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7

RESPONSE AND FURTHER THOUGHTS*

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1. Introduction

Xenophon and leadership. It seems a natural pairing, but why? A quick glance at the Internet shows that Xenophon is a popular author for students of leadership, both in the business world and in the military.[1] Dr Johnson well observed that Xenophon showed an interest in the 'delineation' of the commanders at the end of Book 2 of the *Anabasis* that was literally without precedent.[2] Within the ranks of professional Classicists, leadership has long been recognised as an important Xenophontine topic,[3] perhaps most articulately and influentially in the recent publication by the distinguished scholar of Xenophon, Vivienne Gray, *Xenophon's Mirror of Princes: Reading the Reflections* (2011).

* I would like to thank Richard Fernando Buxton and John Marincola for their invitation to respond to this excellent collection of papers, both at the 2014 American Philological Association meeting in Chicago and here in their final form. Let me also apologise here for my frequent references to my own work; these are tiresome, but I hope that they will be taken mostly as suggestions for further discussion and not as proofs that I am invariably correct in my interpretations of Xenophon and other matters.

[1] Thus, e.g., Holiday (2012) and Sears (2007). Note the first sentence of Holiday's piece from *Forbes*, alluding to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*: 'Forget 1-800-CEO Read. The greatest book on business and leadership was written in the 4th Century BC by a Greek about a Persian king. Yeah, that's right.'

[2] Womersley (2008) 780.

[3] See esp. Breitenbach (1950) 47–104, a section entitled 'Der gute Feldherr als Paradeigma'.

I would like to start by asking why it is so easy to think of leadership in connection with Xenophon? If 'the ideal leader'—to use the brief of the panel that this collection grew out of as it was originally posted—'is one who wins the willing obedience of his followers through displaying a selfless devotion to cultivating their material and ethical prosperity', what is it about Xenophon's writing that makes this way of thinking about human interaction such a fertile issue? Can't we do this kind of analysis also with Herodotus, or Thucydides, or even Homer? Well, obviously, we can and we do, but I would like to begin by supplying part of an answer to the question why Xenophon and leadership seem such a natural pairing, and then move on to the papers proper. I will conclude with a few thoughts of my own.

I believe that we are drawn to the issue of Xenophon and leadership because Xenophon is so explicit himself about his interest in the topic. Consider the following passage, well known, but a useful starting point nonetheless. At the beginning of his longest work, the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon writes as follows (1.1.3):

> When we thought about these things [namely how herd animals are much more cooperative than humans], we were forming the following thoughts about them: that it is easier for a human as he is constituted by nature to rule over all other living things than humans. But when we called to mind that Cyrus was a Persian who gained possession of an enormous number of men obedient to him, an enormous number of cities and an enormous number of nations, from this fact we were compelled to change our view: that ruling over men was not an impossible nor even a difficult task, so long as a person was doing this [that is, ruling] knowledgably.

Leadership is ruling over willing subjects and is an object of knowledge—an *epistēmē*. It can be learned. Evidently, to take Xenophon at his word, the realisation that *to archein* was actually a fairly graspable skill came to him when he was forced from an earlier position—that humans were in fact

ungovernable—by the example of Cyrus the Great (and think here too of that remarkable and similar passage from the *Oeconomicus*, where the Persian king is the model householder (4.4–15), to which I will return below). Indeed, in addition to the explicitness of his lessons in leadership, Xenophon can also offer a personal component to account for his acquisition of the lessons. *His* is real knowledge, tested and reformulated by a thoughtful man—or this is the impression: that he has thought long and hard about leadership and has in fact even changed his mind. Thus, similarly, the *Anabasis* can be read precisely as Xenophon's education in leadership.

So Xenophon is explicit about learning to lead and he invites us to view his own discovery of its laws. He preaches, but seemingly from experience and reflection, not in the abstract. Both of these features of Xenophon's treatment seem positively to invite our participation with him in considering the nature of leadership. And yet, not infrequently, we seem to want to make our analyses of Xenophon and leadership about something else. Why? Are we troubled by his explicitness—are his interests too obvious? Or is it shallow of us to be satisfied with Xenophon and leadership?[4]

2. The Papers

Luuk Huitink and Tim Rood focus on subordinate officers in the *Anabasis*. I think that by and large they succeed in establishing their main points: (1) Modern scholars tend to overestimate the 'granularity' of Xenophon's description of the lower or 'junior' officers of the Ten Thousand; that it is

[4] I am encouraged by the conclusions of Waterfield (2011) 150, who suggests that in the *Anabasis* Xenophon writes about leaders 'in such a way that his readers are expected to learn the theory', whereas when he imagines the Ten Thousand as a *polis*, it is a way for him 'to explain or understand the destructive power of greed on *poleis*'. That is, leadership is explicitly theorised, whereas the political aspects of the *Anabasis* are inherent in Xenophon's view of the actions of the Ten Thousand and its leadership.

not so much the 'command structure' that he is interested in showing us, rather, it is 'the relation of individual leaders and the soldiers they led'. This overestimation takes the form of seeing consistency in Xenophon's use of terms for lower-rank commanders, when in fact he seems to be fairly loose in deploying terms such as taxiarch. (2) Two terms in particular look troubling: *ὑποστράτηγος* and *ὑπολόχαγος*. They are both used only once by Xenophon in the *Anabasis* (indeed the second is a *hapax* for all Greek literature), and Huitink and Rood make a compelling case (slightly stronger for *ὑποστράτηγος*) for viewing the terms as interpolations.

Two larger points came into my mind connected to their main findings. I suspect they may well be right about the focus of Xenophon's attention in the *Anabasis*. While we do see several instances where the activities or words of subordinate officers (often Xenophon's) are privileged in the narrative, we do not see a consistent presentation of the command structure between the lead commander and the rank and file. This is an important finding and will no doubt need to be taken account of by those who are eager to see in Xenophon early evidence for the growing professionalisation and sophistication of Greek theorising about the command of armies, especially in combined arms, in the fourth century.

But I think there is also another issue that needs to be stressed. That the intermediary levels of command should receive any attention at all in the *Anabasis* is worth thinking about a little more. More typical in Xenophon, to say nothing of Herodotus and Thucydides, is for military action to be told very much either from a 'top-down', commander-centred perspective, or from a collective one.[5] Even for actions that make most sense as ones that would have been conveyed down a chain of command, perhaps an extensive one, it is the commander who performs them. Thus, at the second battle of Mantinea, it is Epaminondas who is the

[5] I have dealt with this mode of narrative discourse in a couple of places: Dillery (1995) 75 and 266 n. 70; Dillery (2001) 14, citing Connor (1984) 54–5 on 'commander narrative'; see now also Ferrario (2014) 197–8.

one who issues the command for his troops to whiten their helmets and paint their shields (*HG* 7.5.20); it is he who is credited with deploying the troops (21); he the one who leads them into battle; he who grounds the soldiers' arms (22); and crucially, it is *Epaminondas* who brings the *lochoi* up one after another into a dense formation. No mention here at all of any subordinates receiving Epaminondas' orders and then implementing them in action with their troops, which is surely what must have happened.

Or, alternatively, unit types identified by ethnics, and sometimes just the ethnics themselves, move about the battlefield or march with no commanders specified as ordering them to do so, and no sub-commanders either. Thus at the end of the same battle narrative, context tells us that cavalry and hoplites are moving about on both sides (*HG* 7.5.25), and in one area (the left wing), 'most were killed by the Athenians'. But no one, either supreme commander or sub-commander, is telling the soldiers to do these things. Now some may object that inasmuch as Epaminondas was innovative precisely in his deployment of troops at Leuctra and Mantinea, Xenophon wishes to portray him as an especially 'hands-on' commander; there is no doubt that Xenophon singles him out for special treatment before his account of Mantinea.[6] But in fact Agesilaus comes in for similar treatment at Coronea. For the most part ethnics are used both in the lead-up to that battle and the combat itself (*HG* 4.3.15–21). In a few, important moments, however, we see Agesilaus and one subordinate officer at Coronea performing specific actions: Herippidas, commander of the *xenikos lochos*, leads a charge from the phalanx of Agesilaus

[6] Note esp. *HG* 7.5.19: Epaminondas is made a member of a whole class of 'ambitious men' (*philotimoi andres*), whose training of his army is carefully observed (a favourite Xenophontine topic of course, most clearly at *HG* 3.4.16–19 = *Ages.* 1.25–8); Epaminondas' dispositions of his army before battle are 'worth paying attention to' (*HG* 7.5.21: ἄξιον αὖ κατανοῆσαι ἃ ἐποίησε—*axion* being a key term for Xenophon, most memorably at *HG* 5.1.4; Breitenbach 1950: 20–3). The characterisation of Xenophon's praise of Epaminondas for Mantinea as grudging at Cawkwell (1979) 35–6 I think mischaracterises the notice the general receives at *HG* 7.5, or at least grossly misrepresents it.

(17), and in the same section, the Argives fail to withstand the assault of 'Agesilaus and his men' (τοὺς περὶ Ἀγησίλαον) and flee towards Mt. Helicon.[7] Then, perhaps most memorably, Xenophon takes note of a courageous but also rash assault that Agesilaus himself undertook, apparently, on the basis of what Xenophon says, all by himself (19 = *Ages*. 2.12: 'he fought face-to-face with the Thebans' (ἀντιμέτωπος συνέρραξε τοῖς Θηβαίοις)), the vividness and rarity of the vocabulary occluding the participation of the troops under his direct command (cf. 4.3.15), who were presumably also there.[8] The charges of Herippidas and of Agesilaus—the latter crucially as a unit commander and not overall general—remind me of the stubborn refusal of Amompharetus before Plataea to move from his position (Hdt. 9.53ff.): independent action by a subordinate officer that has a profound consequence on the outcome of the battle, sometimes good (as at Plataea), but not infrequently bad.

All this is to say that Xenophon's focus on subordinate officers in the *Anabasis* is remarkable, whether understood as showing an interest in chain-of-command or simply because that link was the one that best showed the mutual bond of leader and led. Commander-centred narrative and identification of troops and their actions by collective terms such as 'Athenians' or 'the cavalry' work best when your focus is on explaining strategically and tactically what happens in combat and on campaign. However, something else is required when you wish to talk about cultivating loyalty: for that, at least in the *Anabasis* and occasionally elsewhere in Xenophon, a focus on the actions of the intermediate commander, or on the overall commander when functioning as a unit commander, is what is needed. Perhaps this should not come as a surprise given that the

[7] For the periphrasis οἱ περί τινα, cf. Dillery (2015) viii–ix n. 7 with bibliography.

[8] The adjective ἀντιμέτωπος is especially noteworthy and very rare; also found at *Eq. Mag.* 3.11 and (much later) Cassius Dio: see Gautier (1911) 169 sv.

Anabasis is in fact told by an intermediate, unit commander who specifically turned down the overall command.

The second point I would like to bring up in connection with the detailed study of Huitink and Rood is the problem of technical vocabulary in Xenophon. I have said that on balance I think they are right to worry about ὑποστράτηγος and ὑπολόχαγος. But the fact of those terms being *hapax legomena* does not bother so much as the conclusion one is encouraged to form on the basis of their acute contextual analysis of both cases, in particular the rhetoric of the passages in question, which seems disturbed by leaving the words in. Indeed, I think we ought to remember the implication one can draw from the judgment of Herbert Richards, who was keen to rein in excessive doubt regarding rare, indeed once-occurring terms in the minor works of Xenophon: there are often times when this author wishes to use either rare technical or poetic words, even only once, and as such '[a]ll these words, therefore, though not used by X[enophon] elsewhere, tell really rather for than against X[enophontea]n authorship'.[9]

Xenophon likes technical terms that he employs very rarely or even one time only. To think of one especially well known case from the *Hellenica*, recall that in the remarkable digression on the conspiracy of Cinadon (the whole passage being something of a one-off), we harvest from a single narrative two important descriptions of Spartan society and governance nowhere else attested in all ancient literature: 'lower-grade Spartans' (ὑπομείοσι, 3.3.6) and 'the so-called "Little Assembly"' (τὴν μικρὰν καλουμένην ἐκκλησίαν, 3.3.8).[10] Relatedly, Xenophon is also in this same section the first author to use ὅμοιοι in the technical sense of Spartan 'peers' (3.3.5).[11] As Cawkwell well observes, '[w]ithout this

[9] Richards (1907) 117.

[10] See, e.g., Gilbert (1895) 40 and n. 1 and 50 n. 2, who points out in the second case that ἐκκλησία is not a Spartan term, and that the insertion of καλουμένη suggests that Xenophon is being approximate. Cf. Andrewes (1967) 18 n. 7. See, in general, Gautier (1911) 153–5, a section entitled 'mots attestés chez Xénophon seulement'.

[11] Cf. Finley (1990) [1968] 239 n. 7.

chapter the obscurity surrounding ancient Sparta would be ten times more opaque'.[12]

The papers of Michael Flower and Frances Pownall form a logical pair and I will take them up together. I am in fundamental agreement with both, but that will surely not come as a surprise.[13] From these essays one learns that for Xenophon good leadership and piety are very much thought of as interconnected, or, in the case of impiety, it is a sure marker of bad leadership or tyranny. For me, the critical questions are two and are interrelated: how representative is Xenophon in taking this view, and is such a view a remarkable one to hold?

Taking up the second question first, it is stressed at several points in Flower's essay that *for us* the answer is essentially 'yes'. Itemising the qualities of the effective leader identified by Gray and others towards the start of his essay, Flower notes one big absence: '[o]ne essential aspect, however, is missing from this list, and in our secular age, has naturally escaped the attention of many modern scholars.' 'In today's world … no military handbook would begin with an appeal to prayer and sacrifice', such as Xenophon's *Hipparchicus* does. Modern leaders such as Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush, 'who appeal to divine guidance', excite our scepticism. Some, at least in the US, might well respond that in fact displays of religiosity by politicians seem positively required by a significant block of the electorate; that both Houses of Congress still employ chaplains; and that public devotion is to some extent expected of presidents (I am thinking, for instance, of the considerable national interest in the choice of denomination by Eisenhower in 1952).[14] Flower, though, anticipates these potential objections at the end of his discussion. Yes, President Bush could assert that he was inspired 'by God to invade Iraq in

[12] Cawkwell (1979) 161 n. Cf. Andrewes (1967) 1 on our reliance on Xenophon for information about Sparta.

[13] Dillery (1995) 182–94 and 252.

[14] E.g. *New York Times* Dec. 19, 1952, a story entitled 'Eisenhowers Select Church'.

order to bring peace to the Middle East', but Greek leaders according to Xenophon are never given such detailed and prescriptive instructions; 'for most Greeks the answer [from the divine] is "advice" rather than a "directive"'. This strikes me as basically correct.

But was Xenophon unusual in seeing piety, and in particular a reliance on divination, as central to leadership? Here the answer is essentially 'no'. Leaders who make decisions on the basis of divine communication go back to Homer, and are very much in evidence in Herodotus and Thucydides. What is perhaps unusual in Xenophon from a Greek perspective is the theorising he does in explaining the efficacy of relying on information from the gods.[15] An omniscient and omnipotent divine that is also scrupulous about reciprocity is one worth consulting and being solicitous towards. Now Greeks had long felt that divination, especially by those in positions of authority, was a good thing; but it is Xenophon who explains clearly why that was the case, and in so doing precisely is innovative. Much of this theorising is found in connection with Cambyses in the *Cyropaedia* and Socrates in the *Memorabilia*. In the case of the latter, I might suggest a modification to Flower (and also Tamiolaki, who makes the identical point in her paper). Flower asserts that 'Socrates is in many ways the perfect leader'. This observation comes as something of a shock I think. I don't believe Xenophon thought of Socrates as a leader *himself*, though he reports on a Socrates who did have a lot to say *about* leadership. Remember that this is the man who, according to Plato, was proud to claim in his defence speech that he had been an obedient soldier, following the orders of those chosen to command him (ἄρχειν μου) and not leaving his post 'at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium' (Pl. *Ap.* 28e). To be sure, in Xenophon's conception, Socrates is a model for his followers (e.g. *Mem.* 1.2.1ff.); but does that make him *a leader*? That I am not so sure about.

[15] Cf. Dillery (1995) 182–94.

While impious leaders form an important subsection of Flower's essay, they are the main focus of Pownall's treatment. Her discussion fairly sparkles with wonderful observations *en passant*, especially in connection with the morality of the figures so acutely observed by Xenophon. Thus she is right to stress that Xenophon is careful to present villains who are, for all that, still 'fully fleshed-out characters', not cardboard cut-outs. Or, conversely, that men who are otherwise presented as ideal leaders can also be 'not wholly virtuous', such as Jason of Pherae. I am not sure if in the end we can style these men as morally ambiguous—and if I have read Pownall correctly, I do not in fact think she is urging this view. Hence, a portrait like that of Jason makes what Xenophon writes seem all the more remarkable. Are we to conclude that a fundamentally bad man, capable of plundering arguably the most important sacred site of the Greeks, could also be a good leader? It is a puzzle—and one to which I will return below.

If I have reservations about Pownall's contribution it is in connection with her assertions that Xenophon appropriated the idea of the evil tyrant specifically from Athenian democratic ideology, and also that '[i]t is only with Xenophon that impiety becomes one of the standard *topoi* of tyranny'. As to the first matter, as Pownall herself notes, the word *tyrannis* first occurs in Archilochus, where it is used of a Lydian king, Gyges (F 19.3 West^2);[16] and let's not forget many other cases from around the Greek world, e.g., Alcaeus F 348.3 LP; or Theognis 823 and 39–40, where the word 'tyrant' does not occur, but the man who will correct Megara's problems clearly is one and is finally classed with 'monarchs' at line 52; or Xenophanes F 3.2, in a context where Lydia is also important. And so forth. Pownall in particular believes that 'the stereotypical fate of a tyrant is to be assassinated, all the more so to an Athenian audience'. But I, for one, am hard pressed to think of many Greek tyrants who were assassinated *sensu stricto*, though perhaps

[16] Cf. Forrest (1982) 256: 'Archilochus may not want a tyranny for himself, but he knows what a tyranny is and he can envisage wanting it.'

we need to be careful about what we mean by 'assassination': targeted killing by a close associate or someone posing as one, by a fellow citizen, or perhaps by an agent of one's enemy sent precisely for that purpose? Candaules was clearly assassinated, but was he a tyrant? Polycrates of Samos was clearly a tyrant, but was he assassinated? Myrsilus was clearly a tyrant too, but while we are famously invited by Alcaeus to celebrate his death (F 332), we don't know how it was engineered, or even if it was violent.[17] We must be on guard not to fall into the error so well observed by Thucydides of the Athenians (1.20.2, 6.54.2): making a man a tyrant when he was not one. Examples could be multiplied to suggest that assassination is not the typical end of the Greek tyrant, though some manifestly were assassinated; these cases are often found in areas on the fringe of the Greek world and involve leaders who were at least nominally kings, though they perhaps also ruled tyrannically (thus, e.g., Jason and the other dynastic murders in his family;[18] Mania; Philip II). It is maybe more accurate to say that tyrants are routinely thought of as *fearing assassination*, thus providing us with innumerable stories both about their fateful request for a bodyguard while still ordinary citizens, as well as those moralising tales about how tyrants are in fact pitiable creatures who have to live every day in fear of their own shadow (see esp. X. *Hier.* 6.4, Pl. *R.* 579b). Indeed, sometimes the two topics are even connected, with the tyrant so fearful of his fellow citizens that he must keep a foreign bodyguard (e.g. Pl. *R.* 567e, X. *Hier.* 5.3).[19]

Speaking of *topoi* leads me to my second point. Pownall's commendable advocacy of Xenophon's literary originality may have led her astray in asserting that he was the pioneer of the theme that impiety is an identifying marker of the bad leader—to use her words, that '[i]t is only with Xenophon that impiety becomes one of the standard *topoi* of

[17] Cf. Andrewes (1956) 93.

[18] Cf. Dillery (1995) 174–5.

[19] Cf. Gray (2007) 215, from an appendix entitled '*Topoi* of tyranny'.

tyranny'. Surely the famous lines from the second stasimon of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* are predicated on the idea that impiety leads to tyranny: '*hybris* breeds the tyrant' (S. *OT* 873ff.);[20] in commenting on these lines, Jebb adduces A. *A.* 757ff., the 'impious act' (*τὸ δυσσεβὲς … ἔργον*) begets like ones afterwards, in anticipation of the arrival of the tyrannical Agamemnon.[21] Even if we confine ourselves to prose antecedents, Herodotus produces multiple examples, but perhaps none more useful for me in this context than Otanes in the Constitutional Debate. He tells his fellow conspirators that they know the lengths to which the *hybris* of both Cambyses and the magus went (Hdt. 3.80.2); he asserts that the tyrannical man, glutted with *hybris*, performs 'impious' (*ἀτάσθαλα*) acts (4).[22] Unless I have misread Herodotus here, it seems to me that Otanes is most definitely connecting impiety with the tyrant. Moreover, if Jacoby is correct in characterising the Debate as essentially a theoretical or generalised one, that would make Otanes' remarks illustrative of views that were very likely widely held or at least acknowledged.[23] However, I appreciate Pownall's larger point that emerges from her discussion, and with which I have a great deal of sympathy: Xenophon seems like he is making a new point about the connection between tyranny and impiety because he is so consistently more explicit about it than other authors—with I think the exception of Plato.

Richard Fernando Buxton's essay and that of Benjamin Keim also form a logical pair—at least in my mind. Both papers are very good at pointing out novel features of Xenophon's understanding of leadership and how it works. Specifically, both are interested in how Xenophon redeploys elite ways of negotiating aristocratic interrelation

[20] Cf. Kamerbeek (1967) 175: '… *ὕβρις* means disregard for [divine laws]. Such a disregard leads to tyranny.'

[21] Jebb (1893) 118.

[22] 'Impious' is Powell's translation of *ἀτάσθαλος*: Powell (1938) 50 s.v.

[23] Jacoby (1913) 358.

to the larger world of the relations between the commander and his men. For Keim the key concept is honour; he claims that Xenophon asserts that all classes of people are motivated by honour, even slaves. I would argue that Xenophon does not make so sweeping a claim; rather, that the human desire for honour is in fact limited to only *some* people, and furthermore that the notion is still fundamentally an aristocratic one for Xenophon. Buxton's view is broader and takes up more issues; he asserts that Xenophon very deliberately appropriated the idea of aristocratic *philia* and refashioned it into a major component of his theory of successful leadership.

I will begin with Buxton. The central argument of his essay, it seems to me, emerges in the section of his paper entitled 'From Cyrus the Younger to Xenophon: Generalship as Xenia'. Buxton argues that the social reach of Xenophon's (and Jason of Pherae's) bonds of friendship and solidarity-building activity (i.e. taking the lead in strenuous public action and exercise) go much further than Cyrus'. To be sure, Cyrus also aims to build loyalty and willing obedience by undertaking actions that narrow the societal distance between him and his subordinates, so that they become in essence his 'friends', but a close look at who these people are reveals that they are themselves elites. By contrast, according to Buxton, Xenophon very visibly undertakes actions that put him on a par with the common rank-and-file; for Buxton, Cyrus is an 'observer' of these activities, whereas Xenophon is a 'partner'. I think that Buxton is on to something here. It is I think true that good, which is to say, successful leaders in Xenophon often seem to be conspicuous performing the same sort of actions that even the lowest members of their armies perform. But is this *xenia*?

As seems frequently the case with Xenophon, matters are not as straightforward when it comes to illustrating what seem to be episodes of good leadership. Consider the all-important crossing of the Euphrates by Cyrus and his army (*An.* 1.4.11ff.). Cyrus informs his Greek generals of his real intention to march to Babylon against the Great King, and

they are instructed to report the plan to their soldiers; upon being told Cyrus' real intentions, the troops refuse to go further without pay. At this point Menon sees an opportunity: he encourages his men to be the first Greek contingent to cross the river, for either they will be the first to follow the prince, or, if the Greek army decides not to follow Cyrus, they will be seen at least to have been obedient where others were not; thus Cyrus will feel gratitude towards them (*χάριν εἴσεται*) in the first scenario, and will be their *philos* in the second (*An.* 1.4.15).[24] When the soldiers cross, Cyrus is pleased, and he sends gifts to Menon, and then crosses the Euphrates himself in spectacular, indeed miraculous fashion (as with Alexander and the Pamphylian Sea, the waters of the Euphrates seem to retire before Cyrus),[25] with his entire army then following his example.

There is a lot to unpack here. In some details Buxton's analysis is confirmed: Cyrus is indeed an observer, and most crucially he delegates, he does not lead directly himself—at least initially. He tells the Greek generals to relay his plans to their men; and he rewards Menon with gifts for engineering the crossing of the Euphrates, thereby acknowledging and reinforcing the bond of obligation he has with his unit commander who has managed to bring off this crucial stage of the inland march against Artaxerxes. Cyrus is generous, but typically he is generous only with his subordinate officers, not the ordinary mercenary soldier.[26] But there are also complications to Buxton's view. Menon describes for his men a reciprocal relationship that they will have directly with Cyrus of *charis* or *philia*. Real authority seems to rest with Menon's men who clearly have to be persuaded to take the action Menon has in mind. If anyone is actually showing initiative in this passage, it seems to be

[24] I am duty bound to report that the text in the second case is problematic: the MSS read *φίλοι*, emended by Bisschop to *φίλου*, which is followed by Gemoll and Hude and Peters.

[25] Cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1.26.2 and Callisthenes *FGrH* 124 F 31 = Schol T. Eust. Hom. *Il.* 13.29; Dillery (2001) 91 n. 49.

[26] Cf. Roy (2004) 278.

Menon's unit who perform the exemplary action, and then Cyrus himself. Indeed, it is Cyrus who shows the sort of personal initiative and participation that Buxton seems to want to deny him; while he is an observer in the passage, he is also a partner—he fords the Euphrates, and the army follows. And quite apart from these questions, there looms the even larger issue of Menon as leader. It is abundantly clear from elsewhere in the *Anabasis* that Xenophon thought Menon to be a bad man,[27] a point he makes particularly obvious in his obituary of him (indeed, see Buxton's n. 57). We learn there, in relation to matters concerning friendship and being a leader, that Menon 'wished to be a *philos* to the very powerful in order that doing wrong he not be paying the penalty' (*An.* 2.6.21); that he 'contrived the making of his soldiers obedient by participating with them in acting unjustly' (27). While it is clear that self-interest motivates Menon in the crossing of the Euphrates (and he alone is rewarded by Cyrus), and further that he persuades his men to be self-interested as well (1.4.15: as obedient men Cyrus will make them sentries (easy service) and will even make some unit commanders—*lochagoi*),[28] there is nothing in the actual crossing to suggest that Menon and his contingent have acted wrongly[29]—unless perhaps it is that they acted independently of the rest of the army. In Xenophon, as we have already seen, you can evidently be a bad man but a good leader. The obituary of Menon suggests that he manipulated leadership to advance his own interests: 'eager to command in order to be taking more, eager to be honoured in order to be profiting more' (ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ ἄρχειν, ὅπως πλείω λαμβάνοι, ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ τιμᾶσθαι, ἵνα πλείω κερδαίνοι, 2.6.21).[30] This strikes me as a perversion of successful leadership.

[27] Cf. Lane Fox (2004a) 198–9, who discusses Menon's sexual deviance as observed by Xenophon.

[28] Cf. Roy (2004) 287.

[29] Cf. Lee (2007) 49.

[30] The rhetorical structuring of these clauses should be noted: not just the anaphora of ἐπιθυμῶν and πλείω, but also parison (seven

Another intriguing line of inquiry that Buxton follows has to do with the problems that attend command of mercenary armies made up of different Greek ethnicities. He argues quite forcefully that the innovative structures of command that Xenophon seems to promote across his corpus and especially in the *Anabasis* form a response to the challenges faced by a leader of armies that are made up of mercenaries drawn from different Greek states and regions, rather than comprised of citizen armies. The development of personal bonds of *philia* and *charis* between the unit commander and his men is an appealing suggestion for this world, where other ways of achieving unity of purpose and respect for chains of command may not have been available. While Buxton nowhere states this explicitly, he implies that commanders of 'traditional' Greek armies relied on regional and ethnic loyalty to keep their forces together, as well as social status. This must be true—one does not have to look very hard to find evidence that shared identity keeps units together in the Classical Greek world, and that commanders were often higher status persons. Yet, I am not so sure that the problems faced by multi-ethnic mercenary armies were particularly new in the period of Xenophon, hence necessitating the innovative response imagined by Buxton.

Consider the grumbling against Dionysius of Phocaea, which Buxton briefly mentions, that took place in the Ionian fleet before the battle of Lade as reported by Herodotus (6.12.3):

> Having offended which one of the gods do we endure these evils? We who in our madness took leave of our senses continue to entrust ourselves to a Phocaean braggart (ἀνδρὶ Φωκαιέι ἀλαζόνι) who provides three ships!

syllables in each, with the exception of eight in ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ τιμᾶσθαι), as well as homoioteleuton and homoioptoton. Cf. Bigalke (1933) 2.

Whatever else is going on in this passage (and there is a lot: proof of Ionian softness and insufficient appreciation of what freedom means), that an ethnic slur is being directed toward Dionysius by the sailors of the Ionian fleet who are not Phocaean seems to me to be unmistakable. Even if the story is a later fabrication, intended to explain the later Samian defection to the Persians, the imagined scenario relies on the basic assumption that there would have been grumbling at an upstart outsider who provided many fewer ships than others.[31] And other potential fissures in Greek armies may also have been felt, if not along ethnic lines, then, dare I say, more along those of social standing or class. Not only Thersites, whom Buxton does acknowledge, but also, e.g., Archilochus F 114 West and Tyrtaeus F 12.1–9 West: men who possess the outward trappings of physical and hence social excellence are nonetheless counted as worthless next to the man who possesses stalwart courage, though he is not so endowed with aristocratic virtues.[32] And in general it is arresting, if also disturbing, that Kendrick Pritchett can look at the *Anabasis* and arrive at the following conclusion: '[l]imiting our research to the *Anabasis* of Xenophon, we gain the impression that discipline was very lax *even in a mercenary army*' (my emphasis).[33] Pritchett seems to assume that mercenary armies would have been more disciplined than the citizen-based army, and thus presumably whatever aspects of command that fostered discipline in mercenary armies were normally even more effective than those in citizen armies—not less so and thus in need of augmentation.

Keim's essay argues a similar case. The core of his paper treats the transactional or reciprocal nature of leadership in the specific form of honour and honouring. In a sense, for

[31] Murray (1988) 488; cf. Burn (1962) 212–13.

[32] Cf. van Wees (2004) 80 on Archilochus F 114: '[a] poem by Archilochus also came down on the side of the ordinary soldier in preferring a commander with the plain looks of a commoner to one with the well-groomed appearance of an aristocrat.' Also e.g. Dover (1963) 196; Forrest (1982) 255–6.

[33] Pritchett (1974) 244.

Keim, honour is the coin of successful leadership; it is the currency whereby the bonds of willing obedience and enlightened leadership are forged. In arguably the most important section of the paper, Keim analyses the 'Psychology of Honour' in Xenophon. He latches on to a most important passage in the *Hiero* (7.3), in which Simonides observes that out of all the classes of animals (*zōa*), humans are distinguished by their desire for honour (*timē*); he goes on to state that '*philotimia* is neither found in irrational beasts nor in all humans; in whomever there is rooted a love of honour and praise', these are not only the most different from beasts, 'they are considered men and no longer only humans'. In other words, not even all humans possess a craving for honour; only some do. Keim acknowledges that this is the claim in the *Hiero*, and yet he goes on to argue that 'evidence from elsewhere throughout [Xenophon's] corpus indicates that all humans may fall under honour's sway'; notably women even, as well as some slaves. I think it is difficult to follow Keim in his analysis on this point. Rather than contradicting himself, which is what Keim must ultimately argue, I believe that what we must understand as Xenophon's claim is (1) that humans do uniquely possess the desire for honour, but (2) that not all humans have this desire, and (3) that this desire can be felt by all classes of humans: men, women, slaves, etc. In her commentary on the *Hiero* passage, Gray compares *Oec.* 13.6–12: '… creatures have none [that is, *philotimia*], nor all human beings either, but … it does occur among some slaves.'[34] This is I think correct. Just because *some* women and *some* slaves possess the desire for honour, that does not make it a universal human quality, especially when it is remembered that Xenophon has stated the opposite to be the case. Thus at *Oec.* 14.8–9 some of Ischomachus' slaves show a propensity towards *pleonexia*, whereas others are honest and are treated like 'free men', even 'gentlemen' (*kaloi te kagathoi*) by Ischomachus (more on this passage below)! *Philotimia* is obviously an elastic term in Greek and

[34] Gray (2007) 133 ad loc.

Xenophon is no exception.[35] In many passages, it seems as though it is a thoroughly positive concept for him; but at other points, it is at least neutral, if not negative. Thus, as will be seen below, when I turn to a consideration of Tamiolaki's paper, Critias and Alcibiades could be characterised as 'most ambitious in nature' (*φύσει φιλοτιμοτάτω*, *Mem.* 1.2.14); Tamiolaki's discussion is very nuanced, but, at a minimum, this passage shows that *philotimia* is not invariably a quality associated with positive human achievement in Xenophon's eyes. *Philotimia* can even be 'foolish', and citizens engage in activities clearly related to it that are ruinous to their private fortunes (*Oec.* 1.22 and 2.5–8 respectively).[36]

I do, however, believe that Keim makes a strong case for seeing honour as a, if not the, major incentive for generating willing obedience and hence successful leadership. Keim is at his most persuasive when he is able to break down in detail how best the leader should use honour in the management of his army. In 'Honouring Successfully', he itemises five 'lessons' that Xenophon offers that the good leader should follow. In 'What to Do with Honours', Keim isolates three 'broad categories' related to the distribution of honours: rewards for 'completing specific tasks, acquiring necessary skills, and honing appropriate dispositions'. These are wonderful analyses, for they show *in detail* how successful leadership worked in Xenophon's eyes. If I have criticisms in connection with these two sections, they stem precisely from some of the details. Thus, it is sometimes difficult for me always to see the connection between the five 'lessons' and honour specifically; and in relation to the 'broad categories', there seems to me to be a problem with the term 'skills'—'abilities' I think is closer to what Xenophon had in mind—'skills' seeming to me to be too narrow. Also, on my reading, there seems to be significant overlap between developing 'appropriate

[35] Dillery (2015) 284 n. 249 for bibliography.

[36] I am indebted to Sarah Herbert for my awareness of these passages.

dispositions' and acquiring the necessary skills. Keim's precision in advancing his views, however, is noteworthy.

Melina Tamiolaki's essay, 'Athenian Leaders in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*', is productively specific and treats material that is not always found in discussions of Xenophon and leadership. On both counts she is to be congratulated. While she takes up matters that are handled elsewhere in this volume, she manages to discuss the issue of Xenophon and leadership in ways that yield important results, in fact ones that will provide me with a way to wrap things up in my conclusion.

As I indicated above in my treatment of Flower's paper, I do not think that Xenophon saw Socrates as a leader. Thus I have difficulty accepting Tamiolaki's claim early on in her discussion, where she observes that 'Socrates himself is portrayed as a sort of ideal leader: he does not actively engage in politics, but he constantly gives advice to his fellow-citizens, politicians or not, about several political issues'. As I argued above, I think there is a big difference between giving advice and having things to say *about leadership*, and *being a leader oneself*. I do not think that Xenophon elides the distinction. Indeed, if we were to press the issue in relation to, say, the *Hiero* for example, we would have to argue that Simonides and Hiero were both tyrants or quasi-tyrants, since they both hold forth on the question of tyranny, but this is obviously not true. With Keim, Tamiolaki, too, takes note of Xenophon's characterisations of *philotimia*, and cites the same passages he does that demonstrate his belief that desiring honour is a uniquely human quality.

The core of Tamiolaki's project, however, is devoted to two pairs of leaders treated by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*: Critias and Alcibiades, and Pericles and Themistocles. Somewhat provocatively she asks us to see the first pair as not so negatively drawn by Xenophon as is commonly thought, and the second as more critical than one might have expected. As regards the first pair, Tamiolaki argues that Xenophon approached the leaders with two different

purposes in mind: a moral analysis that is subtly positive and attributes their respective falls to their prideful natures, and a political one that admits that Critias was a 'lawful tyrant' (!), while the even-more positively presented Alcibiades becomes a mouthpiece for Xenophon's own views. There is much to admire in her discussion of Xenophon's view of Critias and Alcibiades, but there are points when I sense her argumentation becomes a little tendentious. For example, in discussing the analogy of an Alcibiades who neglects himself being like an athlete who gains an easy victory and then neglects his training (*Mem.* 1.2.24), she argues 'that Alcibiades ceased to be excellent (and therefore risked losing his superiority over others), not necessarily that he became bad'. Tamiolaki astutely notes that precisely the same point is made by Socrates in connection with the Athenians at *Mem.* 3.5.13.

While there is an internal logic to what she says, and furthermore Socrates, after being prompted by the Younger Pericles, does offer ways that the Athenians could reclaim their earlier excellence, even fairly quickly (3.5.14, 18), we need to bear two points in mind. First, there is the historical and dramatic contexts to consider of the two passages in question: the dramatic date of *Mem.* 3.5 is some time after the battle of Delion in 424 (cf. *Mem.* 3.5.4) and before Pericles the Younger's death in 406 (post Arginusae); the date of the actual composition of the chapter is put late in Xenophon's career, almost certainly after Leuctra in 371, probably in the decade 360–50.[37] Socrates envisions real solutions to Athens' decline in military standing.[38] But when

[37] The circumstances that so trouble Pericles, namely the rise of Boeotian, and specifically Theban power, are truer of a Greek world that is post-Leuctra than the last quarter of the fifth century: Delatte (1933) 57–8 and 73; Dorion (2011) 292 n. 3 and 294–5 n. 7.

[38] Cf. Dillery (2002) 469–70 and n. 44. Indeed, at one point (*Mem.* 3.5.18) Socrates even observes 'no no, Pericles, don't think the wickedness of the Athenians so utterly past remedy. Don't you see what good discipline they maintain in their fleets, how well they obey the umpires in athletic contests, how they take orders from the chorus trainers as readily as any?' To this Pericles responds (19): 'Ah yes, and it's strange that such groups submit themselves to their masters, and yet

we turn to the passage regarding Alcibiades from *Mem.* 1.2, Xenophon offers us no possibility of a corresponding recuperation of Alcibiades' character and abilities. Indeed, since Xenophon's larger point there is that Socrates was not responsible for the awful things that both Critias and Alcibiades did in their careers, it is hard to see how any subsequent rehabilitation of Alcibiades would have been possible in Xenophon's line of thinking. What was done was done, and Alcibiades was probably long dead when Xenophon wrote up *Mem.* 1.2. Athens at the mid-point of the Fourth Century was a very different matter: Xenophon held out hope that the city, perhaps linked in some way with Sparta, might regain its political ascendance.[39] Thus *Mem.* 1.2 and 3.5, while both featuring the image of the successful but complacent athlete, are in the end not really comparable. The second point to keep in mind is the larger issue of Xenophon's views on the potential for good not realised. While complete consistency on the matter is probably not to be found in Xenophon, he does tend to view entities (states, armies, choruses, households) that have the potential for good which has not been realised (due typically to disorder) not as situations that can be made right, but as ones that are to be regretted.[40] Thus, as Socrates says in the *Memorabilia* to one of his interlocutors (2.6.17):

> It confuses you [literally: disorders your thinking—*ταράττει*] that you often see men who both do good and keep away from shameful things, instead of being

the infantry and cavalry, who are supposed to be the pick of the citizens for good character (*καλοκἀγαθίᾳ*), are the most insubordinate' (translation from the Marchant and Henderson Loeb). Cf. Wankel (1961) 107–8. I am reminded of the point I was making above in connection with Archilochus and Tyrtaeus: the lower status combatants turn out to be better than the higher status ones.

[39] Dillery (1993) and (1995) 241–54.

[40] A very large question, but cf. Dillery (1995) 31–5.

> friends, fight with one another and treat each other more cruelly than men of no worth.[41]

For Tamiolaki, Critias and the Thirty are lawful essentially because Xenophon presents them as a board lawfully empowered as *nomothetai*. With all due respect for her wonderfully close readings, this point seems a little like special pleading. All our main sources for the history of the Thirty (D.S. 14.3.7; Just. 5.8.8; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 35.1; X. *HG* 2.3.11) make clear that they were lawfully appointed. What is interesting is that Xenophon alone does not make the 'reestablishment' of the *patrios politeia* one of the conditions of the Peace imposed by Sparta, which led naturally to the appointment of a board to review the laws.[42] Instead of being imposed on the Athenians by the Spartans, in Xenophon the Thirty are chosen by the Athenian people to write down their 'ancestral laws' (*HG* 2.3.2 and 11), arguably making their later violent regime an internally motivated action for which the Athenians are themselves to some extent ultimately responsible.[43] But the larger point to register is that all our ancient sources are uniform in characterising the Thirty as an initially legal board of *nomothetai* that devolved into a band of bloodthirsty murderers. Xenophon was no exception. To minimise the tyrannical status of Critias and the Thirty risks obscuring the larger message Xenophon is trying to lodge with his portrait of them, especially in the *Hellenica*.[44]

In my view, Tamiolaki is more successful with her treatment of Pericles and Themistocles. As with Buxton, she sees the development of *philia* as the hallmark of successful leadership. Contrasting it with 'Periclean *eros*', she claims that both Themistocles and Pericles are most successful when they are shown encouraging political *philia* in their

[41] Dillery (1995) 249.

[42] This is all admirably laid out in Rhodes' table at Rhodes (1981) 416–17.

[43] Dillery (1995) 147.

[44] Cf. Dillery (1995) 158.

fellow citizens towards themselves, when 'the leader (and not the polis) becomes the object of love'. There is great merit to this observation, and I will return to it in my own conclusion. Here, though, I would like to examine Tamiolaki's further assertion that this fostering of *philia* in one's followers is a specifically *Persian* concept in Xenophon's way of thinking. While it is certainly true that two Persians happen to display particularly clearly the quality of fostering devotion in their followers (Cyrus the Great and Cyrus the Younger), I believe that Tamiolaki errs in thinking that this makes the ability specifically Persian in Xenophon's eyes. Tamiolaki writes:

> Xenophon's most compelling paradigms of leaders who acquired political *philia* are the two Persian Kings, Cyrus the Great and Cyrus the Younger, who are described as the most beloved leaders (*Cyr.* 1.1.3, 1.6.24, 5.1.24; *An.* 1.9.28).

I should first point out that, while he certainly craved the title, Cyrus the Younger was never king of Persia. However, even Xenophon himself could connect the Cyruses (famously at *An.* 1.9.1), and occasionally even appears capable of conflating them (notoriously at *Oec.* 4.18),[45] thus making the younger Cyrus into a quasi-king—indeed at *An.* 1.9.1 he is even called 'the most *kingly* after Cyrus the Great' (μετὰ Κῦρον τὸν ἀρχαῖον … βασιλικώτατος). Secondly, and more importantly, it is not clear to me why these paradigms and not others are the 'most compelling paradigms of leaders who acquired political *philia*', though compelling they surely are. To cite a very conspicuous counterexample, consider the much-discussed scene at the start of Book 5 of the *Hellenica*, Teleutias' departure from his men (5.1.3–4):

> [Hierax] took over the navy, and Teleutias sailed homeward in a most blessed fashion (μακαριώτατα δή). For when he was going down to the sea setting out for

[45] Cf. Pelletier (1944); Pomeroy (1994) 248–50 ad loc. with bibliography.

> home, there was no one of his soldiers who did not take him by the right hand; one crowned him, another put a fillet on him, and those who came late nevertheless threw their crowns into the water as he was pulling out, heaping abundant prayers on him. Now I know that in these matters I treat no memorable (*ἀξιόλογον*) expense or danger or stratagem. But by god the following thing does seem to me worthwhile for a man to take to heart (*ἐννοεῖν*): by doing what on earth (*τί ποτε ποιῶν*) did Teleutias so dispose his men? For this achievement of a man is surely worth much more attention (*τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη … ἀξιολογώτατον ἀνδρὸς ἔργον*) than a lot of things—money or dangers.

If we are to take Xenophon at his word and respect the rhetorical staging of this passage, one would have to say that Teleutias was one of the most compelling examples of a commander who inspired devotion in his men. Indeed, given that the passage is conceived of, and written in, a Herodotean and Thucydidean register while simultaneously challenging the primacy of their criteria for historiographic importance,[46] it could be (and indeed has been) reasonably argued that Xenophon offered no more 'higher profile' example of leadership than Teleutias.[47]

[46] At a detailed level, there are linguistic signals indicating both Thucydidean and Herodotean imitation, as well as locutions that are idiomatically Xenophontine. Thus, in the case of *μακαριώτατα δή*, Denniston observes that δή '[w]ith superlative adjectives and adverbs … is a favourite use of Thucydides', while noting other authors as well, including our passage (Denniston (1954) 207). On *ἤδη* + *ἀξιολογώτατον*, compare Hdt. 2.148.1, *τὸν* [sc. *λαβύρινθον*] *ἐγὼ ἤδη εἶδον λόγου μέζω*, a similarly programmatic and polemical passage, and consult Kühner and Gerth (1966) 2.2.122, connecting *HG* 5.1.4 and Hdt. 2.148. Of course *ἔργον* as a historical object is both Herodotean and Thucydidean. On the other hand, Breitenbach (1950) 20 notes that *τί ποτε ποιῶν* is a 'Xenophontine question-form'; indeed, see, e.g., *Mem.* 1.1.1. Also, *ἐννοεῖν* is a favourite term of his as well, especially in important, programmatic passages: see Dillery (forthcoming).

[47] Breitenbach (1950) 19–23; Rahn (1971) 499–501.

Tamiolaki asserts at one point that 'Athenian democratic leaders are viewed positively only *to the extent* that they can be potentially assimilated with the Persian monarchs … or *to the extent* that they possess Socratic qualities' (emphasis original). I am in much sympathy with this view, though I think it needs to be worded slightly differently. It is one thing to say that Persian rulers and Socrates seem invariably to embody Xenophontine virtues of leadership, but quite another to say that those virtues are necessarily identified with those individuals to the exclusion of others—that excellent leadership is at its root either uniquely Persian or Socratic. For one thing, there are morally suspect and unsuccessful Persian commanders in Xenophon. I think it is more accurate to say that Xenophon developed a set of virtues regarding leadership that are embodied to a significant, indeed remarkable degree by Socrates and men who happen to be Persian—though with the caveat that Socrates was not really a leader, and not all Persian commanders were also morally good and militarily successful (Tissaphernes in the *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* especially comes to mind as a counterexample). And having said that, I think that Tamiolaki has usefully forced a revisiting of Xenophon's views: why is it the case that successful leaders in Xenophon seem so very 'Persian' and 'Socratic'?

3. Conclusions

For Gray, at the centre of Xenophon's 'leadership theory' is 'the acquisition of "willing obedience" to secure success' for both leaders and the led.[48] Thus at the conclusion of *Xenophon's Mirror of Princes* (2011) she observes (373):

> Ideally [Xenophon's] leaders treat their followers as friends, and followers make the choice of free men to follow because of the leader's knowledge of how to develop their talents and achieve their success as a

[48] See esp. Gray (2011) 15–18.

> group, while retaining the right of choosing not to follow if their expectations are not met.

This is a very important insight and a good way into what I want to discuss here in my concluding remarks. Gray is quite right, but I think we need also to see Xenophon's ideal as fundamentally paradoxical. For followers to be followers they really shouldn't have a choice—no army could really function if its rank and file had the choice not to follow. Cyrus the Great's endorsement of 'geometric' as opposed to 'arithmetic' equality (*Cyr.* 2.2.20; cf. *Oec.* 13.11) should be seen in precisely this context: while Cyrus can claim that 'even to the worst it will seem that the good should have the larger share' (Trans. Miller), I think F. D. Harvey was correct: 'Democratic arithmetical proportion', where no distinctions are made between citizens, 'is … a concept introduced by anti-democrats'; no real Greek citizen of a democracy would have ever proposed such a thing; it was a straw man that permitted the veneer of societal equality to obscure societal difference and vertical hierarchies.[49] In several different places Xenophon shows himself to have been a proponent of aristocratic, geometric equality, which is really no equality at all. Thus it is I think vitally important that we recognise that at a basic level Xenophon's theorising about what makes good leaders is utopian (that's 'ou'-topian); if anything like what he describes in the *Anabasis* really happened, Xenophon must have known this was true. We ought not be too distressed though; many have noted the utopian streak in Xenophon's thinking more generally.[50]

To me, a productive way to proceed is to look for points of similarity throughout Xenophon's corpus on ideal leadership and ask whether we can see a unified theory emerge and what constitutes it. Obviously, it is impossible for me to be comprehensive here. Rather, I will try to

[49] Harvey (1965) 128–9. See also Dodds (1959) 339–40 on Pl. *Grg.* 508a6; Gera (1993) 163–4. Cf. Gray (2011) 284–5.

[50] Cf. Dillery (1995) 41–58 with bibliography; see also Wankel (1961) 55–8.

gather some of the strings of thought in my foregoing analyses of the papers in this volume and venture a few of my own no doubt hasty and half-baked observations.

First, let me be clear: Gray I think is right in identifying the generation of willing obedience as an essential element of successful leadership in Xenophon's mind. But I wish to return to Tamiolaki's line of inquiry and the odd predicament that we find ourselves in when reading Xenophon's thoughts on the matter—namely that his models for this quality seem often to be either Persian or Socratic, or in fact both. One passage that especially comes to mind is *Oec.* 4.4. In answer to Critobulus' question about what sort of *technai* ought Athenian citizens practice, other than the banausic (which have been ruled out), we learn the following:

> We shall not be ashamed, shall we, said Socrates (ἆρα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ αἰσχυνθῶμεν), to imitate the king of the Persians? For they say that that man, believing farming and the military *techne* to be among the best and most necessary occupations, pays especially close attention to both.

Regarding the phrase ἆρα … μή, Denniston explains that '[i]t does not necessarily imply the expectation of a negative reply, but merely that the suggestion made is difficult of acceptance … It expresses, in fact, an antinomy, a dilemma, an impasse of thought, or, at the least, a certain hesitancy'.[51] I take it, then, that the phrasing of Socrates' question suggests that there was in fact something odd, even counter-intuitive, about finding in the Persian king a model of the best occupations to follow, and that Socrates was pre-empting that reaction. Similarly, later in the same dialogue, Ischomachus explains to Socrates that in educating his slaves he employs the law codes of Draco and Solon, but

[51] Denniston (1954) 47; see also p. 48 and n. 1. My translation is based on Goodwin (1890) 99 § 287, referred to by Denniston. The subjunctive αἰσχυνθῶμεν is explained as deliberative. But note the difficulties of Richards (1907) 3–4.

also 'royal laws' (*basilikoi nomoi*)—that is, the laws of the Persian king (*Oec.* 14.6–7). Ischomachus makes use of all of these because, while Athenian law is good insofar as there are punishments for wrongdoers (ἐκεῖνοι … οἱ νόμοι … εἰσὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν), the king's laws both punish wrong behaviour and also benefit the just (ὠφελοῦσι τοὺς δικαίους). What is more, we learn that, with his slaves thus 'incentivised' by the positive inducement of Persian royal law, Ischomachus observes those among his slaves who are inclined to be honest and rewards them—*Oec.* 14.9: 'now these just as freemen I treat (τούτοις ὥσπερ ἐλευθέροις ἤδη χρῶμαι), not only by making them wealthy, but even by honouring them as gentlemen (ὡς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς).'[52]

The Socratic householder and his slaves, and the Persian king and his subjects are Xenophon's ideal leaders.[53] Why? In both locations—the private estate of the Athenian farmer and the Persian Empire—there is no public space. There are no institutional or true governmental structures in these imagined worlds.[54] Essentially, this idealised view permits Xenophon to deploy concepts that were more familiar from private relations between aristocratic Greeks into the public, non-elite sphere. The leader treats his inferiors as friends, even as fellow elites. To my eyes, Xenophon's theorising about leadership involves a reworking of the private world of the aristocrat into the larger world of the political community. Thus honour and *philia* become central to his thinking about the ideal leader (think again of the papers of Buxton and Keim).

[52] Wankel (1961) 57–8 and 64.

[53] I realise here that I have therefore made Ischomachus into Xenophon's mouthpiece, and have also somewhat flattened out the distinction between Ischomachus and Socrates. My student Sarah Herbert is currently engaged in a doctoral dissertation that shows, among other things, that this is problematic.

[54] Here I am encouraged by the similar findings of Vincent Azoulay: see esp. Azoulay (2004) and (2006). My thinking is to some extent anticipated by Scharr (1919), esp. 169–70 and 221–9, whose views both Momigliano (1966) [1935] 351 and Carlier (2010) [1978] positively note but with cautions.

In some ways, Plato was attempting something similar in the *Laws*. At *Lg*. 693d–701e, Plato not only very deliberately seems to take on Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*,[55] he even formulates an ideal view of leadership with the help of both Persian kings and Athenian laws: when the Persian king (either Cyrus or Darius I) treated his subjects not as chattel but as friends, and when the free Athenians bound themselves in servitude to their laws, then an equilibrium was found that enabled them to achieve great things. Thus the ideal freedom for Plato in the *Laws* can be arrived at if Persian authoritarian rule is tempered with the collegiality of friendship, or Athenian license controlled by subservience to law. But either case produces a kind of Xenophontine willing obedience, whether you start from the un-free or the free extreme.[56]

But to return to Xenophon, this making public of the relations found in the private world of the Greek aristocrat had far-reaching consequences for him. Thus the relationship that Procles of Phlius imagines for Athens and Sparta towards the end of the *Hellenica* is, in essence, a relationship defined by the virtues of aristocratic *philoi*: Athenian support for Sparta would be 'noble' (*HG* 6.5.48: *gennaia*).[57] Perhaps most radically, Xenophon's vision in the *Poroi* involved the transformation of all of Athens' citizenry into, essentially, aristocrats—people who did not have to work, but who would be supported by revenue generated by silver mines worked by public slaves. As van Wees has eloquently put it: 'Xenophon's pamphlet *Ways and Means* proposed a radical scheme to liberate the Athenians from

[55] When the 'Athenian' says at 694c6 that Cyrus the Great, though a good general, had no experience of 'correct education' (παιδείας … ὀρθῆς), many have detected a dig at Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (let's not forget what the title means: the 'education of Cyrus'), beginning with Athenaeus 11.505a. See English (1921) 1.393–4 ad loc. Also, e.g., Pomeroy (1993) 10, 26. Cf. Gray (2011) 260–1; I do not think that Plato 'misunderstood Xenophon's argument', but was deliberately attacking it.

[56] I am very much indebted here to Stalley (1998) 154–5.

[57] Dillery (1995) 247–8. See now also Baragwanath (2012).

the need to work without resorting to imperialism (1.1).'[58] So it should not come as a surprise that, for Xenophon, the ideal leader is one at the head of a community (or army) of willingly obedient followers. The resulting picture looks an awful lot like a Greek aristocrat leading a group of similarly minded *kaloi kagathoi*, but with 'geometric equality' quietly and tactfully observed. I am beginning to catch glimpses of the Hellenistic agora or gymnasium.

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[58] van Wees (2004) 36. Cf. Finley (1983) [1959] 106.

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