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NOVEL LEADERS FOR NOVEL ARMIES: XENOPHON'S FOCUS ON WILLING OBEDIENCE IN CONTEXT*

Richard Fernando Buxton

Abstract: Although the universalising bent of Xenophon's leadership theory shows Socratic influence, its prioritisation of the general and the author's fame for leading the Cyreans suggests an equal foundation in his battlefield experiences. In particular, the theory's focus on securing willing obedience can be understood as a response to the novel fourth-century challenge of uniting ethnically disparate forces of free-agent mercenaries as an army, an issue central to *Anabasis* 5–7. Not only was Xenophon familiar with such a force, but he also shows an interest throughout his works in the advantages of mercenary professionalisation and specialisation, particularly with Jason of Pherae.

Keywords: Xenophon, leadership, mercenaries, *Anabasis*, xenia, Jason of Pherae.

Recent work on Xenophon's theory of moral leadership, culminating with Vivienne Gray's 2011 monograph, has succeeded admirably in establishing both the core tenets of the author's theory and the universalising scope that he sets for its application throughout his polygeneric opus.[1] Described succinctly, the Xenophontic leader is one who can inspire the willing and

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[1] See especially Gray (2011) 5–24. Important earlier studies are Due (1989) 147–206; Wood (1964); Breitenbach (1950) 47–104.

enthusiastic obedience of his followers through presenting himself to them as, on the one hand, a competent and nurturing champion of their prosperity and, on the other, a visible partner in the labours needed to secure this prosperity. The *Hipparchicus* contains one of Xenophon's most concise formulations (6.1–4):

> One would be unable to fashion anything as one wished it, unless the materials from which it were to be fashioned should be disposed to obey the will of the craftsman. Nor especially in the case of men, unless they, with god's help, will be willing in this same way both to be disposed in a friendly manner (*φιλικῶς*) towards the one commanding and to consider him more sensible than themselves as regards trials against their enemies. It is thus likely that those being ruled will display goodwill (*εὐνοϊκῶς*) from the following: when he behaves in a friendly-minded fashion (*φιλοφρόνως*) towards them and appears to display foresight. … And in short they would least scorn a commander if he himself should appear to perform however many things he enjoins upon these men better than they.

Although the battlefield commander is the most frequent manifestation of the Xenophontic leader, the author advocates a similarly benevolent approach to management in all fields of group endeavour, from politics to oversight of household domestics, as the analogy with the craftsman hints at already.[2]

Despite the ubiquity of the model leader in Xenophon's writings, only tentative steps have been taken towards identifying the sources informing his paradigm, particularly those that shaped the author's distinctive and moralising focus on securing willing obedience through beneficial acts. Older critics, such as George Cawkwell and Hans Breitenbach, disposed of the question by focusing on the

[2] See especially *Mem.* 3.4; cf. Gray (2011) 20–4, Johnstone (1994) 230–2.

traditional character of the moral sentiment animating Xenophon's model, which they lumped with his piety as ever so much Hellenic boilerplate.[3] Breitenbach also posited a strong Socratic influence, as have to varying degrees Roger Brock, John Dillery and Eric Buzzetti; a position that has seemed increasingly plausible as the theory's universalising bent has been elucidated.[4] But Xenophon's Socratic expansion of model leadership beyond the battlefield does not alter the fact of the military general's conspicuous priority in the author's investigations of the topic.[5] This, in turn, implies that his paradigm must have to some significant degree been forged in that context.

The elephant in the room, then, is Xenophon's own experience as the general who led the remnants of the Ten Thousand—the Cyreans—safely to Pergamum, and Neal Wood long ago drew attention to the consistent coincidence between the author's paradigmatic leaders and his own self-portrait in the *Anabasis*.[6] Despite the ancient reception of

[3] Cawkwell (1979) 43–6; Breitenbach (1950) 144 and 147, who nonetheless attributes the author's pronounced *militärpsychologische Interesse* to his personal experience of command.

[4] Breitenbach (1950) 144; Brock (2004) 256–7; Dillery (1995) 5–6, who adds Cyrus the Younger and Agesilaus as the two other figures key to understanding the development of Xenophon's thought; Buzzetti (2014).

[5] This priority naturally reflects a generic bias in the political-military works and *Hipparchicus*, which is, however, not insignificant in itself. At the same time, the military commander remains not just a common analogy for other forms of leadership in Xenophon's Socratic corpus, but rather the default reference point in discussing the larger art of command; e.g. *Mem.* 3.1.4, cited above, and, most striking, Ischomachus' frequent parallel between a good *oikonomos*—both male and female—and the Xenophontic general (4.12, 5.15–16, 8.4–8, 9.15, 20.5–10, 21.2–9).

[6] Wood (1964) 59–60, who nevertheless attributes Xenophon's universalisation of this leadership figure to Socratic influence; cf. Luccioni (1947) 44–56, who places equal emphasis on military and Socratic influences. Gray (2011) 7–8 advances the alternative hypothesis that it was Xenophon's experience running his estate at Scyllus and his ability to draw lessons for it from his first-hand observations of the political-military leadership of Cyrus, himself and Agesilaus that led the author to formulate a universalising theory of management; but cf. 12,

Xenophon as a philosopher first and foremost (D.L. 2.48–59), his achievements as a general in safely delivering the army were also a key aspect of his reputation, as Arrian's Alexander (*An.* 2.7.8–9), Plutarch's Marc Antony (*Ant.* 45), Polybius (3.6.10), Maximus of Tyre (15.9; 22.5; 36.6) and the Emperor Julian (264C) all attest.[7] Xenophon too indicates an awareness of the fame that the Cyreans' return had already won him (*An.* 7.6.33; *HG* 3.4.2 and 6.1.12). This suggests that a strong experiential foundation to the author's leadership-model would have been attractive to both him and his audience. Moreover, critics are fond of pointing out the author's habit of warping his material to stay within his personal experiences and hobbies, regardless of genre: horsemanship, an idealised Persian monarchy, quality hunting grounds, beautiful boys, estate management, clever stratagems, Socrates and incessant sacrifice all join battlefield commanders as staples across the Socratic, historical and technical works.[8] Similarly, Xenophon's coverage of Greek affairs is notorious for concentrating on areas and sources near where the author happened to have been.[9]

I would like to take Wood's argument a step further and suggest that the specific character of Xenophon's model leader—namely, his concern to gain willing obedience—is decisively informed by the particular and, in the fourth century, novel form of generalship that the author had practised: command over a mercenary army rather than a civic militia. Although Greek mercenaries already played a

where Socrates' influence on Xenophon's command of the Cyreans is also emphasised.

[7] Tuplin (1993) 27: 'For most people Xenophon was a general or a philosopher', with relevant ancient testimonia in n. 55. Cicero, in fact, describes Scipio Africanus as an admirer of the *Cyropaedia* primarily for its insights on military leadership (*Tusc.* 2.62).

[8] As Tuplin puts it in his *OCD* entry on the author: 'The clearest common features [of his works] are (1) intimate relationship with Xenophon's personal experiences and (2) taste for didactic discourse.'

[9] See Krentz (1989) 4–7, Cawkwell (1979) 22–8, Anderson (1974) 170–1, Breitenbach (1967) 1699–1700.

supporting role in Greco-Persian affairs by the late fifth century, ancient and modern authors agree that a sharp increase in their use and importance was a hallmark of the fourth-century Mediterranean.[10] The Cyreans, in fact, represent a watershed moment, setting a precedent for hired forces of over ten thousand.[11] However, mercenary service is a complex phenomenon: the sources alternately view it as an honourable and lucrative occupation to be pursued freely (X. *An.* 6.4.8; Isae. 2.6), and as an ignoble refuge for those economically and politically displaced by the period's incessant mainland conflicts and their collateral *staseis* (Isoc. 4.146 and 167–8; X. *An.* 2.6.13).[12]

Further, as Matthew Trundle has usefully pointed out, military service for hire in Classical Greece was actually of three distinct types.[13] First, there were mainland hoplites, recruited mostly from Arcadia, and primarily providing garrison or infantry forces to potentates in the Persian sphere and Sicily. In the course of the fourth century, mainland Greek poleis—including Athens (Isoc. 8.44–8; Aeschin. 2.168; D. 4.24) and Sparta (X. *HG* 5.2.21)—also began hiring such men (Aen. Tact. 13), culminating with the massive force assembled by the Phocian Philomelus in the Third Sacred War (D.S. 16.30.1–3). Hired hoplites were organised as separate contingents, each under its own *stratēgos* and subdivided into companies (*lochoi*) under *lochāgoi*. These *stratēgoi* and *lochāgoi* represent a mercenary officer-class that provided well-connected adventurers an opportunity to exploit their aristocratic networks of xenia in recruiting fighters and connecting them to ambitious

[10] The following discussion is deeply indebted to Trundle (2004) and Roy (2004), the two best recent surveys of mercenary service in Classical Greece, which supersede Parke (1933) and synthesise each author's earlier articles.

[11] Trundle (2004) 7 and 45.

[12] Bonner (1915) provides a still useful survey of the diverse economic and political backgrounds among the individual Cyreans discussed in the *Anabasis*, even if Xenophon privileges the army's more affluent members and their less desperate motives; see Dillery (1995) 73–7.

[13] Trundle (2004) 40 and 47–54.

paymasters.[14] Second, there were auxiliary peltast, cavalry and light-armed contingents, hired mostly by mainland poleis to supplement their citizen hoplites from regions along the peripheries of Greece that were noted for each type of fighting, particularly Thracian peltasts and Rhodian slingers. Such contingents were rarely recruited for service in the east where, unlike hoplites, native contingents were already available. Finally, there were rowers for fleets in the Aegean, which were hired mainly from the islands and Ionia.

A final complication is that states like Sparta regulated the supply of mercenaries from surrounding territory (D.S. 14.44.2 and 58.1) and effectively leveraged them as an extension of their foreign policy, for instance coordinating the activity of the Cyreans with the Spartan navy (X. *HG* 3.1.1, D.S. 14.19, X. *An.*1.4.2–3). Nevertheless, ancient authors, including Xenophon, possess a largely unified, if reductive, vision of the contemporary mercenary. First, despite their frequent role as an extension of state foreign policy, ancient authors tend to caricature all mercenaries as destabilising free agents 'who, whenever someone gives them a greater wage, will serve with them against us' (Isoc. 8.44); there also never seems to have been a shortage of supply for well-funded employers.[15] Second, despite their different areas of specialisation and origin, ancient writers grouped mercenaries together by virtue of the unique degree of professionalisation that their paid fulltime service allowed, often obscuring whether hoplites or auxiliaries are meant in individual passages. Thus Aristotle juxtaposes the superior experience, equipment and training of the mercenary with the citizen soldier (*EN* 116b.10–20): 'they fight as if trained athletes against amateurs' although 'they are the first to flee, whereas citizen forces die holding their place.' It is precisely this environment of a professionalised force that otherwise lacks any natural ties or developed

[14] Lee (2004); Trundle (2004) 104–17 and 159–63; Roy (2004) 286–7; Nussbaum (1959) 16–29.

[15] Trundle (2004) 104.

sense of shared purpose, which, I will argue, Xenophon consistently portrays as placing a premium on the leader's ability to inspire unity and obedience.

Model Generals and Technical Innovation

Suggesting a direct connection between the mercenary warfare of the fourth century and Xenophon's ideal of the selfless commander is complicated by what one must admit, with Cawkwell, is the highly conventional nature of many of this paradigm's core elements. Greek literature, after all, effectively begins with Achilles criticising Agamemnon as a bad leader for not setting an example of superior or even equal effort (Hom. *Il.* 1.225–31).[16] Similarly, Cicero's description from three centuries after Xenophon of what a typical candidate for office with a military record should hope that his men have to say about his command makes clear the uncontroversial character of Xenophon's model (*Mur.* 38):

> He nursed me back to health when I was injured, he provided me with plunder; when this man was general we captured the camp, we joined battle; this man never imposed more labour on a soldier than he undertook himself, he was not only brave but also fortunate.

At the same time, an emphasis on cultivating the good will (εὔνοια) of followers was a staple of fourth-century thought about relations between a hegemon and its allies, particularly in Isocrates.[17] These ideas, in turn, map comfortably onto Xenophon's applications of his leadership theory to the realm of interstate relations.[18] Nevertheless,

[16] Cf. Anderson (1974) 124, who compares Xenophon's leadership advice at *An.* 3.1.36–7 to Sarpedon's at Hom. *Il.* 12.307–30.

[17] de Romilly (1977) 63–9. Gray (2000) 146–51 traces similarities between the political thought of the two authors without speculating about crosspollination or a common origin in the teachings of Socrates.

[18] Lendon (2006), who sees Xenophon's political theory as systematising Greek conventional wisdom.

Xenophon's leadership theory is, in military contexts, frequently paired with a pronounced interest in technically innovative war-making, which quite often involves what the author highlights as novel uses of mercenaries. This repeated association suggests that the former may have been, in his mind, a particularly effective catalyst for the latter.

The intersection of Xenophon's interests in model leaders and the growing importance of mercenary warfare can best be seen in the *Hellenica*. Although there is a frustrating scarcity in this work of direct authorial commentary or generalising reflection, most of the author's few remarks work to focus the audience's attention on instances of model leadership that appear in contexts devoid of larger political-military significance.[19] The most explicit and programmatic example occurs when the author defends including his loving description of the heartfelt farewell that the soldiers of the Spartan *nauarch* Teleutias spontaneously provide him at the end of his rather routine tour (5.1.4). Xenophon admits that the event seems trivial in political-military terms, but claims it is important to consider 'what exactly it was that Teleutias had done to dispose the men he commanded to act in such a way,' foregrounding his didactic interest in voluntary obedience. Such interventions, as Vivienne Gray well argues, train the reader to detect important lessons about benevolent leadership even in low-key contexts (cf. *Smp.* 1.1), justifying thereby the many similar digressions throughout the work, even when these lack explicit signposting.[20]

Less remarked upon are Xenophon's fewer but equally significant historiographical summations that direct the reader's focus to technical innovations in combat. As with the Teleutias apologia, these serve to bring attention to his

[19] Pownall (2004) 76–82; Tuplin (1993) 36–41; Rahn (1971).

[20] Gray (2003), especially 112–14, who agrees correctly with Tuplin against Pownall and Rahn (see previous note) that this does not represent a new moralising focus in historiography so much as a self-consciously broader and more nuanced appreciation for what elements of history can prove useful for political-military didaxis.

commentary on such issues throughout the *Hellenica*, for example in describing the decisively deeper Theban left at Leuctra (6.4.12).[21] In addition to novel tactics, much of Xenophon's coverage in this area focuses on leaders who create and deploy specialised contingents of mercenaries. The most important example serves as the introduction to two successful peltast campaigns during the Corinthian War helmed by the Athenian Iphicrates, which culminate with his mercenaries defeating a regiment of previously unassailable Spartan hoplites at Lechaeum (4.4.14):

> The large armies of each ceased, and sending garrisons instead, one side's to Corinth and the other's to Sicyon, the cities were guarding their walls. However, each side, possessing mercenaries, waged war vigorously through these.

The passage and the episodes it introduces are perhaps the *locus classicus* for tracing the growing use of hired peltasts from sporadic but important appearances in the Peloponnesian War to a mainstay of Greek warfare in the fourth century.[22] Similarly, Xenophon notes that a turning point for the Spartan king Agesilaus in his Asian campaign is the recruitment of a mercenary cavalry to match the superior horse of the satrap Pharnabazus (3.4.15). Xenophon himself in the *Anabasis* likewise creates slinger and cavalry units to combat native analogues (3.3.16–20)

[21] For Xenophon's recurrent focus on strategic acumen and clever stratagems, see Breitenbach (1950) 57–60 and 88–101; Wood (1964) 47–9.

[22] See the commentary of Crawford and Whitehead (1983) 489–90. The watershed significance of Iphicrates' peltast victory at Lechaeum is axiomatic in the ancient sources (Plu. *Ages.* 22; D. 4.24), perhaps even leading Diodorus (15.44.3) and Nepos (*Iph.* 11.1.3–4) to misunderstand it as the point when peltasts supposedly replaced hoplites entirely; see Best (1969) 102–10. Xenophon's unmarked transition from discussing mercenaries in general to Iphicrates' peltasts in particular demonstrates well the degree to which ancient authors thought of different types of hired soldiers as representing a single phenomenon.

and proves highly astute in exploiting preexisting peltasts (see below).

All three of these figures—Iphicrates, Agesilaus and Xenophon—are held up elsewhere in Xenophon's historiography as prime examples of model leaders who inspire the willing devotion of their soldiers and match their efforts on the battlefield. That all of them are also singled out for the successful incorporation of novel and specialised mercenary units suggests a close association between the cultivation of willing obedience and the ability to exploit the battlefield potential of such auxiliaries.[23] Nevertheless, it is not yet clear whether the two factors are complementary tools available to the Xenophontic commander or directly interrelated elements. In either case, however, the importance that Xenophon attaches to a model leader's capacity to exploit new forms of combat suggests a strong contemporary dimension in this figure's formulation, rather than a slavish traditional moralising.[24]

Model Generals and Professionalisation

The Cyreans, of course, not only contained specialised mercenary contingents formed by Xenophon, but were also themselves already an army made up entirely of mercenaries. Such forces, as noted, became a staple of mainland, Persian-sphere and Sicilian warfare in the fourth century, representing a transitional stage in Greece between the dominance of citizen militias and that of the professional armies of Philip II and his successors. Although Xenophon is largely unconcerned with the activities of such armies outside of the mainland apart from the Cyreans, he nevertheless displays a keen awareness of the disruptive

[23] In a similar vein, Xenophon notes how Thrasybulus, another model commander, exploits the high ground of Munychia so as to allow his light-armed troops to effectively neutralise the enemy's superior number of hoplites (*HG* 2.4.10–19, esp. 12 and 15–16).

[24] There is a nice parallel in the contrast between the apparently traditionalising content of Xenophon's works and the innovative generic forms in which they appear.

power of this military novelty in his depiction of the Thessalian strongman Jason of Pherae. Jason is a complex figure in the *Hellenica*, appearing as both a model general to his men and a distrusted potential tyrant to his Greek neighbours (6.4.32).[25] On the eve of his assassination in 370, Xenophon deems him 'the greatest man of his age' due to an unparalleled military strength based on a combination of allies and, especially, mercenaries 'thoroughly trained to be the best possible' (6.4.28).

The *Hellenica* contains a long digression on Jason, in which Polydamas of Pharsalus describes to the Spartan assembly the nature of his hired force and the existential threat that it presents to both the rest of Thessaly and, in the medium term, Greece itself. The centrepiece of Polydamas' speech is his retelling of a recent conversation with Jason, in which the latter extolled the virtues of his mercenaries (6.1.5):

> You know that I possess around six thousand mercenaries, against which, as I see it, no polis would be able easily to do battle. For even if from somewhere else no smaller a number of men might set out, the armies from poleis contain those already advanced in years and no longer at their peak. Moreover, a very few in each polis train their bodies (*σωμασκοῦσι*), while in my company no one earns a wage who is not capable of working to a degree equal to me.

Polydamas goes on to describe how Jason inspires his men to put up with his demanding training routine, drawing attention to a host of devices associated throughout the Xenophontic corpus with model leadership and its cultivation of enthusiastic obedience (6.1.6 and 15): Jason drills his men incessantly; he incentivises physical excellence by conspicuously rewarding outstanding effort with higher pay and other honours so that 'they have all learned that

[25] On Xenophon's ambivalent presentation of Jason, see Pownall (2004) 99–103 and in this volume; Tuplin (1993) 171–6; Gray (1989) 163–5.

from toils are also born the finer things'; his complete self-control prevents him from making careless mistakes; and, just as Xenophon recommends in the *Hipparchicus*, Jason not only displays superior strategic foresight, but also can best his men in physical performance in order to both earn his superior position in their eyes and create solidarity with them.[26]

Such moves are hallmarks of Xenophon's various model commanders, recommended across his works as, for example, in the programmatic dialogue between Cyrus the Great and his father about generalship. Here, both embrace setting prizes for the soldiers in contests over their various military skills as a way of keeping the army 'especially well trained (*μάλιστ' … εὖ ἀσκεῖσθαι*) in each' so that the commander can 'make use of men who are prepared, whenever he might need them' (*Cyr.* 1.6.18). But in the *Hellenica*, Jason's arsenal of leadership practices are associated particularly with mercenary environments and exercised most frequently by those commanders shown as adept in exploiting specialised mercenary contingents. Thus, on being ordered home from Asia to fight in Greece, Agesilaus offers prizes to the *lochāgoi* able to raise the best quality companies of hoplites, archers and peltasts to accompany him (4.2.5). Xenophon provides Teleutias with a speech to his men, in which he details the leadership qualities that had so endeared them to him, especially his commitment to set an example of hard work that is always clearly linked to a specific longer-term benefit (5.1.15).[27] These men, rowers in the Spartan fleet, are of course mercenaries, as were increasingly the majority of rowers in the Athenian navy, a type of service that had in any case always been tied to quasi-mercenary specialised training and remuneration.[28] Accordingly, in a long digression on a

[26] On Jason as a model Xenophontic general, see Breitenbach (1950) 60, 62, 73, 75–6; cf. Pownall (2004) 100–1.

[27] For Xenophon's remarks at 5.1.4 as pointing forwards proleptically to this sequence, see Gray (2007) 344–7; Tuplin (1993) 82; Pownall (2004) 79 and 81.

[28] Hunt (2007) 136–7 and 141; Trundle (2004) 40.

later naval command of Iphicrates (6.2.27–32), Xenophon carefully details and explicitly praises (6.2.32 and 39) the rigorous training programme that the commander institutes for his rowers, including the use of prizes to build their efficiency and speed (6.2.28). Iphicrates thereby insures men 'trained (ἠσκηκότες) and knowledgeable about all things relating to naval warfare' (6.2.30).

Jason's form of leadership is thus not different in kind because he commands mercenaries. Instead, Xenophon emphasises the unique level of professionalism that mercenary forces can achieve, but he also stresses a correspondingly elevated degree to which success in such a context depends on the commander's ability to inspire willing obedience. Willing obedience within a mercenary army has, in fact, a twofold importance. Explicitly, it is the necessary precondition for unlocking the professional skill that can make mercenary forces qualitatively superior on the battlefield. Implicitly, the commander's benevolence, in large part because of the results that this delivers, is the only glue holding the mercenaries together, since its members are otherwise free agents without an obligation or incentive to fight, unlike a citizen militia. Agesilaus, for instance, marching back to Greece with his Asian-Greek mercenaries, feels compelled to lie to them about the outcome of the battle of Cnidus, aware that these troops are only fair-weather companions (*HG* 4.3.13). Similarly, in the *Anabasis*, the harsh mercenary commander Clearchus has trouble holding on to men, since, unless they are serving with him under orders from their polis, there is nothing to stop his soldiers from abandoning him for any number of alternative employers (2.6.12–13). Xenophon portrays this same problem as preoccupying naval commanders, who know that a better or steadier wage on the other side can easily peel off their rowers (*HG* 1.5.4–7), hence Iphicrates' stratagem of hiring out his rowers as farm labourers when no lucrative naval operations are available to finance their employment (6.2.37; cf. 2.1.1). In Weberian terms, Jason's

authority is characterised as charismatic by necessity, since it has no institutional foundation.[29]

The Xenophon of the *Anabasis* displays a similar appreciation for the distinctive professionalism of the Cyreans upon their arrival on the Greek fringe of the Black Sea's southern coast, 'observing the many hoplites of the Greeks, and observing the many peltasts and archers and slingers and horsemen, and that these were already especially capable on account of constant practice (*τριβήν*)' (5.6.15).[30] It is a professionalism, moreover, which the author has been careful to show his younger self building up through a Jason-like programme of setting a personal example of selflessness and superior effort (3.4.44–8, 4.4.11–12; cf. 3.1.37), demonstrating exceptional strategic skill (3.3.16–18, discussed above; 4.8.9–12; cf. 3.1.36), recognising the value of fostering competitions for martial excellence (4.7.12, 4.8.27; cf. 4.1.27–8), and conspicuously rewarding valour (4.3.29, the retrospective 5.8.25; cf. 7.8.11).[31] At the same time, the last three books of the *Anabasis* dramatise the difficulty in keeping such a force united and the outsize role played by a charismatic general in doing so, creating a negative complement to the portrait of Jason that again foregrounds the indispensability of willing obedience.

Willing Obedience and the Problem of Unity in *Anabasis* 5–7

The arrival of the Cyreans at Trapezus (4.8.22), the first of the Greek poleis along the Black Sea, marks a new phase, in which the army's focus shifts from the goal of simple survival to the procurement of a lucrative reward for each

[29] Weber (1994) [1919].

[30] Although the Cyreans' professionalism is a product of their long experience in the *katabasis* from Cunaxa, Cyrus already had insisted on recruiting distinguished men (1.1.6), allowing him to dispense with training; see Roy (2004) 270–1.

[31] Anderson (1974) 123–33.

soldier's homecoming (6.1.17–18; cf. 5.6.30 and 6.6.38).[32] This, in fact, represents a return to the original objective of the mercenaries, which had been sidelined by more existential concerns after the death of the younger Cyrus. If a less desperate situation, it is nevertheless a more complex one, where the generals of the Cyreans and the various contingents that they head have available multiple and mutually exclusive paths to achieving separately their common ambition.[33] Much of the action consequently revolves around Xenophon's struggle to maintain the army's unity as, he argues, the most effective means to achieving its purpose: not merely the immediate acquisition of wealth, but the possibility of possessing it safely.[34] In this environment the lessons of Xenophontic leadership continue to appear. However, there is a new emphasis on the commander cultivating the army's loyalty through conspicuous displays of his selflessness to insure both the leader's position and the leverage of a united army in securing benefits. It is therefore in this most characteristically mercenary of environments—in the sense that the Cyreans, like Jason's men, can again act as largely

[32] Dillery (1995) 77–81. Xenophon seems to project the desire of the officer class to return to the mainland with a substantial reward onto the Cyreans as a whole, most of whom were content with the more modest outcome of finding steady employment serving in or around the Greek world; see Roy (2004) 280–8. Still, the potential for realising either possibility upon reaching the Black Sea represents a significant shift in circumstances.

[33] Waterfield (2006) 160–1: 'Their arrival at the sea was meant to change the focus of the army. Their worst dangers seemed to be past; there was no longer the unrelenting psychological pressure on each man of fearing imminent death. They expected to be safe, and as a result unity no longer seemed as essential as before.'

[34] In this way Xenophon fulfils the Xenophontic leader's primary function of securing *εὐδαιμονία*: a maximum degree, given present circumstances, of sustainable flourishing for himself and his subordinates as defined by their mutual goals; see Gray (2011) 11–15. The able generalship that Xenophon displays on the march to the Black Sea is therefore only one element in meeting the larger challenge of successful mercenary command, namely monetary reward and a safe return.

free agents—that Xenophon dramatises himself most fully embodying and exploiting the distinctive core of his leadership model. It is an environment, moreover, where Xenophon's model is put under tremendous strain, but in which he depicts it emerging from these challenges as the only plausible path to success.

A recurrent motif in the closing books is the threat of faction.[35] In four separate episodes, Xenophon's long-term plans are undermined by a rival's disastrous appeal to shorter-term gains that threaten to undercut the Cyreans' collective strength. Through invoking his record of benevolent foresight or further displays of it in action, Xenophon manages on each occasion to reunite a willing army under his leadership in a manner that better secures its survival and its capacity to exact lucrative booty.[36]

Almost programmatic is the first episode set at Cotyora and involving Neon, the lieutenant left in charge of the Spartan contingent while Chirisophus—effectively the senior partner to Xenophon in leading the Cyreans to the Black Sea (4.6.3)—is away negotiating with the *nauarch* Anaxibius (5.7). Attempting to bolster his authority, Neon incites a mob against Xenophon with the rumour that he and several other generals are secretly planning to settle the army along the river Phasis rather than return to Greece. As the army begins breaking up into smaller groups ready to take matters into their own hands (5.7.2), Xenophon heads off its disintegration by quickly calling an assembly. He there refutes Neon's charge on the grounds of its impracticability, before lecturing the soldiers on the danger of factionalism and the breakdown of order it entails. Memorably, Xenophon pictures this process as a rabies-like frenzy (5.7.26: λύττα) that threatens to undercut the force's collective leverage in exacting concessions from those who

[35] Flower (2012) 198–201.

[36] In a similar manner, Flower (2012) 141 highlights how the last three books are organised around a repeated narrative pattern of an accusation against Xenophon followed by his lengthy and successful apologia, which together serve to focus attention on the quality of his leadership.

can aid or harm its progress.[37] Xenophon then submits to a public review of his leadership (5.8), which allows him the chance to emphasise the disinterested nature of his actions as a general, inspiring spontaneous affirmations from the ranks that represent the reestablishment of trust.[38]

Afterwards, when the army decides at Sinope to elect a single overarching general to bolster its effectiveness in collecting booty (6.1.17–18), Xenophon sidesteps a potential *stasis* (6.1.29) between himself and the supporters of Chirisophus by deferring publicly and without reservation to the latter. Defending his decision, Xenophon points out that all paths out of the Black Sea are controlled by Spartans. Thus cultivating their goodwill will prove critical, which appointing the Spartan as leader could achieve, whereas selecting him, an Athenian, would doubtless provoke mistrust (6.1.26–8). His speech serves to placate his own followers, refocus the assembly on the importance of prudent collective action, and bolster his reputation as a disinterested leader in the assembly, even if it involves the concession of battlefield deference to Chirisophus. There is, again, an emphasis on both the practical benefits of consensus and the effectiveness of appeals to it as a rhetorical strategy for winning willing support.[39] Indeed, as regards the latter, the support for Xenophon's candidacy actually grows after his speech (6.1.30).

Xenophon's exploitation of rhetorical theatre before a sovereign assembly and the metaphor of *stasis* play into the frequent modern interpretation of the Cyreans as a sort of

[37] Xenophon's speeches have already touched on this theme, if more briefly, at 3.1.38, 2.29; 5.6.32.

[38] Rood (2004) 324: 'The positive qualities of his leadership (his maintenance of discipline and morale, for instance) are not left to be inferred from the narrative, but are presented as such in a speech, and acknowledged by his internal audience.' Cf. especially 5.8.12, where Xenophon's apologia for beating an insubordinate soldier is depicted as not only gaining acceptance, but also resulting in the assembly spontaneously crying out that he should have thrashed the man even more than he had.

[39] Rood (2004) 326.

quasi-polis.[40] Doubtless, the highly political dimension of Xenophon's experience and success as a general helped suggest the universal scope of his leadership ideas. But the Cyreans are not a polis, as Xenophon's fantastic failure to found a new community with them on the Black Sea makes clear (5.6.17–19; cf. 5.6.36–7.2; 6.4.1–7 and 14). Instead, their concern is not the protection of a territory and its resources, but the effective appropriation of these from that of others with a view towards an eventual reintegration into their own home communities (6.4.8). Simon Hornblower has also drawn attention to the fact that the Cyreans' deliberative assemblies are only the most developed example of what is a recurrent feature in depictions of Greek armies, particularly those that involve coalitions.[41] The latter, I will argue below, are another favourite area for Xenophon to explore model leadership. The political dimension of Xenophon's leadership and its prioritisation of winning willing obedience, therefore, develop in the *Anabasis*—and thus, I would argue, historically—within a specifically military context. Moreover, it is one that is heightened due to the prevalence of centrifugal forces affecting the Cyreans once they reach the Black Sea. Before this assembly, meetings are less common, and it is only now, when the means and ends of the army as both parts and whole are no longer straightforward, that the problem of unity and the negotiation of it in assemblies become frequent.[42]

Despite the move towards greater unity at Sinope, the most serious and prolonged division within the army occurs shortly afterwards at Heracleia, when the Achaean general Lycon persuades the Arcadian and Achaean hoplites to break off as a separate force (6.2). Lycon, complaining of the army's shortage of provisions and revenues, persuades the assembly to send him into Heracleia in order to extort money by threatening it, which results only in the

[40] Nussbaum (1967) and, with modifications, Dalby (1992).

[41] Hornblower (2004).

[42] Lee (2007) 9–11, who offers a penetrating critique of the Cyreans as a polis.

inhabitants shutting their gates and market to the Cyreans. Chirisophus and Xenophon, characteristically taking a longer-term view, had opposed the move on the grounds that alienating a friendly Greek community would prove unwise (6.2.6). Attempting to save both face and influence, Lycon accuses Chirisophus and Xenophon of sabotaging his embassy. He then appeals to the numerical superiority of the Arcadians and Achaeans—combined, they form more than half the Cyreans (6.2.10 and 16)—to argue that they should take orders from no one except their own generals, who, moreover, are willing to set out immediately to find booty (6.2.11 and 17).[43] Matters deteriorate further when Neon convinces Chirisophus to detach his loyalists and seek their own deal with the Spartans, leaving Xenophon with the leftover forces.

However, the Arcadian-Achaean army quickly runs into trouble while pillaging the nearby Bithynian Thracians. It is left to Xenophon to convince his men to go to their rescue, which he does by arguing that the dire straits of the Arcadian-Achaeans demonstrate that it is only as a united force that any may hope to escape Bithynia (6.3.12–18). Xenophon's pragmatic generosity towards the Arcadians and Achaeans produces the desired effect, leading to a warm reunion at Calpe Harbour where the two sides 'welcome each other as brothers' (6.3.24) and join an expedition under Xenophon to bury the Arcadian-Achaean dead (6.4.9). Chirisophus' forces re-join the army for the latter, having failed to make contact with the Spartan authorities and lost their general to disease. Moreover, at a subsequent assembly influential Achaean *lochāgoi* and older Arcadians initiate a measure to return to the status quo and punish with death any future suggestions of division (6.4.10–11).

The message of the scene is clear: not only has Lycon been discredited, but also the Arcadians and Achaeans

[43] For the number of Arcadians (greater) and Achaeans (lesser) in the Cyreans, see Roy (1967) 308–9. For the centrality of Arcadians in Classical mercenary armies, see X. *HG* 7.1.23; Hermippus fr. 63 (Kassel-Austin); Roy (2004) 271–6; Trundle (2004) 53–4 and 58–9.

themselves recognise the superior strategy helmed by Xenophon, to which they commit eagerly.[44] At the same time, the sequence as a whole emphasises the degree to which ethnic loyalties represent a unique challenge for the mercenary commander, which he can best overcome through displays of conspicuous benevolence.[45] It also combines this contextually conditioned strategy with an equally mercenary-appropriate focus on the advantages of specialised contingents: the author is careful to make clear in this episode that the Cyreans' united strength is not a question of numbers alone, but also of combining different types of forces. Thus the Arcadian-Achaean army, made up only of hoplites, is too slow to prevent the Thracian peltasts and cavalry from escaping and reforming to harass them effectively with sorties (6.3.4 and 7).[46] Meanwhile, Xenophon's rescue depends on deploying his own cavalry and peltasts at night to set fires quickly over a great distance in order to simulate a larger army, thereby scaring off the Thracians (6.3.19).

The closing chapters of the *Anabasis* find Xenophon once again using his record of selfless leadership to head off a

[44] For this narrative strategy of the validating internal audience, see the note on 5.8 above.

[45] Ethnic identity proves powerful enough that even Arcadians and Achaeans serving in the contingents of Xenophon and Chirisophus abandon them (6.2.12). Lee (2004) 67–71 downplays the strength of ethnic loyalties among the Cyreans, but even he admits that 'open ethnic faction occurred late in the expedition, at a point when the soldiers faced little external threat, had plenty of time on their hands, and were disposed to question their existing leadership'. Disunity thus becomes an issue as the Cyreans' circumstances come more closely to approximate those of the stereotypical mercenaries of Aristotle and Isocrates (see above). Such divisions had already plagued coalition forces of the fifth century, memorably before the battle of Lade, when the other Ionians rebelled against the demanding training regime of the Phocaean general Dionysius (Hdt. 6.12), arguing that the small number of ships supplied by his polis for the allied navy meant he was not entitled to give orders to everyone else.

[46] This is the exact same strategy that Xenophon depicts Iphicrates as employing in his famous peltast victory at Lechaeum over an unaccompanied regiment of Spartan hoplites (*HG* 4.5.13 and 15).

destabilising challenge to his authority and furthering the army's interests by doing so. Ambassadors from the Spartan general Thibron arrive to recruit the Cyreans for Sparta's incipient war in Ionia against the satrap Tissaphernes (7.6.1), encountering an army that has spent the winter fighting for the Thracian warlord Seuthes, who now refuses to pay them. Xenophon had hired the army out to Seuthes after the Spartan harmost of Byzantium, Aristarchus, conspired with the satrap Pharnabazus to keep the Cyreans out of Asia Minor and made them only a vague offer of employment helping Sparta in its war in Thrace (7.1–2). The offer had involved travelling to the Chersonese, where the army could be easily isolated (7.2.15), and followed Aristarchus' enslavement of four hundred stray Cyreans found lingering in Byzantium (7.2.6) and an unsuccessful attempt to have Xenophon arrested (7.2.14). Seuthes, by contrast, offered ready pay on set terms in the face of impending winter and only withdrew his generosity as the Cyreans' initial victories attracted enough new followers that the hired army became dispensable (7.5.15–16).

Seuthes brings the ambassadors before the army without introducing them to Xenophon or the other generals, hoping thereby that the impoverished soldiers will immediately accept the Spartan offer and depart, abandoning their leadership before it can organise them to exact back pay (7.6.2–3). Not only does the army accept Sparta's terms, but revanchist Arcadian elements also take the opportunity to suggest that Xenophon be stoned for turning down the earlier occasion to serve with Sparta in Thrace and involving them instead with the duplicitous Seuthes (7.6.8–10). Xenophon then makes yet another long speech (7.6.11–38), in which he puts the decision to follow Seuthes in context, emphasises that he has suffered as much as if not more than the army, and reminds them how they had once recognised him as both a father and a *euergetēs* (7.6.38). Whereas Seuthes had told the Spartan ambassadors that Xenophon was a *φιλοστρατιώτης* ('friend to the soldier') and 'because of this things are worse for him' (7.6.4), his ability to demonstrate this very quality wins him the respect

of not only the army but also the Spartans.[47] Emphasising the point through ring composition, the author has the ambassadors repeat Seuthes' remark about Xenophon as *φιλοστρατιώτης* to the army, recasting it as a compliment (7.6.39).[48] Xenophon is then able to use his influence with the Spartans to have them keep the Cyreans in Thrace and send him as an ambassador to Seuthes until he simultaneously shames and threatens him into providing the owed balance in booty (7.7.13–56).

This final sequence is interesting for providing three key insights into Xenophon's leadership strategy. The first is the emphasis on *philia* as a defining element of Xenophon's generalship that inspires loyalty beyond simple strategic effectiveness, which nicely dovetails with the author's insistence on reciprocal *philia* between leader and followers in the *Hipparchicus* passage. Second, when Xenophon convinces the Spartans to allow the Cyreans to remain in Thrace until he can cajole Seuthes into paying them, Xenophon hints at the pragmatic as opposed to altruistic motives for doing so (7.7.14): 'I think … that you might recover for the army the pay that is due if you should say … that the troops say that they would follow you enthusiastically in case they should obtain it.'[49] The Cyreans were already happy to abandon Seuthes for Thibron, but Xenophon points to this extra benevolence as a shrewd investment in fostering a positive connection between army and employers in the long term, even if it involves a temporary delay.

This squares nicely with the third important insight, from Xenophon's subsequent speech to Seuthes, where he reproaches the warlord's broken word not just on moral grounds, but also as a pragmatic miscalculation in his role as a leader. The danger of duplicity is that it undermines the foundations of trust that allow a leader to persuade

[47] This is the culminating virtue of the 'Socratic king' in Buzzetti (2014) 259–94.

[48] Flower (2012) 163–4, who notes the use of another validating internal audience.

[49] Xenophon repeats the idea to Seuthes at 7.7.31.

followers to carry out his wishes without resort to coercion (7.7.23–4). Trust is both more economical, as coercion ties up military resources (7.7.33), and allows a leader to request help from his followers on faith, as Seuthes' initial goodwill had convinced the Cyreans to begin campaigning for him on credit (7.7.25). Moreover, a united and loyal army is critical when one is occupying hostile territory, since unwilling subjects are constantly seeking to exploit weaknesses and gain confidence from perceived divisions (7.7.29–32); an analysis as apt for the expansionist Seuthes as for the troubles of the Arcadian-Achaean army in Bithynia.

Together, the climactic confrontations of Xenophon with the Cyreans and Seuthes make a point about leadership very similar to what Xenophon puts into the mouth of Cyrus the Great when describing the king's strategy to make the conquered warrior-aristocrats of his empire friends rather than subjects: Cyrus confidently claims that 'by making men wealthy and doing them favours, I get from them loyalty and friendship (*philia*), and from these I reap security' (*Cyr.* 8.2.22; cf. *Mem.* 1.2.10). The leader's kindness, then, is ultimately a form of self-interested insurance,[50] which if it cannot avoid dissension entirely can at least mitigate it effectively.[51] It is a lesson with wide application, as Xenophon's speech to Seuthes demonstrates, but one that the *Anabasis* suggests the author first and most fully developed in the context of his experiences keeping the Cyreans together along the Black Sea. Moreover, this was an environment that simultaneously placed a premium on the technical aspects of professionalisation and specialisation, which are the complementary prescriptive focus of

[50] See Wood (1964) 60–5; Gray (2011) 315–17; Hirsch (1985) 14–38, who reads the *Anabasis* as a study in the negative individual and social consequences of false conduct. The pragmatic benefits of benevolence over coercion are also a major theme in Simonides' advice in the *Hiero*.

[51] Xenophon is everywhere clear that virtuous leadership raises the chances of an enterprise's success, although it does not guarantee them, explicitly in the case of Epaminondas (*HG* 7.5.8–10), and implicitly with Jason and Cyrus the Younger (but cf. Flower in this volume).

Xenophon's leadership thought to his insistence on willing obedience.

From Cyrus the Younger to Xenophon: Generalship as Xenia

If the experience of the Cyreans along the Black Sea was an ideal environment for Xenophon to develop his ideas about the importance of fostering *philia* between leader and follower, the practice had already been modelled for him by the younger Cyrus. In his eulogy of the expedition's original leader, the author draws attention to how Cyrus cultivated mutually beneficial partnerships with both his Persian and Greek allies through conspicuous generosity in order to leverage combined strength (1.9.20–1):

> As for friends (*philoi*), however many he made and knew to be good-willed (*εὔνους*) and judged to be capable partners for whatever he happened to wish to accomplish, it is agreed by all that he was in fact the greatest at looking after them. And in fact this same thing for the sake of which he himself considered that there was need of friends, namely so that he might have partners—he himself also undertook to be the greatest partner to his friends in whatever he perceived that each desired.

Friendship here is, of course, the term of art for the ties binding the prince's network of Persian and Greek aristocrats, the latter containing those influential *xenoi*—Clearchus, Aristippus, Proxenus, Sophaenetus and Socrates the Achaean—who could recruit large numbers of quality mercenaries for his expedition (1.1.9–11).[52] It is this elite circle on which Cyrus explicitly concentrates his generosity, 'for the *stratēgoi* and *lochāgoi*, who sailed to him for the sake of money, came to know that to obey Cyrus in a noble

[52] Trundle (2004) 159–63. On xenia generally, see Mitchell (1997) and Herman (1987).

manner produced more gain than their wage each month' (1.9.17). The equivalence between *philia* and xenia comes across most clearly when the author explains his own reasons for being among the Cyreans: although Xenophon was not himself a *stratēgos* or *lochāgos*, Proxenus, 'who was an old *xenos* of his,' had promised great benefit by making him a *philos* of Cyrus (3.4.1). Only when the army discovers the true purpose of its expedition and is on the point of mutiny does Cyrus turn his attention to the rank and file, bribing them to continue on with promises of pay and a half (1.3.21) and, later, a bonus upon victory (1.5.11–13).[53]

Xenophon's innovation, therefore, seems to have been to expand the scope of aristocratic friendship from the army's leadership to its entire complement, adapting the logic of enlightened self-interest to the general-soldier relationship that he had observed operate in the euergetism between a dominant aristocrat and his network.[54] Thus, like Jason, but unlike Cyrus, Xenophon's rhetorical self-presentation positions him as a first among equals vis-à-vis the entire soldiery. For example, during the blizzard in Western Armenia he forces himself to get up before the rest and set to making a fire, motivating his peers by example to escape succumbing to the numbing cold (4.4.11–12), just as Jason takes the lead in the exercises he demands of his hoplites. Cyrus, by contrast, builds a reputation for channelling his vast wealth to those aristocrats who are proactive in advancing his interests as a means to motivate Greeks and Persians alike to perform spontaneous services in his presence (1.4.13–17 and 1.5.7–8, respectively). He is here an observer rather than a partner. Very different is Xenophon's cultivated air of openness, allowing any

[53] Roy (2004) 277–80.

[54] Here one might detect a first—and applied—instance of Socratic universalising in Xenophon's thinking about leadership. Portraying the Cyreans as *philoi* may also be another instance of the author attempting to recast his mercenary activity for aristocratic peers as something more elevated than warrior banausia, which Azoulay (2004) 295–304 has argued is a central purpose of the *Anabasis* (cf. the poor view of the expedition at Isoc. 4.146 and 5.90).

subordinate to offer advice or opinion useful to the army (4.3.10); a quality that he shares with Teleutias (*HG* 5.1.14).[55] This creates a striking contrast not just to Cyrus, but also to the strong division between officer and soldier first seen in *Iliad* 2.212–77. Here, during an assembly, Odysseus is cheered after beating the vagabond Thersites for daring to offer advice, even though it is substantively similar to earlier remarks of Achilles. Xenophon, meanwhile, must justify at length his beating of a mule driver to an angry assembly as being punishment for his trying to murder a sick comrade (5.8.1–12).

The gulf between Xenophon and Cyrus, however, represents more than anything else the former's adaptation of the latter's model to the poorer economic condition and more egalitarian Hellenism of the independent Cyreans. Nevertheless, it was an adaptation that by accident or design proved better suited to the particular circumstances of Greek mercenary warfare. Indeed, to the degree that he can, Xenophon still positions himself as a new Cyrus to the army's surviving officer class: he directs Seuthes to re-channel any personal gifts to his *stratēgoi* and *lochāgoi* (7.5.2–4); on the way to turning the Cyreans over to Thibron he organises a lucrative pillaging raid for those *lochāgoi* and other *philoi* who had most helped him (7.8.11); and the *Anabasis* ends when Xenophon is finally enriched 'with the result that he was now able even to do kindness to another' (7.8.23). Revealingly, Xenophon portrays his ideal mercenary commander, Jason, as both a Xenophon-like hands-on leader and one whose wealth allows him to inspire martial excellence by offering Cyrus-like honours for conspicuous displays of devotion. These, however, are now targeted at the rank and file instead of only the officers (*HG* 6.1.6). Nevertheless, all three men are linked by the use of patronage to unify a potentially heterogeneous community through defining a common interest for its members that is

[55] Cf. Hermocrates of Syracuse at *HG* 1.1.30 and Cyrus the Great at *Cyr.* 7.5.46.

best achieved in concert through the leader's material and intellectual resources.

Anabasis: Apologetic or Didactic?

Any attempt to trace the evolution of Xenophon's leadership ideal from the details of his experiences in the *Anabasis* must take into account the work's clearly constructed nature or risk plunging into unsophisticated biographical criticism. In particular, the last three books, with their recurrent foregrounding of Xenophon's elaborate and successful speeches defending his conduct as general, have been seen as serving an apologetic function meant either to amplify or justify the author's role in events.[56] The persuasiveness of such readings is often influenced by the assumption that the Cyreans' period along the Black Sea represents a sordid devolution into rapine from the inspirational Panhellenic unity of the journey back from Babylonia, from which Xenophon wished to disassociate himself.[57] Without discounting such interpretations or necessarily contradicting them, there is also a case to be made for distortions resulting from the work's didactic agenda insofar as the *Anabasis* is, at least in part, a prescriptive essay on leadership.[58]

From extant parallels to episodes narrated in the *Hellenica*, one can observe Xenophon's tendency to simplify historical events in order to create more effective and elegant didactic schemata. Xenophon's account of the Thirty at Athens, for instance, is organised into two sections tracing, respectively, the consolidation of the regime's power (2.3) and its overthrow by Thrasybulus' democratic insurgency (2.4). The hinge between the two is the trial and execution of Theramenes, whose defence speech casts him

[56] Azoulay (2004), incisively critiqued by Flower (2012) 157–9; Cawkwell (2004) 59–67; Erbse (2010) [1966]; Dürrbach (1893) 343–86.

[57] Dillery (1995) 59–98.

[58] So Rood (2004) 322–5; cf. Flower (2012) 28–30, Waterfield (2006) 143–50.

as a moderate member of the Thirty seeking to curb the despotic abuses that he claims will forfeit the regime's legitimacy and create opportunities for successful rebellion (2.3.35–49, especially 37–44). The juxtaposition of Theramenes' dubiously legal execution and the immediately following start of Thrasybulus' insurgency serves to position the former's defence as a programmatic explanation for the latter's success. However, the account in the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* claims that Thrasybulus' campaigns actually preceded the execution of Theramenes (37), while Lysias provides an entirely different and less sympathetic account of Theramenes' speech (12.77).[59] The relative merits of each author as against Xenophon's account are open to debate, but the *Hellenica*'s discrepancies suspiciously align to make the narrative more amenable to a central Xenophontic leadership lesson: the need for political regimes, like effective generals, to win the willing obedience of their followers through selfless actions.[60]

On analogy, the character Xenophon in the *Anabasis* doubtless represents a simplified and more schematically elegant version of the author's leadership ideal than his historical self, as do the other model leaders in the text. One indication of this is Xenophon's emergence as a convenient synthesis of the contrasting leadership styles that he sketches out in the obituaries of his most important predecessors (*An.* 2.6): the disciplined but overly harsh Clearchus (2.6.13: 'he possessed no followers due to friendship (*φιλίᾳ*) and goodwill (*εὐνοίᾳ*)'), and the generous but indulgent Proxenus.[61] Here, as in the example from the *Hellenica*, there

[59] Krentz (1995) 132 and 140.

[60] Gray (1979) makes a similar argument about the *Hellenica*'s version of the battle of Sardis in contrast to that in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and Diodorus.

[61] Flower (2012) 166; cf. Wood (1967) 51–2. Similarly, his focus in the third obituary on Meno's obsession with quick gain ('the shortest path' of 2.6.22) and contempt for genuine friendship foreshadows the shortsighted plans from which Xenophon portrays himself as constantly rescuing the army.

is a careful juxtaposition of types, although the parallel tradition about Clearchus in Diodorus (14.12.9: 'Clearchus possessed daring and a prompt boldness') confirms that Xenophon's *modus operandi* is heightening for didactic effect rather than drastic revision.

It is reasonable to assume a kind of virtuous circle or feedback loop in Xenophon's depiction of himself as a model leader. The particular conditions of service with the Cyreans, both under Cyrus and in their journey to Pergamum, presented the author with situations in which technical specialisation and willing obedience proved particularly fruitful. These were qualities that Xenophon observed other leaders exploit, most especially individuals like Jason and Iphicrates, whose innovative mercenary forces in important ways resembled the diversified and potentially fractious Cyreans of the Black Sea journey. In depicting these leaders across a series of works that shared a universalising theory of leadership, Xenophon—whether consciously or not—emphasised the common features of each that fit into his paradigm to strengthen its apparent didactic authority. But this didactic force also depended on the perception of Xenophon himself as an authority on the style of leadership that he advocated. The congruity of his model's most distinctive features with the circumstances in which his own strongest claim to outstanding leadership emerged thus argues for the paradigm's strong biographical foundation, regardless of the undeniable narrative manipulations of the *Anabasis*. This is all the more so given the author's predilection, mentioned at the beginning, to dwell on material that was proximate to his own experiences.

Xenophontic Generalship in Non-Mercenary Contexts

Above I have tried to argue that Xenophon depicts his suasion-based leadership theory as best suited to the novel context of professionalised mercenary warfare, as one might expect given that this is where his fame as a leader was

rooted. The association is, of course, not exclusive, since the Xenophontic general also appears in plenty of non-mercenary environments and the author, as seen, saw a universal field of application for his management precepts, suggesting a fusion of his battlefield and Socratic backgrounds. But it is worth considering the degree to which even non-mercenary model generals are concerned with cultivating willing obedience to achieve the same kind of military professionalisation most easily obtained, in the opinion of Xenophon's Jason, using a hired force.

An illuminating case study involves that quintessential device for encouraging enthusiastic and able followers: the use of contests and prizes to incentivise training. As seen, Cyrus the Great recommends these, and although hardly a mercenary general, he nevertheless becomes a monarch with a standing army composed of heterogeneous allies rather than a polis militia. They are also a centrepiece of Agesilaus' 'workshop of war' at Ephesus, a training camp set up for his Asian campaign of 395 and celebrated in an encomiastic passage featured in both the *Hellenica* and the Spartan king's eponymous biography (*HG* 3.4.16–19, *Ages.* 1.25–8). Ephesus is the rendezvous point for an extraordinary force of mainland and Asian Greeks assembled to take on a satrapal army, of which two key components were explicitly mercenary: the remnants of the Cyreans (3.4.20) and the new cavalry raised by Agesilaus (3.4.15, discussed above), the latter providing the lynchpin of the king's strategy. The integration of ethnically diverse forces, the fostering of specialised units (prizes are offered for hoplites, cavalry, peltasts and archers), the challenge of finding provisions, and the lure of pillaging lucrative enemy territory all create an environment well suited to Xenophon's mercenary-inflected leadership.[62]

[62] Further suggesting the quasi-mercenary nature of Agesilaus' force, his predecessor in Asia Minor, Dercylidas, uses plunder to raise pay for 8,000 men (3.1.28), which clearly includes a significant number of mercenaries beyond the 5,000 remaining Cyreans (D.S. 14.37.1), 300 Athenian horsemen to whom he promised μισθός (3.1.4), and the former bodyguards of Meidias that he had taken on (3.1.23). For the similar problems faced by coalition and mercenary forces, see n. 45 above.

Such contests are also a key element of the reforms that Xenophon advocates for the Athenian cavalry in *Hipparchicus*, a work concerned with recreating these auxiliaries as a quasi-professional force through a regularised training programme. In a revealing passage Xenophon discusses the salutary effect of pairing citizen and mercenary cavalry together so that the former can learn from the latter's more advanced skills (*Eq. Mag.* 9.3–4):

> But I say that the whole cavalry would be filled up to a thousand very much more quickly and much more easily for the citizens, if they should establish two hundred mercenary horsemen. For the addition of these men, it seems to me, would make the cavalry both more obedient and more competitive among its ranks in terms of bravery. And I know that even with the Spartans their cavalry began to be held in esteem after they added mercenary horsemen. And in the other poleis I everywhere observe that mercenary elements are held in esteem, for employment is conducive to great enthusiasm.

Xenophon, accordingly, seems concerned with exporting the strengths of mercenary warfare back into traditional civic forces.[63] This is true both of technical innovations, such as the exploitation of peltasts and cavalry, and management strategies that reached maturity only in the context of professionalised service, even if these draw on traditional elements dating back to Homer.

Finally, if one accepts that Xenophon's theory of leadership represents an innovative adaptation of conventional tropes to contemporary conditions of warfare, the central element of the author's supposed conservatism,

[63] Cf. 6.4.10, where Xenophon praises the professionalism of the Theban cavalry, which, like the Cyreans, has achieved this due to continuous fighting rather than a programme of formal training.

his *philolaconism*, can be read in a new light.[64] There is, of course, Xenophon's personal connection to Agesilaus and his estimation of him as a model leader. But beyond this, Xenophon's celebration of Lycurgan ideals in the *Constitution of the Spartans* in large part revolves around that society's unique organisation towards the goal of military professionalisation.[65] The Spartiates, as fulltime hoplites subject to a regular training regime, resembled in-house mercenaries with the added advantage of common citizenship much more than they did the amateur militiamen of neighbouring poleis. In the context of the fourth century, in which professional armies were becoming prevalent, Sparta's 'archaic' constitution may therefore have seemed to the author to offer—paradoxically—the best solution for dealing with a rapidly evolving present. This was a present, however, that after the author's return from Asia Minor with Agesilaus in 395 (*An.* 5.3.6) mattered for him only to the degree that it involved mainland affairs, as noted earlier. Despite his repeated interest in mercenary and mercenary-like practices within Greece, Xenophon largely ignores the true successor armies of the Cyreans: the huge Greek forces hired in the west by Dionysius (D.S. 14.44.2), and in the east by Artaxerxes (D.S. 15.41.1) and the Pharaoh Tachos (D.S. 15.92.2; but cf. X. *Ages.* 2.28–31), despite Iphicrates' command of the former and Agesilaus' of the latter.

Colorado College richard.buxton@coloradocollege.edu

[64] Tuplin (1993) 163–4 provides an excellent and nuanced assessment of Xenophon's fond but far from uncritical attitude towards Agesilaus and contemporary Sparta.

[65] Thus willing obedience and self-mastery are goals of Spartan *paideia* (2.14), and Lycurgus fosters courage through formal competitions (4.2).

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