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REVIEW–DISCUSSION
A NEW TAKE ON EMOTION IN POLYBIUS

Regina M. Loehr, *Emotion and Historiography in Polybius'* Histories. Routledge Studies in Ancient History. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2023. Pp. 242. Hardback, £135.00. ISBN 978-1-032-42362-3. eBook, £35.99. ISBN 978-1-003-36243-2.

The paradox of the theory of 'tragic history' is that it persists in some form or other despite overwhelming skepticism among scholars that any such thing as a 'school of tragic history' ever existed. Studies that consider Polybius's comments about Phylarchus and the others he accuses of writing history in tragic style have had trouble approaching escape velocity and oftentimes persist with assumptions that originate from the theory of tragic history itself and not from Polybius's text. Such arguments presume, for instance, that Polybius accepts an Aristotelian definition of tragedy, or that Duris of Samos—who is never mentioned in the extant fragments of Polybius and whose connection to the Peripatos has been established primarily through a problematic emendation by Adamantios Korais[1]—wrote history in the Peripatetic style and therefore somehow illustrates the qualities of Phylarchus's narrative as described by Polybius, or even that Polybius's attack on Phylarchus is so disingenuous that it describes his own narrative as accurately as it describes those he polemicises against. As a result of assumptions like these, the theory of 'tragic history' has long stunted investigations into Polybius that otherwise might help us engage with his text in more satisfying and more meaningful ways.

Regina M. Loehr's (hereafter 'L.') book, *Emotions and Historiography in Polybius'* Histories, in contrast, represents a promising and interesting new direction in studies of Polybius's narrative method. This book strikes at a central assumption of 'tragic history' and heads in a fruitful direction in the study of Polybian narrative theory. Specifically, Loehr reconsiders the long-held assumption, inspired by the theory of tragic history, that Polybius considered the depiction and arousal of emotions unsuitable for a serious work of history.

L. begins her study by asking what place emotions do or should have in historiography (1). By studying 'the historiographical role' of emotion in

[1] Cf. Dalby (1991).

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Polybius's *Histories*, she argues for a significant place for emotion in history, that emotion is not opposed to pragmatism, rationality, or morality, and that emotion was 'an explicit and important payoff' in historical narrative (1). She sets out to use these findings to further an understanding of Polybius's practice, his criticism of Phylarchus, and his conception of history, and she argues that ancient historians consciously recorded emotion in their works and could consider their depictions of emotion a feature of truthful narration (4). Even though, as L. argues, 'emotion in a historical event remains unproven and unprovable', and the presentation of emotion necessarily represents an authorial literary choice, the narration or evocation of emotion is not necessarily equivalent to fabrication or prevarication (4).

The book includes an introduction followed by five argumentative chapters, the fifth of which also contains the conclusion. Notes and bibliography are given at the end of each chapter, and the volume concludes with a brief index and comprehensive index of passages. In the Acknowledgments, the author explains that this book began as her dissertation at UC-Santa Barbara. The first section of Chapter 3, carrying the subtitle 'Collective Emotion in Theory: The Anacylosis', has been adapted with minor changes from an article that appeared elsewhere.[2] To illustrate how Polybius represents the role emotions play in historical 'actions, decisions, and events', L. turns to modern social scientific theories of emotions, and she underlines the social nature of emotions in ancient historiography; they are, after all, a central feature of human interaction (5). To this end, L. employs critical terminology from modern psychology and sociology to analyse emotions in the *Histories*, focusing particularly on 'philosophies of collective emotion and political thought'. L. furthermore focuses on how emotions, in the way they motivate historical actors to act, serve to bridge 'morality and rationality' (6). She argues that 'emotion itself can exemplify morality, rationality, and pragmatism' for Polybius and that he intends his depiction of emotions to teach readers 'how to feel' emotion (7).

Chapter 1, 'Fundamentals of Emotion: Social Science, History, and Human Behavior', begins with a retelling of the death of Achaeus in 213 BCE and the reaction of his captor, Antiochus III, in contrast to that of Achaeus's wife and the others who witnessed his betrayal. L. uses this example to introduce a discussion of the social nature of emotion and establish some fundamental vocabulary for her study. She sets out to distinguish 'generic' terms for emotion in the *Histories* and to differentiate emotion from other states of affect or cognition. She argues that Hellenistic Stoicism and Epicureanism foreground the social nature of the presentation of emotion in Polybius. Finally, she considers how Polybius fares in light of debates about 'who could

[2] Loehr (2021).

and stereotypically did feel emotion and whether people feel the same emotion across cultures' (16).

L. follows Douglas Cairns[3] by 'exploring the parameters' of emotion, namely their intentional and phenomenal dimensions. Intentionality, L. explains (17–18), the fact that emotion is directed at an object, distinguishes emotion from other phenomena like 'feelings, moods, dispositions, and sensations' (17). Furthermore, L. takes four terms for her discussion from modern social sciences: (i) the subject, who feels the emotion, (ii) the object, at which the subject directs the emotion, (iii) the import, something relevant to the subject or the subject's values about which the subject cares, and (iv) the result.

A particular concern of the study is whether Polybius depicts emotions as appropriately expressed by the subject, which for L. requires the emotion to 'accord with the import' (19). She argues that Polybius depicts Philip V's anger at the Achaean desecrations of Dium and Dodona as appropriately felt (19). Whether or not his response was ultimately proportionate, his emotion accorded with his 'motivation and action within a specific social interaction' (21).

After describing emotions in this social context, L. moves on to consider emotions' 'orientation', that is, whether emotions are felt on one's own behalf or on the behalf of others, and their 'multidimensionality', or the experience of multiple simultaneous emotions (21). L. does not argue that Polybius describes or understands emotions in these terms; rather, this theoretical framework simply provides an effective scaffold from which to approach and analyse the presentation of emotion in the *Histories*.

Having established her terminological parameters, L. moves on to consider Polybius's emotional terminology in an effort to contrast his portrayal of emotion with its portrayal in Hellenistic Stoicism and Epicureanism. In contrast to the lost Hellenistic philosophical treatments of *πάθη*, and Aristotle's employment of the same term, Polybius uses the term *πάθος* only once to refer to 'emotion', namely when Africanus's mother is overcome at the prospect of both of her sons holding the office of aedile simultaneously (24). Rather than take this single instance as confirmation of the 'prevailing view of emotion in history' as a negative and irrational quality of non-elites, L. sees evidence that emotional usage and terminology in historiography has little in common with the subjects' treatment in philosophy (24).

In contrast to *πάθος*, Polybius frequently employs the term *θυμός* with overtones of various types of emotionality, so much so that 'Polybian scholarship' often makes this term 'paradigmatic of all emotion' (25). In this context,

[3] Cairns (2019).

L. considers primarily Craige Champion's arguments,[4] in which he 'bases his category of barbarism on this Greek term' and opposes it to the λογισμός of the Hellenic elite (25). L. argues, in contrast, that θυμός, in the *Histories*, designates an intensity of feeling and should not be understood as a term for 'emotion' more generally (27).

Moving on to consider the relationship between Polybius's presentation of emotions and contemporary Stoic and Epicurean philosophy, L. finds little in common between them. Polybius shows no concern for rationalising theories about emotional or cognitive processes (27–8). She attributes the divergence to Polybius's focus on the social aspects of emotions, that is, how they 'affect the decisions, actions, and events' in the course of history (28). Where Polybius overlaps with his philosophical counterparts, for L., is in his attempt to educate his readers about emotional processes, that is, in his efforts to teach his readers how to recognise, moderate, and manipulate emotions according to their own ambition.

To round out Chapter 1, L. applies a 'social constructivist conceptualization of emotion' (29) to the *Histories*. This conceptualisation, she explains, is opposed to an evolutionary or naturalistic theory of emotions that defines basic, universal emotions that are shared across cultures. L. places Stoic theories of emotion in this category: 'The instinctual nature of προπάθεια mirrors the instinctive, universal reactions of basic emotions in naturalism' (29). She then considers whether Polybius portrays emotions as cultural or social constructs or as universal phenomena shared by everyone. Opposing herself to Arthur Eckstein,[5] she argues that Polybius does not portray any particular emotion as the exclusive expression of any single group. That is, elites display the same emotions as other groups. L. agrees with Eckstein that some groups react more poorly to emotions, but she argues that this supports a social constructivist view of emotions in the *Histories*. She uses Philip V to illustrate her point. First, culture formed his emotion insofar as his cultural belief in the sanctity of Dium and Dodona led to his reaction to their violation. Second, he learned of the sanctity of those spaces by participating in his culture, and third, his emotional reaction, i.e. destroying Thermum, is purposeful and not simply instinctive. Nevertheless, she argues that Polybius is not an extremist in this regard and tends to portray emotions on a spectrum between the universal and constructivist extremes according to which certain groups, like Hannibal's elephants, react with more instinct, and other groups, like the Epirotes or Aetolians, show more cultural idiosyncrasy (32). It is when discussing emotions more theoretically, L. argues, that Polybius 'writes on a universal level' (32). She concludes that 'While all kinds of characters in the

[4] Champion (2004).

[5] Eckstein (1989).

Histories felt emotions with similar types of motivation, expression, and resulting action, culture and social interaction shaped the subjects' emotions' (33). Furthermore, Polybius 'established parameters for judging characters by reference to the appropriateness, direction, and proportionality of their emotion' (33).

In Chapter 2, 'Individual Emotions in Context: Polybius, Aristotle, and the Classical Historians', L. turns her attention to the emotions that appear in the *Histories*, how they function, what distinguishes them, and whether Polybius treats them in unique ways (45). L. begins her chapter by referring to the framework for emotional analysis outlined by Simon Koschut,[6] Professor of International Security Policy at Zeppelin University. According to that framework, there are three approaches available to analyse emotion: 'emotion terms', 'emotional connotations', and 'emotion metaphors, comparisons, and analogies' (45). Because the second and third methods 'rely on analysis of deeply embedded cultural meaning which is difficult to recognize fully from a perspective outside of the culture', L. rejects these methods and focuses on emotional term analysis, 'a lexical approach, focusing on direct references to emotion' in which authors specify and identify emotions directly (45). L. organises the chapter by categorising emotions according to their social function. She posits that the historian's lack of interest in emotional theory is an advantage for identifying normative treatment and presentation of emotions, and such a study should help determine how Polybius's presentation of emotions provides a counterpart to the method he criticises in historians like Phylarchus. L. organises the chapter in four divisions: emotions of disapproval, emotions of anticipation, emotions of positive affect, and reflective emotions of fellow-feeling (46).

The emotions of disapproval are comprised of anger, hatred, resentment, indignation, and shame. L. explains that her discussion of anger 'analyzes how Polybius presents anger and how his usage compares to his historiographical predecessors Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon and to Aristotle's definition in the *Rhetoric*' (47). The context of historiography, L. argues, 'illuminates the persistent function of anger in history' and 'highlights the historians' idiosyncratic usages' (47). The comparison to Aristotle, L. argues, will both highlight the aspects of Polybius's usage that are common while simultaneously demonstrating the importance of looking beyond Aristotle when analysing emotion in ancient historiography.

L.'s discussion first focuses on the emotion of Philip V to highlight the 'core components' of anger in the *Histories*. The first component is that it is expressed at the perception of an injustice, restated later as 'a provocation which the subject perceives as detrimental or contrary to their own values' (48). L. argues

[6] Koschut (2020).

that this presentation of anger 'continues from the Classical historians' who also depicted anger directed at a 'past grievance' that 'directly motivates a specific action' (48). L. continues by arguing that Polybius sometimes expresses approval of behaviour motivated by anger. Furthermore, unlike his predecessors, he shows that actions taken in anger sometimes lead to positive outcomes (48). From here, L. analyses how anger can 'negatively characterize' figures, that is, how Polybius sometimes presents subjects as inherently angry as opposed to expressing anger in a given moment (49). Contrasting her views to Eckstein[7] and Champion,[8] but aligning herself with Erskine,[9] L. argues that anger is expressed by all varieties of subjects, and Polybius's presentation of it shapes his narrative and is an important catalyst of political action and change. L. then moves on to compare anger in Polybius to Aristotle's consideration in the *Rhetoric*, relying primarily on David Konstan's[10] argument that Aristotle's definition of anger is 'reducible to a desire for revenge and provoked by a slight' (51). L. finds Polybius's presentation of anger to be more expansive than Konstan's arguments about Aristotle's definition, primarily due to 'the historian's concern for reality' (52). In the end, L. concludes that Polybius presents anger in a social context and evaluates it in the specific contexts in which it arises.

From anger, L. progresses to hatred, moving through a similar method of examining Polybius's presentation, comparing his presentation to earlier historians' narratives, and finally to Aristotle's discussion of the same emotion in the *Rhetoric*. At the beginning of the section, L. presents Polybius's discussion of traitors to introduce his conception of hatred. She then introduces the work of psychologists Robert Sternberg and Karin Sternberg,[11] who define three major components of hate: 'a negation of intimacy, passion, and devaluation' (53). L. argues that Polybius's presentation of hatred is 'multidimensional': it stimulates and correlates with anger, it appears alongside anger, indignation, and resentment, and it contrasts with love and pity (55). He depicts hatred as the motivation of the decisions and actions of individuals and groups (56). L. argues that Polybius's understanding of anger 'builds upon' earlier historians but the variety of terminology and frequency of depictions distinguishes his narrative from theirs (56). Similarly, Polybius's conception of anger differs from Aristotle's in that it can be directed both at individuals and at groups.

L. proceeds with the same method through other emotions of negative affect, ultimately concluding that Polybius's presentation of emotions of

[7] Eckstein (1989).

[8] Champion (2004).

[9] Erskine (2012).

[10] Konstan (2006).

[11] Sternberg and Sternberg (2008).

disapproval is consistent with the '"realistic" portrayals of [the same] emotions' in earlier historians, but broadly expanded (70).

For emotions of anticipation, namely fear and hope, L. presents a brief discussion introduced by a summary of Stoic classification of these as 'anticipatory' emotions (70). Despite L.'s assertion that 'Polybius and the rest of the Greek historians use these two emotions most frequently of all the emotional terms studied here' (70), the section is quite short, less than four pages long in total. L. argues that these emotions appear most frequently in the context of military events and though they motivate military and political events and decisions, they do not connect closely to moral evaluation.

From here, L. turns to emotions of positive affect which she defines as joy and gladness, gratitude, gentleness, and love. L. argues that these positive emotions 'diverge greatly in their relation to other categories of emotions' (79) in that they tend to characterise end results, the general dispositions of historical actors, and serve to complicate reasoned actions.

The final section of the chapter focuses on reflective emotions: sympathy and empathy, and pity. As with the other emotions discussed, L. argues that Polybius's presentation of these is consistent with but broader than the presentations in earlier historians and distinguished from Aristotle's by a focus on reality (86).

Chapter 3, 'Internal State Change: The People's Moral Emotions', focuses on '[c]ollective emotion, or emotion ascribed to a group of people' and 'combined emotions … , a variety of emotions felt simultaneously by someone' (104). At the beginning of the chapter, L. briefly discusses modern theories of collective emotion. These are 'plural subject theory' which concerns emotions as a single expression of a group, and the 'theory of shared emotion' which concerns a group of individuals who separately feel the same emotion towards the same object (104). She adopts Bennett Helm's[12] 'theory of emotional communities' (104), which holds that 'communities share emotions which reinforce and validate their values' (104). L. focuses on 'two passages of collective, combined emotions and their significant impact on politics' (105), namely Polybius's description of constitutional *anacyclosis* and his narrative of the Egyptian Agathocles. In both cases, she opposes herself to the arguments of Eckstein[13] and Champion[14] and argues that collective emotion, and the groups that express it, can exhibit reason and morality and affect the community in positive ways. For L., 'Polybius does not condemn the people as inherently worthless for politics or denigrate them as irrational because of their collective emotions. Rather, as a community, they preserve social

[12] Helm (2014), (2001).

[13] Eckstein (1995).

[14] Champion (2004).

morality … and act as a catalyst for positive social and political change' (105). Concerning Polybius's ideas of *anacyclosis*, L. argues that Polybius 'finds a parallel in Bennett Helm's modern theory of communal emotions, which contends that "reactive emotions play a fundamental role in constituting distinctively human communities"' (107).[15] 'Through reacting emotionally in adherence with their social values, humans develop a sense of community' (110). L. argues that offence and indignation motivate social groups to reject the degenerated constitutions of tyranny and oligarchy while fanning the flames of ochlocracy. L. further argues that an absence of social morality leads mixed constitutions into their degenerate states. L. discusses Plato's and Aristotle's considerations of the role emotions play in constitutions and argues that they focus on individual desire or self-interest in contrast to Polybius's focus on social morality. She concludes that Polybius advocates for public emotional investment to play a role in regulating political communities and constitutional change (119). In the remainder of the chapter, L. presents the narrative of Agathocles as an example of the role collective emotion plays in the moral and political regulation of communities in practice. L. argues that the narrative demonstrates that, for Polybius, 'rationally and morally justified collective emotions can cause extreme violence' (132). Polybius is aware that emotion and violence are unpredictable and liable to lead to unforeseen complications, but in a case like that of Agathocles, it can also be a moral and appropriate response to a degenerated constitution.

In Chapter 4, 'Emotions at War: Causal Anger and Justifying War', L. continues her discussion of collective emotion but now focuses on Polybius's presentation of the emotions of interstate conflict, and in particular, the role anger plays in starting wars. She continues to ground her argument in modern social theory but shifts from shared emotion theory to plural subject theory. In this theory, members of a community endorse emotions expressed on their behalf by a large social group to which they belong, like a corporation, church, or *polis*, without necessarily experiencing the emotion themselves (152). She further contextualises her study with issues of 'just war theory', which concerns itself with issues like the justifications for starting wars, how the actors and agents represent themselves and their decisions as just, who is considered morally and legally accountable for acts of war, and how morals fare in the face of strategic and pragmatic concerns (152). L.'s fundamental concerns are how Polybius represents the role emotions play in the justification for starting wars, in the choices actors make during wars, and in reactions to the resolution of conflict and the end of war. She focuses primarily on anger as a cause of

[15] Helm (2014).

war and presents her arguments in opposition to those of Eckstein,[16] Champion,[17] and Erskine,[18] rejecting 'anger's placement on the side of barbarians in a dichotomy between barbarian and civilized' (156). She first examines the causes of the Second Punic War, which she identifies as Hamilcar's passion, the anger of Carthaginian citizens over Rome's seizure of Sardinia and the imposition of additional tribute, and the Carthaginians' confidence in the strength of their Spanish military forces and resources. She argues that Polybius presents the Carthaginian motivation for starting the war as a just and morally justifiable anger at Roman behaviour, which in turn places the moral responsibility for the war on the Romans (161).

Next, L. turns to the category of 'Unjustifiable Anger', or instances when Polybius expresses a negative judgement concerning episodes of anger in his narrative. These examples, L. argues, reinforce 'negative stereotypes of … mercenaries, Aetolians, and women' (161). For a paradigm, L. employs the Mercenary War which illustrates the 'causal power of anger' (161). The mercenary leaders incite anger among the troops who reject the Carthaginian attempts at payment, commit various crimes, and even loot the camp of the Carthaginian commander, Gesco. Polybius disapproves of these disruptions to normal diplomatic procedure because they have been motivated by the mercenaries' unreasoning anger (162–3). In contrast to the episodes of anger that Polybius endorses, this episode shows anger expressed outside of a 'community of respect': the mercenaries show no concern for harming the innocent, they allow themselves to be led into anger by demagoguery, and their anger is motivated by greed and pride (163). Ultimately, Polybius's characterisation of the unjustified anger of the mercenaries reveals his negative assessment of the characters of their leaders, Spendius and Mathos (163). As a further example of unjustifiable anger, L. analyses the mutual anger between Teuta and the Romans during the First Illyrian War, which she argues reflects negatively on Teuta alone (163–4). Finally, she turns towards Polybius's disapproval of the angry Aetolians' selfish and misdirected anger at the end of the Second Macedonian War (164–5).

From anger as a cause of war, L. moves on to analyse anger as a pretext for war. This section first focuses on Hannibal's pretexts for the Second Punic War. L. argues that Polybius criticises Hannibal for hiding the true cause of the war—his anger—behind pretexts that were in fact less just than his anger (168). She argues that the when the Gauls who join Hannibal in Italy hide their true reason, a desire for plunder, behind the false pretext of anger, it further reinforces that anger can be, for Polybius, both a just cause and a suitable

[16] Eckstein (1989), (1995).

[17] Champion (2004).

[18] Erskine (2015), (2013).

pretext for war. The opposite may also be true, however, as the example of Dorimachus and the Social War illustrates (169–71). Here, the anger that causes the war is unjustifiable and fails as an effective pretext. L. concludes that pretexts can be judged not only in terms of expediency, but also morality (171).

Next, L. argues that Polybius depicts anger playing an appropriate role in 'prudent considerations' and strategic decisions (171). She reviews the examples used in the chapter so far to illustrate the complex interplay between emotion, legality, morality, and strategy. At times, emotion aids strategy, other times it impedes it. Similarly, emotion can precede legality (176). L. continues this analysis, building on the argument that Polybius's depiction of emotion is nuanced and not given to simple predispositions and prejudices by arguing that he uses emotion as a thread in the fabric of universal history. L. argues that 'Emotions help to connect past events to the current circumstances and allow Polybius to emphasize the interwoven nature of history' (179). Consequently, emotion plays an important and closely considered role in Polybius's analysis of the causation of historical events.

L. begins Chapter 5, 'Learning from History: Audience-Based Emotion and Conclusions' by reiterating her conclusion from the previous chapters: 'History, with its emphasis on causes, is distinguished as useful to the reader through emotion' (197). Having concluded her arguments about the crucial role Polybius ascribes to emotion as a factor that helps determine the course of events, L. turns to a consideration of how Polybius guides his readers' emotional reactions in the *Histories*. For these conclusions, L. adopts and 'focuses exclusively' on David Levene's[19] coinage of 'audience-based' emotions, that is, the emotions that a historiographer attempts to arouse in the reader (198). L. argues that Polybius suggests that it is necessary to experience emotion in the study of history, though historiographers themselves must first process the emotion they experience in their study before producing a narrative that is designed to elicit what the historiographer believes is an appropriate emotional response (200). To elicit these emotions, L. argues, Polybius describes the emotional reactions of observers within the work to model the appropriate emotional response to the events themselves (200). As one example, L. employs the putative participants in the *anacyclosis* who grow indignant when they see children maltreating their parents, thereby becoming inclined to propel the cycle of constitutions along; this passage was discussed at length in Chapter 3. Another example is the observation of the Romans looting Syracuse, which was discussed at length in Chapters 1 and 2. A third example is the audience to the fall of Achaeus, discussed at length in Chapter 1. Through the guidance of such models, 'the reader becomes a better student of

[19] Levene (1997).

history by learning both to feel correctly in response to types of incidents and to judge characters morally through emotional reactions' (208–9).

Overall, L. concludes that Polybius illustrates the role emotions play in the course of historical events, passes judgement on the appropriateness of historical actors' emotional motivations and responses, and elicits emotion in the reader in an effort to bring the reader to the same judgements about emotions as the historian himself. Further, she 'challenges the universal applicability of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as "the standard" account of ancient Greek emotion' (211) but sees an affinity between emotion in Polybius and in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, though Polybius delves deeper into the nature and role of emotions in history. Like Phylarchus, she argues, Polybius does try to elicit particular emotions in the reader and to feel sympathy with historical figures but, unlike Phylarchus, Polybius narrates emotions in a way that is consistent with his own conception of their proper use in historiography: he shows how emotion is tied to causation, he judges the appropriateness of the emotions exhibited in the historical moment, and he challenges readers to interrogate their own emotions so they might learn the lessons from history and withstand the vicissitudes of their own fortunes.

Certain qualities of the author's method require at least passing mention. In the first place, L. has a tendency to focus her secondary research, at least in the text of the argument, on the work of one, two, or sometimes three scholars. She follows this method both when she agrees with the scholarship and when she opposes it. For discussions and interpretations of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, for instance, she relies primarily on the work of Konstan. As far as Polybian scholarship goes, she addresses primarily Eckstein, Champion, and Erskine.[20] For scholarship on emotions, L. similarly tends to anchor her analysis on the work of one or two scholars, Koshcut[21] for emotional analysis, for one example, or Helm's[22] theories of emotional communities for another. In the case of the classical scholarship, a broader engagement with a wider selection of work would have been appreciated. In the case of scholarship on the social and psychological aspects of emotion, a subject farther from the wheelhouse of most Polybians, such engagement seems even more essential.

A corresponding quality appears in the author's treatment of primary authors throughout the text. When L. reaches for the works of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, or the works of Plato or Aristotle, she often adduces a very few comparative examples to support her points. For instance, in her comparison of Polybius's depiction of anger expressed at past grievances (47–8), she illustrates her position with one example from Herodotus (Megacles'

[20] Champion (2004); Eckstein (1989), (1995); Erskine (2012), (2013), (2015).

[21] Koschut (2020).

[22] Helm (2001), (2014).

anger toward Pesistratus), one example from Thucydides (the Corinthians' anger toward the Corcyreans), and one example from Xenophon (Pharnabazus vs. the Spartans). For the subsequent point, that anger can be depicted in these four authors as a direct motivation for subsequent action, she compares Polybius's discussion of Philip V at Thermum with Xenophon's presentation of Dercylidas at Cebren. She adds three more examples of characters setting aside their anger, Periander and Cyrus in Herodotus and the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton in Thucydides, before concluding that 'Classical historians do not quite depict anger as an actively positive force' (49). The conclusion, even qualified as it is, seems overly generalised given the amount of primary text analysis presented in support of it. Perhaps, given the expanse of the subject L. has taken on—the presentation of (all) emotion in the *Histories*, its relationship to the presentation of emotion in (all) the Classical historians and in the (whole of the) philosophy of Plato and Aristotle—deeper engagement is impossible in every instance. But in sections like that on gratitude (75–6), where L. presents no examples from any classical author and argues that 'Polybius' widespread use of the term *χάρις* corresponds with Konstan's analysis of Aristotle's restrictive definition of this term' (76), the lack of broader engagement with at least the primary sources if not the secondary scholarship limits the utility of L.'s discussion for the reader.

In fact, the book is at its strongest when L. pays more attention to primary analysis. In her discussion of indignation (63–8), for instance, after spending a paragraph on the Classical historians, L. engages in several pages of original and detailed analysis of Polybius's text. She considers the causes for historical actors' indignation, under which circumstances they felt indignation for others, the moral aspects of their indignation, Polybius's evaluation of his sources' presentation of indignation, the relationship of indignation to historical causation, and even Africanus's manipulation of indignation in his address to the mutineers in Spain. The discussion is nuanced, and it reveals a broad spectrum of the presentation and narration of a group of related emotional concepts in Polybian narrative. Further, it is organised and executed along an original line of inquiry.

It is in moments like these, when L. departs from considerations of Polybius's relationship to Plato and Aristotle, or the Classical historians, and especially to Phylarchus, that her arguments go furthest in repairing our understanding of Polybius's narrative method. In this way, L.'s book suggests new and productive directions for study that might well correct the misunderstandings promoted and disseminated by studies that fail to escape

the mistaken assumptions originated by Eduard Schwartz and perpetrated by those who have taken up his theory of tragic history in the decades since.

SCOTT T. FARRINGTON
Dickinson College farrings@dickinson.edu

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