accept the version he does, as being (i) apologetic of Brutus' decision to fight the second battle of Philippi and (ii) highly effective dramatically—Brutus in the last resort only failed by a hair's breadth. Yet this in itself does not prove that the version recorded by P., which must come from a detailed source, is wrong. Of course P.'s pro-Brutan source *might* conceivably have falsified the record on this point, since if Brutus did know of this victory, his decision to fight the second battle on land was all the more suspect. But unless (again—cf. on 39.8ff.) one automatically assumes the superiority of Appian on every critical point (as e.g. Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 87), P.'s detailed narrative, clearly based, directly or ultimately (cf. Dio), on a source present in Brutus' camp, deserves at least some consideration. Appian's | statement could 456 (again) simply be an inference from the actual facts of the situation or—conceivably—from the defection of Clodius or other deserters to Brutus from the Caesarian camp. One should bear in mind the military situation at this juncture. Brutus had totally lost the initiative and was in effect cooped up in his camp (cf. Appian 4.121–122, Dio 47.48.1 on the licence Brutus had allowed the Caesarian troops). It does not seem impossible that Antony and Octavian heard news of their defeat and believed it, whereas Brutus (or his officers) heard rumours and disbelieved them. To pose the question in the form of polar opposites: did Brutus know of his victory or did he not?—ignores Brutus' military situation (tactically he had been completely out-manoeuvred) and also to some degree the realities of ancient communications (ancient history offers countless instances of

reports of victories or defeats which were correct but were not believed at the time). One need not reject the version of P.'s source outright. It may even be correct.

5. τύχη: an innocent enough reference in itself, but one that becomes philosophically important at 47.7.

κακία: 'incompetence'.

ἡμερῶν ... διαγενομένων: 'twenty days intervening'. The question is: between the battle at sea and what? Perrin, followed by Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 164 (very confused), clearly takes it to mean that there was an interval of twenty days between the sea battle and Brutus' learning of it. This would imply that Brutus eventually learned of his success but that it was by then too late for him to revoke his decision to fight on land. But this interpretation runs flatly counter to the explicit statement of 47.5–9, according to which Brutus *never* learned of his success at sea. P.'s phraseology is admittedly loose, but he must mean 'twenty days intervening between the battle at sea and the second battle of Philippi'.

457 The second battle of Philippi is usually (e.g. Rice Holmes, *Architect*, | 87 and n. 5, Garzetti on *Caes.* 69.12–13) dated to c. November 16 on the basis of Suet. *Tib.* 5 'natus est ... XVI. Kal. Dec. per bellum Philippense'. P.'s 'twenty days', if it is true that the sea battle was fought on the same day as the first battle on land, gives a dating of November 11 (October 23 + 19). {But see on 41.1–43.9n. above: if the Praenestine Fasti are right in dating the *second* battle to 23 October, the calculation would be rather a matter of dating the first battle, presumably to c. 3 October.} The dating from Suetonius is relatively more secure, and P.'s twenty days are perhaps best seen as a typical Plutarchean round number.

6. οὐ γὰρ ... γεγωνός: the apologetic note is plain—P. is aware that Brutus could be accused of making a thoroughly bad military decision in accepting the Caesarian challenge to a second battle. The particular formulation may be P.'s own, but it is clear from 47.5, as well as from Appian 4.123–124 (independent of P., but containing much the same material; cf. also 4.134.567), that some sources had already gone to considerable lengths to exonerate Brutus from blame. In P.'s case Messalla is the obvious candidate.

τὰ μὲν ... γεγωνός: the *ἄν* goes right through the sentence—all this is what would have been the case had Brutus known of his naval victory. Perrin misses this. {Scott-Kilvert–Pelling also disagree with Moles here.}

7. ἀλλὰ ... δεομένων: for the idea that the Roman monarchy was heaven-ordained cf. 55.2 (*Comp.* 2.2), 6.5 and n. Appian 4.134.567 also invokes this as a reason for Brutus' decision to fight, in a passage that is quite similar to *Brut.* 47.6–7.

ἐξ<αγ>αγεῖν: Perrin translates ‘to remove from the scene’, rightly sensing a theatrical metaphor. Cf. *Ant.* 93 (*Comp.* 6).⁴ *ἐαυτὸν ἐξήγαγεν* in the light of *Demetr.* 53.10 *Διηγωνισμένου ... τοῦ Μακεδονικοῦ δράματος, ὥρα τὸ Ῥωμαϊκὸν ἐπεισαγαγεῖν.*

ἀπέκοψε: ἀποκόπτω is fairly common in a metaphorical sense in later Greek (e.g. *ἐλπίδα ἀ.* *Ap. Rhod.* 4.1272, cf. *Plb.* 3.63.8; *ἔλεον ἀ.* *D.S.* 13.23; *ἀποκοπήναι τῆς ἐλπίδος* *Plut. Pyrrh.* 2.3). The precise metaphor here is unclear: ? pruning/chopping down a tree or flower. |

τύχην ἐκείνην: an interesting phrase. Brutus seems to be regarded as having two τύχαι, a good and bad. Either one could have prevailed, but for the direct intervention of God. This idea can be connected to Brutus’ twin δαίμονες (see the *excursus* on *chs.* 36–37). 458

7–9. καίπερ ... ἀπαγγέλλων: not elsewhere attested. Although tales of messengers who just fail to get their message through or are disbelieved because of the magnitude of their tidings are suspiciously common in ancient historiography, one can hardly doubt that there is some historicity in this incident.

8. Κλώδιός τις: *RE* 4.64 (Münzer). Nothing more is known of this man. Münzer’s suggestion that he be identified with the Clodius sent by Brutus to Rhodes with thirteen ships (*Appian* 5.2) is chronologically a very tight fit, and requires one to suppose that Brutus entrusted thirteen ships to a man he did not know, who had only deserted from the enemy the day before, and whom he did not even see (47.9). Only marginally less disastrous is the identification with the Clodius who guarded C. Antonius in Apollonia (*Dio* 47.24.2, 24.4), and then killed him: such a man would never have found a welcome in Antony’s camp! A less dreadful identification would be with the Clodius who represented Lepidus’ soldiers and urged Antony to attack Lepidus in May 43 (*Ant.* 18: {implicitly rejected by Pelling *ad loc.*}), but speculation is fruitless.

9. καταφρονηθείς: P.’s narrative seems to suggest that Clodius is to be regarded as a worthless fellow (cf. *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*—contemptuous)—a typical dishonourable time-server. There is perhaps a trace of his moralistic ‘contempt-for-the-treacherous’ τόπος (cf. *Sert.* 27.7, *Pomp.* 80, cf. *Brut.* 33.6): small wonder, implies P., that such a wastrel was disbelieved.

ἀπαγγέλλων: picking up 47.8 ἀγγέλλων. |

**Ch. 48: Unfavourable omens before the second
battle of Philippi**

1–2. Ἐν ἐκείνῃ ... οἴχεσθαι: other accounts of the second visitation of the *φάσμα* are *Caes.* 69.13 and Appian 4.134.565. (Florus does not have the second visitation, but as he sites the original visitation in Philippi and conflates the two battles he may be reflecting the second visitation in typically garbled style.) On the second visitation of the *φάσμα* to Cassius of Parma see 36.1–7n.

1. ἐκείνῃ τῇ νυκτί: defined by 47.8 *μέλλοντος ... ἡμέρας*. P. has moved from the first battle of Philippi and the sea-battle fought on the same day to the night before the second battle of Philippi without giving any details of the military operations in the intervening period (45.3 aside). These are given in Appian 4.121–122 (very full) and Dio 47.47.2–3 and 47.48.1 (divergent).

φασίν: on the probably sceptical connotations of this see 36.1n.

2. Πόπλιος ... Βολούμνιος: *HRR* II, 52 fr. 1 {= *FRHist* 47 F 1}; *RE* 9A.876 (Gundel).

Volumnius has been identified with the Volumnius Flaccus of *Ad Fam.* 11.12 [394].1, an envoy sent by D. Brutus with a message to the senate in May 43 (so Bähr, *RE* 6.2744, cf. Gundel *loc. cit.* and 879, and Shackleton Bailey on *Ad Fam.* 11.12 [394].1). This Volumnius Flaccus has, however, also been identified with the senator L. Volumnius of Varro, *RR* 2.4.1 (Teuffel in *RE* 6.2743; Broughton II, 498), and the ‘Volumnius senator’ of *Ad Fam.* 7.32 [113].1 (who are probably the same man). But if this latter friend of Cicero’s is identical with the L. Volumnius L. f. of Pompeius Strabo’s *consilium* at Asculum in 89 (so Cichorius, *Röm. Stud.*, 150), the identification with Volumnius Flaccus can hardly stand and it is therefore likely that Volumnius Flaccus was the son of L. Volumnius (thus Badian, *Historia* 12 [1963], 142). Hence the identification of D. Brutus’ envoy, |
460 Volumnius Flaccus, with Brutus’ philosopher friend is possible and perhaps even likely. (The description *συνεστρατευμένος ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς*, if pressed, might be thought to go against this identification, since Brutus had embarked on his *στρατεία* before May 43, but we have only Volumnius’ word that he was with Brutus *ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς*, and the claim must in any case have been conventional—cf. the claim of L. Sestius—Dio 53.32.4.) {Drummond, *FRHist* I.404 rejects all these identifications, though he thinks that this Volumnius might be a relative of the Volumnius Flaccus of *Ad Fam.* 11.12 [394].1.}

φιλόσοφος: i.e. from P.’s point of view a level-headed witness.

οὐ λέγει: for the argument that this is meant to cast doubt on the whole *φάσμα*-tradition cf. *excursus* on *chs.* 36 and 37. If so, it is a pity that P. did not register scepticism over some of the incidents Volumnius did report. But

one ought not to assume that P. is necessarily taking Volumnius' report of other omens very seriously (cf. 48.4n. below), though he does use them for dramatic effect: he is quite capable of using Volumnius' failure to mention the *φάσμα* as evidence against the authenticity of that tradition without committing himself to the authenticity of everything that Volumnius did report.

μελισσῶν ... γενέσθαι: this is paralleled only in Florus 2.17.7 (bees on standards), though Florus carelessly conflates the two battles of Philippi. Cf. the similar omen of 39.5 above {with n.}. For the interpretation of the omen cf. 39.5n. It is obviously bogus (cf. 47.2).

3. καὶ τῶν περαίνειν: not elsewhere attested and hardly credible (at least in the form stated). The point of the omen must lie in the common association of roses with death. Cf. Artem. 1.5 (= White 20): 'If a man dreams that he receives an unguent or rose, or anything similar, from a corpse, it must be held to indicate a similar fate' (i.e. death after the rose withers), and 1.77 (= White 57): 'Garlands made of roses, if they are in season, indicate bad luck for all those who are sick or trying to conceal themselves. | They symbolize death for the sick because they wither quickly. And, because of their strong scent, they indicate that those in hiding will be found. But in a place where one can make use of roses even in winter, we must always regard them as a good sign'. For graves decked with roses see e.g. *BCH* 24.415, 425, *CIG* 3754, *Inscr. Perg.* 374 B8, *Supp. Epigr.* 1.330 B8, and in general R. Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (1942), 129ff., esp. 134ff. Artemidorus' remark that roses symbolize bad luck for those who are trying to conceal themselves might conceivably give an added point to the omen—Brutus and his army would eventually be forced to come out of 'hiding'—but the general associations of roses are sufficient to explain it. {Cf. also Drummond on *FRHist* 47 F 1, with further bibliography.}

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4. καὶ πρὸ ... Βροῦτον: this spectacular omen, also recorded in Appian 4.128.532 and Dio 47.48.4 (complete with laborious exegesis), smacks of Greek epic or tragedy and defies belief. Although Appian's and Dio's accounts are very similar to P.'s, they state explicitly that the omen occurred immediately before the battle when the two armies were already drawn up, whereas P. does not make this quite so clear, and his list of omens is out of chronological sequence (48.5 τῆς πύλης ἀναχθείσης). This suggests that all three authorities are drawing independently on a common source, P. Volumnius (P. surely directly). {R. Westall in K. Welch, ed., *Appian's Roman History* (2015), 151–2 finds Appian and P. closer to one another than to Dio, but thinks that the extra detail in Appian makes it unlikely that he is drawing from Volumnius: he thinks of Augustus' *Autobiography* instead. But that apparently assumes that P. not merely draws

on Volumnius but keeps all of his detail, and there seems no reason to think this.}

If one asks why P. has juggled the order of omens, the answer perhaps is that he wants to keep the more incredible omens quite separate from the sober historical realities of his main narrative, and the omen of the Ethiopian, which is presumably historical to the extent that Brutus' soldiers did kill an Ethiopian slave out of superstitious fear, provides an effective 'bridge' between dubious supernatural happenings and sober reality. Of course the explanation *might* simply be that Volumnius did not have the story of the Ethiopian, and P. is merely keeping his material together before moving on to another source, but cf. 48.5n. {See also Drummond on *FRHist* 47 F 1.} |

462 **ἄπιστον**: with *σιγήν*; the flavour is epic/tragic. *ἄπιστον* is probably 'passive' = 'incredible' (one does not expect silence when two armies are drawing up for battle).

5. ὁ δ' ... οἰωνοσαμένων: recorded also in Appian 4.134.566, Florus 2.17.7–8, and Jul. Obs. 70, and presumably authentic as to the fact of the killing. It is not clear from Appian or Florus whether the incident is to be connected with the first or second battle of Philippi, but Jul. Obs. (referring to 'Brutiani') perhaps supports P.'s account. It is also unclear from P.'s wording whether Volumnius was the source, or one of several sources, or whether the story did not appear in Volumnius at all. On *a priori* grounds, however, (and on the assumption that the story is authentic or at least contemporary) it seems unlikely that the sensationalist Volumnius would have omitted so striking a story.

The appearance of the Ethiopian was clearly regarded as ominous because of the common association of the colour black with death, evil, the underworld etc.: cf. e.g. Aeschylus' *Oresteia* and Sophocles' *Ajax*; J. André, *Étude sur les termes de couleur dans la langue latine* (1949), 57, 362–64; F. J. Dölger, *Die Sonne der Gerechtigkeit und der Schwarze: eine religionsgeschichte Studie zum Taufgelöbnis, Liturgiegeschichtliche Forschungen II* (1918), 57–64. A very similar story is recorded of Septimius Severus (*SHA, Septimius Severus* 22.4–5) and in *Anthologia Latina* (ed. Reise) 157–58, no. 189, the fall of Troy is attributed to Priam's acceptance of ill-omened assistance from Memnon and his black troops. See further F. M. Snowden, *Blacks in Antiquity* (1970), 179f. and 321f., nn. 79–81.

Ch. 49: The second battle of Philippi

1–10. Προαγαγών ... προκινδυνεύοντες: other sources for the second battle of Philippi are *Ant.* 22, *Caes.* 69.13–14; Appian 4.125.522–129.541; Dio 47.48.3–5; Aug. *Res gestae* 2.1; Livy *Epit.* | 124; Vell. 2.70.4–5; Val. Max. 6.4.5 (suspiciously similar in tone to *Brut.* 29.9, 40.7–9); Suet. *Aug.* 13.1; Flor. 2.17.11, 14–15 (telescoping the two battles); Eutrop. 7.3.1–2; Oros. 6.18.6 (telescoping the two battles); *De vir. ill.* 82.6. Of these only P. *Brut.* and Appian are important. On this occasion P.’s account of the actual battle is certainly no worse than Appian’s, which is very largely a typical stereotyped ‘set-piece’ battle description, similar in tone to Dio’s account of the first battle. Appian’s description of the aftermath of the battle, however, is good. {Magnino *ad loc.* thinks that Appian’s unique detail comes from Volumnius.} For modern discussions of the battle see 41.1–43.9n. On the date see 47.5n.

1. Προαγαγών ... χρόνον: thus P. has got Brutus to the point of the second battle without giving any precise indication of his motives, though it is true that his narrative generally has given a vivid enough picture of psychological drift and partial psychological disintegration in the Republican camp. Appian 4.123–124 represents Brutus as yielding unwillingly to the pressure of his men and officers, with the fear of desertions a prominent factor in his decision to fight. (On the question of Brutus’ *dictum*, comparing himself to Pompey, see on 40.3.) Dio 47.48.1–2 makes fear of desertions the key factor. An Appian/Dio mix is accepted by e.g. Ferrero 206f., Syme 205, whereas Kromayer 117, Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 87, and others suppose that the deciding factor was fear that Antony would succeed in severing the Republican lines of supply. Obviously one cannot pronounce a definitive judgement on this question: it is enough to point out that the ancient and modern hypotheses are by no means mutually exclusive. {Cf. Pelling, *CAH²* X.8 for a similar blend.}

Appian, Dio, and P. *Brut.* (reading between the lines) agree that Brutus was reluctant to fight. (*Caes.* 69.13, where after the second visitation of the *φάσμα* Brutus rushes knowingly to meet | his doom, tells us more about P.’s theology in the *Caesar* than about the historical facts.) This is no doubt correct: the serenity, attested by Val. Max. 6.4.5 probably reflects a bogus tradition (see on 29.9 and 40.7–9).

ἐπέιχε ... χρόνον: this is clearly implied by Appian 4.128.532, though he attributes it simply to *παρασκευή*—hardly a sufficient explanation.

1–2. ὑποβίαι ... ἔργον: fear of desertions is not mentioned by Appian or Dio once Brutus has actually drawn up his army.

3. εἶτ’ ... ἐκαλείτο: this incident is not attested elsewhere.

Καμουλάτος: *RE* Suppl. 1.273 (Münzer). The name is Celtic (Münzer, cl. *CIL* 12.2480—Gallia Narbonensis). Nothing else is known of this man, although he may well have been one of the Caesarian veterans whose loyalty Brutus and Cassius were worried about (Appian 4.124.521).

4. τοῦτον ... καταφερομένου: P.'s narrative is at any rate a great improvement upon Appian 4.128, where battle is joined immediately after the fight between the two eagles (cf. 48.4n.).

ὄραν ἐνάτην: c. 3 P.M. This detail also in Appian.

5–8. καὶ ... στρατεύματος: none of the detail of this has any close parallel in Appian or Dio, though Appian's account agrees with P.'s in very general terms. Dio's is simply too short to make comparison fruitful. All three agree that the battle was hard fought.

καὶ συνεπέρρωσαν ... τεταραγμένοις: the cavalry are not mentioned in Appian. Dio 47.48.5 mentions that they fought well.

7. ἐκυκλοῦντο: cf. *Cat. min.* 73.5 κλινομένης τῆς φάλαγγος. Appian 4.128.536–7, though without details, agrees that the Caesarians pushed back one part (unspecified) of the Republican line and then wheeled against the rest.

αὐτὸν ... ἀποδεικνύμενον: other sources do not mention Brutus' |
465 personal part in the battle. P.'s comment here is sufficiently vague as to suggest that it is either simply Republican propaganda or even Plutarchean invention.

7–8. ᾧ δὲ ... τῶν δὲ Κασσίου: a highly contrived rhetorical contrast, to be explained by P.'s anxiety to demonstrate the pattern of cause and effect between Brutus' failure to press home his success in the first battle and his defeat in the second. The rhetoric is ugly, but here at least has point.

8. οἱ δὲ ... στρατεύματος: a more general description of the confusion caused by the defeated troops among the rest of the army in Appian 4.128.537–8.

9. ἐνταῦθα ... νεκροῖς: other accounts of the death of Cato's son (*RE* 22.166f., Miltner) are *Cat. min.* 73.5, Vell. 2.71.2, Appian 4.135.571. Velleius records the bare fact. *Cat. min.* is similar to *Brut.* but not obviously modelled on it. Appian is independent. Zonaras 10.20 reproduces the *Brut.* account more or less *ad verbum*.

ταπτόμενος ... ἔφυγεν: Ziegler's reading, restored from Zonaras. It is hard to understand his enthusiasm for Zonaras over the *MSS* order (his arguments in *Rh. Mus.* 1932, 78f. are unconvincing). The sequence 'neither

did he flee nor did he even yield any ground' must surely be right. It is the second verb that requires stress.

<ἑαυτὸν>: rightly added by Ziegler on the basis of the text of Zonaras and (more important) the reading of *Cat. min.*

10. ἔπιπτον ... προκινδυνεύοντες: not attested in Appian or Dio.

κράτιστοι: 'bravest' (Perrin) is unnecessarily to restrict the application of *κράτιστοι*, which surely = the 'flos reipublicae'. One senses a parallel with Vell. 2.71.2 'Tum Catonis filius cecidit; eadem Lucullum Hortensiumque, eminentissimorum civium filios, fortuna abstulit', Eutrop. 7.3.2 'secundo (proelio) Brutum et infinitatem nobilitatem ... victam interfecerunt', cf. Livy | *Epit.* 124 ... (lacuna!) 'inter quos Q. Hortensius occisus est'. Livian influence!?

ἔπιπτον ... προκινδυνεύοντες: a fascinating observation. *προκινδυνεύοντες* is ambiguous—(i) 'risking their lives on behalf of Brutus'; (ii) 'running the risk' (sc. of death) 'before Brutus'. The former reading clearly represents P.'s primary meaning, but the latter may also be relevant. The second battle of Philippi is the death struggle of the Republic and Cato's son and the 'flos reipublicae' die heroically, leaving Brutus alive but having lived too long, hence the secondary meaning 'running the final risk before Brutus'. This secondary meaning becomes more prominent at 51.2 (clearly picking up 49.10), when Brutus has indeed lived too long and is in fact on the point of suicide. At the same time the primary meaning 'risking their lives on behalf of Brutus' has interesting implications (especially pointed in 51.2, where *πρό* + genit. = 'on behalf of', is a highly poetical usage). While the heroism of Cato's son, Flavius, and Labeo obviously earns P.'s approval, it is in a sense misdirected, for they are no longer fighting for the Republic but simply for Brutus. Surely one can connect this with the veiled implications of 44.2 and 45.6–9. By this clever verbal play on the two applications of *πρό* P. seems to be hinting that not only had Brutus lived too long, because the days of the Republic were long gone, but also his followers were no longer even fighting for the Republic—Brutus has *become* the Republic, and once a single individual *becomes* the Republic then the whole concept of the Republic no longer has any validity. Having gone so far, one might also wonder if the punning ambiguity of 49.10 and 51.2 can be related to the punning ambiguity of 10.4–5. At 10.4 Brutus is ready to *προαποθνήσκειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας*. Cassius' reply is that many Romans will join Brutus in the act of *προαποθνήσκειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας*, by not allowing Brutus to *προαποθνήσκειν*, in | the sense of 'die before them', But by 49.10 and 51.2 the only *προαποθνήσκειν* the 'flos reipublicae' can do is *τοῦ Βρούτου προκινδυνεύειν, νοτ τῆς ἐλευθερίας*. In the assassination of Caesar Republicanism and Brutus are inextricably linked—by the time of the second battle of Philippi, after all the intervening illegalities and extraordinary commands, the cause of Brutus has nothing to do with

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Republicanism, for the Republic itself is finally dead. That, at least, is what I take P. to be implying. If that is the implication, the discretion and sleight of hand with which it is done is most impressive.

Chs. 50–53: The death of Brutus

The climax of the *Life*. The whole section is beautifully written and full weight is given to the heroism of Brutus' suicide and the worth of the ideals for which he stood, yet at the same time the predominant note is one of acceptance of the demise of the Republic and of reconciliation between the followers of Brutus and the Caesarian leaders he opposed.

Ch. 50: The story of the loyal Lucilius

1–9. Ἦν δὲ ... διετέλεσε: the story of Lucilius is also told in Appian 4.129.542–545 and alluded to in *Ant.* 69.2 (with a cross-reference to *Brutus*). Zonaras 10.20 excerpts *Brut.* closely. Appian's account is very similar to P.'s, though much less detailed. Direct verbal indebtedness is not apparent. Ultimate source? Bibulus is ruled out by the fact that he died before Actium. Messalla is a remote possibility. Lucilius himself might also be considered. Russell, *Plutarch*, 140, plausibly suggests that Lucilius may have left a written record of Antony's last days, since Lucilius was one of Antony's companions till the end (*Ant.* 60.2) and P. is notably well informed about the final period of | Antony's life. If so, he must presumably have been spared by Octavian, and in such a work an account of how he came into Antony's service, and of how he was spared on two occasions by the enemies of his former masters might not have come amiss. Against this, however, one might expect a reference to Lucilius' memoir in P. if it did indeed contain the narrative of *Brut.* 50. The most likely source is surely Asinius Pollio, friend of Antony and yet admirer of Brutus, and the usual common source of P. and Appian. 468

Although one must accept the historicity of the story, its general tone is redolent of a fairly familiar type, particularly in pseudo-philosophical historiography: the story of ἐλευθερία/παρρησία unexpectedly rewarded. (In P. cf. e.g. the encounters of Diogenes and Timoclea with Alexander, or Cloelia with Lars Porsenna.) Structurally, it forms a sort of pendant to the Clodius story. It follows naturally from 49.9–10 because Lucilius, like Cato and the rest, is an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, even if his bravery takes a different form, and also 'puts his life at risk' (παρακινδυνεύσας).

1. Λουκίλλιος: *RE* 30.1617 (Münzer). A Roman (*Ant.* 69.2), otherwise unidentified.

βαρβάρους: these could be Germans, Gauls or Thracians.

2. καὶ πιθανός ... θαρρῶν: cf. 50.5 and 50.8 below, and on Brutus' relations with Antony see 18.5n.

3. οἱ δ' ... νομίζοντες: a characteristic piece of Plutarchean 'psychologizing', without parallel in Appian.

4. αὐτὸς ... γενόμενον: cf. above.

τῆς δόξης: on Brutus' δόξα see 29.4n.

ἄγραν: cf. 50.8 below, where Appian also has this image.

469 5. ὑπέστη: 'stopped'. The *MSS* reading is adequately supported by *Phoc.* 9.2 (Sintenis), though ἐφίσταμαι is certainly more common in this sense. There is a similar transitive | use of ὑφίστημι in *X. An.* 4.1.14, *Plb.* 1.50.6. Cf. also *Alex.* 16.9, where Hamilton is unduly agnostic. {But Perrin and Scott-Kilvert–Pelling take it as intransitive, as apparently at *Phoc.* 9.2.}

Βροῦτον Ἀντώνιε: more natural than the *MSS* order. Cf. the emphatic Βροῦτος μὲν οὐχ ἔάλωκεν in Appian.

μὴ ... ἀρετῆς: interestingly different is Appian's οὐδὲ ἀλώσεται ποτε πρὸς κακίας ἀρετή. In the immediate context in both Appian and P. here (particularly after οὐδ' ἂν ἔλοι πολέμιος) a reference to κακία is the more obviously appropriate. The question is: is the reference to τύχη an invention of P. or had the original tradition already fragmented? Debate about the relative powers of τύχη and ἀρετή was a philosophical and rhetorical commonplace, and for their admirers the failure of Brutus and Cassius, both in their different ways men of consummate ἀρετή, would have raised the problem in an acute form. Both men were themselves exercised by the problem (cf. 37.2n. on Cassius' conversion to Epicureanism and 51.1n. for the story of Brutus' quotation from the tragedy on the impotence of ἀρετή against τύχη). On the other hand, P. personally was greatly interested in this question: cf. the *De fortuna Romanorum*, *De Alexandri fortuna aut virtute*, and *passim* in the *Lives*. And the idea that τύχη was against the Liberators is an important one in the *Brutus*. Nor does it seem likely (given the very close parallels between P. and Appian here) that the original tradition had fragmented. The original tradition must always have had an element of philosophical allegory (about the impossibility of 'capturing' the wise man). It *may* also have raised the question of the relative powers of τύχη and ἀρετή (Appian's Ἀντώνιος ... τὴν τύχην ὁμοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τάνδρὸς καὶ ἀρετὴν ... is interesting, but of course Appian could be writing with an eye on P. as well as on the common source). Thus it is almost certain that the discrepancy between 470 τύχη and κακία in P. and Appian is to be explained by the | hypothesis that P. has deliberately altered the wording of the original source in order to maintain the theme of the struggle between the ἀρετή of Brutus and τύχη. P., of course, has few scruples about such a procedure: cf. Babut 288, n. 1, and H. Martin, *AJP* 82 (1961), 165f., for other examples.

The equation of Brutus and ἀρετή suggests that Brutus is being described in the terminology of the Stoic sage (cf. Tacitus' famous

statement that Nero decided to destroy ‘virtutem ipsam’ by putting to death Thræsea Paetus and Barea Soranus, *Ann.* 16.21, or the descriptions of Cato in Lucan 2.243, 287 etc.). Consistent with this is the statement of the impossibility of an enemy ever ‘capturing’ Brutus (cf. e.g. *Stoic. absurd. poet. dic.* 1057E). It does not follow from this that the reference is an embellishment of the first century A.D. and the later Stoic hagiographical tradition. It could have been made by a contemporary, even Lucilius himself, in the light of Brutus’ close association with the school of Antiochus of Ascalon and with Cato Uticensis, himself effectively ‘canonized’ in 46/45 B.C. (cf. on 2.1 and 2.3).

6. ἀλλ’... ἐαυτοῦ: the sense is ‘whether he is found alive or dead, his state will be worthy of him’; ἀξίως covers both ζῶν and νέκρος, and κείμενος has to do duty for two applications: ‘lying’ dead and ‘in a condition’ worthy of himself. Perrin misses this. As a triumphant assertion of Brutus’ superiority to fortune, however, the sentence reads awkwardly and the text may not be sound. (Zonaras’ order is no better. An ἦ before ζῶν would help a little.)

7. τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ: χαλεπῶς φέρω + dat. is rare, but found in Xenophon (e.g. *An.* 1.3.3, *H.G.* 3.4.9, 5.1.29) and Pausanias (e.g. 1.10.4), so the text is justifiable. Perhaps the ‘hunting’ context explains the Xenophonic touch?!

8. ὅ τι ... ἐχρησάμην: ‘cum contemptu quodam dictum’ | (Voegelin). I 471
doubt this very much.

9. ὕστερον ... διετέλεσε: Lucilius was still with Antony in the last days after Actium (*Ant.* 69.2).

Ch. 51: The last night of Brutus' life; he decides on suicide

51.1–52.8. Βρούτος ... ἀποθανεῖν: after the elevating story of the bravery of Lucilius, whose self-sacrificing act secured Brutus the necessary respite from his pursuers, P. returns directly to the fate of Brutus without giving any further details of the rout of the Republicans and their pursuit by the Caesarians (full details in Appian 4.129, cf. Dio 47.48.5). Other accounts of Brutus' last hours are *Caes.* 69.14 (a very brief paraphrase of events, not particularly close verbally to *Brut.*); Appian 4.130.546–131.552; Dio 47.49.1–2; Livy *Epit.* 124; Vell. 2.70.4–5; Flor. 2.17.14; Eutrop. 7.3.2; Oros. 6.18.16; *De vir. ill.* 82.6. Zonaras 10.20 excerpts a few details from *Brutus*, mixing them with Dio. Of all these, only *Brutus*, Appian and Dio are of any real value either for the historical facts or for the purposes of source comparison. P.'s *Brutus* account is naturally far longer than Appian's or Dio's. All three sources contain material not preserved in either of the other two, and all three must ultimately reflect eye-witness accounts. Volumnius is clearly P.'s main source (51.1, 3–4, 52.2–3), but not his only one (52.8).

1. Βρούτος ... καθίσας: Appian says vaguely that Brutus fled. Dio's χωρίον τι ἐρμυμόν and Velleius' 'tumulus' roughly correspond to P.'s τόπω ... προκειμένην. The detailed topographical description is typical P. and helps to put the pathos of Brutus' plight in sharp focus.

472 **ἤδη ... ὄντος:** as often, P.'s narrative from 50.1ff. is arranged paratactically. But although this detail has point in its | immediate context, one may perhaps also see in it a technical device to suggest simultaneous narrative (cf. 50.3).

ὕλωδες: the MSS reading is guaranteed by Sintenis' parallel, *Pyrrh.* 21.7 ποταμόν ὑλώδη, and Zonaras' χωρίον ὑλώδες (a P./Dio mix).

ὀλίγων ... ὄντων: in sharp contrast Appian says that Brutus had a ἱκανὸν πλῆθος (4.130.546), of something less than four full legions (4.131.549). His account is internally consistent, since on the following day Brutus considers forcing his way through the enemy lines to his camp (4.131.549), and may be supported by Dio 47.49.1 and 3. Consequently, there is good reason for supposing that P. has falsified the historical record in the interests of playing up the pathos of his narrative. (Note too that according to Appian 4.131.549 Brutus did not contact his troops personally. If so, this would have made it easy for P. to suppress their presence entirely.)

πρῶτα ... κακῶν: closely similar is Appian 4.130.546, though he is clearly not working from P. as he does not mention the second quotation from Greek tragedy but does record the (doubtless spurious) tradition that the line from *Medea* was later used by Antony in sore straits.

Βολούμνιος ... ἐπιλαθέσθαι: *HRR* II, 53 F 2 {= *FRHist* 47 F 2}.

Ζεῦ ... κακῶν: *E. Med.* 332 (Medea referring to Jason). Who had Brutus in mind, Antony or Octavian? Obviously both are possible—Octavian, as

(arguably) ultimately responsible for the renewal of civil war after Caesar's assassination; Antony, as one formerly close to Brutus who had (arguably) betrayed him. Appian, presumably reflecting the indication of his source (cf. the reworking of the *προσθήκη*-motif), says that it was Antony. P. says nothing, perhaps because he was unsure (cf. his failure to explicate Brutus' Delphic remark at 24.6), or perhaps to avoid rupturing the mood of reconciliation which he is beginning to create. As Brutus himself | will hardly have interpreted his remark to his companions, we are at liberty to speculate ourselves. Despite Appian, one suspects that Brutus had Octavian, not Antony, in mind, for he had consistently seen that Octavian was the greater ultimate threat to the Republic. {So also Moles, *Latomus* 772–3; Magnino *ad loc.* and Drummond on *FRHist* 47 F 2 prefer Antony.} It would be nice to think that Pollio wrote 'scilicet Antonius'!

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λάθοι: better than *λάθη*—see Page *ad loc.*

τοῦ δ' ἐπιλαθέσθαι: this innocent statement raises interesting questions—
 (i) can Volumnius' *ἕτερος στίχος* be identified with the quotation recorded by Dio 47.49.2, the gist of which is also preserved by Flor. 2.17.11 (see the rather unkind comments of Forster, *Loeb* ed. 310, n. 1) and Zon. 10.20? These lines, from an unknown tragedy {= Diogenes of Sinope, 88 F 3 Sn}, and spoken by Heracles (Dio), run:

ὦ τλήμων ἀρετή, λόγος ἄρ' ἦσθ', ἐγὼ δέ σε
 ὡς ἔργον ἦσκουν· σὺ δ' ἄρ' ἐδούλευες τύχῃ.

(ii) is it credible that Brutus uttered such a sentiment as *ὦ τλήμων* etc., in any case? (iii) why does P. not record these arresting lines?

(i) The identification is often posited (e.g. Rice Holmes, *Architect*, 88, n. 3, and many others). P.'s use of the word *στίχος* is not an objection: it could simply be a tiny inaccuracy of either Volumnius or P. himself, but *στίχος* can anyway be used of a couplet (*LSJ s.v.*, cl. *B.Mus.Inscr.* 1074). More seriously, in Florus the lines are spoken by Brutus with his dying breath, and in Dio, though his account is less melodramatic, the implication is still that they were spoken only just before Brutus committed suicide. Thus for the identification to work, one would have to suppose that these lines, interpreted as despairing and revealing of a final consciousness by Brutus of the futility of his career, were transferred from their proper place to form Brutus' *ultima verba*, and that they came from an eye-witness other than Volumnius, who | could not remember, or perhaps pretended not to be able to remember, a sentiment which showed his hero to be less heroic than he would like. This hypothesis is of course a possible reconstruction of events, though it is rather elaborate.

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(ii) Early editors (e.g. Coraes and Voegelin) argued that the noble Brutus could never have uttered such a 'pessima sententia'. This is naïve, and there are anyway plenty of parallels for such despairing utterances by

better men than Brutus *in extremis* (e.g. ‘My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me!’). As for Volumnius’ failure to record the sentiment, one may point out that Volumnius was *not* beside Brutus when he killed himself (52.6–7). On the other hand, while there must have been people other than Volumnius able to record Brutus’ *ultima verba*, there is no corroboratory evidence for the Florus/Dio tradition. (Horace, *C.* 2.7.11, and *Epist.* 1.6.31 and 1.17.41, yield nothing, though Nisbet and Hubbard are inclined to toy with the idea that they do.) Given that Brutus probably did utter some remarks about *τύχη* shortly before his death (cf. 52.5), it is entirely possible (and in my view likely) that this despairing sentiment was fraudulently attributed to him in order to demonstrate that at the last even Brutus himself recognized the meaninglessness of his much vaunted pursuit of virtue. The lines must have been well known and would have suited this purpose excellently.

(iii) Discussion of the first two questions must necessarily be speculative. The third question is much more interesting. P. himself was thoroughly familiar with the quotation from the lost tragedy: *De superst.* 165A cites it directly and with disapproval, and it *may* also lie behind *De fort. Alex.* 343C. Might he therefore have suppressed it here as being unworthy of his hero, Brutus? One cannot say for certain, but I am inclined to think that if he had known of the tradition that Brutus uttered it, he would have been so interested by it that he would have mentioned it, if only to combat | its authenticity. (To use it in support of his belief in the inevitability of empire he would, I think, have considered too heavy-handed.) P., after all, is greatly exercised by the problem of how men should bear the blows of Fortune in their final moments (cf. *Mar.* 46, and see on 40.8 above). The conclusion is that P. simply did not know of the tradition that Brutus uttered these despairing lines just before death, and that this seems to be a case where P. has failed to make systematic use of the source that must surely lie behind Florus and Dio, that is, Livy.

{Moles, *Latomus* 775–9 discusses this again, engaging also with Clarke, *Noblest Roman* 71 and 142 n. 26, and adding some discussion of the view of Heracles implied by the quotation and by its Stoic connotations.}

2. μετὰ ... τεχνιτῶν: nothing of this in Appian or Dio. P. means us to understand that Brutus is already contemplating suicide.

πρό: ambiguous—see on 49.10.

Φλαβίου: C. Flavius: *RE* 6.2526 (Münzer). See also Shackleton Bailey on *Ad Fam.* 13.31[302] for a useful corrective of Münzer’s views. P.’s statement that Flavius was Brutus’ ‘Praefectus fabrum’ is wrong if Flavius is the ‘C. Flav. Hemic. Leg. Propr.’ of Crawford 504 (discussion in I, 516). An alternative identification is with the C. Flavius killed at Perugia (Appian 5.49.207). Crawford rightly regards the former as more likely, for it is easier

to believe that P. got the essential fact right—Flavius was killed—rather than his exact position in Brutus’ army.

Λαβεῶνος: cf. 12.4n. P.’s account here is inconsistent with Appian 4.135.572—a detailed account of Labeo’s heroic suicide in his tent. Despite the difficulty over Flavius (above) P. should surely be preferred

51.3–52.6. ἐν ... συνήθης: none of this in Appian, Dio, or any other source. {51.3–4 is printed as *FRHist* 47 T 1.}

3. Δάρδανος: *RE* 4.2179 (Münzer). Evidently a Greek freedman, like Pindarus (43.7).

4. ἡθικῶς: Perrin’s ‘with a very expressive smile’ is | a little heavy. {Moles 476 would have thought the same of Scott-Kilvert–Pelling’s ‘significantly’} Better ‘tranquilly’, ‘pleasantly’, cf. *De aud. poet.* 20E ἐν ἡθελ καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς λεγομένοις (mistranslated by Babbitt, Loeb *Moralia* I, 105), and on this later meaning of ἡθικός and cognates see Lucas on Arist. *Poet.* 1356a1 and Russell on ‘Longinus’ 9.15. The point is that Brutus, after 51.2 ἐπεστέναξεν, is now at peace with himself, having (as immediately becomes clear) resolved on suicide.

‘ἐκπέποται ... κομισθήσεται’: a memorable *dictum*. Brutus is speaking on two levels: the literal and the metaphorical. He himself has ‘drunk up’ his life, the others will live to drink again. I cannot find an exact parallel for this metaphorical use of ἐκπίνω but the idea is a natural one and one can compare the common metaphorical use of ἐξαντλέω. If Brutus was speaking in Latin (which is presumably the case), he probably used ‘exhaurio’, which is often used metaphorically in this general way. Perhaps in the emphasis upon the drink one may sense a certain light evocation of the last pages of the *Phaedo*. {Drummond, *FRHist* I.405 n. 7 adds that Volumnius’ professed inability to recall the second quotation also ‘potentially place him in the tradition of the Platonic narrator (cf. *Phaedo* 103a).}

5. Στατύλλιος: cf. 12.3n.

(ἄλλως ... ἦν): for the Caesarians’ blockade of Brutus’ camp see Appian 4.130.548, Dio 47.48.5–49.1. Both record that Brutus had earlier intended to force his way through to his camp.

Ch. 52: Suicide of Brutus

1. Προϊούσης ... ἐλάλει: thus in P. the finally determining factor in Brutus' decision to kill himself is Statyllius' failure to return. In Appian 4.131.550 it is the refusal of his officers to attempt to break through the enemy's lines and regain the camp. In Dio 47.49.1 it is Brutus' failure to break out, together with the knowledge that some of his troops had come to terms with the Caesarians. P. records the version he does presumably because he is following Volumnius, though it perhaps also provides a sort of |
477 structural parallel to the experiences of Cassius (43.4–8). P.'s version is not strictly irreconcilable with Appian or Dio, though the focus is naturally much more restricted.

Προϊούσης ... νυκτός: Vell. 2.70.4 seems to agree that Brutus killed himself during the night, whereas Appian 4.131.549 makes it the following day. Dio 47.49.1 may support P. So also may Brutus' words at 52.5, though little stress can be placed on them.

Κλεῖτον: *RE* 11.668 (Münzer). Nowhere else mentioned.

Δάρδανον: already glossed as Brutus' shield-bearer at 51.3. But the repetition may have a point: to emphasize that Brutus was loved by all classes—servants (Cleitus), shield-bearers (Dardanus), and philosophical intimates (Volumnius)—all reluctant to let Brutus die. For the general theme cf. 29.3.

2. αὐτόν: a clear indication that Volumnius is P.'s main source in these two chapters. {*FRHist* print 52.2–3 as 47 T 2.}

τῶν ... ἀσκήσεως: Perrin's 'their student life' is loose, but gets the general sense. {But Scott-Kilvert–Pelling take as 'appealed to his philosophical doctrines and training'.}

3. ἀλλὰ ... ποδῶν: rightly restored by Ziegler (for detailed arguments see *Rh. Mus.* 81 [1932], 79f.), on the basis of the reading in Zonaras. The *MSS* reading is clumsy.

4. φαιδρός: cf. 16.4n.

ἡδονήν: the cognate accusative is rather poetic appropriately, for this is Brutus the philosopher giving thanks as he prepares to leave this life.

τῶν φίλων ... ἐψεύσατο: not a reference to the events of 49.10 and 51.2, but rather to the fact that none of Brutus' partners in the conspiracy against Caesar broke faith—cf. 57.6 (= *Comp.* 4.6) and Appian 2.114.475. Cf. also 12.8n.

5. τῇ τύχῃ: again the theme that *τύχη* was against the Liberators is heavily emphasized (even if, as is likely, P. is simply reproducing Volumnius more or less 'straight'). Brutus' |
478 reproach to *τύχη* is insufficient to spoil his otherwise impeccable philosophical deportment at the end of his life.

οὐκ ἔχθες ... πρώην: a slightly problematic utterance. Early editors saw in the phrase the proverbial *χθίζα τε καὶ πρώϊζα* (*vel. sim.*) of *Il.* 2.303, Hdt. 2.53.1, Aristoph. *Frogs* 726 etc. = ‘the other day’. This idiom was adopted in Latin poetry at least (e.g. Cat. 61.130, Plaut. *Most.* 953, *Stich.* 152). For Voegelin (and others) this poses a difficulty, because the idiom is usually used to imply a contrast between ‘just recently’ and the remote past. Voegelin thinks therefore that *ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν* is a copyist’s misguided ‘correction’ of (e.g.) *πάλαι*. This is clearly wrong: the thought ‘I am more fortunate than my enemies *even now*, when I am defeated’ is absolutely required by the context. Nor is it true that the Greek idiom *necessarily* requires a contrast with the remote past (cf. Cat. 61.130). It is not in any case clear that Brutus has to be regarded as using the Greek idiom. The *οὐδέ* implies a disjunction between ‘yesterday’ and ‘the day before’ (which of course is common—cf. e.g. Thuc. 3.113). Brutus may simply be saying ‘I was obviously fortunate yesterday, when I had not yet been defeated; I was obviously still more fortunate the day before, before I had even decided on battle. But I am still fortunate now, even after defeat’. But, whatever the difficulties of exact interpretation, the general meaning is clear.

δόξαν: cf. 29.4n.

ἀπολείψουσιν: the text gives tolerable sense, but it seems much more natural that Brutus should be saying that Antony and Octavian will not be able to destroy his *δόξα* (as opposed to his person) by force of arms. Coraes’ *ἀπαλείψουσιν*, {already noted as a correction in *L*²,} is quite attractive: the metaphor *ἀπαλείφειν* seems appropriate since the *δόξα* is what Brutus will have ‘bequeathed’. {It is printed by Flacelière and commended by Gärtner in his revision of Ziegler.} Voegelin’s *ἀπολοῦσιν* is also good (picked up by *ἀπολέσαντες*): | they can destroy good men physically, but they cannot destroy their *δόξα*—but perhaps too far from the *MSS* reading.

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δοκεῖν: with a play on *δόξα*.

6. Σπράτων: *RE* 4A.315 (Münzer); of Aegeae (Macedonia) according to Vell. 2.70.4; an Epirote according to Appian 4.131.551.

7–8. καὶ ... ἀποθανεῖν: other accounts of the mechanics of the suicide are *Caes.* 69.14; Appian 4.131.551–2; Dio 47.49.2; Livy *Epit.* 124; Vell. 2.70.4–5 (with much physical detail); Flor. 2.17.14; *De vir. ill.* 82.6.

7. καὶ ... ἐτελεύτησεν: this version, in which Strato is essentially passive, presumably stems from Volumnius and is in a minority of one (*Caes.* follows the version of 52.8 {or rather ‘conflates what *Brut.* 52.7–8 gives as two versions, the first that Brutus pushed the blade into himself with both hands and fell on it, the second that his friend Strato reluctantly held the blade, eyes averted’, Pelling *ad loc.*}). It seems to be not quite accurate: it goes against not only the consensus view, but also Brutus’ wishes, in so far

as they can be reconstructed from 52.1–3, which shows that Brutus wanted someone else to help in his suicide; and, most important, against the opinion of Messalla (53.1), who must have had Strato's own testimony. The slight inaccuracy could be explained mundanely if Volumnius was not one of the two or three who accompanied Brutus at the last (as indeed the wording of 52.6 suggests), and thus could not quite see what was going on. {Drummond, *FRHist* I.405 prefers to speculate that Volumnius was 'perhaps unwilling to acknowledge that a Greek rhetorician (Strato) had eventually provided the assistance he himself had refused his friend'.}

8. πολλὰ ... δεηθέντος: cf. Appian, where Strato only obliges through shame when Brutus calls on one of his servants instead.

τὸ στέρνον: so also *Caes.* and Vell. (the left nipple). Florus and Appian make it the side, *De vir. ill.*, definitely wrongly, the neck (? confusion with Cassius).

**Ch. 53: Subsequent reconciliation of the loyal Strato
and Messalla with Octavian; Antony gives
Brutus' body honourable burial**

1–2. Τοῦτον ... Ἑλλήνων: nowhere else attested, but a | story of the sort P. 480
is fond of (cf. 50.9). Conceivably from Messalla (as 52.8 might also be)? The
respect Brutus' intimates receive from Octavian illustrates the important
theme that 'even his enemies' respected Brutus, yet it also helps to suggest
a sort of reconciliation between the ideals of Brutus and those of the
Empire, as embodied by Octavian.

2. ἔν τε ... πόνοις: this text is perfectly all right
τῶν ... Ἑλλήνων: a characteristic touch of pride in Greek distinction.

3. αὐτὸν ... ἐγενόμην: not elsewhere attested.
αὐτοῖς: Reiske's (not Ziegler's) αὐτῶ certainly makes better sense.

4. Τὸν ... ἀπέπεμψε: on the treatment of Brutus' body see also 58.1 (= *Comp.* 5.1) below (where the text is quite satisfactory and the discussion of Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 260, n. 4, poor); *Ant.* 22.6–8 (cf. 28.1 above), 89.5 (= *Comp.* 2.5); Appian 4.135.568; Dio 47.49.2; Val. Max. 5.1.11; Suet. *Aug.* 13.1. *Ant.* adds the information that Antony first reproached Brutus for the death of his brother, and is not verbally close to *Brut.* Appian, though brief, is very close. Dio reports that Brutus' head was sent to Rome but was thrown into the sea during a stormy voyage from Dyrrachium. Suet. is similar but less accurate; {see Wardle *ad loc.*}. Val. Max. is very similar to *Brut.* Conceivably the Dio/Suetonius tradition can be reconciled with the others by the hypothesis that Antony and Octavian had different ideas about the treatment of Brutus' corpse. Perhaps P. did not know of the fate of Brutus' head, for if he had, he might have reported it as part of the continuing saga of defeated Republicans who lost their heads (cf. 43.8n.). But he might have felt that so macabre a tale would have spoiled the note almost of reconciliation conveyed by 53.1–4.

P. is evidently greatly impressed by Antony's magnanimous | treatment 481
of his fallen foe. {See also Pelling on *Ant.* 22.7–8.} For another Antonian
φιλανθρώπειμα see *Ant.* 3.10–11. Cf. also *Demetr.* 17.1, and the emphasis P.
places on the similar treatment (alleged) of Darius' corpse by Alexander
(*Alex.* 43.5, *De fort. Alex.* 332F).

53.5–7. Πορκίαν ἐστίν: other sources for the death of Porcia are *Cat. min.* 73.6; Appian 4.136.574; Dio 47.49.3 (very brief); Val. Max. 4.6.5; Polyæn. 8.32; Mart. 1.42 (all giving the version of 53.5). *Cat. min.* cross-references to *Brut.* 53.5. All accounts are very similar. The ultimate source is presumably Nicolaus, as indeed P. seems to imply at 53.7. {G. Delvaux,

Latomus 52 (1993), 617–22 suggests that Plutarch draws the Valerius Maximus citation from Thræsea Paetus' *Life* of Cato.}

5. **Νικόλαος**: *FGrH* 90 F 99.

ὁ φιλόσοφος: so also described in *Quaest. conviv.* 723D. We may see in the emphasis a device for giving weight to Nicolaus' evidence (1.7 and n.).

Οὐαλέριος Μάξιμος: 4.6.5.

βουλομένην ... παρεφύλαττον: similar details in all sources except *Cat. min.* and Dio.

ἐκ ... καταπιεῖν: in Appian her servants are carrying the hot embers on a brazier when Porcia seizes them; in Polyænus Porcia asks for them, apparently to warm herself.

συγκλείσασαν: deleted by Ziegler as a gloss (*στόμα* of course stays) on *μύσασαν*. Correctly, I think. {Ziegler's text deletes *στόμα* as well, though his apparatus suggests he meant to delete only *συγκλείσασαν καὶ*.}

6–7. **καίτοι ... ἐστίν**: a typical piece of Plutarchean irresolution. On the one hand he is reluctant to give up so good a story as 53.5, ending the *Life* on a note of high drama and heroism; on the other hand he is sufficiently conscientious a historian to record evidence which shows the story to be false; yet in the final analysis he cannot quite bring himself to reject the story unequivocally (*εἴπερ ... ἐστίν*). {Similarly Moles, *Letters* 159–60.}

482 6. **καίτοι ... ἐπιστολή**: this letter is not extant, but | there seems no reason to deny its authenticity, since a forger would hardly have contradicted the sensational version of 53.5 (cf. the excellent observations of Tyrrell and Purser on the related question of the authenticity of *Ad Brut.* 1.9 [18]). P.'s qualification *εἴπερ ἄρα* shows that he is aware that some of the letters passing under Brutus' name in his time were forged, but in the particular circumstances it does not show critical acumen, but rather an artistic reluctance to ditch 53.5. Porcia died in the early summer of 43, as her death is referred to in Cic. *Ad Brut.* 1.9 [18] (Cicero to Brutus, June 43) and her ill health in *Ad Brut.* 1.17 [26].7 (Brutus to Atticus, June 43), the authenticity of both letters being above suspicion (see Tyrrell and Purser for very judicious discussion and cf. on 22.4ff. above). Tyrrell and Purser reasonably surmise that she died of a plague which was ravaging Italy at about that time (Dio 45.17.8), a hypothesis which seems to fit P.'s remarks at 53.6 quite well. {Moles discusses this further in *Letters*, 159–61, with further engagement with Shackleton Bailey.}

It is worth recalling that P. was conversant with *Ad Brut.* 1.17 [26] (cf. 22.4n.), but has apparently failed to connect Brutus' words about Porcia's ill health with the question of the circumstances of her death, even though that was a letter whose authenticity he did not doubt.

ἐπιστόλιον: a feline touch? Cf. the use of *ἐπιστόλιον* in 2.8.

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I have appended no commentary on the *Comparison of Dion and Brutus*, as being outside the scope of this study. Most of the comparison is the usual stuff—no better and no worse than P.'s other formal *Comparisons*. Yet, more than many, it is important as containing P.'s final verdict on his hero. 2.2 emphatically picks up 47.7 and makes clear P.'s belief that, in the end, monarchy was necessary, and even beneficial, for Rome. And the final anecdote | about Augustus and the people of Mediolanum implies the same sort of reconciliation between the dead Brutus and the Caesarians as P. has already hinted at in 50.1–9 and 53.1–4. Brutus, P. delicately suggests, was wrong to suppose that Roman monarchy could any longer be delayed, yet we can still revere his memory and admire the ideals for which he stood: 'even his enemies' respected him. (*Cic.* 49.5–6 serves a similar function.) One can say more. For all his often irritating sanctimoniousness and his zeal for imparting simple moral lessons (on this aspect of the *Lives* see Russell, *Plutarch*, 130, 142; Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled*, 256–275), P. shows acute understanding of one of the essential conditions of engaging the sympathy of his readers. The downfall of a very good man, as Aristotle perceived, impedes the identification of stage-figure and audience, because it is 'morally outraging' (τὸ μιαιρόν, *Poet.* 13.1452b36). To avoid this, Aristotle believes that the ἐπιείκεια of the tragic figure must be diminished. But for P. Brutus is, in Aristotelian terms, a 'very good man' (ἐπιεικής). (It is true that *chs.* 45ff. show P. interested in tracing a degree of deterioration in Brutus' character, but this does not substantially upset P.'s editorial view of Brutus—indeed, it cannot, for if P. made this deterioration more explicit, or more central, he would seriously damage the philosophical framework around which the *Life* is built.) Yet one does not feel, in reading the *Brutus*, that Brutus' downfall is 'morally outraging', simply because moral redress is achieved to a considerable extent by the emphasis P. places on Brutus' posthumous reputation—the fact that even his enemies, those with most cause to hate him, recognized his sterling worth. Thus in a broad sense justice is done, and while this is the emphasis of P. the moralist, it is also the emphasis of P. the literary craftsman, who understands well how to avoid the 'morally outraging'. (For discussion of Aristotle's concept of the 'morally outraging', | how according to Aristotle it may be avoided, and how the tragedians sometimes achieve the same end by roughly the same means as P. here, see T. C. W. Stinton, 'Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy', *CQ* 25 [1975], 221–254 {repr. in his *Collected Papers on Greek Tragedy* [1990], 143–85}, esp. 239 ff. {166ff.}) And so, in a way that is both morally satisfying and intellectually coherent, P. manages to close his life of the great tyrannicide with a mature acceptance of the need for the monarchy that Brutus so strenuously opposed. |

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{See also Supplementary Bibliography, pp. 397–405.}

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