POLEMOS AND HIS CHILDREN: WAR, ITS REPERCUSSIONS, AND NARRATIVE IN ANCIENT GREEK LITERATURE

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EDITED BY

RACHEL BRUZZONE

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PREFACE

This volume explores the intersection between the historical experience of warfare and the human construction of narratives about it. Taking as our inspiration a 2016 conference on Representations of Warfare in Freiburg, Germany, we consider various aspects of the complicated negotiation between the activity of war itself and the production of the narratives through which we understand it, as well as how such narratives contribute, deliberately or accidentally, to collective identities.

We would like to extend our gratitude to the FRIAS Institute of Albert-Ludwigs-Universität and its director, Bernd Kortmann, for supporting the initial conference, in which many of us took part. Others joined the project subsequently and have added greatly to its depth.

We are also most grateful to Donald Sells, who served as co-editor in much of the process of producing the volume.

We are further indebted to *Histos* and especially its Supplements Editor John Marincola for helping shape and polish the volume. In addition to helpful feedback by colleagues noted in individual chapters, the anonymous *Histos* referees' thorough and constructive comments were very useful both to individual authors and in sharpening the focus of the volume as a whole.

R.B.
Ankara, 28 January 2021

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

RACHEL BRUZZONE is an Assistant Professor at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. Her work focuses primarily on literary aspects of Thucydides' representation of the Peloponnesian War. She has a commentary to Thucydides Book 3 under contract with the University of Michigan Press.

TOBIAS JOHO is a wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at the Department of Classics of the University of Bern in Switzerland. He received a joint PhD from the Department of Classics and the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago. His monograph entitled *Style and Necessity in Thucydides* is under contract with Oxford University Press. He has published scholarly articles on various aspects of Thucydides, on Jacob Burckhardt's and Friedrich Nietzsche's engagement with ancient Greece, and on the style of Goethe's *Elective Affinities*.

EDITH FOSTER works on ancient Greek prose writers, primarily historiography. She published a monograph called *Thucydides, Pericles and Periclean Imperialism* with Cambridge University Press in 2010 (paperback 2013), and co-edited (with Donald Lateiner) a volume on *Thucydides and Herodotus*, published with Oxford University Press in 2012. Another co-edited volume (with Christina Clark and Judith Hallett), *Kinesis: Essays for Donald Lateiner on the Ancient Depiction of Gesture, Motion and Emotion*, appeared with the University of Michigan Press in 2015. She is also a co-editor (with Ryan Balot and Sarah Forsdyke) of *The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides* (2017, paperback 2020); (with Emily Baragwanath) of *Clio and Thalia: Attic Comedy and Historiography; Histos* Supplement 6, 2017); and (with Dominique Lenfant and Christian Wendt) of *Interprétations de la défaite d'Athènes dans la guerre du Péloponnèse* which appeared as *Ktèma* 42 in December 2017. She is presently working on a rhetorical study of the battle narratives of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon and is preparing a commentary on Book 4 of Thucydides for the Cambridge Greek and Latin series.

STYLIANOS CHRONOPOULOS is post-doctoral researcher in the Department of Philology at the University of Crete. He has studied Classics at the Universities of Athens, Leipzig and Freiburg. His research interests focus on Aristophanic comedy, fragments of Ancient Greek Comedy, theory of laughter, ancient lexicography and digital editions. His research includes *Spott im Drama. Dramatische Funktionen der persönlichen Verspottung in Aristophanes' Wespen und Frieden* (Heidelberg 2017) and 'Pollux' Onomastikon: Beschreibung eines griechischen Thesaurus des 2. Jh. N. Chr." (forthcoming).

MARK MARSH-HUNN completed his Master of Arts in History at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, in 2018. He is currently writing his PhD at the same institution, as well as working as a historical assistant in the ongoing archaeological-topographical survey of the surroundings of ancient Olympia. His research mainly focuses on the study of ethnic identity in Classical Greece, in particular inter-group negotiation of ethnic boundaries, with a specific interest in Boiotia.

FRANCES POWNALL is Professor of Classics at the University of Alberta. She has published widely on Greek historiography (particularly the fourth century and the Hellenistic period), the source tradition on Macedonia and the Successors, and the historiographical tradition of Sicily and the Greek West. She has written updated editions, translations, and historical commentaries for a number of important fragmentary historians (including Hecataeus, Hellanicus, Duris, Aristobulus, Eratosthenes, and Philistus) for *Brill's New Jacoby*. She is the author of *Lessons From the Past: The Moral Use of History in Fourth-Century Prose* (Ann Arbor 2004), *Ancient Macedonians in the Greek and Roman Sources* (co-edited with T. Howe, Swansea 2018), *Lexicon of Argead Macedonia* (co-edited with W. Heckel, J. Heinrichs, and S. Müller, Berlin 2020), and *Affective Relations & Personal Bonds in Hellenistic Antiquity* (co-edited with E.M. Anson and M. D'Agostini, forthcoming).

STOYAN PANOV is a lecturer of international law and jurisprudence at University College Freiburg, Albert-Ludwigs University of Freiburg. He has received his education at the University of Birmingham (Birmingham Law School, Ph.D.), Leiden University, Georgetown University, and DePauw University. Panov has published on topics such as liability for international crimes, the role of the judiciary in anti-corruption policies, and human rights in climate change litigation.

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INTRODUCTION: WAR AND ITS NARRATIVES*

Rachel Bruzzone

Warfare can be seen as a uniquely powerful driver of historical memory, and in particular of historiography. A visit to any popular bookstore today demonstrates that much contemporary interest in the past focuses on these violent turning-points in human events. Many of the most influential historical works of modern times, whether studies of leadership and political history (like Winston Churchill's *The World Crisis*) or of psychology (such as Joshua Phillips' *None of Us Were Like This Before*) or more popular writing (for example, David McCullough's *1776*) treat warfare as a particularly meaningful lens through which to study the past. Military history is very much not limited to the academic sphere; American Civil War re-enactments, for example, are a powerful demonstration of the purchase of historical events on the imagination. Both academics and the lay public, meanwhile, continue to argue over more fundamentally historiographic issues having to do with conflict, such as the supposedly universal validity of theories of power politics sometimes attributed to Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

The favoured status of conflict as the subject of historical memory has held true since the birth of the genre of historiography, with the first Western historians writing about the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars. All three major pioneers of the genre, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, chose war as their focus, helping to cement the link between conflict and historiography, even as genres such as tragedy or lyric poetry, which had once produced plays such as Aeschylus' *Persians* and lyric such as Simonides' 'Plataea Elegy', largely ceded the ground. Herodotus and Thucydides each argue explicitly that the wars that are their subjects are worthy of being enshrined in their works: Herodotus notes the extraordinary deeds performed by the combatants on both sides of the Persian Wars (*praef.*), while Thucydides argues for his own war's exceptional length and scale (1.1.1, 1.23.1). Xenophon implicitly endorses this assertion when taking up his predecessor's unfinished work in the *Hellenica*. The claims and goals of these works can be seen as in some ways polemical. Early on, the public might not have accepted the implication that this particular genre had a uniquely

* I would like to thank Donald Sells, who helped draft this introduction. I am also very grateful to John Marincola and the anonymous *Histos* referees for their encouragement, careful reading, and valuable advice.

meaningful role in safeguarding memories of the past. The tension over whose artistic output—whether physical, poetic, or historiographic—best serves to preserve memory is implicit, for example, in Pindar's favourable comparison of his work to fragile statuary (Pind. *Nem.* 5.1–3). Similar assertions are evident among early historians,[1] while Thucydides seems to dismiss other genres' ability to preserve historical memory in his assertion of a degree of accuracy that eludes poets (1.21.1) and in describing his work as lacking τὸ μυθῶδες (1.22.4).

Historiography was compelled to engage in this struggle over control of the past partly because it was a relative newcomer, while other types of literature had long been claiming the role of the protector of memory. The close association between war and remembrance begins long before Herodotus undertook his inquiries into the Persian Wars. Already in Homer, Helen claims that the gods engineered the Trojan War to create memory through song, an idea that is common both in Homer (*Il.* 6.357–8; cf. *Od.* 8.579–80) and elsewhere (e.g. Eur. *Hel.* 41). The Sirens of the *Odyssey* also seem to be historians, proposing the Trojan War as the topic of their song (*Od.* 12.189–90). The gods are even understood as deliberately using war as a tool to create memory. Isocrates postulates that, while they were forced to allow their sons to die in the Trojan War, they thereby created an immortal memory of their offspring's excellence (4.84): in controlling the course of human affairs, the gods also 'write history', albeit in a different way than human beings do. Efforts to preserve and control memory become increasingly intentional and self-conscious with the Persian War generation, however, when historiography continues to crystalise around war, with its most conspicuous pioneer Herodotus.

War was partly worthy of memorialisation for the Greeks, as for subsequent people, because of its centrality in shaping a sense of identity. They believed that the Trojan War—arguably the most famous conflict of all time—initiated the mythological Iron Age, defined by humanity's separation from the gods and the attendant hardships of mortal life, such as the need to work to survive and the threat of disease. More historically, war brought peoples separated by vast distances into contact, prompting the Greeks to define both themselves and others more actively. One result of the Persian Wars of the early fifth century BCE was its enhancement of a sense of common identity consisting of shared language and culture among the many independent Greek states scattered across the Mediterranean. The Peloponnesian War and the troubled years that followed, however, forced a reconsideration of this commonality, as a fleeting sense of unity devolved into unprecedented levels of inter-Greek violence. On an individual level as well, war was ripe for self-definition, as the primary arena in which a man could demonstrate his excellence and value as a citizen. War was central to

[1] Moles (1999). See also Immerwahr (1960).

both the past and the present: in constructing an imagined ideal of a soldier citizen, the Greeks looked to their own past—at least as it was represented in the Homeric texts that many took to be accurate representations of historical events—projecting an epic version of the military onto the very different realities of fighting for a fifth-century democratic *polis*.[2]

Texts that nominally treat war can be the locus of conversations about ideological questions concerning identity and values in part because the very complexity of the task of writing history renders it inherently subjective, even if the writer is an 'unbiased', conscientious professional. Those who have experienced war first-hand often emphasise the chaotic and confusing aspects of the experience. The Duke of Wellington famously advised that a history of Waterloo not be attempted, because 'the history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball! Some individuals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle lost or won; but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which, they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance'.[3] A few years later, Carl von Clausewitz coined the phrase 'the fog of war' to describe the effect of battle on the human mind, which stress often renders nearly incapable of accurate perception or comprehension. One officer in World War I offered more empirical evidence for these impressions by testing his troops' memories after they returned from an encounter. He found that they vastly miscalculated how many shots had been fired (21 reported, 7 in reality), misremembered whether an officer's revolver had been recharged (they reported it had been, but in reality it had not), and could not agree whether the night had a 'bright moon' or was 'very dark'.[4] Later, others discovered that even whether or not a battle was going on could be unclear.[5]

It would have been particularly difficult to ascertain 'what really happened' on the Ancient Greek battlefield. The modern commanders cited above tended to be professionals leading relatively well-trained troops, as opposed to the essentially amateur background of the Greek soldiery. Nor did Greek generals, in the thick of the fighting, have a significantly clearer perspective on events than the average soldier did, again in contrast with typical combat in the modern era. One Peloponnesian general notably failed to realise that the majority of his troops had been defeated, with only his own

[2] Lendon (2005) 45: 'Those who fought in the seemingly unheroic phalanx conceived of what they were doing in Homeric terms.' Human behaviour in and understanding of modern wars is also influenced by ideas taken from literature (Fussell (1975), esp. 155–90). On the complex relationship between literature and historiography regarding battle scenes, see, e.g., Flower (1998).

[3] Quoted in Macaulay (1849) 412 from the Wellington Papers August 8 and 17, 1815.

[4] Whatley (1964) 121. Similar experiences were recorded by Jerome (1923), Bartlett (1932), Buckhout (1974) (cf. Woodman (1988) 17–18), and Keegan (1976) 141.

[5] Keegan (1976) 76.

wing achieving success.[6] The plight of men encased in the considerable armour of a Greek hoplite is vividly expressed by Theseus in Euripides' *Suppliant Women* (846–56):

> one thing that I will not ask you, lest I bring laughter upon myself, is whom each of the men opposed in the battle… For these are meaningless stories for both the listeners and the one speaking, that anyone who has gone into battle, with spears sailing thick in front of his eyes, could report clearly who was honourable … For only with difficulty is one able to see even what is obligatory when standing opposite enemies.

Most Greek adult men would have been familiar with such sensations; Lysias too describes without censure a type of fear in battle that caused men to 'believe they saw things they did not see, and heard things they did not hear' (2.39). When historians such as Thucydides offer orderly reconstructions of the events of a battle, then, the historiographic product may be impressive, but the account must be understood within the context of the confusion that reigned over such clashes.

In addition to the challenge of obtaining an organised understanding of tumultuous occurrences, historians must engage in extreme selectivity in deciding which parts of the data they have collected should be used to construct their narratives, and how and at what length each event should be presented. As the narratologist Manfred Jahn points out: 'contrary to the standard courtroom injunction to tell "the *whole* truth", no one can in fact tell all. Practical reasons require speakers and writers to restrict information to the "right amount"—not too little, not too much, and if possible only what's relevant'.[7] The act of converting real-world events into a verbal, narrative description is thus inherently reductive. This is true of any effort to distil a coherent narrative thread out of the complexity of real, historical life, but is especially so for complicated events with many moving parts, like warfare. Because this work of capturing or constructing a 'plot' from reality necessarily involves some degree of subjectivity,[8] even historians sincerely committed to accuracy and objectivity can engage in bias.[9] This is the case because the obligatory process of selection inherently implies interpretation, as the significance of any event is suggested by the length and form it takes in the narrative text. Omission indicates irrelevance; many readers have been puzzled, for example, about Thucydides' apparent downplaying of the Megarian Decree, as his reticence suggests that he did not consider it a

[6] Paul (1987) 308.

[7] Jahn (2007) 94.

[8] Benson and Strout (1961).

[9] E.g., Chakrabarty (2000), esp. 27–46.

significant cause of the Peloponnesian War, though many of his contemporaries did. The simple fact of inclusion, by contrast, can be taken to mean that an event is considered important—whether literally or symbolically—by the author.[10] Even among events privileged with inclusion, however, the very structure of the text imbues different elements of the story with varying degrees of significance, as the amount of text dedicated to any particular detail suggests *how* important the author views it as. Prominent placement and other literary techniques are likewise employed in works of historiography in ways that imply historical analysis even when none is made explicit.[11]

In addition to implying the significance (or insignificance) of historical events, the process of selection also often indicates causation, as accounts of past events are structured in storylines whose sequential nature implies cause and effect. But such relationships are not always simple or uncontroversial, and historiographic texts often conflate intent and result.[12] Both Herodotus and Thucydides suggest their awareness of the general difficulty in retrospectively identifying causation when they proudly claim to have discovered the origins of their wars: Herodotus takes as his first explicit subject the reasons why the barbarians and the Greeks fought each other (*praef.*), while Thucydides, always attempting to best his predecessor, claims to have identified both the superficial and underlying causes of the Peloponnesian War, and writes 'so that nobody will ever wonder how such a war among the Greeks came about' (1.23.5–6). The causes of more minor events can also be elusive, and may appear much clearer in a text than they were in real life. Even modern generals have difficulty distinguishing what was foreseen, intended, or accidental in retrospect,[13] and early historians may have responded to this interpretative challenge with the very human impulse to extrapolate plans from results.[14] Chains of intention, cause, and effect may thus appear more straightforward than they were in reality, or the narrative may even impose them where they did not exist. Outcomes of a war, or any given action, that were in no way obvious at the time can seem predetermined or inevitable through the author's strategic hindsight or literary

[10] Megill (1989) 637–41.

[11] For only one example, on the interpretative function that literary allusion can serve in Thucydides, see Rood (1998).

[12] Whatley (1964) 121: 'There is the greatest difficulty in distinguishing what was foreseen from what was unforeseen, able generalship from a stroke of good luck. It is particularly difficult to discover what was in the mind of a general. The general himself may not find it easy. No battle follows one simple plan. There are not only constant improvisations to meet new situations, but constant flukes and, above all, constant mistakes. But it is only human to forget the mistakes if they do not lead to disaster and the flukes if they lead to success. Similarly, outside opinion inevitably tends to regard what happened as having been carefully thought out and intended, which is by no means always the case.'

[13] Whatley (1964) 121.

[14] Hunter (1973) 18.

foreshadowing. Edith Foster, in this volume, similarly studies the way that narrative itself can suggest futility. Because of the subjectivity inherent in historiography, lines of causation can tell us a great deal about the author or his or her culture. For example, one author may view, and thus represent, a moral or religious transgression as the ominous precursor to a disastrous military defeat inflicted by the gods; another might tell the same story with an emphasis on the greed that inspired strategic overreach and doomed an army, with no reference to the divine; and a third might focus exclusively on tactical mistakes that caused the same loss. None of these narratives would be 'wrong' or even remarkable for their approach to the defeat, but they would differ greatly from one another, illustrating how the objectivity of historiography can lend itself to the same kind of interpretation typical of other, more overtly 'literary' genres as well.

War's tendency to drive the construction of narrative is equally fraught after the conflict is over. As has been famously stated, 'mere description' is impossible,[15] and 'narrative is not innocent',[16] and the memory of any war can be harnessed to various non-innocent agendas in its aftermath. This is especially the case when states, groups, or individuals have a vested interest in how their actions are remembered, or in the inevitable changes in identity wrought by war. Sometimes such concerns are baldly self-interested, for example the situation of warlords seeking validation or absolution for wartime atrocities, such as are discussed by Frances Pownall and Stoyan Panov in this volume. The establishment of peace is another moment of great social upheaval to be negotiated in the public eye through the use of narrative, as is explored by Stylianos Chronopoulos. Later, the collective society must determine how the war is remembered, both because of dislocation caused by the violence and as a means to negotiate the group's role as villain, victim, or hero. This is especially so because in real life, these roles are often not neatly distinguishable. The Plataeans discussed by Mark Marsh-Hunn, for example, came from a city with a fabled past and heroically resisted the Peloponnesians, but they also brutally slaughtered Theban captives in the Peloponnesian War. When large numbers of Plataean refugees moved to Athens, they, and their Athenian hosts, seem to have worked actively to weave a narrative out of the historical facts that would support an understanding of them as purely heroic. The Athenians, meanwhile, were motivated to create a historical memory of themselves as the big-hearted saviours of Plataea, though they in fact declined to come to the city's aid at its most desperate moment.

[15] Megill (1989).

[16] Dewald (2009) 114. White (1987) argued for the significance of the structure of historiographic texts and their literary facets. Indeed, the idea that there can be any objectivity whatsoever in the study of history has come to require defenders over the past few decades: e.g., Haskell (1990), Evans (1997).

Modern studies of war usually fall into the third category of analysis mentioned above, focusing primarily on tactics, organisation, and military manoeuvres. Indeed, today's readers sometimes assess the quality of ancient historical work by how similar it seems to such strategically-oriented studies. Thucydides, for example, has often been judged favourably for seeming compatible with modern tastes in military history-writing, and the assumptions that come with this mode of reading have often shaped, and possibly distorted, understandings of his text.[17] This modern approach to comprehending and envisioning war is profoundly influenced by the type of strategic planning that typically defines modern warfare, in which a far-off commander 'visualizes the events of and parties to the battle, again because for efficiency's sake he must, in fairly abstract terms: of "attack" and "counter-attack", of the "Heavy Brigade", of the "Guard Corps"—large, intellectually manageable blocks of human beings going here or there and doing, or failing to do, as he directs'.[18] While often providing a clearer sense of the big picture, however, this is not an objectively superior perspective. The abstract conception of soldiers, for example, tends to gloss over diverse individual experiences,[19] while pushing the reader to give special consideration to tactical aspects of war at the expense of other facets, such as the role of emotion in one of humanity's most violent and terrifying practices.[20] John Keegan has similarly identified homogenising techniques that are normally deployed to make a 'battle piece' more comprehensible: 'uniformity of behaviour', 'discontinuity', 'stratification' of combatants, 'over-simplified human behaviour', and 'omission of dead and wounded'.[21]

Much influential recent scholarship on military history has begun to break with these limitations, considering aspects of war beyond the ones focusing on strategy, and these studies provide fruitful strategies for approaching ancient historiography as well. The Greeks themselves seemed to have viewed war as having other significant facets; as a recent overview of the subject notes, ancient writers were among the first to struggle with the challenges of depicting war and its effects as both a technical and a moral problem,[22] encouraging readers to study features beyond the technical. Keegan's *The Face of Battle* (1976) has been an influential forerunner of this broader perspective, as it attempts to reconstruct conflict as an individual soldier would have experienced it, rejecting the bird's-eye commander narrative that has dominated military history in modern times. Keegan

[17] E.g., Immerwahr (1956) 242 criticises this understanding.

[18] Keegan (1976) 46.

[19] Keegan (1976) 65–6.

[20] Åhäll and Gregory (2015), *passim.*

[21] Keegan (1976) 38–9.

[22] Pitcher (2009) 71.

argues that any individual combatant would have great difficulty comprehending or accurately recalling his own experiences, and by exploring the cases of three famous battles, he brings to light the difficulties with reconstructing battles after the fact. This argument fits well both with the individual's experience of battle as described in most ancient sources and with the observations of N. Whatley, who suggested that ancient battlefields cannot be as neatly reconstructed as is sometimes assumed.

The expanding definition and practice of war in the twenty-first century have also pushed scholars to reconsider the very nature of the phenomenon.[23] In an era of a global 'War on Terror', it is no longer clear precisely when a nation is at war and when it is not. In addition to the problem of defining a war fought against a hostile phenomenon rather than an enemy nation, modern attempts to regulate and curtail war have resulted in a tendency for states to engage in undeclared, unofficial, or even secret conflicts. As a consequence, the clear and formal declarations of war that were standard in the twentieth century have become obsolete in the twenty-first. While this nebulous brand of conflict has little in common with the prescribed and declared wars of the recent past, it finds parallels in ancient literature. The thesis appears in Plato, for example, that peace is only a name, and that states are in fact in a condition of constant war with one another (*Leg.* 626a), much as cyber war seems to fill the internet even in 'peacetime'. Thucydides, similarly, asks us to consider the elusive question of when, exactly, a war exists—and when it does not—in his enigmatic representation of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, complicated by his concepts of *aitia* and *prophasis*,[24] and in his depiction of his subject as a single war encompassing a period of peace during the Peace of Nicias.[25]

Explicit ancient discussions of the causes of war, whether mythological or historical, also emphasise its complexities and unexpected or uncontrollable trajectory, aspects that tend not to dominate modern ideas about the phenomenon. Starting in the Archaic period, texts tend to treat war's causes as elusive, complex, and even overdetermined, as 'outside human initiative and … within the domain of nature or the realm of the gods'.[26] Even the interventions of the Homeric gods in the Trojan War, for example, are only partly driven by their own desires, as they are limited by the dictates of Fate (e.g., *Il.* 8.61–72). Tragedy and comedy often play on the theme of the seemingly trivial origins of major conflicts, sometimes formulated as the 'beginning of evils' (ἀρχὴ κακῶν). Greek texts also almost always treat conflict as somehow overdetermined, brought about by a combination of human

[23] Brooks (2016).

[24] For some important discussions of *aitia* and *prophasis*, see Pearson (1952); Kirkwood (1952); de Ste. Croix (1972) 51–62; Rawlings (1975).

[25] For monograph-length treatments of the outbreak, see, e.g., Kagan (1969); Jaffe (2017).

[26] Garlan (1975) 18.

and external factors. The Trojan War, for example, is variously blamed on Paris, Helen, and the gods' will (e.g., Eur. *Hel.* 40; cf. *Il.* 3.172–5). Among philosophers, Heraclitus lists war and peace among natural fluctuations like winter and summer (22 B 67 D–K), suggesting their inevitability. And although Thucydides views war as deriving from human nature, he presents it as inescapable in human history (1.22.4) and as something that unfolds in ways that the majority of viewers—unlike the wise historian (1.1.1)—cannot foresee.

Although a type of easily identifiable, formally-declared conflict still dominates the Western imagination, Ancient Greek historians tend to present their wars with some of the confusion and complexity characteristic of the outbreak of World War I, or indeed many other wars, rather than with the moral and strategic clarity of the American Civil War or the Second World War. Herodotus (1.1ff.) and Thucydides (1.23.5), for example, treat the causes of their conflicts as anything but obvious when addressing their *aitiai* prominently at the openings of their works, where they proudly claim to have identified the causes. Both Herodotus and Thucydides also treat the outbreak of war as a lengthy process spanning generations. While modern scholars might trace the Persian Wars to strategic sources such as Persian overreach or the Ionian Revolt, the former traces their roots all the way back to the abduction of Io (1.1.2–4), laying out a history of resentment that emphasises the types of emotion and conflicting interpretations of events that tend to be downplayed in modern military history; underlying causes rather than proximate ones form a significant portion of Herodotus' understanding of war.[27] Thucydides too is enigmatic in his definition of the moment of outbreak. Although he is often taken to have a 'modern' outlook seen as central to the development of current theories in International Relations,[28] his remarks on the beginning of the war offer considerable challenges to modern IR theories. Thucydides describes the Peloponnesian War as 'forced' onto the Greeks in both outbreaks (1.23.6; 5.25.3), not a formulation that is likely to be seen in an analysis of a modern conflict. His fundamental definition of the state of war also appears to differ from ours. In Book 5, he seems to resort to special pleading to make his war as long as he wants it to be, while evidence from his contemporaries suggest at least two separate wars.[29] Xenophon likewise presents international relations as having a basis in culture, ethical principles such as reciprocal relationships, and emotions more than the naked power politics that are often attributed to Thucydides and have been regularly adopted into modern International Relations.[30]

[27] See, e.g., Immerwahr (1956) 267–8 on Herodotus and underlying causes.

[28] E.g., Johnson Bagby (1994), Eckstein (2003), Tompkins and Lebow (2016).

[29] Aristophanes (*Lys.* 507, 513), Plato (*Men.* 239d–46a), Andocides (3.8, 30, 9, 31, 28–9) and Aeschines (2.175–6).

[30] See esp. Lendon (2006).

Experts in human security have criticised the neglect of the role of emotions in modern analyses of war, as our sanitised, technical interests have caused us to overlook one of the most central aspects of the experiences of killing, dying, or even simply deciding that a situation has become so intolerable that such actions are required.[31] A sense that the study of emotional aspects of war is somehow unserious has even shaped scholarly responses to Herodotus and, especially, Thucydides,[32] albeit with exceptions following renewed scholarly interest in emotions generally in the 2000s.[33] Again, ancient literature can provide a helpful corrective to modern biases in both explicitly historiographic contexts and elsewhere. Far from treating war and emotions as separate entities, traditional representations of Ares have him attended by personified Fear and Panic, Deimos and Phobos (Hom. *Il.* 4.438–9; 11.37; [Hes.] *Asp.* 195). Indeed, these figures are sometimes described as his children (Hes. *Th.* 934) or siblings (Hom. *Il.* 4.441). Athena's aegis, too, features Phobos among other personified experiences of battle (Hom. *Il.* 5.739). Later authors such as Aeschylus also highlight the role of emotions, especially fear.[34] Thucydides too emphasises the role of a leader in guiding a city's emotions so as not to lose control of a war (2.59.3). Although the historian himself is often thought to be 'dispassionate', he places emotions at the centre of his treatment of the Peloponnesian War in his statement that its hidden cause was in fact fear, which 'forced' Sparta into the conflict (1.23.6).

The independence of the phenomenon can also be seen in its frequent personifications—often taking the form of *Polemos* or *Stasis* rather than Ares—in which it often acts in defiance of human desires or attempts at control. While modern wars are often presented in the public sphere as predictable, scientific, and precise, at least before they have been launched, the ancient figures behave independently, and maliciously. Solon's figure of *Stasis* leaping over house walls to chase men down in their homes (fr. 4.28 *IEG*²) captures its capacity to dissolve even the most intimate personal bonds, including when this action is against the will of those whose relationships are being overturned. The embodiment is rarely positive: *Stasis* screams (Aes. *Eum.* 978–80), for example, while *Polemos* is imagined as a wild drunkard preemptively disinvited from an imaginary dinner party (Ar. *Ach.* 979–82). As in this second instance, war often seems bent on hunting, harvesting, and consumption; in a fragment of Sophocles, War itself is said to enjoy hunting young men (Soph. *TGrF* fr. 554), while in Aristophanes he chef-like prepares the Greek cities to be eaten as delicacies (*Pax* 236–89). Ares, similarly, reaps (Aes. *Supp.* 637–8) and shears men (ibid. 665–6). Even in a rare positive

[31] E.g. Hutchinson and Bleiker (2008).

[32] Marincola (2003) 186–7.

[33] For one study of emotions and war (primarily in the *Iliad*), see Konstan (2003).

[34] See e.g. de Romilly (1958) *passim*, Kantzios (2004).

context, war devours its dead, as those who die in war are said by Thucydides' Pericles to have offered their lives as a contribution to an ἔρανος (2.43.1), a term for a feast to which all participants contributed.

Even as it consumes, war teaches, and one of the features that Greek texts often associate with war is both its didactic potential, as it pushes participants toward new technologies and strategies, and its own resulting development and refinement. Variations on the term *deinos*, a word meaning 'terrible' but also with connotations of invention and discovery (e.g. Soph. *Ant.* 334), frequently modify war and its consequences in ancient text. Personified *Polemos* is *deinos* (Ar. *Pax* 240), for example, and war remains so even when it is not being cast in a negative light (Pind. *Pyth.* 2.64). War also inspires some prime examples of the word *deina*, things both terrible and new. The children of *Polemos* are δεινοί (Hes. *Th.* 935), and war produces *deina* (e.g., Isoc. 4.168 δεινὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τὸν πόλεμον).

Explicit discussions of the nature of war also refer to the 'lessons' it delivers. Warfare, Thucydides' Corinthians repeatedly state, depends on innovation (1.71.3, 122.1), and the war in fact seems to force a type of development. Thucydides' editorialising following the violence at Corcyra uses a word associated with progress for the development of *stasis* (3.82.1 προυχώρησε) and describes human behaviour during the fighting as a type of malignant inventiveness (3.82.3 τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ' ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει). Indeed, he personifies war itself, πόλεμος, as a βίαιος διδάσκαλος (3.82.2), at once a teacher of violence and a violent teacher. His characters, meanwhile, point to the innovative nature of the Sicilians in particular in developing the technology of war (7.56.3 τοῦ ναυτικοῦ μέγα μέρος προκόψαντες).[35] Pindar, too, seems to allude to the intellectually stimulating aspects of conflict when he calls *stasis* θρασυμήδεα καὶ δεινάν (*Nem.* 9.13), and Aeschines associates a type of bitter education with war (3.148 πόλεμος … ἀείμνηστον παιδείαν αὐτοὺς ἐπαίδευσε). This aspect of conflict has remained constant: especially in the modern development of cyber war, one can see the validity of ancient statements about the tendency of war to drive innovation, and its capacity for constant mutation. In some chapters of this volume, war's own ability to 'educate' can be seen in strategic innovation and developing political machinations, while others focus on its 'teachings' that appear in the work of historians using it as a philosophical lens through which to explore new ideas and arrive at deeper truths about the universe.

Even as war 'educates' humanity in new tactics and methods of violence across the millennia, it retains many of the same fundamental aims and strategic goals. One standard element that has adopted a new form in the modern era is the tendency of narratives about conflict to themselves become objects of struggle or even weapons with which to bludgeon opponents. The

[35] Dodds (1973) 1–2.

new arenas in which the narratives of war are disputed are part of a general broadening of the field in which war is fought: in the twenty-first century, as 'war blurs and expands, the fog of war expands as well'.[36] A large part of the 'fog' that seeps out beyond the battlefield today is due to the migration of conflict narratives, or disputes about the historiography of war, into the online world. While attacks in the cyber-realm often have practical aims, such as infiltrating the banking industry, many web-based 'attacks' specifically target a society's ability to produce historically accurate narratives: historiography itself is a regular, intentional target of modern warfare. As a central facet of cyber war, appealing but inaccurate tales are propagated to weaken a nation and damage its capacity for productive and rational discourse.

This growth in the role of perverted historical narrative, and thus of argument in war, represents both continuity with the past and a remarkable expansion of one of war's timeless elements. This phenomenon has ancient roots; this volume argues, for example, that the Sicilian tyrants actively construct war narratives to serve sophisticated political purposes. In doing so, they wrestle with their opponents not only over possession of resources and terrain, but also for control of the story of the war being fought, a fight that continues after military hostilities conclude. In this aggressive use of storytelling, in which narrators employ their tales to set themselves up as heroes for their people, Greek combatants prefigure modern ones. Today there is an even greater appreciation of the power and potential danger of the historiography of war, a topic also treated comparatively in this volume. Bodies such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia actively attempt to thwart the creation of precisely the type of 'war hero' narratives that the Sicilian tyrants were forging, especially if the 'heroes' in question are in fact war criminals. Put another way, modern entities charged with protecting justice consider the containment of false narratives about a war, or the misuse of historiography, a key part of their agenda, and they therefore fight the development of incorrect or mendacious historiographic tradition just as they do violent war crimes.

While the preservation of history, and specifically the history of war, is usually considered the particular responsibility of formal historiography, writings about the past can also take other forms. As Nathan Arrington has argued, for example, Athens' monuments served as a meditation on the city's history, and especially on military history and civic identity.[37] Elements of public discourse such as Funeral Orations likewise seek to establish a shared nexus of memory and preserve a carefully selected recollection of the dead and the state they championed.[38] Thucydides' version of Pericles' Funeral

[36] Brooks (2016) 267.

[37] Arrington (2015), *passim*.

[38] E.g., Loraux (1981), Shear (2013).

Oration explicitly encourages its audience to reshape their memories, disregarding earlier imperfections in the lives of the fallen and considering only their glorious end (2.42.2–3). He even uses a term he elsewhere employs to describe the erasure of a historical inscription, ἀφανίζω (2.42.3 ἀφανίσαντες; cf. 6.54.7), to describe the process by which former misdeeds are rendered invisible by a glorious death. Such history-shaping monuments, documents, and oratory can be highly consequential, moulding society's self-perception in the public arena and extending a significant influence even over more professionally researched and written historiography. Such efforts can be essentially subconscious or more deliberate. For example, according to Herodotus (9.85.3), some cities attempted to reconstruct the past by erecting sham monuments at Plataea, even though they had not participated in the battle, and in other situations, as well, the very bodies of the dead became the site of a struggle over historical narrative.[39] No longer limited to public songs, monuments, or rumour, today even more aggressive types of disinformation have emerged as a method of directly striking public discourse. On the other hand, efforts to suppress malicious or false narratives have developed through the court system, which has with some success challenged and contained this type of storytelling.

War is arguably the most intense and challenging of human experiences on intellectual, emotional, social, and moral levels. The historian's task of distilling a sensible, accurate narrative from this phenomenon, as well as its causes and effects, is enormously difficult, a fact that military histories, and especially modern ones employing a bird's-eye perspective, can obscure. Ancient Greek authors, with their greater personal exposure to war, tend to see and discuss these complicating factors to a greater extent. Much like the traditional representation of the Olympian lover of strife and violence, Ares—hated by his own family (Hom. *Il.* 5. 890), attended by Fear and Panic (Hes. *Th.* 934)—, war in their texts is often uncontrollable, unpredictable, and ferocious. Rather than a sanitised chess-like engagement on the human plane, they often represent it as an all-encompassing catastrophe that shakes and reveals the nature of the universe itself. As ancient authors knew, war's legacy, both in the intellectual ferment and in the forced reshaping of society it causes, can also reveal important truths. Just as war is an inescapable expression of human nature, capturing, controlling, and learning from conflict through narrative is an eternal human endeavour. It is this complex relationship between conflict, its disruptions, and the narratives that they produce that this volume takes as its subject.

[39] Low (2006).

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2

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR AND THE STATE OF NATURE IN THUCYDIDES: THE COINCIDENCE OF MOTION AND REST*

Tobias Joho

Hermann Strasburger once observed that Thucydides' initial, programmatic characterisation of the Peloponnesian War as 'the greatest motion' (*κίνησις … μεγίστη*, 1.1.2) reveals his notion of the primary subject matter of historiography.[1] According to Strasburger, Thucydides turned his attention toward the kinetic and dynamic aspects of history, i.e., the struggle for power and, in particular, war.[2] With this choice, he bequeathed an overriding concern with the forces of motion to the entirety of subsequent ancient historiography. Strasburger observes that Thucydides' influential choice had its costs: his strong emphasis on the state of exception and the moments of crisis led to a relative disinterest in the stabilising forces of human culture, such as economic systems, religious beliefs, or cultural institutions. As a result, ancient historians conceptualised their subject matter in the wake of Thucydides as the quintessential unleashing of intense, wide-ranging commotions.[3] In a similar vein, Leo Strauss stressed the importance of the antithesis between motion and rest for Thucydides' view of the Peloponnesian War.[4] According to Strauss, Thucydides implicitly contrasts the period of climactic motion, i.e. the Peloponnesian War, with the preceding era of relative peace and stability, a phase of rest, marked by an accumulation of power and wealth. On the basis of this antithesis, war is motion and destructive, whereas peace means rest and is constructive.

My goal in this paper is to demonstrate that Thucydides' text shows the Peloponnesian War collapsing the opposition between motion and rest. This thesis will be substantiated through various case studies of specific episodes. Instead of being mutually exclusive, motion and rest are polar opposites that

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[1] Rusten (2015) 35 has argued that *κίνησις* means 'mobilisation' instead of 'commotion'. For a defence of the traditional understanding, cf. Munson (2015) 41–42.

[2] Strasburger (1966) 58, 61–2.

[3] Strasburger (1966) 58 (neglect of stabilising factors), 57 (influence on subsequent ancient historiography).

[4] Strauss (1964) 155–6.

both remain permanently in play. In periods of general flourishing, they enter into a relationship that enables mutual enhancement on the basis of a fine-tuned balance. By contrast, the Peloponnesian War is simultaneously climactic motion and climatic rest: each member of the antithesis, instead of achieving balanced proportionality with its counterpart, manifests itself in an extreme value. Rest in the sense of excess signifies entrapment in a situation and the impossibility of independent, free motion. The Peloponnesian War confronts people, time and again, with the experience of entanglement in circumstances while simultaneously exposing them to events that occur with an extreme degree of unforeseeable rapidity.

As I will argue, Thucydides identifies the experience of the Peloponnesian War with the state of nature. In advancing this view, he also takes a stance, albeit implicitly and beneath the surface of his factual account, on one of the central puzzles that occupied the Pre-Socratics: the significance of motion and rest for the makeup of the cosmos as a whole. Historiography, as conceived by Thucydides, thus touches on matters that go far beyond a purely factual reconstruction of the events of one particular war. In my conclusion, I will consider what light Thucydides' concern with motion and rest sheds on a foundational scholarly controversy about the ultimate aims of Thucydides' historiographic project.

Extremes of Motion and Rest in the State of Nature: The *Archaeology*

In the *Archaeology* Thucydides introduces the reader to the theme of the paradoxical coincidence of motion and rest. Throughout the *Archaeology* Thucydides portrays the development of Greece from a miserable early condition, in which the Greeks lacked fixed habitations and commerce and were constantly exposed to instability and external threats. An image of extreme disorganisation emerges. Thus, early Greece is stirred by an excessive degree of movement, manifesting itself in constant migrations and a nomadic lifestyle. These are due to the permanent compulsion to find new abodes in the wake of attacks by those who are stronger and drive people out of their current place of residence (1.2.2). On the other hand, Greece simultaneously suffers from extreme immobility, due to the absence of mercantile traffic and indeed the impossibility of any safe travel (1.2.2, 3.4, 6.1). Communication between different places is hardly possible, and most communities live in a state of utter isolation. Oscillating between extremes, the world of early Greece is disrupted by the equally dismal alternatives of incessant flux and paralysing inaction.

The amorphous state of Greece is reflected in the lack of any designation, at this early time, referring to the Greeks in their entirety as one people (1.3.2). This lack of a common proper name reflects two circumstances: first, that the Greek world, affected as it is by incessant motion, lacks the stability

requisite for a distinct identity presupposed by a proper designation; second, that the Greeks have not yet risen to a sufficient level of common self-awareness because they lack the resources that could enable them to regard themselves as a collective. Only after the Greeks have become able to explore what will be called the 'Greek' world through controlled motion—and especially navigation—will they be able to ascend to a more comprehensive outlook and recognise their shared identity.

The *Archaeology* traces the development of the strategies through which the Greeks, in an attempt to respond to the unbalanced world around them, impose order and stability on the ubiquitous chaos. As several scholars have stressed, the account systematically uncovers a definite set of material factors that enable the Greeks to establish order: ships, city walls, and wealth (1.7, 8.2–3, 9.3, 13.1, 13.5, 15.1).[5] Ships facilitate the motion necessary to conduct traffic and undertake grand military expeditions, and fortifications provide the stability that is indispensable for long-standing fixed habitations. While seafaring is the antidote to isolation and immobility, walls counteract the flux of uncontrolled motion. Monetary resources accrue from the mutually balanced employment of ships and walls, and they simultaneously provide a stimulus to refine both the instruments enabling extension and the factors furthering unity.[6] Thus, motion and rest are equally indispensable for the rise of a city, but they must be brought into a carefully calibrated balance. The interplay of both factors is nicely illustrated by the account that Thucydides gives of the state of Greece after the Trojan War. Even then, he writes, Greece was still 'subject to migration and settlement' (*ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἔτι μετανίστατό τε καὶ κατῳκίζετο*, 1.12.1). As a result, it 'did not come to rest nor undergo a process of growth' (*ὥστε μὴ ἡσυχάσασαν αὐξηθῆναι*, 1.12.1). Only after a further considerable lapse of time, 'Greece became securely tranquil and no longer subject to enforced migrations, and so it began to send out colonies' (*ἡσυχάσασα ἡ Ἑλλὰς βεβαίως καὶ οὐκέτι ἀνισταμένη ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψε*, 1.12.4). This combination of 'rest' and 'growth' encapsulates the process of civilisation: while rest is required to overcome chaotic and violent migrations, growth, manifesting itself in the building of wealth and material resources, is the antidote against the state of immobility through isolation that prevailed before the art of seafaring had advanced to the appropriate level.

Thus, the extreme poles of motion and rest have finally entered a state of well-balanced equilibrium. By contrast, the pre-civilised condition is characterised by a simultaneous climax of these two opposites. Motion and rest in unmitigated form are hallmarks of a situation in which human beings are incapable of imposing order on the world around them. Under these

[5] de Romilly (2012) 157–60; Parry (1972) 53–4; Loraux (2006) 365; Hunter (1982) 20–2, Allison (1989) 14.

[6] For the crucial role assigned to, and the specific contribution made by, financial resources in the *Archaeology* see the summarising remarks by Kallet (1993) 35.

conditions, they are pushed around by hostile forces, whether by other people or elemental nature. As Werner Jaeger observed, in the *Archaeology* Thucydides lets his basic principles emerge from a minimum of facts, thus presenting them with singular incisiveness.[7] Given this paradigmatic status of the *Archaeology*, its systematic concern with the interaction of motion and rest is bound to have bearing on Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War proper.

The Warring Parties and the Antithesis of Motion and Rest

The antithesis between motion and rest is also central to Thucydides' portrayal of the contrasting character of the two warring parties: the Athenians are generally equated with motion, and the Spartans with rest.[8] As the Corinthians observe in their speech at Sparta in Book 1, the Athenians and Spartans occupy opposite poles on the spectrum ranging from extreme motion to extreme rest (1.70.2–8): while the Athenians distinguish themselves through unbounded versatility and incessant motion, the Spartans are slow to act, dislike leaving their country, always wish to hold on to what they have, and are generally risk-averse. Thucydides himself notably endorses the Corinthians' observation on the characters of the two cities when he comments on the Spartans' failure to blockade the Piraeus after the revolt of Euboea (8.96.5).

Thucydides' report of the first official acts of war also reflects this antithesis (2.10–23): Thucydides brings the differences in temperament between the two cities sharply into focus through stark juxtaposition, highlighting at the outset what specific challenges the two cities identified with the extremes of motion and of rest will face in the Peloponnesian War.

When the troops sent out from the different Peloponnesian states have gathered at the Isthmus, the Spartan king Archidamus gives a speech to the Peloponnesian commanders in which he expresses his view that the Athenians, confronted with the sight of their own territory ravaged before their eyes (2.11.7), will leave the city to fight the Peloponnesians.

Given the issues raised by Archidamus (viz., military strategy as well as fighting morale), his speech functions most naturally as a direct prelude to military action. However, the expected advance into Athenian territory does not follow. Instead, Archidamus sends a messenger named Melesippus to Athens 'on the chance that the Athenians might perhaps be somewhat more

[7] Jaeger (1934) 485.

[8] On the antithesis between the Spartan and the Athenian character, see Gundert (1968) 115–32, Strauss (1964) 146–49 and 210–17, Edmunds (1975) 89–93, Rood (1998) 43–6, Luginbill (1999) 87–94. Cartledge and Debnar (2006) 561–2 mention indications that on Thucydides' view the antithesis might not be as absolute as the Corinthians represent it. Price (2001) 147–51 does not believe that Thucydides endorses the criticism of the Spartan character implied in the portrait provided by the Corinthians.

given to yielding when seeing them [i.e., the Peloponnesians] already on the march' (εἴ τι ἄρα μᾶλλον ἐνδοῖεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁρῶντες σφᾶς ἤδη ἐν ὁδῷ ὄντας, 2.12.1). And yet, Melesippus is not even allowed to enter the city. Archidamus has to accept 'that the Athenians will not yet yield' (ὅτι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδέν πω ἐνδώσουσιν, 2.12.4). The repetition of the verb ἐνδίδωμι draws attention to Archidamus' concern with the vague possibility of Athenian compliance, an issue that will become prominent in due course.

As a result of the failed embassy, Archidamus 'advanced towards [or, alternatively, into] their [sc. the Athenians'] territory' (προυχώρει ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν, 2.12.4). Jacqueline de Romilly has rightly drawn attention to the deceptive phrasing of this passage: although in the present circumstances it most naturally suggests that Archidamus advanced 'into' Athenian territory, this is not what actually happens. For the next five chapters (2.13–17), Thucydides moves his focus to Athens to recount Pericles' concurrent countermeasures. In the meantime, the reader is left hanging with the phrase προυχώρει ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν. When Thucydides returns to the Peloponnesian army, one's natural assumption is that the Peloponnesian troops have in the meantime entered Athenian territory. However, the reader learns that the Peloponnesians have in fact advanced no further than the border separating Athens from Boeotia (2.18.1–2). The preposition εἰς has set the reader on the wrong track: the Athenians have not advanced 'into', but merely 'in the direction of' Athenian territory. Thucydides' account thus conveys the impression of failed forward motion.

Another disappointment of expectations follows in due course: Archidamus decides to halt and besiege the fortified border town of Oenoe. The delay causes considerable frustration among the Peloponnesians since it gives the Athenians more time to move their property inside the city. As Thucydides reports, Archidamus' long delay at the Isthmus (ἐπιμονή) and the 'leisureliness' (σχολαιότης) of the march had already earned him criticism before the halt at Oenoe (2.18.3). In this way, Thucydides retrospectively draws explicit attention to the Peloponnesians' excessive slowness, which the arrangement of his narrative had already signaled.

In order to account for the motives for Archidamus' halt at Oenoe, Thucydides reports the following widely held view: he halted 'because, as it is said, he expected that the Athenians would yield somewhat as long as their land was still unravaged and would shrink from allowing it to be laid waste' (προσδεχόμενος, ὡς λέγεται, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς γῆς ἔτι ἀκεραίου οὔσης ἐνδώσειν τι καὶ κατοκνήσειν περιιδεῖν αὐτὴν τμηθεῖσαν, 2.18.5).[9] Through

[9] As de Romilly (1962) 288–9, 293 and Hunter (1973) 15–16 have pointed out, this forecast, and the strategy based on it (i.e., the *hesitation* to ravage Athenian territory in the hope that the Athenians will yield), contradicts the expectation that Archidamus expresses in his earlier speech at the Isthmus (2.11.6–8) and that Thucydides will pick up in due course (2.20.2) when supplying the motive for Archidamus' subsequent halt at Acharnae (i.e., the *resolve* to ravage Athenian territory in the hope that the Athenians will be provoked to offer

specific echoes, this passage recalls the ineffectual delegation of Melesippus: each time, an expectation of Archidamus' (*προσδεχόμενος*, 2.18.5 ~ *εἴ τι ἄρα*, 2.12.1) is directed towards the possibility that the Athenians might 'yield' (*ἐνδώσειν*, 2.18.15 ~ *ἐνδοῖεν*, 2.12.1, *ἐνδώσουσιν*, 2.12.4). Drawing attention to the repetition of the forms of *ἐνδίδωμι*, de Romilly rightly observes that Archidamus seems to experience the same episode twice.[10]

Once it becomes clear even to Archidamus that the Athenians are unwilling to comply, 'then at long last they set out from there … and invaded Attica' (*οὕτω δὴ ὁρμήσαντες ἀπ' αὐτῆς … ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν*, 2.19.1). As de Romilly has observed, the phrase *οὕτω δή* is another echo of the earlier delay at the Isthmus: Thucydides had used the same phrase to segue from the failed mission of Melesippus into the Peloponnesians' marching off from the Isthmus (*οὕτω δή*, 2.12.4).[11] The impression of Archidamus' newfound decisiveness is immediately undermined by the flashback to the previous episode, with its frustrated expectation that, now at last, determined action would follow.

The scepticism aroused in the reader immediately proves justified. The first phrase used by Thucydides to describe the Peloponnesians' advance into Attica is *καὶ καθεζόμενοι*—'and they halted' (2.19.2). Their motive is to ravage (*ἔτεμνον*, 2.19.2) Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. Next, they proceed to march against Acharnae, but another halt immediately follows: 'and halting at this place they pitched camp, and they stayed there for a long time and kept on ravaging the country' (*καὶ καθεζόμενοι ἐς αὐτὸ στρατόπεδόν τε ἐποιήσαντο χρόνον τε πολὺν ἐμμείναντες ἔτεμνον*, 2.19.2). The repetition of the phrase *καὶ καθεζόμενοι* as well as the verb *ἔτεμνον*, both of which have already appeared in connection with the stop at Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, suggests that, yet again, Archidamus replays an earlier episode.

Archidamus' curious procedure is meant to baffle the reader. Otherwise, Thucydides would not have felt the need to supply the following explanation: 'It is said that it was with the following idea in mind that Archidamus remained in the area of Acharnae, with his troops drawn up with a view to battle, and did not descend into the plain during this invasion …' (*γνώμῃ δὲ τοιᾷδε λέγεται τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον περί τε τὰς Ἀχαρνὰς ὡς ἐς μάχην ταξάμενον μεῖναι καὶ ἐς τὸ πεδίον ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἐσβολῇ οὐ καταβῆναι*, 2.20.1). The chief

battle). Unlike de Romilly and Hunter, I take the view that the ascription of contradictory motives contributes to Archidamus' characterisation: Thucydides' goal is to dramatise the wavering course of a man who is forced to conduct a war that he considers entirely mistaken (1.80.1–2, 81.6).

[10] de Romilly (1962) 291. De Romilly goes on to observe that, despite the resemblance, the two passages also mark a progression (292), but, as I show in what follows, Thucydides' goal is to bring home to the reader that Archidamus is entrapped in a circle.

[11] de Romilly (1962) 294. For *οὕτω δή* (meaning 'then at length' and introducing an apodosis), see LSJ s. v. *οὕτως* A.I.7, Classen–Steup (1963) IV.67 (*ad* 4.30.3, line 7); Fantasia (2003) *ad* 2.19.1 ('per enfatizzare la proposizione principale').

reason for the halt is Archidamus' expectation that the Athenians might meet the Peloponnesian army in battle at Acharnae (2.20.2). However, Archidamus' determination to meet an Athenian sally is not resolute. While halting at Acharnae, Archidamus also considers another possibility: 'And even if the Athenians should not come out during this invasion, it would be less intimidating, on a future occasion thereafter, to ravage the plain and to proceed up to the city itself' (*εἴ τε καὶ μὴ ἐπεξέλθοιεν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἐσβολῇ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδεέστερον ἤδη ἐς τὸ ὕστερον τό τε πεδίον τεμεῖν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν χωρήσεσθαι*, 2.20.4). Raids on Athenian territory will be less intimidating in the future because, in Archidamus' view, the Acharnians will no longer be willing to fight, and the Athenian populace will be split over the issue of a sortie (2.20.4). Two conclusions follow: first, Archidamus knows that, if he were to push ahead as far as the city's walls, the Athenians would be even more likely to come out, but he fears this possibility; second, Archidamus welcomes a scenario in which the Athenians, with their divided opinions, will be less inclined to face the Spartans in open battle in the future. Given that these considerations are on Archidamus' mind, his willingness to provoke an open battle turns out to be highly dubious.

Given these ambiguities of Archidamus' intentions, the use of the particle *ὡς* in the phrase *ὡς ἐς μάχην* at 2.20.1 deserves attention. According to Classen–Steup, *ὡς* combined with prepositions such as *ἐπί* or *ἐς* usually signifies 'intention' or 'purpose' in Thucydides.[12] Yet at least when used with participles, *ὡς* can mean 'as if'.[13] It is not entirely clear whether in the present passage *ὡς ἐς μάχην* means 'having drawn up his troops *in order to do* battle' or 'having drawn up his troops *as if* for battle'. It is striking that, in the passage in question, the addition of *ὡς* is entirely optional. If Thucydides had omitted the word, the phrase would have been free from any ambiguity. By inserting the particle, Thucydides subtly accentuates the indecisiveness that afflicts Archidamus. By all appearances Archidamus himself is not entirely certain about his own motives: does he really intend to do battle, or does he merely want to act as if?

As de Romilly has pointed out, the phrase 'it is said' (*λέγεται*) that Thucydides uses in alleging the motive for Archidamus' halt recalls the same words from the episode of the delay at Oenoe, where it refers to Archidamus' motives for his failure to invade directly (*ὡς λέγεται*, 2.18.5).[14] What is more, both the report of the stop at Acharnae and the associated story of Oenoe

[12] Classen–Steup (1963) I.149 (*ad* 1.48.1, line 2): 'Absicht, Vorsatz'.

[13] LSJ s.v. *ὡς* C.I.1.

[14] de Romilly (1962) 294. In a study of Thucydides' source citations, Gray (2011) 79–82 has observed that Thucydides tends to use this formula in order to highlight Spartan indecision and torpidity as a cause of missed opportunities. Westlake (1977) 352 draws attention to the repeated use of *λέγεται* on 'occasions when Spartan leadership was or might have been subjected to criticism on the ground that it was insufficiently venturesome or determined'.

abound in terms that signify waiting and standstill.[15] In addition, both at Acharnae and at Oenoe, Archidamus' actions ensue from a distinct 'expectation' about Athenian behaviour (Acharnae: *ἤλπιζεν*, 20.2; *ἐδόκουν*, 20.4 ~ Oenoe: *προσδεχόμενος*, 18.5). Finally, on both occasions the expectation has to do with the Athenians' unwillingness to 'allow their land to be ravaged' (Acharnae: *τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἂν περιιδεῖν τμηθῆναι*, 20.2; *οὐ περιόψεσθαι … τὰ σφέτερα διαφθαρέντα*, 20.4 ~ Oenoe: *περιιδεῖν αὐτὴν* [sc. *τὴν γῆν*] *τμηθεῖσαν*, 18.5).[16]

In these various ways, specific echoes link the halt at Acharnae with each of Archidamus' preceding two stops: that at Oenoe and the other at Eleusis and in the Thriasian plain. Both of the preceding pauses did not have the intended effect. Further echoes have already connected the stop at Oenoe with the lingering at the Isthmus. The structure of repetition directs the reader ever further backwards. The echoes arouse the expectation that the strategy at Acharnae will likewise come to nothing.

The pillaging of Acharnae, sixty stadia (i.e. about 11 km) distant from Attica, brings the Athenians to the brink of a breakout. As several scholars have observed, Thucydides' report of the Athenian reaction to the devastation of Acharnae is connected via another wealth of verbal parallels with Archidamus' speech at the Isthmus and with Thucydides' own description of Archidamus' motives for the halt at Acharnae.[17] On the interpretation of both de Romilly and Hunter, the main function of the parallels is to show that Archidamus' anticipation of the Athenian reaction has been correct.[18] However, this facet must not obscure the fact that, at the end of the day, the Athenians again do not act as Archidamus expects: due to Pericles' intervention, they do not face the Peloponnesians in open battle. In this connection, it is important to realise that there is an ironic twist to Archidamus' narrow failure. The Athenians' agitation is not least due to the intense visual impact of the destruction of their territory (*ὁρῶσιν*, 2.11.6; *ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι*, 11.7; *ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ὁρᾶν*, 11.7; *ἐν τῷ ἐμφανεῖ*, 21.2; *ὃ οὔπω ἑοράκεσαν*, 21.2). How much more promising would it have been, then, to

[15] Oenoe (pointed out by de Romilly (1962) 292): *ἐνδιέτριψαν χρόνον*, 18.2; *ἐπιμονή*, 18.3; *σχολαιότης*, 18.3; *ἐπίσχεσις*, 18.3; *μέλλησιν*, 18.4; *ἐν τῇ καθέδρᾳ*, 18.5; Acharnae: *καθεζόμενοι*, 19.2; *χρόνον … πολὺν ἐμμείναντες*, 19.2; *μεῖναι*, 20.1; *καθήμενος*, 20.3.

[16] According to de Romilly (1962) 293, Thucydides wanted to impress the difference between the two episodes on the reader: whereas at Oenoe Archidamus hopes that the Athenians will 'yield' (*ἐνδώσειν*, 2.18.5), at Acharnae he expects that they will come out to fight (*ἐπεξελθεῖν*, 20.2; *ὁρμήσειν*, 20.4). However, *pace* de Romilly, the episodes are in fact connected by a deeper parallelism: on each occasion, Archidamus stops his advance due to the expectation that the Athenians will act in a specific way, and each time this forecast will be frustrated. What is more, as has been pointed out above, Archidamus' expectation of an Athenian sally is less straightforward than de Romilly thinks.

[17] de Romilly (1962) 296–7; Hunter (1973) 12–13 and 17; Rusten (1989) *ad* 2.11.7.

[18] de Romilly (1962) 298; Hunter (1973) 20.

lead the Spartan army directly before the walls of the city! This interpretation receives support from Pericles' slight deviation from his doctrine of military non-engagement with the invading Peloponnesian army: he sends out horsemen to prevent scattered Spartan contingents from ravaging 'the fields near the city' (τοὺς ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως, 2.22.2). The most plausible explanation is that the Athenians would have felt an even greater temptation to offer battle if they saw the Peloponnesians devastate the immediate environs of the city itself.

On a later occasion in the *History*, Thucydides is unmistakably clear that it is imperative for an invading army to make the most of the factors of speed and surprise. During the critical stage of the Sicilian Expedition, Demosthenes arrives with his reinforcements at Syracuse. Considering swiftness to be essential (νομίσας οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι διατρίβειν, 7.42.3), he wants to avoid reiterating the mistake of his predecessor Nicias, who squandered his chances by failing to attack immediately (7.42.3). Upon arrival, speedy action (ὅτι τάχος, 7.42.3) is thus Demosthenes' highest priority. As Nicias' failure to strike fast shows, the attacked city has the chance to regain its composure when the initial moment of shock has subsided. Archidamus allows the Athenians to do just that.

The upshot of this account is that Thucydides does not just emphasise the slowness of the Peloponnesians' advance. The repetitive circle (suggested by the string of echoes) highlights their incapacity for genuine motion, i.e., for action that would effect a substantive change in the situation. Even when the Spartans are on the attack, their chief concern is with delay, misdirected anticipation, and repetition. The reader is left with the impression that the height of Spartan motion is still effective standstill.

When Thucydides turns to reporting the Athenians' reaction to the Spartan invasion, it becomes clear that the Athenians find it unbearably difficult to sit still and wait a situation out. The Periclean war strategy presupposes that the Athenians accept their immobility in their Attic home territory, while simultaneously retaining a maximum degree of mobility at sea (1.143.4–5; 2.13.2, 65.7). On Pericles' view, Athens will be victorious provided that she maintains this balance between motion and rest. But already at the sight of the first Spartan invasion of Attica, the Athenians, overtaken by an extreme impulse towards motion, become frantic to break out (2.21.2).

In marked contrast to the steadiness of repetition that marks the narrative of the Spartan advance, the Athenians' reaction is a bustle of different reactions that go off in all sorts of directions. References to 'gatherings' (κατὰ ξυστάσεις, 2.21.3) and 'disputation' (ἐν πολλῇ ἔριδι, 2.21.3) suggest a back-and-forth of different opinions among the Athenians. A crisp μέν–δέ antithesis, underscored by strict formal parallelism, highlights the clash between sharply opposite viewpoints: 'some urging to go out, some others not allowing it' (οἱ μὲν κελεύοντες ἐπεξιέναι, οἱ δέ τινες οὐκ ἐῶντες, 2.21.3).

As the verb forms *ὥρμητο* and *ἐνῆγον* (2.21.3) indicate, eagerness and mutual incitement are widespread. The verbs show that the prevailing mood is a foretaste of the still more excited atmosphere that will prevail at Athens on the eve of the Sicilian Expedition. On this subsequent occasion, Thucydides will draw on the same verbs to capture the seething atmosphere at Athens (*ἐνῆγε προθυμότατα*, 6.15.2; *ὥρμηντο*, 6.6.1, *ἐξώρμησαν*, 6.2, *ὥρμησθε*, 9.3, *ὥρμηντο*, 19.1, *ὡρμημένους*, 20.1, *ὥρμηντο*, 24.2). Thucydides also mentions that the young men in particular were eager for the sortie (*μάλιστα τῇ νεότητι*, 2.21.2) because they, unlike the elders who witnessed the Persian Wars, had never experienced this shocking sight (2.21.2). At Athens, the naturally more hot-headed and mercurial young men tend to take precedence over the elders in devising action. This also anticipates the heavy stress on the young men's agitation for the Sicilian Expedition (6.12.2 (two references), 17.1, 18.6 (three references), 24.3): on the latter occasion, Nicias even worries that the eagerness of the young men will cow the more sceptical elders into compliance (6.13.1). A vein of hysteria is added by the reference to 'oracle-mongers' who 'chanted oracles of all sorts' (*χρησμολόγοι τε ᾖδον χρησμοὺς παντοίους*, 2.21.3). This aspect also looks forward to the situation on the eve of the Sicilian Expedition: 'oracle-mongers' and 'prophets' took a leading role in inducing the hope in the Athenians that they would conquer Sicily (*τοῖς χρησμολόγοις τε καὶ μάντεσι καὶ ὁπόσοι τι τότε αὐτοὺς θειάσαντες ἐπήλπισαν ὡς λήψονται Σικελίαν*, 8.1.1). The impression of Athens as a buzzing hothouse of widely different opinions is summed up by the phrase 'in every regard the city was in a state of irritation' (*παντί τε τρόπῳ ἀνηρέθιστο ἡ πόλις*, 2.21.3). Whereas the extended account of the march of the Peloponnesian army induces the impression of immobility and repetition, the much shorter flashlight report of the situation at Athens depicts a city brimming with motion that strains in all sorts of different directions.

Through this juxtaposition, Thucydides' account of the first official operations of the Peloponnesian War highlights the vast dichotomy between Athens and Sparta. Both can be identified with an extreme value of either motion or rest. In the new era brought by the Peloponnesian War, these extremes will get each side into trouble: whereas the principle of rest makes the Spartans incapable of posing a challenge to the Athenians, the Athenians would almost certainly face defeat if at the sight of the Spartan army they gave in to their impulse for motion.

Coincidence of Motion and Standstill (I): The Spartan Nadir at Pylos

While the opponents in the War represent, between themselves, the antitheses of motion and rest, they both experience on the occasion of their most

devastating defeats, suffered by the Spartans at Pylos and by the Athenians in Sicily, the simultaneity of swirling agitation and numbing deadlock.

Thucydides' report on the Spartan reaction to the defeat at Pylos merits particular attention. Experiencing a total loss of confidence, the Spartans lose faith in the possibility of any effective action: 'they came to believe that they would fail in whatever they might set in motion' (*πᾶν ὅτι κινήσειαν ᾤοντο ἁμαρτήσεσθαι*, 4.55.4). While the War is identified by Thucydides as the prime mover, the *κίνησις μεγίστη* (1.1.2), the Spartans have lost faith in their ability to initiate any expedient motion at all.

The Spartans' loss of faith in the possibility of motion derives, in turn, from their experience of a world that swirls around them: 'The vagaries of fortune, which had happened to them in great numbers and within a short period and contrary to expectation, induced the greatest consternation in them' (*τὰ τῆς τύχης πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ ξυμβάντα παρὰ λόγον αὐτοῖς ἔκπληξιν μεγίστην παρεῖχε*, 4.55.3). In being exposed to sudden and extreme shifts of fortune, the Spartans experience nothing less than the supreme *κίνησις*. Yet, as the following quotation shows, this extreme of motion has its flipside in the vanishing of purposeful human mobility (4.55.1):

> *γεγενημένου μὲν τοῦ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πάθους ἀνελπίστου καὶ μεγάλου, Πύλου δὲ ἐχομένης καὶ Κυθήρων καὶ πανταχόθεν σφᾶς περιεστῶτος πολέμου ταχέος καὶ ἀπροφυλάκτου.*
>
> The misfortune that had happened to them on the island was unexpected and great, with Pylos and Cythera occupied and with a war, which was quick and took unforeseeable turns, encompassing them from every side.

Several features of this passage draw attention to the Spartans' passivity and their confinement through circumstances: the perfect forms of *γίγνομαι* and *περιίσταμαι*, verbs that taken by themselves would already suggest human passivity, underline the static, situational character of the Spartans' experience; the spatial adverb *πανταχόθεν* along with the prefix *περι-* in *περιεστῶτος* suggest the Spartans' encompassment from all sides; and the noun *πάθος* strongly underlines the passivity of the Spartans in all this. While emphasising the static and passive dimension, Thucydides simultaneously captures the Spartans' entanglement in a vortex of motion: due to its quickness and unpredictability (*πολέμου ταχέος καὶ ἀπροφυλάκτου*), the War resembles a formidable super-agent that encircles the Spartans (*περιεστῶτος*). Through the dazzling turns of events, the Spartans undergo an experience marked by the simultaneity of motion and standstill: while the world around them moves with breath-taking speed, they themselves are trapped in a deadlock. In all this, the swiftly moving opponent is not identified, as one might expect, with the Athenians, but with the War itself.

The Abatement of Athenian Motion: Demosthenes' Trip to Sicily

It is remarkable that the Athenians, the paragon of motion in Thucydides, eventually succumb to the same state of immobility that befalls the Spartans in the wake of Pylos amidst a rapidly moving hostile environment. When approaching their nadir in Sicily, the Athenians are increasingly affected by uncharacteristic inertia. This theme becomes prominent from the moment when the Athenians respond to Nicias' lengthy letter in which he describes the critical situation faced by the expeditionary force in Sicily. Nicias writes that, regardless of what the Athenians decide to do, they should 'do it at the beginning of spring immediately and without any delay' (*ἅμα τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς καὶ μὴ ἐς ἀναβολὰς πράσσετε*, 7.15.2). At first, it seems as if the Athenians comply with Nicias' appeal: after they have sent out Eurymedon with ten ships to Sicily immediately after the arrival of the report from Sicily (7.16.2), Demosthenes, who has gathered troops among the Athenian allies during the winter, departs with a large fleet for Sicily in early spring (7.20.1–2). The reference to the phrase 'immediately when spring began' (*τοῦ ἦρος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου*, 7.20.1) picks up Nicias' request that the Athenians send reinforcements 'immediately at the beginning of spring' (*ἅμα τῷ ἦρι εὐθύς*, 7.15.2). The echo raises the expectation that the Athenians have heeded Nicias' urgent appeal that they should 'not make postponements' (*μὴ ἐς ἀναβολὰς πράσσετε*, 7.15.2).

However, contrary to this initial impression, Demosthenes does not make directly for Sicily, but has received instructions to support, before crossing the Ionian Sea for Sicily, another Athenian general, a man named Charicles, who has been entrusted with operations along the coast of Laconia (7.20.2). Even this step does not follow immediately, but for the time being Demosthenes stops at Aegina, where he 'kept on waiting in case any part of his armament had been left behind, and also for Charicles to receive the Argives [viz. hoplites to support Charicles' force]' (*τοῦ στρατεύματός τε εἴ τι ὑπελέλειπτο περιέμενε καὶ τὸν Χαρικλέα τοὺς Ἀργείους παραλαβεῖν*, 7.20.3).

With Demosthenes' voyage thus suspended, Thucydides turns his attention back to Sicily where Gylippus, the commander sent out by Sparta, arrives with the considerable reinforcements that he has gathered among the cities of Sicily over the winter (*ἄγων ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ὧν ἔπεισε στρατιὰν ὅσην ἑκασταχόθεν πλείστην ἐδύνατο*, 7.21.1). Given the different geographical scale, it is natural enough that Gylippus arrives faster than Demosthenes with his reinforcements. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that by the beginning of spring Gylippus' mission has been successfully accomplished while Demosthenes does not even have his forces gathered. Without much ado, the Syracusans, eager to make use of the advantage afforded by the fresh troops, attack and capture the forts at Plemmyrium, an event that

Thucydides calls the worst setback suffered by the Athenians in Sicily thus far (7.24.3).

After the conclusion of the account of this military episode, the narrative returns to Demosthenes, who is only now finally setting out from Aegina to meet Charicles (7.26.1). Thucydides then gives a detailed report of the places ravaged by Charicles and Demosthenes in Laconia and of the establishment of a fort that they build opposite Cythera (7.26.2). After these operations, the reader, aware of the speedy and successful accomplishment of Gylippus' mission, expects that Demosthenes will now finally set out to bring the urgently needed reinforcements. Instead, one is surprised to learn, again without the benefit of any previous indication, that Demosthenes now sails to Corcyra in order to receive yet further reinforcements (7.26.3). Thucydides then presents two events that are unconnected to the story of Demosthenes' voyage: first, the report of the damage done to Athens by the Spartan fort at Deceleia (7.27.3–28), and, second, the episode of Thracian mercenaries who arrive too late at Athens to join Demosthenes and inflict carnage at Mycalessus on their way back to Thrace (7.27.1–2, 29–30). Through the insertion of these reports, Thucydides stretches narrative time, just as he did with the account of the capture of Plemmyrium. When he turns his attention back to the voyage of the relief mission, Demosthenes has still not arrived at Corcyra, let alone Sicily, but stops at various other places to collect additional troops. Thucydides again makes a point of enumerating each place where Demosthenes stops,[19] thereby extending his report of Demosthenes' trip to maximum length.

While Demosthenes is occupied with these matters, he meets Eurymedon, who is on his way back from Sicily and informs him of the capture of Plemmyrium (7.31.3). This incident prods the reader to wonder whether Demosthenes will speed up at long last, but this expectation is instantaneously disappointed with the arrival of Conon, the Athenian commander at Naupactus, who asks for support against a superior force of Corinthian ships (7.31.4). Demosthenes and Eurymedon give him ten ships: and not just any, but the best sailors of their fleet (7.31.5). Thereafter, Eurymedon sails to Corcyra to levy troops and Demosthenes continues to gather men in Acarnania (7.31.5).

After the troops are finally gathered, the Athenians make the journey west across the Ionian Sea (7.33.3). Yet, even now, they do not head directly to Syracuse, but continue to pause at various places in the hope that they will gather further reinforcements: these are the Iapygian Islands known as Choerades (7.33.4), Metapontum (33.5), and Thuria (33.5–6). Then, they decide to hold a review of their armament 'in case anyone had been left behind' (*εἴ τις ὑπελέλειπτο*, 7.33.6). Thereupon, the fleet and the land forces are split, whereby, as H. D. Westlake remarks, further delay must have been

[19] 7.31.1: Pheia in Elis; 31.2: Zacynthus and Cephallenia; 31.2: contact with Messenians at Naupactus; 31.2: ports of Alyzeia and Anactorium in Acarnania.

caused.[20] Thucydides enumerates the various places which the land forces touch on during their march (7.35.1–2). This report gives the historian a chance to mention the refusal of the people of Croton to let the Athenians traverse their territory, necessitating a detour (7.35.2). Here as before, Thucydides' meticulous enumeration of the various places stretches narrative time, thus inducing the impression of an excessively slow forward motion.

Due to his enterprising spirit and resoluteness in action, Demosthenes stands out among the Athenian generals that appear in Thucydides. As Connor observes, it is easy to guess why the Athenians have selected Demosthenes for the reinforcement mission for Sicily: 'We have seen him in action often enough to predict his strategy. In particular his Ambraciot campaign (3.102.3–114.4) and his brilliant success at Pylos (4.29–40) have shown him to be a commander who believes in swift and decisive action often enough to predict his strategy'.[21] Thus, Demosthenes ought to be exactly the right man for the tasks at hand, bringing speedy relief to the Athenians at Syracuse and boosting their morale. Despite this initial expectation, however, Demosthenes' journey, with its constant interruptions, rather recalls Archidamus' indecisive invasion of Athenian territory.

The effect is still further heightened by the implicit juxtaposition of Demosthenes' trip with the journey of the original armada under the lead of Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus. As Westlake points out, 'the voyage of Demosthenes to Sicily is described with a much greater wealth of detail than that of Nicias and his colleagues two years earlier'.[22] Westlake goes on to observe that Thucydides says nothing about the motives inducing Demosthenes to make the various stops. Westlake considers this simply to be due to Thucydides' lack of information,[23] but, while this may be so, Thucydides' silence inevitably has a specific narrative effect: while Nicias has stressed that speed is of the essence, Demosthenes' slowness, which lacks obvious justification, appears negligent and out of character, both for Athenians in general and for Demosthenes in particular. Due to the lack of explanation, the reader is left with the impression of a mysterious event, as if the Athenians have been smitten with unaccountable torpidity. As several scholars have pointed out, a central theme of the Sicilian narrative is the Athenians' puzzling loss of their characteristic speed and zest for action, qualities that progressively align themselves with the Syracusans, just as if

[20] Westlake (1968) 266–7.

[21] Connor (1984) 191. A similar assessment is also made by Westlake (1968) 97, 264. Strauss (1964) 197 memorably calls Demosthenes 'the most lovable of Thucydides' characters'.

[22] Westlake (1968) 264.

[23] Westlake (1968) 264.

they were independent forces with a will of their own.[24] By way of an ironic twist, that Athenian general who, unlike Nicias, has nothing in common with the Spartan character[25] succumbs to the ineffective type of motion, previously exemplified by Archidamus' raid of Athenian territory, that is constantly reduced to standstill.

Demosthenes' trip to Sicily conveys the impression of a man who tries to do everything at once: turn the scale at Syracuse, gather as many troops as possible, put pressure on the Spartans at Laconia, and reinforce the Athenians at Naupactus. The compulsive tendency to let no opportunity go unexploited may well be a sign of Athenian *πολυπραγμοσύνη*. According to Ehrenberg, *πολυπραγμοσύνη* refers to 'the characterisation of a dynamic policy which is in complete contrast to the static conservatism of Sparta'.[26] One might also say that the term captures the idea of fully unleashed motion. However, on the occasion of Demosthenes' mission, this bent for hyper-activity ironically leads to circuitousness and delay: seizing every opportunity, Demosthenes in fact loses sight of what is most vital. A frantic striving that goes in every direction results in an effective standstill. In this way, Demosthenes' journey encapsulates the paradoxical coincidence of extreme motion and extreme rest.

Coincidence of Motion and Standstill (II): The Athenian Nadir in Sicily

Once Demosthenes arrives with his reinforcements, the Athenians momentarily overcome their torpor and briefly regain their initiative thanks to the zeal of Demosthenes (7.42.4). Yet, when the first major enterprise launched by Demosthenes, the attempted reconquest of the heights of Epipolae, fails, the foregoing situation is restored. In fact, the generals realise 'that the soldiers were troubled by their abiding on the spot' (*τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀχθομένους τῇ μονῇ*, 7.47.1). The noun *ἡ μονή* suggests fixation to a specific place: the Athenian soldiers are vexed by the immobility that has befallen them.[27] Nevertheless, at this point the Athenians still have it in their power to undertake an orderly retreat. Demosthenes, who appears to have rediscovered his penchant for energetic action since his arrival, forcefully argues for this option (7.47.3–4). However, Nicias, with his usual indirectness and hesitancy, opposes Demosthenes' plan (7.48). Trying to overcome Nicias' opposition, Demosthenes highlights that the Athenians have taken up position in a 'narrow space' (*στενοχωρίᾳ*, 7.49.2), a disadvantage for the

[24] Strauss (1964) 206; Rawlings (1981) 149–50; Connor (1984) 191; Kallet (2001) 160; Taylor (2010) 168.

[25] Strauss (1964) 219 calls Demosthenes a 'thoroughly un-Spartan man'.

[26] Ehrenberg (1947) 47.

[27] Notice that Aristotle uses the plural of *μονή* as an antonym of *κινήσεις* at *de An.* 408b18.

Athenian fleet. The phrase highlights how close the Athenians have come to a state of total immobility. Trying to counter this threat of complete deadlock, Demosthenes urges Nicias to set the army in motion again: 'he said that he was not at all in favour of remaining any longer in the same place, but that they should depart now as quickly as possible and not hesitate any longer' (*οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ οἱ ἔφη ἀρέσκειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτι μένειν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τάχιστα ἤδη ἐξανίστασθαι καὶ μὴ μέλλειν*, 7.49.3). Yet, due to Nicias' opposition, 'hesitation and delay occurred' (*ἀντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου ὄκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο*, 7.49.4). Thucydides' concluding remark on this episode underlines the immobility that has befallen the Athenians: 'The Athenians lingered on in the same way and continued to remain at the spot' (*καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ διεμέλλησάν τε καὶ κατὰ χώραν ἔμενον*, 7.49.4).

When, soon after the report of the debate among the generals, further reinforcements arrive for the Syracusans (7.50.1), Nicias finally gives up his opposition, and the Athenians prepare for retreat. Yet, in this moment, an eclipse of the moon occurs, leading to a complete reversal of the situation. The soldiers are now urging the generals 'to sit tight' (*ἐπισχεῖν*, 7.50.4), and for Nicias the idea of a retreat is, for the time being, out of the question: 'he refused even to deliberate any longer how a move might be made before they had waited thrice nine days, as the soothsayers had ordered' (*οὐδ' ἂν διαβουλεύσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη πρίν, ὡς οἱ μάντεις ἐξηγοῦντο, τρὶς ἐννέα ἡμέρας μεῖναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινηθείη*, 7.50.4). It is striking that, just as the Spartans lose confidence in any kind of 'motion' in the wake of Pylos (4.55.4 *κινήσειαν*), so the Athenians undergo the same experience in Sicily (*κινηθείη*). When the War, 'the greatest *κίνησις*', shakes either of the two warring parties to the core, they simultaneously forsake the power of motion and numbing standstill befalls them. Thucydides sums up the episode: 'And so, because of this, there was more abiding for the Athenians, as they delayed' (*καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις μελλήσασι διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μονὴ ἐγεγένητο*, 7.50.4). Due to the perfective aspect of *ἐγεγένητο*, the sway of the situation over the Athenians becomes apparent. The quasi-passive construction, literally 'there was abiding' instead of 'they abided', likewise brings out the inability to initiate self-propelled motion. From this missed opportunity, the last moment at which an orderly, voluntary retreat would have been possible, the Athenians' fortunes in Sicily decline steadily until their fate is sealed and the whole army is wiped out. Thus, the Athenians' immobility, which represents a leitmotif of the Sicilian narrative, is largely responsible for the unparalleled disaster with which the expedition ends.

Several passages referring to the Athenians' experience in Sicily indicate that the Athenians, while undergoing the paralysis of immobility, are engulfed in rapidly moving circumstances. Before the decisive battle in the Great Harbour, Gylippus, the Spartan commander of the Syracusan forces, describes the situation of the Athenians as follows (7.67.4):

> ὑπερβαλλόντων γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν κακῶν καὶ βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἀπορίας ἐς ἀπόνοιαν καθεστήκασιν … ἀποκινδυνεῦσαι οὕτως ὅπως δύνανται …, ὡς τῶν γε παρόντων οὐκ ἂν πράξαντες χεῖρον.
>
> As the misfortunes confronting them exceed all bounds and they are under the compulsion of their present perplexity, they have resorted to the desperate resolve … of making a hazardous venture, in whatever way they can, … in the belief that they could not possibly fare worse than in their present circumstances.

With καθεστήκασιν, the passage features another perfect form of a compound of ἵσταμαι. The participial phrases with ὑπερβάλλω and βιάζομαι, each with an impersonal agent (τῶν κακῶν and τῆς … ἀπορίας) indicate that it is the situation confronting them, rather than any personal agents, that puts pressure on the Athenians. The nominalised forms of πάρειμι ('to be present') reflect the spatial dimension of circumstances that impose themselves on people, a burden also felt, as noted above, by the Spartans in their dejection after Pylos (4.55.1). The word ἀπορία, with its literal meaning of 'no way out', has the same effect. At the same time, the verb ὑπερβάλλω, which literally means 'to overshoot' and is usually rendered as 'to exceed all bounds' in translations of the present passage,[28] directs attention to the aspect of dynamic motion in the circumstances confronting the Athenians. Since the subject of ὑπερβάλλω is the substantivised neuter τῶν κακῶν, the dynamic opponent is not, just as in the case of the Spartans after Pylos, a human agent, but the terrors in which the War manifests itself.

The passage recalls in both style and content a similar phrase from Thucydides' account of the plague at Athens: 'For, as the evil overpowered them with exceeding severity, human beings, since they did not know what was to become of them, turned towards neglect of both sacred and profane alike' (ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅτι γένωνται, ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων ὁμοίως, 2.52.3). In ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ from the plague passage, the two participial phrases from Gylippus' speech (ὑπερβαλλόντων … τῶν κακῶν καὶ βιαζόμενοι …) have coalesced. In each passage, the evils (expressed through a substantivised form of κακόν) in which the War manifests itself appear at the head of the sentence as the subject of a genitive absolute. Adam Parry has cited the passage about the effects of the plague among various phrases that provide evidence for the tendency that '[t]he Plague itself is likely to appear in active verbs at the beginning of the sentence'.[29] As Parry also observes, '[t]he Plague … is essentially part of the war', and '[m]uch of the language of the Plague, in

[28] LSJ s. v. A.II.3.a.

[29] Parry (1969) 115.

fact, suggests that it comes as a military attack'.[30] Just as the plague puts on the shape of a formidable enemy which, as suggested by its position at the opening of the sentence, overpowers the population of Athens, so the Athenians are exposed to the same experience in Sicily: the force of disasters is best described as a superhuman attacker, who strikes with irresistible force.[31] The destructive motion of the War has been released in full force.

It is significant that, just before stressing the Athenians' experience of a deadlock, Gylippus describes them as frantically moving about: 'How will they not destroy their ships and all be in confusion among themselves because they move about in a way that does not suit them?' (*πῶς οὐ σφαλοῦσί τε τὰς ναῦς καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς πάντες οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν τρόπῳ κινούμενοι ταράξονται*, 7.67.2). This very experience of uncontrolled motion will reduce the Athenians to a state of blockage, and so the extremes of motion and rest come to coincide again.

The Ascendancy of Pure Φύσις in the Peloponnesian War

Once fully unleashed, the Peloponnesian War reintroduces the situation that Thucydides described in the Archaeology: the exposure of human beings to uncontrolled motion, which simultaneously reduces them to immobility. The slow and laborious process of civilisation appears to have been undone, and the Greeks suffer a relapse into the pre-civilised state described in the Archaeology. In his account of Corcyrean *stasis*, Thucydides observes that the evils descending upon the Greek world during *stasis* have their origin in 'the nature of human beings' (*ἡ … φύσις ἀνθρώπων*, 3.82.2) and are destined to recur, as long as this nature stays what it is. In several other central passages, Thucydidean speakers likewise single out *φύσις* as the power ultimately responsible for human behaviour (e.g., 1.76.3; 3.45.7; 5.105.2).

In the excursus on *stasis* at Corcyra, Thucydides provides a distilled account of what the relapse from civilisation into the raw state of nature looks like. The situation that prevails under *stasis* reflects the simultaneity of extreme motion and extreme rest. Thucydides remarks that, during *stasis*, 'Greekness in its entirety was, one might say, stirred' (*πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη*, 3.82.1). Scholars have pointed out that this comment recalls the earlier designation of the Peloponnesian War as 'the greatest commotion' (*κίνησις μεγίστη*, 1.1.2).[32] The echo encapsulates the relationship between *stasis* and the Peloponnesian War: as Colin Macleod and Nicole Loraux have observed, they are intimately related and mutually reflect each

[30] Parry (1969) 116.

[31] In addition to the parallel discussed here, Thucydides uses several other echoes to forge a link between the disaster in Sicily and the description of the plague: see Joho (2017) 38–43.

[32] Connor (1984) 103; Loraux (2009) 265; Hornblower (1991) 479.

other.[33] It turns out that if a city is in the grips of revolution, the forces of motion are fully unleashed. This, however, is only half the story.

As Loraux has pointed out, the Greek word usually translated as 'revolution', namely *στάσις*, is marked by a peculiar ambiguity: while, in the realm of politics, it suggests the idea of 'standing up, rising up, agitation', the word generally also signifies 'standing' in the sense of 'standing position, immobility'. Whereas in the former sense it is equivalent to *κίνησις*, in the latter it is used, for instance by Plato, as the opposite of *κίνησις*.[34] Loraux suggests that the Greeks, aware of the ambiguity of the noun, capitalised on its paradoxical implications and represented *stasis* (viz., civil strife) as 'a fixed explosive', i.e., as both standstill and motion:[35] under conditions of *stasis*, a city is both shaken by relentless conflict and hamstrung by agony.

In the section on revolution in Corcyra, Thucydides not only uses the noun *στάσις* (3.82.1, 82.2, 83.1) and the verb *στασιάζω* (3.82.3), but also a series of compounds of *ἵστημι* (*κατέστη*, 3.81.5; *ἐφιστῶνται*, 3.82.2; *καθισταμένων*, 3.82.8; *κατέστη*, 3.83.1). Commenting on the role of such words in Thucydides, Parry has observed that, when used in the middle or in the intransitive active, the verbs 'signify the putting into a position of something, or the taking up of a position'.[36] In this way, the compounds of *ἵστημι* tend to capture that human beings find themselves placed amidst settled circumstances conditioning their behaviour. The string of these words draws attention to the more subdued, but nonetheless relevant, semantic dimension of the word *στάσις*: revolution also signifies entrapment in a situation that severely reduces the possibility of prudent, self-determined agency. The phrasing of the following passage hints at the etymological link: 'In this way, every kind of depravity occurred to the civilisation of Greece in the wake of acts of civil war' (*οὕτω πᾶσα ἰδέα κατέστη κακοτροπίας διὰ τὰς στάσεις τῷ* Ἑλληνικῷ, 3.83.1). The form *κατέστη* suggests the onset of a settled state that imposes itself on the Greek world. The close proximity of this word and the noun *στάσεις* calls attention to the literal meaning of the noun (viz., 'standing, station'), thus highlighting the static connotations that the word can convey. Thus, agitation and paralysis of the city are two sides of the same coin: the regression of the city into the state of nature.

[33] Macleod (1983b) 123–4; Loraux (2009) 265.

[34] Loraux (2002) 104. In the *Sophist* (255e11–12) Plato expresses the antithesis between motion and rest through the terms *στάσις* and *κίνησις*. In the *Republic* (436c5–6) he captures the same idea through the corresponding verbal forms *ἑστάναι* and *κινεῖσθαι*.

[35] Loraux (2002) 106.

[36] Parry (1981) 99.

Coming Face to Face with Nature: Peloponnesian War and Ultimate Reality

Hadot has observed that the term *φύσις* at first was invariably used with a genitive indicating the specific entity whose 'nature' was at stake, but that this qualification was increasingly dropped over the course of the fifth century: 'Here, *physis* is no longer the form *of* something but designates the process of formation or its result, taken in general and in an abstract way'.[37] *Φύσις* thus became a term that referred to the nature of the world as a whole. In fact, one of the perennial problems occupying Pre-Socratic philosophy concerns the question whether the cosmos is, at its heart, being or becoming, unchangeable or in flux—in other words, rest or motion. The paradigmatic positions in this quarrel are those of Parmenides and Heraclitus: while Parmenides champions immobility as the ultimate cosmic principle, Heraclitus can be taken to reserve the same position for flux.[38] Another thinker who propounds the primacy of motion is Anaximander. According to Simplicius, the followers of both Anaximander and the Atomists 'used to call motion eternal' (*τὴν κίνησιν ἀίδιον ἔλεγον*, 12 A 17, 24 D–K): 'For without motion there is neither birth nor destruction' (*ἄνευ γὰρ κινήσεως οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις ἢ φθορά*, 12 A 17, 24–5 D–K). As we have seen, the opposition between motion and rest is likewise a concern that crystallises in the work of Thucydides. Through his account of the Peloponnesian War, he seems to take an implicit stance on the Pre-Socratic debate about the ultimate nature of the cosmos.

Parry has shown that Thucydides often employs the word *ἔργον*, used as an indication of what is factual and real, as a synonym for war.[39] From this peculiarity, Parry draws the following conclusion: 'Thucydides … is indicating, building the notion into the structure of his language, that power and war are simply aspects of reality. War is the final reality',[40] or, as he writes elsewhere, 'the *ergon par excellence*'.[41] Another way of stating Parry's point is that the Peloponnesian War is full-blown, undiminished *φύσις*, the

[37] Hadot (2006) 19.

[38] Cf. Schadewaldt (1978) 401 on Heraclitus: 'Der Hauptbegriff, der noch nicht in dieser ausgesprochenen Form bei ihm [sc. Heraclitus] auftaucht, ist der Begriff der Bewegung. Ich kenne das Wort *kinesis* bei ihm nicht, aber daß die Bewegung es ist, die als ein Unbezweifelbares für ihn das Sein bestimmt, im Gegensatz zu Parmenides, … ist wohl nach allem klargeworden'. Cf. 330 on Parmenides' characterisation of being in DK 28 B 8, 26–27 (*αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν* | *ἔστιν ἄναρχον ἄπαυστον*): 'Damit taucht der Grundbegriff der *kínesis* auf, der von jetzt ab das ganze griechische Naturdenken beherrschen wird bis zu Aristoteles … *kínesis* ist dabei aber nicht nur unsere Ortsbewegung, sondern Bewegung und Veränderung jeder Art … Die Unbewegtheit wird jetzt vom Sein selber ausgesagt'.

[39] Parry (1972) 52.

[40] Parry (1972) 58.

[41] Parry (1970) 19.

ultimate reality of things. The Athenian ambassadors at Melos do in fact use the term *φύσις* with manifest cosmic resonance: they identify it with a force that determines the behaviour not just of human beings but also of the gods (5.105.2). In the manner noted by Hadot, the Athenians do not, in making this claim, attach a genitive or an attribute to the noun *φύσις*, so as to name the specific domain of entities whose nature is at stake. Instead, they simply refer to *φύσις ἀναγκαία*: the compulsory force of nature, a comprehensive cosmic principle that governs even the behaviour of the gods.[42]

In equating the world as revealed in the Peloponnesian War with *φύσις*, Thucydides may well be responding to the aforementioned longstanding debate in Pre-Socratic philosophy. Based on the evidence of Thucydides' text, neither is Heraclitus right in claiming that the cosmos is constant flux nor Parmenides when he maintains that Being, ultimate reality, is at rest. Instead, when the cosmos reveals itself in its barest actuality, motion and standstill come to coincide. *Φύσις*, as revealed by the Peloponnesian War, is simultaneously motion and rest: the rapidly moving events of the War have their flipside in the passivity of human beings who are confined by circumstances, which reflect the limitations imposed on their endeavours by nature.

Just after the chapter on method and before beginning his narrative proper, Thucydides refers to a list of 'sufferings' (*παθήματα*, 1.23.1) that reveal the unparalleled greatness of the War. As several scholars have observed, it is odd that, apart from man-made disasters, the list of sufferings features several natural occurrences, such as earthquakes, eclipses, droughts, and the plague that do not seem intrinsically related to a conflict among human beings (1.23.3).[43] Highlighting a certain reductionism in Thucydides' work, Jaeger and Strasburger have stressed that Thucydides usually seeks to exclude from his account all spheres of reality that do not contribute directly to his main theme, i.e., the struggle for power of the Greek cities.[44] Given this general approach, the encompassing list of disasters is all the more striking.

[42] On the cosmic resonances of the claim made by the Athenians at Melos, see Orwin (1994) 106: 'The gods are not the first beings on which all else depends; they depend, like the others, on nature'.

[43] Strauss (1964) 150–1; Lateiner (1977) 44; Marinatos (1981) 20; Parry (1981) 115–16; Munson (2015) 42–3.

[44] Jaeger (1934) 481; Strasburger (1966) 57, 60, and id. (1982) 784–92. The reductionism manifests itself most notably in the systematic exclusion of various significant aspecs of reality: the sphere of culture, the private realm, the anecdotal element, and the character traits of individuals (to which, as the examples of Nicias, Alcibiades, or Brasidas show, Thucydides only pays attention insofar as they have direct bearing on the course of the War). The systematic exclusion of these aspects of reality becomes especially evident when one compares Thucydides' representation of the world with the vast range of phenomena that attract Herodotus' attention.

The inclusion of natural catastrophes among the distinctive sufferings brought on by the War lends support to the thesis that Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War casts light not just on political events but on reality as a whole. The sufferings suggest that the Peloponnesian War marks a period in which the cosmos in its entirety, comprising the realms of both human beings and inanimate nature, comes under heavy stress. As scholars have pointed out, over the course of the narrative, Thucydides notes the occurrence of several such natural disasters, for instance the eruption of Mount Etna (3.116.1–2), solar eclipses (2.28.1; 4.52.1), inundations (3.89.2–5), and various earthquakes (2.8.3; 3.87.4 and 89.2–5; 4.52.1). Just like the list of sufferings, these events do not have any direct connection with the military affairs that Thucydides recounts.[45]

In connection with the first of these earthquakes, Thucydides uses the verb from which the noun *κίνησις* is derived: *Δῆλος ἐκινήθη* (2.8.3). As Thucydides points out, the earthquake at the island of Delos, which had never been shaken before, took place shortly before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (2.8.3). Rusten has observed that Thucydides uses *κινέω* only here for an earthquake (the usual designation being *σείω* and *σεισμός*).[46] Thucydides reports that people took the earthquake to be an ominous portent for the upcoming War. The War for which the phrase *Δῆλος ἐκινήθη* serves as a portent has been identified in the proem as *κίνησις μεγίστη*. Moreover, as the War escalates and *stasis* descends, Greekness itself will 'be shaken' (*τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη*, 3.82.1). These links suggest that Thucydides' reference to the portentous earthquake at Delos hints at the possibility of an engagement between the realm of nature and the sphere of human action. With his usual restraint, Thucydides states that the identification between the earthquake and the approaching War was what people 'said' and how it 'seemed' to them (*ἐλέγετο δὲ καὶ ἐδόκει*, 2.8.3). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that, in stating this belief, Thucydides evokes the proem through the word *κινέω*. He thus directs the reader's attention to a potential sympathetic relationship between the two commotions.

When, on the other hand, the eclipse of the moon occurs in the moment when the Athenians are about to retreat from Syracuse, the cosmic forces

[45] Lateiner (1977) 45; Marinatos (1981) 24; Munson (2015) 43–5. As Munson points out, Thucydides refers to five further earthquakes, all of which have some effect on military and political events, although not always a particularly consequential one. The passages in question refer to the great earthquake at Laconia (1.101.2, 128.1; 2.27.2; 3.54.5; 4.56.2) and to four other seismic convulsions in various areas (5.45.4, 50.5; 6.95.1; 8.6.5 and 41.2, the last two referring to the same event).

[46] Rusten (2013) 3. As Rusten also observes, the phrase alludes to Herodotus' identical reference to the same earthquake (*Δῆλος ἐκινήθη*, Hdt. 6.98.1). In alluding to Herodotus here, Thucydides corrects him: Herodotus, observing just like Thucydides that it was the only earthquake ever to shake Delos, dates it to the year 490, around the time when Darius' expeditionary force set out against Athens and Eretria. See Rusten (2013) 7; Munson (2015) 48–51.

seem to have entered a phase of enforced standstill. Among other sources, Plato's *Gorgias* provides evidence for the belief that lunar eclipses were caused by Thessalian witches who dragged down the moon from the sky (513a4–6).[47] As this belief shows, an eclipse was viewed as a situation in which the moon entered a state of confinement, passing from its regular wandering activity into a state of enforced rest. As mentioned above, when faced with the eclipse, Nicias and the superstitious majority of Athenians succumb to a state of total immobility, forcefully expressed by the accumulated vocabulary denoting standstill at 7.50.4 (<u>ἐπισχεῖν</u>; <u>μεῖναι</u>; <u>μελλήσασι</u>; ἡ <u>μονὴ</u> ἐγεγένητο). The paralysis of the Athenian army reflects and underlines the corresponding cosmic stagnation centred around the lunar eclipse.

The examples of the earthquake at Delos and the eclipse at Sicily show that the theme of natural disasters is not limited to the programmatic comments on the character of the War in 1.23. The repeated references to events from the sphere of inanimate nature provide a hint that the Peloponnesian War brings us face-to-face not only with the truth about human nature, but also with the forces governing the cosmos as a whole.

As the Archaeology shows, civilisation does not require a one-sided suspension of either motion or rest, but it presupposes the achievement of a successfully calibrated balance between both principles. If such an equilibrium is the hallmark of the self-elevation of human beings over their original uncivilised state, then Athens as represented by Pericles in the Funeral Oration is the epitome of civilisation. Konrad Gaiser has shown that according to Pericles the Athenians succeed at harmonising in their institutions and daily life antithetical predispositions of which other people usually possess only one half or the other.[48] Several of the antitheses enumerated by Pericles can be parsed in accordance with the polarity of extroverted activity and introverted circumspection—in other words, along the lines of the antithesis of motion and rest. For instance, the Athenians have adopted a liberal lifestyle while being obedient to their magistrates and the laws (2.37.2–3), they are simultaneously concerned with public and with private affairs (2.40.2), and they are both forceful in action and inclined towards reflection (2.40.2–3).

The Peloponnesian War unhinges the balance between opposite forces, of which the fleeting equilibrium achieved in Periclean Athens represents the highest realisation.[49] Instead of entering into a relationship of mutual balance and enhancement, motion and rest return to the extreme values which they

[47] See Boll (1909) 2333.

[48] Gaiser (1975) 31–2. On Pericles' ability to balance antithetical dispositions, see also Macleod (1983a) 86.

[49] Strauss (1964) 160 makes a slightly different, but highly pertinent point about the interrelation of motion and rest at Athens: '[T]he statesman who has acquired knowledge, like Pericles, as opposed to the fickle multitude, represents superhuman rest in the midst of human motion—rest confronting, understanding, and mastering motion'.

already had in the pre-civilised state.[50] When the harmonious unity is overthrown, the extreme manifestations of motion and rest paradoxically come to coincide. Instead of acquiring a distinct form that enables human achievement, they become indistinguishable. Motion and rest no longer maintain but erode civilisation.

Athens, representing motion, and Sparta, representing rest, make up between themselves the fundamental possibilities of the cosmos. As long as the two cities are balanced against each other, the cosmos is in a healthy state. However, due to the identification of each side with one of the polar principles, each city has an appetite for extremes: while the Spartans want to be at rest, the Athenians long for ever greater motion. From a cosmic perspective, the striving of each city after a climactic realisation of its leading principle undoes the state of balance and results in the coincidence of extreme motion and extreme rest. This situation marks a reversion into the state of nature. This return of uncontrolled natural forces manifests itself in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, a condition in which, as the *stasis* chapters show, unrestrained *φύσις* rules supreme. The tragic aspect of this development is that, over the course of the War, the consequences of the unleashed state of nature fall back on the two protagonists: at Pylos and in Sicily, Sparta and Athens themselves come to be subjected to the coincidence of extreme motion and extreme rest. Thus, the degeneration into the chaotic state of nature finally catches up with the two protagonists themselves. Thucydides considers the resurgence of pure *φύσις* as the quintessential experience induced by war: it brings us face-to-face with ultimate reality.

The Antithesis of Motion vs. Rest and the Aims of Thucydidean Historiography

The argument presented in this paper has some bearing on a venerable dispute among scholars of Thucydides. Two distinguished protagonists of this controversy are R. G. Collingwood and A. W. Gomme. Comparing Thucydides with Herodotus, Collingwood makes the following observation about Thucydides' intellectual objectives: '[W]hat chiefly interests Herodotus is the events themselves; what chiefly interests Thucydides is the laws according to which they happen. But these laws are precisely such eternal and unchanging forms as, according to the main trend of Greek thought, are

[50] Strauss (1964) 160 also observes the co-presence of motion and of rest both in developed civilisation and in the chaotic early state: '[I]t is not so much motion as a certain kind of interplay of motion and rest which is responsible for the ancient poverty, weakness, and barbarism, and it is not rest but another kind of interplay of motion and rest which is responsible for present wealth, power, and Greekness'. My view differs from Strauss' observation insofar as I think that motion and rest do not really interact in the original state, but that they manifest themselves as amorphous extremes that paradoxically coincide.

the only knowable things'.[51] Thus, on Collingwood's view, Thucydides has more in common with Plato than with Herodotus, or than he has with the practice of modern history. Along similar lines, Jaeger equates Thucydides' notion that events can be subsumed under general laws, and that they follow a circular pattern, with the very opposite of a 'historical consciousness'. This is the case because the basic tenet of historicism is the conviction that all events are radically unique and unrepeatable, so that absolute difference separates each moment as well as each epoch from every other.[52]

By contrast, A. W. Gomme vigorously upholds the view that Thucydides is a scientific historian. In a critique of the picture presented by Collingwood, Gomme maintains that 'Thucydides is more recorder than philosopher'.[53] Elsewhere in the same work, Gomme calls Thucydides 'the first scientific historian',[54] a writer who 'tells us just what happened'.[55] In addition, Gomme emphasises that, when Thucydides sets up 'dramatic contrast' (for instance, by juxtaposing episodes that confront the fates of Mytilene and Plataea), he does so because that opposition 'is there, in the events'.[56]

Each side in this debate finds it easy to adduce evidence for its position. Those who hold that Thucydides' main objective was to penetrate the surface of historical contingency towards eternal governing principles usually point to the claim in the chapter on method, which is repeated in the excursus on *stasis* at Corcyra, that the events recorded by Thucydides will recur in the same or similar form due to the unchangeable constitution of human beings (1.22.4; 3.82.2).[57] By contrast, Gomme draws attention to the extended stretches of narrative in which Thucydides meticulously presents a factual account of events in strict causal sequence, with a rigorous focus on those details that are of immediate relevance for the military action at hand. He also emphasises Thucydides' general avoidance of authorial comments by which he might dispense praise or blame or draw moral lessons for the reader's edification.[58]

Thucydides' exploration of the principles of motion and rest, and of their constitutive role for the Peloponnesian War, is chiefly based on an implicit procedure: the arrangement of his narrative and certain stylistic choices. While Thucydides uses the proem to highlight the centrality of motion, and the *Archaeology* to signal that it is complemented by rest as its necessary

[51] Collingwood (1946) 30.

[52] Jaeger (1934) 487.

[53] Gomme (1954) 138.

[54] Ibid. 117.

[55] Ibid. 124.

[56] Ibid. 125.

[57] Jaeger (1934) 486–7; Patzer (1937) 93–4.

[58] Gomme (1954) 127–31 (on Thuc. 2.1–33), 134–37 (on Thuc. 4.66–109), 144–9 (on Thuc. 3.70–85).

counterpart, he nowhere makes explicit that, via his account of the Peloponnesian War, he will shed light on a perennial concern of Pre-Socratic thought.[59]

The argument presented in this essay shows that both sides in the dispute have important aspects of Thucydides' work in mind. Gomme is right when he emphasises that Thucydides does not expound general principles directly, but that he lets them emerge, as he does in the case of motion and rest, through his manner of representation. However, the image of the scientific historian easily conceals Thucydides' attempt, which is equally ambitious and discrete, to shed light on issues of the highest generality: when he opens the narrative of the War with a confrontation between Spartan rest and Athenian motion, or when he represents the traumatic defeats at Pylos and Syracuse as the coincidence of extreme motion and extreme rest, he chooses to highlight a specific theme that, in turn, reflects his conception of underlying forces manifesting themselves through the War. His means to arrive at these insights is a rigorous account of what happened—but his goals are not exhausted by his commitment to a faithful chronicle. Thucydides' concern with motion and rest reflects the permanent interaction between the mundane and the cosmic, between empirical detail and general law, and between scientific history and the quest for ultimate truths. The convergence of these contrary priorities amounts to an irreducible paradox, around which the primary aspirations of Thucydidean historiography crystallise.

[59] To some extent, this procedure may count as evidence in support of Gomme (1954) 138, who does not deny that Thucydides had general truths in view: '[W]e may feel certain that he was always thinking of general laws—but thinking about them rather than formulating them and giving them to the world'. However, the principles that Gomme thinks were on Thucydides' mind (e.g., awareness of the possibility that even the best insight may fail: cf. Gomme (1954) 155–6) are a long way from any ambition to illuminate, however implicitly, the basic principles governing the cosmos.

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3

XENOPHON'S *HELLENIKA* ON THE GREEKS' CONTINUOUS WARFARE*

Edith Foster

I

In this paper, I consider the role and formation of some sample campaign and battle narratives in Xenophon's *Hellenika* and pursue the idea that there is a conflict, at least in spirit, between Xenophon's focus on warfare and his authorial statements about the results of warfare. For while Xenophon gives campaign and battle narration more space than either Herodotus or Thucydides,[1] he emphasises that the warfare he is recording leads to no definitive result for anyone. How should we understand this heavy focus on fruitless warfare?

To frame the question in another way: the fact that Xenophon writes many campaign and battle narratives in *Hellenika* seems deceptively 'natural' from our point of view. First, Xenophon was the most militarily experienced of the three founding historians, and wrote not only not only *Hellenika*, but also *Anabasis*, *Cyropaedia*, and military manuals.[2] Second, there's the common sense idea that in *Hellenika*, Xenophon is telling the story of wars, so that he will write up many campaigns and battles in order to tell the story. Finally, there's Xenophon's emphasis on leadership: where are his generals to shine, if not in numerous campaign and battle stories?

In fact, however, the narrative does not follow the events in a 'natural' way: Xenophon omits to tell us about many events of the nearly five decades of warfare he relates, and briefly summarises many others. Like Thucydides' *History*, Xenophon's *Hellenika* is carefully selective, and like Thucydides, Xenophon might have written up more or fewer battle descriptions. The number, length, and character of campaign and battle stories in *Hellenika* thus arises from Xenophon's own decisions. Again, if we want to argue that Xenophon relates so many campaigns and battles mainly in order to feature particular leaders or cities who were exemplary in a good or bad way, we

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[1] On the amount and density of battle narration in *Hellenica*, see especially Tuplin (1986) 37. For the scholarship that considers the question of the genre of *Hellenika* (i.e., whether it is or is not, historiography), see Riedinger (1991); Nicolai (2006) 695–8; Marincola (2017).

[2] On the latter, cf. Dillery (2017).

may seem to have the same problem as for the battle narratives. How can military leaders be important if the wars themselves are fruitless? In light of these questions, perhaps we can rethink the proportions of *Hellenika* and suggest a reason why *Hellenika* features warfare in the way that it does.

The following paper will largely examine warfare in Book 4, but will refer to the rest of *Hellenika* as much as possible. It will proceed from large to small, considering the overall campaigns and then focusing on particular features of the battle stories. Over the course of this paper, I will sometimes ask how Xenophon compares to Thucydides, whose campaign narratives sometimes feature several successive fights leading to a decisive battle: most famous of all of these series are the three, final, ever more desperate naval battles at Syracuse, leading to Athens' final defeat at sea.[3]

It is perhaps useful to note that this Thucydidean framework has a well-established, in fact traditional, psychological basis: the expectation (or knowledge) that the outcome of the decisive, concluding battle of a campaign will have consequences that determine the further course of the war, or even end the war, draws us through the campaign narratives to their end. The pattern is familiar from Homer's *Iliad*, where all duels climax in the duel between Achilles and Hector in Book 22, at which the fate of Troy is also decided, and from Herodotus, whose main Persian campaign story culminates in the Battle of Plataea in Book 9, which sees the complete destruction of the Persian land forces. Homer and Herodotus must remain in the background in this paper, but it is useful to note the pervasiveness of this pattern of stacking up contests toward a climax, which Xenophon will exploit in his own way.

Admittedly, in Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides, as in Xenophon, the resolution offered by the outcome of even a decisive victory is temporary. Life goes on, the fighting goes on. But Thucydides lays emphasis on the climax created by an important defeat or victory, and some of his most stirring authorial remarks, for instance where he comments on Athens' total defeat in Sicily, pertain to the outcomes of campaigns.[4]

By contrast, in *Hellenika*, Xenophon lays special emphasis on the futility of expecting that significant changes could result from the outcome of a series of battles. In particular, he frames the two main narratives of the *Hellenika*, namely the stories of the defeat of Athens and then Sparta, with remarks that distance him from expectations that military victory could bring order to human affairs. Thus, in respect to the defeat of Athens, Xenophon describes

[3] Foster (2017) outlines this form of Thucydidean campaign narrative.

[4] Thuc. 7.87.5–6 'It seems to me to be the greatest deed of this war and of the Hellenic wars that we know about from report, both most brilliant for the victors and most disastrous for the defeated. For they were entirely defeated in every way, and suffered nothing less than the total destruction of their forces, infantry and navy and everything else, and few from many returned home'. Similar Thucydidean comments on defeat are not uncommon: cf., e.g., 3.113.6, 98.4; 4.40.1, 48.5; 7.30.3; 8.96.2–3.

the enthusiasm of those who threw down Athens' walls, reporting that this was because of their belief that the fall of Athens' walls would be the 'beginning of peace for Greece' (2.2.23).[5] The irony, from Xenophon's point of view, is evident, since the rest of *Hellenika* is one long tale of the ensuing inter-Greek warfare.

Likewise, the famous final paragraphs of *Hellenika* (7.5.26–7) show that the wars of Sparta and the Greeks resulted in nothing but further disorder, despite high expectations that the Battle of Mantinea would bring closure:

> Once these things had taken place [i.e., once the battle was over], the opposite of what *all men believed* would happen had occurred. For since nearly *all of Greece* had come together and [the peoples had] taken up positions against each other, there was *no one who did not suppose* that if a battle were fought, those who proved victorious would rule and those who were defeated would be their subjects; but the god so ordered it that both parties set up a trophy as though victorious and neither tried to hinder those who set them up, that both gave back the dead under a truce as though victorious, and both received back their dead under a truce as though defeated, and that while each party claimed to have been victorious, neither was seen to have anything more than before the battle in respect to land, city, or empire; but rather there was even more disorder and confusion in Greece after the battle than before.
>
> I have written to this point; subsequent events will perhaps be the concern of another.

It has been perhaps less noticed that Xenophon's closing remarks say quite a lot about what he thought of his readers. In his view, because everyone important had gathered to fight, his contemporaries (all of them, as he emphasises) expected a decisive outcome at Mantinea. In other words, his contemporaries thought that if large and important cities confronted each other in battle, some resolution would result.

However, their expectation was confounded at Mantinea, a battle at which all the Greek cities had gathered to fight, but which resulted, in Xenophon's view, in no significant gain or loss on any side, but rather only in the continuation of the same confusion and disorder as before. Of course, Xenophon had also written up the Battle of Mantinea so that it fizzles out as soon as Epaminondas dies (cf. 7.5.24–5), and he thus denies every reader, contemporary or not, the sense of a climactic ending. He had no intention, apparently, of satisfying the desire for closure to which Thucydides and Herodotus sometimes appealed. Instead, he seems determined to illustrate

[5] 2.2.23 *νομίζοντες ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν τῇ* Ἑλλάδι *ἄρχειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας*. For the argument on whether this thought is recorded for the Peloponnesians themselves, their allies, or Athenian refugees, see Kapellos (2011).

that warfare cannot bring the results his contemporaries expected and desired.[6]

This determination resulted in an important effort to represent battle and warfare: Tuplin counted 153 significant battle narratives in Xenophon's representation of the continuous and futile warring of the Greeks.[7] As mentioned above, what follows will analyse Xenophon's description of the Spartans' glory period in Book 4. §2 shows that Xenophon leads the story of successive Spartan victories in the Corinthian War to an anti-climax, although differently than at Mantinea.[8] In §3 I will suggest that Xenophon's descriptions of the battles of the Corinthian War showcase the self-defeating violence of Sparta's decisive victories. I will conclude with the argument that Xenophon shows the Spartans adopting warfare as their main means of regulating Greece, and that his descriptions of Sparta's wars and their outcomes demonstrate that this policy fails. It is not just that the Spartans themselves sometimes make mistakes and sometimes have bad leaders, although all this happens, but that their warfare causes both deep hatreds and frequent imitative competition. The many imitators, all of whom adopt the Spartan model of trying to dominate through warfare, eventually exhaust the Spartans themselves in a series of fruitless wars, which Xenophon writes up partly in order to show that no expectation of future order could be attached to any of this fighting.

II

The battles of Book 4 are set up by what happens in Book 3, which I will review very briefly.

In Book 3 of *Hellenika*, successive Spartan commanders attack Asia Minor. Spartan land campaigning in Asia Minor will have to be abandoned early in Book 4 and can never be resumed. Moreover, its overall results are not good news: first, Persian enmity, particularly that of Sparta's formerly loyal and energetic ally, the satrap Pharnabazus, and second, a war in Greece, since the campaigns of the Spartan king Agesilaus cause the satrap Tithraustes to bribe powerful individuals in Thebes, Corinth, and Argos to make war on Sparta. The final phase of the book begins when the Thebans persuade Athens to join this alliance against Sparta and contrive to begin a war.

This war provokes Sparta's second Greek campaign of Book 3. In their previous campaign, the Spartans had decided to 'teach Elis prudence' (3.2.23

[6] To these passages of frustrated achievement at the beginning and end of *Hellenika* can be added not only the series of battles from Book 4 discussed in this paper, but also Xenophon's relation of Agesilaus' abortive campaign to conquer Persia, which is abandoned at the moment when Agesilaus expected his greatest successes and is never resumed.

[7] See above, n. 1; for comparison, we may note that Paul (1989) 308 counted 86 significant battle narratives for Thucydides.

[8] See below, n. 22.

σωφρονίσαι αὐτούς); Xenophon's detailed catalogue of Spartan complaints against Elis shows nothing that could not have been arbitrated (3.2.21–2), particularly by a larger city against a smaller one,[9] but the Spartans nevertheless do to Elis what they will in Books 6 and 7 fight to the death to prevent being done to themselves, namely, they waste Elian land, 'liberate' the Elians' subject allies, and depart after implanting civil strife in the Elians' devastated territory (3.2.24–30). They undertake their second campaign when the Theban plans to begin a war became apparent. The Spartans happily (3.5.5), Xenophon says, decide to attack the Thebans, wanting to put a stop to their hubris' (3.5.5 *παῦσαι τῆς εἰς αὐτοὺς ὕβρεως*).[10] In respect to specific motivations for the Theban campaign he provides a second catalogue of Spartan complaints, which pertains mostly to the Thebans not obeying Spartan commands to follow them to war; [11] the catalogue shows how deeply the Spartan sense of what was due to their leadership conflicted with their stated principle of 'Greek freedom'.

Of course, Book 3 is more complex than I have recounted here. But the main story of Book 3 shows, in my view, that the Spartans have managed to alienate both the Greeks and the Persians through their decisions to campaign, whereas after the Peloponnesian War both the Greeks and the Persians had been their allies. Xenophon is careful to provide causes for Spartan campaigns, and thus to show that the campaigns were undertaken because of decisions and not through necessity; the Spartans had aggressive aims of 'teaching prudence', punishing Theban hubris, or 'liberating' cities, and Agesilaus, individually, but surely with Spartan acquiescence, aimed to conquer Persia.

Book 4, which is the longest book of *Hellenika*, is characterised by a series of big battle narratives, bracketed by accounts of Persian and Aegean affairs. The beginning of Book 4 shows how Agesilaus twice tried and twice failed to

[9] 3.2.21: '… the Lacedaemonians … had long been angry with the Eleans, both because the latter had concluded an alliance with the Athenians, Argives, and Mantineans, and because, alleging that judgment had been rendered against the Lacedaemonians, they had debarred them from both the horse-races and the athletic contests; and this alone did not suffice them, but furthermore, after Lichas had made over his chariot to the Thebans and they were proclaimed victorious, when Lichas came in to put the garland upon his charioteer, they had scourged him, an old man, and driven him out' (Carleton Brownson, trans.).

[10] Xenophon also specifies that the Spartans chose to campaign both against Elis and against Thebes in full consciousness of their simultaneous wars in Asia (3.2.21, 5.5).

[11] 3.5.5: 'the [Spartans] had long been angry with the [Thebans] both on account of their claiming Apollo's tenth at Decelea and their refusing to follow them against Piraeus. Furthermore, they charged them with persuading the Corinthians likewise not to join in that campaign. Again, they recalled that they had refused to permit Agesilaus to sacrifice at Aulis and had cast from the altar the victims already offered, and that they also would not join Agesilaus for the campaign in Asia. They also reasoned that it was a favourable time to lead forth an army against the Thebans and put a stop to their insolent behaviour toward them …' (Carleton Brownson, trans.).

create alliances for himself in Asia Minor.[12] The end of Book 4 shows the resulting Aegean wars between Sparta and the Persians, who were now allied with Athens.

4.2–7 spotlights fighting on land, in Greece. Three formal battle accounts—the stories of the battles of Nemea, Coronea, and Lechaeum, with smaller battle stories interspersed—lead to an anti-climax: the story of the Spartan 'disaster' at Lechaeum. It seems best to review the course of these battles, and after that to discuss their characteristics in more detail.

The story of the Battle of Nemea is the first big battle narrative of Sparta's war against the Thebans and their allies, a war which we call the 'Corinthian War'. It begins with the Spartans calling a levy and choosing Aristodemus to lead (4.2.9). At the same time, Sparta's opponents (that is, Thebes, Corinth, Argos, and Athens, along with smaller cities) assemble and hold a conference in Corinth, at which they vote to take the war to Laconia, since they think that the Spartans, alone and without their allies, will not be strong. However, they never march to Laconia, since the Spartans arrive at Sikyon, near Corinth, while they are still talking.

Once he has brought the combatants to the same area, Xenophon provides a formal catalogue of the cities fighting on each side. This catalogue shows that the Thebans and their allies have about 10,000 more hoplites than the Spartans and their allies, who have about 13,500 hoplites (4.2.16–17).

Next, Xenophon describes the Theban decisions that will account for the defeat of this more numerous force.[13] His description displays the Thebans as poor leaders who are on the one hand reluctant to face the Spartans and on the other willing to ignore an agreement negotiated with their allies to assemble the phalanx sixteen men deep. Instead, they adopt a deeper formation with a shorter front. This formation forces the Athenians, who are facing the Spartans, to move closer to the Thebans and to take up a position that they know is dangerously vulnerable to outflanking (4.2.18). The Spartans take advantage of this situation, leading their forces to a position where they can surround the Athenians.

Xenophon's description of the actual fighting is brief and the main idea is clear: after taking their advantageous position, the Spartans win alone. All of Sparta's allies are defeated, but the Spartans themselves defeat the Athenians, whom they surround and kill in large numbers (4.2.21). In the next sentence, at the climax of the battle narrative, the intact Spartan force successively meets and defeats the Argives, Corinthians, and Thebans, as each party returns to the battlefield from the pursuit of whichever Spartan ally they had beaten (4.2.22). At the end of the story, the Spartans set up a

[12] His alliance with Otys, the king of the Paphlagonians, is scuttled when one of Agesilaus' officers insults the king (4.1.20–8), and his hoped-for renewal of an alliance with the satrap Pharnabazus was either illusory from the start or very short-lived (cf. 4.1.37, 3.11–12, and 8.1).

[13] Cf. Riedinger (1991) 216–17 on the basic structure of Xenophon's battle narratives.

trophy, and the Thebans and their allies, denied entrance into Corinth, go back to their camp. The battle narrative thus repudiates the allied view that the Spartans are strong because of their allies.

The incredible extent of the victory at Nemea, and the fact that only eight Spartans died (4.3.1), is announced to Agesilaus, who is proceeding down the north-eastern coast of Greece on his way back from campaigning in Asia Minor.[14] Two shorter battle narratives follow. In the first, Agesilaus defeats the famed Thessalian cavalry by correcting a tactical deficiency of his own forces (4.3.6–7).[15] In the second, the satrap Pharnabazus defeats the heavily outnumbered Spartan admiral Peisander in a sea battle at Knidos. Agesilaus, who has claimed centre stage in the narrative, is at first distraught, but then successfully deceives his own forces about the outcome of the battle at Knidos. They come to believe that Peisander died, but was victorious (4.3.14), and Agesilaus can thus claim the benefit of three victories, namely high troop morale.

These stories lead to the account of the battle at Coronea, in northern Boeotia, which Xenophon says was 'like no other of our time' (4.3.16), probably referring to the ferocity of the fighting. This battle narrative again begins with a catalogue, although Xenophon provides no numbers. At Coronea, the Theban and Argive hoplites and cavalry are perhaps equal in number to Agesilaus' forces, which he has collected from Asia Minor and northern Greece (cf. *Ages.* 2.7–8). However, Agesilaus outnumbers his opponents in light-armed troops (4.3.15).

Not that light-armed troops have any role in Xenophon's account of the battle, which again describes the actions of hoplites only. The story of the fighting is short and direct, just a few sentences, as it was also for the Nemea narrative. However, Theban actions here contrast with their manoeuvring at Nemea, since at Coronea the Thebans make a running attack on the Spartans, similar to that which the Athenians had used against the Persians at Marathon. But at the last minute a Spartan officer, Dercylidas, dashes out in front of the Spartan phalanx with his force of mercenaries and leads the Spartans to rout the Theban advance. This ends the first phase of the battle: no one is left for the Spartans to fight, since the Thebans' Argive allies had fled the field at the outset.

However, a second phase of fighting begins when the Thebans try to cross Agesilaus' baggage train to reconnect with Argives; Agesilaus wheels his

[14] Agesilaus' response to this news in *Hellenika*, where he wishes it advertised to the allies remaining in Asia Minor in order to encourage their zeal for Sparta's cause (4.3.2), contrasts with his response to this news in the *Agesilaus*, where he mourns 'that [Greek] men had fallen who might have fought against the barbarians instead' (*Ages.* 7.5).

[15] Agesilaus' solution is, generally speaking, to pursue the cavalry aggressively, a tactic the horsemen are not expecting. His initiative contrasts with the mechanical responses of the unnamed polemarch who led his men into the 'disaster' at Lechaeum (on which, see below).

phalanx around and attacks the Thebans head on, defeating them in what Xenophon emphasises was a very fierce fight. If Dercylidas' initial victory arose from a tactical idea to send fresh runners against the Thebans (who had perhaps started running from too far away), Xenophon suggests that victory in the second stage of the battle was due purely to valour (4.3.19).

Our first two battles have therefore found their high points in the victory of Spartan hoplite *ἀρετή*. After this battle, Xenophon relates that light-armed troops in neighbouring Locris killed 18 Spartiates, and nearly killed many more, in an evening and night attack (4.3.22–3).[16]

This seems to be but a slight setback. Right now, everything seems to be going very well for the Spartans, who are heading into their third successive victory, at the Battle of Lechaeum,[17] the emotional climax of this series of Spartan victories and by far the most violent, strange, and deadly of the battles.

There is no catalogue. Instead, the story begins with the impious murders, at altars inside Corinth, of Corinthian oligarchs by Corinthian democrats who want to prevent Corinth from abandoning Thebes and rejoining the Spartan alliance (4.4.1–6). It continues as two younger oligarchs, determined to retake their city, admit a division of Spartans, Sikyonians, and Corinthian exiles into the long walls. These invaders fortify themselves behind their own hastily constructed trench and wall and wait through the night for help to arrive (4.4.7–9).

As it turns out, the first help that comes is for the other side, namely Argives who have arrived to help the Corinthian democrats. These Argives advance against the Peloponnesian invaders and defeat the Sikyonians, whom they chase to the sea; at the same time, however, the Corinthian exiles fighting for the Spartans are victorious on their side and head toward the city. Now the Spartans go to help the fleeing Sikyonians and total confusion ensues in a situation where too many different parties are changing direction in the constricted space between the walls. In particular, the Spartans meet and attack the Argives as they are returning from their pursuit of the Sikyonians. Badly harmed, the Argives head for the city, but meet the Corinthian exiles and are hopelessly trapped between enemy forces. A lengthy authorial comment (see below, p. 59) describes the many forms of death the Argives now endure.

After this third victory, the Spartans tear down a section of Corinth's long walls, and the cities, Xenophon says, no longer send out large campaigns. This is hardly any wonder since the Spartans seem to win every time. But warfare goes on. The Athenian Iphicrates does Sparta's allies considerable damage with his light-armed troops; the allies conceive a panicked fear of

[16] On the light-armed attacks on Spartan hoplites which foreshadow the disaster of Lechaeum, see Foster (2019).

[17] Lechaeum was a harbor inside the long walls that led from Corinth to the sea.

peltasts, much to the Spartans' contempt (4.4.17).[18] As for the Spartans, their successes continue to accumulate: the Athenians rebuild the Corinthian walls, but Agesilaus retakes them, after wasting Argos for good measure.

Now Agesilaus uses a trick to capture the Corinthian stronghold at Peiraeum (4.5.4), and is comfortably watching the distribution and sale of the booty when we first hear of the Spartan disaster, the *pathos*, as Xenophon calls it, near Lechaeum. To anticipate my own argument, this is the anti-climax of the section. While Sparta has been winning very large battles almost without exception, this loss of 250 men will return the situation to the starting point, and except for the accumulating hatreds, of course, it will be as if the three victories we just rehearsed, namely Sparta's victories at Nemea, Coronea, and Lechaeum, never happened. Just as for the Pylos story in Thucydides (4.3–40), then, the loss of a relatively small number of Spartans will change everything: the Thebans, who had been about to seek peace, will abandon that notion (4.5.9), and the Spartans will slink back home across the Peloponnesus, arriving at each city late in the evening and leaving early on the next morning so that the fewest possible observers would see them in their humiliation (4.5.18).

The story of the *pathos* at Lechaeum is longer than any of the preceding battle narratives, and highly literary, since it is charged through with reminiscences of Thermopylae and Pylos. Xenophon creates suspense for the narration of the disaster in advance of relating the events by showing the complete reversal of Agesilaus' mood when he hears that something, the reader does not know what, has gone wrong, by showing that Agesilaus' frantic efforts to help came too late, by reporting that he was concerned for the city (i.e., Sparta), and finally, by reporting, as mentioned, that as a result of this unknown event the Thebans had ceased to ask for peace (4.5.7–9). In addition, and still in advance of his narration of the events, Xenophon shows the response in the Spartan army, much of which was in mourning, except for the relatives of the dead, who glory in the noble deaths of their fathers, sons, or brothers.[19] The reader is compelled to assume that something really major has gone wrong.

From the subsequent story we learn that an unnamed polemarch had been sent on a religious mission, namely to accompany homeward the Spartan Amyclaeans so that they could celebrate the Hyacinthia, a festival that celebrated the Dorian conquest of Laconia. The polemarch had set out from Lechaeum, arrived close to Sikyon, and then split his forces. He headed

[18] On this display of contempt as an adumbration of the ensuing disaster at Lechaeum, see Tuplin (1993) 71.

[19] 4.5.10: *ἅτε δὲ ἀήθους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις γεγενημένης τῆς τοιαύτης συμφορᾶς, πολὺ πένθος ἦν κατὰ τὸ Λακωνικὸν στράτευμα, πλὴν ὅσων ἐτέθνασαν ἐν χώρᾳ ἢ υἱοὶ ἢ πατέρες ἢ ἀδελφοί· οὗτοι δ' ὥσπερ νικηφόροι λαμπροὶ καὶ ἀγαλλόμενοι τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει περιῇσαν.* For an analysis of this response, see Foster (2019).

back toward Corinth with 600 hoplites, allowing his cavalry to accompany the Amyclaeans onward.

Xenophon specifies that the Spartans did not know about the Athenian hoplites and peltasts in Corinth and had contempt for the Corinthians because of their series of defeats (4.5.12). The Spartans thus felt too safe, as it turned out, since the Athenian generals inside Corinth see their vulnerability, set up their hoplites near Corinth, and attack the Spartan hoplites with their light-armed forces (4.5.13–14). The light-armed Athenians inflict damage on the Spartans immediately upon their attack, and the polemarch sends out the youngest and fastest hoplites in pursuit, but there are immediate deaths, and the Spartans also fall into disorder from running (4.5.15). The next oldest are then ordered in, to no effect except more deaths, and then the Spartan cavalry comes to the rescue, but does not pursue the light-armed attackers aggressively enough to make a difference (4.5.16).[20] Finally, the Spartans are reduced to helplessness, and once they see the Athenian hoplites coming to take advantage of their disorder, they flee. 250 are lost (4.5.17). Agesilaus picks up the rest and makes his forced march back to Sparta (4.5.18).

Afterward, the war continues unabated. Iphicrates and his Athenian peltasts retake some of the Corinthian forts, but the Spartans keep Lechaeum and generally harass Corinth from the sea. Moreover, in the following two sections (4.6–7), the Spartans waste Acarnania and bring it to a forced alliance, and then again waste Argos, doing, as Xenophon says, huge damage (4.7.7). These victories are surely all the more reason to see this single defeat at Lechaeum in perspective. In another account, the *pathos* might have been just an incident.[21] But Xenophon has insisted on its importance. For him, it was a turning point which exposed Spartan vulnerability and allowed the Thebans to hope again.

III

Our sample set of campaign and battle narratives has shown that Xenophon, like Herodotus and Thucydides, uses successive battle accounts to build to a narrative climax.[22] In Book 4, however, the climactic Battle of Lechaeum results in the anti-climactic 'disaster' at Lechaeum, because of which Sparta's series of victories ends without producing positive political results. The fact

[20] This story, in which the unnamed polemarch is ineffective, has sometimes been considered to belong to *Hellenika*'s series of stories in which bad commanders cause the deaths of groups of Spartans; cf. Hau (2015) 227, who cites relevant literature, with Foster (2019).

[21] Cf., e.g., the destruction of 200 Greek guards by light-armed attackers in Bithynian Thrace, which Xenophon himself depicted at 3.5.18–20, without making further comments on any ensuing consequences.

[22] The successive invasions of Laconia in Books 6 and 7, leading to the anti-climactic Battle of Mantinea, form another such series.

that Spartan losses in the 'disaster' are small compared to what they inflict on others underscores the quite shocking vulnerability of any outcomes Sparta might achieve in the big massed battles that were thought to be so important: one needed only to kill (or capture, as at Sphacteria) a few hundred Spartan hoplites to annul the effect of Sparta's victories. Xenophon's presentation of the 'disaster' therefore exposed the weakness of expectations that such victories could create order in Greece. Does an analysis of the battle narratives help to support this contention?

We can make some initial observations about our battle narratives. First, none of our battles featured exhortations, which are, however, fairly rare in *Hellenika*.[23] Second, none of our main battles featured tricks, which are, by contrast, a very regular part of Xenophontic battle narratives.[24] Agesilaus' trick at the Corinthian fort of Peiraeum is the only deception of enemies in our section.[25] Consistent with this, the planning of Spartan generals is not reported for any of the three main battles. Their intelligence is mostly reflected in reports of their initial actions, such as encircling the Athenians at Nemea or constructing a barricade at Lechaeum. At Coronea, Dercylidas leads a running counter-attack, and Agesilaus gives a passionate command to attack the Thebans head-on. However, their thoughts, planning, and intentions for these actions are not reported. Xenophon therefore reserves the representation of thoughtful planning for the anti-climax and the enemy, since for the battles we have discussed here, only Iphicrates and Callias, the Athenian generals who cause the Spartan 'disaster', are shown to assess a battle situation and make a plan according to their perception.[26] The narratives of the three big battles at Nemea, Coronea, and Lechaeum therefore display no exhortations, reported thought, or tricks. Their form is stripped down to the physical competition between the Spartans and their Greek enemies.

Perhaps the aim of this type of battle narrative is to allow Spartan valour, and Agesilaus' valour, to shine all the brighter. And in fact, the victory narratives feature no reversals, such as are common in Thucydidean battle narratives. In Thucydides, the battle hangs in the balance, but then the point of reversal comes, and the defeated lose cohesion and must flee, as for example at the final battle in the Great Harbour of Syracuse (7.69–71). Until the turning point, however, anything can happen.

[23] The two exhortations in *Hellenika* are at 2.4.13–17 (Thrasybulus), and 7.1.30 (Archidamus). For the contrast between *Hellenika* and *Anabasis* in this and many other regards, see Marincola (2017).

[24] Cf. Riedinger (1991) 230–4.

[25] Unless we should also count the passage where Agesilaus lies to his own side about the outcome at Knidos.

[26] The one exception to this is the passage where Agesilaus recognises and fixes his cavalry problem in Thessaly (4.2.10–14).

Our Xenophontic descriptions of Sparta's victories built no such suspense. At Nemea, the Spartans carry all opponents before them: they defeat the Athenians, then the Argives, then the Corinthians, then the Boeotians. At Coronea, they defeat the Thebans twice. At Lechaeum, they attack the Argives, and, once the Argives are completely confused, slaughter them. The victory stories are more impressive than suspenseful. Devices to create suspense, such as warnings, tragic changes of mood, the introduction of an Athenian plan that might or might not work, and the final tragic reversal as the Spartans flee, are, like reported thought, all reserved for the story of the 'disaster'. Xenophon thus leads his Spartans and his reader onward through a succession of secure successes until they reach this anticlimax or reversal of their fortunes.

An analysis of Xenophon's style can help us better understand the character of these stories of direct competition, in which the Spartans are until their catastrophe so dominantly successful. How does Xenophon describe the fighting? In our search for the answer to this question we miss Thucydidean *enargeia*, that is, his depiction in detail of some events of combat. Xenophon's descriptions of fighting are much shorter.

To compensate, Xenophon creates clear themes. The chief feature of the victory stories seems to be Spartan killing of Greek enemies, which is rendered distinct through Xenophon's word choices and stylistic decisions, such as the use of parataxis, asyndeton, and unvaried repetition.

To review our battles one last time, Xenophon's few sentences describing Spartan actions at Nemea emphasise that they 'killed many Athenians', that other luckier Athenians 'were not killed' (4.2.21), that 'they killed many [Argives]', further caught up with the Corinthians and then with the Thebans and 'killed many of these' (4.2.22).[27] The repetition of the words 'killed many of' describes the fighting. Xenophon otherwise describes only how the Spartans get access to each successive party, depicting in detail the moment when they let the Argives run past and then attack their unprotected flank. Dercylidas' subsequent announcement to Agesilaus that only eight Spartans died enriches the theme of allied deaths, emphasising that the Spartans did not suffer the fate they inflicted on their fellow Greeks.[28]

Likewise, at Coronea, once Agesilaus has commanded the frontal attack that begins the second stage of the battle, the fighting turns deadly. Xenophon uses epic asyndeton to emphasise the violence of the encounter

[27] 4.2.21–2: *αὐτοὶ δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὅσον τε κατέσχον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκράτησαν, καὶ κυκλωσάμενοι τῷ ὑπερέχοντι* ***πολλοὺς ἀπέκτειναν αὐτῶν***, *καὶ ἅτε δὴ ἀπαθεῖς ὄντες, συντεταγμένοι ἐπορεύοντο· καὶ τὰς μὲν τέτταρας φυλὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρὶν ἐκ τῆς διώξεως ἐπαναχωρῆσαι παρῆλθον, ὥστε* ***οὐκ ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν*** … *ὡς δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐγένετο, παραθέοντας δὴ παίοντες εἰς τὰ γυμνὰ* ***πολλοὺς ἀπέκτειναν αὐτῶν***. *ἐπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ Κορινθίων ἀναχωρούντων. ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπέτυχον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων τισὶν ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐκ τῆς διώξεως, καὶ* ***ἀπέκτειναν συχνοὺς αὐτῶν***.

[28] See especially Tuplin (1993) 64.

(4.3.19): 'and once they met, they were shoving shields, fighting, killing, being killed. Finally, some of the Thebans broke through toward Helicon, but many were killed retreating'.[29] Once again, we notice that the focus on killing mostly stands in for a description of the fighting.[30]

Most conspicuous is of course the emphasis on the Spartan slayings of helpless enemies at Lechaeum. The Spartans first attack the Argives as they are charging back from their pursuit of the defeated Sikyonians (4.4.11–12):

> And those upon the [Argives'] extreme right, since they were struck on their unprotected sides by the Lacedaemonians, were killed, but those who had collected in a large crowd near the wall were retreating toward the city. But when they happened upon the Corinthian exiles and recognised that they were enemies, they turned back again. And then some of them were destroyed when they climbed up the steps and jumped off the walls, others perished from being shoved and struck around the steps, and still others suffocated from being trampled. [12] The Lacedaemonians, for their part, were at no loss for people to kill; for at that time the god gave to them a deed such as they could never have prayed for. For that a mass of enemies was entrusted to them who were in fear, panic-stricken, exposing their vulnerabilities, in no way turning to fight, but rather all assisting their own destruction in every way—how could anyone not consider this something divine? At that time, certainly, so many fell in a short time as people are accustomed to see heaps of grain, wood, or stones; at that time they were seeing heaps of corpses. The Boeotian guards in the port also died, some on the walls, and others after they had climbed up onto the roofs of the ship sheds.

The passage describes the Spartans as the deadly agents of the gods, who are possibly punishing the impious murderers of the Corinthian oligarchs.[31] At the same time, Xenophon's vivid description places the Spartans in a dubious tradition.[32] His emphasis on the numbers and anonymity of the helpless victims, attained through the simile comparing their corpses to piles of grain, wood, or stones, as if the Spartans were Sophocles' mad Ajax among the helpless herds, or the murderous post-Patroclus Achilles among the hapless Trojans, leaves historiography behind for epic and tragic emphases. The Spartans may be instruments of the gods, but they are also savage killers; in all of these battles, in fact, the Spartans are killing other

[29] 4.3.19: *καὶ συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνῃσκον. τέλος δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων οἱ μὲν διαπίπτουσι πρὸς τὸν Ἑλικῶνα, πολλοὶ δ' ἀποχωροῦντες ἀπέθανον.*

[30] Xenophon further sharpens the theme of Greek death at Spartan hands through a contrasting silence: he mentions no Spartan casualties at all for Coronea and Lechaeum, and only the famous eight for Nemea.

[31] Cf. 5.4.1

[32] *Contra*, Riedinger (1991) 252.

Greeks in droves. In Xenophon the consequences of divine jealousy quickly follow, since the *pathos*, in which the Spartans are killed as they perform a religious duty, is the next main story of *Hellenika*.

Moreover, we can legitimately ask whether attacking opponents on their unprotected flanks, wasting the fields of less powerful adversaries, or boasting about the small numbers of Spartan as opposed to allied Greek losses, had reflected Spartan *ἀρετή* in the first place: Xenophon's portrait of Spartan warfare seems as ambiguous as his narrative techniques are clear.

To sum up: The plot of this section of *Hellenika* shows that the Spartans win a succession of large and small battles. The sea battle at Knidos is the only large-scale Spartan defeat of this section, and Agesilaus' lies protect the Spartans from the consequences of this defeat, at least in the short term. The Spartans also waste a lot of land and kill many Greeks, to almost no effect. After all of this fighting and all of these Spartan successes, the Spartans opt for peace close to the beginning of Book 5. Xenophon argues that this is primarily because they are tired of Greek troubles, particularly around Corinth itself, the site of the very victories Xenophon so vividly depicted in Book 4 (5.1.29).[33] He then shows that the Spartans attacked Mantinea as soon as they were satisfied with the peace agreement, for reasons even weaker than those indicated by their complaints with Elis and Thebes (5.1.36–2.1). In other words, the Spartans are among the peoples who trust in military victories to ensure their dominance: in fact, they are the leaders in this, and set an example that all others follow. Their long slide into deterioration in Books 6 and 7, as they are overwhelmed by the response to and imitation of their own bellicosity, ends with the indecisive battle of Mantinea, where the Spartans are barely mentioned, and with a new power which similarly hopes, through warfare, to create an order pleasing to itself. But Xenophon probably thought that the fighting he had already depicted was sufficient to show that this could not work: his focus on fruitless warfare had demonstrated in detail Sparta's belief, and the Greeks' belief, that military victories could secure their power.

[33] 5.1.29: *οἱ δ' αὖ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, φρουροῦντες μόρᾳ μὲν ἐν Λεχαίῳ, μόρᾳ δ' ἐν Ὀρχομενῷ, φυλάττοντες δὲ τὰς πόλεις, αἷς μὲν ἐπίστευον, μὴ ἀπόλοιντο, αἷς δὲ ἠπίστουν, μὴ ἀποσταῖεν, πράγματα δ' ἔχοντες καὶ παρέχοντες περὶ τὴν Κόρινθον, χαλεπῶς ἔφερον τῷ πολέμῳ.*

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4

THE DIFFICULT PASSAGE FROM WAR TO PEACE: LIMINALITY, TRANSITION, AND TENSIONS IN ARISTOPHANES' *PEACE* 8*

Stylianos Chronopoulos

Peace is one of the eleven extant comedies of the Athenian playwright Aristophanes, performed at the City Dionysia 421 BCE, just before the conclusion of the so called 'Peace of Nicias', the treaty between Athens and Sparta concluding the war that had broken out in 431 BCE (Thuc. 5.20.1). The negotiations between Athens and Sparta that began in winter 422/1 (Thuc. 5.17.2) were successful despite difficulties: both the Athenian general Cleon and the Spartan general Brasidas, whose roles in prolonging the war were decisive (Thuc. 5.16.1), had died in summer 422; both sides now had strategic reasons to stop fighting (Thuc. 5.14–16.1); and both were led by generals who favoured a peace treaty (Thuc. 5.16.1–2).[1] *Peace* was thus written and performed while Athens was preparing to make the passage from a state of constant war to a state of peace.[2] The spectators were Athenians, metics, and foreigners, some of whom were officials of their cities who had come also to bring their annual tribute to Athens. The state of transition from war to peace and the prospect of a peace treaty affected the lives of all groups of spectators—albeit in different ways. I will here argue that the *Peace* serves as an interpretation of this transitional historical moment, serving as a sort of popular act of historiography, in which members of the general public are invited to engage in communal reflection on the implications of a pivotal moment in history.

Peace presents several smaller confrontations between supporters of peace and supporters of war in different forms: either narrated by a figure, or projected in the audience, or enacted on stage. It does not, however, contain

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[1] Thucydides 5.13.2 documents a prevailing pro-peace sentiment in Sparta already before Brasidas' death: see Gomme (1956) 657–8 (*ad* 13.1–2 and 14.1). For the peace negotiations see also Storey (2019) 45–7.

[2] The poets applied to the Archon in order to obtain permission to present a play in the Great Dionysia (*choron aitein*) late in the summer; by this time they must have been able to present at least a rough idea of the play: see Robson (2009) 20.

any major confrontation between the protagonist Trygaeus and an opponent.[3] This fact, combined with its performance only a few days before the signing of the 'Peace of Nicias', has led several scholars to regard it as a play virtually lacking any tension, a simple celebration of the end of the war.[4] Against this interpretation Sicking (1967) argues that *Peace* criticises the peace treaty, since it was far from an ideal, lasting solution. Other interpretations of the play attempt to temper the celebratory tenor by considering its elements of critique.[5]

In this paper I propose a reading of *Peace* that goes beyond the dichotomy of 'celebration vs critique', interpreting the comedy mainly as a play that dramatises a specific historical shift, the transition from a prolonged war to an era of peace. This dramatisation imposes a narrative structure resembling a rite of passage onto the historical process of the transition, while also using this structure to provide reflective responses to the social tensions provoked by the historical transition. These tensions are on the one hand connected with economic loss for some and gains for others, and on the other hand with the problematisation of social values connected with war and peace. To support this reading, I consider the dramatisation of the transition from war to peace in the play, the implied models for understanding the relation of the new period to the past, and the critique expressed by different figures against individuals and social groups.

The paper is divided into five sections.

I first introduce the concepts 'liminal phase', 'social drama', and 'aesthetic drama', and employ them to argue that *Peace* is a staged drama adopting the structure of rites of passage in order to reflect upon the transition from war to peace, as argued in the second section.

In the third section, I examine the play's discourses about the past, visions of the future, and reflections on social and political values that are treated as unstable in the process of transition.

In the fourth section I examine the two models *Peace* proposes for thinking about the relation of the new period of peace to the past: both as a restoration of and return to a familiar past and as a brand-new reality.

Finally, I explore two structures that *Peace* uses to dramatise tensions in the liminal phase: the confrontation between individuals and unified groups on the one hand, and the presentation of groups that initially seem to be

[3] See the remarks in Storey (2019) 28–9.

[4] Sicking (1967) 17–8 presents a good summary of this interpretation. See also Whitman (1964) 104, Newiger (1980) 221–2, Prandi (1985) 74, Harriott (1986) 119, Zimmermann (2006) 78 and Storey (2019) 56–9. The formulation in Whitman (1964) 114 is characteristic: 'The lack of plot and conflict in the *Peace* contributes to its lyrical flavor'.

[5] Blanchard (1982) argues that the intention of *Peace* is, on the one hand, to celebrate the forthcoming peace, and, on the other hand, to criticise specific public persons who support a pro-war political agenda. Cassio (1985) argues that there is a contrast between the utopian agrarian idyll enacted in the comedy and elements of general critique against the political system of the Athenian democracy.

unified but are actually divided into supporters of peace and supporters of war. *Peace* thus provides a means of reflecting on the application of the exclusion–inclusion dichotomy that is crucial for the creation of stable social structures after the liminal period of the passage from war into peace.

1. Experiencing and Representing Passages: Liminality in Social and Aesthetic Dramas

The following examination of *Peace* as dramatisation of specific contemporary historical circumstances presupposes the system Victor Turner and Richard Schechner delineate for the relationship between aesthetic dramas—such as theatre plays—and social dramas, as well as the tripartite model of the rites of passage van Gennep proposes.

Turner employs the metaphor 'social drama' to categorise and name social processes centred around a conflict and structured in four phases leading from the disruptive breach of a crisis, through the formation of clearly opposed parties and the application of crisis-solving social mechanisms to a final phase, consisting either of 'the reintegration of the disturbed social group' or of 'the social recognition of irreparable breach between the contesting parties'.[6] In Turner's system, aesthetic dramas and historical, social dramas are interdependent. Social dramas are concrete historical cases of conflict and similarly concrete manifestations of historical social processes, which the aesthetic dramas selectively absorb, and transform and render social meta-commentary on the life, values, and social structures of a specific society.[7] On the other hand, aesthetic dramas, among which theatre pieces are the most prominent type, provide discursive and performative structures which are used in all phases of social dramas; moreover, aesthetic dramas may be directly connected with a specific social drama as one of the redressive mechanisms which allow groups to reflect on a conflict and devise solutions.[8]

[6] See Turner (1974a) 37 for the definition of social dramas as 'units of aharmonic or disharmonic social process, arising in conflict situations'. For the phases of a social drama, see Turner (1980) 150–1 (from which the citations) and Turner (1986) 34–9, 74–5, 99–100.

[7] For the term 'metasocial commentary' see Turner (1982) 104 citing Geertz: 'a story a group tells itself about itself' and Turner (1990) 8. The citation from Geertz (1973) 448: 'it [sc. the cockfight] provides a metasocial commentary upon the whole matter of assorting human beings into fixed hierarchical ranks and then organising the major part of collective existence around that assortment. Its function, if you want to call it that, is interpretive: it is a Balinese reading of Balinese experience, a story they tell themselves about themselves'. Turner uses the term 'social metacommentaries' instead of Geertz's term 'metasocial commentary', with no differentiation in meaning.

[8] See Turner (1980) 153–4; id. (1986) 38–9; Schechner (1988) 187–8; see also the critical summary of Turner's schemes in Grimes (1985) 80–3. For the reflexive function of the Greek theatre in particular see the remarks in Turner (1982) 103–4.

I apply this general model of relations between social dramas and aesthetic dramas to *Peace*. There is not enough information, independently from what can be extracted from *Peace* itself, to understand fully the negotiations between the cities and the social processes occurring alongside them in winter 422/1 as a historical and social drama. It is, however, probable that the passage from roughly a decade of constant war to a state of peace provoked significant social and economic changes and corresponding tensions. A close reading of *Peace* shows how comedy can be a tool for a society to reflect on this significant historical transition.

An unusual plot pattern that appears only in *Peace* is the first hint at its role in showcasing the process of historical transition. Important acts are anticipated, announced, or even begun. Their completion, however, occurs significantly later, and in some cases after a considerable pause; a significant part of the plot of *Peace* consists of presenting precisely these pauses and the processes that occupy them. This pattern of marked delay is observed in the following significant plot elements:

- As the Chorus enters the stage for the first time (301), the dancers cheer, anticipating the liberation of Eirene and the coming of a new era of peace. Trygaeus, on the contrary, points to the fact that the situation is still precarious.[9] The liberation of Eirene, which marks the completion of the first stage in the peacemaking process and turns the anticipation of the Chorus into reality, finally arrives at verse 520.
- After the liberation of Eirene, Hermes announces a movement of closure for the Chorus, ordering them to leave and go to the countryside (551–5); the execution of this movement begins (555) but remains uncompleted and becomes reality only much later, in the wedding procession after verse 1316 that leads the Chorus, Trygaeus, and Opora to the countryside.[10]
- The sacrifice for the installation of the statue of Eirene is announced and begun at verse 922. It is completed 204 verses later, at 1126.
- Trygaeus' betrothal to Opora takes place at verses 706–7: the event of the marriage is anticipated at 859–64, its preparation completed in the background between verses 842–4 and 868–70, the marriage feast is mentioned in the background in verses 1191–310, but the final consummation of the event comes only with the procession beginning at verse 1316.

This structural pattern of suspense indicates that a major element in the plot of *Peace* is the dramatisation of a lengthy process. Given that peacemaking is in the centre of the plot and that this is directly associated with the ongoing negotiations for a peace treaty between Athens and Sparta, I propose that

[9] For the dance scene of the *parodos* and Trygaeus' reactions to the premature expressions of joy, see Zimmermann (2017) 30–9.

[10] See Revermann (2006) 173–4.

Peace conceives of and dramatises the process of these negotiations. This means that *Peace* projects onto the specific historical reality of the time a particular dramatic structure, offering social meta-commentary by means of this structure.

The structure of *Peace* shares, thus, crucial features with the general tripartite structure of the ceremonies that van Gennep dubs 'rites of passage', a ritual process marking change in the condition of a subject, be it an individual, a group, or a whole society. A series of sequential phases make up such a ritual: first, separation; second, a liminal phase representing transition; and finally, a phase of re-aggregation in which the transformation is consummated and celebrated.[11] The liminal phase is marked by rites that illustrate a destabilisation of accepted structures and social norms, and possibly even an inversion or confusion of value systems. The liminal phase is associated with the 'dangerous, troubling, anxiety-generating aspects of uncertain periods of transition, conflict, and crisis'.[12] It is a period in which, at least theoretically, anything can happen. At the same time this period has an important formative function: structures that are not present in the state from which the subject of the rite departs are generated or anticipated in the liminal phase.[13]

The plot of *Peace* fits this tripartite structure of a rite of passage. The comic hero, Trygaeus, undergoes a double transition, in order to become the subject who secures peace for all Greece (the peacemaking subplot) and the husband of Opora (the marriage subplot). In both of these subplots, the element representing the liminal phase, the phase in which the new structures have not yet been definitely installed, and in which crisis and unstable or non-existent structures are in the process of transforming into a state of stabilised new structures,[14] is particularly long and contains significant confrontations.

Based on the relationship between the historical event of peacemaking in winter 422/1 and the plot of *Peace*, I next argue that *Peace* adopts a structure of a rite of passage with a prolonged liminal phase, in order to project this structure and the ensuing discursive models and social meta-commentaries onto the historical reality of a society in negotiations for a peace treaty after ten years of war. I will show that *Peace*'s plot can be read as a tripartite

[11] See Gennep (2004) 31–3, Turner (1967), id. (1974b) 231–3, Thomassen (2009), and Szakolczai (2009), especially for the liminal phase. This structure is directly comparable with the structure of folk tales narrating how a male hero travels to a liminal place, rescues a female hero, imprisoned there by a monster of some sort, and marries her: Κωνσταντάκος (2019) 190–200 discusses in detail the folk tale structure, on which *Peace*'s plot is based, and compares its elements with elements from tales from Indo-European and Chinese traditions.

[12] Szakolczai (2009) 141–2, 147–9; citation from 142.

[13] Turner (1969) 128–9 and Szakolczai (2009) 142, 147–8, 150–1.

[14] See Grimes (1985) 81–2.

structure similar to the structure of rites of passage with particularly prolonged liminal phases.

2. Parallel Plot Strands, Transitional Processes, and a Prolonged Liminal Phase

In *Peace* the process of securely and finally establishing peace, *after* the liberation of Eirene, is remarkably long and complex. It takes place in two different spaces, first in the sky, in the abandoned palace of Zeus, and then in Athens. Between the moment of the liberation of the goddess (520) and the moment her statue is finally set up (1126), 517 verses elapse, or approximately 38% of the comedy.[15]

At the beginning of the comedy, Trygaeus is separated from Athenian society and his family, flying into the heavens alone (54–5 and 110–49) to visit Zeus and persuade or oblige him to stop the war destroying the cities of Greece (56–81, 103–8). As soon as Trygaeus arrives at the palace of Zeus, he enters a liminal state. He first introduces himself as 'filthiest/utterly vile' (μιαρώτατος), echoing the characterisation Hermes uses for him (182–6) and, although he reveals his real name (190) and thus regains his civic identity, he remains and acts as a human among non-humans in a liminal space between earth and the new abode of the gods, remaining physically within a place that has been abandoned to War. It is in this state that he conceives of his scheme to liberate Eirene by evading Zeus' orders, becomes the leader of the Chorus, and realises his plan.

Even after the liberation of Eirene, Trygaeus remains in a liminal state, entering into a phase of transition. First, he has succeeded as a peacemaker in that he has brought Eirene back, but he has not yet secured a new reality: he must appease the anger of the goddess, return to earth, and establish her cult. Second, he must become the husband of Opora, as soon as Hermes hands her over to him to be his wife. Betrothal is in real life a liminal phase between unmarried life and married life.[16] In the case of Trygaeus, it represents the final phase of the transition between his status as an

[15] Ar. *Pax* 520–1126 = 606 verses, 89 of which belong to the Parabasis; excluding the Parabasis a total of 517 verses remain; the whole comedy is 1358 verses long, that is, the enactment of the process of establishing Eirene after her liberation covers ca. 38% of the comedy. As a measure of comparison: the prologue is 300 verses long and covers *c.* 22% and the first and the second parabasis together are 152 verses long or *c.* 11% of the comedy.

[16] See Gennep (2004) 11 and Dillon (2002) 215 (especially for Athens) for the betrothal as a passage period from adolescence to married life for women. Betrothal is not associated with specific rites of passage for a man, for whom the standard in Athens was to marry in about his thirties (cf. Plat. *Leg.* 721b, 772d, 785b). But betrothal was also a passage for men from a civic and existential point of view, since marriage gave the male citizen the opportunity to legally produce children.

unremarkable, ageing male Athenian at the beginning of the comedy and his being celebrated as the new husband of a deity at its conclusion.[17]

The liminal state in the peacemaker subplot ends with the completion of the sacrifice marking the *hidrysis* of the statue of Eirene (1126). The liminal state connected with the marriage subplot ends with the beginning of the wedding procession (1316). In wedding ceremonies, the phase between engagement and marriage ends with a complex of ritual acts that include a ceremonial feast, the unveiling of the bride (*anakalyptēria*), during which the male protector of the bride brings her to the groom (*ekdosis*), and a wedding procession leading to the new couple's home.[18] Within this complex, the *anakalyptēria* is a critical moment.[19] In *Peace*, the wedding feast happens in the background (1191–315) and there is no indication of a performance of the *anakalyptēria* on stage.[20] The moment marking the completion of the liminal phase in the marriage sub-plot and the definite passage into the celebration phase is the point at which Trygaeus, after having left the stage at verse 1310, reappears at verse 1314 and asks that the bride be brought out in order for the procession to start (1316–8). The two sub-plots are, thus, structurally firmly connected: the celebration phase in the peacemaking-subplot is represented by the marriage feast and the procession; the marriage feast, however, still belongs to the liminal phase in the marriage-subplot.[21]

[17] In the scene with the sickle-maker and the potter, Trygaeus receives several gifts from them to celebrate marriage. It is significant that the sickle-maker comments upon them that the presents are 'out of the sales and the profits [they] have made'. This comment parallels the marriage gifts to the *aparchai,* the firstlings offered or sacrificed to the gods.

[18] For the wedding ceremonies in ancient Greece of the classical period see Oakley and Sinos, (1993) 22–37, and Zoepffel (1985), esp. 383–5 for *engyē* and *ekdosis* in Athens.

[19] For the discussion on the *anakalyptēria,* the sources on it, the exact moment the ritual was performed and its meaning as a passage ritual see Oakley and Sinos (1993), and Mason, (2006) 44–6.

[20] It is possible to assume that just after 1316 a veiled Opora appears on stage accompanied by a male attendant (cf. 1316: *τὴν νύμφην ἔξω τινα δεῦρο κομίζειν*, 'let someone bring the bride out here' [my translation]) and that the unveiling is performed on stage; however, there is no solid grounds for this assumption.

[21] The plot seen from the perspective of Eirene presents a similar tripartite structure: At the beginning of the comedy Eirene is in a state of separation, imprisoned by War. As soon as Trygaeus and the Chorus liberate her, she enters into a liminal state, since she is free but her relation to the Greeks/Athenians, Trygaeus, and the Chorus is vexed and problematic and her cult is not yet installed. After the completion of the sacrifice that installs her statue (*hidrysis*), she enters the new state of an acknowledged and officially worshiped deity. In *Peace* Eirene is a deity and at the same time a symbolic representation of the ideal state of peace, in this case of the state of peace among the Greek cities: Olson (1998) xxxv–xxxvi. From the perspective of Athens and the cities of Greece the passage is the transition from a state of war and acute danger of complete destruction into a state of peace, friendly relations, and prosperity.

3. Recollecting the Past and Envisioning the Future from a Liminal Standpoint

The prolonged liminal phase after the liberation of Eirene is marked by three sets of acts: first, speeches and dialogues about the war and its causes; second, formal or ritual acts that restore a pre-war state and/or create a new reality; and third, interactions between Trygaeus and his slave with supporters of peace and supporters of war. These interactions include episodes that occur during the marriage feast, that is, in the celebration phase of the peace-making subplot but while the liminal phase of the marriage subplot is still incomplete.

The question of who bears responsibility for the war is crucial both to the first part of *Peace* and to this prolonged liminal phase. It is a question directly connected with a negotiation about how to remember the past and, more crucially, how to proceed through the liminal phase into the new state.

At the beginning of the comedy, an answer presupposing the gods' responsibility (56–9, 62–3, 104–8) is confronted with an answer stating that humans alone—specifically Athenians and Spartans—are to blame (210–20).[22] After the liberation of Eirene, both in a rather long speech of Hermes (603–48) and in the subsequent dialogue between Eirene and Trygaeus mediated by Hermes (657–92),[23] an answer focusing on the responsibility of certain politicians or even mainly on the responsibility of Cleon is complemented by or even challenged by an answer focusing on the broad responsibility of the Athenian people.[24] The oscillation between these two answers is a feature of the liminal phase just following the liberation of Eirene: it is a necessary negotiation process in the course of assessing the question of responsibility for the war in a way that ensures a future of peace.

Finally, as the liminal phase nears completion, in the prayer to Eirene, which is a constituent part of the sacrifice for the *hidrysis* of the goddess' statue, a discourse that stabilises new structures appears. Trygaeus and the Chorus employ an explicitly erotic discourse. The goddess is compared to a desirable but potentially unstable and mischievous mistress, while they are presented as her lovers. The discourse, in particular their pleas for her not to abandon them again, explicitly ask her not to behave like an unstable mistress *any more* (986: *τούτων σὺ ποίει μηδὲν <u>ἔθ'</u>* ἡμᾶς). On the one hand, this requisition primarily emphasises how much Trygaeus and the Chorus missed peace during the war;[25] at the same time, however, it implies that the

[22] See Olson (1998) 110 (*ad* 211–2 and 212–19).

[23] For the performance of the dialogue between the statue of Eirene and Trygaeus see Kassel (1983).

[24] For a detailed discussion of the relations between personal interest, fear, and responsibility for the war in Hermes' speech, see Chronopoulos (2017) 235–40.

[25] In verses 987–90 Trygaeus, speaking also on behalf of the Chorus, uses a marked expression to denote the torment they went through during the war while longing for Eirene:

responsibility for the war lies with Eirene herself. Thus, the erotic discourse in the prayer reduces the responsibility for the war to the tautology 'we had war because we did not have peace' and projects it back on the realm of the gods through the personification of peace as the goddess Eirene. It is significant that in the prayer Trygaeus' view of the past is directly combined with a perspective on the future: the comic hero asks Eirene to influence internal and external politics and promote concord, peace, and forbearance among all Greeks (993–9). The end of the liminal phase, to which the sacrifice and the prayer belong, includes and combines an ongoing discussion about how to remember history, interpret the period of war, and shape the future.

The liminal phase in *Peace* is also marked by an inversion of the values that concern both the recollection of the past and the envisioning of the future. The inversion of values in *Peace* involves on the one hand a causal connection between cowardliness and the support of peace and on the other hand the claim that a demagogue can save the city *because* of his low status. In both cases the value inversion is an element of personal jokes targeting Cleonymus and Hyperbolus respectively.

In 670–8 Aristophanes refashions the stock joke targeting Cleonymus' cowardice,[26] presenting Cleonymus as the truest and most loyal friend of Peace. In the liminal world that this comedy represents onstage, a character who contradicts the moral code of the hoplite/citizen is satirised as embodying a kind of virtue: since courage and steadiness in battle are explicitly connected with war, cowardliness must be positive.[27]

In 679–92 Hyperbolus, the person chosen by the Athenian *dēmos* as its new *prostatēs* after Cleon's death, is presented ambiguously: while Trygaeus accepts Eirene's accusation that this person is a *ponēros*, he first stresses the fact that the choice of the people is only a provisory solution in a liminal situation of acute need,[28] and then turns it into its opposite using the

τοῖσιν ἐρασταῖς | ἡμῖν, οἵ σου τρυχόμεθ' ἤδη | τρία καὶ δέκ' ἔτη ('the lovers who have pined for thee these thirteen years'). The verb τρύχομαι means 'to be worn out, to be distressed or exhausted', can well be used also in military contexts (cf. Thuc. 1.126: τρυχόμενοι τῇ προσεδρίᾳ), and is normally not constructed with the genitive. In this case the genitive can be explained by analogy with the construction of the verb ἐράω ('love', 'long for', 'desire'); see Olson (1998) 258–9 (*ad* 988–90): the result is a condensed and marked expression meaning 'be worn out because of our desire/longing for you'; at the same time the expression refers to the distresses of the war. Thus, this peculiar and marked construction contributes to the presentation of Trygaeus and the Chorus as the victims simultaneously of the detriments of the war and the unstable behaviour of Eirene.

[26] For Cleonymus as a target whom Aristophanes attacks repeatedly, see Storey (1989) and Robson (2009) 166. For an analysis of this specific joke against Cleonymus see Chronopoulos (2017) 271–3.

[27] For a similar re-interpretation of cowardliness, see the discussion about the end of the comedy, see below, pp. 80–1.

[28] See 685–6; the Athenian Dēmos is presented as being suddenly left almost naked after Cleon's death (ἀπορῶν ἐπιτρόπου καὶ γυμνὸς ὤν). The image of the *gymnos* Dēmos, that is of

polysemy of the term *ponēros*, which may refer at the same time to Hyperbolus' political agenda and style, his poor background and his origins, or/and his handicraft profession as lamp-maker.[29] Trygaeus isolates the reference to the profession and creates a joke based, on the one hand, on the satirical *topos* of projecting the professional activity of a demagogue onto his political activity,[30] and, on the other hand, on the blending of the literal fact that Hyperbolus produces lamps with the metaphorical expressions 'groping in the dark at the political issues' (*ψηλαφᾶν ἐν σκότῳ τὰ πράγματα*) and 'discussing/deciding by light' (*ἅπαντα πρὸς λύχνον βουλεύσομεν*). In this case, the 'light' is nothing more that 'lamp-light', but it seems to be better than nothing in this critical and difficult moment for the Athenian people. The joke establishes a logic that destabilises the moral/political code implied in Eirene's negative reaction towards Hyperbolus and inverts its values, creating a direct link between a *ponēros prostatēs* controlling the democratic deliberation processes and *euboulia,* the ability to take just and correct decisions (*eubouloteroi genēsometha*).

Both jokes have an obviously satirical purpose in subverting values in the ways discussed below. At the same time, however, these jokes *are* the only answers Trygaeus gives to Eirene's questions. In the liminal phase enacted in *Peace*, jokes illustrating an inversion of norms and values are serious discourse.

Just after the liberation of Eirene, Trygaeus stands at a liminal point between war and peace, a precarious position reflecting the situation of the historical audience. Remembrance and interpretation of the past, as well as envisioning of the future, from this liminal point are marked by oscillation about responsibility for the war and by the destabilisation of values and norms concerning both the code of the hoplite/citizen and the code of political behaviour that comedy in general promotes.

a Dēmos left only with a *chiton*, alludes to the fact that the now lost Cleon as a tanner provided Dēmos with the necessary garments: see Neil (1901) 126 (*ad* 881–3) and Olson (1998) 209–10 (*ad* 685–7).

[29] For *ponēros* and *mochthēros* as Hyperbolus' distinctive marks, see Rosenbloom (2002) 301 n. 73 and 309; for the polysemy of *ponēros,* the interconnection between the political and the moral meaning, and the usages of the term in the political–ideological confrontations in Athens at the end of the fifth century, see Neil (1901) 206–8 and Rosenbloom (2002) 284–312. For the alleged poor background or alien origin of Hyperbolus and his lack of education see Rosenbloom (2002) 290 and 308 n. 102. For Hyperbolus' biographical data see *APF*, no. 13910 (p. 517) and Brenne (2001) 215.

[30] See Rosenbloom (2002) 307; to the passages referred to there may be added Ar. *Eccl.* 252–3 (performed between 393 and 390 BCE).

4. From War into Peace: Restoring the Past or Creating a Brand-New Reality?

After the liberation of Eirene, Hermes and Trygaeus perform three acts: the handing over of Theoria to the Council of the Five Hundred; the betrothal and marriage of Opora and Trygaeus; and the *hidrysis* of the statue of Eirene. These acts are formal and ritual processes, the completion of which marks either the restoration of a pre-war situation and/or the establishment of a new reality in the era of peace. *Peace* represents these processes as such, dramatising the historical passage from war to peace.

Hermes hands over Opora to Trygaeus to be his wife in a dramatisation of the formal act of betrothal (*engyē*, 706–12);[31] he then entrusts Theoria to him,[32] and orders him to return her to the Athenian Council of the Five Hundred (713–7; cf. 892–3). As soon as Trygaeus returns to earth, he orders his slave to take Opora into the house and to start the preparations for the marriage (840–4), stating his intention to hand Theoria over to the Boule (846). Soon afterward, the slave announces that the marriage preparations are complete (868–70) and Trygaeus leads Theoria to the special section of the auditorium designed for the members of the Council (871–908).[33]

These two acts are similar in that both can be seen as acts of restoration. Nevertheless, there is a significant distinction, since the restoration of Theoria establishes a continuity between a certain period of the past and the present, while Trygaeus' betrothal represents a kind of rejuvenation. The two acts thus imply two different models for viewing the passage from war to peace and assessing how the new reality is related to the past.

Hermes and Trygaeus explicitly present the handing over of Theoria to the Council as an act of returning to the pre-war situation.[34] Hermes gives orders to Trygaeus (713–4): 'take Showtime here, and bring her as quickly as possible to the Council, whom she used to belong to'. Later, when Trygaeus executes Hermes' instructions, he and his slave engage in a comic dialogue with sexual innuendos, which point in the same direction (891–3).

The restoration is presented both in a formal and in a joking register as an act that isolates and brackets out a certain traumatic and destructive period of the past and secures the continuity of the normal.

On the other hand, the betrothal and the marriage of Trygaeus and Opora restores Trygaeus to a previous stage of his youth, while creating a

[31] See Olson (1998) 212 (*ad* 706–8); for *engyē* in Attic legislation on marriage and the debate about its exact function see Harrison (1968) 3–9 and Oakley and Sinos (1993) 9–11.

[32] For the different meanings of *Theoria* see the discussion in Cassio (1985) 124 and Landrum (2013) 31–2 and n. 19. Sommerstein (1985) translates 'Theoria' aptly as 'Showtime'.

[33] See Olson (1998) 239 (*ad* 881–2) and 242–3 (*ad* 905–6)).

[34] See Cassio (1985) 124–5 who stresses the aspect that the act of handing over Theoria to the Boule is an act of restoration that in the real world corresponds to the restoration of the possibility to travel freely, in order to visit a festival.

new reality: the old man (860–3) and father (111) becomes a groom once more and appears to be young again.[35] The presentation of this transition (856–62) is significant. The Chorus addresses Trygaeus and praises him; he responds by pointing to his rejuvenated state.

The restoration in this case does not mean return to normality and continuity between past and present but the creation of a brand-new reality with no reference to the past: the children of Trygaeus appear on stage only in the prologue (110–72) and are not mentioned again later. The motif of rejuvenation, which comedy uses in several contexts,[36] implies in this case a different model to reflect on the transition from war to peace: the end of war is presented as a definite turning point and the establishment of peace as the initiation of a new era representing a complete break with the past.

The model of the new era also underlies the most important ritual act that Trygaeus conducts, the sacrifice with which he sets up the statue of Eirene. In fifth-century Athens, the goddess Eirene was not officially worshipped as an autonomous deity.[37] In the comic world of *Peace*, the transition from war to peace is performed through an innovation, the establishment of the new cult. This cult opens up a new era which makes real what is impossible in the real world, namely everlasting peace.

The *hidrysis*-sacrifice is a complex ritual that marks the end of the liminal phase in the peacemaking subplot.[38] The completion of the sacrifice is the presupposition for the initiation of Eirene's cult. Only a selection of the ritual acts that constitute the regular sacrificial process in real life are performed onstage: the choice of the sacrificial animal (922–38); the preparation of the altar and the bringing of the animal to the altar (938–60);[39] the cleansing ritual and the prayer to the goddess (960–1015);[40] the preparation of the fire (1023–38); the burning of the thigh-bones, the rump, and the tail (1039 and

[35] For an interpretation of the speaking name 'Trygaeus' revealing the fact that the comic hero is old and young at the same time see Sells (2018) 119–26 with further bibliography; see also Kanavou (2011) 98–9.

[36] For the dramatic element of rejuvenation in Aristophanic comedies, see Byl (1977) 72–3, and Hubbard (1989) 94–105. See also the emphasis Segal (2001) 64–7 places on the rejuvenation element in *Peace*.

[37] An autonomous official cult of Eirene was established in Athens in 375/4: see Olson (1998) 113 (*ad* 221) and 264 (*ad* 1019–20). Athanassaki (2018), based on Euripides' *Cresphontes*, Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, *Farmers*, and *Peace*, discusses in detail the possibility that in the last years of the 420s, a real movement existed towards establishing an official cult of Eirene in Athens.

[38] For the ritual act of *hidrysis* of a statue see Pirenne-Delforge (2015) 126–30.

[39] For the ritual act of sprinkling the sacrificial animal with water see Naiden (2013) 65–6.

[40] The animal is not killed onstage. Instead of performing the act onstage, Trygaeus and his slave deliver a dialogue about the nature of goddess Eirene ('surely Peace takes no delight in slaughter, "nor is her altar bloodied"' (1018–19)); the slave is asked to kill the animal off-stage, cut out the thigh-bones, and bring them back on stage (1020–1): see 1017–22 and the remarks in Olson (1998) 264–5.

1053–4—that is, the shares of the goddess, which Trygaeus will also use to do the divining);[41] the wine offering to the goddess (1060, 1104–10); and the roasting of the entrails and the other parts of the animal (1040, 1110–20).[42]

The performance of the sacrifice is an extended process: Trygaeus announces his intention to sacrifice in verse 922 and the ritual act ends at verse 1126, that is, it covers 204 verses or roughly 15% of the comedy. The length of the sacrifice process is due, among other factors, to the fact that Trygaeus and the Chorus discuss which offerings/animal should be used for the sacrifice (924–36, 13 verses). The debate over the type of the sacrifice and the sacrificial animal clearly indicates the novelty of the decision to set up the statue and establish the cult of Eirene. Different gods and different circumstances demand different types of sacrifice, and the practitioners know from traditional experience which type they should choose each time.[43] No such experience is available for the *hidrysis*-sacrifice Trygaeus intends to conduct, as the goddess Eirene is being installed for the first time. Accordingly, the transition from war to peace is presented and experienced as a passage into a novel condition.[44]

Peace thus presents two different models for understanding the relationship between the troubled past and the upcoming period of peace: the new period is simultaneously a restoration of the more distant past and an entirely new period as an unprecedented condition with new safeguards against disaster. The plot of the comedy and especially its end merges these two models, as the rejuvenated countryman Trygaeus, a human who is married to a deity and has been restored to his youth and stripped of any connection to his personal past, returns to the country and his fields, in many ways resembling the condition of his state in its entirety.

[41] See Naiden (2013) 111–4).

[42] See Bremmer (2006) for a concise presentation of the procedure of a typical sacrifice ritual with animal sacrifice and Ziehen (1939) 598–623 for a more detailed presentation. The sacrificial feast, that is, the event consisting of the celebration phase of the sacrifice ritual, is not presented on stage. The marriage feast that happens in the background in verses 1192–315 and the offering of food from this feast to the Chorus and by extension to the audience (1193–6 and 1305–15; see Olson (1998) 311 (*ad* 1305–11/12)) can be regarded as the replacement of the sacrificial feast.

[43] See the remarks in Ullucci (2011) 63.

[44] See Ambler (2014), who reads *Peace* as a critique of established religion and focuses on the fact that Trygaeus breaks with the existing religious tradition and installs a new Pantheon. This reading is possible—and actually opens up an interesting and innovative insight into the play—because the installation of Peace is indeed presented as a highly innovative act.

5. Individuals against Groups—Unified and Divided Groups: Two Models to Represent Tensions

In *Peace* the transition from war to peace is an event that involves a whole community. This community is represented both by the audience and by groups of Athenian citizens represented onstage. These groups and the audience do not simply express untempered joy for the new life in peace but become involved in confrontations, with which the comedy dramatises and reflects upon social tensions of this period of transition. *Peace* uses two different structures for the dramatisation of conflicts. The first is based on the confrontation between a group and an individual who tries unsuccessfully to find a place in it. The second structure consists of creating divisions between groups which are initially presented as unified, supposedly united in a pro peace stance. The division is based on the fact that specific subgroups or persons belonging to these groups actually stand on the side of war. In the following, I discuss in some detail the examples from both conflict-structures.

5.1 Individuals against Groups: The Case of Hierocles

A significant part of the sacrifice scene whose end marks the conclusion of the liminal phase in the peacemaking subplot is the confrontation between Trygaeus and his slave on the one hand, and the oracle collector Hierocles, on the other.

Hierocles enters the stage as soon as Trygaeus and his slave start roasting the sacrificial meat, and three important ritual acts that mark the conclusion of the sacrificial process are completed despite his disturbing presence: the separation of the parts of the sacrificed animal that belong to the god; the wine-offering (*spondē*);[45] and the collective participation in the consumption of the entrails (1115–16). He is identified as an oracle collector (*chrēsmologos*),[46] that is, a religious expert who possesses a collection of diverse oracles, from which he selects, recites, and interprets in various circumstances, including processes of political deliberation.[47] Thucydides (2.8, 21; 8.1) testifies that in Athens, oracle collectors had—at least until the disaster of the expedition in Sicily—a significant role in political deliberation regarding the war.

[45] See *Pax* 1056–61 and 1109–10, Ziehen (1939) 613–4, and Olson (1998) 270 (*ad* 1056) and 280–1 (*ad* 1110).

[46] For translating the tern *chrēsmologos* as 'oracle collector' instead of 'oracle monger' see Parker (2005) 111.

[47] For the distinction between a *mantis* and a *chrēsmologos* see Smith (1989) 141–3 and Flower (2008) 60–5. For oracle collectors in general in Greece in the archaic and classical periods cf. also Bowden (2007) 34–7; for the presentation of oracle collectors in Aristophanic comedies, see Smith (1989) 141–7 and Barrenechea (2018) 53–4. See also Shapiro (1990), who discusses in detail the activity and the political connections of the oracle-collector Onomakritos of the 6th century (Hdt. 7.6). For Hierocles see also Eupolis, fr. 231 (*Poleis*).

The comic character 'Hierocles' in *Peace* refers most probably to the historical Hierocles (*PAA* 7473), the person who was instructed in the decree *IG* I³ 40.64–6 to lead the sacrifice that sealed the treaty between Athens and Chalkis after the suppression of the revolt of Euboean cities in 446/5.[48] The features of the historical Hierocles indicate that he had gained money and fame because of the war and that he had some power and influence in the city. This assumption is crucial for the interpretation of his presence in *Peace*.

The Hierocles episode shares basic features with scenes in other comedies in which characters who do not otherwise appear in the play come onstage and either attack the comic hero or try to profit from the reality he has established. The hero usually reacts by denying them what they ask for and/or chasing them off.[49] These episodes are designed to illustrate the consequences of the new reality the hero has created, and they thus occur only after this new reality has been definitely imposed.[50] In contrast with these examples, the Hierocles episode does not come after the final establishment of the statue and the cult of Eirene but while it is unfinished. In other words, Hierocles appears while the liminal phase is not yet concluded and represents the last challenge in the process of passage from war to peace. The way the episode is introduced (1048–50) indicates that the sacrifice is at a crucial point: Trygaeus focuses on the fact that it is not yet completed, regards Hierocles as a potential opponent, and fears that he will endanger the process of establishing peace. By contrast, the slave focuses on the fact that the sacrifice is almost finished and regards Hierocles as a person who simply wants to get some personal profit. While the slave's point of view is more compatible with a typical episode *after* the establishment of the new reality in the comic world, Trygaeus' comment implies rather a confrontation episode *before* the definite establishment of this new reality. It is significant in this context that one of Hierocles' arguments against the peace treaty is that the gods oppose it (1073–9); he thus recalls one of the first obstacles Trygaeus had to overcome in order to liberate Eirene, namely Zeus' prohibition of such an act (371–82).

The final ritual acts, bringing to an end the long liminal phase of the peacemaking subplot, coincide with the confrontation with, and the

[48] Mattingly (2002) argues for an alternative dating of the decree *IG* I³ 40 at 424/3 in connection with the military intervention of Athens in Euboea reported by Philochorus. For the roles Hierocles possibly undertook during this sacrifice see Olson (1998) 269; cf. also Meiggs–Lewis (1988) 173. For the available biographical data about Hierocles see Olson (1998) 268–9 and Flower (2008) 62.

[49] For a discussion of the Hierocles episode in comparison to similar episodes from other comedies see Cassio (1985) 129–35.

[50] See the presentation of these episodes as structural part of the Aristophanic comedy in Robson (2009) 10–11, in the section entitled 'Consequences of the Agôn'. For a detailed discussion concerning the relation between these episodes and the main plot of the comedy see Zimmermann (1987).

expulsion of, Hierocles.[51] Hierocles simultaneously represents an individual who profits from war and seeks to hinder peace to maintain his profits; an individual who seeks to exploit collective processes to gain some personal advantage; and a rather powerful individual who stands for the entrenched social structures established during the ten-year war period (cf. Thuc. 3.82.8). In his figure, *Peace* binds together advocacy for the war and the uninhibited pursuit of personal profit and discredits both, while also criticising social and hierarchical structures that foster the war. During the first stages of the sacrificial process, Trygaeus and his slave have created a unified space including the stage, the orchestra and the spectators:[52] this sacrificial community, led by the comic hero, remains unified, confronts Hierocles, and rejects him, thus securing the proper conclusion of the sacrifice, the end of the liminal phase in the peacemaking-subplot, and the emergence of new structures in the Athenian society.

5.2 Divided Groups

A confrontation between an individual such as Hierocles and a group such as the sacrificial community presided over by the comic hero represents a case in which the tension is provoked by the individual alone and can be solved rather simply by excluding this individual from the community. *Peace*, in its liminal phase, also dramatises other, more complicated cases of tensions, presenting groups that at first glance give the impression of being unified and of having a pro-peace stance when the opposite is actually true: these groups are shown to be deeply divided. *Peace* uses this structural pattern to dramatise tensions in three crucial moments of the prolonged liminal phase: tensions involving the Chorus before the liberation of Eirene; tensions projected onto the audience just after the liberation; and those involving the community of the guests just before the definite completion of the liminal phase during the marriage feast.

The Chorus of the comedy is introduced as a group comprising virtually all Greeks and all professional classes (296–8): all dancers are initially enthusiastic to help liberate Eirene (302–8). But as soon as they start performing the task, it becomes obvious that not everybody is equally interested in it. The unified group is presented then as divided into different ethnic groups: Boeotians, Argives, Megarians, and Athenians, who do not really help; while of the Spartans, only those being held as prisoners of war in Athens are really interested, since they have urgent personal reasons (475–508). Besides the division into ethnic groups, the Chorus is also divided in

[51] See Cassio (1985) 137, who remarks also that the expulsion of Hierocles signifies in more general terms Trygaeus' definite victory against the enemies of peace.

[52] Cf. 925–6, where Trygaeus discusses with the Chorus the offerings/animal that should be sacrificed. In 960–72 the spectators and the Chorus are included in the ritual acts: see Cassio (1985) 126.

segments according to professions (cf. 296–7); of these, only the group of farmers shows genuine interest in the endeavour and manages in the end to liberate Eirene (508–11). During the following actions and for the rest of the play the Chorus is in fact a Chorus of farmers (cf., for example, 560–600 and 1127–71).

The transformation of the Chorus from a group comprising all Greeks into a group that consists only of farmers[53] deconstructs a discourse that presents everyone as a peace supporter and thus as a member of the community celebrating a recently achieved peace treaty as one. *Peace* starts with a Chorus that includes the entire community and successively tears this group apart, gradually identifying the real supporters of peace. Thus, through the discourses of an idealised agrarian landscape and life (especially in 560–600 and 1127–71), the comedy celebrates the new era of peace not as an obvious choice but as the result of the process of sifting apart true and false supporters of peace and excluding the latter.[54]

The joy that prevails after the liberation of Eirene is illustrated with two rather opposing images. In the first, Hermes and Trygaeus comment upon the imagined reactions of the various cities they can see from their perch in the sky. The cities form an undivided collective, they talk to one another and laugh together happily. Trygaeus agrees with Hermes' remark while pointing to the fact that they all still bear clear signs of the fights that have just ended (538–42):

> *Hermes*: Come now, look and see how all the states have been reconciled, how they're talking to one another and laughing in gladness—
>
> *Trygaeus*: And that though they've got incredible black eyes, *the whole lot of them*, and have cupping vessels applied to them.[55]

Just after this image of a previously divided but now unified group follows a second one that focuses on the spectators and uses the opposite pattern to

[53] For the staging problem that the fluctuation of the Chorus' identity poses, see the discussion in Zimmermann (1985) I.262–5: Zimmermann favours the idea that no extra dancers were present and no specific dancers were identified as Megarians, Boeotians, or Spartans. The transformation of the identity of the Chorus is performed through the text and through mimetic gestures. Cassio (1985) 74–6 proposes a different solution: at 508, where Trygaeus addresses exclusively the farmers, the vast majority of the dancers leaves some dancers behind and becomes 'the Chorus of the farmers'. The few dancers who remain are re-united with the Chorus after 520. See also Olson (1998) 181 (*ad* 508).

[54] For the tension between the presentation of unified collectivities and their disruption see also the remarks in Nelson (2016) 227–30, focusing on the question of how 'Panhellenic' peace can be.

[55] Since representatives from several allied cities were attending the performance of the play, it is probable to assume that the image Hermes draws also has a reference to assumed reactions of representatives of some of these cities among the spectators.

illustrate joy. The spectators are not presented as a unified collective but as disrupted group. Craftsmen of different specialisations are opposed to each other. On the one hand, weapon and arms producers and sellers, and, on the other hand, producers and sellers of farming tools have exactly the opposite reactions. The tool producers indeed treat the weapon producers as humiliated opponents (543–50). In an economy with a considerable degree of horizontal specialisation, as the Athenian economy at the end of the fifth century seems to have been,[56] the passage from war to peace causes loss for some and gains for others, a process the comedy presents as a zero-sum game. We may assume that this representation is related to or reflects a discourse in real life about the need to re-organise production and find a new balance in production and commerce.

The antagonism between tool producers and sellers who gain, and weapon producers and sellers who lose is not only projected onto the public of the theatre. It is also enacted on stage in two episodes after the completion of the *hidrysis* sacrifice, during the final phase of the liminal period in the marriage sub-plot (1197–208 and 1208–69). These episodes belong typologically to those illustrating the consequences of the new reality the comic hero has imposed. In the first episode, a sickle-maker and a potter bring Trygaeus sickles, pots, some other farming tools, and gifts for his marriage. They are grateful to him because of the gains they are making since peace has been restored (1198–201, 1205). Conversely, in the second episode, a dealer of arms, a producer of helmets, and a producer of spears, all in desperate economic straits because of the sudden fall in demand for their products, try to persuade Trygaeus to buy some of their wares. Trygaeus does not immediately refuse but ridicules the weapon sellers/producers: he sarcastically offers extremely low prices, describing how he will use some helmet crests or a cuirass for very low purposes, but when his humiliating offers are nevertheless accepted, he refuses to make the purchase after all (1214–23 and 1224–39). Alternatively, he proposes transforming the weapons into tools that bring no gain (1240–9, 1256–9), practically impossible solutions (1250–4), or else mass sale at ridiculous prices (1260–3). Theoretically everyone can participate in the new reality, provided that they accept the new conditions: those who lose from the new situation have to go through their own process of passage and change. But it is obvious that this process neither is easy nor has a guaranteed end. In *Peace*, the weapon sellers and producers are treated as enemies and are definitely excluded, even though they demonstrate some will, at least, adapt to the new situation.

The third case to which the division of groups applies involves the invitees at the wedding feast. They are initially presented as a collective without any further qualification (1191–2 and 1265–7).[57] Some verses later, children of

[56] See Harris–Lewis (2016) 1–3, 24–5 and n. 123.

[57] In verses 1191–2 Trygaeus is surprised by the large number of the guests who have come to the wedding feast: 'Whew! What a crowd's come to dinner for the wedding!' Olson

these invitees come out to practice the songs they intend to sing at the feast, as Trygaeus wants to hear their songs. The first child sings only epic verses about war and battles, and it emerges that he is the son of the general Lamachus (1270–90), who has been addressed shortly beforehand as an obstacle in the attempt to liberate Eirene (473–4).[58] Trygaeus chases Lamachus' son away (1294) and asks explicitly for the child of Cleonymus to come forward and sing. Trygaeus uses the characterisation of Cleonymus as loyal peace lover because of his cowardliness, an identity already established earlier in the comedy. Because of this characterisation, Trygaeus is sure that his child will never sing a song for the war (1295–7). The cowardliness of Cleonymus is here presented as a guarantee that both father and son will be for peace and against war. Both Lamachus and Cleonymus are ridiculed: the difference is that Lamachus' son is expelled from the feast, while Cleonymus' son remains a welcome guest.[59] The exclusion–inclusion dichotomy is thus also applied to the celebratory community: from the initially unified collective of the invitees, at least one supporter of war must be expelled before the marriage procession, the representation of the proper celebratory re-aggregation phase in *Peace,* begins.

Conclusion

Peace is directly tied to a contemporary historical reality, and contains significant 'historiographic' elements that offer interpretations of the past and its relationship with the present and future. In this article I have attempted to examine some of the features of this association, that is, I have posed the general question of how the comedy *Peace* responds to the negotiations for a peace treaty between Athens and Sparta in summer and winter 422/1 and to the transition from a prolonged period of war to a period

(1998) 295–6 (*ad* 1192) remarks that 'since no persons have been seen on stage entering the house, the remark is most easily taken as a reference to the audience'.

[58] There is no indication that Lamachus was supporting the continuation of war at 421 apart from the way he is portrayed in *Peace*. Obviously, it is possible to interpret this comic portrait as corresponding directly to the historical reality; cf. Olson (1998) 133 (ad 302–4). Nevertheless, the speaking name of the general Lamachus, a compound from the epitatic prefix *λα*- and the noun *μάχη* ('battle'), and an intended intertextual reference to his salient role as supporter and representative of pro-war politics in a previous Aristophanic comedy, the *Acharnians*, may also have some importance for choosing him as a comic figure in *Peace*; see the discussion in Ercolani (2002) 241 and Chronopoulos (2017) 252–62. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Zogg (2014) 58–70 and 144–63.

[59] See the remarks in Zogg (2014) 160–3. See also Gödde (2011) 304–5, who argues that Trygaeus associates the installation of Peace directly with the usage of a language that will not allude to or be reminiscent of war. He goes so far in this respect that he inverts the conventional language, which actually prohibited the naming of acts that one should never commit, like 'throw away your shield' (*rhipsaspis*, *apoballein ta hopla*), and not only uses these words but also rewards the associated behaviours.

of peace. *Peace* connects fantastic plot elements, such as the flight of a human being to the palace of Zeus or the marriage of a human being to a deity, and representations of rites, such as the sacrifice complex and the betrothal–marriage complex, to create a plot structure similar to the tripartite division of rites of passage. This plot structure has a significantly prolonged liminal phase, in which the process of the passage from a state of war into a state of peace is performed onstage. *Peace* projects this plot onto the historical process of negotiations and transition from war into peace. A general feature of liminal phases is ambivalence regarding value codes and structures: they are periods in which, on the one hand, firm, broadly accepted structures and norms are destabilised or even disappear, and, on the other, new or altered norms and structures start to form. *Peace* represent discourses that destabilise crucial civic and political values, seeming at least partly to suggest that this value system irresponsibly foments war, and creates a plot that enacts onstage the formation process of new structures in social and economic life and the ensuing tensions. *Peace* proposes two different models of thought about the relation of this new period to the past: it both conceives and presents the new present as a restoration of the past, the continuation of a normality that was interrupted by the war; and it also presents it as a novel, unprecedented reality. The plot of the comedy is designed to merge these two models. The transformation that *Peace* represents on stage is a difficult one, since it involves crucial tensions. *Peace* applies two different structural patterns to perform these tensions: powerful individuals are set up in opposition to and excluded from groups, and groups that are initially presented as unified are subsequently shown to be divided between supporters of peace and supporters of war. The latter are excluded or humiliated, while the group continues to exist in a new or a differentiated form. *Peace* thus applies an exclusion–inclusion dichotomy in order to destroy previously existing structures but also in order to begin with the formation of the structures to be established in the upcoming new period.

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5

THE ATHENIAN PORTRAYAL OF THE DISPLACEMENT AND FLIGHT OF PLATAEAN WAR REFUGEES IN THE FIFTH AND FOURTH CENTURIES BCE: CITIZENSHIP, INTEGRATION, ETHNIC IDENTITY*

Mark Marsh-Hunn

Our lives as human beings are shaped by stories: the stories we tell about ourselves, and the stories that are told about us by others. It is by means of stories that our identities are constructed. We adapt, change or embellish these narratives as required to project a certain image of ourselves or reinforce a specific agenda. The narratives we construct, and the manner in which we do so, form a crucial part of our understanding of history: the latter consists, inherently, of narrative. This paper is concerned with the close interplay between historical events, the stories that surround them, and the corresponding effect on collective identity. The study is thus more of a historical than a literary analysis of ancient sources, and yet the two realms are here closely interlinked. I seek to examine closely the way people in Classical Greece constructed stories around historical events, and how these stories were then instrumentalised and exploited.

When the tragic poet Phrynichos staged his play *The Fall of Miletus* in Athens shortly after the capture and sack of the latter city by the Persians toward the end of the Ionian Revolt in the first decade of the fifth century BCE, Herodotus tells us that the Athenian audience in the theatre was grief-stricken and moved to tears. So distressing was the depiction that the Athenians allegedly fined Phrynichos 1,000 *drachmai* and forbade any future staging of the play.[1] As if foreshadowed by the tragedian, Athens itself would be sacked twice by the Persians but a few years later during Xerxes' invasion of Hellas (Hdt. 8.51–5, 140α.2, 142.4; 9.1, 3, 13.1–3). The Athenians were

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[1] Μιλήτου ἅλωσις, Hdt. 6.21.

fortunate enough to have been able to evacuate the bulk of their population before the destruction; yet the trauma of their ruined homes and temples remained ingrained in their consciousness and in the narratives they would later spin.[2]

The subsequent decades saw the rise of the Delian League and, with it, Athenian imperial aspirations. These ambitions would ultimately culminate in the cataclysmic conflict with Sparta. In this Peloponnesian War, as modern scholarship has named it, the Athenians themselves were guilty of the utter annihilation of a number of *poleis*: Histiaia,[3] Torone, Skione, and, most notably, Aigina and Melos.[4] On the opposing side, the Boeotian city of Plataea, a staunch ally of Athens, was likewise destroyed by the Lacedaemonians and Thebans after a lengthy siege (Thuc. 2.75–8; 3.52–68). Such wholesale destruction of entire communities inevitably led to the mass movement of large numbers of people, not only in the form of slaves, but also as war refugees.[5] Perhaps the most prominent war refugees in Athens during the Classical period were the Plataeans, evacuated from their city around 430–429 BCE. The sudden influx of a number of refugees into Athens called for various measures to integrate them into Athenian society, and the Plataeans would subsequently become part of that same society for almost a century. Accordingly, the Plataeans added a new dimension to the various historical narratives generated in Athens in the late fifth and fourth centuries: the image of the war refugee and the tragedy of the destruction of an entire *polis*. While Homer had supplied a dramatic depiction of the destruction of Troy in his *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, this story was the stuff of legends; and the fall of Miletus, however distressing it may have been to the Athenian audience, was geographically far removed. Plataea, however, lay at Athens' doorstep, and the presence of the Plataeans served as a constant reminder not only of what would happen if Athens lost the war against Sparta, but likely also of the atrocities the Athenians themselves had committed against other cities.[6] Phrynichos could be fined, and his play banned; the Plataeans however were ever-present. The Athenians were thus perpetually faced with that timeless

[2] Steinbock (2013) 323–6.

[3] Destroyed, in fact, over a decade before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

[4] Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.3; Thuc. 5.84–116; see Steinbock (2013) 323–6. To this list could be added non-Greek Hykkara, see Thuc. 6.62.3–4. On Thucydides' treatment of the Melos episode and on revulsion against unnecessary violence in ancient Greece, see Panov's contribution to this volume.

[5] See, e.g., Mantineian and Thasian refugees in Athens in the first quarter of the 4th century, IG II² 33, 5–8: [… εἶ]ναι δὲ [καὶ τοῖ]ς ἄλλο[ι]ς το[ῖς φεύγοσι] Θασί[ων ἐπ' ἀ]ττικισμῶι τ[ὴν ἀτέλει]αν καθά[περ Μ]αν[τ]ινε[ῦ]σιν [ἦν·…]. '… that the other refugees from Thasos also [be granted] exemption from taxation due to their partisanship in favour of the Athenians, in the same way as the Mantineians …' See also the restoration of the Aiginetans, Melians, and Skionaians to their cities by Lysander after the end of the Peloponnesian War: Plut. *Lys.* 14.3.

[6] In this regard, see Steinbock (2013) 123, 126, 323–6.

aspect of war, given face in the shape of the Plataeans, and were forced to grapple with the fear of suffering the same fate, as well as their own feelings of guilt. Psychologically, this struggle ultimately manifested itself in the many narratives the Athenians spun throughout the late fifth and fourth centuries BCE, generating the image of the war refugee and deeply shaping the self-conception the Athenians had of themselves. It is with this issue—the portrayal of war refugees as a consequence of war—that this paper is primarily concerned.

The Plataeans remained as refugees in Athens from *c.* 430 to 338 BCE, and during this time were a part of Athenian society. This period of *c.* 92 years was interrupted by a short-lived colonisation of the town of Skione, recently destroyed by the Athenians (421–404 BCE), as well as a brief restoration to Plataea (*c.* 386–373 BCE), during which at least a portion of the Plataeans left Athens before being forced to return. The Plataeans feature frequently in Athenian public discourse of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. As far as historical sources are concerned, the Plataeans themselves remain largely mute; almost all sources left to us are Athenian.[7] Accordingly, this paper attempts to analyse the various ways in which the Plataeans and their lot as war refugees feature in Athenian public discourse, and what impact this had on their cohesion and identity as a group. In the first part of the paper, I attempt to analyse the legal status of the Plataeans during their exile in Athens. Secondly, I examine the role played by the Plataeans in Athenian contemporary narratives, especially with regard to their role as staunch allies of Athens and as victims of war. In particular, I lay emphasis on the evolution of the Athenian portrayal of the Plataeans as war refugees, and how these portrayals are used to further political agendas or to discriminate against other groups, as well as serving to alleviate the Athenians' feelings of guilt. In the third and final section, I draw conclusions regarding the construction, maintenance, and evolution of Plataean group identity, especially to what extent the Athenian portrayals and treatment of the Plataeans shaped and influenced it.

The story of the Plataeans as refugees in Athens begins thus: in 431, after having decided to hold the city against Theban aggression and having somewhat impetuously executed the 180-odd Theban prisoners captured during the latter city's abortive attempt to take Plataea in a *coup de main*, the Plataeans prepared for a siege (Thuc. 2.2–6). In a rather unceremonious and sober manner, Thucydides writes: 'After this, the Athenians marched to Plataea, brought food, established a garrison, and took away the weakest amongst the men along with the women and children'.[8] In his dramatic

[7] This need not mean that the Plataeans did not have their own narratives, and possibly their own dedicated historians; for a discussion in this regard see below.

[8] Thuc. 2.6.4: *καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύσαντες ἐς Πλάταιαν σῖτόν τε ἐσήγαγον καὶ φρουροὺς ἐγκατέλιπον, τῶν τε ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἀχρειοτάτους ξὺν γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν ἐξεκόμισαν.*

description of the siege of Plataea (Thuc. 2.71–78) he later adds that 400 Plataean warriors remained behind as a garrison, together with some 80 Athenians and 110 women to prepare food, emphasising again that the rest of the populace had earlier been evacuated to Athens (Thuc. 2.78.3). In their report on the extensive ÖAI archaeological survey of Plataea published in 2013, Konecny et al. tentatively estimate the population of Plataea at the start of the fifth century, both citizen and slave, as being around 5,000–6,000 people, or possibly slightly more.[9] Deducting the five hundred or so warriors and women left behind to hold the city as well as adjusting for the loss of territory to Thebes in the second half of the fifth century,[10] the number of Plataean refugees entering Athens in 429 can plausibly be estimated at around 4,000–5,000.

In his portrayal, Thucydides is clearly sympathetic toward the Plataeans. His extremely detailed description of the defence of Plataia, as well as the dramatic escape of some 212 of the defenders on a stormy night in 428 BCE,[11] show a degree of admiration. However, Thucydides does not shy away from pointing out that, in this war, the Plataeans were the first to commit an atrocity. In his description of the Theban night attack on Plataea in 431 BCE, he mentions that the Theban attackers attempted to win the Plataeans over by persuasion (albeit with a degree of coercion), deciding to refrain from using violence in order to eliminate the political opposition within the town. When the Plataeans successfully surrounded, attacked, and killed a number of the Thebans and captured some 180 of them, they subsequently executed all of the latter.[12] As we shall see, Thucydides' inclusion of this detail will be relevant when analysing later portrayals of the Plataeans' lot.

1. Legal Status

In order to understand the narratives surrounding the Plataeans, as well as their image amongst the Athenians, it is first necessary to take a close look at the legal status the refugees were granted upon entering Athenian society. Most probably shortly after the escape of the 212 Plataean (and possibly some Athenian) warriors from Plataea, the Plataeans were granted Athenian

[9] Konecny et al. (2013) 26–7.

[10] Especially the smaller settlements of Hysiai, Erythrai, Skaphai, and others, which may have formed a *sympoliteia* under Plataean hegemony; see Bruce (1968) 190–5; Konecny–Aravantinos–Marchese (2013) 26–9.

[11] Thuc. 3.20–4; see Hammond (1992) 146.

[12] Thuc. 2.5; for a detailed discussion see Pelling (2000) 62–4. See also Mackil (2013a) 39–40. See also Panov's comments on this episode in his contribution to this volume.

citizenship *en masse* around 427 BCE.[13] The decree recording the naturalisation is preserved in the fourth-century court speech *Against Neaira*:

> Decree regarding the Plataeans: On the motion of Hippokrates [it is thus decreed] that the Plataeans are to be Athenians from this day hence, and are to enjoy all the civil rights which the Athenians themselves enjoy; that they may have a share in everything, both in the religious and in the civil context, except for such priesthoods or religious rites which are the prerogative of specific families. They are also excluded from the office of the nine archons. Their offspring, however, are not. The Plataeans are to be distributed amongst the demes and tribes. After this distribution, no Plataean shall be eligible for Athenian citizenship without the express consent of the Athenian people.[14]

[13] There has been much discussion in regard to the exact date of the naturalisation. Based largely on Thucydides' reference to the Plataeans as 'allies and citizens' of Athens (both the Plataeans and Thebans do this in the Plataean Debate: see Thuc. 3.55.3: *ξυμμάχους καὶ πολιτείας*; 3.63.2: *Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι καὶ πολῖται*), some authors have argued that the naturalisation must have occurred at some point during the fifth or even at the end of the sixth century BCE: see, for instance, Christ (2012) 145 n. 54. Hammond (1992) 146 has argued that the naturalisation must have happened at some point during the siege of Plataea. This, however, makes no sense: how could the besieged Plataeans have got wind of the naturalisation, consequently referring to themselves as Athenian citizens in the debate with the Thebans? Pelling (2000) 76–7 has argued for a naturalisation at some point in the fifth century, since he does not think it likely that the otherwise so meticulous Thucydides would make such a glaring mistake. This ultimately speculative assumption presupposes a large degree of faith in Thucydides. Perhaps Thucydides did indeed make a mistake here; I would however argue that he purposefully projected the later naturalisation into the past, using it in the Plataean Debate in order to provide arguments for both the Plataeans (3.55.3) as well as the Thebans (3.63.2). Since he subsequently mentions the Plataeans only three times, and only briefly (4.67; 5.32; 7.57), it is most likely that he moved the naturalisation to the debate for narrative reasons. The naturalisation can therefore be most plausibly dated to 427 BCE, after the survivors of the siege reached Athens. The idea may however have been floated at an earlier date, and indeed the whole issue may have been more of a lengthy process, discussed in the popular assembly and finally ratified after the destruction of Plataea.

[14] [Dem.] 59.104: *Ψήφισμα περὶ Πλαταιέων*[.] *Ἱπποκράτης εἶπεν, Πλαταιέας εἶναι Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, ἐπιτίμους καθάπερ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς ὧνπερ Ἀθηναίοις μέτεστι πάντων, καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων, πλὴν εἴ τις ἱερωσύνη ἢ τελετή ἐστιν ἐκ γένους, μηδὲ τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων, τοῖς δ' ἐκ τούτων. κατανεῖμαι δὲ τοὺς Πλαταιέας εἰς τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς φυλάς. ἐπειδὰν δὲ νεμηθῶσι, μὴ ἐξέστω ἔτι Ἀθηναίῳ μηδενὶ γίγνεσθαι Πλαταιέων, μὴ εὑρομένῳ παρὰ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων.*

The granting of citizenship almost certainly only applied to Plataean men of age, and excludes women and children. Kapparis (1995) 373 (see below) has argued that the women and children also received citizenship; however, he provides no evidence for this claim. It is far safer to assume that citizenship was only extended to the men of age, and possibly even only to the select few who escaped from the siege of Plataea.

πλὴν εἴ τις ἱερωσύνη ἢ τελετή ἐστιν ἐκ γένους: the hereditary priesthoods almost certainly refer to the old Athenian *genē*, groups of families who by tradition officiated various major *polis* cults; see e.g. the Kerykes, Philleidai, and Eumolpidai (priesthood of Demeter und Kore in Eleusis: see Andron of Halicarnassus, *FGrHist* 10 F 13; *SEG* XVII 2; *IG* I² 845; *IG* II² 204,

The orator, Apollodorus, then goes on to add some details:

> And [the lawmaker] does not allow anyone to become Athenian at a later point in time, unless he becomes such now and with the approval of the court; in this way, no great multitude of people may claim Athenian citizenship by falsely claiming to be Plataeans. Furthermore, in the Plataean Decree he included a clause in regard [to the Plataeans], in the interest of the city and the Gods: that they not be allowed to be chosen by lot to hold the offices of archon or the priesthoods; their offspring, however, are to have this right, so long as they were born of mothers of Athenian descent who were wedded according to the law.[15]

The naturalisation is unrepeatable; in this way no one could, at a later point in time, falsely claim to be a Plataean and thus be entitled to citizenship. The Athenians were famously protective of their citizenship and sought to limit the scope for fraud. The Plataeans are here barred from *all* priesthoods; and Plataean offspring may hold the aforementioned offices only if their mothers are citizens of Athenian descent.

Both the authenticity of the decree as well as the apparent contradictions between it and Apollodorus' subsequent details have been extensively debated by scholarship, most notably by Konstantinos Kapparis and, more recently, Mirko Canevaro.[16] This discussion is beyond the scope of this article; however, they come to the following relevant conclusions.

While Canevaro makes a very convincing case that the decree is a later post-Classical insertion[17] and is thus not authentic, the overall content of the decree can broadly be considered accurate.[18] However, Canevaro points out that Apollodorus' added details are probably a more accurate reflection of the status the Plataeans enjoyed. For instance, the hereditary priesthoods are

3639.3–4); the Eteoboutadai (priesthood of Athena Polias and Poseidon Erechtheus on the acropolis: see Aeschin. 2.147; Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.15; Plut. *Mor.* 841B, 843E–F); and the Bouzygai (priesthood of Zeus Teleios and Zeus at the Palladion: see *IG* I 71, 273, 294; *IG* II^2 1096, 2884, 3177, 5055, 5075). In this regard see also Blok (2009) 162–4.

κατανεῖμαι δὲ τοὺς Πλαταιέας εἰς τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς φυλάς: The distribution amongst the demes and tribes is further confirmed in Lys. 23.2; see below.

[15] [Dem.] 59.106: *καὶ ὕστερον οὐκ ἐᾷ γίγνεσθαι Ἀθηναῖον ἐξεῖναι, ὃς ἂν μὴ νῦν γένηται καὶ δοκιμασθῇ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, τοῦ μὴ πολλοὺς φάσκοντας Πλαταιέας εἶναι κατασκευάζειν αὑτοῖς πολιτείαν. ἔπειτα καὶ τὸν νόμον διωρίσατο ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐθέως ὑπέρ τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν θεῶν, καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτῶν μηδενὶ τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων λαχεῖν μηδὲ ἱερωσύνης μηδεμιᾶς, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων, ἂν ὦσιν ἐξ ἀστῆς γυναικὸς καὶ ἐγγυητῆς κατὰ τὸν νόμον.*

[16] Kapparis (1995) 359–78; Canevaro (2010) 337–69.

[17] Canevaro (2010) 362, 365, 367.

[18] Blok (2009) 166; Blok (2009) 166 n. 106 has pointed out that the language and terminology used in the decree match those used in other surviving late 5th-century decrees, suggesting that while it may be a later insertion, the information and wording contained within it may have been drawn from an earlier, late 5th-century document.

exclusive by definition, so it makes far more sense if the Plataeans were in fact barred from *all* priesthoods and the archonships altogether.[19] In this speech, Apollodorus charges an Athenian citizen, Stephanos, with having falsely passed off his lover, Neaira, as an Athenian citizen. Even more outrageously, he is accused of having married off Neaira's daughter, Phano—according to his argument, likewise not a citizen—to the Athenian *archon basileus* ([Dem.] 59.72–3). One might therefore suspect that Apollodorus is here consciously and deliberately misrepresenting the legal position to reinforce his argument: it was in his interest to emphasise that only Athenian citizens whose parents were also citizens were eligible for the priesthoods—regardless of whether these were hereditary or, as in the case of the *basileus*, drawn by lot.[20] Josine Blok has, however, argued convincingly that the Athenians went to great lengths to retain the customary requirements for the eligibility for the priesthoods and archonships, namely being a citizen born from Athenian citizen parents into an *oikos*. The most important point can thus be identified as the regulation of marriage and the rights of the offspring. Eligibility for the priesthoods would therefore, naturally, not apply to the Plataeans, but could apply to their offspring, *if* they married an Athenian citizen woman.[21] On the one hand, this created an incentive to marry into the Athenian citizen body. On the other, one might speculate as to how many Plataeans would have had any hope of actually marrying an Athenian citizen woman. The number of unmarried Plataean citizen men of age was likely rather small, perhaps as few as a couple hundred or so,[22] especially after the loss of some 200 at the end of the siege of Plataea. Additionally, there was no incentive on the Athenians' side to marry a Plataean, especially considering the fact that the Plataeans, having lost their city, appear initially to have been extremely poor. This is borne out by the fact that they fought as light-armed troops, not as hoplites, in the Athenian attack on Nisaia during the Peloponnesian War.[23] Many of the Plataean men of age would already have been married and had children, and epigraphical evidence hints that some Plataeans married *metoikoi*, implying that at least some of them were *metoikoi* also.[24] The Athenians were

[19] Canevaro (2010) 361–2, 368–9.

[20] On the exclusivity of Athenian citizenship and its close association with eligibility for the priesthoods, see Roy (2014) 244.

[21] Blok (2009) 167.

[22] See Kears (2013) 166–7.

[23] Thuc. 4.67.2–5: Πλαταιῆς τε ψιλοί. See also the Plataeans in Isocrates' *Plataikos* complaining about their poverty (14.48); see below for a more detailed discussion.

[24] For the epigraphical evidence see *Ag.* XVII 648 (dated to the 4th c. BCE): Σίμη Θέωνος Πλαταικιή Εὐκτήμων Καλλιμάχου Σινωπε[ύς]. 'Sime, daughter of Theon the Plataean, [and] Euktemon, son of Kallimachos of Sinope'. If Sime were the daughter of a citizen, it would make little sense for her to marry a *metoikos* or *xenos*, as Euktemon's *ethnikon* Sinopeus makes clear. She must have held *metoikos* status. This reasonably contradicts Kapparis' somewhat

clearly very protective of their citizenship and went to great lengths to bar foreigners from entering the most sacred offices. It is very reasonable to assume that, initially, only very few Plataeans would have been available and had the means to marry into Athenian families,[25] thereby severely restricting the number of new citizens of Plataean descent. Additionally, by opening the offices only for second-generation Plataeans born from an Athenian mother, a sufficient level of integration into the host society would have been guaranteed. Within a few decades, however, at least some Plataeans appear to have achieved some level of financial prosperity: by the early fourth century, some apparently owned slaves,[26] and some may also have run cheese-stalls in the *agora*.[27] There is subsequently epigraphical evidence for intermarriage with Athenian citizens, which appeared to have continued up until the first century BCE, thereby forming close family ties between the Plataeans and Athenians.[28] Indeed, the horrendous losses of Athenian citizens due to the Peloponnesian War as well as the plague may have caused the Athenians to reconsider, at least temporarily, their expectations of a respectable marriage. This may ultimately have contributed to marriages between Athenian citizen women and Plataeans.

Kapparis adds the interesting if somewhat speculative notion that the naturalisation of the Plataeans by the Athenians first and foremost happened for practical reasons: it was the easiest way to integrate the sudden influx of a comparatively large number of people into Athens without alienating them by classing them as *metoikoi*, which could have led to social strife.[29] For the Plataeans, who had lost everything due to their loyalty to Athens, this would have been degrading, and the payment of the *metoikoi* tax difficult. Additionally, it may have proved difficult to find so many Athenian citizens to serve as *prostatai* for a large number of new *metoikoi* at such short notice. Indeed, in 427 BCE the Athenians were facing a series of crises, including the renewed bout of the plague as well as the situation at Mytilene, and may have wanted to deal with the Plataean issue as swiftly and efficiently as possible. Most importantly, however, the naturalisation of the Plataeans may have served an additional, more psychological function. The Athenian image among its allies and tribute cities may well have suffered due to the Athenian handling of the revolts of Poteidaia and Mytilene, and the naturalisation of the Plataeans served to present the Athenians as loyal

speculative argument ((1992) 373) that Plataean women and children also received a form of citizenship.

[25] Hammond (1992) 147; see also Lape (2010) 254.

[26] 'Middle-class' citizens and *metoikoi* would have been able to own slaves: see Schumacher (2001) 92–4; Andreau and Descat (2011) 44–6, 68–9; Hunt (2018) 51–4; Weber (1981) 156–8; for a particularly enlightening discussion see Fisher (2001) 34–57.

[27] Lys. 23.6–10; for a more in-depth-discussion on this, see below.

[28] e.g., *IG* II^2 10087, 10088/9, 10094/5, 10097–102; *SEG* XVII 97.

[29] Kapparis (1995) 360–1, 376–8.

protectors of their allies. More significantly, by granting the Plataeans citizenship, the Athenians could allow themselves to feel absolved of guilt. The heavy toll of the plague, as well as the costly and lengthy sieges of Poteidaia and Mytilene, had distracted Athenian attention from the siege of Plataea, and the Athenians' utter failure to provide their loyal Boeotian ally with help may have influenced their decision to naturalise the refugees.[30]

With regard to the legal status of the Plataeans, the picture presented by the sources is, however, somewhat vague. In his meticulous analysis of *metoikoi* identity in Athens, Matthew Kears points out how ambiguous the status of the Plataeans appears to have been in practice.[31] The line between Plataeans with citizen and those with *metoikos* status appears to have been blurred to such an extent that even those with Athenian citizenship were still referred to as 'Plataeans', and not by their *demotikon*,[32] and citizenship, at any rate, appears to have been difficult to prove.[33] Both Kears and Kapparis make the argument that the Plataeans could thus choose their own level of integration, and that many may indeed have rejected Athenian citizenship

[30] Athenian feelings of guilt in this regard are echoed most clearly, and bitterly, by Thucydides; see below for more detailed discussion.

[31] Kears (2013) 84, 95, 168–71, 204. See also Loraux (1981) 32–3.

[32] See, for instance, *SEG* XVII 97: *Φίλων* Ἐλαιεύς. *Χρυσαλλὶς Γρύλλου Πλαταιέως*. 'Philon from Elaious [and] Chrysallis, daughter of Gryllos the Plataean'. Gryllos is clearly referred to as a Plataean; yet he must have been a naturalised Athenian citizen who had wedded an Athenian citizen woman, as his daughter, Chrysallis, wedded the Athenian citizen Philon from the *demos* of Elaious, implying she was a citizen also. Pausanias (1.29.11–2) mentions a grave stele in the Kerameikos listing the fallen of the Sicilian Expedition of 415–413 BCE; he says that 'of the warriors are inscribed the Plataeans together with the citizens' (*γεγραμμένοι δέ εἴσιν* [...] *τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὁμοῦ τοῖς ἀστοῖς* Πλαταιεῖς). It seems strange that the Athenians would have listed the Plataeans together with, and yet grouped separately from, the Athenian citizens; this further implies the ambiguous status the Plataeans must have held. Other examples of naturalised Plataeans being referred to as 'Plataeans' may be found in Lys. 23.1–2, 5–6, 8, 12–13 and possibly also Aeschin. 3.162. See also Hammond (1992) 143, 146. Just how blurred the status probably was in practice is implied by a problematic passage in Lys. 3.33: Theodotos, a Plataean youth (Lys. 3.5: *Θεοδότου, Πλαταϊκοῦ μειρακίου*), is to be tortured in order to provide a testimony to the court. Torture of a citizen to obtain a testimony was illegal; Theodotos must therefore have been a *metoikos*. It is quite likely, however, that Lysias is here deliberately using the potentially ambiguous status of the Plataeans in favour of his own argument. In this regard see Kears (2013) 168–9.

[33] Though the Athenians kept lists of their citizens at the level of the *demos*, there appears to have existed no central register. Citizenship appeared to have been based largely upon the consensus of the fellow demesmen, and needed to be reemphasised and reconfirmed regularly, for instance by the means of *dokimasia*; in this regard see Lape (2010) 186–7, 194, 196.

due to their identity as citizens of Plataea and their hope—at least initially—of soon being able to return.[34]

To summarise: the decree awarding citizenship to the Plataeans was influenced in its inception by two important factors. On the one hand, it was clearly a pragmatic solution to the pressing problem of integrating a large number of newcomers swiftly in a time of crisis, while at the same time safeguarding both the exclusive Athenian citizenship as a whole and the sacred priesthoods and the archonship in particular.[35] On the other hand, by granting the Plataeans citizenship, the Athenians also had opportunity not only to publicly demonstrate their generosity at a time when Athens' image was tarnished by its mistreatment of its subject cities, but also to salve their own bad conscience at having failed such a loyal ally.

As staunch and long-standing allies of Athens, the Plataeans quite obviously enjoyed a very favourable reputation, which would have contributed to the decision. The decree, however, in practice extended full rights on par with Athenian citizenship only to second-generation children born from marriage between a naturalised Plataean and an Athenian citizen woman. The first-generation naturalised Plataeans thus appear to have had a sort of second-rate citizenship status, while the rest—quite likely a large number including women as well as children not yet of age—almost certainly became *metoikoi*, possibly receiving *ateleia*.[36] The second-rate status, together with the granting of citizenship only to a select number of Plataeans, may have been one of the factors which contributed to the maintenance of their cohesion and identity as a separate group within Athenian society. This issue is covered in more detail below, but let us first examine the Athenian portrayal of the Plataeans in Athenian public discourse throughout their exile.

2. The Plataeans in Athenian Contemporary Narratives

Let us now turn to the realm of narrative: the stories told about the Plataeans, both by themselves as well as their Athenian hosts. One aspect common to all contemporary Athenian depictions of the Plataeans—be they histories, court speeches or comedies—is the extremely positive image enjoyed by them in Athens. This is probably largely due to Plataea's long history of alliance with Athens beginning in the late sixth century, and also to Plataean

[34] Kapparis (1995) 367–8, 376–7; Kears (2013) 169, 171–2. This hope may have been regularly fed afresh by their colonisation of Skione, 421–404 BCE, and their brief restoration to Plataea, 386–373 BCE.

[35] On this matter see Canevaro (2010) 364–5.

[36] The Athenians routinely granted *ateleia* to refugee populations in Athens: see, e.g., the Thasians and Mantineians in *IG* II² 33, 5–8. See also Gauthier (1972) 364, who refers to an 'isopolitie exceptionnelle' granted to all the Plataeans collectively, equating it to a 'droit de cité (avec certaines restrictions)'.

loyalty toward Athens: they were the only other Greek *polis* joining the Athenians at Marathon against the Persians,[37] as well as losing their city to the Thebans in 427 BCE. Plataea's prominent role during the Persian Wars, along with its function as serving as a place of collective memory for all the Greeks and guardian of the graves of those who had fallen in the defence of Greece, likely reinforced this image.[38] Aside from this generally positive depiction, however, the Athenians had a habit of portraying the Plataeans as victims. The destruction of Plataea at the hands of the Thebans as well as Athenian generosity in accepting the Plataean refugees and granting them citizenship feature prominently in several contemporary texts. In nigh all cases, the lot of the Plataeans is used by the author to generate emotions of compassion as well as outrage, most often with an agenda aiming to discriminate against or discredit a third party or present the Athenians themselves in a particularly positive light.

Let us begin with Thucydides. In his famous Plataean Debate, Thucydides has those Plataeans who had remained behind to defend the city—who ultimately surrendered to the besieging Lacedaemonians—debate their antagonists, the Thebans, in an attempt to save themselves from execution. The Plataean arguments, based largely on appeals to past glories earned during the wars against Persia, ultimately fail to impress the Lacedaemonians, and after hearing the Thebans, the Plataeans are executed, the captured women enslaved, and the city razed shortly thereafter.[39] Rachel Bruzzone has convincingly shown that Thucydides here uses his portrayal of the atrocity committed against the Plataeans as an example of how the past can be ignored in favour of expediency.[40] Implicitly, Thucydides thereby criticises the Lacedaemonians and Thebans for their actions while at the same time adding to the drama of his narrative of the Peloponnesian War.[41] The arguments which Thucydides puts into the mouths of the Plataeans betray a very strong use of what Hans-Joachim Gehrke has termed 'intentional history': the historical narratives that are crucial to the self-conception of a group.[42] There is a strong case to be made

[37] Hdt. 6.108, 111.1–2. See Christ (2012) 146–7; Hammond (1992) 144.

[38] Bruzzone (2015) 290, 293, 295–6; Kalliontzis (2014) 342–4; Steinbock (2013) 121–2, 127–30; Pelling (2000) 61; Cogan (1981) 15; Macleod (1977) 229, 231, 241. On the sacrosanctity of Plataea declared by Pausanias after the Battle of Plataea, see Thuc. 2.71.2–3; Hammond (1992) 145–6. For an in-depth examination of remembrance in regard to the Battle of Plataea see Jung (2006) 225–95.

[39] Thuc. 3.52–68. For the weakness of the Plataean arguments see Cogan (1981) 15; Macleod (1977) 229, 231.

[40] Bruzzone (2015) 289–300; see also MacLeod (1977) 241.

[41] See Pelling (2000) 68.

[42] Gehrke (2007) 93–4; id. (2010) 15–16.

that these arguments actually reflect Plataean self-perception,[43] as I discuss below. It is however equally likely, and indeed probable, that Thucydides echoed Athenian opinions on the matter. Perhaps the most interesting point, however, is that Thucydides appears implicitly to criticise the Athenians themselves. Though they had no direct part in the destruction of Plataea, it was their very inaction which doomed their loyal allies. Thucydides never openly states this; however, he does end his description of the destruction of Plataea with a particularly bitter note: 'And thus ended the business at Plataea in the ninety-third year after they had become allies of Athens'.[44] By emphasising the length of the alliance, the author points out the enduring loyalty the Plataeans had exhibited as well as the trust they had placed in Athens, while at the same time demonstrating the Athenians' failure to live up to that very trust.[45] Thucydides briefly touches upon this again in his Book 5: he describes how the Athenians, after having destroyed the city of Skione in the Chalkidike, killing the men of age and enslaving the women and children, gave the land thus acquired to the Plataeans to colonise.[46] Though Thucydides does not go into any detail, there are nonetheless glaring similarities to the destruction of Plataea. The Athenians committed the very same crime against the Skionaians which the Thebans and Lacedaemonians had committed against the Plataeans, only to then give the destroyed city to the latter; this bitter irony would not have escaped his audience. It is quite likely that the Athenians were actually attempting to make good their earlier failure to help the Plataeans by giving them new land to settle, something which his mostly Athenian audience would have been aware of and which is echoed more directly by Diodorus: '[A]nd [the Athenians] gave the island to the Plataeans to live in, as it was on account of the Athenians that they had

[43] Thucydides quite likely had opportunity to interview Plataean refugees, either before, after, or indeed during his exile (by visiting Skione in the Chalkidike, where at least some Plataeans had by then been settled); in this regard see Hornblower (2007) 143.

[44] Thuc. 3.68.5: *καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ Πλάταιαν ἔτει τρίτῳ καὶ ἐνενηκοστῷ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν*. In this regard see Hornblower (2007) 143.

[45] Badian (1989) 97 makes the valuable observation that the evacuation of the bulk of the population of Plataea to Athens effectively turned them into hostages, forcing the Plataeans to hold out and not give in to Theban and Lacedaemonian demands, while at the same time making a formal promise for aid which they never provided: see Thuc. 2.73. Conceivably the Athenians, originally at least, may have had somewhat darker motives for the evacuation of the Plataean population to Athens, thereby precluding a Plataean capitulation to the Thebans and forcing them to hold on. Hornblower (2007) 141–4 and West (2003) 442 argue that sending military aid to the besieged Plataeans would have been a significant challenge for the Athenians and might, at any rate, not have made much strategic sense. Indeed, Hornblower notes that the Athenians may even have had some religious or political reservations which contributed to their not lending more aid to their ally. This, however, in no way rules out that the Athenians may have subsequently felt guilt at not having provided help, especially after the horrible fate of those Plataeans who surrendered.

[46] Thuc. 5.32.1; compare D.S. 12.76.3; Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.5. See Christ (2012) 154; Konecny–Aravantinos–Marchese (2013) 31.

been originally driven from their homeland'.[47] Though subtle, in his description of this episode Thucydides not only levels criticism at the Athenians for the crimes they had committed, but also indirectly points out their concomitant feelings of guilt. The execution of the Plataeans by the Lacedaemonians and Thebans may have drawn significant contemporary attention and indeed condemnation;[48] as such, the Athenians may have been forced to reflect upon their role in the whole affair. It is these feelings of guilt, together with the practical question of integrating a large number of refugees, which best explain the ease and swiftness with which the Athenians granted the Plataeans citizenship. Additionally, when taken into consideration, this guilt puts the later Athenian narratives surrounding the Plataeans into a somewhat different and interesting perspective.

Thucydides mentions the Plataeans only three times after his Plataean Debate (Thuc. 4.67; 5.32; 7.57). In his description of the Athenian *strategos* Demosthenes' attack on Nisaia in 424 BCE, the author has a unit of Plataean light-armed warriors accompany the general. The Plataeans heroically storm the gates, holding them until Athenian reinforcements arrive (4.67.2–5). This further hints at Thucydides' admiration of the Plataeans and, by implication, the positive image they enjoyed in Athens. This sentiment is also echoed in a passage in the contemporary comedy *Frogs* by Aristophanes, performed in 405 BCE: 'For it is disgraceful that those who have taken part in but one naval engagement should now be Plataeans and thus masters instead of slaves'.[49] Here, the *choros* laments that slaves serving on Athenian warships in but a single naval battle now demand the same rights as those awarded to the Plataeans—implying that the Plataeans were far more deserving of the exclusive Athenian citizenship and enjoyed a positive image, especially when compared to other social and ethnic minority groups.[50] Due to the horrendous losses of skilled rowers during the Sicilian Expedition 415–413 BCE, it appears the Athenians in the subsequent 'Dekeleian' war made increased and extensive use of slaves and *metoikoi* to fill the rowing banks on the warships in exchange for freedom (in the case of the slaves) and possibly also naturalisation. It is in this context that this passage needs to be read.[51] It

[47] D.S. 12.76.3: *τὴν δὲ νῆσον οἰκεῖν παρέδοσαν τοῖς* Πλαταιεῦσιν, *ἐκπεπτωκόσι δι' ἐκείνους ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος.*

[48] See Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.5; Isoc. 12.92–4, 14.62; Dem. 16.25; see also later sources such as Plut. *Arist.* 21.5. See Panov's point in his contribution to this volume that ancient sensibilities may have been forerunners of our own, for which the condemnation of the atrocity against the Plataeans serves as an example.

[49] Ar. *Ran.* 686–94, at 693–4: *καὶ γὰρ αἰσχρόν ἐστι τοὺς μὲν ναυμαχήσαντας μίαν καὶ Πλαταιᾶς εὐθὺς εἶναι κἀντὶ δούλων δεσπότας.*

[50] See Kears (2013) 174–6.

[51] For ancient sources indicating this, see Hellanikos of Lesbos, *FGrHist* 323a F 25; Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.24; D.S. 13.97.1. See also Hammond (1992) 147–50, in which the author makes the rather unconvincing and speculative suggestion that the citizenship in question is, in fact, not the Athenian, but rather the *Plataean*—and that the Athenians accordingly granted the

makes clear that the Athenians were perfectly capable of discrimination against minority groups, even when they needed them, yet that the unique circumstances under which the Plataeans came to Athens as refugees ensured a favourable opinion toward them on the part of their hosts.

At this point, it is worth drawing a comparison between Thucydides' account and a later one, written several decades after the events. In the mid-fourth century BCE, an orator—probably Apollodorus—wrote the court speech *Against Neaira*. In it, he dwells extensively not only on the topic of the naturalisation of the Plataeans mentioned above, but also on the siege of Plataea and how the Plataeans came to Athens. As in the passage in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, the Plataeans are used to discriminate against a third party—in this case the aforementioned supposed courtesan, Neaira, accused of having been fraudulently passed off as a citizen woman.[52] The orator goes into great detail in describing the siege of Plataea and the escape of a part of the garrison. He apparently used Thucydides' account as one of his sources;[53] however, the two authors also differ on a variety of points, the most prominent being these:[54] in Apollodorus, the attack is instigated by the Lacedaemonians ([Dem.] 59.98), whereas in Thucydides it is the Thebans. The Plataeans who let the initial group of Theban warriors into the city were bribed and not oligarchs trying to overthrow the democracy as portrayed in Thucydides ([Dem.] 59.99; Thuc. 2.2.2). In Apollodorus, the Theban army withdraws from Plataea when they see the Athenian army approaching, and not because the Plataeans threaten to execute their Theban prisoners ([Dem.] 59.100; Thuc. 2.5.5–6, 6.4). Apollodorus has two thirds of the entire Peloponnesian levy, in addition to all the Boeotians and some Thessalian tribes,[55] besiege Plataea, whereas Thucydides mentions these in the broader context of the war, not in regard to the siege ([Dem.] 59.101; Thuc. 2.9.2, 10.2). When making the break-out attempt, Apollodorus has the Plataeans draw straws, whereas Thucydides mentions that half of them remained

slaves Plataean citizenship. His argument relies on the assumption that the term Πλαταιᾶς is to be taken strictly as referring to citizens of Plataea. He also assumes that this arrangement of granting Athenian slaves Plataean citizenship goes back all the way to the battle of Marathon, where slaves and Plataeans were allegedly interred together. I find this unconvincing. As pointed out above, the term 'Plataean' could be applied rather loosely to any person belonging to the Plataean community, regardless of whether they were Athenian citizen or *metoikos*, and regardless of whether they were born in Plataea or were second- or third-generation exiles in Athens. It makes most sense to interpret Aristophanes' Πλαταιᾶς as a reference to those Plataeans who had received Athenian citizenship; this also best fits the context of the speech made by the *choros*.

[52] See Steinbock (2013) 126.

[53] Kears (2013) 167 n. 62; Pelling (2000) 62–4; Trevett (1990) 407, 411.

[54] Pelling (2000) 62–4; Trevett (1990) 412–4.

[55] Trevett (1990) 416 has argued convincingly that the portrayal of the Thessalian tribes as allies of Sparta is, in fact, a reflection of the political situation of the early fourth century, falsely projected to an earlier date.

behind because they were terrified;[56] and Apollodorus subsequently has Plataea fall heroically when the besieging army storms it, while Thucydides says the garrison surrendered due to starvation ([Dem.] 59.103; Thuc. 3.52–68). Apollodorus also claims the siege lasted ten years, which is clearly incorrect,[57] and omits the Theban attempt to bring Plataea into the Boeotian *koinon* peacefully, and that the Plataeans initially agreed to it (Thuc. 2.2.4, 3.1); nor does he mention the Plataean pledge not to execute their Theban prisoners (Thuc. 2.5). Additionally, while he does mention—in passing—that the women and children were enslaved,[58] 'all save those who, when they beheld the advancing Lacedaemonians, slipped away to Athens', he in the very next sentence emphasises how the Plataeans had lost all of their possessions, their wives, and their children, thereby possibly also implying that only those 212 who fled received citizenship, focusing on the heroism and suffering of a small portion of the Plataean population while ignoring the rest.[59] Compare this to Thucydides, who says that the entire population was evacuated save the garrison that was left behind.[60] In regard to the Persian Wars, Apollodorus also has the Plataeans fighting and dying together with the Lacedaemonians at Thermopylae, mentioning that they were the only Boeotians to stand against the Persians when this clearly contradicts the account of Herodotus, who does not mention the Plataeans at that battle, but instead has Thebans and Thespians fighting there;[61] and he has them serving on the ships at Salamis, which also contradicts Herodotus and Thucydides, who mention them at Artemision only (Hdt. 8.1.1, 44.1; Thuc. 3.54.4).

This detailed comparison makes evident a key difference between the two variants of the narrative. Apollodorus paints a picture of a brave and noble people, having endured immense pain and suffering while at the same time heroically fighting not only for their own independence, but for the freedom

[56] [Dem.] 59.103; Thuc. 3.20.2. In this regard, Gomme (1956) 283–4 points out that Apollodorus' version here is more believable than Thucydides'; it seems far more likely that the Plataeans consciously decided to send half their force to Athens in order to make the food supplies last longer. This, indeed, implies that those remaining behind did so out of dedication and bravery, which is more consistent with their later defiance during the Plataean Debate than if they had remained behind out of terror.

[57] [Dem.] 59.102; see Trevett (1990) 414–15.

[58] [Dem.] 59.103. Thucydides (3.68.3), by contrast, mentions only women, not children. It is entirely plausible that children were born during the siege of Plataea; five hundred men sharing a limited amount of space with a mere hundred women for some two years may well have produced offspring.

[59] [Dem.] 59.103–4. *ὅσοι μὴ αἰσθόμενοι ἐπιόντας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ὑπεξῆλθον Ἀθήναζε.*

[60] It must be pointed out, though, that even Thucydides in his more nuanced version of the story does draw a disproportionate amount of attention to the select few Plataeans who remained behind to hold the city, be they those who fled or those who were eventually executed.

[61] [Dem.] 59. 95; Hdt. 7.202, 222; see Steinbock (2013) 134–40; Trevett (1990) 408–9.

of all the Greeks, all the while loyally standing as allies of Athens. He also downplays or ignores the atrocities and alleged oathbreaking committed by the Plataeans. This, of course, serves his purpose: to present a positive picture to contrast the negative one he paints of Neaira.[62]

An evolution of the image of the Plataeans, as well as the corresponding narrative, is apparent. When Thucydides wrote his story, the lot of the Plataeans was largely overshadowed by the Athenians' own suffering in the course of the war and the plague, and the political turmoil directly following the end of the war, and may not have attracted quite as much attention. Additionally, while Thucydides clearly has a favourable opinion of the Plataeans, he does point out their flaws, especially the massacre of the Theban prisoners as well as the breach of their alleged oath to spare them. As pointed out by Stephanie West and Simon Hornblower, this issue was clearly uncomfortable to Thucydides himself.[63] He makes the unusual choice to imply that there are conflicting versions of the story, the Thebans' claiming that the Plataeans had sworn an oath to spare the prisoners, something the Plataeans themselves subsequently denied.[64] The image Thucydides paints is thus nuanced. By contrast, the alleged Plataean oathbreaking as well as their execution of the Theban prisoners is downplayed or ignored outright by later authors. By the time Apollodorus told the story of the Plataeans, the narrative had been modified and dramatised, and was frequently used to discriminate against others or to further one's political agenda. The latter usage is nowhere more apparent than in Isocrates' *Plataikos* and *Panathenaikos*.

Much like his contemporary Apollodorus, Isocrates tells a story of Plataean heroism, loyalty, dedication, and suffering. Isocrates' political agenda is decidedly anti-Theban at a time when there was much debate in Athens on whether to side with Sparta against Thebes, with whom Athens was at the time allied.[65] The subjugations of Plataea and Thespiai by Thebes were major factors and often debated.[66] In his *Plataikos*, Isocrates has the Plataeans make an emotional plea to the Athenians, repeatedly emphasising the many hardships they had suffered at the hands of the Thebans (Isoc. 14.1–2, 4, 7, 22). They also mention the misery of exile, complaining about the difficulty of making a living, adequately caring for their elderly or properly educating their children (Isoc. 14.48). They then go on to remind the Athenians that, by right of intermarriage, they are now bound to the Athenians by blood (Isoc. 14.51–2), before emphasising their role as the sole

[62] [Dem.] 59.107; see Steinbock (2013) 126; Trevett (1990) 407–8.

[63] Hornblower (2007) 138–9, 144; West (2003) 438–9.

[64] Thuc. 2.4–2.6. In this regard see Hornblower (2007) 144–5; Pelling (2000) 62–4; see also Mackil (2013a) 39–40.

[65] See Steinbock (2013) 121–2, 123–6.

[66] Dem. 16.4; see Steinbock (2013) 125–6.

Boeotians to have stood with Athens in the wars against the Persians.[67] Like Apollodorus, in his *Panathenaikos*, Isocrates focuses on those few Plataeans who fled from the siege, and does not even mention the thousands of women, children, and elderly who were also evacuated according to Thucydides: '[...T]he Lacedaemonians, showing favour to the Thebans, after besieging them slew them all, save those who were able to escape'.[68] To this portrayal, full of pathos, the author adds praise of the Athenians for having so generously accepted the Plataeans and given them citizenship (Isoc. 12.94; 14.1, 51–2). It is interesting to note how far the narrative has developed from Thucydides' comparatively sober description. The focus lies, more and more, on the outrageous suffering and injustice done to the Plataeans. In this case, the emphasis placed on the repeated atrocities committed by the Thebans against their neighbour served Isocrates' anti-Theban agenda. In addition, it becomes evident that, as time passes, the number of the Plataeans also seems to diminish in the narrative, as the Plataean population which was evacuated is ignored in favour of the heroic few who fled from the siege—thereby increasing the pathos and drama of the narrative.

The portrayals in both Apollodorus and in Isocrates match the Athenian mentality at the time, which envisioned the Athenians as humble protectors of their allies from enemy aggression, as well as kind and generous hosts to oppressed peoples.[69] Much time had passed since the glorious days of Athens' hegemony, as well as the many atrocities committed by them: the Athenians could now allow themselves to indulge in tales of Athenian generosity toward loyal allies at a time when Athens was struggling to maintain its dominant place in Greece in the face of Spartan and, later, increasing Macedonian aggression.[70] The presence of the Plataean refugees over many decades constantly reminded the Athenians of their past transgressions as well as their failure to help their allies; however it also provided the Athenians with opportunities to construct an identity which envisioned them as generous and kind toward their allies—with the Plataeans, who had become an integral part of Athenian society, ironically serving as living proof thereof.

[67] Isoc. 14.57; see also Isoc. 12.93. This statement is inaccurate, as Thespiai (Hdt. 7.202) and possibly Haliartos (Paus. 9.32.4) also appear to have opposed the Persians.

[68] Isoc. 12.93: [...] *Λακεδαιμόνιοι, χαριζόμενοι Θηβαίοις, ἐκπολιορκήσαντες ἅπαντας ἀπέκτειναν πλὴν τῶν ἀποδρᾶναι δυνηθέντων.*

[69] For further examples of Athenian self-perception as being generous and kind toward the oppressed, see also Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.45; Isoc. 4.52; 12.241; 15.300; Aeschin. 3.134; Dem. 20.3, 64, 109; 25.89; Lycurg. 85; Lys. 2.20–3; Plut. *Pel.* 6.3; *Cim.* 10.5; *Demetr.* 22.1; this view apparently also extended into the stories the Athenians told of their city's mythistorical past, see Hdt. 9.27.2; Soph. *OC* 260–2, 566–9, 1124–7; Eur. *Supp.* 1176–9; *Heracl.* 304–33; Isoc. 4.54–6; 12.168–71; Lys. 2.7–16; and was sometimes indeed judged detrimental to the city's interests: see Pl. *Menex.* 244e; Andoc. 3.28. For discussions on the Athenian claim to kindness and generosity see de Romilly (1979) 97–112; in oratory see Christ (2013); and for the limits of Athenian altruism, see Christ (2012).

[70] See Pelling (2000) 67.

Thus, what may have begun as a psychological mechanism for coping with guilt was ultimately exploited in a wholly different manner, starkly shaping and being shaped by the narratives the Athenians told about themselves.

One particularly interesting case of an evolving narrative is the story of the battle of Marathon. Herodotus tells us that the only Greek allies to come to the Athenians' aid at that battle were the Plataeans, who arrived with their entire levy.[71] As a sign of immense gratitude, from that year onward the Athenians, whenever they celebrated the Panathenaia every four years, had their herald pray for good fortune for the Athenians and Plataeans together (Hdt. 6.111.2). Nonetheless, within just a few decades, in a classic case of intentional history, the Athenians had spun a new narrative: that they had faced the might of Dareios' army entirely on their own, effectively writing the Plataeans out of the tale, thereby emphasising the image of Athenian exceptionalism.[72] The reason for this lies, undoubtedly, in the biased nature of the sources in question, in which Athenian exceptionalism is pushed for political reasons; over time, however, this tendency appears to have become widespread in Athenian society. Accordingly, Marathon features neither in Thucydides' Plataean Debate, nor in Isocrates' *Plataikos*, in which one might expect them. However, there is evidence of an alternative narrative which existed alongside this one, in which the Plataean role at Marathon is remembered. This is most markedly exemplified in Apollodorus: in *Against Neaira*, he begins his story of Plataean noble deeds with the battle of Marathon, also mentioning a painting depicting the battle in the *Stoa Poikile* which supposedly also pictured some Plataean warriors, identifiable by their Boeotian helmets.[73] Despite the passage of one-and-a-half centuries, the Plataean role at Marathon had not entirely been forgotten, and it is reasonable to assume that the Plataeans had their own historical narratives, which they brought with them to Athens and which influenced those told by the Athenians. This is hinted at in the fact that the Plataeans apparently celebrated the memory of Arimnestos, who commanded their forces at both Marathon and Plataea during the Persian Wars; in later times, Pausanias records that the Plataeans had set up a statue of the man in the temple of

[71] Hdt. 6.108.1: ἐπῆλθον βοηθέοντες Πλαταιέες πανδημεί.

[72] See, e.g., Lys. 2.20; Plat. *Menex.* 240c; Dem. 60.10; Thuc. 1.73.4; this indeed already occurs in a speech given by the Athenians in Hdt. 9.27.5, contradicting (intentionally or not) the author's earlier depiction of the battle. See also Christ (2012) 146–7; Steinbock (2013) 141–2. Jung (2006) 160–3 also points out how the battles of Plataea and Thermopylae were marginalised in Athenian narratives in favour of Marathon and Salamis, in which the Athenians featured most prominently. Indeed, by the late fifth and early fourth century BCE many Athenians were unable to even distinguish between the two Persian invasions of 490 and 480 BCE; see, e.g., Andoc. 1.108.

[73] [Dem.] 59.94; see Steinbock (2013) 127–30, 134–40, Trevett (1990) 408–9. The helmet may possibly be the one mentioned by Xenophon in Xen. *Hipp.* 12.3.

Athena Areia in their city.[74] Jeremy Trevett has made the valuable point that the narrative peddled by Apollodoros may have been extensively influenced by popular tradition and, possibly, by the works of other historians now lost to us. It is tempting—if somewhat speculative—to associate the enigmatic contemporary historian Daimachos of Plataea, of whose works only fragments remain, with these narratives.[75] Public discourse, here, is characterised by the heavy use of arguments taken from collective social memory of both the Athenians as well as the Plataeans;[76] when formulated as intentional history, these arguments serve the purpose of forming and legitimising group identity. As John Gillis put it: 'The core meaning of any individual or group identity, namely, a sense of sameness over time and space, is sustained by remembering; and what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity'.[77] The fact that Apollodorus apparently felt confident enough to go against the prevailing Athenian narrative which emphasised their exceptionalism implies that the Plataean version of the story was known and taken seriously. The long history of alliance between the two cities, as well as the tragedy which had befallen the Plataeans not least due to Athenian inaction, was a strong enough factor to make the Athenians take a humble step back and question their established tales of heroism. That the Athenians were, by implication, prepared to accommodate the Plataeans not just as refugees, but also in their stories so crucial to their *polis* identity, is a stark indicator of how disproportionately influential the presence of the small Plataean community was in shaping Athenian society.

The Athenian portrayal of the Plataeans thus served multiple functions. Aside from using the example of the Plataeans to discriminate against other groups, the Athenian portrayal of the Plataeans also appears to have served as a collective psychological coping mechanism as well as a catalyst in the evolution in Athenian collective identity. The ongoing presence of Plataean refugees in Athens served as a perpetual reminder not only of Theban and Lacedaemonian atrocities, but also of which lot could befall Athens herself were she to fall to the enemy. Perhaps more uncomfortably, it also reminded

[74] Paus. 9.4.2; see Hdt. 9.72.2; Plut. *Arist.* 11.5–6. In this regard, see the interesting point made by Yates (2019) 170–80, that the Plataean historical narratives hinted at in the temple emphasise civil strife between fellow Greeks rather than the conflict with the barbarian 'other', thus differing from Athenian narratives which favoured the latter focus.

[75] See Daimachos, *FGrHist*, no. 65; Trevett (1990) 411, 415–7. See Thuc. 3.20.1, in which the author mentions Eupompidas, son of Daimachos, as one of the commanders of the Plataeans who broke out of the siege and fled to Athens. Given Greek naming conventions of naming children after their grandparents, it is entirely plausible that Eupompidas may have had a son named Daimachos, and to associate this son with Daimachos of Plataea. This would have made Daimachos an extremely valuable source of information. Trevett, however, fails to consider the possibility that Thucydides may also have used Daimachos as a source.

[76] Steinbock (2013) 121–2, 123–5, 127–30.

[77] Gillis (1994) 3.

them of the many atrocities the Athenians themselves had committed against other cities as mentioned above, as well as their failure to help a loyal ally.[78] In the words of Christopher Pelling: 'No wonder [Plataea's] destruction lived on in the Athenian memory, a scar in the popular historical consciousness, a perpetual reproach to Thebes and Sparta and an emblem of the horrors of war'.[79] After Thucydides' subtle—or perhaps not-so-subtle—criticism of Athenian foreign policy and the crimes they had committed, in the fourth century Athenian authors would increasingly focus their criticism on the Thebans and Lacedaemonians, thereby glossing over their own city's crimes. Emphasising the gross injustice committed against the Plataeans by others likely helped downplay their own failures. Psychologically speaking, by emphasising Athens' generosity toward the deserving Plataeans in their narratives, the Athenians could thus allow themselves to alleviate their own bad conscience.

3. Plataean Refugee Community Collective Identities: Construction and Maintenance

We have seen how the ambiguous legal status of the Plataeans in Athens as well as the various narratives in which they featured influenced both their own and Athenian identity and contributed to Plataean group cohesion. For the Plataeans, there must have been considerable tension between the desire and need to assimilate on the one hand, and to maintain distinct Plataean and Boeotian identities on the other.[80] In the final portion of this paper, I will accordingly attempt to draw some conclusions with regard to Plataean group identity during their exile in Athens, and how their lot as refugees shaped it.

The Decree of Naturalisation presented in Apollodorus makes clear that, even in the case of the Plataeans, the Athenians were reluctant to yield too much control over their citizenship and their city's institutions. Indeed, Apollodorus himself, son of a freedman and a naturalised citizen, probably felt the stigma surrounding naturalised citizens who overreached in regard to taking part in the city's political life.[81] This likely strengthened Plataean group cohesion. There are strong indications that the Plataeans actively

[78] Steinbock (2013) 123, 126, 323–6. There has long been speculation that Euripides' *Trojan Women* was written as a reaction to Athens' brutal subjugation of Melos in 416 BCE. On this matter see Panov's comments in his contribution to this volume.

[79] Pelling (2000) 61.

[80] Kears (2013) 171–2.

[81] E.g., Dem. 50.26; see Lape (2010) 216–8. It needs to be pointed out, however, that there is no evidence in the ancient sources implying that the Plataeans suffered from stigmatisation at the hands of their host society. Nonetheless, the sources mention no Plataeans in prominent political offices during their exile in Athens, implying that they may have been *de facto* marginalised despite the positive image they enjoyed.

maintained a distinct community within Athenian society which likely transcended the *metoikos*/citizen divide, to encompass all the Plataeans—which is perhaps one of the reasons why the Athenians always called them 'Plataeans', regardless of whether they were Athenian citizens or not.[82] The method by which the Plataeans expressed their group identity was by means of various public statements—*acts of identity*—which stressed their group cohesion, their status in Athenian society, and their identity as ethnic Boeotians.

The earliest indicator for the maintenance of a group identity comes from a group of grave *stelai* from the Kerameikos, found in a common context, identified as Plataean and dated to the late 5th c. BCE.[83] The *stelai* feature a number of names, some of which are clearly Boeotian in form,[84] while others are apparently uncommon in Attika yet common in Boeotia.[85] As is common in Boeotian grave inscriptions throughout the Classical period, only the personal name of the buried person is inscribed,[86] which differs from the Athenian practice that was coming into increased use during this time, in which often not only the name, but also the *patronymikon* and sometimes the *demotikon* are inscribed. All but one of the names are written in the Boeotian alphabet and carved somewhat roughly into the rock.[87] Most interestingly, one *stele* contains the fragmentary name of a woman, […]ΣΤΡΑΤΕ, written in the Attic dialect and alphabet.[88] It is tempting to identify this woman as an Athenian citizen woman who had married a Plataean. The fact that she was buried along with the Plataeans, yet that differing alphabets were used, suggests that the Plataeans made a specific point of setting up their own grave *stelai* and using their own alphabet and burial practices to reinforce their identity as a distinct group.[89] The grouping of the graves thus emphasised their own *polis* identity, while the use of the Boeotian alphabet clearly identified them as belonging to the Boeotian *ethnos*. At the same time, the

[82] Hammond (1992) 143, 146.

[83] *IG* I³ 1363a–h; see Blok (2009) 167 n. 109; Lewis–Jeffery (1993) 857–8.

[84] *IG* I³ 1363a (Thoga), d (Theomnastos and Nikostrata), f (Pherenika). These names feature the Boeotian long A instead of Attic H.

[85] *IG* I³ 1363b (Dorkion and Kallis), c (Konto); see Blok (2009) 167 n. 109.

[86] See, e.g., the magnificent late 5th-century grave *stelai* of Mnason, Rhynchon, and Saugenes (*SEG* II 187 (a–b), 189). For further examples from the fifth century see, e.g., *SEG* II 193–5, 200, 201, 203, 205, 212, 216–20, 222, 223. For examples from the fourth century, which prove that this practice continued in Boeotia throughout the Classical period, see, e.g., *SEG* II 204, 206, 207, 210, 211, 221. For a rare exception listing the deceased's place of origin see, e.g., *SEG* II 209.

[87] See Hondius (1925) 126–30. The poor quality of the inscriptions, incidentally, could serve as evidence for the financial destitution the Plataeans initially faced.

[88] *IG* I³ 1363h; see Hondius (1925) 126–30.

[89] Regarding the use of dialects and writing systems as markers of ethnic identity, see Hall (1997) 143, 146–7, 153, 179.

stelai indicate that some Plataeans wedded Athenian, others Plataean women,[90] possibly confirming that some Plataeans likely held *metoikos* status, yet that they apparently placed emphasis on maintaining group cohesion despite the disparity in legal status, accordingly burying their dead together. This prioritisation of the group over the actual difference in terms of legal/social status further hints at the somewhat ambiguous status of the Plataeans.

That the Plataeans made efforts to be seen as a distinct, cohesive group is also evident from the textual sources. In the aforementioned passage from Thucydides describing the attack on Nisaia, the author specifically mentions the Plataeans as a distinct military unit of light-armed troops, fighting alongside Athenian light-armed *peripoloi* (Thuc. 4.67.2–5). This implies that both the Plataeans themselves as well as the Athenians saw the Plataeans as a distinct group, regardless of their legal status.[91] This is further confirmed in a speech by Lysias, dated to the early 4th century. In *Against Pankleon*, Lysias charges a man named Pankleon with posing as an Athenian citizen of Plataean descent. The orator first disproves Pankleon's claim as being registered in the *demos* of Dekeleia by having the accuser interview the Dekeleians in the city (Lys. 23.2–4). He then also disproves the man's Plataean descent, interestingly, by first having the accuser speak to the eldest of the Plataeans, Euthykritos, then to all the Plataeans he knows personally, asking whether they know the man (Lys. 23.5–6). After confirming that they

[90] Later *stelai* from the fourth century further confirm this: see *IG* II² 10096: Plangon and her father Tolmides, both Plataeans, were buried together; and *SEG* XVII 97: Chrysallis the Plataean wedded an Athenian citizen from Elaious. Apparently, some Plataean women also wedded *metoikoi* (or *xenoi*) not of Plataean descent, see *Ag.* XVII 648: Sime the Plataean wedded a man from Sinope.

[91] In this regard, see the intriguing case of an unpublished inscription from Plataea listing those men who had fallen in a campaign at Olynthos in the Chalkidike. Yannis Kalliontzis rediscovered the *stele* originally found in 1924 and wrote a paper (2014) in which he analyses it. The *stele* merely states 'In Olynthos', then listing the names of the fallen, with no *patronymika*. The names are in themselves intriguing, with three (Asopon, Asopillos, and Asopolaos) incorporating the name of the river Asopos, closely associated with Plataea. Most interestingly, the name Asopolaos is otherwise only known from Thucydides' Plataean Debate (Kalliontzis (2014) 337–8; see Thuc. 3.52.5). The *stele* is dated to the 1st c. BCE; however, it is clearly a copy of a list referring to a campaign at some point in the 4th c. (Kalliontzis (2014) 338–40). There is a remote chance that the men fell in an otherwise unknown battle against the Olynthians during the Plataeans' colonisation of Skione in the late 5th c. BCE. More probably, however, the men were in fact part of an Athenian force sent to support Olynthos against the king of Macedon in the mid-4th c. BCE. Either way, the fallen must almost certainly originally have been listed on a *stele* in Athens, now lost, and then copied by the Plataeans after their return to Plataea. This implies that they were probably listed separately, much in the manner Pausanias (1.29.11–2) describes for a different *stele* listing the dead of the Sicilian Expedition. Whether the Plataeans in this campaign were fielded as a separate unit, or whether merely their dead were listed separately, it appears that both the Plataeans and the Athenians clearly thought of them as a distinct group within Athenian society.

do not, the Plataeans finally advise the accuser to 'go to the fresh cheese' at the market on the last day of the month, since on that day the Plataeans always congregated there; there he would receive 'the most accurate information'.[92]

Multiple points are of note here. Firstly, this interesting passage provides us with an example of the practical application of the rules laid down in the Plataean Decree later mentioned in Apollodorus' *Against Neaira*. The fact that Pankleon claimed to have been registered in the *demos* of Dekeleia confirms that the Plataeans were distributed amongst the demes and tribes. That he was able to successfully pose as an Athenian citizen of Plataean descent at least for a time (assuming he actually was a fraud) implies that even the strict rules laid down in the decree could, and were, exploited, confirming that the Athenian reservations in this regard were not unfounded.

Secondly, the fact that the accuser first asks the eldest of the Plataeans, then goes to their regular meeting-place, implies that they maintained a tight community bound by social networks in which they kept track of each other and knew exactly who was a member of their group and who was not. Additionally, the accuser is claimed to have known a number of Plataeans personally, suggesting that they were likely a relatively prominent, visible and well-integrated group within Athenian society.

Thirdly, the fact that the Plataeans congregate at a specific public place at regular intervals is telling. While Lysias does not go on to say why they do this, and it is impossible to know with any degree of certainty the exact intention behind this regular meeting, we can make some reasonable assumptions. This little Plataean 'ritual' likely served the purpose of networking and keeping track of the members of their group, as well as providing social support and an opportunity to discuss issues concerning the group, regardless of their legal status within Athenian society.[93] Constituting an *act of identity*, it probably also strengthened group cohesion and helped maintain their group identity. However, the fact that the Plataeans decided to meet at a public place likely to be frequented by Athenian citizens[94] betrays a second important function: intended or not, it served a public statement to the Athenians as a cohesive group on a regular basis. This would not only provide a small measure of political and social leverage but, perhaps more importantly, would also reaffirm their privileged status: by

[92] Lys. 23.6: *ἀκριβέστατα ἂν ἔφασάν με πυθέσθαι ἐλθόντα εἰς τὸν χλωρὸν τυρὸν τῇ ἕνῃ καὶ νέᾳ: ταύτῃ γὰρ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ μηνὸς ἑκάστου ἐκεῖσε συλλέγεσθαι τοὺς Πλαταιέας*. Lysias is here likely referring to the fresh-cheese corner in the market in the *agora*.

[93] Kears (2013) 95. For the relevance of networking in the maintenance of group identity, see Collar (2014) 97–9, 104; Haarmann (2014) 20.

[94] See Xen. *Oec.* 8.22–3, in which Xenophon presents the market as a well-ordered place in which the customer always knows exactly where to find what he is seeking. This may have contributed to the Plataean decision to choose the market as their regular meeting place, knowing that it would be frequented by the Athenians also.

appearing as a cohesive group, the Plataeans would regularly signal publicly who belonged to their group, and who therefore was a Plataean. This was particularly important in a society in which proof of citizenship rested largely on popular consensus and providing witnesses,[95] and would therefore serve the function of protecting their citizen status as well as their positive image enjoyed in Athens, in addition to regularly reminding the Athenians of the same. Even those Plataeans who merely held *metoikos* status would profit by these regular meetings: if they were in need of a citizen spokesman—for instance, in regard to legal issues—they could ask fellow Plataeans who had full Athenian citizenship for help. Additionally, by thus drawing a line between themselves and the other *metoikoi* in the city, they could assert their privileged status. That the line between Athenian citizens and *metoikoi* amongst the Plataeans *de facto* appears to have been blurred may in fact have been a significant advantage.

Fourthly, the location is suspect. The fresh-cheese corner of the market was a suitably public place in order to make public statements. But why the cheese? Admittedly, we are now moving into the realm of speculation. I nonetheless posit the following hypothesis: Boeotia was famous for its green pastures which allowed for extensive animal husbandry, and the Parasopia—where Plataea was located—was particularly fertile.[96] Indeed, the name 'Boeotia' contains the same stem as *βοῦς*, 'ox' or 'bull'.[97] Boeotia, 'the land of cattle', accordingly appears to have been famous for its cheese,[98] and it is plausible to assume that some Plataeans had taken up their native craft and set up cheese stalls in the market. Economic advantages aside, this not only provided the Plataeans with a place to congregate, but it also affirmed and reinforced their identity as Boeotians. Quite possibly, making and selling Boeotian cheese may also have been a conscious effort on the

[95] Lape (2010) 187–8, 194, 196, 198.

[96] See Konecny–Aravantinos–Marchese (2013) 23, 26.

[97] In this regard see Paus. 10.15.1: After the victory over the Persians before the gates of their city in 479 BCE, the Plataeans apparently dedicated an ox of bronze at the sanctuary in Delphoi. See also McInerney (2010) 147–8, 182, 218: it appears that both the Athenians as well as the Plataeans grazed their cows on the Kithairon mountain range; the alliance between the two would have significantly facilitated this. See also a coin find from Plataea (a *chalkous*?) dated to the 4th c. BCE depicting the face of Hera (the protector of the city) on the obverse, and an ox or bull on the reverse: Imhoof-Blumer (1871) 375–6. The bull could represent Boeotia. See also a comparable bronze coin find depicting the nymph Plataea on the obverse and a bull on the reverse, Millingen (1831) 58.

[98] See for instance Ar. *Eq*. 475–80:

> Κλέων: *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὐτίκα μάλ' ἐς βουλὴν ἰὼν* […] *ἐρῶ*, […] *τἀκ* Β*οιωτῶν ταῦτα συντυρούμενα.*
>
> Ἀλλαντοπώλης: *πῶς οὖν ὁ τυρὸς ἐν* Β*οιωτοῖς ὤνιος;*
>
> Kleon: 'I shall swiftly hurry to the Council […] and tell them everything […], all the Boeotian things you are cheesing together'.
>
> Sausage vendor: 'How much then does cheese cost in Boeotia?'

part of the Plataeans to keep their native traditions alive and therefore reinforce group cohesion and identity. Despite their centuries-long conflict with Thebes, the Plataeans apparently cherished their identity as Boeotians, and their being part of the Boeotian *ethnos* was never questioned, neither by the Athenians, nor by themselves, nor by the other Boeotians.[99] The Thebans, who apparently equated the membership of the Boeotian *ethnos* to membership in the Boeotian *koinon*, in Thucydides' Plataean Debate use the Plataeans' own Boeotian identity as an argument against them: they argue that the Plataeans had 'betrayed their Boeotian heritage' when they had scorned membership in the *koinon* and had instead allied themselves with Athens.[100] Indeed, it appears that the Plataean quarrel was with Thebes in particular, not with the Boeotian *koinon*. In times when Theban hegemony over the *koinon* was reduced, the Plataeans were happy enough to join it; this may in fact have happened during their short-lived return to Plataea, *c*. 386–373 BCE.[101] This is evidenced by the fact that, during this period, the Plataeans minted a number of coins, many of which depicted the characteristic shield of the *koinon*—a strong indicator of their continued identification as Boeotians.[102]

Nonetheless, over time the Plataeans appear to have integrated into Athenian society fairly well. An indicator for this may be found in Plataean grave *stelai* during the fourth century BCE. The Plataeans appear to have adopted the Attic alphabet as well as Attic dialectal elements;[103] also, where

[99] Indeed, the point made by Yates (2019) 170–80, that Plataean historical narratives seem to have focused on civil strife rather than the conflict with the Persians, is interesting in this regard. The fact that most Boeotian cities had medised, and that the Plataeans had faced their fellow Boeotians on the battlefield, may have been a deeply distressing experience which engraved itself in the Plataean psyche in the subsequent decades. This may reinforce the idea that the Plataeans perceived themselves as part of the Boeotian *ethnos*.

[100] Thuc. 3.61.2: *παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια*. See also the Theban coup attempt described in Thuc. 2.2.4, during which the Thebans attempt to win the Plataeans over by appealing to their common descent and kinship (*τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν*). In this regard see Mackil (2013a) 39–41; ead. (2013b) 307–9; ead. (2014) 273–4. Apparently, the ethnic argument only worked to a limited degree: see Mackil (2014) 280–1.

[101] They may have also done so for a time during the *Pentekontaëtia*, see Mackil (2013a) 336–7; 336 n. 39; and perhaps even 338 BCE, after their restoration with the help of the king of Macedon.

[102] Head (1884) 58; Hoover (2014) 377–8; Kraay (1976) 112. In regard to the usage of the 'Boeotian' shield as a symbol of the *koinon* see Buck (1972) 97–8; Mackil (2013b) 309; Kraay (1976) 108–9.

[103] See, e.g., *IG* II^2 351: Εὔδημος; *Ag*. XVII 648: Σίμη; *IG* II^2 10090: Ἐπιχαρίδης; and *IG* II^2 10096: Τολμίδης. All these names feature the Attic H instead of the Boeotian long A. For corresponding Boeotian variants of these names cf. *SEG* III 333, 361, 370; *SEG* XXIII 271; *SEG* XXXII 493; *SEG* XXXVII 385; *SEG* XL 488; *IG* VII 505, 1740, 2117, 2424, 2466, 3067, 3089, 3153, 3180, 3204, 3293, 3349, 3386; *SIG*^{3} 519; *AD* 2 (1916) 269; *Klio* 6 (1906) 45; *BCH* 23 (1899) 195–6; *BCH* 26 (1902) 296; *BCH* 60 (1936) 177; BCH 70 (1946) 477, 479. Whether we

the Plataean grave inscriptions from the late fifth century BCE only listed the name of the deceased, the fourth-century BCE inscriptions now followed the increasingly established Athenian practice of listing name along with *patronymikon* and *demotikon*.[104] Of particular interest is the curious practice of listing not the *demos* in which the Plataean was registered, but instead using the *ethnikon plataieus*[105] or *plataiikos/plataiike*.[106] It must be noted that the *ethnikon* is applied to all Plataeans, regardless of whether they held Athenian citizen status or were *metoikoi*.[107] One may therefore conclude that, while there appears to have been a certain level of acculturation, the Plataeans nonetheless sought to emphasise their heritage and identity.

At this point, a brief comparison between the aforementioned early grave *stelai* from the late fifth century BCE and the later ones from the fourth century BCE can provide interesting insights, especially when taking into account the Plataean practice of meeting regularly at the fresh cheese stalls in the *agora*. In his seminal work *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, Fredrik Barth emphasises that the cultural markers which are used to draw boundaries between ethnic groups may shift and change over time, the boundary itself remaining stable despite these changes.[108] I suggest that it is this very dynamic described by Barth which may be observed in the case of the Plataean identities during their exile in Athens. This is most evident in the burial practices as evidenced by the grave *stelai*. Initially, shortly after their arrival in Athens in the late fifth century BCE, the Plataeans used the Boeotian alphabet and the Boeotian practice of inscribing merely the name of the deceased on the grave *stele*; this would have sufficed to mark them out as distinct from the Athenians. However, as time passed and the Plataeans became acculturated into Athenian society, they gradually adopted the Attic alphabet, Attic dialectal elements, as well as Attic burial practices. As their own alphabet and dialect fell into disuse as boundary markers, the Plataeans created new markers by explicitly adding the *ethnikon* denoting their heritage,

can assume an Attic H or a Boeotian long A for the Plataean Tolmides/Tolmidas mentioned in Thuc. 3.20.1 remains unclear due to the genitive.

[104] See e.g. *Ag.* XVII 647, 648; *IG* II² 10090, 10096; *SEG* XVII 97. Cf., however, the exception of the aforementioned casualty list analysed by Kalliontzis (see above, n. 91) which, if dated to the mid-4th c. BCE, clearly deviates from this practice. However, Athenian casualty lists usually only listed the name of the deceased under a heading indicating the tribe he belonged to, which could explain why the Plataean list contained the names only.

[105] See, e.g., Hondius (1925) 128; *SEG* XVII 97; *SEG* XXXVII 171; *IG* II² 10090, 10096.

[106] See. e.g. *Ag.* XVII 647, 648; *IG* II² 10096.

[107] For an example of Plataeans who were clearly *metoikoi* see *Ag.* XVII 648 (see above, nn. 24 and 90).

[108] Barth (1969) 14–15. Cf. Hall (1997) 20–6, 32: Supplementing Barth's theory, Hall argues that *indicia* of ethnicity are used to mark the boundaries between groups. These *indicia* may vary from group to group and over time, and may take many different shapes and forms, language and dialect being one of these; *indicia* are, however, not constitutive to the group itself, and serve merely to differentiate the group from other groups.

thereby re-drawing and re-emphasising the boundary between them and the Athenians. They supplemented this marking of the boundary by creating new traditions which had hitherto not been necessary by meeting at the fresh-cheese stalls in the *agora* on a regular basis. This meeting not only allowed them to demonstrate clearly to the Athenians who belonged to their group and who did not, but also explicitly linked them with a cultural marker associated with Boeotia: cheese. In this manner, as they integrated into Athenian society and their own dialect and alphabet fell from use, the Plataeans sought new ways to draw a clear boundary between themselves and their hosts, despite and perhaps in conjunction with increasing integration and acculturation. We can thus here observe a constant and dynamic negotiation and renegotiation of ethnic boundaries.

Integration into Athenian society is also attested by many inscriptions indicating intermarriage.[109] Exogamy is one of the swiftest ways to breach the barrier between one group and another,[110] and the Plataeans appear to have been no exception. Boundaries between groups are not hard, and individuals may be members of multiple groups at the same time, thereby maintaining multiple or hybrid identities.[111] This can be beneficial, since it allows the individual to be part of multiple social fields, thereby increasing his possibilities to prosper.[112] Nowhere is this made clearer than in a fragment by Herakleides Kritikos, writing in the third century BCE, many decades after the Plataeans had returned to Plataea from their exile in Athens: 'The citizens [of Plataea] have only this to say: that they are Athenian colonists, and that at this place the famous battle between Hellenes and Persians took place. They are Athenian Boeotians'.[113]

Conclusion

In this paper, I have presented a case study of collective construction of narrative, using the case of the Plataean refugee community in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. I have demonstrated how collective narratives were constructed and exploited by Plataeans and Athenians alike, and how these were in turn used to construct group identity, demonstrating the close link between the stories people tell and their identity. I have presented the case of the Plataean refugees as an example of the depiction of the

[109] See, e.g., *SEG* XVII 97; *IG* II² 10091. These apparently continued well into the 1st century BCE, as attested by *IG* II² 10095, 10097.

[110] Reger (2014) 120–1; Hall (1997) 28.

[111] Wimmer (2008) 976; Gruen (2013) 20; see also Hutnyk (2005) 81.

[112] Reger (2014) 121–3.

[113] Herakleides Kritikos, *FGrHist* 369A F 1.11: *οἱ δὲ πολῖται οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔχουσι λέγειν ἢ ὅτι Ἀθηναίων εἰσὶν ἄποικοι καὶ ὅτι τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ Περσῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο. Εἰσὶ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι Βοιωτοί*. See also Mackil (2014) 273–4.

consequences of war in ancient Greek sources, as well as providing a case study for the handling of a refugee crisis and the integration of foreigners into a host community in an ancient Greek context. The story of the Plataeans offers a unique insight into ancient Athenian societal mechanics, as well as embodying one of those timeless aspects of war: the destruction of entire communities and the flight of the survivors to a safer haven. I have argued that the legal status of Plataean war refugees, as well as the various narratives they featured in, starkly shaped Plataean group identity in this period, while at the same time allowing their Athenian hosts to manufacture a narrative casting themselves as saviours.

The ambiguous second-rate citizen status afforded by the Athenians after the destruction of Plataea was enjoyed by only a portion of the first-generation exiles. While a generous gesture on the part of the Athenians, it significantly limited the number of Plataeans who would be able to produce offspring with an Athenian citizen wife, who would be born enjoying full Athenian citizen rights. The majority of Plataeans remained *metoikoi*, and the sources make apparent that the Plataeans went to great lengths to maintain a group identity and cohesion, likely in order to provide financial and social assistance to the majority who were not naturalised.

The portrayal of the Plataeans in the Athenian sources indicates that the glorious and tragic history of Plataea—most notably its loyalty to Athens, its prominence in the wars against the Persians as well as its perceived injustices suffered at the hands of the Thebans—were crucial factors in the construction and maintenance of Plataean identity. These narratives were reinforced and embellished by the Athenians, who used them to discriminate against other groups, and quite probably to alleviate the Athenians' own guilty conscience in regard to atrocities committed against other cities by focusing on the generous benefactions granted to the deserving and loyal Plataeans. The favourable and positive Athenian presentation of the Plataeans in their narratives indicates that the generosity shown by the former to the latter may well have begun as a psychological coping mechanism designed to absolve the Athenians of their guilt of not having helped their loyal ally in time of need. In time, however, this image was increasingly exploited by the Athenians to construct for themselves a new identity casting themselves as benefactors and protectors of the oppressed, with the Plataeans serving as proof thereof. In this way, the Athenians further contributed to the maintenance of a Plataean group identity constructed around the city's past. The narratives evolved over time, increasing in pathos and glorifying Plataea's past in what can be termed 'intentional history'. Despite the Plataeans having been written out of Athens' narrative of the battle of Marathon, Apollodorus' mention of the Plataeans at that battle and the painting thereof in the *Stoa Poikile* support the notion that the Plataeans may have maintained their own narratives alongside the Athenian ones, perhaps with their own dedicated historians, and in turn influenced the evolution of the stories being told.

The Plataeans accordingly walked a thin line between assimilation and maintaining their own identity. The use of the Boeotian dialect and alphabet and the running of cheese stalls are indications that the Plataeans made an effort to stress their Plataean and Boeotian, as distinct from Athenian, identities. When the dialect and alphabet fell into disuse, the Plataeans sought alternative methods to mark the ethnic boundary between themselves and the Athenians by using *ethnika* to identify themselves as Plataeans. Additionally, they regularly made public appearances as a cohesive group, be it as warriors on the battlefield or at the cheese corner in the market, thereby emphasising the boundary between them and the rest of Athenian society and regularly reaffirming their status as Plataeans. At the same time, the positive image enjoyed by the Plataeans in Athens as well as the opportunity for some of them to marry into the Athenian citizen body contributed to their integration into the host society and to their increasingly adopting an additional, Athenian identity, to the degree that, even a century after returning to Plataea, they identified as both Athenians and Boeotians.

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6

WARFARE IN THE SICILIAN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL TRADITION*

Frances Pownall

Traditionally, in both antiquity and modern scholarship, the historiography of ancient Sicily has been considered apart from that of the Greek mainland,[1] and where any direct influence has been recognised, it has generally been only from east to west.[2] The almost complete loss of Sicilian historical texts prior to Diodorus Siculus (whose narrative is heavily influenced by his contemporary context in Augustan Rome) further complicates the situation.[3] Nevertheless, the complex and tumultuous history of Sicily provides a critical object lesson in the process through which the narrative of warfare became polarised in the historiographical tradition.[4] As dynastic autocrats branded their territorial expansion as a defence against external enemies, upon their expulsion these same campaigns were rebranded as imperialistic and tyrannical by their successors as a means of legitimising the transfer of power. A parallel polarity can be seen in the Sicilian historiographic tradition's fraught dialogue with the mainland historiographic tradition on the construction of Greek identity

* I would like to thank the co-editors for their kind invitation to contribute to this volume. All translations are my own.

[1] The extant 'fragments' (or, more properly, citations of lost works by later writers) from the historiographic tradition of ancient Sicily can be found in Jacoby, *FGrHist*, nos. 554–77; translations and commentaries can now be found in *Brill's New Jacoby*, and I shall henceforth cite them under their *BNJ* reference.

[2] E.g., the Sicilian historian Philistus' alleged 'plagiarism' from Thucydides: *BNJ* 556 T 14 and F 51. But the fragments extant from Philistus' narrative of the Peloponnesian War reveal in fact some significant differences from Thucydides, and provide a useful complementary viewpoint of the disastrous Athenian expedition from a Sicilian perspective; cf. *BNJ* 556 FF 51–6 with commentary by Pownall (2013) *ad loc.* For criticism of the compartmentalisation of the western Mediterranean in recent studies of the Hellenistic world, see Dench (2003) and the essays in Prag–Quinn (2013); the same tendency is present also in scholarship on earlier periods of Greek history.

[3] On the impact of Diodorus' first-century Roman context on his history, see esp. Muntz (2017) and Sacks (2018).

[4] On the particularly rampant role of warfare, even by the standards of ancient Greece, in the history of Sicily, see the introduction to a recent collection of essays on this topic, Jonasch (2020) 12: 'Ancient Sicily is, in fact, ideally suited for the study of the impact of collective aggression on people and their living space since it was a popular theatre of conflict throughout large parts of its history'; cf. Funke (2006).

through warfare. On the one hand, Sicilian historians challenged the mainland narrative of wars against external foes to make the achievements of the western Greeks more impressive, but on the other hand they were also willing to dip into the repertoire of traditional historiographical *topoi* on tyrants when it suited their political and ideological agendas. The shaping of the narrative of warfare is not a phenomenon limited to modern dictators and warlords, but represents a constant since antiquity, and the ways in which the ancient Sicilian historians portrayed the role of military campaigns in the rise (and fall) of autocratic rulers offer an especially useful comparandum to recent and current events in our contemporary world, as are discussed, for example, in Stoyan Panov's contribution to this volume.

Sicily's fertile agricultural land and abundant natural resources made it an attractive target for exploitation by the mainland Greeks and the Phoenicians/Carthaginians as early as the 8th c. BCE. As the Greek cities established a presence on southern and eastern coasts and inexorably expanded their territories, the indigenous (or, perhaps more precisely, pre-Greek/pre-Punic) populations in the interior were gradually conquered and assimilated. This process of assimilation, however, did not diminish the economic and political frictions that developed between the various ethnic groups co-existing in Sicily, exacerbated by the fact that many of the Greek *poleis* were controlled by a narrow and tenacious aristocratic elite, whose opponents could exploit the simmering resentment not only of the unenfranchised masses but also of the large proportion of immigrant and non-Greek residents.[5] The ensuing outbreaks of violent civil war (*stasis*) frequently led to inter-city disputes, as individual *poleis* attempted to expand their territory at the expense of their neighbors in periods of weakness. The turbulent social and political conditions left the Greek cities in Sicily open to aggression from outside powers, both their 'sister cities' on the mainland and the aggressively expanding Carthaginians and Etruscans, to whom their geographical proximity left them vulnerable. The ever-present threat of outside invasion (whether real or perceived) offered the opportunity for ambitious individuals to exploit the ongoing tension between *demos* and elite to assert themselves at the expense of their peers and gain absolute control of their home *polis* to rule autocratically.

The emergence of these dynastic autocracies contributed greatly towards the continuing political and military instability of Sicily. Although the autocratic rulers did to some extent reach a *modus vivendi* with one another through intermarriage and the deliberate cultivation of support from their counterparts that they could tap into during times of domestic crisis, they

[5] On the emergence of elites in archaic Sicily and the tensions this process engendered, see Shepherd (2015) esp. 370–2; cf. Asheri (1988) 753–4. Thucydides (6.38.3) puts the following statement in the mouth of the Syracusan demagogue Athenagoras: 'Our city is seldom at peace, and is subject to frequent episodes of civil strife and struggles more against ourselves than against external foes'.

also engaged in competitive rivalries in laying the foundations of their hegemonies, and consolidating and extending their power by expanding their city's territory well beyond its traditional boundaries.[6] These grandiose and openly imperialistic ambitions required drastic and sometimes even brutal measures, including the annexation of vast territories, the destruction of entire cities, and large-scale transfers of population. Ironically, although they themselves were responsible for much of the perennial warfare that pervaded ancient Sicily, the autocratic rulers simultaneously profited from the opportunity that it offered to frame their seizure of absolute power and its maintenance through aggressive military expansion as the defence of their home *polis* against either internal uprisings of subjugated elements of their populations or external threats posed by rival Greeks, the non-Greek inhabitants of Sicily, or foreign enemies. In this way, military necessity could readily be used as a pretext to justify rapid territorial expansion, and not surprisingly the malleable role of warfare in the self-promotion of successive autocratic regimes had a profound effect on the development of the nascent historiographical tradition.

Right from the very beginning, elements of the Sicilian autocrats' efforts to justify their appropriation of land, especially from non-Greek populations, can be discerned in the 'Archaeologies' extant from the historiographical tradition. The earliest Sicilian historian, Antiochus of Syracuse, situates the early history of Sicily into a western Greek axis (probably in the wake of 'pan-Sicilian' rhetoric after the conference at Gela in 424),[7] which effectively wrote out the island's non-Greek inhabitants.[8] Antiochus presented the island's earliest history as a series of migrations and expulsions (i.e., emphasising Greek foundations),[9] involving southeastern Italy in particular (*BNJ* 555 FF 8–13), a region that was the original homeland of the Sicels (*BNJ* 555 F 4) but under Gelon had largely been annexed by Syracuse.[10] It seems that Antiochus may have been following a Deinomenid agenda which denied appeals to autochthony by the pre-Greek/pre-Punic peoples of Sicily in order to justify the policy of large-scale resettlement and displacement of populations adopted by Gelon and his successors to extend their territory and consolidate their control;[11] Herodotus, on the hand, is far more critical

[6] So Vattuone (2007) 196: 'Creating a territorial state centered upon a hegemonic *polis* was a necessity from the age of the Deinomenids all the way down to Agathocles and beyond. This necessity set the political history of the Greeks of Sicily apart from that of mainland Greece'.

[7] So Luraghi (2002) 76–7 and id. (2013) Biographical Essay; Vattuone (2007) 191.

[8] Moggi (2019) esp. 36.

[9] Cf. Pearson (1987) 12.

[10] On Gelon, see Asheri (1988) 766–80; Luraghi (1994) 273–328; Evans (2016) 19–46.

[11] Although large-scale forced migrations had been a policy of the earlier Sicilian autocrats (e.g., Thuc. 6.5.3), the Deinomenids took this policy to a whole new level: Lomas (2006).

of Gelon's policy of mass migrations, concluding that they constituted evidence of his great tyranny.[12] Antiochus does, however, seem to accept the claim of autochthony of the Sicans,[13] who were located to the west of the central plain and were therefore geographically removed from the direct control of Syracuse, and so the Deinomenids had no reason in their case to deny it.

Antiochus' successor in the Sicilian historiographical tradition, Philistus of Syracuse, who was closely associated with the court of the Dionysii,[14] reconfigured the early history of the island in order to bring it in line with Dionysius I's legitimisation of his massive territorial expansion.[15] Dionysius not only continued the successful Deinomenid policy of mass migrations to unify his subjects and extend his empire,[16] but also demonstrably (as we shall see below) engaged in a polemical relationship of rivalry with his illustrious predecessor, and reflections of his desire to surpass Gelon's achievements are reflected in the historiographical tradition. Philistus denied the autochthony of the Sicans (*BNJ* 556 F 45), which was accepted by the Deinomenids, as well as the Sicels (*BNJ* 556 F 46), claiming that both peoples were immigrants from elsewhere. This allegation serves to justify Dionysius' domestic military campaigns by alleging that he was not removing these populations from their ancestral homes, but merely occupying land that they themselves had seized from others.

Timaeus of Tauromenium, who succeeded Philistus in the Sicilian historiographical tradition, was hostile both to Philistus (possibly because of his favorable portrayal of the Dionysii) and also to the current autocratic ruler at Syracuse, Agathocles.[17] Timaeus' emphasis in his own 'Archaeology' is on the remote past, showcasing the associations of Greek gods and heroes with Sicily and the Greek West in the legendary period in order to establish a claim to these territories in the present.[18] In other words, Timaeus asserts that the non-Greek settlements in Sicily and the west were Hellenised and therefore civilised in the legendary period, an assertion that presumably arises from the blanket justification for the expansion of the Greek cities of

[12] Hdt. 7.156.3: *τοιούτῳ μὲν τρόπῳ τύραννος ἐγεγόνεε μέγας ὁ Γέλων* ('in this way, Gelon had become a great tyrant').

[13] *BNJ* 555 T 3; cf. Thuc. 6.2.2 with Hornblower (2008) 267.

[14] On Philistus' Dionysian agenda, see Sordi (1990); Bearzot (2002), esp. 114–19; Pownall (2017b).

[15] On Dionysius I, see Caven (1990); Evans (2016) 152–69; Roisman (2017) 227–73.

[16] Harris (2018).

[17] On Timaeus' polemic against Philistus, see Pownall (2017a) 65; cf. Baron (2013) 258. On Timaeus' hostility to Agathocles, see Baron (2013) 18–20 and 61–2.

[18] Vattuone (2007) 197: 'Unlike Antiochus, Timaeus' 'Archaeology' was organized around a remote past when Greek heroes came into contact with the indigenous populations, creating a precedent that legitimized the appropriation of the land in the colonial phase centuries later'. Cf. Pearson (1987) 59.

Sicily into the indigenous interior (possibly reflecting the spin put on their territorial acquisitions by successive dynasties), but removes from individual rulers the specific grounds legitimising their imperialism. Thus, the appeal to the legendary past offered one avenue for the Sicilian autocrats to legitimise their territorial conquests, especially of non-Greek cities, and it was mirrored and retooled in the historiographical tradition in service to differing agendas.

As the territorial expansion of the Sicilian autocrats brought them to the borders of areas of Carthaginian influence, a new and particularly effective means of justification presented itself, namely the protection of the freedom of the Greeks against a foreign foe. Based on the widespread employment of liberation rhetoric in the later historiographical tradition, it is easy to fall into the trap of assuming that relations between the Greek cities in Sicily and Carthage had always been hostile. Nevertheless, prior to the fifth century, conflict between the Carthaginians and Greeks in Sicily appears to have been sporadic and isolated, and in fact most of the recorded military engagements involved rivalries of Greek cities, occasionally drawing in the Carthaginians as allies on one side or the other.[19] Even after the Battle of Himera in 480, when Gelon, the Deinomenid ruler of Syracuse, and Theron, the Emmenid ruler of Acragas, inflicted a decisive defeat upon Hamilcar and the Carthaginian navy, liberation rhetoric did not develop immediately. Instead, it made its first extant appearance in connection with the defeat of the Etruscans at Cumae in 474 by Gelon's brother and successor Hieron. Hieron's own military victory against a foreign foe offered him the perfect opportunity not only to outdo Gelon's victory over the Carthaginians at Himera, but to solidify his position as an appropriate successor, whose military success was equal to that of his brother.[20] In an epinician ode commissioned from Pindar (*Pyth.* 1.72–80), Hieron's defeat of the Etruscans at Cumae is telescoped into Gelon's victory over the Carthaginians at Himera, both attributed without differentiation to the ruler of the Syracusans (*Συρακοσίων ἀρχῷ*), effectively allowing Hieron to appropriate his brother's triumph.

The importance of Hieron's choice of epinician poetry to advertise his defeat of the Etruscans cannot be overstated. The ability of Sicilian autocrats to respond to situations that they could spin as emergencies and 'save' their fellow citizens from real or perceived threats was entirely predicated on their reputations as military leaders (or 'warlords'),[21] which they were careful to emphasise. This was a trend by no means unique to Sicily, for autocratic

[19] Asheri (1988) 748–53; cf. Hornblower (2011) 52–3.

[20] On Hieron's appropriation of Gelon's victory, see Pownall (forthcoming); cf. Harrell (2002) and (2006); Prag (2010) 55–7.

[21] Cf. the titles of Caven's book (1990) and Rawlings' article (2018).

rulers in Archaic Greece similarly capitalised on their military accomplishments to seize or maintain power,[22] and the Deinomenids were no exception in adopting epinician poetry, which focused on agonistic success in order to showcase the ruler's victorious nature, as the vehicle of choice for self-promotion. But for Hieron, epinician odes offered a particularly attractive venue for his self-fashioning as an extraordinarily successful military leader precisely because they reached a panhellenic audience,[23] and in this way aligned with his dedications commemorating his victory over the Etruscans at the great panhellenic sanctuaries of Delphi and Olympia.[24]

Pindar's *First Pythian* also reveals that Hieron explicitly framed his victory at Cumae as a panhellenic triumph over a barbarian enemy, where the Deinomenid victories of Gelon and Hieron over the Carthaginians and Etruscans are equated with the illustrious defeats of the Persians at Salamis and Plataea by the mainland Greeks. Furthermore, Pindar's Hieron claims (*Pyth.* 1.75) also to have 'rescued Hellas from oppressive slavery' (Ἑλλάδ' ἐξέλκων βαρείας δουλίας). Hieron's positioning of himself as a liberator of the Greeks against a threatening barbarian enemy served not just to legitimise his rule within Sicily, but also as a means of self-promotion on the larger Hellenic stage. By explicitly linking his victory over the Etruscans with those of the mainland Greeks over the Persians in 480/79, Hieron attempted to carve out a niche for the Deinomenids in the ongoing elaboration of the narrative of Hellenic resistance to foreign invaders.[25] In other words, Hieron's salvation of Sicily extends to the mainland, and he portrays himself not only as the equal of the leaders of the eastern Greek *poleis* in liberating the Greeks from the barbarians, but as in fact their superior as the one responsible for their salvation.

Reflections of the continuing efforts of Hieron and his successors to engage in a competitive dialogue with mainland Persian Wars discourse and thereby to 'elbow their way into the top league of Hellenism',[26] can be discerned in the Sicilian historiographical tradition. Although Herodotus follows the mainland version which attributed Gelon's refusal to join in the defence of Greece from Xerxes to his self-interest and insistence on his own supreme command of the Greek forces in the place of the Spartans (esp. 7.163.1 and 165), he does allude to an alternative Sicilian motive (7.165),

[22] E.g., Peisistratus of Athens (Hdt. 1.59.4) and Cypselus of Corinth (Nic. Dam. *BNJ* 90 F 57).

[23] So Mann (2013); cf. Morgan (2015) and Nicholson (2016).

[24] *SIG*³ 35 with B. 3.17–19; Osborne and Rhodes (2017) no. 101; cf. Harrell (2002).

[25] So Feeney (2007) 45: 'it is clear that the whole project of the poem is to claim that the Sicilian victories over *their* barbarians are as important and significant as the mainland Greeks' victory over *their* barbarians, part of a universal Hellenism defended by both West and East Greeks'. Cf. Harrell (2006) 130–33; Prag (2010) 58–9; Morgan (2015) esp. 133–62; Yates (2019) 105–9.

[26] So Feeney (2007) 45.

according to which a simultaneous Carthaginian invasion prevented Gelon from providing military assistance. Diodorus (11.1.4–5) elaborates upon the collusion of the Persians and Carthaginians in order to illustrate how Gelon was threatened with a foreign invasion of equal magnitude as Xerxes' invasion of Greece.[27] This is clearly a patriotic Sicilian version intended not only to exculpate Gelon for his inability to join the war effort against Xerxes, but also to highlight his defence of the Greek West from a foreign foe portrayed as no less terrifying as Xerxes and his forces. The question of Diodorus' sources remains controversial and it can no longer be assumed that for the fifth century he is copying uncritically large chunks of the fourth-century universal historian Ephorus of Cyme. Nevertheless Ephorus is generally considered to be an important source for Diodorus' narrative of the Persian Wars, particularly in his attention to events in the Greek West.[28] Ephorus (*BNJ* 70 F 186) claims that ambassadors from the Persians and Phoenicians 'ordered' (*προστάσσοντας*) the Carthaginians to send a massive expedition to Sicily to coincide with Xerxes' invasion of Greece. Ephorus (or, more likely, his source) expands upon the tradition of a coordinated Persian-Carthaginian expedition launched against both mainland Greece and Sicily, and creates a further parallel with the addition of an embassy to the Carthaginians to mirror that of the Greeks to Gelon. The elaboration of this tradition of a joint Persian-Carthaginian embassy in Diodorus' narrative (it does not appear in Herodotus) suggests that Ephorus is indeed his source for this detail.[29]

Herodotus' narrative does reflect, however, that the process of creating parallels between the mainland Greeks' repulsion of Xerxes' forces and the Sicilian Greeks' defeat of the Carthaginians began very early on. Herodotus observes (7.166) that Gelon and Theron of Acragas defeated the Carthaginians at Himera on the very same day as the Greek victory over Xerxes at Salamis,[30] a synchronism emanating from the Sicilian historiographical tradition that reinforces the Western Greeks' role as equals in the defence of Hellas from barbarian invaders. Diodorus (11.24.1) takes this synchronism one step further by stating that Gelon's victory at Himera occurred on the very same day as Leonidas' defeat at Thermopylae. This additional manipulation of the synchronism enables the Sicilian Greeks not only to rival the role of their mainland brethren in fighting off the barbarian invaders, but actually to surpass it, for the backdating of Himera to the day of Thermopylae (a loss) rather than Salamis (a victory) results in the

[27] On Diodorus' positive portrayal of Gelon, see Sulimani (2018).

[28] See, e.g., Green (2006) 24–38; Parmeggiani (2011); and Parmeggiani (2013–14). But cf. Parker (2011) Biographical Essay, Section F and Parker (2018), who adheres to the traditional orthodoxy.

[29] Cf. Prag (2010) 58–8 (with earlier bibliography).

[30] Aristotle (*Pol.* 1459a24–6) also mentions this synchronism, although he rejects the Sicilian version of events, stating that the simultaneity was merely a coincidence.

superiority of Gelon's achievement. This reworking of the original synchronism is generally attributed to Timaeus, who was notoriously fond of such temporal devices especially in contexts linking east and west,[31] but it could equally well have come from another source (such as Ephorus, who was probably dependent upon a Sicilian source), and may even derive ultimately from Hieron's own aggrandising propaganda.

Hieron's appropriation of the defeat of the Carthaginians at Himera and his retrojection of the element of panhellenic salvation onto Gelon's victory, themes that are emphasised in Pindar's *First Pythian*, can be discerned also in the Sicilian historiographical tradition. Ephorus (*BNJ* 70 F 186) states explicitly that Gelon 'fought for the freedom not just of the Sicilian Greeks, but for all of Greece' (*διαμαχησάμενον μὴ μόνον τοὺς Σικελιώτας ἐλευθερῶσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα*). Significantly, the 'cover text' for this citation is a scholiast to Pindar's *First Pythian* (Σ *Pyth.* 1.146b), which suggests that Ephorus is repeating Hieron's own propaganda, especially in light of the similarity of the panhellenic motivation attributed to the Deinomenids in both passages. Ephorus' apparently gratuitous reference to Hieron as being 'very eager to fight alongside the Greeks' (*τοῦ μὲν Ἱέρωνος συμμαχῆσαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι προθυμουμένου*) in the context of the Greek embassy to Gelon and the simultaneous Persian/Phoenician embassy to the Carthaginians confirms the hypothesis that Ephorus' ultimate source for this statement was the Sicilian historiographical tradition, as Herodotus does not mention Hieron in this connection. Although modern commentators believe that the scholiast is simply confused in his apparently anachronistic reference to Hieron,[32] another scholiast on the same passage (Σ *Pyth.* 1.146a) also highlights Hieron's role prior to Xexes' invasion (without attributing it to Ephorus) and as we have seen Hieron himself was keen to appropriate Gelon's victory and rebrand it is a panhellenic one. Similarly, the implication that the Deinomenids surpassed the mainland *poleis* in the salvation of Greece from foreign invaders lies behind the statement of Diodorus (11.23.3) that whereas Themistocles and Pausanias met ignominious ends, Gelon by contrast 'grew old in his kingship' (*ἐγγηρᾶσαι τῇ βασιλείᾳ*) and continued to enjoy high esteem from his fellow citizens. Thus the Sicilian historiographical tradition was instrumental in transmitting Hieron's panhellenic rhetoric as proof that the Western Greeks not just equalled, but in fact surpassed the mainland Greeks in the Persian Wars narrative, the memory of which continued to resonate strongly.[33]

The Sicilian autocrats seem to have quickly realised that panhellenic rhetoric and liberation propaganda could be employed closer to home as

[31] So, e.g., Feeney (2007) 50–1 and Baron (2013) 110–11.

[32] Parker (2011) *ad BNJ* 70 F 186; Jacoby (*ad loc.*) suggests emending Hieron's name to Gelon.

[33] See, e.g., the essays contained in Bridges–Hall–Rhodes (2007) and Yates (2019).

well. Playing on the fears of barbarian invasion offered a particularly effective method of legitimising military campaigns that might otherwise be considered at worst imperialistic and at best opportunistic, as can be seen most explicitly in the case of Dionysius I.[34] Diodorus gives a lengthy and vivid description of how Dionysius took advantage of the panic at Syracuse engendered by the Carthaginian siege and destruction of Acragas in 405 by accusing the existing generals of failing to prosecute the ongoing war against the Carthaginians with sufficient vigour, thereby gaining the trust of the *demos* and manipulating them into appointing him *stratēgos autokrator*, giving him the military backing to seize sole power (D.S. 13.91–96). Diodorus' source for Dionysius' use of liberation rhetoric to justify his coup at Syracuse is almost certainly Philistus,[35] who was personally involved in Dionysius' rise to power (*BNJ* 556 T 3) and was (as noted above) more than willing to circulate his propaganda, effectively taking over the role as court historian and spin doctor that epinician poets like Pindar and Bacchylides had played for the Deinomenids (and other contemporary autocratic rulers). Following his successful coup, Dionysius proceeded to extend his self-proclaimed role as the guardian of Greek freedom against the Carthaginian menace to justify his consolidation of Sicily. As Diodorus remarks: 'When it seemed to him that he had secured his tyranny well, he led out his forces against the Sicels, eager to get under his power all the independent peoples, and especially these people because they had previously allied with the Carthaginians'.[36] This invocation of a Carthaginian alliance to justify Dionysius' territorial expansion originates with his own propaganda, as circulated by Philistus. Notably, Philistus is our only source for the attribution of Ligurian ethnicity to the Sicels (*BNJ* 556 F 46). Because the Ligurians dwelt in what later became Etruscan territory, this claim appears to reflect propaganda intended to justify Dionysius' campaigns in Italy against the Etruscans, who enjoyed friendly relations with the Carthaginians.[37] Similarly, Philistus (*BNJ* 556 F 45) claims that the Sicans were originally Iberians (i.e., allies of the Carthaginians), which suggests the motivation to deny their own tradition of autochthony (as discussed above) was to connect them to the Carthaginians and thereby legitimise Dionysius' campaigns against them. Dionysius continued to play on the fear of the Carthaginians and his role as liberator of the Greek cities to justify the extension of his military campaigns to South Italy (D.S. 14.44.3 and 45.4), and eventually his territorial acquisitions

[34] See the detailed treatment in Pownall (2020) of Dionysius' effective use of liberation propaganda, which ultimately served as a model for Alexander the Great.

[35] D.S. 13.91.4 and 13.103.4; cf. Sanders (1987) 110–57.

[36] D.S. 14.7.5: *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἐδόκει διῳκηκέναι, τὴν δύναμιν ἐξήγαγεν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σικελούς, πάντας μὲν σπεύδων τοὺς αὐτονόμους ὑφ' ἑαυτὸν ποιήσασθαι, μάλιστα δὲ τούτους διὰ τὸ συμμαχῆσαι πρότερον Καρχηδονίοις.*

[37] Vanotti (1993); Bearzot (2002) 104–7; Pownall (2013) *ad BNJ* 556 F 46.

overseas along the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian coasts.[38] Agathocles later employed similar kinds of panhellenic discourse in reference to his campaigns against Carthage in North Africa,[39] although in the changed political circumstances of his own day the rivalry in defeating the barbarians was directed towards the Macedonian Successors instead of the Greeks of the mainland (cf. D.S. 21.2.2).

The Sicilian historians not only brought their own war narratives in line with mainland historiography in the portrayal of campaigns against the Carthaginians and Etruscans and their allies as motivated by the desire to liberate their fellow Greeks from the barbarians, but also in their deliberate employment of the *topoi* prominent in the mainland discourse on tyranny. From the very beginning, a strong polarity can be discerned in the historiographical tradition. On the one hand, the extant historical accounts reflect the self-promotion of the autocrats themselves, for whom warfare offered the opportunity to portray their assumption of sole rule as the quashing of threats to their fellow elites from the *demos* or, more generally, as responding as military leaders to situations that they could spin as emergencies requiring them to assume extraordinary powers. On the other hand, it soon became commonplace for new dynastic autocracies to denigrate the previous rulers as stereotypical tyrants in order to legitimate their own seizure of power, a tendency that is also reflected in the historiographical tradition. In this vein, it is important to note that although modern scholarship generally refers to the autocratic rulers of ancient Sicily as 'tyrants', the application to them of this loaded term with the negative connotations of oppression, wanton cruelty, and arbitrary abuse of power that it acquired, especially in the wake of the Persian Wars,[40] is almost certainly due to the later hostile tradition. In other words, the so-called tyrants in Sicily did not use this term in reference to themselves (although they may well have done so in reference to their predecessors),[41] but instead tended to emphasise the legitimate basis of their rule and to portray

[38] Pownall (2020) 203–4. Cf. Davies (1993) 203–7: Dionysius' flurry of apparently arbitrary imperialistic activity is motivated by his wars against Carthage, which required him to move mass populations to Syracuse in order to be able to man his massive fleet, to eliminate power centres on the northeast coast to deprive invaders of a base to attack Syracuse, to control the straits of Messina to prevent a naval attack on Syracuse, and to extend his imperial control far up the coast of Italy in order to obtain the resources to maintain his fleet.

[39] See Prag (2010) 65–6 (with earlier bibliography).

[40] On the seismic semantic shift of the term after the Persian Wars, see esp. Anderson (2005); Lewis (2009); Mitchell (2013); Luraghi (2018). Anderson's suggestion ((2005) 173–4) that the title of 'tyrant' no longer be applied to the elite rulers of Archaic Greece should be extended to the autocrats of ancient Sicily.

[41] On the negative framing of the Sicilian autocrats in the later tradition through the application of the term 'tyrant' (and all that implies), see Lévy (1996) and Bearzot (2018).

themselves as the defenders of their people (according to what can be discerned from their own self-fashioning, at least).

The tendency to discredit the rise to power of Sicilian autocrats through military prowess as can be seen as early as the negative portrayal in the subsequent historiographic tradition of Phalaris of Acragas, a shadowy figure who created the first true hegemonial power in Sicily in the first half of the sixth century.[42] According to Aristotle (*Pol.* 5, 1310b29–30), he gained autocratic power through the holding of civic offices,[43] and possibly through the appointment to an extraordinary military command as well. Aristotle (*Rh.* 2, 1393b10–2) narrates a colourful fable to illustrate how Phalaris gained control of Himera by deceiving its population into appointing him *stratēgos autokrator* and providing him with a bodyguard with which he seized power (just like the Herodotean Peisistratus at 1.159.4–6). While Phalaris may well have gained power through an extraordinary military appointment (as many autocratic rulers did), his appointment (whether deceptive or not) as *stratēgos autokrator* as well as the extension of his power to Himera are anachronistic elements, which suggests that this (hostile) tradition was appropriated from mainland discourses on tyranny and slavery and applied to Phalaris as part of a subsequent hostile tradition.[44] For what it is worth, the protagonist in another version (Conon, *BNJ* 26 F 1.42) of the same dramatic anecdote is Gelon, an identification probably first made by Philistus (cf. *BNJ* 556 F 6), as I have argued elsewhere,[45] as a way of undermining the reputation of Dionysius I's illustrious predecessor in order to reserve for him the honour of being the true saviour of the Sicilian Greeks from the Carthaginian menace.

A parallel account of Phalaris' use of a deceptive ruse to seize power occurs in Polyaenus (5.1). In this version, Phalaris hired a work crew to construct the temple of Zeus Polieus, and then under the pretense of the theft of his construction materials he gained permission to fortify the citadel. As soon as he had possession of a fortified base, he proceeded to transform his workers into a mercenary army and seized control of the city during the festival of the Thesmophoria by massacring the men and enslaving the women and children. The use of deception to secure a bodyguard is a stereotypical *topos* of tyranny (as can be seen, for example, in Herodotus' vivid narrative of Peisistratus' rise to power at 1.59–64), as is Phalaris' seizure of power under cover of a religious festival (as in, for example, the infamous

[42] On Phalaris, see Bianchetti (1987) and Luraghi (1994) 21–49.

[43] *οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ Φάλαρις ἐκ τῶν τιμῶν* ('the Ionian tyrants and Phalaris [gained their power] through civic offices').

[44] See Pownall (forthcoming).

[45] Pownall (forthcoming); *pace* Pownall (2017b) 69–71, where I suggested that, like Aristotle, Philistus identified the protagonist as Phalaris.

case of Cylon the Athenian at Thuc. 1.26.2),[46] the disarming of the population of Acragas (Polyaen. 5.2; cf. Plat. *Rep.* 569b and Arist. *Pol.* 1311a12–13), and his legendary cruelty, best represented by the notorious bronze bull in which he is alleged to have roasted his political enemies alive.[47] These memory sanctions levied against Phalaris, which obscured the constitutional basis of his rise to power and attributed to him all the stereotypical *topoi* of tyranny, are likely due to a smear campaign wielded relentlessly by the subsequent Emmenid dynasty at Acragas, intended to justify their own usurpation of power.[48] The Emmenids reinforced the transformation of Phalaris into a boilerplate tyrant through the claim that an ancestor of Theron assassinated him and thereby 'freed' the city (perhaps invoking the memory of the tyrannicides at Athens).[49]

These kinds of tyrannical *topoi*, imported from mainland discourses on tyranny, were fluid and malleable. Although the Emmenids tapped into the stereotypical anecdote of the tyrant's rise to power through a deceptive ruse whereby an acknowledged military commander invoked the need for personal protection (the precise details of which apparently varied), they themselves eventually in the later tradition fell victim to the very same tyrannical trope that they had levied against Phalaris. Polyaenus (6.51) narrates an anecdote according to which the Emmenid Theron was granted a sum of money for the construction at Acragas of a temple to Athena, but appropriated these funds to pay a bodyguard with which he seized power. As it seems, not only could these *topoi* of tyranny be employed by new dynasties to delegitimise their predecessors' justification of autocratic power based on the military ability to protect the people from either internal or external enemies, but the very same ones could also be shifted from one dynasty to another as the need for legitimation arose.

The repertoire of prophetic dreams and omens in the mainland discourse on tyranny could also be manipulated to assimilate the autocratic rulers in Sicily to their archetypal predecessors, as Sian Lewis has convincingly demonstrated.[50] As I am arguing, the same process is at work in reverse in the application of the negative *topoi* of tyranny by the subsequent hostile tradition. These prophetic dreams and omens were generally used to signal the birth of a great military leader, who would grow up to deliver his people from the threat of a powerful enemy. It was also a tradition, however, that such omens could be read ambiguously, and it is perhaps no surprise that

[46] On the desire of autocratic rulers to increase their panhellenic power and prestige through their 'ownership' of festivals, see Lavelle (2014), esp. 317–9.

[47] The references to Phalaris' alleged bronze bull have been collected by Schepens (1978); see also Dudziński (2013).

[48] Luraghi (1994) 36–49.

[49] On the invention of the Emmenid ancestor who killed Phalaris, see Adornato (2012) 484 with n. 18.

[50] See the excellent discussion of Lewis (2000).

their original positive meanings were manipulated to shade into additional evidence of their despotism by subsequent dynasties, who justified their own rule with the claim that they were liberating their cities from the tyranny of their predecessors. This is almost certainly the case with the prophetic dream of the woman of Himera, who had a vision of Dionysius I as a 'destructive scourge of Sicily and Italy' chained beneath the throne of Zeus. This omen was interpreted negatively by the later historiographical tradition in service to the agenda of those who, like Timoleon, claimed to be saving Sicily from tyrants,[51] and it is in this polemical context that it was narrated by Timaeus (*BNJ* 566 F 29), who was hostile both to Dionysius and his mouthpiece Philistus.[52] Nevertheless, the existence of an alternative version (Val. Max. 1.7. ext. 6) strongly suggests that the omen was originally a positive one circulated by Philistus, who is our source for the cluster of portents surrounding the birth and rise to power of Dionysius marking out his future military role as divinely ordained.[53] The original version reflected Dionysius' own claim to be an avenging spirit of Sicily from the Carthaginians, which underpinned his rule from the very beginning. As we have seen, Dionysius invoked the threat of the Carthaginians to have himself proclaimed *stratēgos autokrator* and seize autocratic power in Syracuse in 405. On the strength of his ongoing military success, Dionysius eventually assumed the title of king,[54] probably in deliberate rivalry once again with the Deinomenids.[55] Nevertheless, he too is denigrated as a tyrant in the later historiographic tradition, not just through the normal delegitimising propaganda of his successors, but also through the powerful anti-tyrant discourse at Athens, sharpened in his case by the hostility of Plato and the Academy.[56]

[51] On Timoleon's self-proclaimed role as liberator, see D.S. 16.90.1; Plut. *Tim.* 39.5; cf. Talbert (1974) and Prag (2010) 63–5. On Timoleon as an anomaly in the historiographical tradition as a stereotypical figure representing an idealised democratic tradition, see De Vido (2019), esp. 125–6.

[52] So Sordi (1984); cf. Lewis (2000) 100–1; Prag (2010) 63; Pownall (2019).

[53] *BNJ* 556 FF 57a and 58; for discussion of the significance of these portents in terms of Dionysius' own legitimisation and self-fashioning, see Pownall (2019); cf. Lewis (2000) 101.

[54] [Lys.] 6.6; Pol. 15.35.4; with Oost (1976) 232–6. On Dionysius' royal self-fashioning, see Duncan (2012); cf. Pownall (2017a) 27–8 and (2017b) 66–8. Perhaps because such a title would be unpalatable on the mainland, the Athenians refer to him in official inscriptions as archon of Sicily: *IG* II^2 18.7 (Rhodes–Osborne, no. 10); *IG* II^2 103.19–20 (Rhodes–Osborne, no. 33); *IG* II^2 105.8 (Rhodes–Osborne, no. 34).

[55] The Athenian representative requesting Gelon's help against Persia addresses him as 'king' (Hdt. 7.161.1: ὦ βασιλεῦ Συρηκοσίων), and Pindar refers to Hieron twice as such (*Olym.* 1.23 and *Pyth.* 3.70), as well as his son Deinomenes (*P.* 1.60); cf. Oost (1976). Both Herodotus (7.156.3) and Thucydides (6.4.2 and 6.94.1) refer in *propria persona* to Gelon as a 'tyrant' (likely adopting the hostile terminology that circulated in the aftermath of the expulsion of the Deinomenids).

[56] Cf. Sanders (1987), esp. 1–40.

The military reputation of Agathocles underwent a similar trajectory. Even in the changed political conditions in the wake of Alexander the Great's expedition and sudden death, the basis for Agathocles' power (like that of previous autocratic dynasties in Sicily) was still military (i.e., rather than hereditary or constitutional). Agathocles gained control of Syracuse by using his military reputation against foreign foes in Magna Graecia to capitalise on ongoing political tension between the *demos* and the elite, ultimately succeeding in having himself appointed *stratēgos autokrator* in 316 (D.S. 19.9.4).[57] After gaining control of Syracuse, he extended his hegemony to the rest of Sicily, and then set his sights on Africa and South Italy, imperialistic aspirations likely motivated at least in part by conscious rivalry with his predecessors, particularly Gelon and Dionysius I.[58] This desire to match the achievements of the previous dynastic autocrats in Sicily, as well as those of contemporary autocrats to the east in the regions conquered by Alexander the Great, explains why Agathocles joined the Macedonian Successors in assuming the royal title through the prestige conferred by military victory (D.S. 20.54.1–2; cf. Pol. 15.35.4).[59] Diodorus (19.2.2–3) presents a negative interpretation (probably originating in Timaeus, whose hostility to Agathocles was virulent) of prophetic dreams experienced by Agathocles' father, alongside a prediction by the Delphic oracle that his future son would be the cause of great misfortunes for the Carthaginians and Sicily. Nevertheless, Diodorus' subsequent narrative offers the standard folktale motif of the exposed child who grows up to be the savior of his people (D.S. 19.2.4–7), implying the existence of a positive version presumably emanating from Agathocles' own propaganda and circulated by his court historians, Callias (*BNJ* 564) and Antander (*BNJ* 565), who was also Agathocles' brother, justifying his seizure of power in response to the threat posed by external enemies. Once again, we find direct inspiration from the mainland discourse on tyrants, for the existence of opposed traditions on the birth of Cypselus can be discerned from Herodotus' narrative (5. 92β–ε) traditions which are not only very similar to Agathocles' birth narrative, but equally polyvalent.[60]

Steeped in almost continuous warfare, ancient Sicily offered fertile terrain for autocratic rulers to spin their seizure and maintenance of power as the defence of their people against internal or external enemies. Ironically, however, the efforts of even the earliest Sicilian autocrats to justify their territorial aspirations by positioning themselves as defenders of the Greeks generally served as ammunition upon their expulsion for their successors to

[57] On the career of Agathocles, see Consolo Langher (2000) and Péré-Noguès (2019).

[58] As hinted by Péré-Noguès (2019) 85.

[59] But cf. Zambon (2006) 77–85, who argues that Agathocles' kingship was not a continuation of the previous Sicilian autocracies, but a new 'true' monarchy.

[60] Cf. Consolo Langher (2000) 14 n. 2.

legitimise their own rule by exposing their predecessors as archetypal tyrants whose warfare was motivated only by naked imperialism. Thus, one distinctive aspect of Sicilian history that is reflected in the historiographic tradition is the extent to which warfare was employed as an instrument of domestic policy, resulting in its portrayal as either necessary or imperialistic, according to the desire of individual historians to align with the self-presentation of a particular autocrat or to undermine it. Furthermore, the historians of ancient Sicily were engaged in a constant and competitive dialogue on the role of warfare not only with one another, but with the historiographic tradition of the Greek mainland as well, presenting themselves as equal (and perhaps even superior) partners in the defence of Greece during the Persian Wars and appropriating the stereotypical *topoi* of tyranny as best suited their political agendas.

As I have argued, the Sicilian historiographic tradition offers an extremely important and often overlooked model of strategies for the seizure of autocratic power and the legitimisation of territorial conquests both in Sicily and beyond, matters which took on a new urgency for the 'mainstream' Greek historiographic tradition in the wake of the campaigns of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, and their Hellenistic Successors. The success of the autocratic rulers of ancient Sicily in shaping the narrative of warfare to their own political advantage, by positioning themselves as sole defenders of their people from foreign threats (either real or manufactured), and rewriting their own local history to justify their seizure of power, finds numerous parallels in the modern world. The only real difference is one of degree, as the specific methods of controlling the narrative of warfare have now become increasingly sophisticated and elaborated. *Plus ça change* …

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7

ANCIENT AND MODERN WAR: A COMPARISON OF REGULATION OF WARFARE AND LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS IN ANCIENT GREECE AND CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT*

Stoyan Panov

Introduction

War does not happen in vacuum, but is shaped in response to specific cultural, political, and historical moments. The regulation of warfare has thus always been a contentious issue, especially when new methods are employed. Such regulatory frameworks typically attempt to adapt as new techniques emerge and are perfected. The following chapter attempts to examine how the theory and practice of ancient warfare may help scholars from various disciplines interested in the phenomenon of war understand how the story of contemporary challenges such as cyber or information warfare fit historically within the development of principles of the law of armed conflict. In this manner, the history of ancient warfare, and in particular its practices of remembrance, could provide guidance for how we view modern problems, as the development of warfare has always coincided with the development of human capabilities. The discussions in ancient sources may help to achieve a better and perhaps a novel interpretation of how our contemporary society understands and responds to the hybridity of information warfare, the narrative of warfare, and the utilisation of cyberspace for military purposes. The reframing of the modern issues within their broad historical context can shed light on many aspects of war that remain relevant today. The goal of this chapter is to explore how the fundamental strategies of warfare have remained constant across the millennia even as they show remarkable development in technology and implementation.

The one area in which there has been considerable change in the fundamental methodology of war pertains to historical narrative, namely in the development of active efforts to contain the development of 'war hero'

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stories, such as are discussed by Frances Pownall elsewhere in this volume. As Mark Marsh-Hunn also studies in this volume, the stories that shape our understanding of war and its aftermath are a central element of war itself. Modern regulation of war has thus made considerable, and largely successful, efforts to limit the development of pseudo-history, fundamentally changing the nature of the historiography of war, although the emergence of counter-narratives in the cyber world have increasingly challenged these efforts.

In what follows, I argue that certain types of cyber war share more with ancient warfare than the 'traditional' conception of modern warfare as a clearly defined battlespace. I will focus in particular on the control and manipulation of historical narrative, the use of language as disguise, and new manifestations of what might traditionally have been deemed 'treachery': paradoxically, the trappings of modernity are allowing the practice of warfare to revert into something more similar to ancient war.

In what follows, I first discuss the background of how ancient principles of warfare are reflected in or have influenced the contemporary regulatory regime of kinetic warfare and how this regime is applied in order to control new challenges, such as information warfare and cyber-attacks, which in some circumstances may directly target the past itself. This analysis additionally requires a broad background understanding of the most essential principles of contemporary and ancient warfare in order to clarify some of the contemporary challenges to regulating warfare in cyberspace. I will thirdly discuss how the very existence of the principles in law reflect the actors' concerted attempts to preserve and remember the social practices that led to their initial formation.

The very process of creating and applying laws to warfare serves as a formalised type of historiographic enterprise establishing the narrative of the armed conflict in question. The process of law-making and enforcing norms and rules of war is inherently determinative and influenced by both human memories and the account of survivors regarding the practices of war. Modern courts attempting to regulate war or punish abuses suffered in it must interview participants or witnesses in a kind of elaborate and legalistic historiographic enterprise, using (seemingly) objective and unbiased standards and procedures with which to establish 'what really happened'. Von Ranke's famous formulation of 'wie es eigentlich gewesen ist' takes on particular import when the protection of survivor accounts, or the potential incarceration of an alleged perpetrator, is at stake. Although the final historiographic product is produced by a team and in a legal setting rather than by an individual historian conducting research, the stakes in this type of 'historiography' are, if anything, even higher to produce a fair and accurate representation of the past, although, as discussed below, some of the ways of handling (and mishandling) memory remain consistent over time.

The starting point of our journey is the contemporary language and categories which are used in the regulation of warfare, as this is where we see means and methods, some of them timeless, codified in legal terms through the application of the law. The International Humanitarian Law (subsequently referred to as the IHL) is the law regulating armed conflict in the modern era. Officials and individuals who participate in an armed conflict can be held individually responsible for the violations of the rules of IHL in criminal trials for the perpetration of international crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Modern law tends to be far more specific than ancient regulations and norms; for example, although the elements of war crimes require the existence of an armed conflict and a corresponding violation of the IHL provisions, crimes against humanity do not require the existence of an armed conflict but only a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, although such attacks usually take place during war. In contrast with the Ancient Greek framework, which often left civilians at the mercy of the victors, the primary emphasis of the contemporary legal regime rests on the protection of a civilian population in a dire situation. The development of International Criminal Law following the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals after WWII clearly indicates that officials are responsible for the decision-making in armed conflicts and must be individually responsible for the violations of the rules, norms, and principles of armed conflicts. Interest in the role of the victims is relatively recent, and has greatly increased since the 1990s, as reflected in the functioning and jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

In the ancient world, the space between war and peace could be nuanced: Thucydides, for example, makes his characters debate at length whether or not another party's actions constitute war (e.g. 1.71, 86, 88); and in a statement that becomes increasingly familiar as cyber war becomes more prevalent, states in Plato are described as by nature in a state of constant war, with the term 'peace' serving only as a sort of thin veil masking that reality (*Leg.* 626a). The modern term 'warfare', however, has traditionally strictly applied to the existence of an armed conflict between two or more belligerent parties. Further refinements according to the modern law of armed conflict (IHL) determine the existence of war based on the gravity and continuation of the use of force in order to reach the objective criterion of the severity of the use of force, its immediacy, directness, invasiveness, and military character. These are the essential legal elements which must be applied to a particular set of events in order to determine and describe the event as 'war'. The determination of whether there is or is not an armed conflict today is thus a primarily objective legal test that does not require a declaration of war or armies facing each other in a clearly demarcated theatre of war.

The ancient world is often thought of as more amorphous with respect to warfare regulation: while ancient societies had a mix of taboos, traditions, and laws to govern behaviour in conflict zones, the legal regulation of modern warfare is relatively explicit and rigid, at least concerning physical (kinetic) attacks. Modern warfare again has a well-developed framework within the IHL. First, the IHL regulates what means and methods are allowed in armed conflicts (traditionally known as the Hague Law). Its main goal is either to generally or specifically prohibit or to restrict the means and methods (namely some types of weapons) which would cause excessive damage in particular circumstances. For example, treacherous warfare is prohibited (originally codified in Art 23(b) of the Hague Regulations) in terms of killing the members of the enemy army through morally and legally culpable deception. While this law is relatively recent, it should be noted that the revulsion against treacherous warfare (at least as defined by one's own side) is an eternal element of war, and is apparent as early as Homer in an aversion to particular types of 'non-heroic' fighting, such as the use of arrows.[1] The more widely-known contemporary aspect of the IHL is the Geneva Law, which through positive regulations and negative prohibitions focuses on the protection of actual victims of armed conflicts such as persons who are wounded and sick, including combatants who have laid down their arms, prisoners of war, and civilians. The law of contemporary warfare regulates what armed forces may do in a legally conditioned or restricted manner and what the protected individuals should not suffer. Hence, the IHL tries to achieve the difficult balance of determining what is actually military necessity: 'a belligerent to apply only that degree and kind of regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by the laws of war, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and physical resources'.[2] While this again has no direct parallel in Ancient Greek wars, revulsion against excessive or unnecessary levels of violence beyond what is necessary is implicit, for example, in tragic literary representations of Greek behaviour during the fall of Troy, or in Thucydides' apparently critical treatment of the Athenian obliteration of Melos for largely symbolic reasons (5.98–9, 116).

Simply by the act of regulating war, international bodies have implicitly accepted that wars *will* occur, much as the Greeks largely did, but they try to control its nature when it does so and also attempt to preserve the record

[1] However, it could not be categorically concluded that the term 'treacherous' still carries the same connotation as in ancient times. For example, perfidy and treachery are used interchangeably in the modern understanding of warfare and they may be exemplified in Article 37 of Protocol I, stating that 'acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy'. See, e.g., Lendon (2005) *passim* on the development of ancient ethics about warfare.

[2] See The US Navy Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare (1959).

of warfare for the purpose of determining whether the law was followed in armed conflicts. One core principle of modern warfare is proportionality, which stipulates that all military measures by the belligerents must be proportionate to the aim they attempt to accomplish. Again, a nascent form of this principle can be seen in ancient historiography. Thucydides, again, seems to be a forerunner of modern ethical systems, despite his reputation for amorality. He at least has a careful eye for proportionality—or specifically *disproportionality*—in his depiction of the Peloponnesian War, representing the violence, including against children, at Mycalessus as 'no less worthy of lamentation than anything that happened in the war' in comparison with the tiny size of the city (7.30.3), or the suffering of massacred Ambraciots as 'the greatest of those that happened in this war, to a single city in an equal number of days' (3.113.6).

In this manner, war is carefully defined and modern warring parties perform a cost-benefit analysis in which the military advantage obtained by the military operation must outweigh the damage or suffering caused to civilians or civilian objects.[3] The principle of humanity, similarly, prohibits the use of any kind or degree of force not necessary for the purpose of war, namely for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and physical resources. In this manner, the regulatory framework of modern warfare is objective in the sense of the applicability of a given set of rules, most of them expressions of eternal human feelings about violence, to particular circumstances, while relying on social constructs such as law to define and remember processes, acts, events, and the corresponding consequences of such.

Fundamental Principles of Modern Warfare

The theater of war as regulated by the IHL cannot protect all individuals affected by the armed conflict, and ultimately the IHL does not intend to eliminate, but aims at restrictive regulation of the goal of, the armed conflict, namely the military advantage and defeat of the enemy. The practice of warfare, however, is evolving beyond these restrictions, with implications for its 'historiographic', and memory-preserving aspects that mark a significant departure from standards of war that have been relevant since ancient times. A more traditional standard concept of warfare tries to demarcate the actual physical boundaries of the theatre of war. The spatial element of where, exactly, war takes place is becoming somewhat relativised and less relevant in the protection of civilians. The old notion of the military field as the

[3] Proportionality is also important in deciding whether an attack has been indiscriminate in nature and purpose as Art 51(5)(b) of the AP I says that an indiscriminate attack is such that 'may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated'.

theatre of war is replaced by a wider space where the conflict (armed or otherwise) is determined and described to take place. Meeting at a battlefield outside an urban area is no longer strictly required by the customs of war. War has always evolved: for example, when the more traditional practice of phalanx warfare was increasingly replaced by types of violence involving urban areas populated by noncombatants in the Peloponnesian War. This departure from the field of battle takes war onto a new plane.

Total war is restricted in the modern legal framework, similar to the limitations, or at least public censure, imposed in Ancient Greece. The limitations now embodied as legal principles attempt to provide clear and objective protection for civilians by controlling what belligerents may or may not do in war. For example, the principle of limitation, enshrined in Article 35(1) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), stipulates that the right of the belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited, as causing unnecessary suffering is prohibited. Distinction, meanwhile, requires belligerents to distinguish between the military objectives and civilian persons or objects at all times during the armed conflict, and to attack only military objectives (Art. 48 AP I).[4] While such laws did not apply in Ancient Greece, where civilians were subject to terrible fates if their defenders failed, these laws crystallise similar ancient aversions against violence toward civilians, such as the performance of Euripides' *Trojan Women* on the heels of Athenian violence at places like Mytilene, Scione, and Melos, or in the prohibition in the Delphic Amphictyony of cutting off water to member states in wartime, thus targeting trapped civilians as well as soldiers (Aesch. 2.115).

Demarcating War in the Ancient and Modern World

With the development of modern warfare, including both cyber war and armed conflict taking place in urban settings, the principle of distinction plays a special role in ultimately describing and separating what belongs to the sphere of war from what does not, and it is this grey area that will be the primary focus of this rest of this paper, especially information and cyber war as it compares with similar historical phenomena related to knowledge and information in the Ancient Greek world.

Civilian objects may of course become military objects if the use of the object is military in function as long as the use of the objective makes an

[4] The principle of distinction is particularly important for demarcating what constitutes the theatre of war because military objectives are 'objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total of partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage'. See Additional Protocol I Art 52(2)–(3) and Burchill, et al (2005) 85–6.

effective contribution to the military action.[5] There are many examples of bridges destroyed, for example, based on their capacity to contribute to the military advantage of the enemy. The growing cyber world is even more problematic in this regard. Particularly relevant for the development of cyber warfare is the question of so-called 'war sustaining' objects and whether they are eligible for lawful attacks. If a certain industry is crucial for the ability of one of the warring parties to sustain its armed capabilities, then such an industry would be targetable, including financial systems of the state. Such industries are particularly susceptible to cyber-attacks. As most dual-use objects are located in or near urban areas, it is necessary to consider the reality of warfare, which often results in collateral damage. The determination through description, application, and interpretation of legal definitions to particular objects indicates if the law is abided by. Nonetheless, the picture is often unclear. Cyber weapons are also relatively precise in their nature and effect, as they are usually deployed against closed military e-infrastructure, although there are examples in which cyber malware may unintendedly (or not) affect civilian systems. Compared to more traditional types of war, cyber-attacks are, however, less likely to cause collateral damage or be indiscriminate in their nature and effect.

Contemporary laws draw a distinction between an armed attack and other types of the use of force, trying to distinguish a state of war from a state of peace, although today even this question can be murkier, and more reminiscent of the ancient world, than it has been generally believed to be for the past few centuries. The objective case-by-case determination and representation of what constitutes an armed attack or other, less grave forms of use of force, include any account of use of force that injures or kills a person or damages or destroys property, thus triggering the right to self-defence;[6] unfortunately for the Spartan and Corinthian hawks, the actions leading up to the Peloponnesian War would probably not have qualified to trigger their right to self-defence. Non-destructive and non-injurious cyber operations that target the economic infrastructure of a state similarly may not cross the threshold of an armed attack, although 'a significant destruction or injury would qualify as an armed attack'.[7] For example, a disruption of the banking system or banking transactions as in an Estonian case of 2007

[5] The dual-purpose or dual-use military objective is targetable as the modern armies are contingent on vast networks of supplies and the supply lines, and facilities used in the supply lines are legitimate military objectives in order to defeat the enemy forces. Additional Protocol I Art 52(3).

[6] Schmitt (2013) 55. The regulation of modern warfare allows for exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force. Self-defence is the most widely accepted exception to the prohibition of the use of force. Article 51 of the UN Charter states, 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security'.

[7] See also Schmitt (2014) 268, 283.

would not count, as seen below. However, a cyber-attack that affects the whole financial system or prevents the government from carrying out essential sovereign tasks, for example severe intrusions in the military communication lines or command control, would be seen as equivalent to an armed attack.

One of the most significant differences between Ancient Greek and modern war seems to be the absence of a principle of distinction such as is discussed above that could draw a sharp division between those bearing arms and civilians. While certain types of actions in the civilian sphere might have been considered distasteful, almost nothing and no one was truly off-limits once a war had begun. Excesses were often explicitly or implicitly condemned, for example in massacres of suppliant prisoners, as happened at Plataea in 427 BCE; abuse of corpses, as happened in the culmination of the civil war at Corcyra (427); or massacres such as occurred at Melos in 415. Thucydides' account of the Athenian general Demosthenes' deception in sneaking his troops into Idomene in order to slaughter men sleeping in their beds, similarly, could hardly be read in a positive light (3.112.1). The lack of a true principle of distinction meant that norms were thus not inviolable, although they were often observed. Truces for the burial of the dead are often shown as being respected from Homer onward (e.g., *Il.* 24.780–90); even the 'barbarian' Xerxes is not depicted as willing to violate sacred heralds (Hdt. 7.136); and certain weapons were not widely employed in armed conflicts, although, again, they were not formally banned. Disapproval of treachery can, for example, be seen as early as Homer's story of Ilus of Ephyra refusing to supply Odysseus with a poison for smearing on his arrows (*Od.* 1.159).

Evolution of the Arena of War

Warfare has evolved in different eras, as has the way we talk about it. One area that has recently presented particular challenges in modern times, which are remarkably reminiscent of ancient ones, is the issue of remembrance—namely the establishment of accurate records of military actions. The regulation of the use of force in cyberspace, 'a domain characterised by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and exchange information via networked information systems and physical infrastructures',[8] has proven particularly difficult. This novel 'battlefield', one which is not strictly linked to the kinetic realm of ascertainable, factual damage or harm as a result of the use of force, poses new regulatory questions as well as issues regarding the preservation of the facts of what has actually happened in a military context. It is beyond any doubt that in 2020, critical military infrastructure that protects 'a State's

[8] US Department of Defense (2006) 11. See also Finkelstein and Govern (2015) 2.

security, economy, public health or safety, or the environment' depends heavily on cyberspace capabilities, which in itself poses security dilemmas.[9] Therefore, if cyber operations are directed against the cyber infrastructure of a State, such a hostile act would constitute a violation of the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs whenever such operations cause physical damage or injury, since States have the right to exercise sovereign control within their territory including cyber infrastructure.

The most problematic interpretative aspect of cyberspace activities is when cyber operations do not strictly involve destructive force but result in serious non-kinetic consequences. At the core of the modern regulation of circumstances in which armed force could be used is the prohibition of the use of force in international law. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter stipulates, 'All members [of the UN] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations'. The question of when the threshold of the use of force by cyber operations has been passed is answered by assessing the severity, immediacy, directness, military character, state involvement, invasiveness, and legality of the cyber operation.[10] For example, the damage inflicted on Iran's nuclear facilities and centrifuge capabilities in particular by using the Stuxnet virus would cross the threshold (unless the virus was applied with an alleged legal justification in anticipatory self-defence).[11] The emphasis of the current regulatory framework is on the consequence of the act of violence, the attack.[12]

The cyber domain offers challenges, however, to this traditional assessment of violence, as cyber operations can target communication lines, e-resources, information systems or servers, for example, all without actually inflicting physical damage. Historical memory is also vulnerable, and the crux of the problem today is how such data, especially of a historical nature, fit into existing legal regulatory provisions: should they be protected, as a tangible object, or treated as something that is intangible? If data, facts, or historical narratives are treated as objects, then by analogy, the alteration of data should be considered consequential damage and deletion of it should be classified as harm to a civilian (and thus protected) object. Actors have frequently engaged in such destructive activities with the intent to create a

[9] Schmitt (2013) 211. See also Schmitt (2014) 268, 271.

[10] Schmitt (2013) 47–51. The standard that is applicable in cyber operations is similar to the standard used in kinetic force, as the assessment is done case-by-case and cyber operations afflicting larger than *de minimis* damage or injury on the attacked State's infrastructure would suffice.

[11] Schmitt (2013) 47.

[12] An attack is 'acts of violence against the enemy, whether in offence or defence' (AP I art 49).

false historical narrative and erase or recast the memory of certain key historical events. Hence, the suggested definition of a cyber attack, 'a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects', does not fit well with evolving uses of cyber war aimed not at practical resources but the historical record.

Cyberspace and Monuments

Modern warfare involves, essentially, complex battles over historiographic memory, incorporating various aspects of the use of both kinetic and cyber capabilities to control the narrative of what has occurred in conflict zones. Some states like Russia have developed military doctrines to include a range of methods and means of warfare which do not fit squarely within the modern world's traditional understanding of warfare. For example, around 2013 the Chief of the General Staff of Russia Gerasimov formulated that 'the role of the non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of weapons in their effectiveness …The open use of forces—often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation—is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict'.[13] In this manner, kinetic capabilities such as use of armed force are coupled with elements of non-linear warfare such as intelligence war (disinformation, propaganda, damaging lines of command and communication) and information war (conspiracy theories, misinformation, fake news, winning the war of hearts and minds). It should be recalled that even if no damage is caused, such operations may qualify as unlawful interventions if there is an intent to coerce the State in matters of sovereignty.[14] Moreover, it comes as no surprise that States have a duty to disallow 'knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States',[15] an obligation transposed into cyberspace.[16] For example, States shall remedy or prevent their cyber infrastructure being used for malicious cyber operations against the infrastructure of another State by closing down Internet Service Providers which are used regularly for harmful operations.[17] The principle approach to legal regulation of such issues has been to adjust the existing legal framework to the particular circumstances in order to discourage any

[13] Gerasimov (2016) 24.

[14] Schmitt (2014) 275.

[15] Corfu Channel case (UK v Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 22.

[16] Schmitt (2013) 32–3. States are required not to 'knowingly allow the cyber infrastructure located in their territory or under exclusive governmental control to be used for acts that adversely and unlawfully affect other States'.

[17] Schmitt (2014) 277.

development of legal loopholes. In this manner, there is a continuous evolution in how the law adjusts to new facts and phenomena. There has been increasing interest in controlling the process of memorialisation or preservation of fact, an aspect of war that has become especially central with the proliferation of such narratives in cyberspace.

One of the first examples of such a hybrid scenario, in which complex cyber capabilities respond to a physical movement of historic or cultural property, and with revealing parallels in the ancient world, occurred in Estonia in April–May 2007. The Estonian government relocated the bronze statue of the Unknown Soldier (erected in 1947 by the Soviets as homage to the 'liberation' of Estonia at the end of WWII), removing it from downtown Tallinn to a military cemetery on the outskirts of the city on 27 April 2007.[18] The statue of the Unknown Soldier had become a gathering place for the 400,000-strong minority of ethnic Russians in Estonia, and had therefore become a political flashpoint in the conflict over Estonian identity. The statue commemorating the Red Army in WWII provoked different reactions within the Estonian and Russian populations: for some Estonians, the memorial represented the occupation and subsequent annexation of Estonia into the Soviet Union after WWII, serving as an affirmation of the occupation, and an attempt to erase independent Estonian ethnicity by the Soviets. For others, the statue was a homage to the sacrifice of the Soviet troops in WWII.[19] The Russian reaction reached the highest ranks of the Government in Moscow as the First Vice Prime Minister called for a boycott of Estonian goods and services.[20] When the memorial was physically relocated, it spurred a series of reactions in cyberspace amounting to a battle to control the history of the place, the relocation of the monument being seen as a kind of *damnatio memoriae* to be resisted. The subsequent response by Russia indicates a key difference between ancient and modern struggles over memory: as Russia could not physically control the material relocation of the monument, the dispute was moved into another medium, cyberspace. The cyber sphere offered an opportunity for Russian-backed hackers to respond to what they perceived as an unjust *damnatio memoriae*.

The initial phase of the operation against Estonian cyber infrastructure consisted of low-sophistication cyber operations that did not result in serious disruption of information infrastructure or data in the Estonian cyber system. For example, Russian-language web forums openly criticised the decision to relocate the statue and, on some occasions, webmasters employed strong, abusive, and provocative language such as invoking 'patriots' to protect Mother Russia from 'f-cking Estonian Fascists'.[21] The next phase of

[18] Ruus (2008).

[19] Evron (2008) 122.

[20] Schmitt (2013) 1–3.

[21] Ruus (2008).

the attacks was more disruptive, preventing interaction between parts of the Estonian cyber infrastructure for prolonged periods of time. The Estonian e-infrastructure would be overloaded with unprecedented traffic of data in cyber operations that were conducted through botnets, a network of affected 'zombie' computers which generate numerous requests for information to the targeted websites. In this manner, the electronic attack was launched on the premise of taking control over a high number of computers which generated millions of requests to access the targeted Estonian sites.

Control of the narrative and communication in cyberspace was crucial for the Russian hacking attempts, but maintaining possession of the narrative of war has been a key part of fighting them since ancient times. The strong reaction to the relocation of the statue resembles, with some differences, erasure such as we hear of in the story of the Spartan king Pausanias. Thucydides describes an ugly conflict between Greek cities a generation after the Persian Wars and discusses the importance of the Plataea monument (1.132.1–3):

> [Pausanias] by his contempt of the laws and imitation of the barbarians, … gave grounds for much suspicion of his being discontented with things established; all the occasions on which he had in any way departed from the regular customs were passed in review, and it was remembered that he had taken upon himself to have inscribed on the tripod at Delphi, which was dedicated by the Hellenes, as the first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the following couplet:
>
> The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised
> This monument, that Phoebus might be praised.
>
> At the time the Spartans had at once erased the couplet, and inscribed the names of the cities that had aided in the overthrow of the barbarian and dedicated the offering. Yet it was considered that Pausanias had here been guilty of a serious offence.

Like Estonians in Tallinn or the Russian-affiliated hackers online, the Spartans attempt to erase a boastful claim of power and authority (albeit one coming from their own side), through physical removal and erasure of a monument. This monument had constituted a threat to their identity, as the famously self-controlled Spartans display their modesty and commitment to their city, rather than their status as individuals, even on their notably restrained tombs for the war dead. Pausanias' showy boast thus not only threatened impiety but also undermined the value system that Sparta hoped to project, the basis for their feeling of superiority in the Greek world. The story of Pausanias demonstrates both the efforts to control the physical record of the historical narrative, and also the failure of such efforts. Just as

the Russian efforts to smear Estonia became public, Thucydides, after all, knows (and shares) this story: the cover-up did not work.

While there is considerable continuity in the efforts by authorities to control or shape historical narrative in various eras, we can also see in this comparison one of the unique features of modern war: changes in who gets to narrate history and the evolution of the cyber world as an arena in which historiography is both controlled by state forces and open to the input of anyone at all. Although the relocation of the monument of the Soviet soldier was not an act of total erasure, unlike the Spartans' action described above, the complementary cyber response represents the attempt to re-draft or control the narrative about the past. The relocation of the monument in Estonia served a function of reconciling with a particularly problematic moment in Estonian history and loss of independence. The monument could be considered just a symbol and its relocation could be seen as a sign of self-determination and dealing with the past.[22] With labels that suppress the role of the Estonian population in earlier conflicts and with goading language of division, the hackers showed, and attempted to sow, contempt for Estonian identity and its supporters. The usurpation of the message about the past is comparable to Pausanias, but in the contemporary example the response by the Estonian authorities was no simple erasure of the wrongful record. The control of history has become even more complex in cyberspace as the medium allows for nearly unhindered spread of messages, and may have a counterintuitive negative effect on the ability of communities to meet, discuss, and ideally bridge the differences in a reasonable manner with respect to the past.

Another similarity between the two stories can be found in the reaction of Sparta and Estonia as regards a problematic aspect of their respective histories. The Spartans opted to erase and rewrite the record in the form of inscription, not necessarily with an eye to changing history itself, but with the intent to reshape an offensive representation of it. The Estonians decided to relocate the monument which commemorates a problematic and contentious moment in its past, one which still provokes strong reactions from various actors in different media, as observed above. Thus after many millennia we still try to find the appropriate manner to understand, represent, and commemorate the past.

The hacking in Estonia demonstrates a new tool with which states can apply to exercise the same type of censorship, offering insight into the relationship between the use of botnets and the spread of requests originating from various allocations of internet protocols, thus obfuscating the exact origin of the operation and offering a veil of anonymity or at least non-attribution. It was a highly organised and coordinated operation.[23] It was

[22] Serhan (2020).

[23] Evron (2008) 123.

estimated that at least one million botnets were used in the digital bombardment on the Estonian servers, servicing a population of only 1.3 million people. This number of requests blocks or overwhelms the ability of the targeted site to respond and offer the requisite services, resulting in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). The DDoS attacks did not result in destruction of data or hardware, but rather shut down websites of various newspapers and media, limited access to various governmental websites, made unavailable the services of two large Estonian banks, and interrupted the online services of private and state entities.[24] The email system of the Estonian Parliament was inoperable for two days and the largest daily paper was down for some time. The economic damage was limited to approximately US $40 million but the message was sent that the Estonian cyber infrastructure was vulnerable.

The described operations in cyberspace may be novel, as they take place in a new medium. Further inspection, however, reveals that there are certain similarities with the past. The ability of the Russia-affiliated hackers to disrupt the cyber capabilities of Estonia could be compared, for example, in design, function, and effect to Demosthenes' trickery in Thucydides' account of his campaign in Idomene. As computers communicate by using a cyber 'language' to connect with each other, language in ancient Greece was used as medium of communication as well as a shorthand for what we currently regard as ethnicity.[25] One of the markers of ethnicity is common culture, which may be based on shared language. As linguistic ties imply the same ethnicity or cultural identification, it is not surprising that shared dialects would present a golden opportunity to infiltrate or 'hack' an enemy. Thus, Demosthenes in Thucydides (3.112.3–5; 4.3.3, 41.2) employs tactics of infiltration through common language that could be compared to the modern use of bots or hacked computers which try to overload the responding server with multiple access attempts. Demosthenes uses the Doric dialect to infiltrate unsuspecting Idomene in the middle of the night (3.112.1). He launches an attack on the Ambraciots in their sleep by placing Messenians, who speak the same dialect as their foes, in front of his army in order to gain the trust and fool the enemy. The following excerpt from Thucydides (3.112.3–5) illustrates the trickery applied by Demosthenes:

> At dawn he fell upon the Ambraciots while they were still abed, ignorant of what had passed, and fully thinking that it was their own countrymen—Demosthenes having purposely put the Messenians in front with orders to address them in the Doric dialect, and thus to inspire

[24] Haataja (2017) 161.

[25] See Hall (1997) 5: 'No other ancient people privileged language to such an extent in defining its own ethnicity'. Dialects seem to have been mutually intelligible (Morpurgo Davies (1987)), but ties among ethnic groups were normally closer than those to other Greeks (Anson (2009) 12–13). See also Whitehorne (2005) 39.

> confidence in the sentinels who would not be able to see them, as it was still night.

The language ruse that was implemented by Demosthenes resembles botnets' attempts to trick the servers they access into responding as if they are legitimate users, with the actual goal of overloading, hacking, and bringing down the system. Moreover, the botnets were unseen invaders much as the Messenians used the darkness of night not to reveal their true identity. In this manner, Demosthenes strategically implemented a well-coordinated ruse in order to infiltrate the enemy that prefigures modern efforts to do the same.

Demosthenes employs similar tactics on at least one more occasion, when he deploys the Messenians at Pylos with the purpose of infiltrating the Spartans since they speak the same dialect. Thucydides confirms the success of Demosthenes' calculation (4.41.2): 'The Messenians from Naupactus sent to their old country, to which Pylos formerly belonged, some of the most suitable of their number, and began a series of incursions into Laconia, which their common dialect rendered most destructive'. Similar effects could be observed in DDoS attacks, as the botnets aim to simulate on the surface a legitimate attempt to seek access to the attacked network. Once the infiltration or the overload of the system is achieved, the damage and disruption could be massive. In this manner, a similar disregard for the rules of engagement are achieved in modern times by the trickery of hacking as used by Demosthenes in the past. Both use what might be thought of as treachery, in the layman's mind, but in a time before such actions would be formally labeled as such.

Warfare has always spurred and fed on technological innovation (e.g., Thuc. 1.71.3, 122.1; 3.82.3), and in the case of Estonia, new developments in the conflict over narrative emerged in a place of increasing technological warfare capabilities. Estonia prides itself as a pioneer in digitalising many aspects of governmental and transaction services: 97% of all bank transactions are conducted online and more than 60% of the population uses the internet daily.[26] The disruptive attempt to interfere with this critical infrastructure could be interpreted as sending a message in a specific area in which Estonia felt that it had developed significant capabilities. The hijacked botnets were used as a ruse to trick the Estonian e-infrastructure into believing that real requests were generated to access its websites although in reality it was a campaign that was designed to result in DDoS. The political and ethnic tensions were transferred onto and through cyberspace in an attempt to undermine identity as well as security, repudiating the Estonian claim of having become a truly online society.[27]

[26] Ruus (2008)

[27] Evron (2008) 122

The technological progress forced by this 'war' went further. The cyber operation against Estonia also raised pressing questions as to the definition of cyber-attack, the role of NATO in responding to cyber operation against Members of the Alliance, and under what circumstances the digital intrusion could be similar in effect and damage to traditional means of warfare. The then Defence Minister of Estonia, Aaviksoo, compared the cyber assault to cutting off a state from the world by blockading all ports to the sea, an accepted *casus belli*.[28] The incident exposed structural vulnerabilities in cyber defence through the inability of the State to protect its citizens against the external attack. The US also reacted by declaring that the domination and structuring of the regulation of cyberspace would henceforth be crucial for dominating air, space, land, and sea, according to a special assistant to the US Air Force Chief of Staff.[29] It was crucial to construct a narrative of legal standards that could be applicable in similar situations in order to design and streamline a common framework of reaction to such cyber incidents.[30]

Sacred Places

Another aspect of warfare with continuity from the ancient world to the modern one, but also with some evolution, is the protection of certain treasured spaces, which also tend by nature to be loci of memory. Sacred places and localities were inviolable under the principle of *asylia* during armed conflicts in ancient Greece. The punishment for destruction of religious property was a sanction of divine vengeance, and this threat seems to have been nearly universally taken seriously. The distinction and immunity of places of worship were therefore generally observed and respected. For example, the temple of Zeus was spared during the sack of Syracuse by Athens in 414 BCE (Paus. 10.28.6). As the significance of temples was crucial for Ancient Greeks, the response to attacks on temples might be a declaration of sacred war, even though some sanctuaries such as Delphi also had secular purposes in preserving and enforcing treaties or arbitrating disputes. The role of the sanctuaries and the administration of dispute settlement has modern echoes, resembling, to some degree, the role of the UN Security Council as regards the determination whether the norms and rules of maintenance of peace and security have been upheld. Thus, it is not surprising that the sanction of destroying religious property was upheld even by entities outside of the Greek city-states such as the Macedonians. Priests and heralds were also immune from armed conflict and attacks, and, again, these rules were largely observed.

[28] Ruus (2008)

[29] Ruus (2008)

[30] Evron (2008) 126.

Today, international law imposes prohibitions; it is forbidden '(a) to commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; (b) to use such objects in support of the military effort; (c) to make such objects the object of reprisals'.[31] In comparison with prohibitions in the ancient world, modern law is more focused on cultural value rather than the objective 'sanctity' of the space that ancient Greece might have attributed to such places. The specific modern prohibition aims to preserve for present and future generations important sites which carry a particular religious or cultural value for the preservation and continuation of protected religious, ethnic, and cultural groups. Moreover, there is a separate international treaty for the protection of cultural property which provides that states 'undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the territory of other [states] by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict'.[32] In these regulations, we can see both continuity and change: like the Greeks, modern societies are concerned to preserve sites that are of particular cultural value. The motivation, however, has become increasingly oriented toward cultural and historical preservation for its own sake, rather than fear of divine retribution.

Nonetheless, the modern prohibition is not absolute, in contrast to Greek protection of holy sites, since the duty 'may be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver' (Article 4(2) Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property).[33] This waiver is based on imperative military necessity and may only be invoked 'to use cultural property for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage when and for as long as no choice is possible between such use of the cultural property and another feasible method for obtaining a similar military advantage'.[34] The militarisation of cultural and religious property is possible only in extremely limited circumstances, but, as in the case of cyberwar above, can leave the situation murky and open to subjective analysis.

Unlawful attacks on protected property carry criminal liability if intentionally directed against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science, or charitable purposes, as well as historic monuments, 'provided they are not military objectives' according to Article 8(2)(b)(ix) and (e)(iv) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. The criminal responsibility attempts to deter and punish perpetrators whose main aim is oftentimes the

[31] Additional Protocol I art 53.

[32] 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property art 4(1).

[33] Although Thucydides' Athenians represent the protection of religious sites as also flexible under duress (4.98), most readers do not find this argument persuasive.

[34] 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property art 6(b).

alteration of history or knowledge (in the case of educational objects) and erasure of artifacts and monuments which preserve identity and memory. In this manner, these violations of international law control and alter memories which are crucial for group identity in certain localities, especially among minority populations: these laws aim to protect not only individuals or places but also history. It is thus considered a war crime when the public historical record, in the form of religious or cultural sites, is attacked and 'rewritten' violently by means of forceful control of changing, altering, or destroying memories and protected monuments.

Bodies, Graves, and 'War Heroes'

The most painful reminder of a war is the actual bodies of the dead, which are often used, in both ancient and modern contexts, as tools to control remembrance. The scope of the regulation of warfare in this area has expanded greatly since the origin of modern warfare in the mid-nineteenth century, but there are still revealing parallels with the ancient world, showing both how war has changed and how it has remained the same. In more recent times, there has been a constant push for enlarging the protective scope of IHL: from only the military dead in the Geneva Convention of 1864 to the entire affected civilian population in 1949. The IHL has also managed to respond to new types of warfare that fall within its regulatory ambit, along with the extension of the protective regime related to victims in international or non-international armed conflicts.

The central focus on the victims as protected groups of individuals who suffer during armed conflict has resulted in a notable move away from the traditional narratives of 'war hero' stories, altering the way that conflict is preserved in both historiographic and popular memory. In this regard, modern war has made a significant shift from ancient war, and specifically in terms of the way that the narrative is preserved rather than the techniques or strategic goals of the conflict. While many of the developments discussed here have been quantitative rather than qualitative in nature—as discussed above, modern war maintains many of the same fundamental goals and taboos while pursuing and regulating them through novel means—, in this respect, war has changed. In the legal framework that is established by the Geneva Conventions, narratives that fit the 'war hero' type, as embodied in the popular imagination by figures such as Achilles, have become particularly suspect. Today, a 'war hero' would not be considered a belligerent who inflicts the most damage on the other side and defeats the enemy, as traditional stories might have it, but rather an officer who carefully follows the complex regulatory regime that the IHL requires, while many 'heroic' stories are seen as fomenting further conflict. Additionally, behaviour resulting in many victims, as 'war hero' stories often do, is now criminalised

and considered a violation of the IHL, something to be condemned rather than idealised.

As part of this attempt to control the engagement between fantastic war-hero stories and the behaviour of real human beings, courts today are charged with producing a kind of highly structured, legal 'historiography' recording what has occurred in a conflict, partly with the goal of controlling the development of false narratives or those that incite further conflict. Rather than allowing the kind of mythmaking that may emerge from the storytelling behaviour of groups of stressed individuals, courts have attempted to redirect the production of popular history into a highly formalised and factual arena, correcting errors and suppressing lies. Perpetrators, too, of course make extensive efforts to control the historical narrative today, as is discussed further below and by Pownall in the context of ancient Sicily, and thus there is often a push and pull between the legal system and those violating the law and their supporters. In the international proceedings producing such knowledge, the victims typically share their stories on the witness stand. With the creation of the first permanent International Criminal Court, victims have the opportunity not only to testify to the most serious violations of international criminal law, but also to ask for reparations for the damage incurred during the armed conflict from the most responsible perpetrators, based on the strength of their stories and evidence. The complex contemporary theatre of war involves increasing, and increasingly undefined, categories of group and individual participants, posing unprecedented challenges to peacekeepers, who have in recent years recognised the importance of both establishing true war narratives and eradicating false ones in order to appropriately reflect and influence the unfolding of real-life events. This can be particularly complicated because, rather than existing simply in oral narrative and stone inscriptions, the record of modern warfare typically consists of a convoluted web of stories represented in the media, internet, individual accounts, and literature, as well as the testimonies and evidence presented in international and domestic courts.

The legal framework, in its sheer promise to create documentation and potential deterrence, helps to control potentially criminal behaviour of soldiers and commanders, as well as offering a unique opportunity to delegitimise and 'steal the limelight' of the persons most responsible for the commission of war crimes. The categories of 'national heroes' or 'war heroes' that might have dominated narratives in the past are today considered misnomers, because with the widespread and easy exchange of information, evidence for the behaviour of the belligerents in war becomes easily accessible and widely reported. The stories that a society or individuals tell about action in war is thus more closely tied to potentially uncomfortable factual information than it might have been in an era with more limited information-sharing platforms. Military campaigns of the late-nineteenth–early-twentieth-century still generate heated debates as to the role and

behaviour of commanders in the theatre of engagement. One must not look further than the complicated engagement of European powers in their colonies in that period. The military played a crucial role in establishing colonial subjugation around the world, and ultimately, the top generals were instrumental in the war efforts. For example, the decorated general L. von Trotha commanded several military campaigns in intra-European conflicts such as the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars and colonial military suppressions of various rebellions such as the multi-national Boxer Rebellion and the Herero rebellion in Namibia. The extermination colonial campaigns perpetrated under the command responsibility of the decorated general have sparked a strong reaction that is continuing today, as societies challenge how the brutal acts are remembered,[35] similarly to the challenges of confederate memorials in the United States today. In the case of the von Trotha monument, the role of the once celebrated general is reconstructed and re-examined in order to capture what actually happened in brutal campaigns of mass extermination of civilians under his command. The narrative of what happened has been re-evaluated in different manners: from acts on local level—renaming a street in Munich dedicated to the general[36]—to official apologies by the German state for the extermination campaign,[37] to class-action lawsuits filed by the descendants of the victims for genocide reparations before US courts.[38] Similar trends are observed in various states around the world such as the recent debate on how to evaluate and respond to Belgium's King Leopold II's atrocious campaign in the Congo.[39] Through a careful and thorough evaluation of the evidence, the narrative becomes one of the anti-hero.

The work of the courts, albeit after the fact of the commission of the crimes, further insists on the establishment of factual truth. The 'war hero' who plunders and kills the enemy forces and civilians is not a hero in the eyes of the law. Strict sanctions are possible consequences, and humanity has witnessed cases where former Heads of State such as Milosevic or (former) Heads of Government such as Al Bashir of Sudan could be indicted for the perpetration of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The construction of narrative in war crimes trials is thus now structured around an adversarial process in which the defendant, witnesses, and victims create a complex nexus of stories in the form of testimonies. The role of these testimonies could be seen as the modern equivalent of oral story-telling, under strict legal restrictions, rules, and documentation.

[35] Hull (2005) 55–63 (for the extermination campaign against the Herero and Nama people).

[36] *EPV* (6 October 2006).

[37] Federal Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (14 August 2004).

[38] *The Guardian* (16 March 2017).

[39] Serhan (2020).

The traditional 'war hero' designation, a narrative type originating before the formal development of the idea of war crimes, often refers to one who commits crimes intentionally or has the knowledge of such commissions or has superior command responsibility for his or her forces. This 'anti-hero' is ultimately responsible for the violations of international law but attempts to construct a factually misleading narrative that obfuscates what actually happened or even eliminates references that may be used as evidence of his actual behaviour. The court system of constructing historiography and the commander today exert a kind of mutual pressure on one another, with historical knowledge and narrative again central. The 'anti-hero' or 'non-hero' war criminal today, knowledgeable about potential legal ramifications of his actions, typically does not attempt to glorify his activities publicly, as such narratives could be used against him in the court of law as evidence. Such glorification of misdeeds might indeed exist, but exclusively within very private circles of officials who aided, conspired or co-perpetrated the crimes. For example, military and police commanders in Yugoslavia at the end of the 1990s attempted to alter the historical record by digging up the graves of their victims and transporting the remains hundreds of kilometres away from the crime scenes, purely to remove evidence of the commission of the crimes. Hiding the dead in order to obscure the historical record has indeed become a hallmark of modern conflicts, and can be seen in instances as distant as the Irish Troubles to the 'Disappeared' of Latin America. The defeated enemy and the slaughtered civilians would not be left in peace as the simple principle that guides the 'non-hero' is based on the concept of concealment and attempt to evade criminal liability: 'no body in evidence, no case to answer'. In this manner, actions that might have been trumpeted as heroic in previous generations become non-heroism, a closely-knit secret to navigate a complex framework of criminal law by removing the evidence from the crime scene or the theatre of war. What factually happened is internalised in a close group of officials, a criminal design of officials, who share the responsibility for the crimes while retaining some internal, accurate knowledge of the acts. Pressure is thus exerted on inside witnesses not to break the secret or disclose the mode of the elimination of evidence. In a sense, the pattern of obfuscation resembles fragmentary mosaics that seem randomly placed over the actual events, in which pieces are held together by the fabricated narrative of non-truth, i.e., by not disclosing the truth about what actually happened and what responsibilities the act may or should entail.

The concealment of bodies and prevention of judicial proceedings in terms of identifying the perpetrators and the victims reaches unprecedented levels in some conflicts. It is categorical that despoiling the dead 'is and always has been a crime'.[40] The mutilation of dead bodies is also strictly

[40] *United States v. Pohl et al., Case No. 4* (Opinion and Judgment and Sentence, Green Series) Mil. Trib. No. 21947-11-03 [235].

prohibited as the act is a war crime of committing outrages upon personal dignity.[41] The graves of the dead must also be respected and properly maintained, and States are encouraged to maintain grave sites permanently.[42] In one particular example, in order to ensure that no investigation could take place against perpetrators who may be law-enforcement authorities, clandestine re-burial operations were often implemented under the coordination and guidance of the authorities responsible for the investigation of the crimes committed against the victims in the Kosovo conflict in 1999. The transportation of the remains of the deceased and their subsequent re-burial or attempt to submerge them in rivers and lakes are in 'complete defiance of the operative law … and … in grave dereliction of … duties and responsibilities' of the investigating and law enforcement authorities.[43] Such highly clandestine operations resulting in outrageous burial in mass unidentified graves and the destruction of the vehicles used for the transportation of the deceased from the crime scenes were coordinated with the sole purpose of 'clearing the terrain' of the evidence of the crimes committed during armed conflicts against civilian population,[44] and indicate the significance attached to 'controlling the narrative' on the perpetrators' side.

The intentional tampering with evidence in hiding the bodies of the deceased in order to prevent their subsequent acknowledgement in the process of establishing the legal 'historiography' of a war in criminal trials is a disturbing deviation from a long-established regime of treatment of the dead in armed conflicts since ancient times. One of the most significant characteristics of the regulation of armed conflict in ancient Greece was the retrieval of the dead from the theatre of war. Although the victor of a battle was entitled to the spoils such as the armour from the body of the defeated enemy, the treatment of the dead body was to be respectful and dignified. The treatment of the dead was indeed a quintessential part of 'Hellenism and Panhellenic morality itself'.[45] The commanders of the armed forces engaged in the armed conflict were obligated to recover the remains of the belligerents fallen in battle. Truces were also made between the belligerent parties in order to bury the dead.[46] The earliest and perhaps most memorable illustration of the outrage caused by mistreatment of human remains can be found in the reaction to Achilles' desecration of Hector's body (*Il.* 22.472–5, trans. Fagles): 'And a thick cloud of dust rose up | from the man they dragged, his dark hair swirling round | that head so handsome

[41] ICC Statute art 8(2)(b)(xxi).

[42] Additional Protocol I art 34(2).

[43] *Prosecutor v Djordjevic* (2011) ICTY Case No IT-05-87/1-T [1973].

[44] *Prosecutor v Djordjevic* (2011) ICTY Case No IT-05-87/1-T [1980].

[45] Lateiner (1977) 97, 99.

[46] Bederman (2004) 259.

once, all tumbled low in the dust— | since Zeus had given him over to his enemies now to be defiled in the land of his own fathers'. Even the gods of the *Iliad*, hardly humanitarians, object (*Il.* 24.104–7).[47]

Into the historical period, the proper treatment of war dead remained a central value. One example is Herodotus' account of the aftermath of the Greek victory over the Persians at the battle of Plataea in 479 BCE (9.85), and especially the Spartan care with their dead. The latter applied three distinct burial practices: the young men between the age of twenty and thirty, known as irens, were buried separately from the rest of the fallen Spartans. Interestingly, a third burial site was reserved for the helots, the Spartans' slaves. In contrast, the Athenians and the Tegeans did not differentiate between the fallen and buried all bodies together. Falsification of the historical record occurred here, too, albeit in the opposite manner as is discussed above: later, other cities constructed fake tombs at Plataea to suggest that they, too, had taken part in the heroic battle (Hdt. 9.85.3). The real tombs maintain their emotional and political significance for a generation, as recorded by Thucydides. This historian records the Plataean plea during the Peloponnesian War: 'Look at the tombs of your fathers, slain by the Persians and buried in our country, whom year by year we honoured with garments and all other dues, and the first fruits of all that our land produced in their season, as friends from a friendly country and allies to our old companions in arms!' (Thuc. 3.58.4–5). Although the plea is unsuccessful, it can hardly fail to move the reader.[48]

Tampering with remains in order to alter the historical record went beyond the production of sham tombs, as can be seen in another passage from Thucydides (5.64.1, 74.2) dealing with the Battle of Mantinea, although again in this case the treatment of the dead involved respect and proper burial, unlike in the modern parallels. After the battle in 418 BCE, the Spartans removed their own dead and carried them to Tegea, where they buried them. Tegea is a traditional ally of Sparta at a considerable distance from the battlefield on which the dead lay, but, as Low has demonstrated, this apparently strange action can be explained in that the burial at Tegea of Spartan remains can be read as both a claim and a commitment by the Spartans that they intend to maintain their ties to the place.[49]

The strength of the taboo against mistreatment of corpses can be seen in the rare circumstances in which they are not treated with respect. Removal of bodies is, for example, the most extreme form of civic punishment for traitors. Isocrates relates the story of the Athenian tyrants' hatred of the Alcmeonidae, which was so potent that they had their tombs dug up (16.26). On another occasion, Thucydides describes the treatment of the Cylonian

[47] Such a treatment caused an uproar of indignation as an example of grave violation of the customs of war: see, e.g., Bederman (2004) 258.

[48] See, e.g., Macleod (1977) 236; Low (2006) 98.

[49] Low (2006).

conspirators and their families: 'the living were driven out, and the bones of the dead were taken up; thus they were cast out' (1.126.12). Similarly, Athenians were horrified when a storm prevented the collection of the dead after the naval battle at Arginusae in 406 BCE. The fact that those generals who did not flee were sentenced to death over this failure, despite the mitigating circumstances, suggests the power of the prohibition against neglect or mistreatment of corpses. The 17-day delay in returning corpses at Delium is presented as a similarly appalling violation in Thucydides (4.97–101).

Although modern combatants do not seem to feel equally strongly about proper treatment of remains, legally, just as was the case in ancient Greece, all possible measures must be taken to search for, collect, and evacuate the dead per Article 15(1) of the First Geneva Convention. The obligation extends to the search and collection of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked along with the dead. Both sides of the conflict must take all possible measures to search for and collect the dead. The duty is applicable to the remains of the dead without adverse distinction—namely, without differentiating whether the dead are belligerents or civilians. The international community at the UN General Assembly level has reminded parties to armed conflicts, regardless of their character, 'to take such action as may be within their power … to facilitate the disinterment and the return of remains, if requested by their families'.[50]

Facilitation of return of the remains of the deceased to the party of which they belong or to their kin is also provided for in international law. There is a general obligation to return the remains as laid down in Art 130(2) of the Geneva Convention IV.[51] State practices also indicate that the return of remains is an established principle of international law as observed in the exchange of mortal remains between Israel and Egypt in 1975–76. Various military manuals also provide guidance as to the process of returning remains to the opposing party. Additionally, some states follow the duty to collect and return personal items/effects of the dead such as last wills, documents of importance to the next of kin, objects of sentimental value, and money.[52] Such regulations exist in order to facilitate the preservation of the memory and dignity of the dead.

[50] UN General Assembly, 'Assistance and co-operation in accounting for persons who are missing or dead in armed conflicts' A/Res/3220 (XXIX).

[51] The graves of the dead must also be respected and properly maintained, and States are encouraged to maintain grave sites permanently (see Additional Protocol I art 34(2)). The Geneva Conventions specify that the dead must be buried, if reasonable and possible, according to the rites of their religion. Collective graves could be used in exceptional circumstances and graves should be grouped by nationality if possible.

[52] See the military manuals of Argentina, France, Hungary, Israel, Netherlands, Nigeria, Spain, United Kingdom, United States.

Conclusion

The regulation of warfare in ancient Greek city-states and contemporary times seemingly differs, as societies, technologies, and means and methods of warfare inherently change. As seen above, however, there are strong reminiscences of the regulatory framework from ancient Greece, often in the form of taboos, that could be still found in the contemporary regulatory regime of warfare. The purpose of this chapter was not to prove the degree of legal regulation in the ancient world but to selectively compare various areas of the complex regime of war and how such areas affect the historiography of the development of the law and narratives of use of force and armed conflicts. In this manner, it was established that some areas of modern warfare are more complex and restrictive, such as the applicability of a detailed set of rules and norms in armed conflicts. Simultaneously, we are witnessing other rapid developments in cyberspace activities which provoke a great detail of re-evaluation of the applicable legal framework. What is striking is that analogies or metaphors from the narratives of the past could clarify how modern technology functions. In this manner, we understand how complex digital operations can be compared to known narratives from the past, a process that ultimately helps us in regulating such novel activities. A comparative analysis of ancient and modern war can thus show us constant features of war even while it changes and develops: many of the fundamental strategies and goals remain precisely the same, even if they have migrated to the internet or metamorphosed so as to reflect other artifacts of modernity.

Nonetheless, one key difference is the way that the historiography of war is handled: in ancient times, control of the story was unregulated and open to dramatic 're-writing', as is discussed, for example, by Pownall in this volume. While similar attempts to control historical narrative occur today, especially online, international bodies such as the ICTY and ICC attempt to carefully control any development of 'war hero' stories and to establish, through the court system, accurate accounts of what occurred and especially of any wrongdoing. The narrative of describing and evaluating the warfare reflects this change: the current language of the law of armed conflict seems more technical, codified, and rich in tests and principles, while ancient definitions are rooted in shared understanding and the customary source of their binding force. The historiography of warfare has thus become more formal, with higher stakes, as we attempt through modern legal means to control humans' ancient impulse to make war on each other.

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