HERODOTUS AS HOMERIC CRITIC

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PREFACE

This study explores the extent of Herodotus' interest in Homeric criticism and his significance within the discipline of ancient Homeric criticism. The main focus of the discussion is on two well-known passages of the *Histories*: 2.116–17 and 2.53. In connection with the former passage, there are five critical issues that need to be explored. First, what Herodotus intends by saying that Homer preferred a 'more seemly' version of the Trojan war to the one that he knew was true; in this study it will be argued that Herodotus here articulates something like a concept of fiction (or 'poetic licence'). Second, what Herodotus means by saying that Homer 'did not contradict himself': as interpreted here, Herodotus espouses a view of Homer as being free from contradictions within his poetic oeuvre (which Herodotus may have seen as confined to the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*). Third, how Herodotus conceives of Homer's relationship with the truth; contrary to what has sometimes been said, it will be argued here that Herodotus wishes Homer to be consistently in touch with the truth – even when his ostensible narration is false or fictitious. Fourth, whether Herodotus takes a positive or negative view of Homer: again, contrary to some scholarly opinion, Herodotus will be argued here to have a positive, even idealising, view. Fifth, why Herodotus contemplates an Egyptian, not a Greek, source for Homer's knowledge of the version in which Helen went to Egypt, not Troy; it will be suggested that Herodotus was loath to think of Homer as being influenced by poetic traditions there were attested in later, post-Homeric Greek authors (*neōteroi*, to use a later term of art).

The second passage, chapter 53 of the second book, raises other important questions. First, what was at stake for Herodotus in declaring Hesiod and Homer to be the oldest Greek poets; it will be proposed that their anteriority is to be connected to their assumed qualitative pre-eminence, and also that Herodotus did not necessarily take them to be the first Greek poets *tout court*. Second, what was behind Herodotus' dating of Hesiod and Homer four centuries before his own time: it will be argued that Herodotus may have operated with the assumption that the two poets could be roughly synchronised with one another, with the Lelantine war, and hence with the more easily datable Archilochus.

In all these areas, Herodotus will have anticipated, sometimes by centuries, several well-known positions in ancient Homeric criticism, in

particular, positions associated with the likes of Aristotle, Eratosthenes, Aristarchus, and Strabo. Moreover, some, but not all, of these positions bear the marks of Herodotus' intellectual ownership.

The present study has grown out of reiterated engagements with Herodotus 2.117–18 over a period of several years: first, as a crucial early testimony for the title, authorship, and contents of the *Cypria* (see Currie (2015) 281, 287); and subsequently as an important ancient forerunner of the so-called neoanalytical method in modern Homeric scholarship (see Currie (2016) 23 and, in greater depth, Currie (2020)). Over the past several years, parts of the work have been presented as research in progress in seminars and conferences at Nottingham, Oxford, Tel Aviv, and Venice; I have profited greatly from the feedback received on those several occasions. I am grateful to John Marincola and Tim Rood for encouraging the publication of this work as a *Histos* Supplement, and to the anonymous readers of *Histos* for raising this as possibility and for making numerous other constructive suggestions besides. I also wish to record my thanks (without any imputation of responsibility) to Denis Feeney, Bob Fowler, and Henry Spelman, for generously commenting on earlier drafts. I am also indebted to Cristiana Sessini for preparing the Index of Passages and to John Marincola for expert editing. All translations, except where otherwise indicated, are my own.

ABBREVIATIONS

Adler　　　　A. Adler, ed., *Suidae Lexicon*, 4 vols (Leipzig, 1928–38).

Bernabé　　　A. Bernabé, ed., *Poetae epici Graeci: Testimonia et fragmenta, Pars I*² (Leipzig, 1996).

　　　　　　　A. Bernabé, ed. *Poetae epici Graeci: Testimonia et fragmenta, Pars II: Orphicorum et Orphicis similium testimonia et fragmenta: Fasciculus 1* (Munich and Leipzig, 2004).

Biondi　　　 F. Biondi, *Teagene di Reggio rapsodo e interprete di Omero* (Pisa and Rome, 2015).

BNJ　　　　 I. Worthington, ed., *Brill's New Jacoby*: http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/brill-s-new-jacoby.

Broggiato　　M. Broggiato, ed., *Cratete di Mallo: I frammenti: edizione, introduzione e note* (Rome, 2001).

Cardauns　　B. Cardauns, ed., *M. Terentius Varro* Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum *Teil I: Die Fragmente* (Wiesbaden, 1976).

Dindorf　　　W. Dindorf, ed., *Aristides*, vol. III (Leipzig, 1829; repr. Hildesheim, 1964).

D-K　　　　　H. Diels and W. Kranz, edd., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁶, 3 vols (Berlin, 1951).

Finglass　　 M. Davies and P. Finglass, edd., *Stesichorus: The Poems* (Cambridge, 2014).

Fowler　　　 R. L. Fowler, ed., *Early Greek Mythography: Volume 1: Text and Introduction* (Oxford, 2000).

GGM　　　　 K. Müller, ed., *Geographi Graeci minores*, 2 vols (Paris, 1855–82).

Gigon　　　　O. Gigon, ed., *Aristotelis opera: Volumen tertium: Librorum deperditorum fragmenta* (Berlin and New York, 1987).

IEG　　　　 M. L. West, ed., *Iambi et elegi Graeci*², 2 vols (Oxford, 1989–92).

Janko	R. Janko, ed., *Philodemus* On Poems *Books Three and Four with the Fragments of Aristotle* On Poets (Oxford, 2010).
Keaney	J. J. Keaney, ed., *Harpocration: Lexeis of the Ten Orators* (Amsterdam, 1991).
K–G	R. Kühner, and B. Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache. Zweiter Teil: Satzlehre*[3], 2 vols (Hannover and Leipzig 1898–1904).
Laks	A. Laks, *Diogène d'Apollonie: la dernière cosmologie présocratique* (Lille, 1983).
LGGA	F. Montanari, F. Montana, and L. Pagani, edd., *Lexicon of Greek Grammarians of Antiquity*: https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/lexicon-of-greek-grammarians-of-antiquity.
Lightfoot	J. Lightfoot, ed., *Hellenistic Collection: Philitas, Alexander of Aetolia, Hermesianax, Euphorion, Parthenius* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2009).
LSJ	H. G. Liddel, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, and R. Mackenzie, edd., *A Greek-English Lexicon*[9] (Oxford, 1940).
Matthews	V. J. Matthews, ed., *Antimachus of Colophon: Text and Commentary* (Leiden, 1996).
Most	G. Most, ed. and trans., *Hesiod:* Theogony, Works and Days, *Testimonia*[2] (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2018).
Paroem. Gr.	E. von Leutsch and F. W. Schneidewin, edd., *Paroemiographi Graeci*, 2 vols (Göttingen, 1839–51).
Pontani	F. Pontani, ed., *Scholia Graeca in Odysseam*, 4 vols to date (Rome, 2007–).
Prince	S. H. Prince, ed., *Antisthenes of Athens: Texts, Translations, and Commentary* (Ann Arbor, 2015).
RE	A. von Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll, edd., *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 85 vols (Stuttgart, 1894–1980).
Roller	D. W. Roller, ed., *Eratosthenes'* Geography*: Fragments Collected and Translated, with Commentary and Additional Material* (Princeton and Oxford, 2010).

Rose   Rose, V., ed. *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta*[3] (Leipzig, 1886).

Sandbach   F. H. Sandbach, ed., *Plutarchi moralia*, vol. VII (Leipzig, 1967).

Swift   L. A. Swift, ed., *Archilochus, the Poems: Introduction, Text, Translation, and Commentary* (Oxford, 2019).

TGrF   B. Snell, S. L. Radt, and R. Kannicht, edd., *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, 5 vols (Göttingen, 1971-2004).

Trelenberg   J. Trelenberg, ed., *Tatianos* Oratio ad Graecos, *Rede an die Griechen* (Tübingen, 2012).

van der Valk   M. van der Valk, ed., *Eustathii archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem pertinentes*, 4 vols (Leiden, 1971–87).

Wehrli   F. Wehrli, ed., *Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentar* VII *Herakleides Pontikos* (Basel, 1953).

West   M. L. West, ed. and trans., *Homeric Hymns, Homeric Apocrypha, Lives of Homer* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2003).

INTRODUCTION

Herodotus 2.116–117 has been called 'the earliest known example of Homeric criticism'.[1] The emphasis falls on 'example': we know of plenty of earlier Homeric criticism of which we have no specimen.[2] Still, for us these chapters provide an invaluable glimpse of fifth-century ancient literary criticism, worthy to stand alongside Aristophanes' *Frogs* and Plato's *Protagoras*.[3] Although briefer than those, it is to all appearances a genuine piece of literary criticism and not a parody.[4] The aims of the present study are to clarify the principles of Herodotus' Homeric criticism and to appraise their significance within the history of ancient Homeric scholarship.

These Herodotean chapters, often discussed from a variety of other perspectives, have received surprisingly little attention in histories of ancient literary or Homeric criticism.[5] Surprisingly, because Herodotus, here and in

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[1] A. B. Lloyd (1975–88) III.50. Cf. Pfeiffer (1968) 44; Farinelli (1995) 26; D'Ecclesiis (2002) 105–6 and n. 4; Kim (2010) 29.

[2] Tatian, *Or. ad Graecos* 31.3, pp. 164, 166 Trelenberg cites as the oldest authorities to have written about Homer and his poetry: Theagenes of Rhegium (T 1 Biondi), Stesimbrotus of Thasos (*BNJ* 107 F 21), Antimachus of Colophon (F 165 Matthews), Herodotus of Halicarnassus, and Dionysius of Olynthus (on this last, see Ucciardello (2005a)). Herodotus' younger contemporary Antisthenes (*c.* 445–360 BCE) wrote an *On Homer*, an *On the Odyssey*, and many specialised dedicated treatises on Homeric subjects (Diog. Laert. 6.17–18; Prince 155–60, 584–677); his *On Interpreters* (Περὶ ἐξηγητῶν) is understood as 'a polemic against contemporary literary critics' (Prince 155). For PDerv. XXVI as containing Homeric criticism, see Henry (1986); Burkert (1987) 44; Yunis (2003) 195–8; Struck (2004) 25 n. 10; Bierl (2011), esp. 395–7; Kotwick (2020) 9–12.

[3] Cf. R. L. Hunter (2009a) 2 'For us the *Frogs* dramatizes, as Plato's *Protagoras* was to some years later, the emergence of a language of literary criticism and the emergence of the critic'; Griffith (2013) 98 'certainly *Frogs* comprises our first and most extensive "treatise" on the criticism of poetry to survive from antiquity'.

[4] See further the Appendix below, on the question of whether Herodotus took his Homeric criticism seriously.

[5] Cf. Farinelli (1995) 23–4. They get the briefest of mentions by Novokhatko (2014) 36, cf. id. (2020) 95. They are underappreciated by Pfeiffer (1968) 44–5, and ignored by Lamberton (1992) x; Yunis (2003) 193–8; Mayhew (2019) 3–9.

2.53, can be argued to anticipate several important ideas in later ancient Homeric criticism, including certain ideas that we tend to associate with Aristotle and Aristarchus. First, the proposition that Homer is the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and of these two poems only (for Aristotle, also of the *Margites*). Second, the notion that Homer is a flawless poet, who does not contradict himself. And third, the contention that other Greek poets (a sole exception being made by Herodotus for Hesiod) are 'younger' than Homer, and that Homer's influence is supreme: the younger authors are influenced by Homer, and they do not independently preserve traditions that reach back beyond Homer. The espousal of these ideas by Herodotus would show them to be at least as old as the fifth century BCE. It is not straightforward to gauge Herodotus' significance in the sense of whether he should be considered personally the originator of any or all of these ideas, but in some cases this seems likely (see below, Ch. 5, §5.2). A concomitant purpose of this investigation is draw attention to the presence of literary criticism in the list of Herodotus' intellectual interests, alongside, for instance, geography, ethnography, natural history, anatomy, and medical science.[6]

This investigation aims to understand Herodotus' (mostly only implicit) principles of Homeric criticism by setting them alongside those of other ancient Homeric critics.[7] A methodological difficulty must here be signalled at once. It would be convenient if the inquiry could proceed in two discrete stages: elucidation of Herodotus' literary critical arguments, followed by appraisal of the significance of these arguments in the light of later Homeric criticism. The former is, however, a more problematic undertaking than may at first appear. The critical terms and concepts employed by Herodotus are ambiguous and controversial in their interpretation. The very attempt to make out and make sense of Herodotus' position therefore itself calls constantly for comparison with the positions that are taken up in later Homeric criticism; in practice it thus proves impossible to keep the 'two stages' distinct. This entails an obvious circularity in procedure; however, it

[6] On the range of Herodotus' intellectual interests, see Thomas (2000) 1–27 and *passim*; Raaflaub (2002), esp. 196. On Herodotus' relationship to medical science, note Demont (2018) 196: 'a layman, but a layman embedded in the medicine of his time'. On Herodotus as a geographer, see Bichler (2018). On Herodotus as a literary critic, see Grintser (2018). Differently, V. Hunter (1982) 55–6 nn. 8, 9 (discussing Hdt. 2.116–17) denies that Herodotus is interested in matters of 'Homeric criticism' or 'literary criticism', rather than just a historical question (whether or not Helen really went to Troy). See further below, Ch. 5 §5.1.

[7] Currie (2020) sets the principles of Herodotus' Homeric criticism alongside those of modern scholars.

is hoped that in the end the circularity will be viewed as more virtuous than vicious.

HERODOTUS 2.116–17: TEXTUAL ISSUES

2.1 The Text and Translation of Herodotus 2.116–17

A necessary preliminary is to present a Greek text of Herodotus 2.116–17 and to offer a translation, even though some of the translational decisions will receive their full justification only later in the discussion.

[116] Ἑλένης μὲν ταύτην ἄπιξιν παρὰ Πρωτέα ἔλεγον οἱ ἱρέες γενέσθαι. δοκέει δέ μοι καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν λόγον τοῦτον πυθέσθαι· ἀλλ᾽, οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἐς τὴν ἐποποιίην εὐπρεπὴς ἦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῷ περ ἐχρήσατο, [ἐς ὃ] μετῆκε αὐτόν, δηλώσας ὡς καὶ τοῦτον ἐπίσταιτο τὸν λόγον. [2] δῆλον δὲ κατὰ παρεποίησε ἐν Ἰλιάδι (καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἄλλῃ ἀνεπόδισε ἑωυτόν) πλάνην τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὡς ἀπηνείχθη ἄγων Ἑλένην τῇ τε δὴ ἄλλῃ πλαζόμενος καὶ ὡς ἐς Σιδῶνα τῆς Φοινίκης ἀπίκετο. [3] ἐπιμέμνηται δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐν Διομήδεος ἀριστηίῃ· λέγει δὲ τὰ ἔπεα ὧδε·

> ἔνθ᾽ ἔσαν οἱ πέπλοι παμποίκιλοι, ἔργα γυναικῶν
> Σιδονίων, τὰς αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος θεοειδὴς
> ἤγαγε Σιδονίηθεν, ἐπιπλὼς εὐρέα πόντον,
> τὴν ὁδὸν ἣν Ἑλένην περ ἀνήγαγεν εὐπατέρειαν.

[4] ἐπιμέμνηται δὲ καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσείῃ ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖσι ἔπεσι·

> τοῖα Διὸς θυγάτηρ ἔχε φάρμακα μητιόεντα,
> ἐσθλά, τά οἱ Πολύδαμνα πόρεν Θῶνος παράκοιτις
> Αἰγυπτίη, τῇ πλεῖστα φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα
> φάρμακα, πολλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ μεμιγμένα, πολλὰ δὲ λυγρά.

[5] καὶ τάδε ἕτερα πρὸς Τηλέμαχον Μενέλεως λέγει·

> Αἰγύπτῳ μ᾽ ἔτι δεῦρο θεοὶ μεμαῶτα νέεσθαι
> ἔσχον, ἐπεὶ οὔ σφιν ἔρεξα τεληέσσας ἑκατόμβας.

[6] ἐν τούτοισι τοῖσι ἔπεσι δηλοῖ ὅτι ἠπίστατο τὴν ἐς Αἴγυπτον Ἀλεξάνδρου πλάνην· ὁμουρέει γὰρ ἡ Συρίη Αἰγύπτῳ, οἱ δὲ Φοίνικες, τῶν ἐστι ἡ Σιδών, ἐν τῇ Συρίῃ οἰκέουσι. [117] κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἔπεα καὶ τόδε τὸ χωρίον οὐκ ἥκιστα ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δηλοῖ ὅτι οὐκ Ὁμήρου τὰ Κύπρια ἔπεά ἐστι ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλου τινός· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖσι Κυπρίοισι εἴρηται ὡς

τριταῖος ἐκ Σπάρτης Ἀλέξανδρος ἀπίκετο ἐς τὸ ῎Ιλιον ἄγων Ἑλένην, εὐαέϊ τε πνεύματι χρησάμενος καὶ θαλάσσῃ λείῃ· ἐν δὲ Ἰλιάδι λέγει ὡς ἐπλάζετο ἄγων αὐτήν. Ὅμηρος μέν νυν καὶ τὰ Κύπρια ἔπεα χαιρέτω.

That is how the priests said that Helen came into the presence of Proteus. Homer, too, seems to me to have learned of this tale. However, as it was not as seemly with a view to the composition of epic poetry as the one which he adopted, he dropped it, showing that he knew this tale too. [2] This is clear from how he composed as a digression [*or:* composed by adaptation][1] in the *Iliad* (and he did not make himself backtrack[2] anywhere else) the detour of Alexander: how he was carried off course with Helen, both wandering elsewhere and how he came[3] to Sidon in Phoenicia. [3] He makes mention of it in the '*Aristeia* of Diomedes': he[4] speaks hexameter verses as follows [*Il.* 6.289–92]:

> There she had richly embroidered robes, the handiwork of women
> of Sidon, whom godlike Alexander in person
> brought from the Sidonian land, when he sailed over the vast sea,
> on that journey on which he brought back Helen of the noble father.

[4] He makes mention of it also in the *Odyssey* in the following verses [*Od.* 4.227–30]:

> Such were the medicines the daughter of Zeus had, ingenious ones,
> beneficial ones, which Polydamna gave to her, the wife of Thon,
> a woman of Egypt, where the grain-giving soil yields the most
> medicines: some beneficial when mixed, others harmful.

[5] And Menelaus speaks these further verses to Telemachus [*Od.* 4.351–2]:

> The gods detained me in Egypt, yearning as I was to return here,
> since I had not made to them the sacrifice of full one hundred victims.

[6] He shows in these verses that he knew of Alexander's detour to Egypt; for Syria borders on Egypt, and the Phoenicians, whose city Sidon is, live in Syria. [117] From these verses and this passage there

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[1] See below, §2.2.

[2] For this translation, see below, Ch. 3 §3.2.

[3] For the asymmetrical syntax (participle joined with finite verb: … τε … πλαζόμενος καὶ … ἀπίκετο), cf. Denniston (1950) 369 n. 1; Gerber (1982) 37.

[4] λέγει is used here of the primary narrator, i.e., Homer, but of a secondary narrator, Menelaus, at 2.116.5.

comes not the least but the strongest indication[5] that the *Cypria* is not the work of Homer, but of some other. For in the *Cypria* it is stated that Alexander came to Troy with Helen on the third day after leaving Sparta, 'having enjoyed a favourable breeze and a smooth sea';[6] but in the *Iliad*, he says that he strayed off course with her. So much for Homer and the *Cypria*.

2.2 Two Emendations: 2.116.1 [ἐς ὅ] and 2.116.2 παρεποίησε

The passage presents large- and small-scale textual issues. The question of whether there has been large-scale interpolation will be addressed later (below, §2.3), after we have dealt with two small-scale corruptions: [ἐς ὅ] (2.116.1) and παρεποίησε (2.116.2). Clarification of these textual details is not simply didacted by a general need for philological rigour; both readings in fact impact on interpretative issues that are very germane to the question of Herodotus' significance in antiquity as a Homeric critic. On the one hand, the question whether to emend [ἐς ὅ] to ἑκών is wrapped up with the question of the extent of the influence of Herodotus' Homeric criticism on Philostratus in the *Heroicus* and thus in the question whether the Second Sophistic reception of Herodotus can assist us in the reconstruction of not merely the concepts but even the language of Herodotus' Homeric criticism.[7] On the other hand, the question of whether to read παρεποίησε is wrapped up with the question of the availability to Herodotus in the fifth century BCE (and to his contemporary, Glaucus of Rhegium) of a quasi-technical literary critical vocabulary.[8]

First, [ἐς ὅ] (2.116.1). This subordinating conjunction may, in general, introduce either a temporal or a consecutive clause.[9] However, the conjunction is impossible here, because the following clause is not a subordinate one. One simple solution (that of Bekker, adopted by Hude) is

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[5] On δηλοῖ used impersonally, see below, Ch. 5 §5.1.

[6] A quotation from a hexameter source, presumably the *Cypria* (= Bernabé F 14; see below, §2.3).

[7] On the circularity involved here (the reception of Herodotus being used to make inferences about Herodotus' original meaning and expression) see above, Ch. 1.

[8] See below, Ch. 5, §5.1.

[9] K–G II.ii.445, for ἐς ὅ as introducing a temporal clause. Cf. Wilson (2015a) 36, for ἐς ὅ as introducing a consecutive clause.

to delete the words.[10] An alternative is the emendation ἑκών, 'deliberately' (an emendation proposed by Stein, and adopted by Wilson).[11] The corruption of ἑκών to ἐς ὅ is not easy to justify palaeographically; however, the reading ἑκών is excellently supported by parallels. Stein cites parallels from Herodotus' own usage of ἑκών being used of 'deliberately' not mentioning something.[12] Arguably even more telling, however, are the parallels for the use of ἑκών by other authors in similar literary critical contexts. We should compare especially Philostratus, *Heroicus* 24.1: ἑκόντα τὸν Ὅμηρον … παραλιπεῖν ταῦτα, 'Homer deliberately omitted these things', and 43.4: ἑκὼν μετασκευάσαι, 'deliberately altered [them]'.[13] Philostratus' intertextual engagement in the *Heroicus* with Herodotus 2.116 is clear (see further below, Ch. 3, §3.1); his use of the phrases ἑκόντα … παραλιπεῖν and ἑκὼν μετασκευάσαι may suggest that he read ἑκὼν μετῆκε in Herodotus 2.116.1.[14] Regardless of whether we wish to take Philostratus' text as an indirect witness to Herodotus', the parallels suffice to make the emendation plausible.

Second, κατὰ παρεποίησε (2.116.2). This is a highly plausible emendation (proposed, again, by Bekker, and adopted by Hude, Rosén, and Wilson) of the paradosis, κατὰ γὰρ ἐποίησε (which is ungrammatical).[15] The posited corruption of παρ- to γάρ is palaeographically easy. However, rather than this being a purely mechanical misreading, a misprision of the syntax may be supposed to have facilitated the putative alteration of an original **παρε**ποίησε to **γὰρ** ἐποίησε. Herodotus' expression δῆλον δὲ κατὰ …, 'it is

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[10] Bekker (1845) 141; Hude (1927). The explanation for their intrusion is not apparent (Blakesley (1854) I.249 n. 325). Rosén (1987) 208 (*in apparatu*) speculates that ἐς ὅ could have intruded into the text from the sequence ε ca o written as a supralinear correction over an erroneous original χρῆται immediately preceding, intended thereby to be corrected to **ε**χρη**cα**το.

[11] Stein (1869) 208; Wilson (2015b) 191; (2015a) 36.

[12] Stein (1881) 124. See, e.g., 3.75.1: ἑκὼν ἐπελήθετο; 4.43.7: ἑκὼν ἐπιλήθομαι.

[13] Compare also, more generally, Str. 1.2.35 C43: φαίνεται γὰρ εὐθὺς ὅτι μύθους παραπλέκουσιν ἑκόντες οὐκ ἀγνοίᾳ τῶν ὄντων, 'it is immediately apparent that they [the poets] weave myths/fictions deliberately, not in ignorance of the facts'; Plut. *Quom. adul.* 16A: ἑκόντες μὲν (*sc.* ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί), 'poets deliberately tell fictions'.

[14] Compare Kim (2010) 209, suggesting that Philostr. *Her.* 43.16, Ὅμηρος τὰ ἀληθῆ μὲν ἔμαθε, μετεκόσμησε δὲ πολλὰ ἐς τὸ συμφέρον τοῦ λόγου ὃν ὑπέθετο, 'is basically a paraphrase' of Hdt. 2.116.1: δοκέει δέ μοι καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν λόγον τοῦτον πυθέσθαι· ἀλλ', οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἐς τὴν ἐποποιίην εὐπρεπὴς ἦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῷ περ ἐχρήσατο, [ἐς ὅ] μετῆκε αὐτόν.

[15] Bekker (1845) 141; Hude (1927); Rosén (1987) 208; Wilson (2015b) 191. See D'Ecclesiis (2002) 111–14 for discussion of the problem.

clear from how…' (where Ionic κατά equates to Attic καθ' ἅ, introducing a subordinate relative clause) was liable to be mistaken for an instance of the idiom δῆλον δέ· … γάρ, 'there is a proof: (etc.)'.[16] The putative misconstrual leaves κατά grammatically unaccounted for.[17] If the emendation παρεποίησε is read, the verb could be taken in any of three senses: first, 'composed derivatively', 'adapted', 'imitated', 'parodied'.[18] The compound verb is attested in this sense in the Hypothesis to Aeschylus' *Persians*: Γλαῦκος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ Αἰσχύλου μύθων ἐκ τῶν Φοινισσῶν Φρυνίχου φησὶ τοὺς Πέρσας παραπεποιῆσθαι, 'Glaucus, in his book *On Aeschylus' Plots*, says that *The Persians* was adapted from Phrynichus' *Phoenician Women*'. This parallel would be contemporary with Herodotus, if we knew both that this was the fifth-century Glaucus of Rhegium, not his later namesake from Samos, and that the wording could be attributed to Glaucus, not just the scholiast.[19] A second possible meaning of παρεποίησε would be 'introduced as an episode into a poem'.[20] There are several instances of compound verbs with παρα- (and their nominal derivatives) with the sense of 'digress', viz. παρέκβασις, παραδιήγησις, παριστορεῖν.[21] In legal and political contexts, παραγράφειν means 'to write by the side' or 'subjoin', *sc.* a clause to a law.[22] Euenus of Paros in a fifth-century BCE rhetorical treatise employed the terms παρέπαινοι and παράψογοι, for 'indirect praises' and 'indirect censures' (Pl. *Phaedr.* 267a3–4). Analogously, παραποιεῖν might mean 'to narrate indirectly in a poem'. Thirdly, παρεποίησε might mean 'made a mistake in composing'.[23] The main objection to this suggestion is that Herodotus is

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[16] For the idiom, cf. Thuc. 1.11.1; LSJ *s.v.* δῆλος II.4.

[17] κατὰ … ἐποίησε would not be defensible as tmesis (*pace* Blakesley (1854) I.249 n. 326): it would not conform to Herodotean practice with tmesis (on which see Priestly (2009)), nor is there any attestation of a compound verb *καταποιεῖν.

[18] Cf. schol. Ar. *Ran.* 665; schol. *Od.* 3.245a Pontani. LSJ *s.v*, I.3. Cf. D'Ecclesiis (2002) 113–14 and n. 21.

[19] See Wright (forthcoming) and, on the identification of Glaucus, Ucciardello (2007); Fowler (2019) 45.

[20] LSJ *s.v.* II, after Dindorf (1858) 107 (who translates: '*quam in Iliade ut episodium posuit*'); cf. How and Wells (1928) I.223 'introduced an inconsistent digression'; esp. D'Ecclesiis (2002) 113; cf. Grethlein (2010) 154–5 with n. 18.

[21] Cf. Nünlist (2009) 66.

[22] Note also προσπαραγράφειν, 'to write by the side in addition'.

[23] Powell (1938a) 291.

likely to be far from wishing to impute an error or even an inconsistency to Homer (see below, Ch. 3 §3.2).[24]

Other emendations of the transmitted κατὰ γὰρ ἐποίησε have also been proposed. These include κατά περ ἐποίησε, '[it is clear] from how he composed …' (Reiz's emendation, read by Stein and Lloyd).[25] This would give the same basic meaning as κατὰ παρεποίησε, but without any further specialised sense. This emendation also gives an acceptable sense, but it is marginally further from the paradosis than Bekker's emendation. A further emendation is κατὰ ταῦτα γὰρ ἐποίησε, 'there is a proof: for it was in accordance with this that he composed …' (Powell's emendation, accepted by Waterfield).[26] This is less elegant and further from the paradosis. It would be simpler and preferable just to delete γάρ and read δῆλον δὲ κατὰ [γὰρ] ἐποίησε, 'it is clear from how he composed …', γάρ then being taken as an intrusion by someone who had misunderstood the syntax and supposed they had to do with an instance of the idiom δῆλον δέ· … γάρ (see above).[27]

2.3 The Question of Interpolation in 2.116–17

The entirety of both chapters (116–17) has sometimes been condemned as an interpolation, notably by Bravo, who branded the interpolator 'as slovenly, inaccurate and undiscriminating as he was pedantic'.[28] Bravo's main objections are, first, that '[the interpolator] quotes *Il.* VI, 289–292 as belonging to Διομήδεος ἀριστείη, whereas the tradition known to us applies this title to book V'; and, second, that chapter 117 gives a different account of the *Cypria* than does Proclus in his summary of the poem.[29] Neither

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[24] *Pace* D'Ecclesiis (2002) 114.

[25] Stein (1869) 208; A. B. Lloyd (2007) 325.

[26] Powell (1938b) 213; Waterfield (1998) 736.

[27] Note, however, the reservations of D'Ecclesiis (2002) 113 concerning whether Herodotus could have said that Homer 'represented (ἐποίησε) in the *Iliad* the wandering of Paris' (Hdt. 2.116.2), since Homer made only a passing allusion to them at *Il.* 6.289–92.

[28] Bravo (2000) 31–2 and n. 13; (2001) 53–4. On Bravo's approach in general, see D'Ecclesiis (2002) 105 n. 2; S. R. West (2011) 71 n. 9. On this view, the genuine Herodotean text includes the first sentence of 2.116.1, Ἑλένης μὲν ταύτην ἄπιξιν παρὰ Πρωτέα ἔλεγον οἱ ἱρέες γενέσθαι, which is then immediately followed by 2.118.1: εἰρομένου δέ μεο τοὺς ἱρέας εἰ μάταιον λόγον λέγουσι οἱ Ἕλληνες τὰ περὶ Ἴλιον γενέσθαι ἢ οὔ κτλ.

[29] Bravo (2000) 32. On Bravo's objections to χωρίον and δηλοῖ in 2.117, see below, Ch. 5 §5.1.

objection carries weight. The first ignores the fact that Classical authors' demarcations of Homeric ῥαψῳδίαι do not always agree with those of the later tradition.[30] The second involves a famous controversy, which admits several solutions, none likely to command universal consent.[31] One way to account for the discrepancy between Herodotus' and Proclus' account of the *Cypria* is to suppose that the poem enjoyed a multiform tradition.[32] Another is to suppose that Proclus' summary of the *Cypria* was skewed in certain details in order to make it conform to the backstory assumed by the *Iliad*.[33] In any event, the discrepancy itself does not straightforwardly authorise the conclusion that chapter 117 is erroneous, much less that it is slovenly or inaccurate; nor is it entirely satisfactory to invoke a bungling interpolator in order to dispose of such problems. To Bravo's objections, on the other hand, it may be countered that the arguments of these chapters are simply too bold and much too interesting to ascribe to an interpolator. The person responsible can be confidently acquitted of the gross failings here attributed to him. He is amply learned: able to quote aptly and precisely from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and to imply verbatim knowledge of the *Cypria*, of which a hexameter line must underlie the phrase εὐαέϊ τε πνεύματι χρησάμενος καὶ θαλάσσῃ λείῃ (2.117).[34] He develops, further, an argument that is not merely complex and cogent, but idiosyncratic in a way that can plausibly be imputed to Herodotus.[35] Here, however, we begin to anticipate the main arguments of this study that are to be developed in the subsequent sections.

Others who have accepted the passage as a whole have condemned the quotations from the *Odyssey*: sections 4–5 of chapter 116.[36] These, too, should

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[30] Cf., e.g., Arist. *Poet.* 1455a2–3, referring to *Od.* 8.521ff. as Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος, a designation usually applied to Books 9–13 of the Odyssey. Compare and contrast Blakesley (1854) I.249 n. 328, and see Jensen (1999) 10; also Leaf (1886) 146; and, more generally Hunter and Russell (2011) 161–2.

[31] See Bernabé (1996) 52; Currie (2015) 283, 287 and n. 52; cf. Davies and Finglass (2014) 301–2.

[32] Finkelberg (2000).

[33] Cf. Currie (2016) 233.

[34] Bernabé (1996) 52; M. L. West (2013) 92. Cf. Ford (2002) 148; Kim (2010) 35.

[35] See Kim (2010) 34–5 for a good appreciation of Herodotus' argument.

[36] How and Wells (1928) 224; Graziosi (2002) 117 n. 67; A. B. Lloyd (1975–88) III.50; (2007) 325; Fowler (2013) 550–1; D'Ecclesiis (2002) 105 and n. 3, 119–20; Grethlein (2010) 152 n. 9; cf. V. Hunter (1982) 54 n. 7; Sammons (2012) 54 and 57 with n. 12; see Farinelli (1995) 8–10 n. 8 for further references. Differently, Wilson (2015b) vii–viii, 191–2 regards 2.116.4–5 as an alternative version introduced by Herodotus; cf. Powell (1935) 76: one of 'Herodotus' own "interpolations"'; for a critique of this idea in general, see Rösler (2002) 83–5. Dewald

be defended.[37] Herodotus is interested in imputing to Homer knowledge of a version in which Helen was first taken to Egypt by Paris before the Trojan War and was then collected from Egypt by Menelaus on his return. This requires the quotations from both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the evidence of each being indispensable and complementary.[38] The Iliadic verses speak explicitly of Paris' return voyage to Troy with Helen, but only mention *Sidon* (*Il.* 6.290, 291). The passages of the *Odyssey* speak explicitly of Helen in *Egypt* (*Od.* 4.229, 331), though (apparently)[39] in the context of Menelaus' return home, not Helen's outbound voyage with Paris. Only the conjunction of the Iliadic quotation and the Odyssean quotations enables Herodotus to move from speaking vaguely at the beginning of chapter 116 (section 2) of 'Alexander's detour: how he was carried off course with Helen, both wandering *elsewhere* and how he came to *Sidon in Phoenicia*' to speaking at the end of the chapter (section 6) of 'Alexander's detour *to Egypt*'.[40] The formulation 'both elsewhere … and Sidon' in section 2 anticipates the development of the argument in sections 4 through 6, where that 'elsewhere' crystalises out as Egypt. Likewise, the phrase '… ἐν Ἰλιάδι, καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἄλλῃ …' ('… in the *Iliad*, and *nowhere else* …') prepares the ground for the references to the *Odyssey* that materialise in sections 4 and 5.[41] In short, sections 4 and 5 and the Odyssean quotations they contain are indispensable to the argument.[42]

The phrase τόδε τὸ χωρίον (2.117) has been argued to show that the *Odyssey* quotations are interpolated. Thus, according to Waterfield, 'it is clear from

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(1998) 625 is mistaken to say that the quotations from the *Odyssey* (Hdt. 2.116.4–5) are missing from some manuscripts; cf. Farinelli (1995) 8, 10.

[37] So, e.g., Rosén (1987) 208; Farinelli (1995); Kim (2010) 34 n. 49.

[38] It is crucial to recognise that the evidence of the *Odyssey* is neither pleonastic (*pace* D'Ecclesiis (2002) 120) nor irrelevant (*pace* Sammons (2012) 57 n. 12). For a defence of the authenticity of the quotations from the *Odyssey*, and their pertinence to Herodotus' argument, see Kannicht (1969) I.46 n. 11; Danek (1998) 104; Fehling (1971) 47 = (1989) 61; M. L. West (2011 [1975]) 80–1; Kim (2010) 34–5; Nagy (2010) 76 n. 34; Grintser (2018) 163.

[39] See, however, Farinelli (1995) 14–16, arguing that Herodotus could have seen in *Od.* 4.227–30 (the verses quoted by Herodotus, 2.116.4) a reference to Helen being hospitably received in Egypt separately from Menelaus, and conceivably therefore in the company of Paris on the outward journey to Troy.

[40] Cf. Farinelli (1995) 13–14.

[41] Differently, D'Ecclesiis (2002) 118, 121 takes οὐδαμῇ ἄλλῃ to mean 'nowhere else in the *Iliad*'; for a critique of this interpretation, see below (Ch. 3 §3.2).

[42] Differently, Farinelli (1995) offers a more elaborate defence of the Odyssean passages.

the singular "this passage" at the beginning of §117 that it is all an interpolation'.[43] On the contrary, it should be pointed out that 2.117 would follow on awkwardly from the preceding without the quotations of the *Odyssey*. Specifically, κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἔπεα καὶ τόδε τὸ χωρίον (2.117) would be a strangely pleonastic way to refer to just *Il.* 6.289–92. The rationale behind saying 'these verses and this passage' seems to be that in the case of the citations of *Il.* 6.289–92 and *Od.* 4.227–30 the precise *verses* (ἔπεα) quoted are relevant, but in the case of *Od.* 4.351–2 a whole *passage* (χωρίον) of more than two hundred lines (*sc. Od.* 4.351–586, relating Menelaus' sojourn in Egypt), unquotable in its full extent and thus only represented by its first two lines, is broadly relevant to the point being made. Thus the words ταῦτα … τὰ ἔπεα and τόδε τὸ χωρίον seem to be advisedly and precisely chosen. Moreover, the phrasing … ἐν Ἰλιάδι καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἄλλῃ ἀνεπόδισε ἑωυτόν … ('… in the *Iliad*, and *nowhere else* did he make himself backtrack …') makes it clear that the writer (whom we may reasonably recognise as Herodotus) is at this point already thinking of other Homeric poetry than just the *Iliad*.[44] Further, without discussion of the *Odyssey*, the contrast between the *Cypria* and genuinely Homeric poetry would be feeble. We should therefore understand 2.116.6 ἐν τούτοισι τοῖσι ἔπεσι to refer to all the Iliadic and Odyssean lines just quoted.

In sum, the entirety of chapters 116–17 can be regarded as genuine and to have suffered only minor, and quite easily reparable, corruption.

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[43] Waterfield (1998) 736. Bravo (2000) 31–2 also objects to the use of the word χωρίον (taking it to mean 'subject', not 'passage'; see rather LSJ *s.v.* 6a; Powell (1938a) 384 *s.v.* 3; and see below, Ch. 5 §5.1). For discussion, see Farinelli (1995) 21–3.

[44] *Pace* D'Ecclesiis (2002) 115 and 117.

3

HERODOTUS 2.116–17:
INTERPRETATIVE ISSUES

3.1 Herodotus on Homer and 'Seemliness'

We are now in a position to turn to the explication of terms and concepts of literary critical significance in Herodotus' argument. The first to claim our attention is εὐπρεπής (2.116.1): 'as it [*sc.* the Egyptian Helen-*logos*] was not as seemly (εὐπρεπής) with a view to the composition of epic poetry as the one which he did use, he dropped it'. This word has been associated—though perhaps wrongly—with the ancient critical concepts πρέπον and ἀπρεπές, denoting that which is 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate', either from a moral or an aesthetic point of view, whether for a particular character or for the poet himself to say, in a given genre, or just absolutely.[1] The issue of moral or theological (in)appropriateness had already played a role in the Homeric criticism of Xenophanes (21 B 11–12 D–K) and Theagenes (especially T 4 Biondi).[2] On this view, Herodotus would suppose that Homer considered the Egyptian Helen-*logos* as lacking the requisite level of appropriateness for inclusion in epic.[3] Scholars have differed in identifying the respect(s) in which it may have been found deficient. Russell suggested that it would be inappropriate to the heroic ethos of the poem: 'the force of the word seems mainly aesthetic: if Helen had not gone to Troy, the war and all its sacrifices would have been about nothing, and so no fit theme for heroic poetry'.[4] Ford proposed that it would be

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[1] D'Ecclesiis (2002) 109; Ford (2002) 19. See in general for πρέπον as a literary critical concept, Pohlenz (1965 [1933]); Schenkeveld (1970) 167–70; Ford (2002) 13–22; Schironi (2018) 'Index I' *s.vv.* 'Suitability/appropriateness [etc.]', 'Unsuitability/inappropriateness [etc.]', 'Index II' *s.v.* 'πρέπον, πρέπειν'.

[2] Biondi 90, 93, 98 (esp.), 104, cf. 51, 53 n. 3.

[3] Cf. Richardson (1992) 32 'rejected it as less appropriate (εὐπρεπής) for his poetry'; D'Ecclesiis (2002) 106 'meno adatto all'epos'; Kim (2010) 33 'not as well-suited to epic poetry'; Moyer (2011) 78 'unsuitable for epic poetry'.

[4] Russell (1981) 88. Cf. Grethlein (2010) 155 and n. 21; Blondell (2013) 154. This view has precedent in ancient scholarship: schol. BD Aristid. *Or.* 1.131.1 (III.151.1–3 Dindorf): ἵνα μὴ

inappropriate to the supposed nationalistic-panegyric orientation of the genre: 'I suspect such a song would have been "unsuitable" because it shows the Greeks as dupes, and Herodotus assumes that epic poetry is praise poetry'.[5] On such interpretations of Herodotus' diagnosis of Homer's *modus operandi*, the Egyptian Helen-*logos*, because it is seen as failing to meet a certain threshold of appropriateness for epic poetry, is ruled ineligible for that genre.

There is also an alternative view. Herodotus' εὐπρεπής does not have to be equated with πρέπον (appropriateness, suitability), but may convey something more like seemliness or attractiveness: the Egyptian Helen-*logos* can have lost out to an alternative version that was, simply, 'more attractive'. It would not be here a question of one *logos* meeting and another failing to meet an objective threshold of appropriateness or suitability, but a question rather of their relative attractiveness compared to one another. This interpretation does greater justice to Herodotus' formulation, οὐ(κ) … ὁμοίως … εὐπρεπὴς … τῷ ἑτέρῳ, '*not equally seemly* for epic poetry *as* the other one, which he adopted'. The comparative aspect of the expression should be respected.[6] In other words, it need not have been (according to Herodotus' argument) the negative qualities of the Egyptian Helen-*logos* any more than the positive qualities of the version adopted by Homer that determined Homer's preference.

Our passage, then, will be only superficially similar to 2.47.2, where Herodotus deliberately decides not to mention a *hieros logos* accounting for why the Egyptians do not eat pork on the grounds that it is 'not seemly enough to be mentioned by me' (ἐμοὶ … οὐκ εὐπρεπέστερός ἐστι λέγεσθαι).[7] In that passage, there is no weighing of alternative stories. The reason for Herodotus' decision not to mention this Egyptian *hieros logos* is indeed its failure, in Herodotus' eyes, to match up to an objective threshold of seemliness or propriety ('not seemly enough') for inclusion in a literary work

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τὴν ποίησιν ἀσύστατον ἐργάσηται, ὅτι διὰ εἴδωλον τοσοῦτος γέγονε πόλεμος, 'in order not to make the poetry flimsy, because so great a war came about on account of an *eidōlon*'.

[5] Ford (2002) 150; followed by Sammons (2012) 55 n. 9. Compare the nationalistic-panegyric conception of the *Iliad* of Isoc. *Paneg.* 159. Cf. Kim (2010) 31, pointing out that the Egyptian account would show the whole Trojan War to have been 'the result of an unreasonable refusal on the part of the Greeks to believe the truth'.

[6] The comparative aspect is also clear at e.g. Hdt. 1.32.6: οὐκ ὁμοίως δυνατὸς ἐκείνωι ἐνεῖκαι, 'not *equally* capable of bearing it *as* him'.

[7] The passages are compared by Russell (1981) 88.

such as the *Histories*.[8] In 2.116.1, however, Herodotus very differently paints a picture of Homer weighing up alternative stories: a true but less poetically attractive story versus a false but more poetically attractive one, and opting for the latter. A version with Helen present at Troy for the duration of the siege has obvious poetic advantages over a version which removed her to Egypt: we need only think of what Helen's inclusion adds to the interest of *Iliad* Books 3, 6, 22, and 24.[9]

This appears to have been Philostratus' reading of the passage. He has Protesilaus, via the vine-dresser, make the following criticism of Homer (*Heroicus* 25.10):

… ὅτι σαφῶς γινώσκων ὡς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἡ Ἑλένη ἐγένετο ἀπενεχθεῖσα ὑπὸ ἀνέμων ὁμοῦ τῷ Πάριδι, ὁ δὲ ἄγει αὐτὴν ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἰλίου τεῖχος ὀψομένην τὰ ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ κακά, ἣν εἰκός, εἰ καὶ δι' ἑτέραν γυναῖκα ταῦτα ἐγίνετο, ξυγκαλύπτεσθαί τε καὶ μὴ ὁρᾶν αὐτὰ διαβεβλημένου τοῦ γένους

… that although knowing well that Helen was in Egypt after being carried away by the winds with Paris, he brings her onto the wall of Troy in order to view the misfortunes being enacted on the plain [a reference to the *Teichoskopia*, *Il.* 3.130–8]—her whom it would have been seemly [or plausible?], if these things were happening even because of another woman, to veil herself and not to view them, once her sex had incurred this slur.

Philostratus seems to have Herodotus 2.116 specifically in view here.[10] His ἀπενεχθεῖσα recalls Herodotus' ἀπηνείχθη (2.116.1). Philostratus' Protesilaus

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[8] I assume that the *hieros logos* contained something that Herodotus considered indecent, or otherwise too undignified for the narrator of the *Histories*. Cf. Isoc. *Panath.* 267: νοσήματος ῥηθῆναι … οὐκ εὐπρεποῦς, 'an illness not seemly to be spoken of' (presumably because it involved reference to 'indecent' bodily parts or processes); Eur. *Or.* 1145: οὐ γὰρ εὐπρεπὲς λέγειν, 'it is not seemly to speak of it' (*sc.* either Orestes' matricide or Clytemnestra's adulterous-murderous carryings-on). Differently, Russell (1981) 88: 'he seems to mean that it is a secret he ought not to reveal'. But this does not adequately take account of the emphatic first-person pronoun ἐμοί, the use of the comparative adjective εὐπρεπέστερος, and the point that the meaning 'a secret he ought not to reveal' would be more aptly conveyed by the concept of ὅσιον/ὁσίη (cf. 2.61.1, 2.171.2) rather than by εὐπρέπεια.

[9] Cf. Ford (2002) 150: 'a Trojan War with no Helen inside the gates might be thought a less dramatic affair'.

[10] Kim (2010) 177: 'an evident nod to Herodotus'.

also invokes, though rather differently, a notion of what it would have been 'seemly' (or 'plausible', εἰκός) for Helen to do.[11] He implies that Homer was motivated by the attractions of having Helen as a spectator of the action. On this view, Homer sacrificed not merely the true account, but even a plausible and seemly one, in favour of one that was more pleasurable for his audience to hear. This Homeric *modus operandi* gets elaborated subsequently by Philostratus (*Her.* 43.4):

> τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑποτεθεῖσθαι ταῦτα τὸν Ὅμηρον, ἀλλὰ γεγονότων τε καὶ ἀληθινῶν ἔργων ἀπαγγελίαν ποιεῖσθαι μαρτυρεῖ ὁ Πρωτεσίλεως, πλὴν ὀλίγων, ἃ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἑκὼν μετασκευάσαι ἐπὶ τῷ ποικίλην τε καὶ ἡδίω ἀποφῆναι τὴν ποίησιν.

> [Protesilaus testifies] that Homer has not invented these things, but is giving a narrative of facts and of true deeds, except for a few things, which he seems rather to have altered deliberately with the object of rendering his poetry varied and more pleasurable.

Similarly, *Heroicus* 43.16: Ὅμηρος τὰ ἀληθῆ μὲν ἔμαθε, μετεκόσμησε δὲ πολλὰ ἐς τὸ συμφέρον τοῦ λόγου ὃν ὑπέθετο, 'Homer learned the truth, but modified many things to serve the interests of the story he adopted'.[12]

On this view, a poet may—justifiably—sacrifice that which is true, plausible, or even possible, to the interests of his story. In chapter 25 of the *Poetics*, Aristotle proposes the following defence to a criticism of a poem (*Poet.* 1460b23–26): '"There are impossibilities in a poem, it is flawed"; yet it is entirely proper, if it attains its own purpose, if in this way it makes either itself or another passage more gripping (ἐκπληκτικώτερον); an example is the pursuit of Hector'.[13] The view is well attested in later ancient criticism that Homer (and poets generally) typically privileged a pleasurable account over a true one.[14] Plato equates 'poetic' with 'pleasurable for the masses to hear' (ποιητικὰ καὶ ἡδέα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀκούειν, *Resp.* 387b3). But this view did not

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[11] On εἰκός, 'probable', 'plausible' in ancient criticism, see Schironi (2018) 419, 422. Here, it seems tinged with the moral sense, 'fitting', 'seemly' (LSJ *s.v.* ἔοικα III.2, IV.2; cf. ibid. *s.v.* εἰκός).

[12] Philostratus' position on Homer and the truth may be compared with Strabo's (see below, §3.3).

[13] See Schironi (2018) 418–19.

[14] Homer: e.g., Philostr. *Her.* 34.4; Dio Chrys. 11.42.

have to wait for the fourth-century philosophers to find expression. It was current also in the fifth century BCE.[15] Pindar emphasises that poets' tales generally (*O.* 1.28–34), and Homer's poems in particular (*N.* 7.20–3), sacrifice the truth to a pleasurable account.[16] The view that it is the job of poetry to produce pleasure, as opposed to any more serious or edifying function, is alluded to in Euripides' *Suppliant Women* (180–3) and his *Antiope* (fr. 188 *TGrF*).[17] Thucydides, Herodotus' younger contemporary, contrasted the pleasure-producing performative literary genres with those—such as his own—that were concerned with truth and with providing a societal benefit (1.22.4).

The poets' preference of a pleasurable account over a true one could therefore be either justified or problematised. Herodotus' own position does not clearly emerge from the neutrally-worded sentence 2.116.1. Herodotus has been seen here as 'articulating a nascent concept of fiction'.[18] However, Herodotus does not here make an unconflicted case for 'poetic licence', as Eratosthenes and Aristarchus would do later (see below, §3.3). In Herodotus, this view comes with a crucial twist, for his Homer consistently shows that he knows the truth (below, §3.3). There is therefore no straightforward justification offered here for a poet's sacrificing truth for the public's entertainment. Herodotus stops short both of condemning the poet's fiction as a fiction and of commending fiction for fiction's sake.

If the preceding is correct, then Herodotus here assumes and engages with the fundamental ancient literary critical notion that poets may sacrifice truth for the pleasurability of their account. His use of the term $\epsilon\dot{v}\pi\rho\epsilon\pi\dot{\eta}s$, however, will not anticipate that of $\pi\rho\dot{\epsilon}\pi o\nu$ in subsequent ancient literary critical discourse to denote what is 'appropriate' (i.e., conformable to moral expectations, either absolutely or for a given literary character). In contemporary usage the locution $\epsilon\dot{v}\pi\rho\epsilon\pi\dot{\eta}s$ $\lambda\dot{o}\gamma os$, together with $\epsilon\dot{v}\pi\rho\dot{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\alpha$ $\lambda\dot{o}\gamma o\upsilon$ and synonyms, appears to be consistently used to distinguish a seemly or attractive account (i.e., one possessing a superficial, specious, or popular appeal) from a true one, not to distinguish that which is inappropriate or

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[15] Porter (2011a) 24: 'That Homer's readers were capable of contemplating the sheer fictionality of Homer's poetry before Aristotle has been doubted in the past, though the countervailing evidence is sufficiently powerful to assure us of the contrary'.

[16] See esp. Park (2013) 28 and n. 49, 32 and n. 63; cf. Richardson (1992) 31–2; Porter (2011a) 29.

[17] Wright (2010) 167–9.

[18] Kim (2010) 33.

indecorous (τὸ ἀπρεπές) from that which is appropriate or decorous (τὸ πρέπον). Thucydides' usage is illustrative. In the Mytilene debate, Cleon argues that anyone who will argue the opposing cause 'will be attempting to sway [his Athenian listeners] by belabouring the superficial attractiveness of his speech' (3.38.2: τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου ἐκπονήσας παράγειν πειράσεται); in his rejoinder, Diodotus urges the Athenians not to be induced 'by the superficial appeal of [Cleon's] speech' (3.44.4: τῷ εὐπρεπεῖ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου) to eschew 'the utility/expediency' offered by his own. Thucydides himself uses the phrase εὐπρέπεια λόγου ('specious language') in a sense approximating to 'propaganda', i.e., a cloaking of the reality of the abuses of power in a fine language calculated to deceive the masses (3.11.3, 3.82.8; compare also 3.82.8: ὀνόματος εὐπρεποῦς). Plato's usage is similar. In the *Phaedo*, Simmias rejects one philosophical account (λόγος) because it 'has come about without proof and with a certain plausibility and speciousness (μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας), whence it has won acceptance among the majority of men' (92c11–d2); in the *Euthydemus*, Socrates remarks, '[*sc.* the speech] has speciousness rather than truth' (305e5–306a1: [*sc.* ὁ λόγος] ἔχει … εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλήθειαν). Therefore, to characterise a *logos* as εὐπρεπής is to ascribe to it an easy appeal or specious attractiveness that is likely to commend it to the masses, but runs counter to the truth.[19] Thus Herodotus' use of the adjective εὐπρεπής already implies a concern with Homeric poetry's relationship with the truth, a concern that is otherwise central to his discussion in 2.116 (see immediately below, §§3.2 and 3.3).

3.2 Herodotus on Homer and Non-contradiction

We should now consider Herodotus' statement, '[Homer] did not make himself backtrack anywhere else' (οὐδαμῇ ἄλλῃ ἀνεπόδισε ἑωυτόν, 2.116.2). The sense of ἀνεπόδισε ἑωυτόν is difficult to establish.[20] The transitive verb ἀναποδίζειν τινά ought to mean 'to make someone put their foot back,

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[19] Cf. also, e.g., Eur. *Tr.* 951: εὐπρεπῆ λόγον (on which see LSJ *s.v.* εὐπρεπής I.3 '*specious, plausible*, opp. ἀληθής'); D.H. *Isoc.* 18: λόγον εὐπρεπῆ πλαττομένῳ, 'fabricating a specious story', i.e., one superficially attractive, but untrue.

[20] Powell (1938a) 23 'not clear'. For discussion of the meaning, see D'Ecclesiis (2002) 117–19; Farinelli (1995) 27–9; Grethlein (2010) 155 and n. 22.

backtrack, go over the same ground again'.[21] However, the attested usage of fifth- and fourth-century authors, including Herodotus himself, indicates rather a meaning of 'interrogate' or 'scrutinise' someone. Relevant passages are the following.

First, Herodotus 5.92ζ.2: ἐπειρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀναποδίζων τὸν κήρυκα κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ Κορίνθου ἄπιξιν, 'questioning the herald and making him go over the same ground again concerning his arrival from Corinth'.

Second, Antiphon 87 B 18 D–K (from an entry in Harpocration's *Lexicon to the Ten Orators*, α 121 Keaney): ἀναποδιζόμενα· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐξεταζόμενα ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄνωθεν τὰ αὐτὰ πολλάκις λεγόμενα ἢ πραττόμενα· Ἀντιφῶν Ἀληθείας αʹ, '*anapodizomena*: equivalent to "things that are scrutinised" or to "the same things said or done repeatedly from the beginning"; used by Antiphon in Book 1 of his *Alētheia*'.

Third, Aeschines 3.192: πολλάκις ἀνεπόδιζον τὸν γραμματέα καὶ ἐκέλευον πάλιν ἀναγιγνώσκειν τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα, 'they made the secretary repeatedly go over the same ground again and asked him to read again the laws and the decree'.

It is notable that these three examples all exhibit the verb in an imperfective aspect (imperfect indicative or present participle).[22] The sense in each case may thus be 'to *try* to get someone to backtrack', i.e., try to get them to give a different account of the same thing. The negated reflexive aorist form used by Herodotus (2.116.2) would then mean: '[Homer] did not make himself backtrack'; in other words, 'did not give a divergent account of the same thing', 'did not contradict himself'. Thus ἀναποδίζειν, with a basic sense of 'make someone go over the same ground again', could effectively yield the meanings 'interrogate someone' (when used transitively in the imperfect) and 'contradict oneself' (when used reflexively in the aorist). An important implication of the passages cited from Herodotus, Antiphon, and Aeschines is that ἀναποδίζειν is used in contexts where getting at the truth is the issue. Thus, in using ἀναποδίζειν in 2.116.2, Herodotus implies that there is a truth at stake to which Homer faithfully adheres. This is a point to which we will return (below, §3.3).

It remains unclear, however, what precise point Herodotus is making about Homer and self-contradiction. On one view, propounded by D.

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[21] LSJ *s.v.*: 'make to step back, call back and question, cross-examine'. Compare Stein (1881) 124. The late Martin West suggested to me that we may be dealing with a wrestling metaphor.

[22] See De Bakker–Huitink–Rijksbaron–van Emde Boas (2019) 406, 412–13, 416.

D'Ecclesiis, Herodotus is arguing that this is the only instance where Homer contradicts himself by incorporating in his poem a reference to a *logos* that is incompatible with the conception of the poem as a whole.[23] On this view, the *logos* according to which Helen went to Egypt but not Troy is incompatible with the explicit overall position of the *Iliad*, where Helen *is* at Troy. And this will constitute a unique contradiction in Homer, who can thus be said, in a way, to be maintaining the position both that Helen did and that she did not go to Troy. Herodotus' expression, 'and he contradicted himself nowhere else' will amount to: 'he contradicted himself here, but nowhere else'.[24]

An alternative view is available. Herodotus may here be finding not a unique contradiction within Homeric poetry, but, on the contrary, a consistent position across the Homeric poems, which indicates Homer's knowledge of the Egyptian Helen-*logos*. Herodotus' phrase, 'and he contradicted himself nowhere else' will mean: 'nowhere else in all his oeuvre does Homer contradict the implications of his reference to Paris' detour to Sidon at *Il.* 6.289–92'.[25] In other words, according to Herodotus, in every passage in the Homeric poems (which Herodotus perhaps took to comprise just the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*: see below, Ch. 5 §5.2) that pertained to the question of Helen's whereabouts during the Trojan War, Homer did not fail to hint at the Egyptian Helen-*logos*. This Herodotean claim about Homer would be supported by Herodotus' quotations from the Homeric poems. Thus, in *Iliad* 6, by mentioning Paris and Helen's detour to Sidon, Homer would hint at a further detour by Paris and Helen to Egypt. And in *Odyssey* 4, by placing Menelaus, Helen, and Proteus all together in Egypt, Homer would hint at a version in which Menelaus made land at Egypt in order to collect Helen from Proteus (as in the Egyptian Helen-*logos*: compare Hdt.

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[23] D'Ecclesiis (2002) 118–19. This view was indicated, and rejected, by Farinelli (1995) 27.

[24] Farinelli (1995) 28 quite properly objects to this interpretation that Herodotus does not present Homer's procedure as a contradiction ('Per Erodoto, Omero padroneggia la situazione, seguendo coerentemente una versione, ma allo stesso tempo lanciando segnali dell'altra').

[25] According to D'Ecclesiis (2002) 115, Herodotus uses … καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἄλλῃ to express a general rule which admits of a single exception, specified in the words immediately preceding. This is the case at 3.109.3: οἱ δὲ ὑπόπτεροι ἐόντες ἀθρόοι εἰσὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀραβίῃ καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἄλλῃ, 'the winged snakes are frequent in Arabia and nowhere else'. But the syntax is quite different in 2.116.2: κατὰ παρεποίησε ἐν Ἰλιάδι (καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἄλλῃ ἀνεπόδισε ἑωυτόν) πλάνην τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου, the crucial difference arising from the fact that in 2.116.2 the clause introduced by καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἄλλῃ has a different verb (ἀνεπόδισε ἑωυτόν) than the one that precedes it (παρεποίησε).

2.115.6, 2.119.1). Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, although the explicit narrative of each of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* overtly contradicts the Egyptian Helen-*logos*, both Homeric poems would be seen as consistently hinting at it. Moreover, there is a crucial contrast here with the *Cypria*, whose narrative not only overtly excludes the Egyptian Helen-*logos* (by taking Paris and Helen directly to Troy 'in three days'), but also, crucially, fails to hint at it. For Herodotus, this amounts to a further and most compelling proof (οὐκ ἥκιστα ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δηλοῖ) that the *Cypria* is not the work of Homer.

The former interpretation, advanced by D'Ecclesiis, is premised on the inauthenticity of the quotations from the *Odyssey* in Herodotus 2.116.4–5.[26] If we accept their authenticity, then this interpretation becomes unavailable. For if Herodotus also quotes from the *Odyssey* to indicate Homer's knowledge of the Egyptian Helen-*logos*, then the Iliadic excursus will not be the only place (compare 2.116.2: οὐδαμῇ ἄλλῃ, '[*sc.* in the *Iliad* and] nowhere else')[27] where Homer shows knowledge of a *logos* that is incompatible with the overall conception of his poem (he would also do so in *Odyssey* Book 4). The latter interpretation has the decisive advantage of making a coherent argument out of Herodotus' uses of all the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and the *Cypria*. If we accept the authenticity of 2.116.4–5 (as we should: see above Ch. 2 §2.3), then of these two interpretations only the latter can be valid.

Either of these interpretations would resonate strongly with later Homeric criticism. On the former interpretation (D'Ecclesiis'), Homer's handling of the Helen-*logos* results in a unique violation of a rule of non-contradiction within the *Iliad*. It is entirely plausible to impute to Herodotus such a rule of non-contradiction within the *Iliad*. That rule has been called 'probably the most important assumption in the whole of Aristarchus' philological work'.[28] Already in the early third century BCE, Zeno of Citium was concerned to save Homer from self-contradiction.[29] So too, in the

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[26] Cf. Farinelli (1995) 28; D'Ecclesiis (2002) 119–20.

[27] See above, Ch. 2 §3.3 for the interpretation of this phrase.

[28] Schironi (2018) 736–7; for Aristarchus' approach to internal contradictions in the *Iliad*, see Schironi (2018) e.g., 425–6, 453–6, 508–10 (cf. Nünlist (2009) 175). E.g., schol. A *Il.* 9.571a (οὐ μάχεται); etc. Cf. Schironi (2009) 288–90; Schenkeveld (1970) 164–5.

[29] Dio Chrys. 53.5: ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν [τοῦ] Ὁμήρου ψέγει, ἅμα διηγούμενος καὶ διδάσκων ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν, ὅπως μὴ φαίνηται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ μαχόμενος ἔν τισι δοκοῦσιν ἐναντίως εἰρῆσθαι (for these as standard terms for internal contradiction, see Schironi (2018) 453).

fourth, was Aristotle.[30] Aristotle was evidently preceded in this by a certain Glaucon, whom he cites in chapter 25 of the *Poetics* (1461a35–b3); he may have been a contemporary of Herodotus, if he is identical with the person of that name mentioned by Plato, *Ion* 530d1.[31] It was clearly a fifth-century concern to accuse and defend poets of the charge of self-contradiction.[32] 'Socrates'' defence of Simonides against the criticism of 'Protagoras' in the eponymous Platonic dialogue revolves around whether Simonides can be acquitted of self-contradiction within the poem; there is here an underlying assumption that a good poet will not contradict himself.[33]

An objection to attributing this position here to Herodotus is that it is not clear why, in Herodotus' view, Homer should have perpetrated this particular unique violation of the rule of non-contradiction. The assumption must be that Homer somehow felt such deference towards the Egyptian Helen-*logos* that he felt constrained to make an oblique reference to it, even though it contradicted his own explicit narrative; but why he should do so remains obscure. Moreover, this would not follow from any general Homeric *modus operandi*; on the contrary, it would constitute a unique exception to Homer's general practice. Herodotus is more likely to be interested in pointing to the working of a general Homeric *modus operandi* than to a unique exception to it. On the alternative interpretation, Homer's handling of the Egyptian Helen-*logos* does result from the working of a general Homeric *modus operandi*: the assumption that Homer is at pains to be in touch with the truth, even when he does not narrate it. Because the Egyptian Helen-*logos* is true, Homer must consistently be in touch with that truth (see further below, §3.3).

On this interpretation, we will be dealing with an instance of non-contradiction between separate poems (the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*) by the same poet (Homer). This too was, in general, a major concern of critics throughout antiquity. Thus Plutarch in *How to Study Poetry* treats many types of

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[30] Arist. *Poet.* 1461b15–18, 23, cf. 1455a25–6. See Schironi (2018) 424–5; Mayhew (2019) 20–2, 58–9.

[31] Ucciardello (2005b).

[32] Cf. D'Ecclesiis (2002) 121–2.

[33] Pl. *Prt.* 339b9–10, 340b3, 340c8. At *Meno* 95d2–96a4, however, 'Socrates' convicts Theognis of self-contradiction. At *Leg.* 719c5–d1, the Athenian argues that poets generally are often forced to contradict themselves, because their characters say contradictory things, and the poet is unable to arbitrate between them (a problem later resolved by the λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου, on which see Nünlist (2009) 116).

contradiction in poetry, including between different works by one poet.[34] Particular attention, however, was paid to the question of contradictions between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Fourth-century BCE critics such as Aristotle, Heraclides Ponticus, and Ephorus, as well as the third-century Aristarchus, occupied themselves with the implications of Crete being described as having 'one hundred cities' in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 2.649) and 'ninety cities' in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 19.173–4).[35] The issue of inconsistencies between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* was treated in different ways by different scholars. Aristarchus' position was that, although Homer's world is a fictionalised one, it should be free from self-contradiction. Thus Aristarchus was at pains to dispose of all alleged mythological inconsistencies between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.[36]

We also find the view, in contrast with Aristarchus' position, that precisely because Homer's world is a fictionalised one, it quite unproblematically contains self-contradictions. This position is well evidenced by the second-century CE (?) Epicurean philosopher Diogenianus.[37] It is also taken in the following scholium on the *Odyssey* (schol. T *Od.* 10.20):

πῶς δ' αὐτὸς καὶ ἐν Ἰλιάδι ὑποστησάμενος τοὺς ἀνέμους ἐν Θράκῃ οἰκεῖν παρ' Αἰόλῳ φησίν; εἴληπται μὲν τὸ πλάσμα πρὸς τὸν καιρόν, διὸ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀνεύθυνα τὰ τῶν μύθων.

How does [Homer] himself, after in the *Iliad* [23.229–30] locating the winds in Thrace, say that they live with Aiolos [*Od.* 10.20]? It is a fiction that has been adopted for the needs of moment; therefore one ought not

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[34] Plut. *Quom. adul.* 20C–D. Cf. Hunter and Russell (2011) 115.

[35] Aristotle (fr. 146 Rose = 370 Gigon), Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 171 Wehrli), Ephorus (*BNJ* 70 F 146), and Aristarchus (*apud* schol. *Il.* 2.649). See Bouchard (2016) 252–6; Schironi (2018) 632 and n. 32; Mayhew (2019) 18, 97.

[36] Schironi (2018) 636–9, esp. 638. Note that Aristarchus' principle of non-contradiction serves to uphold *believability*, rather than *truth*: Schironi (2018) 419–20, 461.

[37] Diogenianus *ap.* Euseb. *Praep. ev.* 6.8.7, p. 263b (criticising Chrysippus): καὶ τῷ ποιητῇ μὲν ἅτε οὐ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως ὑπισχνουμένῳ ἀλλὰ μιμουμένῳ πάθη τε καὶ ἤθη καὶ δόξας παντοίας ἀνθρώπων ἁρμόττει πολλάκις καὶ τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν, φιλοσόφῳ δὲ οὔτε τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν οὔτε ποιητῇ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο χρῆσθαι μάρτυρι, 'it befits the poet, since he does not promise us the truth of the nature of things, but offers a depiction of the feelings and characters and various thoughts of men, frequently to say contradictory things; but it does not befit the philosopher either to say contradictory things nor, for this very reason, to take a poet as his authority'. See Halliwell (2002) 279–80.

>   to problematise such things; matters of mythology are not held to account.[38]

This scholium polemicises, implicitly, against those who would make a *zētēma* (critical 'problem' or 'question') out of such inconsistencies between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*; this whole line of inquiry is dismissed as fatuous (οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα).

Herodotus' position contrasts revealingly with the position taken both in this scholium and by Aristarchus. According to Herodotus, Homer is hinting at an account that is *not* fictionalised (in contrast with both Aristarchus and schol. T *Od.* 10.20), but *true*; and Homer's fidelity to the truth ensures that he remains free from contradiction. Thus Herodotus agrees in the latter respect (Homer's freedom from self-contradiction) with Aristarchus, but he takes an entirely opposite position to schol. T *Od.* 10.20 (for whom the Homeric poems are simply mythical and self-contradictory). The dictum of the Odyssean scholion that 'matters of mythology are not held to account' (ἀνεύθυνα τὰ τῶν μύθων) contrasts notably with Herodotus' claim that Homer did '[not] contradict himself' ([οὐκ] ἀνεπόδισε ἑωυτόν): a form of words that implies that Homer's subject matter precisely is held to account (we saw above, this section, that the verb ἀναποδίζειν indicates a preoccupation with the truth). For Herodotus, it is evidently not a straightforward fiction (πλάσμα, in the language of the T-scholion), but a true account that is at stake, albeit one only hinted at by Homer. Whereas the Odyssean T-scholion dismisses a charge of factual contradiction between *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by denying any factual basis to the subject matter in question (where the winds live), Herodotus grants a factual basis to the matter under discussion (where Helen spent the Trojan War), and finds a consistent position across both Homeric poems.

We have seen that Herodotus' phrase [οὐκ] ἀνεπόδισε ἑωυτόν relates to contemporary forensic and quasi-forensic uses of the verb ἀναποδίζειν. It is also apparent that this verb does not resemble those employed in later literary critical discourse as terms of art for internal contradiction (e.g., ἐναντιοῦσθαι, μάχεσθαι).[39] These differing lexical preferences may be plausibly explained by the respective interest of the critics concerned in questions of truth. The interrogative process designated by ἀναποδίζειν aims

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[38] Cf. Nünlist (2009) 181.

[39] Schironi (2018) 425, 453. Cf. Pl. *Prtg.* 339b10: εἰ ἐναντία λέγει αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁ ποιητής, cf. 340c7–d1.

to produce contradiction in a witness with a view to exposing their testimony as false or to prove it to be true because free from such contradiction. By contrast, much ancient literary criticism (that of Aristarchus, for instance) pursued the question of internal contradiction as an aesthetic problem divorced from questions of truth.[40] It is obvious that such literary criticism would have little use for a verb like ἀναποδίζειν.

3.3 Herodotus on Homer and the Truth

It is necessary to consider in more detail Herodotus' views on Homer's relationship to the truth, as there seem to be contradictory strands to Herodotus' thinking.

On the one hand, Herodotus is clear that Homer knowingly perpetrates fictions. This is clear from 2.116.1 (οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἐς τὴν ἐποποιίην εὐπρεπὴς ἦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῷ περ ἐχρήσατο, ⟨ἑκὼν⟩ μετῆκε αὐτόν: see above, Ch. 2 §2.2). It emerges even more clearly from an earlier passage in Book 2, namely, chapter 23:

> ὁ δὲ περὶ τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ λέξας ἐς ἀφανὲς τὸν μῦθον ἀνενείκας οὐκ ἔχει ἔλεγχον· οὐ γάρ τινα ἔγωγε οἶδα ποταμὸν Ὠκεανὸν ἐόντα, Ὅμηρον δὲ ἤ τινα τῶν πρότερον γενομένων ποιητέων δοκέω τοὔνομα εὑρόντα ἐς ποίησιν ἐσενείκασθαι.

> The person who spoke about Okeanos referred his (fictitious) discourse [*mūthos*] to the realm of the invisible and is incapable of refutation; for my part, I do not know of the existence of any river Okeanos, but I think that Homer or one of the poets who were earlier invented the name and introduced it into poetry.

Herodotus here employs numerous words and concepts that, as we shall presently see, echo throughout subsequent critical discourse: μῦθον, 'myth' (of a non-real-world discourse); ἐόντα, 'existing' (*sc.* in the real world; synonyms are τὰ γενόμενα, ἀλήθεια); and εὑρόντα ἐς ποίησιν ἐσενείκασθαι, for poetic 'invention' (most commonly: πλάττειν). This Herodotean passage is also likely to have inspired, directly or indirectly, the term ἐξωκεανισμός, 'Oceanising', used by Eratosthenes with reference to Homer's transposing

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[40] Schironi (2018) 419–20, 424–5.

of Odysseus' wanderings into the Ocean (as opposed to locating them somewhere in the real world), a term synonymous with 'mythologising' the wanderings.[41]

On the other hand, Herodotus in 2.116–17 is also keen to credit Homer with knowing a truth and with showing us, consistently, that he knows it. Herodotus' Homer is therefore both wedded to fiction and committed to truth—to some truths, at least. We should try to make sense of this ambivalent stance by positioning Herodotus in relation to other ancient critical views on poetry and the truth. These views are both numerous and complex, but they may conveniently be divided into four groups.

First, there is the view that the poets (voluntarily or involuntarily)[42] are in the business of giving instruction,[43] but make an unconscionably bad job of it. They are therefore criticised for not giving an accurate account of the real world; the ψεύδη that they perpetrate are indefensible, regardless of whether these are understood as inadvertent 'falsehoods' or deliberate 'fictions'.[44] This view is represented by Xenophanes, claiming that 'from the beginning [i.e., from their earliest years], everyone has learned according to Homer' (21 B 10 D–K: ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ' Ὅμηρον ἐπεὶ μεμαθήκασι πάντες; compare Heraclitus 22 B 57 D–K: διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος), and that Homer and Hesiod have fundamentally misrepresented the truth about the gods (especially 21 B 11 D–K: compare Aristotle *Poetics* 1460b36–1461a1; compare also 21 B 1.22: πλάσμα<τα>).[45] It is also famously represented by 'Socrates' in Plato's *Republic*, accusing Homer and Hesiod of telling 'false fictitious stories' about the gods and heroes (377d5–6: μύθους … ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες), which are 'not true' (378c1: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, compare 378a2, 386c1, 391b7, 391e2), and requiring that poetry in general should justify itself as being 'true' (608a2: ἀληθεστάτην [*sc. ποίησιν*], 608a7: ἀληθείας … ἀπτομένηι [*sc. ποιήσει*];

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[41] Eratosth. fr. 8 Roller (ap. Str. 7.3.6 C299); cf. Aristarchus in schol. *Od.* 5.55a Pontani; Apollodorus of Athens, *BNJ* 244 F 157d (ap. Str. 1.2.37 C44). See Romm (1992) 173.

[42] On poets lying deliberately or not, cf. Plut. *Quom. adul.* 16A; cf. Pol. 12.12.4–5. Cf. Priestly (2014) 214–15.

[43] Cf. Russell (1981) 84.

[44] On the indistinctness of 'fiction' and 'falsehood' in Plato, see Halliwell (2002) 49–50.

[45] Yunis (2003) 194: 'Both Xenophanes and Heraclitus assume that Homer's text is a transparent, nonproblematic entity; its meaning is obvious and noncontrovertible. The only consideration is whether what is said by Homer is right or wrong'. Cf. Marincola (1997) 218–19; Ford (2002) 46–7. For Herodotus' acceptance of the Xenophanean (and Persian) position that the gods do not have human form, see Burkert (2003 [1963]) 192–4.

compare 389b3, ἀλήθειαν).[46] Another notorious representative of this view is Aristotle's contemporary Zoilus of Amphipolis, who 'found fault with Homer as a writer of *mythoi*' (*BNJ* 71 F 1 *ap.* Strabo 6.2.4 C271: ὁ τὸν Ὅμηρον ψέγων ὡς μυθογράφον).[47] In the first/second century CE, Dio Chrysostom in his *Trojan Oration* implies that Homer has not told 'the truth and the facts' (τὰ ὄντα καὶ γενόμενα, 11.4) about the Trojan War; likewise, he said not a word of truth (17: μηθὲν ἀληθὲς λέγειν) about the gods.[48] Diogenianus, referenced above (§3.2), states that Homer is not concerned with 'the truth of the nature of things' (*ap.* Eus. *Praep. ev.* 6.8.7, p. 263b: οὐ τὴν ἀλήθειαν … τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως).

Second, there is the view that certain poets (specifically, Homer and 'Orpheus') provide—hidden beneath the surface meaning of their words—an accurate account of the true world. This position is associated with Theagenes of Rhegium in the sixth century (T 4 Biondi),[49] Metrodorus of Lampsacus in the early fifth (D–K 61 A 4),[50] and the author[51] of the Derveni papyrus in the late fifth century[52] (the last interpreting not the Homeric poems, but a *Theogony* ascribed to Orpheus).[53] All of these interpreted the poetic narratives of the gods and heroes in a way that we would regard as allegorical, so as to reveal the poet as giving a true physical and/or cosmological account of the world.[54] This way of reading Homer is alluded to by Plato.[55] On this view, Homer (or in the case of the Derveni author, Orpheus) is seen as engaged in a real-world discourse, provided that we penetrate the surface meaning of the narrative to a deeper level of 'ulterior

[46] Murray (1996) 21: '[according to Plato's Socrates,] the ideas expressed by Homer and the other poets about the gods and their attitude to human life are quite simply wrong in terms of the information they impart'.

[47] On Zoilus, see further below, §3.4. Aristotle's contemporary: cf. Pfeiffer (1968) 70.

[48] Kim (2010), esp. 95–108.

[49] Biondi 57–105; Kotwick (2020) 5–7.

[50] Kotwick (2020) 8–9.

[51] For discussion of his identity (Epigenes, Stesimbrotus, Euthyphro, Metrodorus, Diogenes, Diagoras, Prodicus), see Kotwick (2017) 19–22; Lebedev (2019).

[52] On the date, see Kotwick (2017) 15–16.

[53] On the likelihood of allegorical interpretations of Hesiod, see M. L. West (1978) 63; Montanari (2009) 325–6; Koning (2010) 91–3, esp. 92 n. 133 (in Plato).

[54] Bouchard (2016) 30–7.

[55] *Resp.* 378d2–6, *Cra.* 407a8–b2, *Tht.* 180c7–d3. See Ford (2002) 85–8; Struck (2004) 41–50; Bouchard (2016) 38–40.

meanings' (ὑπόνοιαι: Pl. *Resp.* 378d6–7; compare Plut. *Quom. adul.* 19E–F).[56] Herodotus' contemporary Diogenes of Apollonia was able in this way to 'applaud Homer for discoursing about the divine truly, not mythically' (D–K 64 A 8 = T 6 Laks: Διογένης ἐπαινεῖ τὸν Ὅμηρον ὡς οὐ μυθικῶς ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ θείου διειλεγμένον).[57] Similarly, in the view of the Derveni commentator, Orpheus' poetry is in its entirety 'a riddle about reality (?)' (PDerv. XIII.5: πᾶσαν τὴν ποίησιν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αἰνίζεται).[58]

Third, there is the view that the poets are not in the business of instructing, but entertaining; theirs is not to be mistaken for a real-world discourse, since it is a fictionalised one (*mythoi*, received stories). This view is encapsulated in the statement of the third-century BCE Eratosthenes that 'every poet aims at entertainment, not instruction' (fr. 2 Roller, *ap.* Str. 1.2.3 C15: ποιητὴν γὰρ ἔφη πάντα στοχάζεσθαι ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας).[59] According to Aristarchus' inflection of this position, we should allow Homer to have told his more disconcerting tales about the gods 'rather in mythical vein, according to poetic licence and that we should not concern ourselves needlessly with anything outside of the poet's discourse' (*apud* schol. D *Il.* 5.385).[60] Aristarchus presumably meant to prescribe our going 'outside of the poet's discourse' specifically in search of 'ulterior meanings'.[61] The concept

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[56] E.g. Domaradzki (2019) 547: 'Theagenes goes beyond the surface meaning of the poem to reveal its recondite meaning so that beneath the veneer of a seemingly naive and outrageous myth various profound cosmological and ethical truths are demonstrated to have been concealed'.

[57] See Laks (1983) 102; Domaradzki (2010) 242–5; (2019) 550; Janko (1997) 80.

[58] For περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων as 'about reality' (rather than 'about his subject matter'), see Kotwick (2017) 212, 213–14. For αἰνίττεσθαι as 'compose allegorically', see Ford (2002) 74; Struck (2004) 38–9.

[59] Echoed by Agatharchides of Cnidus (II BCE) fr. 18 *GGM* I.117 *ap.* Phot. *Bibl.* 250, 444b33–4 Bekker: ὅτι πᾶς ποιητὴς ψυχαγωγίας μᾶλλον ἢ ἀληθείας ἐστὶ στοχαστής; Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 1.297. The idea is reprised at, e.g., Andromenides (III BCE?) F 12 in Philod. *On Poems* 1 161.2–6 Janko: δεῖν τὸν μὲν σοφιστὴν ζητεῖν τὴ[ν] ἀλήθ[εια]ν, τὸν δὲ πο[ητὴν τὰ πα]ρὰ τοῖς πολ[λοῖς εὐδοκι]μοῦντα; Plut. *Quom. adul.* 16A: ἑκόντες μὲν [*sc.* ψεύδονται ἀοιδοὶ] ὅτι πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀκοῆς καὶ χάριν, ἣν οἱ πλεῖστοι διώκουσιν, αὐστηροτέραν ἡγοῦνται τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ ψεύδους.

[60] Ἀρίσταρχος ἀξιοῖ τὰ φραζόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ μυθικώτερον ἐκδέχεσθαι, κατὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐξουσίαν, μηδὲν ἐξὼ τῶν φραζομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ περιεργαζομένους. (Similarly, Eustath. *Comm. Il.* 5.395–400 = II.101.13–15 van der Valk.)

[61] Aristarchus' opposition to allegorical readings of Homeric myth is also recorded by Eustathius (*Comm.* on *Il.* 1.46 = I.65.23–7 van der Valk): οὐδέν τι τῶν παρ' Ὁμήρῳ ἀλληγορεῖν ἤθελεν … ἀλλὰ πάντα κατὰ τὸ προφερόμενον καὶ προφαινόμενον τοῦ μύθου ἐνόει, '[*sc.*

of 'poetic licence' grants the poet leave from participation in a real-world discourse.[62] This kind of view goes back to at least the Classical period.[63] The author of the *Dissoi Logoi* claims that 'poets compose with a view to pleasure, not to truth' (90 D–K 2.28: [*sc. ποιηταὶ*] ποτὶ ἀδονάν, οὐ ποτὶ ἀλάθειαν ποιεῦντι).[64] The proverb πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί, 'poets tell many falsehoods' (*Paroem. Gr.* I.371.49), known already to Solon in the sixth century BCE (29 *IEG*), was presumably intended to justify 'fictions' (ψεύδη) as being poets' legitimate stock-in-trade.[65] Aristotle says to Homer's credit that he 'has taught the other poets how to lie as is necessary' (*Poet.* 1460a18–19: δεδίδαχεν δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ[66] λέγειν ὡς δεῖ).[67] Aristotle argues further that 'if the criticism is made [against a poet] that the account is not true, the defence should be offered that this is what people say' (*Poet.* 1460b32–7: ἐὰν ἐπιτιμᾶται ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ … [*sc. λυτέον*] ὅτι οὕτω φασίν). For Aristotle, as an alternative to saying 'the kind of things that really were or really are the case' (οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν),[68] it was admissible for the poet to say 'the kind of things that people say or are conventionally accepted' (οἷά

Aristarchus] was not prepared to allegorise anything in Homer, … but would understand everything in accordance with the surface indication and declaration of the myth'. See Porter (1992) 70–1; Bouchard (2016) 86–99; Schironi (2018) 140–2; cf. Struck (2004) 21–2, 36; Montana (2020) 163–9.

[62] Cf. schol. T *Il.* 4.491b: Ἀρίσταρχος … ὡς ποιητικὸν παραιτεῖται; Schironi (2018) 419, 421, 509-10. Cf. Polybius *ap.* Str. 1.2.17 C25: ποιητικὴν ἐξουσίαν; Ps.-Virg. *Aetna* 91–2: *debita carminibus libertas ista, sed omnis | in uero mihi cura*, cf. 74: *haec est mendosae uulgata licentia famae*.

[63] See above, §3.1, for the 'concept of fiction' in Pindar, Euripides, and Thucydides. Plato was also capable of recognising that *muthoi* are the legitimate *métier* of the poet (see, e.g., Pl. *Phd.* 61b2–3: ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, with Halliwell (2000) 103–4), and also that poetry is answerable to standards of its own (see Annas (1981) 343; Murray (1996) 28).

[64] Cf. 90 D–K 3.17: καὶ τοὶ ποιηταὶ οὐ [το] ποτὶ ἀλάθειαν, ἀλλὰ ποτὶ τὰς ἀδονὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ποιήματα ποιέοντι, 'and the poets compose their poems not with a view to truth, but towards men's pleasures'. Gorgias' pronouncements on ἀπατή (82 B 23 D–K; cf. *Helen* §10) may also point in this direction; see Rosenmeyer (1955); Segal (1962) 114 and 146 n. 68, 130–1; cf. Schollmeyer (2020) 31–4.

[65] The saying is also open to be interpreted as criticism rather than justification of the poets; cf., e.g., Richardson (1992) 30. On the question of the relationship of this saying to Hes. *Th.* 27, see Clay (2003) 58–64, esp. 64.

[66] Editors accent the word as perispomenon (i.e., as an adjective); the paroxytone accentuation (ψεύδη, a noun) would also be possible.

[67] Turned to Homer's *dis*credit at Dio Chrys. 11.23.

[68] Aristotle's οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν (*Poet.* 1460b10) is glossed as ἀληθῆ at *Poet.* 1460b33.

φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, *Poet.* 1460b10–11).[69] Antisthenes apparently anticipated this position in the fifth/fourth century BCE, in maintaining that Homer 'has written some things according to convention, others according to reality' (Antisthenes, T 194 Prince, *ap.* Dio Chrys. *On Homer* (= *Oration* 53) 5: τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν).[70] The distinction must also have been familiar to Aristophanes, for he mischievously collapses it when he makes 'Euripides' ask: 'didn't I compose this as a received/true story about Phaedra?' (*Frogs* 1052: πότερον δ' οὐκ ὄντα λόγον τοῦτον περὶ τῆς Φαίδρας ξυνέθηκα;).[71] It became standard in antiquity to distinguish between poets' discourse (as being fictitious and not corresponding to reality) and that of philosophers or historians (which were true and did correspond to reality).[72]

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[69] Cf. Arist. *Homeric Problems* fr. 163 Rose *ap.* schol. *Il.* 19.108b: τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅλον μυθῶδες· καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ταῦτά φησιν Ὅμηρος οὐδὲ γινόμενα εἰσάγει, ἀλλ' ὡς διαδεδομένων περὶ τὴν Ἡρακλέους γένεσιν μέμνηται, 'the whole thing is *mythical*; for Homer does not vouch for these things in his own person nor is he [here] representing *facts*, but on the understanding that these things are *traditional*, he makes mention of the birth of Heracles'. Here, ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ (also at schol. bT *Il.* 16.278 *ex.*) is a synonym of ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου (for which see Nünlist (2009) 116–34; Bouchard (2016) 252). Cf. also schol. bT *Il.* 5.385a.

[70] See Richardson (2006 (1975)) 80. Antisthenes' ἀλήθεια and δόξα are differently explained by Prince 667, 668. The same distinction between ἀλήθεια and δόξα respectively is assumed at Pl. *Phdr.* 229c4: πείθει ἀληθὲς εἶναι (Phaedrus: 'do you believe that it *is true*?'), in contrast with 230a2: πειθόμενος … τῶι νομιζομένωι περὶ αὐτῶν (Socrates: 'believing what *is customarily held to be the case* about them'). Related fifth/fourth century BCE sophistic views are that the orator was not required to say *what was really good*, but only *what seemed so* (Phaedrus in Pl. *Phdr.* 259e7–260a4), or that he was required to say not τὸ ἀληθές, but τὸ πιθανόν / τὸ εἰκός (= τὸ τῶι πλήθει δοκοῦν; cf. also Ar. *Ran.* 1475) (*Phdr.* 272d4–273a2, 273b1–2 = 'Teisias': 273a7–c4); see Yunis (2011) 179.

[71] Dover (1993) 324; R. L. Hunter (2009a) 25–7. On ὁ ἐὼν λόγος as 'true discourse' (i.e., a story that is true), cf. Hdt. 1.95: τὸν ἐόντα λέγειν λόγον, with Darbo-Peschanski (2013) 87–92. On the *Frogs*' comic exploration of the '"didacticist" approach to literature', see Wright (2012) 17–24 esp. 24.

[72] E.g., Varro, *Antiquitates rerum divinarum* frr. 6–11 Cardauns (I.2, pp. 18–20), distinguishing a μυθικὴ θεολογία (the poets' discourse, comprising *multa contra dignitatem et naturam inmortalium ficta*) from a φυσικὴ θεολογία (the scientists/philosophers' discourse, indicating *dii qui sint*, 'who the gods *are*', etc.). Cic. *Leg.* 1.5: [Quintus:] *Intellego te, frater, alias in historia leges obseruandas putare, alias in poemate.* [Marcus:] *Quippe cum in illa ad ueritatem, Quinte, <quaeque> referantur, in hoc ad delectationem pleraque; quamquam et apud Herodotum patrem historiae et apud Theopompum sunt innumerabiles fabulae* (note the nuanced position). Cf. Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 1.27: *fabula est, in qua nec verae nec veri similes res continentur …, historia est gesta res, ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota …, argumentum est ficta res, quae tamen fieri potuit.* [Cic.] *Rhet. Her.* 1.13: *fabula est,*

This is not the place to explore how the distinction between poets' discourse and historians' is deconstructed,[73] though we may note, for instance, Herodotus' profession of a duty 'to record what is *said*', λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα (7.152.3),[74] without any requirement to believe it, and contrast this with Aristotle's description of the historian's role as being 'to record what *happened*', τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν (*Poet.* 1451b4–5).

Fourth, there is the hybrid view that poets are interested in both entertainment and instruction: while they may use invention, poetic licence, etc., they are not to be denied all participation in an instructive, real-world, discourse. This view is found in Antisthenes' and Aristotle's positions (already cited) that poets speak with reference both to how things 'really are/were' (Antisthenes: ἀλήθεια; Aristotle: οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν) and to how things are conventionally 'said to be' (Antisthenes: δόξα; Aristotle: οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ). The same position was upheld by Zeno of Citium in the early third century BCE.[75] Aristotle in his *Homeric Problems* repeatedly defended Homer on the grounds that he had depicted the world of the heroes 'as it [really] was' (οἷα ἦν: fr. 160 Rose, compare fr. 166 Rose).[76] At the same time, Aristotle was also able to maintain that Homer also invented things that did not really exist, such as the Achaean wall (*Homeric Problems* fr. 162 Rose: οὐδ' ἐγένετο, ὁ δὲ πλάσας ποιητὴς ἠφάνισεν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν, 'it did not exist, and the poet, who invented it, made it disappear, as Aristotle says').[77] Whereas Antisthenes and Aristotle seem to have conceived of truths and fictions as

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quae neque ueras neque ueri similes continet res, ut eae sunt, quae tragoedis traditae sunt. Cf. Walbank (1979) 584–5.

[73] E.g., Moles (1993) 102, 117.

[74] Cf. Hdt. 7.20.2, κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, said of the expedition of the Atreidai to Troy, in contrast with the expeditions 'of which we know', στόλων … τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν.

[75] Dio Chrys. 53.5: ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν [τοῦ] Ὁμήρου ψέγει, ἅμα διηγούμενος καὶ διδάσκων ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν, ὅπως μὴ φαίνηται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ μαχόμενος ἔν τισι δοκοῦσιν ἐναντίως εἰρῆσθαι. ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος Ἀντισθένους ἐστὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δόξῃ, τὰ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ. Cf. Porter (2011b) 825.

[76] Huxley (1979), esp. 73–5, 77: 'Homer described things οἷα ἦν as well as οἷά φασιν'; cf. Kim (2010) 27. *Pace* Schironi (2018) 338: '[Aristotle] stated that the world depicted in a poem must have its own life, independent from outside reality'; 748 n. 52: 'For [Aristotle] also, just as for Eratosthenes and Aristarchus, the "serious" side of poetry did not include scientific, technical, or historical truths', cf. 140 n. 81, 419–20. The position of Aristotle here is complex and (as indicated by one of *Histos'* anonymous readers of this monograph) in need of an in-depth treatment; however, such would exceed the scope of the present study.

[77] Porter (2011a) 23–4.

being in a quasi-paratactic relationship, as co-existing side by side in Homer's text,[78] Strabo in the first century BCE, following Polybius in the second,[79] conceived of them in a quasi-hypotactic relationship as well: that is, truths could be overlaid with fiction. This position is well illustrated by Strabo 1.2.9 C20:

ἅτε δὴ πρὸς τὸ παιδευτικὸν εἶδος τοὺς μύθους ἀναφέρων ὁ ποιητὴς ἐφρόντισε πολὺ μέρος τἀληθοῦς, "ἐν δ' ἐτίθει" καὶ ψεῦδος, τὸ μὲν ἀποδεχόμενος τῷ δὲ δημαγωγῶν καὶ στρατηγῶν τὰ πλήθη. "ὡς δ' ὅτε τις χρυσὸν περιχεύεται ἀργύρῳ ἀνήρ", οὕτως ἐκεῖνος ταῖς ἀληθέσι περι-πετείαις προσεπετίθει μῦθον, ἡδύνων καὶ κοσμῶν τὴν φράσιν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος τοῦ ἱστορικοῦ καὶ τοῦ τὰ ὄντα λέγοντος βλέπων. οὕτω δὴ τόν τε Ἰλιακὸν πόλεμον γεγονότα παραλαβὼν ἐκόσμησε ταῖς μυθοποιίαις, καὶ τὴν Ὀδυσσέως πλάνην ὡσαύτως· ἐκ μηδενὸς δὲ ἀληθοῦς ἀνάπτειν κενὴν τερατολογίαν οὐχ Ὁμηρικόν.

[S]ince Homer referred his myths to the province of education, he was accustomed to pay considerable attention to the truth. "And he put in" [*Il.* 18.541] a false element also, giving his sanction to the truth, but using the false to win the favour of the populace and to lead the army of the masses. "And as when some skilful man overlays gold upon silver" [*Od.* 6.232], just so was Homer accustomed to add a mythical element to actual occurrences, thus giving flavour and adornment to his style; but he has the same end in view as the historian or the person who narrates facts. So, for instance, he took the Trojan War, a historical fact, and decked it out with myth-making; and he did the same in the case of the wanderings of Odysseus; but to hang an empty story of marvels on something wholly untrue is not Homer's way of doing things.[80]

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[78] Similarly, Philostratus seems to have seen truths and fictions as being in a paratactic relationship in Homer's text: the great bulk of his narratives consisted of truths, but some few things had been changed to make them more pleasurable to hear: e.g., *Her.* 43.4 (see above, §3.1).

[79] Pol. 34.2.1–3, with Walbank (1979) 577–87. On the relation of Strabo here to Polybius, see Kim (2010) 71.

[80] Translation adapted from Jones (1917) 71, 73. For discussion of the passage, see Kim (2010) 68–9. Cf. also Str. 1.2.36 C43: περὶ δὲ τῶν τοῦ ὠκεανοῦ παθῶν εἴρηται μὲν ἐν μύθου σχήματι· καὶ γὰρ τούτου στοχάζεσθαι δεῖ τὸν ποιητήν, 'concerning the behaviour of the Ocean, [*sc.* Homer's] discourse takes the form of a myth; for it is right that the poet should make this his aim' (with an allusion to Eratosth. fr. 2 Roller, cited by Str. 1.2.3 C15).

For Strabo, Homer, although he deals in *mythoi*, is concerned with instruction (τὸ παιδευτικὸν εἶδος).[81] And Homer is mindful of the truth (τὸ ἀληθές). Rather than engage in sheer invention, Homer's *modus operandi* is to elaborate the truth through mythologisation.[82] Strabo sees Homer as having the same τέλος as the historian: to speak of what is really the case (τὰ ὄντα λέγειν). We should note the contrast with Aristotle, for whom poetry has its own distinct τέλος (*Poet.* 1460b24) and the poet's task is to speak of οἷα ἂν γένοιτο, while the historian's is τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν (1451a38–1451b5). While the distinction between poet and historian was being strongly emphasised by others (e.g., Pol. 2.56.11–12, and Cic. *Leg.* 1.5), Strabo's Homer seems to emerge as more historian than poet.[83]

Each of these four positions may be understood to define itself in opposition to at least one of the others. However, it is also important to recognise that the boundaries are porous; one may bleed into one another according to the particular aspect of the picture that is given emphasis.[84] The difficulty for us is to determine what aspect of Herodotus' ambivalent picture of Homer's relationship with truth and fiction ought to receive the emphasis. First, it is possible to impute the Xenophanean-Platonic position to Herodotus in 2.23 and 2.116.1, if we put the accent on Herodotus' finding fault with Homer for not telling the truth.[85] Second, we could approximate Herodotus' approach in 2.116.1–6 to that of the 'allegorists', if we emphasise Herodotus' discovery of an 'ulterior meaning' in the narratives of *Iliad* and *Odyssey* that corresponds to historical reality.[86] Third, we could impute the

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[81] Cf. Str. 1.1.10 C6: συγγνοίη δ' ἄν [*sc.* τις] καὶ εἰ μυθώδη τινὰ προσπέπλεκται τοῖς λεγομένοις ἱστορικῶς καὶ διδασκαλικῶς, καὶ οὐ δεῖ μέμφεσθαι, 'one may make allowance even if some myth-like elements have been interwoven among the statements that are made in the manner of a researcher and instructor, and one should not find fault'. Kim (2007) 374.

[82] Cf. Str. 8.3.17 C345: πάρεστι μὲν γὰρ τῶι ποιητῆι καὶ πλάττειν τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ὅταν δ' ἦι δυνατὸν ἐφαρμόττειν τοῖς οὖσι τὰ ἔπη καὶ σώζειν τὴν διήγησιν [τὸ δ' ἀπέχεσθαι] προσῆκε μᾶλλον, 'it is permissible for the poet also *to invent things that are not true*, but, when it is possible, it is more appropriate [for the critic] to fit the verses to *things that are true* and to save the narrative' (on the uncertainties of text and interpretation, see Kim (2010) 59 and n. 35). See in general Kim (2010) 68–9; Lightfoot (2017) 256.

[83] Cf. Kim (2007) 364, 370, 373.

[84] Cf. R. L. Hunter (2009b) 45; Kim (2010) 59–60.

[85] Thus, e.g., Marincola (1997) 225–6 compares 'Herodotus' refutation of Homer' with that of Xenophanes (218–19).

[86] So esp. Sammons (2012) 52: 'Herodotus seeks to interpret Homeric poetry according to *hyponoiai* ("hidden, underlying meanings") and may have been influenced by allegorical

Eratosthenean-Aristarchan position to Herodotus, if we see the chief point
as being Herodotus' recognition of a poetic licence in poetry.[87] However, it
is the fourth position, specifically in its Strabonic inflection (after Polybius),
that offers the best overall fit for Herodotus. Both Herodotus and Polybius-
Strabo offer a picture of a duplex Homer who sacrifices the truth to a more
pleasurable account, yet is still so committed to the truth that he scrupulously
indicates that truth through hints in his narrative.[88] Herodotus maintains
that Homer 'shows us that he also knows this [*sc.* true, Egyptian] tale too'
(2.116.1: δηλώσας ὡς καὶ τοῦτον ἐπίσταιτο τὸν λόγον), Strabo that 'Homer
hints at the truth' (1.2.36: ὑπαινίττεταί πως τὸ ἀληθές). The position of the
allegorists is less close. The allegorists also see Homer as hinting at truths
submerged in the poetic narrative (key words: ὑπόνοια, αἰνίττεσθαι).
However, their allegorising readings translate Homer's ostensible discourse
into a quite different discourse—one, for instance, about the cosmos,
physics, or human psychology. By contrast, Herodotus and Polybius-Strabo
allow Homer to be discoursing about the very persons, events, and places
that he purports to be speaking about, only they contend that he is also
saying, at a submerged level, something different about them than he is
ostensibly saying.[89] Both Herodotus and Strabo treat Homer as a kind of
proto-historian.[90] Further, both Herodotus and Polybius-Strabo set Homer
apart from the other poets: on Herodotus' conception, Homer (the poet of
the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*) can be relied on to indicate his knowledge of Helen's
true whereabouts during the Trojan War, whereas the poet of the *Cypria*
cannot; similarly, Polybius-Strabo's comment that it is 'not Homer's way'
(οὐδ' Ὁμηρικόν, Str. 1.2.17 C25 = Pol. 34.4.4) to engage in invention *ex nihilo*
(i.e., without regard for the facts) implies that such *is* the way of other poets.

approaches to Homer', 57–60, 63–4; cf. Graziosi (2002) 117; Kim (2010) 35–7; Biondi 41;
Grintser (2018) 164.

[87] See above, §3.1, for Herodotus' 'concept of fiction'.

[88] Kim (2010) 51, 81; cf. 29–30, 45.

[89] For this difference between Herodotus and the allegorists, see Sammons (2012) 64. For
the difference between Polybius-Strabo and the allegorists, see Lightfoot (2017) 255. (Strabo
is, of course, also capable of taking the more standard allegorising approach to mythology:
cf. 10.3.23 C474.)

[90] On Herodotus, see V. Hunter (1982) 54: 'Herodotus pictures Homer as working rather
like himself, gaining knowledge through enquiry (116.1, πυθέσθαι), and at times choosing
among variant versions'. Similarly, Ford (2002) 148; Graziosi (2002) 116–17; Kim (2010) 54–
5; Sammons (2012) 57 and n. 14. On Strabo, see Kim (2007), esp. 364. See further above, p.
85 with n. 3.

Indeed, Strabo explicitly sets Homer apart from other poets (Str. 1.2.20 C27). Polybius-Strabo's vision of Homer shares so many features with Herodotus' that we can reasonably see Polybius and Strabo as intellectual heirs of Herodotus' Homeric criticism.[91] A corollary of this is that Strabo can help us to interpret Herodotus' vision more clearly; while such a procedure is circular, it is a defensible version of the hermeneutic circle.

3.4 To Fault Homer or to Praise Him?

The foregoing section was concerned with the nice distinctions in the positions that could be taken in ancient scholarship on the question of Homer and the truth. The present section is concerned with a more basic distinction: whether we are to group Herodotus with Homer's critics or with his apologists-cum-eulogists. To get a handle on that choice, consider what we hear, contrastingly, of Zoilus of Amphipolis and Zeno of Citium, both in the fourth century BCE. Zoilus (Ὁμηρόμαστιξ, 'Scourge of Homer') criticised Homer as being a 'writer of myths' (*BNJ* 71 F 1: ὁ τὸν Ὅμηρον ψέγων ὡς μυθογράφον); he composed a ψόγος Ὁμήρου, a 'Fault-finding of Homer' (Suda ζ 130 Adler), as well as a substantial work (in nine Books) *Against Homer's Poetry* (*ibid.*).[92] By contrast, Zeno, author of a *Homeric Problems* (in five Books), found, according to Dio Chrysostom, 'nothing' to fault in the works of Homer: ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν [τοῦ] Ὁμήρου ψέγει (53.4).[93] In modern scholarship, Herodotus has sometimes been styled as a kind of Zoilus.[94] Lateiner, for instance, sees Herodotus as showing 'contempt' for Homer in

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[91] See further below, Ch. 5 §5.2. Cf. Kim (2010) 51 'Strabo's Homer shares some features with that of Herodotus' (this arguably does not go far enough).

[92] For a survey of the fragments and testimonia and an appraisal, see Gaertner (1978), esp. 1540–1, 1543–50; also, Novokhatko (2020) 112–19.

[93] For Zeno's *Homeric Problems*, see Diog. Laert. 7.4. See Long (1992) 58–64; Porter (2011b) 824–5.

[94] The irony here (see Priestly (2014) 216–17) is that later writers criticised Herodotus himself in the very terms in which Homer's detractors (including also Hdt. 2.116) criticised Homer: esp. D.S. 1.69.7: ὅσα μὲν οὖν Ἡρόδοτος καί τινες τῶν τὰς Αἰγυπτίων πράξεις συνταξαμένων ἐσχεδιάκασιν, ἑκουσίως προκρίναντες τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ παραδοξολογεῖν καὶ μύθους πλάττειν ψυχαγωγίας ἕνεκα, παρήσομεν, 'we shall pass over all the things that Herodotus and some of those who have written up Egyptian affairs have made up off the cuff, purposely preferring the telling of marvels and the fabricating of *muthoi* for the sake of entertainment to the truth'. Cf. Boedeker (2002) 109.

2.116 and as being 'condescending' to Homer in 4.29.[95] The latter passage is as follows:

δοκέει δέ μοι καὶ τὸ γένος τῶν βοῶν τὸ κόλον διὰ ταῦτα οὐ φύειν κέρεα αὐτόθι. μαρτυρέει δέ μοι τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ Ὁμήρου ἔπος ἐν Ὀδυσσηίῃ ἔχον ὧδε· "καὶ Λιβύην, ὅθι τ' ἄρνες ἄφαρ κεραοὶ τελέθουσι", ὀρθῶς εἰρημένον ἐν τοῖσι θερμοῖσι ταχὺ παραγίνεσθαι τὰ κέρεα· ἐν δὲ τοῖσι ἰσχυροῖσι ψύχεσι ἢ οὐ φύει κέρεα τὰ κτήνεα ἀρχὴν ἢ φύοντα φύει μόγις.

The hornless breed of cattle also seem to me not to grow horns there for this reason. And there is support for this opinion, in my view, in the verse of Homer in the *Odyssey* that runs as follows: "And Libya, where the lambs are horned straightaway" [*Od.* 4.85], it being correctly stated that the horns come into being quickly in hot regions; but in the regions of severe cold, the herds either do not grow horns at all, or if they do grow them, they scarcely do so.

In this chapter, Herodotus asserts that animals in hot climates grow horns quickly, but in cold climates slowly or not at all, citing in support of this view *Odyssey* 4.85, where Menelaus says that sheep quickly become horned in Libya. It is notable here that Herodotus here does not shrink from employing Homer as a witness to his point of view (μαρτυρέει δέ μοι τῇ γνώμῃ).[96] There

[95] Lateiner (1989) 99: 'To trust epic poets for historical information shows [*sc.* for Herodotus] a lack of common sense … This contempt [*sc.* from Herodotus] for the epic poets exceeds Thucydides' …'; 100: 'Herodotus once quotes Homer to agree with him … When the historian adds to his citation "rightly said" (4.29.1), it seems condescending if not jocular'. Similarly, Marincola (1997) 225–6, speaking of 'Herodotus' refutation of Homer'; R. B. Rutherford (2012) 14: '[The historians] normally mention Homer to find fault with him in some way', citing Hdt. 2.23 and 2.116–120; Moles (1993) 97: '[Hdt. 7.20.2] suggests a critical attitude to Homeric material, and critical in both senses, depreciatory and discriminating'; 100: '… Herodotus … is concerned to depreciate Homeric subject matter and the historical accuracy of Homer'; cf. Boedeker (2000) 103–5; (2002) 108; Koning (2010) 316–17; Clarke (2018) 6 n. 9. A more ambivalent view is taken by Graziosi (2002) 116–17; Kim (2010) 33: 'Herodotus also makes some effort to *defend* Homer as well, despite his inaccuracy'; 37: 'a deeply conflicted way of thinking about Homer's relation to history'; cf. de Bakker (2012) 123 n. 44; Sammons (2012) 54–5; Donelli (2016) 12–18.

[96] Cf. Hdt. 2.120.3: εἰ χρή τι τοῖσι ἐποποιοῖσι χρεώμενον λέγειν, 'if it is right to speak making use of the epic poets' (cf. Thuc. 1.10.3: τῇ Ὁμήρου αὖ ποιήσει εἴ τι χρὴ κἀνταῦθα πιστεύειν, cf. 1.9.4; contrast Diogenianus *ap.* Eus. *Praep. ev.* 6.8.7, p. 263b, *cit. supra*). Note also Arist. *Rh.* 1375b26–30: περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, … οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ … λέγω δὲ παλαιοὺς … τοὺς

is nothing in Herodotus' use of the phrase ὀρθῶς εἰρημένον to indicate that his tone is 'condescending' or 'jocular'.[97] The opposite, in fact, is suggested by comparison with other ancient writers who quote the same Homeric passage. Thus, Aristotle also quotes *Odyssey* 4.85 approvingly, going beyond Homer only to generalise it, like Herodotus does, to other horned animals (*Hist. anim.* 606a18–20).[98] A further six times in the *History of Animals*, Aristotle either himself invokes Homer as a source of correct information on zoological matters (e.g., 629b21–3) or refers to others who do so (e.g. 574b29–34).[99] Similarly in Aelian's *On the Characteristics Of Animals*, Homer is treated as a zoological expert and almost never criticised.[100] Aristotle was in general strongly disposed to see Homer as a purveyor of truths rather than falsehoods.[101] Strabo, another staunch defender, as we have seen, of Homer's veracity, likewise quotes *Odyssey* 4.85 with approval (1.1.16 C8).[102] On the basis of the scholarly company he is keeping, therefore, Herodotus deserves to be grouped with Homer's apologists, not his critics.

… ποιητὰς …, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι Ὁμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος. Cf. Neville (1977) 4; de Bakker (2012) 123.

[97] *Pace* Lateiner (1989) 100. The phrase ὀρθῶς εἴρηται and similar is a standard expression for affirming the truth of a statement. Note esp. Hdt. 5.54.1, 6.53.2; cf. Pl. *Leges* 628e1–2, 757a6, 781e4, 788c8, 818e2–3, 861c1, 861d1, 894d8, 896e7; Arist. *Pol.* 1252b10–11, *Phys.* 208b29–30, etc.

[98] Mayhew (2019) 63.

[99] Hillgruber (1994–99) I.21 and n. 77; cf. Mayhew (2019) 71, 74: 'Aristotle respected and revered Homer, and sought wherever possible to defend him, but … this reverence did not amount to uncritical approval'. The situation may have been different with Hesiod: cf. Arist. *Hist. anim.* 601b1–3 = [Hes.] fr. 364 M–W. We may note also Aristotle's critical attitude to Herodotus himself (e.g., *de gen. anim.* 756b3–8; Lenfant (1999) 107–8)!

[100] Kindstrand (1976) 45: 'ein Kenner der Zoologie', cf. 36; 38: '[Homer] wird überhaupt fast nie kritisiert'.

[101] McGuire (1977) 160, 162: 'we have the picture of an overwhelmingly positive stance in the Philosopher's attitude towards the Poet—he admires him, defends him, and relies upon him unreservedly'. Cf. Huxley (1979) 73. For Aristotle as defending Homer especially against Platonic criticisms, see Pfeiffer (1968) 69; Halliwell (1986) 266; Hunter and Russell (2011) 184; Mayhew (2019) 9. For Aristotle as an 'admirer' of Homer, note also Dio Chrys. 53.1: θαυμάζων αὐτὸν [*sc.* Ὅμηρον] ὡς τὸ πολὺ καὶ τιμῶν. Aristotle's main defences of Homer were in his *Homeric Problems* (frr. 142–79 Rose) and *Poetics* chapter 25 (1460b6–61b25); cf. also *Soph. elench.* 166b3–9.

[102] On Strabo's attitude to Homer, see Kim (2007); Lightfoot (2017), esp. 252–3.

3.5 Appropriative versus Apologetic Uses of Homer

The existence of 'apologists' of Homer requires us to probe a fundamental indeterminacy underlying Herodotus' reasoning in these passages. On the one hand, Herodotus may be interested in boosting the credentials of his own account by enlisting Homer's support for views that he himself endorses: namely, that Helen did not go to Troy, but saw the war out in Egypt (2.112–15, the version of the priests of Memphis); that animals' horns grow quickly in hot climates, but slowly in cold ones. This would be comparable to, for instance, the way in which 'Socrates' invokes Homer's authority at Plato, *Phaedo* 94d6–95a2.[103] On the other hand, he may be interested rather in defending or boosting the credentials of Homer by showing that Homer is possessed of knowledge of all sorts of facts that at first sight he might have appeared not to have had. The distinction here approximates to that between 'positive' (appropriative) and 'negative' (defensive, apologetic) allegorism.[104] With the former, an allegorist seeks support for his own views in Homer's text; with the latter, the allegorist vindicates Homer by demonstrating that the text, contrary to appearances, expresses an important truth. These are not mutually exclusive alternatives; in all likelihood Herodotus is interested in doing both.[105] It has been pointed out that 'already in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE the philosophers projected their own views, where possible, onto the epics, on the under-standing that the greatest poet had the correct view of all things'.[106] This would be an entirely possible view to take of Herodotus on the basis of these passages. Herodotus would then invite comparison with the fifth-century 'admirers' or 'eulogists' of Homer (Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέται) mentioned frequently by Plato and others.[107] We would see here fifth-century origins of a tradition

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[103] In general, for the Classical Greek penchant for invoking poets as witnesses, see Arist. *Metaph.* 995a7–8; cf. Halliwell (2000), esp. 94–5, 100, 107–8. Compare the notion of the 'Hilfszitat' (Kindstrand (1973) 32, 60).

[104] For this (problematic) distinction, see Struck (2004) 14–16; Domaradzki (2017) 307–8; cf. Sammons (2012) 59 and n. 23.

[105] For the natural complementarity of 'appropriative' and 'apologetic allegorism', see Domaradzki (2017) 307, 314.

[106] Hillgruber (1994–99) I.16 (translated from the German).

[107] Pl. *Resp.* 606e1: Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέταις; cf. *Resp.* 383a7: πολλὰ … Ὁμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες; *Ion* 536d3: Ὁμήρου δεινὸς εἶ ἐπαινέτης; 536d6: Ὅμηρον ἐπαινῶ; 541e2: Ὅμηρον ἐπαινεῖν; 542b4: περὶ Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτην; *Prt.* 309a6: οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης εἶ …;. Cf., in a post-fifth-century BCE context, Arist. *Poet.* 1460a5: Ὅμηρος δὲ … ἄξιος ἐπαινεῖσθαι; Dio Chrys. 11.17: οἱ πάνυ ἐπαινοῦντες αὐτόν [*sc.* Ὅμηρον]; and, negated, Philostr. *Her.* 25.13: οὐδὲ

of crediting Homer with universal knowledge (πολυμάθεια) that is associated especially with Crates and the author of the Pseudo-Plutarchan treatise *On Homer 2*.[108] Although the evidential base here is slender, Herodotus' statements about Homer in both 2.116 (where he wants Homer to be in touch with the truth about the Trojan War) and in 4.29 (where Homer is appraised of an obscure zoological truth) are fully consistent with such a position. Herodotus would then take an idealising view of Homer, rather than the deprecatory view attributed to him by Lateiner and others. Such an idealising view of Homer may also be discernible in Herodotus' insistence that Homer (with Hesiod) is the oldest Greek poet (see below, Ch. 4 §4.1), and in his apparent reluctance to allow other Greek poets to be independently heirs of traditions that are older than Homer (see immediately below, §3.6).

3.6 Herodotus on the Question of Homer's Sources

In this section we consider Herodotus' position on the issue of Homer's sources. On the one hand, Herodotus argues that Homer was influenced by an Egyptian story according to which Helen stayed at Egypt and did not go to Troy, a story that Herodotus himself purports to have heard from the priests at Memphis.[109] On the other hand, he—conspicuously—says nothing about Homer being influenced by the equivalent Greek story that we know to have been propagated by Stesichorus (and possibly by 'Hesiod' in the *Catalogue of Women*) in the sixth century BCE, as well as, in Herodotus' own time, by Euripides in the last quarter of the fifth.[110] It is inconceivable that

ἐκεῖνα ὁ Πρωτεσίλεως ἐπαινεῖ τοῦ Ὁμήρου. For the identification of these fifth-century BCE 'praisers of Homer' as rhapsodes, see Velardi (1989) 31–6; Hillgruber (1994–97) I.15; González (2013) 305–8. See, however, Verdenius (1970) 9: 'It should not be concluded … that the circle of votaries of Homer was confined to the rhapsodes … [Pl. *Prt.* 309ab] shows that besides the rhapsodes there were other people who referred to Homer for everything'. For Aristotle himself as a member of the class, cf. Dio Chrys. 53.1 (cited above, n. 101).

[108] On Crates, see Hillgruber (1994–99) I.26; Broggiato lv–lix; Schironi (2018) 745, 748. In general, see Hillgruber (1994–99) I.4–35; Struck (2004) 43, 156; Kim (2010) 5–7, 8–9, 51.

[109] On the question whether Herodotus (believed that he) encountered such a genuine Egyptian tradition, see below, Appendix.

[110] Stesichorus: frr. 90–1 Finglass (for Helen as staying in Egypt in this poem, despite the doubts of, e.g., Fehling (1971) 46 = (1989) 59, see Davies and Finglass (2014) 308–9). Euripides: *Hel.* 1–55 (412 BCE), but cf. already *El.* 1280–3 (422–413 BCE). 'Hesiod': fr. 358 M–W (in the *Paraphrasis Lycophronis* 822 = Scheer (1881) 71), on which see esp. Danek (1998) 102–3 (differently, Davies and Finglass (2014) 302–3). The oddity of Herodotus' failure to

Herodotus was unfamiliar with this Greek story.[111] It is, on the contrary, likely that Herodotus' own account was created in the knowledge of this Greek story.[112] It would not have been absurd for Herodotus to impute knowledge of the Greek story to Homer; other ancient and modern scholars have done this.[113] The Greek and the Egyptian versions differ in one crucial point: the Greek version has an *eidōlon* of Helen go on to Troy while the real Helen stays in Egypt; the Egyptian version involves no such *eidōlon*. There is nothing in the Homeric texts to suggest that, if Homer knew and was hinting at a version where Helen herself did not go to Troy but saw out the whole war in Egypt, this was the version without an *eidōlon* rather than with one. The question, therefore, is why Herodotus opts to ascribe to Homer knowledge of a story that was being propagated by Egyptian priests in the later fifth century BCE, rather than the Helen-in-Egypt story that had featured in Greek poetic traditions since at least the sixth century BCE. Two plausible answers suggest themselves.

First, Herodotus may have avoided ascribing to Homer knowledge of the Greek version because that version could not be true. Herodotus could not regard the Greek version, in which an *eidōlon* of Helen went to Troy, as true not only because of the intrinsic implausibility of *eidōla*, but also more particularly because it is refuted by the argument from probability that Herodotus makes in chapter 120: if the Trojans had had any kind of Helen, real or *eidōlon*, with them at Troy, then they were bound to have surrendered her (or it) to save themselves. Herodotus' desire to have Homer in touch with the truth would be a sufficient reason for Herodotus to reject this version.

mention this Stesichorean tradition is remarked by Kannicht (1969) I.46–7 and n. 12; Austin (1994) 127–8; S. R. West (2004) 89; Wright (2005) 95–6; Grethlein (2010) 153; de Bakker (2012) 109 n. 6; Sammons (2012) 55.

[111] For Herodotus' wide knowledge of Greek poetry, see Neville (1977) 4 and 10 n. 8; Marincola (2006) 13 and 26 n. 5; S. R. West (2004), esp. 79; Ford (2007).

[112] See e.g. Fehling (1971) 47 = (1989) 60–1; Kannicht (1969) i.41; R. B. Rutherford (2007) 509. It is unclear whether Hecataeus had himself already given a similar rationalising account of Helen's stay in Egypt: see, tentatively in favour, Pownall (2013), on Hecataeus *BNJ* 1 FF 308, 309, 316; cf. A. B. Lloyd (1975–88) III.47; against, Fehling (1971) 46–7 = (1989) 60.

[113] Ancient scholars: schol. BD Aristid. *Or.* 1.131.1 (III.150.32–151.3 Dindorf); see further below, Ch. 5 §5.2. Modern scholars: Danek (1998) 101; Smoot (2012); cf. Currie (2020) 151. The Helen-in-Egypt story need not (*pace* M. L. West (1985) 134–5) be regarded as a post-Homeric invention of Stesichorus or Pseudo-Hesiod: see Danek (1998) 103; Allan (2008) 18, 20–1; cf. Austin (1994) 104.

However, the availability of one sufficient reason does not exclude the presence of others, and the following reason also deserves serious consideration.

Second, Herodotus may have refrained from ascribing to Homer knowledge of the Greek version because he regarded all non-Homeric Greek traditions as being younger than Homer. Herodotus was deeply impressed by the unparalleled longevity and reliability of Egyptian traditions.[114] He was evidently happy to assume a scenario on which Egyptian traditions attested in his own time reached back beyond Homer, even back as far as the Trojan War itself (2.118.1, 2.119.3).[115] However, Greek traditions did not have comparable depth or reliability. It is conceivable that Herodotus did not see the Greek traditions that were extant in his own time as reaching back beyond Homer. Herodotus would then come close to anticipating something like the position of Aristarchus, according to whom all extant Greek poets were 'younger' (νεώτεροι) than Homer and could not be used to reconstruct the mythological background of the Homeric poems. This was one facet of the famous 'Aristarchan' principle 'to elucidate Homer from Homer' (Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν).[116] This position was far from holding unchallenged sway in antiquity. Aristarchus' position contrasts directly with that of the anonymous first-century CE Homeric commentator preserved in the Iliadic D-scholia and known to modern scholars as the 'Mythographus Homericus'.[117] This Homeric critic regularly cites post-Homeric authors (poets and mythographers) to illuminate the mythological tradition within which Homer was working, typically employing the rubric ἡ ἱστορία παρὰ …, 'the story [i.e. the mythological background to the Homeric narrative][118] is to be found in …' (with the name of a post-Homeric author following).[119] This kind of approach seems already to have been adopted by Zenodotus in

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[114] See 2.4.2, 2.77.1, 2.100.1, 2.143–4, 2.145.3. Cf. Vannicelli (2001) 214.

[115] Cf. Vannicelli (2001) 224.

[116] Nünlist (2015) esp. 390. See further Schironi (2018) 737 n. 9.

[117] On the Mythographus Homericus, see Montanari (1995), (2002).

[118] Cf. Fowler (2017) 160–1; Schironi (2018) 266 on the significance of ἱστορία.

[119] The clash in approach can be clearly seen by comparing the position of the 'Mythographus Homericus' in schol. D *Il.* 1.5 with that of Aristarchus in schol. A *Il.* 1.5–6. See Bouchard (2016) 187–8; Schironi (2018) 662–3; Currie (2020) 149–50. Further, for the convergence in the approach of the Mythographus Homericus with modern neoanalysis, see Currie (2020) 150–1.

the first half of the third century BCE, in which case it will have been Zenodotus against whom Aristarchus will have been reacting.[120]

Aristarchus, however, did not originate the view that the post-Homeric poets take their inspiration from Homer.[121] Its best-known expression is the conception of Homer as 'Ocean', from which all other 'streams' flow, which appears to have been a commonplace in the Hellenistic period before Callimachus.[122] There is no reason why this view should not have existed in some form in the fifth century BCE. A reason to impute it to Herodotus is that it would parallel his thinking with regard to influence across cultures. Herodotus is apt to see cross-cultural influence as a tidy one-way process. Egypt, the oldest culture, influences the younger cultures, such as Greece, and not vice-versa.[123] It is plausible that Herodotus viewed influence within Greek poetic culture as a comparable process. That is, Homer (and Hesiod), as the oldest Greek poet(s) influence younger poets (e.g., Stesichorus and Euripides), and these do not independently preserve traditions that are older than the former.

For greater clarity, the different positions that are here being imputed to Herodotus-Aristarchus and Zenodotus-Mythographus Homericus are illustrated below in Models 1 and 2 (p. 46). The main difference lies in whether or not a channel is assumed by which putative pre-Homeric (and pre-

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[120] See Severyns (1928) 44 and esp. 99, discussing schol. *Od.* 3.307a Pontani, where opposite approaches to the reading of the Homeric text are taken by Zenodotos (proposing a reading, or perhaps an emendation, which would bring the mythological background assumed by Homer into line with that attested by the νεώτεροι, viz. Eur. *El.* 18) and Aristarchus (defending the alternative reading by citing a Homeric parallel—*Od.* 8.60—for the form in question). Cf. S. R. West (1988) 180. On Aristarchus' opposition to Zenodotus, see Schironi (2018) 548–78.

[121] For Aristarchus' position, see Schironi (2018) 679, cf. 661 and n. 47, 683–4, 706; Dickie (2019): 'Aristarchus considered Homer to have presented the original version of any myths he mentioned … apparently never allowing for the possibility (now commonly accepted) that both Homer and later poets might have drawn on the same stock of orally-transmitted mythological material, each shaping and adapting that material to fit their own goals'.

[122] Brink (1972) 553–5; Williams (1978) 88; R. L. Hunter (2018) 2–4.

[123] Antiquity of the Egyptians: 2.2.2–4, 2.15.2–3. Influence of Egyptians: e.g., 2.49.3, 2.51.1, 2.79.1–3, 2.91.1. Vasunia (2001) 119–20, esp. 120: 'According to the logic of [Herodotus'] narrative, barbarians can learn the inventions of other barbarians, or teach inventions to others … Yet Herodotus' text allows Hellenes only to acquire knowledge and virtually prohibits Hellenes from handing over knowledge to non-Hellenes …', '… he seems to make a point of Egyptian insularity. The Egyptians, he writes, follow their ancestral customs and take no others to themselves at all (2.79)'. Cf. Currie (2020) 156 with 167 n. 48, 160–1; Fialho (2020) 260.

Hesiodic) tradition could be transmitted independently of Homer (and Hesiod) to post-Homeric (post-Hesiodic) authors, making these potentially independent testimony to pre-Homeric (pre-Hesiodic) tradition. The models are simplified, and they elide some important differences between Herodotus and Aristarchus (they do not take account, for instance, of the fact that Aristarchus considered Hesiod later than and influenced by Homer, while Herodotus apparently did not).[124] The question whether either Aristarchus or Herodotus assumed that Homer and Hesiod were themselves heirs to lost earlier Greek traditions will be addressed in the next section (Ch. 4 §4.1). The model imputed to Herodotus and Aristarchus has the appeal of economy in that it avoids positing a channel of influence that has left no tangible trace in the textual record. Model 2 will be recognised as the model also typically assumed in modern Homeric scholarship, especially by scholars of 'neoanalytical' persuasion.[125]

[124] On Aristarchus' position, see Schironi (2018) 695–703. Cf. below, Ch. 4 §4.1.

[125] See, for more detailed discussion, Currie (2020) 149–52. Cf. also Bouchard (2016) 188; Schironi (2018) 679; Dickie (2019) (cited above, n. 121).

Models of the Greek Poetic Tradition: Herodotus–Aristarchus versus Zenodotus–Mythographus Homericus

Model 1: Herodotus (putatively) and Aristarchus

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   LOST EARLY TRADITIONS?
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│   HESIOD    │          │    HOMER    │
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
Model 2: Zenodotus and Mythographus Homericus

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
HERODOTUS 2.53

4.1 Herodotus on (Hesiod and) Homer's Primacy
among the Greek Poets

The next issue to consider is Herodotus' position on the primacy of Homer (and Hesiod) relative to other Greek poets. In a famous passage, Herodotus opines that Hesiod and Homer are older than the other Greek poets, emphasising that this is a personally-held view (2.53.1–3):[1]

ὅθεν δὲ ἐγένετο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν, εἴτε δὴ αἰεὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὁκοῖοί τέ τινες τὰ εἴδεα, οὐκ ἠπιστέατο [sc. Ἕλληνες] μέχρι οὗ πρώην τε καὶ χθὲς ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ. Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρον ἡλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω μέο πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι καὶ οὐ πλέοσι· οὗτοι δέ εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἕλλησι καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες καὶ τιμάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες καὶ εἴδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες· οἱ δὲ πρότερον ποιηταὶ λεγόμενοι τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν γενέσθαι ὕστερον, ἔμοιγε δοκέειν, ἐγένοντο. τούτων τὰ μὲν πρῶτα αἱ Δωδωνίδες ἱρήιαι λέγουσι, τὰ δὲ ὕστερα τὰ ἐς Ἡσίοδόν τε καὶ Ὅμηρον ἔχοντα ἐγὼ λέγω.

Whence each of the gods was born and whether all of them were always there, and what they are like in appearance, the Greeks did not know until yesterday or the day before, so to speak. For I think that Hesiod and Homer were in respect of their date four hundred years older than me, and not more; and these are the ones who composed a theogony[2] for the Greeks and gave the gods their epithets and differentiated their honours and accomplishments and indicated their appearances; for the poets who are said to have been earlier than these men were later, in my opinion. The priestesses of Dodona are the ones who make the first statements; I am the one who makes the statements pertaining to Hesiod and Homer.

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[1] Personally-held view: cf. Thomas (2000) 216–17.

[2] For θεογονίη of a poem or song about the origin of the gods, cf. Hdt. 1.132.3.

Hippias, Gorgias, Hellanicus, Demastes, Pherecydes, and others in the late fifth century BCE all appear to have placed Orpheus, Musaeus, and Hesiod before Homer.[3] After the fifth century BCE, too, we continue to hear of 'poets before Homer'.[4] This view seems to be assumed by Herodotus thirty chapters earlier, when he spoke of 'Homer or one of the earlier poets' (2.23, cited above, Ch. 3 §3.3). There, in chapter 23, it was evidently sufficient to go along with the orthodoxy; in chapter 53, Herodotus distances himself from it.[5] The locution used in chapter 23, 'the poets who were earlier' (τῶν πρότερον γενομένων ποιητῶν), is reprised in chapter 53 in pointedly qualified form: 'the poets who *are said to have been* earlier than these men [*sc.* Hesiod and Homer]' (οἱ δὲ πρότερον ποιηταὶ λεγόμενοι τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν γενέσθαι). There are other instances of Herodotus apparently oscillating between orthodox and heterodox views on Homeric questions. At 4.32, after Herodotus has mentioned the *Epigoni* as a Homeric poem, he adds: 'if it really is by Homer'. There, the qualification of a *communis opinio* follows immediately; in 2.53, it would follow after an interval of thirty chapters. However, a subsequent reference to 'the Homeric poems' (5.67.1) probably intends the *Thebaid* and *Epigoni*,[6] poems on whose Homeric authorship he had previously cast doubt (4.32); in the Book 5 passage, he apparently reverts to the *communis opinio*, rather than his own more sceptical position.[7]

Herodotus' insistence on the chronological primacy of Hesiod and Homer among Greek poets invites comparison with Aristarchus, for whom all other poets were 'more recent' (νεώτεροι) than Homer.[8] Herodotus and Aristarchus differed in their treatment of Hesiod, however, whom

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[3] Hippias 86 B 6 D–K; Ar. *Ran.* 1030–6; Pl. *Ap.* 41a6–7. Cf. Philostr. *Her.* 25.2, 25.8; Procl. *Chrest.* pp. 99.20–100.6. M. L. West (1966) 40 with n. 1; de Strycker and Slings (1994) 228 and n. 82; Koning (2010) 53–4. For supposed 'borrowings' by Homer from these 'earlier' poets, see, in later antiquity, Clement, *Str.* 6.5 (on Musaeus 2 B 5 D–K and *Il.* 6.146–9; see Burgess (2001) 125–6); Ps.-Justin. *Coh. ad Gr.* 17.1 (on Orpheus fr. 386 Bernabé and *Il.* 1.1); and perhaps, in the fifth century BCE, the Derveni commentator (D'Alessio (2004) 21–2).

[4] Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 1448b28; Philostr. *Her.* 25.2; Suda ε 3585 (Eumolpus), θ 21 (Thaletas), θ 41 (Thamyras: reputedly either the eighth or the fifth Greek hexameter poet before Homer), κ 2091 (Corinnus), ο 655 Adler (Orpheus); cf. μ 1294 (Musaeus). Other named poets earlier than Homer and Hesiod include Olen (Paus. 9.27.2; cf. Hdt. 4.35.3); Pamphos (Paus. 8.37.9); Melampus (D.S. 1.97.4; cf. M. L. West (1983) 53–4).

[5] Cf. Graziosi (2002) 111–12.

[6] Cingano (1985) 37; Burkert (1987) 45.

[7] Cf. Cingano (1985) 39.

[8] Schironi (2018) 652–708.

Aristarchus regarded as later than Homer and spoke of as one of the νεώτεροι—though with a special status, as being closest to Homer in age.[9] The fact that Herodotus names Hesiod first and Homer second need not imply that he thought Hesiod was older.[10] We should consider what the claim of Homer's (and Hesiod's) primacy may have amounted to, both for Herodotus and, by way of comparison, for Aristarchus. It is easiest to begin with Aristarchus.

It needs to be established whether Aristarchus meant to claim that Homer was the start of the Greek poetic tradition *tout court* or that he was just the earliest extant poet. The former has seemed to be the case.[11] However, Aristarchus did in fact take an interest in a pre-Homeric tradition and he assumed that Homer alluded to certain traditional myths.[12] Some Homeric scholia deriving from Aristarchus point out what Homer has concretely taken from tradition,[13] while similar comments are found in scholia not directly derivable from Aristarchus.[14] Aristotle, too, had already been aware

[9] Schironi (2018) 695: 'a privileged position with respect to other neoteric authors'. It is unclear how much later than Homer Aristarchus thought Hesiod was. See, in general, Schironi (2018) 702–3. Schroeder (2007) argues that Aristarchus dated Homer to *c.* 1000 BCE, Hesiod to *c.* 700 BCE (cf. Kõiv (2011) 361); however, the attribution of the relevant scholion to Aristarchus is uncertain (Schironi (2018) 285 n. 87; cf. Schroeder (2007) 141 n. 14).

[10] See (*pace* M. L. West (1966) 47) Koning (2010) 53; cf. Graziosi (2002) 106–7.

[11] Cf. Burgess (2001) 196 n. 12: '[Aristarchus] seems to have assumed that Homer is the root of all Greek literature, and that Homer invented most of the myth in his poems'.

[12] Nünlist (2015) 395–6; Schironi (2018) 525, 661, 671 and n. 89. Aristarchus granted that Homer knew certain myths (e.g., Argonautic myth: schol. T *Il.* 7.468), but not others (the judgement of Paris: scholl. *Il.* 4.32a, 24.25–30; the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, schol. *Il.* 9.145a). Aristarchus sometimes assumed Homer's audience knew a tradition: Nünlist (2015) 396, on schol. A *Il.* 14.434a.

[13] Aristarchus in schol. A *Il.* 11.430b: "δόλων ἆτ᾽ ἠδὲ πόνοιο"· ὅτι ἐμφαίνει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα ἐξ ἱστορίας παρειληφὼς δόλιον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ διαβεβλημένον, '… [Homer] reveals that he has taken over from tradition Odysseus as "guileful" and as being slandered on that account'. Schol. A *Il.* 20.40b1: "Ξάνθος"· ὅτι οὐ προδιασυστήσας τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν Ξάνθον καὶ Σκάμανδρον ὄντα προκατακέχρηται τῇ τοῦ Ξάνθου ὀνομασίᾳ, ὡς παραδεδομένοις δηλονότι χρώμενος καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς πλάσσων τὰ ὀνόματα, '… without having previously indicated that Xanthus and Scamander are the same river [*sc.* as he was to do at *Il.* 20.74], [Homer] has gone ahead and employed the appellation "Xanthus", evidently relying on what has been handed down [i.e., tradition] and not inventing the names himself'.

[14] Schol. A *Il.* 20.147a1: ὅτι οὕτως εἴρηκε σὺν τῷ ἄρθρῳ "τὸ κῆτος", ὡς παραδεδομένης τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς περὶ τοῦ κήτους, '… [Homer] has said "τὸ κῆτος" thus, with the definite article, given that the story about the sea-monster has been handed down'. Cf. schol. bT *Il.*

that Homer inherited things from tradition.[15] He also refers, in a seemingly general way, to 'poets before Homer' (*Poet.* 1448b28). Earlier still, and contemporaneously with Herodotus, Antisthenes was of the view that 'Homer has written some things according to received opinion' (T 194 Prince τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν … γέγραφεν: see above, Ch. 3 §3.3). The view that Homer and Hesiod were heirs to a tradition continues in later antiquity.[16]

Herodotus' pronouncement in 2.53 should be considered in this context. It has been widely understood as a statement that Hesiod and Homer were the creators of the Greek poetic tradition, and were not themselves heirs to any antecedent Greek tradition.[17] However, if this is the correct under-standing, it would be striking for several reasons.[18] First, it would appear to be an anomalous position within ancient literary criticism (we have seen that it was not shared with Aristarchus, Aristotle, or Antisthenes). Second, it would entail that Herodotus ignored certain glaring indications in both the Hesiodic and Homeric texts that both poets were working within an inherited poetic tradition. We could readily excuse Herodotus for not knowing that Homer was heir to a traditional oral poetry and to a mythology

5.385a: ἐπίτηδες μύθους συλλέξας Διώνῃ περιτίθησιν ὁ ποιητής, δι' ὧν τῆς οἰκείας ἀπολύεται βλασφημίας ὡς οὐ καινίσας, ἀλλὰ παλαιαῖς παραδόσεσι πεισθείς, 'the Poet has purposely made a compendium of stories and put them in the mouth of Dione, through which he acquits himself of personal blasphemy, on the grounds that he has not invented them, but has merely given credence to ancient traditions'. Schol. *Od.* 6.42b Pontani: διὰ δὲ τοῦ φασί τὴν ἐκ προγόνων παράδοσιν ἐμφαίνει καὶ οὐκ ἤδη πλάσμα τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὸ τοῦ Ὀλύμπου, 'by means of the word φασί [Homer] indicates a tradition deriving from his predecessors, and that the concept of "Olympus" is not an invention of the poet'.

[15] *Homeric Problems*, fr. 163 Rose in schol. *Il.* 19.108b: τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅλον μυθῶδες· … ἀλλ' ὡς διαδεδομένων περὶ τὴν Ἡρακλέους γένεσιν μέμνηται, 'the whole thing is mythical; … Homer, on the understanding that these things are traditional, makes mention of the birth of Heracles'.

[16] See, e.g., Cornutus (first century CE), *comp. de Graec. theol. trad.* 17: 'for the poet [*sc.* Homer] seems to be handing this down as a snippet of an ancient myth (μύθου παλαιοῦ παραφέρειν τοῦτο ἀπόσπασμα)', '[Hesiod] got some things, I think, from those more ancient than himself (παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων αὐτοῦ παρειληφότος), but added other things for himself rather in the manner of a story-teller' (Greek text after Torres (2018); translation adapted from Boys-Stones (2018)).

[17] Lateiner (1989) 99; Koning (2010) 68; cf. Dowden (2011) 48.

[18] It is sometimes assumed that Hdt. 2.116.1 implies a model of Homer choosing from different traditional stories. See, e.g., De Bakker (2012) 123: 'Herodotus accepts that, as a poet, Homer took the liberty of choosing a suitable version from the many variants of mythological stories'. Similarly, V. Hunter (1982) 54; D'Ecclesiis (2002) 106. However, this is not a necessary implication of Herodotus' language.

with its roots in Mycenaean times. (We may excuse even some twentieth-century scholars on this count.)[19] But it would be hard to explain away his seeming inattention towards the many markers of traditionality (e.g., φασί, 'they say') that are inscribed in the texts of both Hesiod and Homer and that have drawn the attention of both ancient and modern scholars.[20] The poems of both Homer and Hesiod, moreover, abound with references to earlier singers, in whose tradition Homer and Hesiod evidently wish to situate themselves.[21] Such difficulties make it worth exploring the possibility that Herodotus in 2.53 may have intended something else than to declare Hesiod and Homer the creators for the Greeks of their poetic tradition *tout court*.

A crucial indeterminacy in Herodotus' language here is the phrase οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἕλλησι (2.53.2). This could mean, 'the ones who *created* a theogony for the Greeks', emphasising Hesiod and Homer's role as inventors.[22] Or it could mean, 'the ones who *composed* a theogony for the Greeks', in that case upholding Hesiod and Homer's claim vis-à-vis other poets to have composed the poetry that narrated authoritatively for the Greeks the birth of the gods and that differentiated the gods in respect of their epithets, provinces, skills, and appearances.[23] It is noteworthy that Herodotus does not use the word πρῶτοι in this connection, as he does elsewhere when it is a matter of emphasising that certain persons were the

[19] Cf., e.g., Philips (1973) 289: 'Studies of recent years have shown that Hesiod (like Homer) stands at the end long tradition of oral poetry. Knowledge of the contents of this tradition may be limited, but we need no longer adopt the bias of earlier mythologists and literary critics who saw Homer and Hesiod as the *beginning* of a tradition' (italics original).

[20] Hes. *Th.* 197, 306; *Il.* 2.783, 20.203–4, 24.615; *Od.* 6.42, etc. Noted by ancient scholars: schol. *Od.* 6.42b Pontani; schol. A *Il.* 20.147a1 (both cited above, n. 14).

[21] Hes. *Th.* 94–103; *Op.* 26, 656–7; *Il.* 2.594–600; *Od.* 1.154–5, 3.267, 8.38–45, 17.385, cf. 1.10, if this means 'speak to me also' (*sc.* as you have spoken to other poets): cf. S. R. West (1988) 73.

[22] Cf. LSJ *s.v.* ποιέω A.I.4.d: 'invent'; Powell (1938a) 309 *s.v.* ποιέω A.I.1: '*create, manufacture*'. So, e.g., Scullion (2006) 199–200: 'invented', 'created'; Mikalson (2002) 197: 'created'; Graziosi (2002) 111: 'established'.

[23] Cf. LSJ *s.v.* ποιέω A.I.4.a: 'compose'; Powell (1938a) 309 *s.v.* ποιέω A.I.2: 'of poets, etc., *compose*'. The *figura etymologica* ποιήσαντες … ποιηταί (2.53.2–3) tends to confirm the meaning 'compose': cf. 2.156.6, 3.115.2. Note, in general, Ford (2002) 135—'Herodotus' uses of *poiēsis, poiētēs*, and *poiein* do not imply creativity so much as "making poetry" in the sense of "rendering stories in poetry," that is, putting them into verse'—, with n. 12.

first to do something.[24] The phrase he does use, οὗτοί εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες, is
itself employed elsewhere when it is a matter of putting the record straight:
of identifying certain persons rather than others as the authors of a particular
enterprise.[25] Apparently, it is not hypothetical anonymous predecessors of
Hesiod and Homer that Herodotus has here in mind, but named authors of
extant poetic works: Orpheus and Musaeus, in particular. Given that
Orpheus and Musaeus supposedly lived two and one generation respectively
before the Trojan War (Suda *o* 655 Adler), Herodotus will be implying, first,
that the poems ascribed to them are pseudonymous, and second, that these
are later than the Hesiodic and Homeric poems.[26] Herodotus will then not
be committing to the strong claim that Hesiod and Homer constitute the
absolute beginnings of Greek poetry, but to the more modest and reasonable
claim that the extant poetry which it is possible to pinpoint as giving the
Greeks their differentiated portrayal of their gods was composed by Hesiod
and Homer, not by the likes of 'Orpheus' and 'Musaeus'. If Herodotus (like
all of Antisthenes, Aristotle, and Aristarchus) understood that Hesiod and
Homer were themselves heirs to a non-extant poetic tradition, then it follows
that the Greeks' differentiated knowledge of the gods could precede them.
In that case, Hesiod and Homer would not, strictly speaking, supply a date
for the Greeks' acquisition of this knowledge. However, there would be no
automatic presumption that the Greeks' knowledge of the divine would
precede them by very much. Herodotus and his contemporaries had no
reason (unlike the modern scholar schooled in historical linguistics and the
study of oral traditions) to posit a half-millennium-old tradition behind the
Iliad or *Odyssey*. Having indicated Homer and Hesiod (both living 400 years
before Herodotus' time), rather than Orpheus and Musaeus (some 880
before Herodotus' time), as the *terminus ante quem* for the Greeks' possession
of a differentiated knowledge of the gods, Herodotus could still feel entitled
to state that the Greeks were without this knowledge 'until yesterday or the
day before' (2.53.1). The assumption (a reasonable, though not, as we know,

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[24] Cf. esp. 1.171.4: οὗτοί εἰσι οἱ ποιησάμενοι πρῶτοι; 2.58: πρῶτοι ἀνθρώπων Αἰγύπτιοί
εἰσι οἱ ποιησάμενοι. For Herodotus' concern more generally with 'firsts', cf. Lateiner (1989)
35.

[25] Cf. 3.59.2: οὗτοί εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες …; 1.216.1: οὐ Σκύθαι εἰσὶ οἱ ποιέοντες, ἀλλὰ Μασ-
σαγέται.

[26] Aristotle evidently also saw these poems as pseudonymous: *Hist. an.* 563a18: ἐν τοῖς
Μουσαίου λεγομένοις ἔπεσιν; *Gen. an.* 734a18–19: ἐν τοῖς καλουμένοις Ὀρφέως
ἔπεσιν.

an ultimately compelling one) would be that the phenomenon could not be much earlier than its earliest attestation.

Herodotus was, then, committed to the primacy of Hesiod and Homer in either of two senses: either that they were the originators of the Greek mythological and poetic tradition *tout court* or (as has just been argued) that they were the authors of the earliest extant Greek poetic texts: in other words, not 'the first' absolutely, but, in a favourite Herodotean phrase, 'the first of whom we *know*'.[27] It is worth reflecting on what it can have meant for Herodotus to insist on their primacy in either sense. Although any answer is bound to be speculative, it is tempting to relate this Herodotean position to the idealising view of Homer that we have already seen reason to impute to Herodotus (above, Ch. 3 §3.5). The tendency to correlate a poet's excellence with their antiquity is well attested in ancient literary criticism.[28] Horace gives it the clearest articulation in his *Letter to Augustus*: 'if, because of the Greeks all the most ancient writings are much the best …' (*Epist.* 2.1.28–9: *si quia Graiorum sunt antiquissima quaeque | scripta uel optima …*). Even if habitually tongue-in-cheek, Horace will still be alluding to prevalent literary critical values. Herodotus' belief in Homer's chronological priority would naturally go hand in hand with a belief in Homer's excellence, his superiority to other poets. The co-presence of Hesiod implies that Herodotus, like others in antiquity, took a comparable, highly favourable, view of Hesiod.[29]

4.2 Herodotus on (Hesiod and) Homer's Date

Herodotus does not only take a position on the primacy of Homer and Hesiod relative to other Greek poets, he also offers an absolute date for them: four hundred years before his own time 'and not more' (2.53.2). Herodotus' concern with the date (ἡλικίην, 2.53.2) of Hesiod and Homer gives us our

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[27] On Herodotus' employment of the phrase πρῶτος ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν in general, see Shimron (1973). For the notion 'the first of whom we know' as being implicitly understood in the context of Hdt. 2.53, see Currie (2020) 155 and 167 nn. 42–3. For this notion made explicit, cf. D.H. *AR* 1.68.2: παλαιότατος … ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ποιητὴς Ἀρκτῖνος, 'the most ancient poet of whom we know'—implying not the oldest *tout court* (if that is the correct translation of Dionysius' Greek). Elsewhere, Arctinus is seen as a younger contemporary of Homer (Artemon in Suda α 3960 Adler).

[28] Compare, on Homer, Ps.-Plut. *On Homer 2* 1, and see, e.g., Nünlist (2009) 14.

[29] See, in general, Koning (2010) 45–6, cf. 111, 126; Graziosi (2002) 109. In the later fourth century BCE, we find the significant expression 'the poets after Homer and Hesiod' (τοῖς μεθ' Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡσίοδον ποιηταῖς): Megaclides, *On Homer* F 9 Janko *ap.* Athen. 12.512e.

earliest evidence of a major preoccupation of ancient Homeric criticism.[30] Heraclides Ponticus in the following century wrote a two-book work *On the Date of Homer and Hesiod* (Περὶ τῆς Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου ἡλικίας, fr. 176 Wehrli, compare also Diog. Laert. 5.87), and the topic became a *zētēma* of later scholarship.[31] A convenient survey of ancient views on Homer's date is given by Tatian in his *Oration for the Greeks* (31.3–5, pp. 164, 166 Trelenberg).[32] Herodotus' position is strikingly different from that of later authorities, such as Aristotle (who dated Homer to around the time of the Ionian migration, approximately one hundred and forty years after the Trojan War),[33] Aristarchus (who followed suit),[34] and Crates (who may have made Homer contemporary with the Trojan War).[35] Yet it is curious that the dating advocated by Herodotus held its own among the many that were advanced in antiquity (see below, Ch. 5 §5.2). Herodotus' reasons for assigning this particular absolute date to Hesiod and Homer are undisclosed and are not easily deducible from the little that he says on the subject. One consequence of Herodotus' dating is to make (Hesiod and) Homer equidistant from Herodotus' own time and from the Trojan War, since a comment made some ninety chapters later reveals that, according to Herodotus, that war took place eight hundred years before his own day, hence four hundred years before Homer (2.145.4).[36] It does not follow, however, that this consequence was his motive for so dating the poets.[37] A common ancient scholarly method for dating Homer was to situate him in relation to other persons and

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[30] The Pseudo-Herodotean *Life of Homer* also declares itself to be an investigation into the 'birth, date (ἡλικίης), and life' of Homer (§1 West). It argues (§38 West) for a date of Homer's birth (1102 BCE) that is quite incompatible with Herodotus' dating of Homer.

[31] See Schironi (2018) 702–3 and n. 49. Pausanias, for instance, occupied himself with the question (9.30.3: περὶ … Ἡσιόδου τε ἡλικίας καὶ Ὁμήρου πολυπραγμονήσαντι ἐς τὸ ἀκριβέστατον [*sc. μοι*]).

[32] On the dating of Homer and Hesiod in antiquity, see esp. Graziosi (2002) 90–124; Koning (2010) 40–6; Kõiv (2011).

[33] Arist. *On Poets* F 65a1 Janko = fr. 20.1 Gigon = 76 Rose.

[34] Schironi (2018) 622 n. 115.

[35] Fr. 73 Broggiato. Cf. Kim (2010) 25 n. 18.

[36] On the significance of Herodotus' synchronisation of the Trojan War with Egyptian chronology (the Memphite king 'Proteus'), see Vannicelli (2001) 223–6, 235.

[37] Kõiv (2011) 359: 'This is a sheer guess, and it seems to me better to confess our ignorance about Herodotus' calculations'; cf. Koning (2010) 66 n. 30. *Pace* Graziosi (2002) 110, 112, 117–18; Bichler (2003) 359.

historical events (and likewise with Hesiod).[38] The most natural synchro-
nisation involves the three oldest and most highly esteemed poets: Homer,
Hesiod, and Archilochus.[39] The synchrony of Homer and Hesiod was a
premise of, *inter alia*, sixth-fifth century BCE traditions of poetic competition
between these two preeminent hexameter poets (traditions that become
tangible for us in Alcidamas' early fourth-century BCE *Mouseion*, from which
the extant *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* depends).[40] Hesiod, further, could be
readily synchronised with the Lelantine War. The Amphidamas of *Works and
Days* 654, who was self-evidently a warrior (the implication of δαΐφρονος)[41]
from Euboean Chalcis, would not have been hard to identify as a casualty
of that war; and the identification is in fact explicitly made by Plutarch.[42]
The Lelantine War, moreover, could be synchronised with Archilochus,
who mentions it in fr. 3 Swift.[43] Archilochus, in turn, could be synchronised
with the Lydian king Gyges, whom he also mentions (fr. 19.1 Swift). It is
possible that Herodotus' contemporary Glaucus of Rhegium (compare
above, Ch. 2 §2.2) used the dating of Archilochus to establish a chronology

[38] Graziosi (2002) 96–7, 101; Kõiv (2011) 363.

[39] See Kõiv (2011) 365–70, 371–2, 374; cf. Graziosi (2002) 101. Archilochus' stature is
indicated by his presence in the rhapsodic repertoire, alongside Homer and Hesiod (Heracl.
22 B 42 D–K; Pl. *Ion* 531a1–2); Swift 40–1. Note also Swift vii: 'In antiquity Archilochus was
regarded as a poet who rivalled Homer and Hesiod in his quality', cf. 18, 42–3.

[40] The *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* (on which see Bassino (2018)) is a composition dating in
its present form to the first/second centuries CE (see Uden (2010), for the Hadrianic context),
but demonstrably drawing on the *Mouseion* of Alcidamas of the early fourth century BCE
(e.g., Kivilo (2010) 20 and n. 52), with probable antecedents in the fifth or sixth centuries
BCE (Richardson (1981); Graziosi (2002) 102; Kivilo (2010) 20–1, 23–4, 57, 61; Biondi 34–5).
A different tradition of a contest between Homer and Hesiod is reflected in [Hes.] fr. 357
M–W. The synchrony of Homer and Hesiod is assumed by fifth-century authors whose
genealogies of which made them cousins: so, Pherecydes, Hellanicus, and Damastes (all in
Proclus, *Vit. Hom.* §4 West). Compare also, after the fifth century, Ephorus *BNJ* 70 F 101b =
Hes. T14 Most; Suda η 583 Adler = Hes. T 1 Most.

[41] Cf. Graziosi and Haubold (2016) 6–7 on the meanings of δαΐφρων in epic.

[42] *Conv. sept. sap.* 10, 153F = Hesiod T 38 Most (omitting, however, the crucial reference
to the Lelantine War). The identification was presumably also made in Plutarch's lost
commentary on Hesiod's *Works and Days* (cf. Plut. frr. 25*–112 Sandbach); cf. schol. *Erg.* 650–
62.

[43] According to Swift 209, 'the case for connecting the fragment with the Lelantine war
is weak'; cf. Jacoby (1941) 108–9. However, the link is strongly encouraged by Str. 10.1.12
C448. Moreover, Archilochus clearly intends a reference to a well-known conflict in the
Greek world; only the Lelantine war (cf. Hdt. 5.99.1; Thuc. 1.15.3) seems to fit the bill.

of the early Greek poets in his work *On the Ancient Poets and Musicians*.[44] Herodotus could, in principle, have employed such synchronisms to arrive at his absolute dating of Hesiod and Homer. We know that Herodotus synchronised Homer and Hesiod (2.53.2), and also that he synchronised Archilochus with Gyges (1.12.2);[45] he thus made two of the requisite associations. We also know him to have been informed about the Lelantine war (5.99.1). However, if Herodotus did thus synchronise Homer, Hesiod, and Archilochus, the absolute dating at which he arrived differed from that of other ancient critics known to have synchronised the three poets. Theopompus, Euphorion, and certain unnamed 'others' dated these poets five hundred years after the Trojan War:[46] in other words, three hundred years before Herodotus' time, rather than Herodotus' four hundred years. This hundred-year discrepancy can be variously accounted for. Thus, Theopompus *et al.* may simply have dated the Trojan War a century or so earlier than Herodotus did. Alternatively, Herodotus' formulation 'four hundred years before me *and not more*' (2.53.2) may have been meant to allow for a flexible accommodation of essentially the same synchronistic argument that is made by Theopompus and co., sensibly making allowance for the possibilities that Archilochus may have succeeded Gyges and the Lelantine war by a generation or so (his references to these merely proving his knowledge of, not his synchronicity with them) and that Homer may have preceded Hesiod by a generation or so (a greater gap between them presumably seeming improbable). Herodotus' actual reasoning is, of course, unrecoverable, and this is the purest guesswork. Yet the guesswork is not purely fatuous, for it is driven by the attempt to make sense of Herodotus' undisclosed thinking with reference to more explicitly worked out later-attested positions. It also usefully raises the question of how Herodotus may possibly have influenced later developments (see further below, Ch. 5 §5.2).

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[44] Ucciardello (2007).

[45] The authenticity of the reference to Archilochus' mention of Gyges is rejected by Asheri (2007a) 84, but is unquestioned by Wilson (2015b) 9–10; (2015a) 3. For a detailed defence, see Rotstein (2010) 188–201.

[46] Theopompus (*Philippica* Book 43 = *BNJ* 115 F 205) and Euphorion (*On the Aleuadae*, F 198 Lightfoot), both in Clem. Al. *Strom.* 1.21.117; unnamed 'others' (ἕτεροι) in Tatian, *Oration to the Greeks* 31.5 (p. 166 Trelenberg).

5

CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Herodotus' Interest in Homeric Criticism

It is time to draw some conclusions. The most basic, but still important, conclusion to emerge from our inquiry is that literary criticism must be numbered among Herodotus' intellectual concerns. Literary criticism, especially criticism of Homer, was well established as a discipline by the later fifth century BCE, practised especially by sophists and rhapsodes.[1] We should accept that, much as Herodotus was capable on occasion of entering the domain of the Hippocratic physician by discoursing on anatomy and disease, he was capable also of entering the domain of the sophist and rhapsode by engaging in Homeric criticism.[2] Herodotus' treatment (3.38.4) of the Pindaric motto 'custom is king of all' (fr. 169a.1 Maehler) illustrates that he was familiar with the types of readings of poetry practised by sophists.[3] Even though Herodotus makes only fairly infrequent explicit reference to Homer (2.23, 2.53, 2.116–117, 2.120, 4.29, 4.32),[4] it is apparent that he had thought deeply about issues of Homeric criticism.[5] (The wide-ranging intertextuality of the *Histories* with the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* also reveals that he had thought

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[1] On literary criticism in the fifth century BCE, see e.g. Pfeiffer (1968) 16–56; Richardson (2006 (1975)) and (1993) 25–35. See above, Ch. 1, n. 2. Note also: Hippias (cf. Pl. *Hipp. min.* 364e7–365b5, cf. *Prt.* 347a7–b2); Protagoras (Pl. *Prt.* 338e6–347a5; Protagoras, 80 A 29 D–K, with Richardson (1993) 30, cf. Kerferd (1981) 40); Metrodorus, Stesimbrotus, and Glaucon (Pl. *Ion* 530c7–d3, cf. Xen. *Symp.* 3.6); Anaximander the Younger (Xen. *Symp.* 3.6 = T 3 Fowler = *BNJ* 9 T 3; Richardson (2006 [1975]) 75; Fowler (2013) 630–1).

[2] Cf. Graziosi (2002) 117; Kim (2010) 36; Grintser (2018).

[3] Pind. fr. 169a Maehler; cf. Pl. *Gorg.* 484b. Asheri (2007b) 437: 'Herodotus is not interested here in the original meaning of Pindar's text: he isolates the verse from its context and quotes it as a motto for his purposes of ethnological and moral comparison'; note differently, however, Kingsley (2018). Cf. further Pfeiffer (1968) 34–5; Thomas (2000) 125–6 on this passage.

[4] Kim (2010) 30.

[5] Ford (2002) 148: 'Herodotus has real expertise in such poetry [*sc.* epic] that has come from carefully studying and comparing texts'.

deeply about the poems themselves, but that is a separate matter.[6]) Although presented to us piecemeal and elliptically, Herodotus' thinking about Homer appears well developed and consistent: two apparent contradictions, between 2.23 and 2.53 (on the primacy of Homer) and between 4.32 and 5.67.1 (on the authenticity of the *Thebaid/Epigoni*) are more apparent than real (see above, Ch. 4 §4.1). In some respects, his position is also avowedly heterodox or controversial: for instance, on the date of Homer, the question of authenticity (i.e. Homer's authorship or otherwise of given poems), and the question of Homer's Egyptian sources.

Herodotus also offers our first attestation of various literary critical concepts and vocabulary. The former will be discussed in the following section (§5.2). Here, we address the latter, as being suggestive, although probably not ultimately probative, of Herodotus' immersion in a contemporary literary critical discourse. First, Herodotus offers us the first example of a Homeric passage being referenced by means of an established episode title: ἐν Διομήδεος ἀριστηίῃ ('in the "*Aristeia* of Diomedes"', 2.116.3). We may compare, for instance, Thucydides' ἐν νεῶν καταλόγῳ ('in the "Catalogue of Ships"', 1.10.4) or Plato's ἐν λιταῖς ('in the "Entreaties"', following the embassy to Achilleus: *Crat.* 428c3).[7] Second, Herodotus may have used the verb παρεποίησε (2.116.2: Bekker's conjecture, see above, Ch. 2 §2.2) as a technical term of literary criticism, meaning either 'composed in imitation' or 'composed as a digression'; the term may have been used roughly contemporaneously by Glaucus of Rhegium of Aeschylus (see above, Ch. 2 §2.2). Third, there is the use of the noun χωρίον in the specialised sense of 'passage (in a literary work)' (2.117): an isolated usage in Herodotus and also a very rare usage otherwise.[8] Fourth, Herodotus uses the phrase ἐν τούτοισι τοῖσι ἔπεσι δηλοῖ, '[*sc.* Homer] shows in the following verses' (2.116.6).[9] Similar phrases are employed by Thucydides (3.104.4:

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[6] Cf., e.g., Moles (1993) 93–4; cf. Boedeker (2002) 98–109; Pelling (2006); R. B. Rutherford (2012) 23–6; Priestly (2014) 193, 195–209; Clarke (2018) 6–7.

[7] Jensen (1999) 10.

[8] LSJ *s.v.* 6a cites Lucian, *Hist. conscr.* 12 and Athen. 15.672a as the next usages of the word in this sense. The objections to the term raised by Bravo (2000) 32 n. 13 are illusory. The case for its being a technical term of literary criticism would be comparable to that made for Ar. *Ran.* 1239, στίχον by Willi (2003) 58: 'στίχος "verse" is a *hapax legomenon* in Aristophanes and rare in classical literature; so it may have been a technical term, which Aristophanes here adopted from literary criticism'.

[9] This usage differs somewhat from Herodotus' non-literary critical uses of the verb δηλοῦν; cf. Sammons (2012) 56.

δηλοῖ … ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι τοῖσδε; 3.104.5: ἐν τοῖσδε αὖ δηλοῖ),[10] the Derveni commentator (PDerv. XIII.3: δηλοῖ ὧδε λέγων; XVI.9: τοῦτο δὲ λέγων δηλοῖ; XXVI.2: δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς ἔπεσιν; XXVI.5: δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῶιδε),[11] and Plato (*Hipp. min.* 365a1–b6: ἐν τούτοις δηλοῖ τοῖς ἔπεσιν). The expression occurs subsequently very frequently in ancient literary commentaries.[12] It may have the status of something like a term of art of literary critical discourse, used when a critic wished to ground their interpretation in a passage of text quoted for the purpose. Even the use of δηλοῖ with fluctuating personal and impersonal subjects ('[*sc.* the author] shows' versus 'it is made clear') is well paralleled in the literary critical idiom of the Derveni commentator (Hdt. 2.117: κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἔπεα … δηλοῖ ὅτι …, 'from these verses … it is clear that'; PDerv. XXVI.2–3: δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖσε τοῖς ἔπεσιν ὅτι …, 'it is also clear in these verses that …').[13]

It can be questioned whether the foregoing permits us safely to infer that Herodotus was participating in a specialised 'intellectual' discourse about Homeric poetry rather than simply an 'ordinary' one.[14] That is, it is possible that a generally cultured fifth-century Greek who was no specialist in literary criticism would equally have recurred to such language when discussing the poets who made up their cultural heritage.[15] The most unequivocally technical of the lexical items listed in the previous paragraph, the verb παρεποίησε, is only an emendation.[16] If the linguistic picture may be judged insufficient to determine whether we should think of Herodotus as a cultured lay disputant about literature addressing himself to his peers or as one pitting himself against specialists in the field, we may turn to two Platonic dialogues, whose dramatic dates and *dramatis personae* are contemporary with

[10] Kim (2010) 42, 44. Cf. also Thuc. 1.10.4: δηλῶν, δεδήλωκεν.

[11] Lamedica (1991) 85–6. Cf. Kotwick (2017) 47 'fachsprachliche[s] Vokabular', *sc.* for a philological commentary.

[12] E.g., schol. Pind. *N.* 2.1d = Philochorus, *BNJ* 328 F 212: δηλοῖ δὲ ὁ Ἡσίοδος λέγων. See in general Lamedica (1991) 86.

[13] See Kotwick (2017) 346–7; cf. also PDerv. XXI.14, XXII.13. These parallels diffuse the objections raised by Bravo (2000) 31–2 n. 13.

[14] For the distinction between 'intellectual and ordinary discourse' in fifth-century BCE discussions of poetry, see Dover (1993) 32. I am grateful to an anonymous reader of *Histos* for impressing on me the importance of this question.

[15] Cf. Dover (1993) 34: 'The median level of culture is not easily assessed'.

[16] The problems of demonstrating Herodotus' use of a technical language of literary criticism are akin to those with regard to Aristophanes, on which see Dover (1993) 32–5; Willi (2003) 87–94.

Herodotus, which provide a complementary non-linguistic perspective on our problem. On the one hand, Protagoras in the dialogue that bears his name appears to attest to the existence in the later fifth century BCE of the cultured lay disputant: 'I consider, Socrates, that the greatest part of education for a man is to be skilled concerning poetic verses (περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι, *Prtg.* 338e7–339a1)'. On the other hand, the rhapsode Ion in his eponymous dialogue claims likewise, though emphatically speaking as a specialist in Homeric criticism, to be 'skilled concerning Homer' (περὶ Ὁμήρου … δεινός, *Ion* 531a1–2, cf. 531c1, 532a2–3, 532b3–4, 536d3).[17] He also declares: 'I consider that of all men I speak the finest about Homer, since neither Metrodorus nor Stesimbrotus nor Glaucon nor anyone else who has ever lived was able to give so many fine interpretations (καλὰς διανοίας) of Homer as I' (*Ion* 530c8–d3). Plato's Socrates, with repeated polite-ironic deferrals (*Ion* 530d9–531a1, 536d8, 541e6), forestalls Ion's hopes of displaying any of his prized interpretations of Homer; but Herodotus' interpretation of Homer, which undertakes to show that the poet's references to Paris and Helen in Sidon and to Menelaus and Helen in Egypt consistently hint at a true version of the Trojan War in which Helen never went to Troy, is both an ingenious interpretation of Homer and one that reveals Herodotus, like Ion, to be a 'eulogist of Homer' (Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης, *Ion* 542b4);[18] and on both counts it must resemble the kind of interpretations that Ion would have given. Highly significant is the lively spirit of competition that Ion gives voice to (with Metrodorus, Stesimbrotus, and Glaucon): a similar spirit of competition animates Herodotus, both in general and, we assume, in matters of Homeric interpretation.[19] Regardless, therefore, of whether Herodotus employs a technical vocabulary of literary criticism in 2.116, it is reasonable to think that he was familiar with and was engaging with a contemporary

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[17] Socrates, in this context, is figured as a mere 'layperson' (*Ion* 532e1: ἰδιώτην ἄνθρωπον). The dialogue as a whole explores and explodes the rhapsode's conviction that his skill in Homeric criticism involves the exercise of a specialised τέχνη: see esp. *Ion* 538b4, 542b4, with Murray (1996) 109, 127, 132.

[18] On Herodotus' affinity with the Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέται, see above, Ch. 3 §3.5.

[19] Cf. esp. Thomas (2000) 248: 'when his audience listened to (or read?) his attack on certain theories about Egypt or the Hyperboreans, or heard him giving his personal opinions and demonstrations of such and such a correct view, they would recognize the methods and style of other contemporary lectures and performances on subjects which ranged widely from medical knowledge to discussions of Homer'. On Herodotean polemics and competitiveness in general, see Thomas (2000) 213–69.

literary critical discourse that was being plied by specialists in the field (the likes of Metrodorus, Stesimbrotus, Ion, and so forth).

To recognise that Herodotus 2.116–17 is a sally into literary criticism does not, of course, in any way entail that the passage is innocent of other objectives.[20] On the contrary, the passage clearly furthers Herodotus' historiographical ends. Herodotus' argument that Homer knew the Egyptian story of Helen's seeing the war out in Egypt is plainly meant to corroborate the Egyptian Helen-*logos* that is given in 2.113–15 (we are also dealing, therefore, with an 'appropriative' use of Homeric testimony: see above, Ch. 3 §3.5).[21] By a deft turning of the tables, Herodotus suggests that Homer, rather than being the earliest and ultimate authority of the standard Greek account, both knew and acknowledged the truth of the Egyptian version. Herodotus' main demonstration of the correctness of the Egyptians' version comes in 2.120, where he mounts an argument from probability against the view that the Trojan War can have been fought over a Helen who was present at Troy.[22] The bold contention in 2.116 that even Homer is a witness of this version accompanies this demonstration in the manner of an egregious rhetorical *coup d'éclat.* Yet it is possible to recognise all these and other historiographical objectives without needing to deny that Herodotus is interested in matters of Homeric criticism.[23]

Herodotus is also without doubt interested in making a point, in both 2.116–17 and 2.23, about historiographical method, as illustrated by the fundamental divergences between the historian and the epic poet: Homer and Herodotus have different attitudes towards the truth and fiction, relating to the differential, generically-determined, requirements on them to entertain and instruct their audiences.[24] Yet the point being made must be complex: Herodotus was surely well aware that any pat contrast between historian and epic poet was doubly deconstructable.[25] For, on the one hand,

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[20] Ford (2007) 817: 'A number of Herodotus' poetic references serve no historical purpose but seem designed to show his broad and sophisticated culture'; this will not be true of 2.116–17.

[21] E.g., V. Hunter (1982) 53, 60; Saïd (2012) 92.

[22] On this argument from probability, see further below, Appendix.

[23] *Pace* V. Hunter (1982) 55–6 nn. 8–9; cf. 60.

[24] See, e.g., Austin (1994) 123; Marincola (1997) 225–6; Luraghi (2006) 86; cf. Graziosi (2002) 112–13; Koning (2010) 119 and n. 52.

[25] Cf. de Bakker (2012) 123: 'The liberty that Herodotus seems to accept in the case of his epic predecessors makes it tempting to speculate about the liberties that he allowed

Herodotus argues that Homer, although *qua* poet he privileges an attractive story over a true one, is far from indifferent to the truth of where Helen spent the Trojan War; indeed, Herodotus' Homer is painted in the colours of a historian, seeking the truth out by inquiry (see above, Ch. 3 §3.3). And, on the other, Herodotus the historian is himself not insulated from the need to entertain his public, and he too was portrayed by later critics as poet-like, a purveyor of entertaining false stories (μῦθοι, *fabulae*).[26] The way that Herodotus employs epic poetry as a foil to history is thus complex. But this complexity does not in any way rule out Herodotus' being interested in engaging in literary criticism on epic poetry; indeed, such engagement should be recognised as part of its complexity.

5.2 Herodotus' Significance within the History of Ancient Homeric Criticism

Herodotus' Homeric criticism contains inklings of many concepts that were important in later ancient Homeric criticism. A list is given below, prefixed with one, two, or three asterisks as a rough indication of the level of confidence with which a given concept is imputed to him (* = tentatively; ** = fairly confidently; *** = confidently).

1) *Homer is seen through an idealising lens and regarded as a flawless poet.[27] The ascription of this position to Herodotus is conjectural (see Ch. 3 §§3.4–3.5), but this position would be highly consistent with nos 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10 below. This position is associated with Aristotle and Aristarchus.[28] It can also be assumed for the fifth-century BCE, 'eulogists

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himself when he invented his genre. What kind of creative freedom did he allow himself when he drafted a narrative about a disputed subject like that of Helen's whereabouts?'.

[26] For Herodotus being charged with doing precisely what he charged Homer with doing, see (Hecataeus of Abdera *ap.*) D.S. 1.69.7: ὅσα μὲν οὖν Ἡρόδοτος καί τινες τῶν τὰς Αἰγυπτίων πράξεις συνταξαμένων ἐσχεδιάκασιν, ἑκουσίως προκρίναντες τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ παραδοξολογεῖν καὶ μύθους πλάττειν ψυχαγωγίας ἕνεκα, παρήσομεν; Str. 1.2.35 C43 (on all of Herodotus, Ctesias, and Hellanicus) μύθους παραπλέκουσιν ἑκόντες, οὐκ ἀγνοίαι τῶν ὄντων. Cf. Arist. *Gen. an.* 756b6–7: Ἡρόδοτος ὁ μυθολόγος. Cic. *Leg.* 1.5: *apud Herodotum patrem historiae … sunt innumerabiles fabulae.* See Kim (2010) 62–4, 149; Priestly (2014) 216–17; Ellis (2017) 115–16; Meeus (2017) 183–5.

[27] For the expression, 'flawless poet', see Schironi (2018) 736.

[28] See Schironi (2018) 495, 542–4, 638, 736, and above Ch. 3 §§3.4–3.5, on Aristotle's view of Homer.

of Homer' (Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέται), and the likes of Antisthenes and Zeno of Citium (who would 'find no fault' with Homer: see above, Ch. 3 §3.4).

2) ***Homer is seen as being the earliest Greek poet (alongside Hesiod). By implication, other extant Greek poets are seen as being chronologically later and also *qualitatively inferior (see above, Ch. 4 §4.1). This latter position is only implicit in Herodotus, but it is consistent with nos 4, 7, and 9 below. This position is taken by Aristotle (for Homer's superiority to other poets, see *Poet.* 1451a23, 1459a30–1, 1460a5–6; compare Ion at Plato, *Ion* 531d4–11) and Aristarchus (in whose usage the term νεώτεροι may be seen as having both a chronological and a qualitative aspect).[29]

3) *Extant Greek traditions attested in later Greek authors do not take us back beyond Homer (for the reasons for imputing this position to Herodotus, see above, Ch. 3 §3.6). This position is associated especially with Aristarchus.[30] ***Herodotus also assumes that extant Egyptian traditions, by contrast, do take us back beyond Homer (this position is explicit in 2.116). For some important resonances of this position in later Homeric criticism, see further below (this section, §5.2).

4) *Homer is the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* only. The ascription of this position to Herodotus is underdetermined by the evidence. It is, however, suggested by Herodotus' insistence that the *Cypria* is not Homeric (2.117), and by his scepticism about Homer's authorship of the *Epigoni* (4.32). We have seen that the apparent ascription of the *Thebaid/Epigoni* to Homer at 5.67.1 probably does not reflect Herodotus' considered opinion, but the prevailing orthodoxy (see Ch. 4 §4.1). There is no necessary implication in 2.53.2 that Herodotus regarded Homer as the author of anything other than the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (for instance, of the *Hymns*).[31] The conception of Homer as author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* only is later strongly associated with Aristotle (who also admitted the *Margites* as a genuine work of Homer: *Poet.* 1448b30) and with

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[29] Cf. Lyne (1978) 168–9; Schironi (2018) 707.

[30] See Schironi (2018) 679, 706, and above, Ch. 3 §3.6.

[31] *Pace* Graziosi (2002) 181 and n. 47. Herodotus' form of words at 2.53.2 implies no more than that Hesiod and Homer *between them* 'composed a theogony and gave the gods their epithets and distinguished their provinces and their skills and indicated their appearances'. It seems natural to understand that Herodotus saw Hesiod as (primarily) responsible for composing a theogony, and Homer as (primarily) responsible for indicating the appearances of the gods, *pace* Koning (2010) 67–8.

Aristarchus.[32] But this position was probably already emergent in the fifth century BCE; see further below (this section, §5.2).

5) ***Homer is consistent throughout his work. This tenet is central to Herodotus' argument in 2.116.2 and 2.117. It furnishes for Herodotus a powerful proof that Homer did not compose the *Cypria* (see above, Ch. 2 §2.3 and Ch. 3 §3.2). It was a key tenet also for Aristotle and Aristarchus.[33]

6) ***The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* can be used to clarify each other. This is a vital assumption in Herodotus' argument at 2.116.2–5 (see above, Ch. 2 §2.3 and Ch. 3 §3.2). It was a crucial assumption also for Aristarchus.[34]

7) ***The Homeric poems, i.e. the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, have a different mythological background from the non-Homeric *Cypria*. We lack the evidence to say whether Herodotus would have been prepared to generalise this claim for other poems than the *Cypria*; Aristarchus did so.[35]

8) ***A (qualified) concept of 'poetic licence' is granted to Homer. Departures from the truth are seen as being acceptable in poetry because its subject is myth, not reality, the aim of poetry being to entertain, not to instruct. This position is shared with Aristotle, Eratosthenes, and Aristarchus (see above, Ch. 3 §3.3).

9) ***Homer is (notwithstanding the immediately foregoing) in touch with the truth, either sometimes, frequently, or always: appreciably more often, at any rate, than other poets.[36] 'Being in touch with truth' was a requirement that Plato later placed on poetry (*Resp.* 608a7). Aristotle and Strabo (though not, it appears, Aristarchus) were among those who were at pains to show that Homer was indeed consistently in touch with the truth (see above, Ch. 3 §3.3).

10) ***Homer is in touch with the truth even in *recherché* matters that elude most people, such as the question of Helen's whereabouts during the Trojan War and Libyan rams being born with horns. This has something in common with the *polymathia* ascribed to Homer by the earlier

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[32] Pfeiffer (1968) 73–4, 117, 204–5; Schironi (2018) 623, 707.

[33] Schironi (2018) 424–5, 453–6, 495, 638, 736–7.

[34] See Schironi (2018) 639–51, on Aristarchus' practice of 'clarifying the *Odyssey* from the *Iliad* (and vice versa)'.

[35] Schironi (2018) 639, 706.

[36] This may be a reason for Herodotus' scepticism about Homer's authorship of the *Epigoni*, which mentions 'Hyperboreans', a people whose real existence cannot be demonstrated by inquiry (4.32–6); cf. Graziosi (2002) 195; Koning (2010) 110 n. 17.

allegorists, and by Crates, Strabo, and Pseudo-Plutarch (author of *On Homer 2*), among others (see above, Ch. 3 §3.5).

11) **Homer, rather like a proto-historian, makes inquiries to find out the truth (see above, Ch. 3 §3.3). This position is made explicit by Strabo, following Polybius.[37]

12) ***Homer, as a poet, knowingly mythologises the truth; his method is mythologisation of a historical kernel, rather than fictionalisation out of nothing and out of ignorance (see above, Ch. 3 §3.3). It is not clear whether Herodotus understood this as a generalised Homeric *modus operandi*. Evidently Strabo did, following Polybius, and in vigorous opposition to Eratosthenes.[38]

13) ***Homer hints at the truth that has been mythologised. This is also the position of Strabo, following Polybius (see above, Ch. 3 §3.3).

A quick way of gauging the significance of Herodotus' Homeric criticism for the history of ancient scholarship is to observe the extent to which Herodotus anticipates (by two centuries) crucial Aristarchan positions (nos 1–8 above). These include what Schironi has singled out as the 'three assumptions' of Aristarchus' Homeric criticism: that Homer was a flawless poet, that Homer was self-consistent, and that Homer was the author of just the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.[39] Herodotus seems also to go at least part of the way towards adumbrating the key Aristarchan distinction between Homer and the poets of (what was later to be called) the 'Epic Cycle' (compare no. 7 above).[40] All of these positions are strongly associated with Aristotle.[41] Schironi has emphasised 'the Aristotelian imprint on much of Aristarchus' criticism and of Alexandrian scholarship in general'.[42] We are now almost (see the following paragraph) in a position to say that Aristotle's Homeric

[37] Kim (2010) 54; cf. 57–8 (on Strabo). On Strabo, see also Lightfoot (2017) 253 (citing Str. 1.2.29 C36).

[38] Kim (2010) 74, 80–1.

[39] Schironi (2018) 736–7.

[40] Schironi (2018) 415, 638, 661–2, 707, 743–4. Note that neither Aristotle nor Aristarchus used the term κύκλος/κυκλικός of the Epic Cycle (Fantuzzi and Tsagalis (2015a) 30; Schironi (2018) 662 and n. 48, 704–5).

[41] Schironi (2009) 279 'Some parallels between Aristotle and Aristarchus can be found in the distinction between Homer and the Cyclic poets; … in the theory that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are creations of one poet, Homer …; and in the importance of the principle of consistency (Homer does not contradict himself)'. See also Schironi (2018) 415, 542, 707.

[42] Schironi (2018) 414–15, 742–3.

criticism in turn bears something of a Herodotean imprint. While the attestation of these positions in Herodotus makes it impossible to regard Aristotle as their originator, it may well still be the case that it was Aristotle's championing of these assumptions that weighed crucially with the Alexandrian critics. As well as anticipating Aristotle and Aristarchus in certain key points, Herodotus' Homeric criticism also initiated ways of approaching the Homeric poems that find no echo in Aristotle and Aristarchus, but rather in writers like Polybius and Strabo (nos 9–13 above).

We cannot move too quickly, however, to speaking of a 'Herodotean imprint' or of 'Herodotus' influence' on later Homeric criticism: it has not yet been established, nor is it easy to establish, whether the literary critical notions in question are the intellectual property of Herodotus or are owed to another thinker or are simply the property of the culture at large.[43] (Similar questions arise with the attempt to determine the influence of the poets of Old Comedy on later ancient literary criticism.)[44] Some of Herodotus' positions, such as his commitment to Homer's internal self-consistency and to Homer's being in touch with the truth, could easily have been entertained by the fifth-century BCE 'eulogists of Homer' (Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέται) of whom we repeatedly hear. So too, perhaps, the denial of Homer's authorship of any poems other than the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. While it is true that Herodotus, in denying Homer's authorship of the *Cypria*, 'hardly sounds like a man relying on public consensus',[45] it is equally true that he does not sound like someone articulating a previously-unheard-of position either. The way in which the question of the authorship of the *Cypria* is introduced (117: οὐκ ἥκιστα ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δηλοῖ …, 'this delivers not the least, but the strongest indication that …') suggests that this question was seen as being a live preoccupation for both Herodotus and his public; unless we are to suppose it this was a personal hobby-horse of Herodotus (who may, conceivably, have treated the question in some previous oral *epideixeis*),[46] the implication is that the authorship of the *Cypria* was already in dispute in Herodotus' time.[47] In other words, a conception of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as being the only genuinely Homeric poems is likely already in the later fifth

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[43] See above, §5.1, for the linguistic correlate to this question.

[44] R. L. Hunter (2009a) 2–3.

[45] Spelman (2018) 184. Cf. Nagy (1990) 78; (2010) 78.

[46] Cf., in general, Thomas (2000) 257, 260. Compare also below, Appendix, on the 'constitutional debate'.

[47] Cf. M. L. West (2013) 28–9.

century BCE to have been jostling with a conception of Homer as the author of much or most early hexameter heroic poetry.[48]

So far we have been struggling to isolate views that we can regard with a high degree of probability as being distinctively Herodotean. Add to this the general difficulty in seeing the *Histories*, with their piecemeal and somewhat incidental exposition of ideas about Homeric criticism, as having a significant influence on subsequent Homeric criticism.[49] There is the possibility that Herodotus also gave fuller expositions of his Homeric criticism elsewhere than in his published *Histories*, for instance, in oral *epideixeis* that influenced the intellectual currents of the time without leaving discernible textual traces; but that is the purest speculation. There are, however, at least three areas where we are on good ground in positing Herodotean influence.[50]

First, the notion of Homer having an Egyptian source. This is likely to be a distinctive position of 'barbarian-loving' Herodotus.[51] Herodotus did not see Homer as the only Greek poet who had an Egyptian source: he makes the claim also of Aeschylus (2.156.6 = Aeschylus, fr. 333 *TGrF*). The Herodotean position that Homer had Egyptian sources was taken further by Hecataeus of Abdera in the late fourth century BCE, who claimed (alleging, like Herodotus, the authority of the Egyptian priests) that various features of Homer's poetry were influenced by Egyptian beliefs and practices.[52]

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[48] According to Nagy (2015) 61–2 (cf. (2010) 78), Herodotus 'is following here an Athenian way of thinking', realised in rhapsodic performance at the Panathenaia. Cf. Graziosi (2002) 166–7, 195–9. A distinction is made between 'Homer' (= the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*?) and 'the other poets', οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί (= the authors of the other Trojan and Theban epics?) in various contexts. First, by the fourth-century BCE Lycurg. *In Leocr.* 102 (in the context of Panathenaic rhapsodic performance; cf. also Isoc. *Paneg.* 159). Second, in Plato's *Ion* (dramatic date = 412 BCE) 530b8–10, 531c2–3, 531d4–7. Third, by Arist. *Poet.* 1459a31, 1460a5, 8. It is debatable whether in the earlier fifth century BCE Pindar already had a conception of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as being Homer's poems, distinct from the other early Greek epics (e.g., *Cypria*, *Aethiopis*): see, e.g., Mann (1994) 325; differently, e.g., Spelman (2018) 184–9.

[49] M. L. West (2003) 301 speaks of 'Herodotus' casual remarks'.

[50] In addition to the following three points, note also the likelihood (touched on above, Ch. 3 §3.3) that Herodotus' pronouncements on Ocean (2.23) influenced Eratosthenes' concept of Homer's ἐξωκεανισμός (~ 'mythologising', transposition beyond the real world) of Odysseus' wanderings.

[51] See the criticism of the notion of Homer having an Egyptian source in these terms by Plut. *Her. mal.* 857A–B.

[52] Hecataeus of Abdera *BNJ* 264 F 25 *ap.* D.S. 1.12.10 and 1.96–7.

Hecataeus' *Aegyptiaca* was heavily influenced by the second book of Herodotus' *Histories*, and it is very plausible that Hecataeus' position here was indebted to Herodotus.[53] The notion that ancient and historically true Egyptian accounts may lie behind Greek poetic accounts is parodied both by Plato in the *Timaeus* (20d7–26e1) and by Dio Chrysostom in his *Trojan Oration* (11.37); in both cases, intertextuality with the *Histories* makes it sufficiently clear that we are dealing with a parody of, specifically, Herodotus' literary-critical procedure in 2.116.[54]

Second, the conception of Homer as both knowing and hinting at historical truths, where these were inconsistent with his actual narrative. We find this conception taken further, and generalised, by Polybius and Strabo.[55] Here, too, as with Hecataeus of Abdera, it seems plausible to posit Herodotus' influence on his fellow historians.[56] Again, the fact that Herodotus can be parodied for this position gives a good indication that the position is distinctively Herodotean. Dio Chrysostom in his *Trojan Oration* playfully takes over the view that Homer 'knows and hints at' a historical 'truth': in this case, the maverick claim that Menelaus settled down and ended his life in Egypt (11.136: σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐπίσταται τοῦτο καὶ αἰνίττεται); parody of Herodotus is evident throughout the oration.[57] Influence of Herodotus 2.116.1 may also be suspected in a scholion to Aelius Aristides' *Panathenaic Oration*: 'Homer, too, hints at this [αἰνίττεται τοῦτο: *sc.* the story narrated by Stesichorus that Paris took an *eidōlon* of Helen to Troy], where he says "and around the *eidōlon* [*sc.* of Aineias, not Helen!] the Trojans and the godlike Achaeans" [quotation of *Il.* 5.451] fought, but he did not say it openly [φανερῶς δὲ οὐκ εἶπεν], in order not to make the poetry flimsy, because so great a war came about on account of an *eidōlon*'.[58] The scholion

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[53] On Hecataeus' *Aegyptiaca* and Herodotus' *Histories* Book 2, see Burstein (1992) 45–6; Hornblower (2006) 313. We find anti-Herodotean polemic at Hecataeus of Abdera *ap.* D.S. 1.69.7.

[54] On Plato's Atlantis-*logos* and Herodotus, see Gill (1979) 75; (2017) 105, 108; Luraghi (2001a) 154 n. 41. On Dio Chrys. *Or.* 11 and Herodotus, see Austin (1994) 128–33; R. L. Hunter (2009b) 48; Kim (2010) 110, 113, 115, 122–3. See also Appendix.

[55] On this position, and its difficulties, in Strabo, see Kim (2010) 80–1; Lightfoot (2017) 254–9.

[56] On the question in general of Herodotus' influence on Polybius, see McGing (2012).

[57] With Dio's ἐπίσταται, cf. Hdt. 2.116.1: δηλώσας ὡς καὶ τοῦτον ἐπίσταιτο τὸν λόγον. With Dio's αἰνίττεται, cf. Strabo's frequent use of αἰνίττεσθαι and ὑπαινίττεσθαι of Homer: 1.1.3 C2, 1.1.10 C6, 1.2.36 C44, 6.2.10 C276.

[58] Schol. BD Aristid. *Or.* 1.131.1 = III.150.32–151.3 Dindorf.

is strongly redolent of Herodotus, although the imputation of the Stesichorean *eidolon*-version to Homer is emphatically anti-Herodotean (see above, Ch. 3 §3.6).

Third, the dating of Homer to four hundred years after the Trojan War, i.e., to the ninth century BCE. This is a position which Herodotus proclaims explicitly as his own (2.53.2). Herodotus features in Tatian's (second-century CE) roll-call of scholars who have pronounced on Homer's date.[59] The dating propounded by Herodotus is further said by Tatian to be held by 'some', τινές (*Oration to the Greeks* 31.5, p. 166 Trelenberg). In the Pseudo-Plutarchan *On Homer 2* §3, on a plausible emendation of the text, this position is said to have found acceptance 'among the majority' (παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις πεπίσ-τευται).[60] Herodotus' extant published text (as opposed to any putative oral *epideixeis* he may or may not have given) provides no argument for the dating, just the statement of an opinion; it is thus hard for us to understand how he can have been influential in shaping later critics' views. But this is a suitable place to recall that at some point in (presumably) the Hellenistic or Imperial periods it was felt appropriate to make Herodotus the pseudonymous author of an investigation into 'the birth, date, and life of Homer' (Ps.-Hdt., *Life of Homer* §1 West: Ἡρόδοτος Ἁλικαρνασσεὺς περὶ Ὁμήρου γενέσιος καὶ ἡλικίης καὶ βιοτῆς τάδε ἱστόρηκε).[61] This pseudepigraphic ascription seems to take

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[59] *Or. ad Graecos* 31.3, p. 164 Trelenberg: περὶ γὰρ τῆς Ὁμήρου ποιήσεως γένους τε αὐτοῦ καὶ χρόνου καθ' ὃν ἤκμασεν προηρεύνησαν οἱ πρεσβύτατοι Θεαγένης τε ὁ Ῥηγῖ⟨ν⟩ος κατὰ Καμβύσην γεγονὼς καὶ Στησίμβροτος ὁ Θάσιος καὶ Ἀντίμαχος ὁ Κολοφώνιος Ἡρόδοτός τε ὁ Ἁλικαρνασσεὺς καὶ Διονύσιος ὁ Ὀλύνθιος, μετὰ ⟨δὲ⟩ ἐκείνους Ἔφορος ὁ Κυμαῖος καὶ Φιλόχορος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος Μεγακλείδης τε καὶ Χαμαιλέων οἱ Περιπατητικοί· ἔπειτα γραμματικοὶ Ζηνόδοτος Ἀριστοφάνης Καλλίστρατος Κράτης Ἐρατοσθένης Ἀρίσταρχος Ἀπολλόδωρος. For Tatian as intending a reference to Herodotus 2.53 (rather than to the *Life* of Homer purporting to be by 'Herodotus of Halicarnassus', *pace* M. L. West (2003) 301), see Biondi 41–2.

[60] The emendation in question, of the transmitted ἔτη ἑκατόν, 'a hundred years' (*sc.* after the Trojan War) to ἔτη τετρακόσια, 'four hundred years', is due to Gercke (*apud* Raddatz (1913) 2209.30–1); it is adopted by Kindstrand (1990) 8, and approved by Keaney and Lamberton (1996) 69 n. 1; Graziosi (2002) 93 and n. 13. The corruption could be explained either as a mechanical error (τετρακόσια, written as υ′, mistaken for ἑκατόν, written as ρ′) or a mistake resulting from the compression of sources. The more elaborate conjecture of M. L. West (2003) 416 is less attractive, since we should expect 'the majority view' to be the third and crowning view listed, after 'the school of Aristarchus' and 'the school of Crates'; it is not stylistically plausible that it was followed by a fourth view, weakly and anticlimactically introduced by '<and some [*sc.* say]>'. The same objection goes for the emendation of Raddatz (1913) 2209.25–7.

[61] M. L. West (2003) 354.

Herodotus' credentials as an aficionado of Homer for granted.[62] In general, it seems clear that Herodotus could be taken seriously as a critical voice on Homer: thus, for instance, Philostratus' 'spoofing' treatment of Homeric criticism engages conspicuously with Herodotus 2.116–17, alongside the mainstream Homeric commentary tradition.[63]

While a good deal remains uncertain, it can be stated that much of the bedrock of later ancient Homeric criticism must have been laid already in the fifth century BCE. Herodotus personally must be allowed to have had some quite vivacious and well-known opinions on Homer and on Homeric criticism, opinions which continued to animate the thinking of others in antiquity for centuries. We have here the merest snapshot of fifth-century BCE Homeric criticism, yet Herodotus 2.116–17, in particular, is a crucially important testimony to the intellectual range and vibrancy of both the fifth century BCE and of the Father of History himself. Much rides, therefore, both on the recognition of these chapters as authentically Herodotean (see above, Ch 2 §2.3) and on their correct interpretation, however fraught and controversial that may be.

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[62] Kirkland (2018) 320. See Griffin (2014) 3–11, for an exploration of affinities between the Pseudo-Herodotean *Life of Homer* and Herodotus' *Histories*. We should note, however, that there may also have been more mischievous motivations for the ascription of this *Life* to Herodotus: for 'Herodotus' as the appropriate pseudonymous author of a tissue of fictions (μῦθοι) about Homer's life, see also Kirkland (2018) 303–4, 323–6.

[63] See above, Ch. 3 §3.1, and Porter (2011a) 27 with n. 63.

APPENDIX

DID HERODOTUS TAKE HIS HOMERIC CRITICISM SERIOUSLY?

Discussion of a fundamental problem of a largely historiographical character is reserved for this appendix. It has been tacitly assumed in the preceding that Herodotus is in earnest in the Homeric criticism of 2.116–17.[1] Yet the viability of his Homeric criticism seems to be predicated on the truth of three propositions. First, that there existed an authentically Egyptian Helen-*logos* that was independent of Greek tradition, according to which Helen was taken by Paris to Egypt and saw the war out there before being collected by Menelaus. Second, that this Egyptian Helen-*logos* is of great antiquity, reaching back at least some four hundred years from Herodotus' time, so as to antedate Homer. (In fact, Herodotus endorses a stronger position still: that the Egyptian Helen-*logos* originated, another four hundred years earlier, with Menelaus himself, 2.118.1.)[2] And third, that Homer somehow managed to became acquainted with this Egyptian Helen-*logos*: Herodotus here seems to assume a Homer who, like Solon and other sixth-century BCE σοφισταί ('sages-cum-poets') toured foreign parts, in particular Egypt, in quest of cultural knowledge.[3] All these propositions

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[1] Kim (2010) 86: 'Herodotus, Thucydides, and Strabo, whether defending or attacking Homer's account, undertake their analyses in earnest, as befits the genres in which they operate—history and geography. Some of their presumptions and arguments could be considered tendentious and problematic, but there is little doubt that they take the problem seriously'. There is a contrast here with the writers of the Second Sophistic: Kim (2010) 178 'proposing to contest Homer's account the war had become, by Philostratus' time, virtually a declaration of non-serious intent'.

[2] De Jong (2012) 141: 'In the specific case of the Helen *logos*, his Egyptian informants provide Herodotus with an unbroken chain of information linking the present to the past, ending with the eyewitness Menelaus himself'; cf. de Bakker (2012) 119.

[3] See Hdt. 1.29.1, 30.1, for Solon 'and other σοφισταί' as going to Egypt 'for the sake of tourism' (θεωρίης ἕνεκα), on which see Moyer (2011) 58–9. For σοφισταί in fifth-century BCE literary contexts as encompassing poets, see Pind. *I.* 5.28; Aesch. fr. 314 *TGrF*; Cratinus, fr. 2 K–A; Soph. fr. 906 *TGrF*; plus Thgn. 19 *IEG*: σοφιζομένῳ … ἐμοί, 'as I compose poetry'; Kerferd (1950) 8. For Hdt. 2.116.1, δοκέει δέ μοι καὶ Ὅμηρος … πυθέσθαι, 'Homer seems to me also [*sc.* as well as Herodotus] to have learned …', as implying a vision of Homer travelling to acquire knowledge of various kinds, compare Str. 1.2.13 C23: πυθέσθαι, πεπυσμένον;

individually, let alone collectively, place considerable demands on Herodotus' credulity. We will start with the first, which is the cornerstone of the rest, and arguably the most problematic of all.

The Egyptian Helen-*logos* dovetails so suspiciously with the interests of Herodotus' own narrative that it has seemed to many modern scholars an all-too-convenient Herodotean fiction. It seems obvious that we are dealing with a well-known Greek mythological tradition (one employed by 'Hesiod', Stesichorus, and Euripides) that has undergone rationalising myth-criticism, *à la* Hecataeus, and then been foisted, implausibly, onto Egyptian priests.[4] It has even been doubted whether Herodotus ever spoke with Egyptian priests.[5] The verdict of D. Fehling that '[t]here is nothing for it but to accept that the whole story comes from Herodotus himself' has been widely echoed.[6]

It is not just modern scholars who have seen the Egyptian Helen-*logos* as an all-too-convenient Herodotean fiction: 'I do not know who of the

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1.2.3 C16, ἐπύθετο; 1.1.4 C2, πεπυσμένος; Ps.-Hdt. *Vit. Hom.* 6: ἱστορέων ἐπυνθάνετο, and see, e.g., V. Hunter (1982) 54: 'Herodotus pictures Homer as working rather like himself, gaining knowledge through enquiry (116.1, πυθέσθαι)'; cf. Ford (2002) 148; Graziosi (2002) 116–17; Sammons (2012) 57 and n. 14.

[4] A. B. Lloyd (1988) 45: 'the narrative of Proteus' reign and the sojourn of Helen in Egypt bears an unequivocally Greek stamp. Proteus is simply the Homeric sea god of *Od.* IV, 351ff., who has been transmuted into a human ruler and has then supplanted the *Odyssey*'s Thon, whilst Thon himself has been converted into an official'. On Homer's Thon and Herodotus' Thonis, see further A. B. Lloyd (1975–88) III.43–4; Moyer (2011) 77. On the question whether Hecataeus, in his *Periodos*, had given a rationalising account of Helen's stay in Egypt, see above, p. 42 n. 112. Hdt. 2.118.1: εἰρομένου δέ μεο τοὺς ἱρέας εἰ μάταιον λόγον λέγουσι οἱ Ἕλληνες τὰ περὶ Ἴλιον γενέσθαι ἢ οὔ contains a nod to the beginning of Hecataeus' *Genealogies*: fr. 1 Fowler: οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν; see Kim (2010) 33; cf. Marincola (1997) 225 n. 43, comparing rather Hdt. 2.2.5 with Hecat. fr. 1 Fowler.

[5] Heidel (1935), esp. 132–4. See, differently, Moyer (2011) 42 n. 1, 69, 83; cf. Luraghi (2001a) 151–4.

[6] Fehling (1989) 64 = (1971) 49. Cf. De Jong (2012) 141: 'The Helen *logo*s, said to derive from Egyptian priests, upon closer inspection reveals the hand of Herodotus everywhere … The whole make-up of the story is therefore Herodotean, yet Herodotus presents it emphatically and repeatedly as the tale of Egyptian priests. Why? The answer might be that he really heard it from Egyptians. We will probably never be able to prove or refute this idea. But, even if Herodotus spoke with Egyptians about this topic, I would hazard a guess that he at most heard that Helen had stayed with Proteus in Egypt. The entire story built on the basis of this kernel (which was already known from Greek sources too) is his own. He puts it in the mouths of Egyptian priests in order to promote it to his Greek readers'. Similarly, V. Hunter (1982) 58–9 n. 11; Evans (1991) 137–8.

Egyptians told this tale' was Plutarch's acerbic comment (*Mal. Her.* 857B).[7] Numerous Second Sophistic receptions of Herodotus 2.116–17 (Dio Chrysostom's *Trojan Oration*, Lucian's *True History*, and Philostratus' *Heroicus*) all variously make play with the idea that Herodotus' Egyptian Helen-*logos* is a highly convenient invention of its author.[8] The same is true already, barely a generation after Herodotus, of Plato's reception of Herodotus' Egyptian Helen-*logos* in the *Timaeus*.[9] Evidently building on a reading of Herodotus' Egyptian Helen-*logos* as an all-too-convenient fiction of its author, Plato's Atlantis-*logos* presents itself likewise as an all-too-convenient Platonic fiction.[10] The Atlantis-*logos* begins with unmistakeable echoes of Herodotus' proem.[11] In Plato's dialogue, Solon is made to have conversed with Egyptian priests about the distant past (*Tim.* 20d7–8, 22a1–2), just as Herodotus claimed to have done (2.3.1, and elsewhere).[12] Plato is presumably also picking up here on Herodotus' use of Solon as a surrogate for Herodotus

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[7] The comment in essence reverberates in modern criticism: cf. S. R. West (2004) 89: 'The story which he tells was certainly no part of Egyptian tradition'. Plutarch singled out in particular (*Her mal.* 12, 857A–B) as a malicious invention of Herodotus the sacrifice of two Egyptian boys that Herodotus' Egyptian Helen-*logos* attributes to Menelaus (2.119.2–3), in a pointed reversal of standard Greek ethnic stereotyping (e.g., Eur. *Hec.* 1247–8; *Hel.* 155).

[8] On Dio Chrys. *Or.* 11, see Austin (1994) 128–33; R. L. Hunter (2009b) 48; Kim (2010) 110, 113, 115, 122–3. On Lucian, *True History*: Kim (2010) 144, 146. On Philostratus, *Heroicus*: Kim (2010) 186, 200.

[9] For Plato's *Timaeus*—and *Critias*—as a reception of Herodotus Book 2, see Pradeau (1997) 157–79. For another arguable reception of Herodotus (1.8–12) by Plato (*Resp.* 359d–360b), see Laird (2001) 15–19.

[10] Cf. R. B. Rutherford (1995) 288–9: 'That [the Atlantis myth] is anything but a Platonic invention seems to me, I confess, totally implausible'; cf. Gill (2017) 1–2 and, in more detail, Johansen (1998). Compare the Thoth-narrative of *Phdr.* 275b3–4, on which, see Johansen (1998) 208; Laird (2001) 18 n. 29; Yunis (2011) 226.

[11] With Pl. *Ti.* 20e4–6, ἀπεμνημόνευεν … πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ γέρων, ὅτι μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστὰ τῆσδ᾿ εἴη παλαιὰ ἔργα τῆς πόλεως ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ φθορᾶς ἀνθρώπων ἠφανισμένα, 'the old man [sc. the elder Kritias] used to recount to us that great and wondrous deeds of old of this city had been erased by time and by the destruction of men', compare Hdt. 1 *praef.*: Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε, ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστὰ κτλ., 'This is the setting out of the inquiry of Herodotus of Thurii, in order that the achievements of men should not become effaced by time nor deeds that are great and wondrous etc.'. Cf. Gill (2017) 105.

[12] Gill (1979) 75: 'The picture of Solon interrogating Egyptian priests about the distant past is highly evocative of Herodotus' Egyptian investigations'; Luraghi (2001a) 154 n. 41. Gill (2017) 16 n. 38 speaks of a 'pastiche of Herodotean and Thucydidean historiography', cf. 108; cf. Pradeau (1997) 157.

himself.[13] Pointed inversions in Plato's account of Herodotus' Egyptian-*logos* are attributable to the operation of the principle of 'opposition in imitation'.[14] The repeated emphasis on truth in the *Timaeus* (21a4–5, 26c8–d1, 26e4–5) has been seen as 'an example of "Platonic irony"'.[15] Crucially, it already suggests a reading of similar protestations in Herodotus as 'lie-signals',[16] as do Dio Chrysostom's assertions, in his own later reception of the same Herodotean chapters, of the 'truth' of the 'Egyptian's' account (11.4, 124). We would accordingly be dealing with an instance of the 'invented source' topos, in Plato as in Dio:[17] Plato's Solon supposedly discourses with an Egyptian priest with ancient knowledge, just as Dio does in his *Trojan Oration* (11.37), in what has been called an 'unmistakable allusion'

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[13] Cf. Hdt. 1.30. For Solon as a surrogate figure in Herodotus' text for the historian himself, cf. e.g. Węcowski (2004) 162 n. 110; Friedman (2006) 167.

[14] The assertion at *Ti.* 23d7–e6 that the Ur-Athenians are older than the Egyptians appears to be a riposte to Hdt. 2.15.2, 2.2.1 (discussion of whether the Egyptians are the oldest race). The discussion at *Ti.* 24a2–d6 of similarities between Ur-Athenians and Egyptians, where the Ur-Athenians declared to have been the first, can be seen as a riposte to Hdt. 2.49.2–3, 2.51.1, where similarities between Greek and Egyptian culture are discussed, and the Greeks declared to be the borrowers. Cf. Luraghi (2001a) 154; Moyer (2011) 59 n. 58. On 'opposition in imitation', see Hardie (1993) 118. Further on the Athenocentric orientation of Kritias' speech, see Gill (2017) 17–18.

[15] Johansen (1998) 208; Morgan (1998) 102–3. Cf. Gill (1979) 77 'On the other hand, I think Plato's fictional intentions were not entirely misunderstood in antiquity. Two writers of the fourth and third centuries B.C., Euhemerus and Theopompus, created stories that are, roughly, in the same genre as the Atlantis story: that is, stories of fantastic constitutions and climates set in remote and undiscoverable places. Both stories allude to the Atlantis story, and both seem to have been more or less overt fictions. These stories may be regarded, on the one hand, (like the Atlantis story) as elaborations of the philosophico-political fable in the direction of fiction; and on the other, as early examples of the genre of travellers' tales, a fictional genre whose only extant instance is Lucian's avowedly false "True Story" (second century A.D.) … In alluding to the Atlantis story, and, to some degree, taking it as their prototype, [Euhemerus and Theopompus] seem to acknowledge its status as an early experiment in fiction; and the recognition of these practicing writers is a partial compensation for the impercipience of Plato's other ancient readers'. Cf., with qualifications, Gill (1993) 63–6.

[16] Compare and contrast Vasunia (2001) 238: 'Plato presents his story in a context of ambiguity that generates suspicion concerning the claims to truth insisted on by Critias, whereas Herodotus did nothing to undermine the truth of what he heard from Egyptian priests'. Cf. Fehling (1971) 91–2 = (1989) 120–2, on 'lie-signals' in Herodotus.

[17] See Fehling (1971) 43, 114–18 = (1989) 56, 155–61. On the 'invented source' topos in Plato, cf. Laird (2001) 19.

both to Herodotus and to Plato's Solon.[18] In short, Plato, Dio, Lucian, and Philostratus all treat Herodotus 2.116–17 as furnishing them with literary precedent for facetiously invented 'sources'.

It is unclear how these Platonic and Second Sophistic receptions of Herodotus should inform our own reading of Herodotus' Egyptian Helen-*logos*. On the one hand, they could be held to authorise us to read Herodotus' Egyptian Helen-*logos* as being itself ironic or tongue in cheek.[19] On the other hand, the irony could just as well be the exclusive property of the receiving texts, alien to the Herodotean model itself. Indeed, it seems easier to assume that Plato is parodying a Herodotean passage that he took Herodotus to mean seriously than that Plato's approach merely continues in a parodic vein that he identified already in his model. Platonic parody of Herodotus in the *Timaeus* makes obvious sense (compare, for instance, the parody of the Athenian *epitaphios logos* in the *Menexenus* or of Gorgias in the *Gorgias*).[20] But supposition of ludic or parodic intent on Herodotus' part is less easy (whom and what would he be parodying?).[21]

We revert, therefore, to the problem of how Herodotus could conceivably have been in earnest about the existence of an authentic and independent Egyptian Helen-*logos*, when such a *logos* has all the hallmarks of being Herodotus' own creation. We face here, of course, a historiographical problem that recurs in various guises in the *Histories*. One of its guises is the question whether Herodotus can have been in earnest about the existence of a Persian 'constitutional debate' (3.80–2). This passage, too, is dressed up in fifth-century Greek terminology, concepts, and concerns; it, too, furthers the concerns of Herodotus' own narrative; it, too, is prefaced with an explicit and reiterated avowal of truth (3.80.1, compare 6.43.3).[22] In this case, it is

[18] Kim (2010) 110–11, 111–12; cf. Fehling (1971) 119 = (1989) 163.

[19] Compare Marincola (2013 [2007]) 128, who asks: '[w]ould a fifth-century Greek really have believed that an Egyptian priest heard an account of Helen's fate from Menelaus himself?', and suggests that there may be in Herodotus' text 'hints that the world of Egypt is not to be taken at face value'. For Hecataeus as already being 'tongue-in-cheek' or 'ironic', and mistakenly taken 'at face value' by Herodotus, see Armayor (1987), esp. 12, 18; cf. already Heidel (1935).

[20] On Platonic parody, see Dover (1996) 1115; Trivigno (2009) (of the *epitaphios logos*, in *Menexenus*); Levett (2005) (of Gorgias, in *Gorgias*).

[21] Cf., in general, Thomas (2000) 8–9: 'it is difficult to believe that Herodotus should be producing a clever literary parody, equipt with seemingly accurate source-citations, of a literary genre (i.e. history) that did not yet exist'.

[22] E.g., Moles (1993) 118–20; Pelling (2002) 125–6.

certainly arguable that there was some such historical debate, even if hardly conducted in the precise, i.e. Hellenised and contemporised, terms in which Herodotus renders it—or, more pertinently, it is possible that Herodotus persuaded himself that there was such a debate.[23] Another, even more closely comparable, case is presented by 1.1–5, where Herodotus imputes to 'authoritative' (λόγιοι) Persians and Phoenicians an acquaintance with and an interest in Greek mythological stories (concerning Io, Europa, Medea, and Helen) and where it has been argued that 'there is no difficulty at all in thinking that Persians could honestly be represented as knowing these stories'.[24] By the same token, it is possible that there was an Egyptian tradition about Helen in Egypt in the last decades of the fifth century which Herodotus encountered, or at least that he persuaded himself that he did.[25] Given that it was Herodotus' position that traditions common to the Egyptians and the Greeks were ancient and original among the former, and were diffused thence to the latter (see especially 2.79.1–3), and that the Egyptians adhered to their own ancestral customs and did not procure any others besides these (2.79.1), it would follow for him that any Helen-*logos*

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[23] Cf. Lateiner (2013 [1984]) 197–8 with n. 11; (1989) 167 with 272 n. 13; Pelling (2002) 128–9; Asheri (2007*b*) 472–3; Munson (2013a [2009]) 326 and n. 21.

[24] Fowler (1996) 84, cf. 85: 'That the source of the individual rationalized stories is Greek … presents no problem'. Similarly, Haubold (2007), esp. 49–53. Differently, Fehling (1971) 39–41 = (1989) 50–7; Asheri (2007a) 74.

[25] A. B. Lloyd (1975–88) III.46 'H[erodotus] states ([2.]113.1) that he derived the tale from the priests. At the very least this will mean that he extracted it by a series of leading questions but it could be a G[ree]k tale that had already become part of Eg[yptian] tradition … Whatever the situation, the tradition must have existed before this confrontation. Furthermore, its creator cannot be H[erodotus]; otherwise he could not possibly have taken it so seriously. It was evidently a firmly-established *logos* even though it was not canonical'. Cf. A. B. Lloyd (1975–88) I.92, esp. 109: 'The presence of Greek material within the historical tradition which Herodotus claims derived from the priests does not in any way disprove the priestly origin of this historical material. Greeks had been coming to Egypt long enough to inject into the stream of Egyptian folk-lore more than a little of their own ideas and traditions of Egypt … Such matter (e.g. the Proteus legend) could quite naturally be taken up by the priests as part of their national history along with tales of purely Egyptian origin'. Cf. Pritchett (1993) 64–6; Dewald (1998) 625. Moyer (2011) 78 n. 138: 'The tradition most likely existed previously'. Cf. Fowler (2006) 36: 'It is becoming clearer all the time how Herodotus often presents opinions ("the Egyptians say") as fact, when what lies behind the statement is inference: he conjectures that this is what the Egyptians would say, were you to ask them. This is not a fraudulent procedure in his view'; cf. Fowler (1996) 85; (2013) 661–2; Luraghi (2001a) 146–8. I. C. Rutherford (2016) 98–100 speculates about a possible specific case of influence of Homeric poetry on Egyptian traditions (the 'Inaros narratives') in the mid-fifth century BCE; cf. Moyer (2011) 78 n. 138.

found among the Egyptians would be authentically and anciently Egyptian, independent of any Helen-*logos* attested among the Greeks.

There are reasons to think that Herodotus takes the Egyptian Helen-*logos* seriously. First, in general Herodotus evidently takes the chronology furnished by the accounts of the Egyptian priests seriously; it enables him, crucially, to plug the 'floating gap' of Greek tradition, that is, the dearth of knowledge among the Greeks about the period intervening between the heroic age and the archaic age.[26] Second, it is notable how the Helen-*logos* of the Egyptian priests closely resembles Herodotus' own historiographical method, being based on their 'inquires', and hence the object of definite 'knowledge' (2.118.1: ἔφασαν πρὸς ταῦτα τάδε, ἱστορίῃσι φάμενοι εἰδέναι παρ' αὐτοῦ Μενέλεω, '[the Egyptian priests] said the following in view of these things, saying that they knew them by inquiries from Menelaus himself').[27] In addition, Herodotus' own personal investigation in the question of Helen's whereabouts during the Trojan War perfectly exemplifies the historical method: ἱστορίη ('investigation'), comprising ὄψις ('seeing for oneself', 'autopsy'), γνώμη ('ratiocination'), and ἀκοή ('report', 'hearsay').[28] Autopsy of Proteus' precinct in Memphis, and of the temple in it dedicated to 'foreign Aphrodite', is implied by Herodotus' description of the former as being 'especially beautiful and well adorned' (2.112.1).[29] Hearsay is evident in Herodotus' reporting of the traditions of the Egyptian priests (2.112.2: καλέεται (*bis*); 2.113.1: ἔλεγον δέ μοι οἱ ἱρέες ἱστορέοντι). Ratiocination is to be found in Herodotus' argument that the cult title 'foreign Aphrodite' is an appellation of Helen daughter of Tyndareus (2.112.2: note συμβάλλομαι, 'I infer'), and especially in his probabilistic argument disproving Helen's presence at Troy during the Trojan War (2.120.1–5, where note

[26] See Vannicelli (2001), esp. 224; Thomas (2001) 208–9; Fowler (2006) 34; Moyer (2011) 76 and n. 126, 77, esp. 81–2.

[27] See Grethlein (2010) 156: 'the Egyptians' approach is similar to [Herodotus'] own: they draw on an eye-witness, Menelaus, apply *historie* and acknowledge the limits of their knowledge in a manner that reminds the reader of Herodotus himself', with n. 23; cf. de Bakker (2012) 119 and n. 37; Luraghi (2001a) 144–5, 146.

[28] On Egypt in general as presenting for Herodotus favourable conditions for the practice of ἱστορίη, see Luraghi (2001a) 152. On ἱστορίη, ὄψις, γνώμη, and ἀκοή, see, e.g., Marincola (1987) 124–8; A. B. Lloyd (1988) 23–31; (2007) 229–31; Thomas (2000) 189–90.

[29] For Herodotus' 'indirect indications implying autopsy', cf. Bichler (2013) 148 ('indirekte Hinweise, die Autopsie nahelegen'). Indications of Herodotean autopsy in 2.112.1 are fully consistently with the implications of 2.99.1, that Herodotean ὄψις will be added to the *logoi* of the Egyptians (i.e. ἀκοή) from 2.99 onwards; cf. Marincola (1987) 125; A. B. Lloyd (1988) 23.

ἐπιλεγόμενος, 'reflecting'; ἐγὼ μὲν ἔλπομαι, 'I expect'; ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ γνώμην ἀποφαίνομαι, 'as I venture my opinion'; τῆι ἐμοὶ δοκέει, 'as it seems to me').[30] Herodotus' own historical method is thus very much on show in these chapters. We cannot very well see Herodotus as being ironic or facetious about the conclusions to which the method leads him here (that there is an independent Egyptian Helen-*logos* of eight hundred years' antiquity) without being prepared to suppose that Herodotus is unserious about the entire historical method.

Suspicion of authorial irony is only one approach open to the reader when the author commends a proposition in terms patently stronger than the objective grounds for the reader to entertain it. Other approaches are available that need not involve our questioning the author's own commitment to the proposition in question. One possible approach here is to suppose that Herodotus is massaging the evidence to 'help along' what he perceives to be certain more general truths.[31] It seems very likely that the probabilistic analysis given in 2.120 represents a pre-formed view of Herodotus': formed, that is, before he engaged the priests of Memphis on the subject, as he claims to have done at 2.113.1 and 2.118.1.[32] The case of Helen in Egypt will then be one where Herodotus thought of a truth for himself before hearing it confirmed by others (compare 2.104.1).[33] This entails that Herodotean γνώμη will in this case have been at work well before ὄψις, ἱστορίη, and ἀκοή (compare 2.18.1). Herodotean ratiocination implies the operation of assumptions and principles that Herodotus holds dear. In this case, the relevant assumptions and principles may be taken to be the following. First, and most concretely, the implausibility of the Trojans fighting a ten-year war if they had been in a position to stop it by surrendering either a real or a phantom Helen. Second, principles about Homer's *modus operandi*: that Homer should be in touch with the truth (*inter*

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[30] On 2.120 and its argument from probability (εἰκός)—or, equivalently, ratiocination (γνώμη)—see V. Hunter (1982) 59 and n. 12; Thomas (2000) 168 n. 1; A. B. Lloyd (2007) 326; Moyer (2011) 78–9, 81. In general, on argument from probability in Herodotus, see Lateiner (1989) 98, 193; A. B. Lloyd (2007) 236. Cf. Thuc. 1.9 (with, e.g., V. Hunter (1980) 198). For this particular argument from probability parodied, see Dio Chrys. 11.68–70 (Kim (2010) 115); Philostr. *Her.* 25.10–11 (Kim (2010) 177–8).

[31] My use of the phrase 'help along' is indebted to Moles (1993) 120: 'No serious ancient historian was so tied to specific factual truth that he would not sometimes help general truths along by manipulating, even inventing, "facts"'.

[32] Cf. Austin (1994) 122–3.

[33] Cf. Evans (1991) 137–8; Moyer (2011) 78 and n. 139; Fowler (2015) 202.

alia, about the Trojan War), and that he hinted at the truth consistently in the narratives of *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. And third, that extant Greek traditions of the fifth century BCE are not able to take us back beyond Homer, although extant Egyptian traditions of the fifth century BCE may well do so.

At the start of this Appendix it was assumed that Herodotus' Homeric criticism in 2.116–17 came at the end of a process of an essentially inductive reasoning process, in which data gathered from Herodotus' Egyptian inquiries (the discovery of an eight-hundred-year-old Egyptian account according to which Helen went to Egypt and not Troy) was combined with data gleaned from the Homeric poems (Homer's knowledge of Paris and Helen's detour to Sidon, in the vicinity of Egypt, *Il.* 6.289–92; Homer's knowledge of Helen's sojourn in Egypt, *Od.* 4.227–30, 351–586) to yield inferences about Homer's *modus operandi* (Homer as being in touch with the truth; Homer as consistent across his oeuvre).[34] Instead of assuming such an inductive reasoning process, it may be more plausible to assume a two-way deductive and inductive process, whereby these core beliefs about Homer and those about Egyptian traditions (as being ancient and reliable; as being uninfluenced by Greek traditions) had largely taken shape in the historian's mind before he processed the particular data constituted by the Egyptian Helen-*logos*. Thus there is scope to think that (unlike his parodists, Dio, Lucian, and Philostratus) Herodotus means his Homeric criticism seriously even though—or rather, precisely because—there was relatively little objectively to recommend the belief in the existence of an age-old authentically Egyptian Helen-*logos* independent of Greek tradition. Herodotus' commitment to the tenets of his Homeric criticism, combined with the other principles indicated, may have been sufficient for him to commend to his reader the existence of an authentically Egyptian Helen-*logos* extant in the fifth century BCE ancient enough to have influenced Homer in (on Herodotus' dating) the ninth century BCE. It is all too easy to see how this laid Herodotus open to parody in the following generation (Plato's *Timaeus*) as well as centuries later (Dio's *Trojan Oration*, etc.). We should not assume that such a reception would have dismayed or much surprised Herodotus, if his robust insistence on the historicity of the Persian constitutional debate is anything to go by, in the face apparently of incredulous responses from his contemporaries already in the period intervening between presumptive oral

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[34] On Herodotus' use of 'argument by induction', see A. B. Lloyd (2007) 236. On Herodotus' processes of reasoning in general, cf. Darbo-Peschanski (1987) 137–57.

performances of this material and its written publication.[35] Belief in the existence of an authentically Egyptian independent Helen-*logos* may appear from a modern scholarly point of view a bold and reckless thesis, but it is scarcely more so than that in a Persian constitutional debate.[36] Herodotus, like other fifth-century thinkers, was not apt to shy away from strong or controversial positions.[37] The upshot of this is that we are not obliged to see Herodotus' commitment to his principles of Homeric criticism as contingent on his belief in a number of scarcely-credible-seeming propositions. It could very well, conversely, have been the strength of his commitment to these literary-critical principles (in conjunction with certain others) that made him into a determined advocate of the existence of an eight-hundred-year-old Egyptian Helen-*logos*, free from Greek influence.

[35] On the arguable implications of 3.80.1, λόγοι ἄπιστοι … ἐνίοισι Ἑλλήνων ('speeches that are unbelievable to some of the Greeks'), 6.43.3, τοῖσι μὴ ἀποδεκομένοισι κτλ. ('those who do not accept etc.'), see, e.g., Thomas (2000) 116; Pelling (2002) 124–5, with nn. 4–5; in general, Fowler (2001) 107. Cf. also 1.193.4.

[36] On the unconventionality of Herodotus' constitutional debate, see, e.g., Luraghi (2001a) 142–3; Sissa (2012) 232, 260–1.

[37] On Herodotus' love of controversy, note Thomas (2000) 213–48, esp. 217: 'Controversial argument forms a major strand in Herodotus' style'. On other fifth-century thinkers, see, e.g., G. E. R. Lloyd (1987) 96: 'in the context of an exhibition performance, … caution and reserve are not likely to be the most highly prized qualities. On the contrary, every effort will be made to attract and hold an audience, to make the "sales pitch" as effective as possible'. Cf. Thomas (2000) 218–19.

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