INTERTEXTUALITY AND *EXEMPLA**

Author's Note: I have included my paper from the APA Seminar here, although most of the material covered here can now be found in my 'The "Rhetoric" of History: Intertextuality, and Exemplarity in Historiographical Speeches', in D. Pausch, ed., *Stimmen der Geschichte: Funktionen von Reden in der antiken Historigraphie* (Berlin and New York 2010) 259–89. As this article is part of a larger project on allusion and intertextuality in historiography, I would nevertheless be grateful for any comments from readers.

I

The last few decades in particular have seen a full flowering in the study of allusion and intertextuality in classical texts.[1] This has been especially true of studies of Latin literature, where the Romans, because of their generic self-consciousness have provided excellent models to study.[2] As scholars have pointed out, the study of allusion was already much practised in the ancient world, and ancient literary criticism is full of remarks comparing how later authors refer to and modify their predecessors. In addition, it is clear that authors saw themselves as working within a tradition, and that the tradition had endorsed certain models who had attained to the status of canonical authors; later writers were expected to compete, and saw themselves as competing, with their great predecessors. They imitated these past masters by borrowing, modifying, alluding and so forth.[3] The author of *On the Sublime*, for example, tells those who are writing history and wish to attain sublimity in their writing to use as their guide how Thucydides would have done it.[4] By this it is clear that he does not mean that one should simply take over

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* Xenophon and Sallust are cited from their respective OCTs; translations of Xenophon are modified from those I made in R. B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Xenophon's* Hellenica (New York 2009); those of Sallust are taken from A. J. Woodman's Penguin translation of 2007.

[1] A comprehensive bibliography would serve little purpose; for the major works see Levene 2010, 82 n. 2; I have found the following helpful: O'Gorman 2007, Hinds 1998, O'Gorman 2009, Damon 2010 and (especially) Levene 2010, 82–163.

[2] Levene 2010, 82 speaks of the 'the particular self-consciousness with which many Roman writers approached their relationship to their predecessors, and the consequent density of allusions to be discovered in many Latin texts'.

[3] Russell 1979; for historiography see Marincola 1997, *passim*.

[4] [Long.] *Subl.* 14.1: οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡνίκ' ἂν διαπονῶμεν ὑψηγορίας τι καὶ μεγαλοφρο-σύνης δεόμενον, καλὸν ἀναπλάττεσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς πῶς ἂν εἰ τύχοι ταὐτὸ τοῦθ' Ὅμηρος εἶ-πεν, πῶς δ' ἂν Πλάτων ἢ Δημοσθένης ὕψωσαν ἢ ἐν ἱστορίᾳ Θουκυδίδης.

what Thucydides has written wholesale: that is unimaginative imitation, not emulation. Lucian has derisive words for those historians who blindly imitated earlier historians, taking whole episodes from them and transplanting such episodes to their own works. His attack on Crepereius Calpurnianus (*hist. conscr.* 15) shows exactly the kind of mindless copying that was *not* considered appropriate imitation. In creating something new, you were not to expropriate another's words and ideas but to creatively re-imagine them, re-contextualise them, and make them your own.[5]

Now the fact that such an environment surrounded the production of literary works in antiquity makes it a natural area in which to study allusion: with such a conscious looking-back at past models, it was inevitable that historians would try to bring something of their predecessors into their history. Yet this somewhat 'personal' (as it were) approach to authors' relationships with one another has been brought into question by those who have championed the notion of 'intertextuality'. This more recent term is clearly dealing with the same phenomenon (or at least some elements of the same phenomenon), but whereas allusion thinks primarily in terms of individuals – an author intentionally calling to mind another author – intertextuality sees such relationships between texts as functions of discourse, readers, and texts in general. Intertextual studies do not necessarily concern themselves with the intentions of individual authors, since intertextuality is an inescapable aspect of all literary discourse, not tied to a particular individual or individual text. Intertextuality considers echoes and traces of earlier texts as inevitable in any system of language and especially, we might say, in highly formal and stylised genres such as historiography. Even if an author were not intending to echo Thucydides in his work, he would be creating his history in a system on which Thucydides had had the most profound influence, and he thus could not write as if that genre did not exist, especially since to write 'outside' of the genre would run the risk of incomprehensibility.

In the debate over allusion and intertextuality, I am most in agreement with the approach taken by Stephen Hinds, who believes that we need both concepts, and that both assist us in the interpretation of texts.[6] On the one hand he is against what he calls philological fundamentalism, the belief that only a very exact lexical match (verbatim or nearly verbatim) can be used to argue for the existence of allusion. Very often there is no exact match in the language, but the situation, the background, and the context are all the same. On the other hand, Hinds is opposed to what he calls intertextualist fundamentalism as well, the belief that one can simply edit out the author

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[5] Russell 1979, 5: 'the *imitator* must always penetrate below the superficial, verbal features of his exemplar to its spirit and significance.'

[6] Hinds 1998.

altogether. This leaves Hinds with a certain amount of inexactitude, but he argues that such a situation is inescapable, since literary criticism cannot be reduced to fixed rules or single meanings; just as importantly, allusions must be invitations to interpret, not the end of interpretation.[7]

To revert to historiography, then, when we notice, as we must, that quite a number of historians have a prefatory account that serves as background to the main subject of their histories,[8] we must consider that they are employing a kind of 'archaeology' as Thucydides first did. In one sense, their practice cannot be understood without some consideration of Thucydides (the genre being in important ways his); at the same time, individual historians will negotiate this relationship using different approaches, some more explicitly invoking Thucydides or Thucydidean concerns, others less so.

Studies of and commentaries on historical authors have for some time now taken all these matters into account. More recently, however, scholars have examined to what extent the analyses of allusion and intertextuality, which were developed for and originally employed in non-historical and indeed non-prose texts, need to be modified or differently focussed when talking about historical texts.[9] Do we need a different approach to the issues of allusion and intertextuality when we are considering texts that claim (or that we think claim) to have some relationship to the real world of history? It seems common sense, after all, to say that when Virgil alludes to Homer, it does not much matter whether Homer or Virgil or both of them are talking about a real world outside: Virgil's Aeneas is a creation largely of Virgil, and there is no doubt that the poets felt free to modify pretty much any aspect (except the most basic) of their characters. It would seem to be a different matter altogether, however, if an historian claims that a plague occurred, even if he does not do it with the clumsiness and lack of imagination of Crepereius Calpurnianus. If history does not deal with 'invented' events, what does it mean when an author alludes to a predecessor, either a prose or poetic one?

One obvious way to answer this question is to say that in fact there was no serious difference between historians and poets, and that the writing of history in antiquity was a thoroughly rhetorical task, with minimal attention paid to research and/or inquiry, and maximum attention paid to the literary side of things. In that case, the allusive or intertextual techniques of histori-

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[7] Hinds 1998, 50 speaks of 'a "fuzzy logic" of allusive interpretability'.

[8] See, e.g., Polybius' first two books (his προκατασκευή, 1.3.10); Sall. *Cat.* 5.9–13.5; Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.1–1.11.8 with Stadter 1981.

[9] Cf. especially O'Gorman 2007 and 2009, 233–40, Damon 2010, and Levene 2010, 84–86.

ography need no special theoretic of their own, and they can be subsumed within the larger method of analysis that is applied to any and all written texts, poetic and prose. That historians in antiquity were first and foremost literary artists has been maintained by several scholars, and they have marshalled impressive arguments to suggest that this is so.[10] In many ways, of course, I would not question this: it is perfectly true, of course, that an historical text, whatever its level of adornment, is a rhetorical product since it is a series of words strung together in narrative form. Rhetoric, however, explains only one part of the historiographical process, and says nothing about the other, namely, the amount and type of research that an historian has put into his narrative.[11] If we are going to maintain that research was of no or little concern to the ancients, we are going to have to dismiss quite a large number of statements that they make throughout their works; and not just Polybius' remarks will need to be discounted but even many of Diodorus' and Dionysius' remarks where they fault their predecessors for getting the details wrong. To argue that an event occurred in *this* way and not *that* way is to suggest first that there was a particular way that it happened, and second that one can recover what that way was.[12]

Whether or not we need a different or particular methodology for the study of intertextuality in historiography, we must certainly be aware that different issues are in play. It is crucial to remember that the past played a fundamental role in Greece and Rome: as traditional societies they felt themselves closely connected to the past and were often motivated by their past: who they were (or thought they were) was in large measure directed and determined by who they had been (or thought they had been). While it is true that the ancient approach to the past had a certain 'timelessness' about it, and ancient historians often betray what Peter Wiseman has called 'unhistorical thinking', since they regularly envisioned the past as similar to if not the same as the present,[13] we must nevertheless realise that the collapsing of past and present was not only – indeed not primarily – a feature of ancient historiography, but was fundamental to the actual societies of Greece and Rome. It was not that one 'influenced' the other; it was, rather, that they flowed from the same source.[14]

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[10] Fundamental here are Wiseman 1979 and Woodman 1988.

[11] Momigliano 1981; cf. Pitcher 2009, 18–22.

[12] I am of course simplifying here a much more complex issue, to which I intend to return in a future study.

[13] Wiseman 1979, 41–53.

[14] Marincola 2009, 16–22; cf. Damon 2010, 385 who speaks of an 'additional layer of interpretability here peculiar to historiographical texts'.

A whole host of practices and discourses confirm that this is so. Consider, for example, the Athenian funeral oration, which, as Nicole Loraux showed long ago, constructed a timeless and unchanging Athens in which the present inhabitants of Attica, those who were listening to the speeches, thought of themselves and were portrayed as no different from those who had lived hundreds of years before.[15] Consider as well a Roman funeral where various generations were present simultaneously on the rostra, a kind of visual embodiment of the collapsing of time and a vivid image of the simultaneity of past and present.[16] One can see it as well in the Roman concern with *mos maiorum*: here the past and the force of precedent were of the greatest importance in making political decisions.[17]

Certain important points follow from these phenomena. There was in antiquity a certain 'intertextuality' of real life. Members of the élite, always conscious of their status, often modelled themselves on predecessors real or imagined. Alexander the Great, perhaps most famously, imagined himself a latter-day Achilles or Dionysus; Pompey and Caesar, in their turn, thought constantly of Alexander and his achievements. This means that sometimes the literary echoes in a historian will have arisen from the fact that his subject was actually seeking to call up previous historical actors: the 'intertextuality' here was the doer's not the writer's (or at least not wholly the writer's). While allusion is certainly at work in the historians, intertextuality might be a more useful way of thinking about historiographical texts, because the intertext might not necessarily arise from a specific author, but rather from a more general knowledge of historical events.[18] Moreover, as Ellen O'Gorman has shown, intertextual moments in historiography have the effect of collapsing time, of joining past and present.[19] Again, this is not surprising, given the pervasiveness of the past in Greece and Rome; indeed one might argue that this kind of collapsing, far from being a problem for the ancients, actually enhanced the believability of the events being narrated, because it fit those actions into a discernible and familiar pattern.[20]

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[15] Loraux 1981.

[16] On the Roman funeral, see Walter 2004, 89–108.

[17] *Mos maiorum* was, in a very real sense, the sum of previous Roman *exempla*: Hölkeskamp 1996; cf. Walter 2004, 55.

[18] This is especially well brought out by Damon 2010, who distinguishes between allusions made via explicit verbal links and those 'made directly to the historical past, in which there is no (known) textual "window" through which events are seen' (383).

[19] O'Gorman 2007.

[20] Gentili and Cerra 1975, 19–45; Shrimpton 1997, 114–5; Marincola 2009, 21.

II

With these considerations, I want to turn to one particular kind of intertextual moment, the use of historical *exempla* in speeches. As has long been recognised, παραδείγματα or *exempla* are as old as Greek literature itself, already found in Phoenix's address to Achilles (where he mentions Meleager) or to Achilles' own speech to Priam (where he mentions Niobe).[21] In each case there is a hearkening back to the past as justification for a particular course of action. When prose histories began to be written in the fifth century, the use of historical *exempla* was already a part of them. There are several places in Herodotus where characters recall previous historical incidents as a way of forming judgements about the future or of persuading their addressees to adopt a particular course of action, perhaps the best known being the speech of So(si)cles of Corinth, who tells the story of the tyrants Cypselus and Periander as a way of encouraging the Spartans not to install tyranny at Athens.[22] In Thucydides, by contrast, the characters in his work tend not to use historical *exempla* very often, preferring instead to argue from universally held principles.[23] In the fourth century, the use of *exempla* was continued and extended, and several developments were responsible for this, not least the full flowering of the systematic study of rhetoric, with its precepts, guidelines, structures and codifications. What had before been most likely an ad hoc use of *exempla* now came to be formalised, and as more and more writers employed these, a tradition was built up which reinforced their use.[24]

The historical *exemplum* is quite common in oratory and not limited to one particular type of speech, though it is most often found in deliberative and epideictic oratory. Ancient orators themselves indicated that they wished their audience to use the events of the past as a guide for making decisions in the present about the future, in a sense proceeding from the known to the unknown.[25] Their remarks have a close relationship with the

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[21] See *Il.* 9.529–605; 24.602–20; already in Book I Nestor used himself as an *exemplum*: 1.260–73.

[22] Solon invokes Tellus and Cleobis and Biton as *exempla*: Hdt. 1.30–31; Croesus uses himself as an *exemplum*: 1.207; Soclees on Corinthian tyranny: 5.92–93.

[23] Typical is Pericles' tactic in the Funeral Oration not to rehearse the deeds of the Athenians' ancestors, but instead to concentrate on the here and now (2.36); but cf. Hermocrates' mention (7.21) of the Athenians as an *exemplum*, and the Plataeans' citation of the *exemplum* of their loyalty and bravery: 3.54, 58 (but cf. below, n. 44).

[24] I discuss the fourth-century origins and development of exemplarity in a forthcoming study.

[25] See, e.g., Lys. 25.23: χρὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοῖς πρότερον γεγενημένοις παραδείγμασι χρωμένους βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι; Isoc. *Demon.* 34: βουλευόμενος παραδείγματα ποιοῦ τὰ παρεληλυθότα τῶν μελλόντων· τὸ γὰρ ἀφανὲς ἐκ τοῦ

kinds of claims made about history in general: the belief that the future will be much like the past is not absurd, especially in a traditional society, and it is, after all, what Thucydides suggests will be part of the value of his history (1.22.4). When the Romans took over from the Greeks the systematic study of rhetoric, they took as well the importance of *exempla*, and, if anything, used historical *exempla* even more.[26]

Past studies of *exempla* in oratory have often emphasised their sameness, their lifelessness and their historical inaccuracy.[27] There is, however, another way of viewing them. First, when a speaker brings forward an *exemplum*, he is, in a very important sense, interpreting a historical event as *meaning* something: if he invokes Marathon, for example, he is implicitly saying to his audience 'this is what Marathon taught us and it is relevant in the present circumstances'. Whether or not he is correct or indeed whether he is using the *exemplum* in a straightforward or devious way is immaterial; what is important is that he is *interpreting* historical events for his audience. It seems to me that this is what Isocrates is getting at in his well known remark at the beginning of the *Panegyricus* that what happened in the past is available to all, but it is the mark of a wise person to use these events at an appropriate time, conceive fitting arguments about each of them, and set them out in good style.[28] 'Appropriate' here means that one understands history properly and uses an *exemplum* where it rightly belongs, and of course how a speaker uses an *exemplum* will depend on his interpretation of the event and its importance.

Isocrates assumes here that the past, far from being dead or univocal, was a living thing, capable of being examined and used from a variety of viewpoints, and not limited in its meaning or applicability, and this brings me to my second point. Scholars often observe the repeated use of the same *exempla* and consider that they are, in some sense, dead issues, but although it is true that certain examples might be used again and again to make a particular point, the interpretation of each *exemplum* was not carved in stone: as pieces of argumentation and proof, *exempla* were subject to examination

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φανεροῦ ταχίστην ἔχει τὴν διάγνωσιν; Andoc. *de Pace* 32: τὰ γὰρ παραδείγματα τὰ γεγενημένα τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἱκανὰ τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὥστε μηκέτι ἁμαρτάνειν.

[26] Cic. *Rhet. Herenn.* 3.5.9; cf. Quint. 3.8.66: *usum exemplorum nulli materiae magis convenire merito fere omnes consentiunt, cum plerumque videantur respondere futura praeteritis habeaturque experimentum velut quoddam rationis testimonium.* On the wide range of Roman *exempla* see Morgan 2007, 122–52.

[27] See, e.g., Pearson 1941, Perlman 1961, Loraux 1981, and Pownall 2004.

[28] Isoc. *Paneg.* 9: αἱ μὲν γὰρ πράξεις αἱ προγεγενημέναι κοιναὶ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν κατελείφθησαν, τὸ δ' ἐν καιρῷ ταύταις καταχρήσασθαι καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα περὶ ἑκάστης ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὖ διαθέσθαι τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἴδιόν ἐστιν.

and challenge, and they could be accepted, emended, or discarded. The recourse by scholars to labelling the use of historical *exempla* as inaccurate or as a 'deformation' (quite apart from its questionable assumptions about historiography) assumes a wholly passive audience. It presumes that the Greek or Roman audience was completely or largely unaware of what orators were doing, or that the listeners were ignorant of conventions that they heard almost every day of their lives. Indeed, when Cicero says, for example, that it is conceded to speakers to lie in their historical *exempla* so that they may make their point more pointedly,[29] an obvious question to ask is 'conceded by whom?' The answer must be the audience.

When an orator giving, let us say, a deliberative speech in the real world used historical *exempla*, he was trying to persuade his audience to take a particular action based on the way that he himself understood history: he could not have known, of course, whether or not his advice would turn out to be correct. In a history, by comparison, at least some part of how things turned out was already known to the historian and his audience, and this allowed the historian to exploit such knowledge by allowing his readers to watch the debate unfold and analyse the deployment by the speakers of various *exempla* and reflect upon which were accurate, which significant, which appropriate. Jane Chaplin has explored this dynamic in detail in her book on *exempla* in Livy.[30] In such a scenario we have a three-fold relationship: there is the speaker in the history producing the *exempla* for his audience; there is the contemporary audience's reaction to his deployment of those *exempla*; and there is the later reader of the history simultaneously analysing both. Thus when a historian recreates a debate in his history or shows a speaker referring to incidents from the past, he is examining, analysing, at times indeed questioning the purpose and value of history itself. Does it teach? How and what does it teach? Can people learn from it? Does the speaker properly understand the historical event he is citing? Do the people whom he is addressing really understand it?

In what follows I will take two works, Xenophon's *Hellenica* and Sallust's *Catiline*, and show how I think the *exempla* in speeches form a useful nexus for the study of some aspects of intertextuality in historians. For the former I will look at three sets of speeches towards the end of the work, for the latter a single debate in the senate. My goal is not to offer a large number of new insights into the intertextual nature of these works; rather, I want to use these particular examples to show what I think are some of the important aspects in any discussion of historiographical intertextuality.

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[29] Cic. *Brut.* 42: *concessum est rhetoribus ementiri in historiis, ut aliquid dicere possint argutius..*

[30] Chaplin 2000, *passim.*

III

Let us begin, then, with the *Hellenica*. There are three major narrative moments in Books VI and VII, where Xenophon portrays at crucial junctions several speakers bringing forward different historical *exempla*. The first incident is from 371, a trio of speeches by the Athenians to the Spartans. The Athenians have decided to withdraw from their alliance with Thebes because of the Thebans' treatment of the people of Plataea and Thespiae, and they now wish to sue for peace at Sparta. The first speaker, Callias the Torchbearer, uses (perhaps appropriately for a priest) an *exemplum* that has religious connotations (6.3.5–6):

> καὶ σωφρώνων μὲν δήπου ἐστὶ μηδὲ εἰ μικρὰ τὰ διαφέροντα εἴη πόλεμον
> ἀναιρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁμογνωμονοῖμεν, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τῶν θαυμαστῶν εἴη
> μὴ εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι; δίκαιον μὲν οὖν ἦν μηδὲ ὅπλα ἐπιφέρειν ἀλλήλοις
> ἡμᾶς, ἐπεὶ λέγεται μὲν Τριπτόλεμος ὁ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος τὰ Δήμητρος καὶ
> Κόρης ἄρρητα ἱερὰ πρώτοις ξένοις δεῖξαι Ἡρακλεῖ τε τῷ ὑμετέρῳ
> ἀρχηγέτῃ καὶ Διοσκούροιν τοῖν ὑμετέροιν πολίταιν, καὶ τοῦ Δήμητρος δὲ
> καρποῦ εἰς πρώτην τὴν Πελοπόννησον σπέρμα δωρήσασθαι. πῶς οὖν
> δίκαιον ἢ ὑμᾶς, παρ᾽ ὧν ἐλάβετε σπέρματα, τὸν τούτων ποτὲ καρπὸν ἐλθεῖν
> δῃώσοντας, ἡμᾶς τε, οἷς ἐδώκαμεν, μὴ οὐχὶ βούλεσθαι ὡς πλείστην τούτοις
> ἀφθονίαν τροφῆς γενέσθαι; εἰ δὲ ἄρα ἐκ θεῶν πεπρωμένον ἐστὶ πολέμους ἐν
> ἀνθρώποις γίγνεσθαι, ἡμᾶς δὲ χρὴ ἄρχεσθαι μὲν αὐτοῦ ὡς σχολαίτατα, ὅταν
> δὲ γένηται, καταλύεσθαι ᾗ δυνατὸν τάχιστα.

Surely wise men do not start a war if the differences between them are only slight: so then, if in fact we are in agreement, would it not be astounding if we failed to make peace? Indeed, it would been right not even to have begun a war against each other, since it is said that the first foreigners to whom Triptolemus, our ancestor, revealed the secret rights of Demeter and Kore, were Heracles, your founder, and the Dioscuri, your citizens; and he first gave the seeds of the fruit of Demeter to the Peloponnese. How, then, is it right for you ever to go and destroy the fruit of those men from whom you took the seeds, and for us not to wish that those to whom we gave the seeds have the most abundant crops possible? If the gods have made it a part of men's lot that there be wars, it is nevertheless right for us to begin them as reluctantly as possible, and to end them as quickly as we can.

Christopher Tuplin has shown several aspects of Callias' story cannot be paralleled from elsewhere,[31] and Callias, it must be said, does not do much with it: he draws a rather frigid antithesis and a fairly banal conclusion; Xenophon does not describe the audience reaction, but there is no reason to think that Callias has made much headway.

After Callias, Autocles, who is described as a 'particularly vehement speaker' (6.3.7: ἐπιστρεφὴς...ῥήτωρ), attacks the Spartans wholesale, calling to mind both general and specific examples (6.3.7–9):

> ὑμεῖς δὲ ἀεὶ μέν φατε· αυτονόμους τὰς πόλεις χρὴ εἶναι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐστὲ μάλιστα ἐμποδὼν τῇ αὐτονομίᾳ. συντίθεσθε μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰς συμμαχίδας πόλεις τοῦτο πρῶτον, ἀκολουθεῖν ὅποι ἂν ὑμεῖς ἡγῆσθε· καίτοι τί τοῦτο αὐτονομίᾳ προσήκει; ... καὶ ὅτε μὲν βασιλεὺς προσέταττεν αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις εἶναι, μάλα γιγνώσκοντες ἐφαίνεσθε ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἐάσοιεν οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν τε ἑαυτῆς καὶ οἷς ἂν βούληται νόμοις χρῆσθαι, οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὰ βασιλέως γράμματα· ἐπεὶ δὲ παρελάβετε τὴν Καδμείαν, οὐδ' αὐτοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐπετρέπετε αὐτονόμους εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μέλλοντας φίλους ἔσεσθαι οὐ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἀξιοῦν τῶν δικαίων τυγχάνειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ ὅπως ἂν πλεῖστα δύνωνται πλεονεκτοῦντας φαίνεσθαι.

> Now you always say that the cities must be autonomous, but you yourselves stand most in the way of this autonomy. For you stipulate first that the allied cities must follow you wherever you lead them – and yet how is this consistent with autonomy? … When the King ordered that the cities be autonomous, you were manifestly very much of the opinion that if the Thebans did not allow each of the cities in Boeotia to rule themselves and to use whatever laws each chose, they would not be acting in accordance with the King's orders. But then you seized the Cadmeia, and did not thereby allow the Thebans themselves to be autonomous. Yet those who intend to be friends must not demand justice from everyone else while displaying such zeal to seize as much as they can for themselves.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, his speech is greeted with silence (6.3.10), although Xenophon, interestingly, does not tell us what the silence might have meant. It may have indicated a shamed admittance and even assent, or perhaps shock at such an undiplomatic approach, but whatever it is, Autocles' speech is not sufficient to make the Spartans accept the Athenian overtures. It is only when Aristocles, the final speaker, puts forward his arguments that

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[31] Tuplin 1993, 105–6.

the Spartans are brought over. Like Autocles, Aristocles mentions the Spartan seizure of the Cadmeia, but he does so in a context that acknowledges errors made in the past by both Sparta and Athens (6.3.11, 13):

καὶ ὑμῖν δὲ ἔγωγε ὁρῶ διὰ τὰ ἀγνωμόνως πραχθέντα ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰ ἀντίτυπα γιγνόμενα· ὧν ἦν καὶ ἡ καταλειφθεῖσα ἐν Θήβαις Καδμεία· νῦν γοῦν, ἃς ἐσπουδάσατε αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις γενέσθαι, πᾶσαι πάλιν, ἐπεὶ ἠδικήθησαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ἐπ' ἐκείνοις γεγένηται. ὥστε πεπαιδευμένους ἡμᾶς ὡς τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀκερδές ἐστι νῦν ἐλπίζω πάλιν μετρίους ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίᾳ ἔσεσθαι. … τί μὴν ἥκομεν; ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀποροῦντες, γνοίητε ἄν, εἰ μὲν βούλεσθε, πρὸς τὰ κατὰ θάλατταν ἰδόντες, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, πρὸς τὰ κατὰ γῆν ἐν τῷ παρόντι. … εὔδηλον ὅτι <…>[32] εἰ τῶν συμμάχων τινὲς οὐκ ἀρεστὰ πράττουσιν ἡμῖν ἢ ὑμῖν ἀρεστά. ἴσως δὲ καὶ βουλοίμεθ' ἂν ὧν ἕνεκα περιεσώσατε ἡμᾶς ἃ ὀρθῶς ἔγνωμεν ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι.

And I see that at times many things have turned out badly for you too, since you have done some arrogant deeds. One of these was your seizure of the Cadmeia in Thebes. And now, because of your unjust treatment of the Thebans, all the cities that you were eager should be autonomous are once again under their control. And so I hope that now we have all learned that selfish gain will bring us no profit; we should instead be more measured in our friendships with each other. … So, then, why have we come? Well to begin with, we are not here because we are in a difficult situation, as you could learn, if you wished, by looking at our present situation on land and sea. What then is the reason? Well it is quite clear⋯ if some of our allies are acting in a way that does not please us but pleases you. Perhaps we may also wish to show you that you were right when you decided to save our city.

Aristocles has softened the tone that Autocles had employed, and his reminder (in the last sentence quoted above) of the Spartan preservation of Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War casts the Spartans themselves in the role of benefactors of the Athenians. He predicts, moreover, that Sparta united with Athens will result in the two cities ruling by both land and sea. He concludes, however, with what Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* calls the Socratic kind of παράδειγμα, where the comparison is made not to historical events but to everyday matters (6.3.15–17):

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[32] There is a gap in the text here.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι ὅτι μὲν πόλεμοι ἀεί ποτε γίγνονται καὶ ὅτι καταλύονται
πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα, καὶ ὅτι ἡμεῖς, ἂν μὴ νῦν, ἀλλ' αὖθίς ποτε εἰρήνης
ἐπιθυμήσομεν. τί οὖν δεῖ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἀναμένειν, ἕως ἂν ὑπὸ πλήθους
κακῶν ἀπείπωμεν, μᾶλλον ἢ οὐχ ὡς τάχιστα πρίν τι ἀνήκεστον γενέσθαι
τὴν εἰρήνην ποιήσασθαι; ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκείνους ἔγωγε ἐπαινῶ οἵτινες
ἀγωνισταὶ γενόμενοι καὶ νενικηκότες ἤδη πολλάκις καὶ δόξαν ἔχοντες οὕτω
φιλονεικοῦσιν ὥστε οὐ πρότερον παύονται πρὶν ἂν ἡττηθέντες τὴν ἄσκησιν
καταλύσωσιν, οὐδέ γε τῶν κυβευτῶν οἵτινες αὖ ἐὰν ἕν τι ἐπιτύχωσι, περὶ
διπλασίων κυβεύουσιν· ὁρῶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων τοὺς πλείους ἀπόρους
παντάπασι γιγνομένους. ἃ χρὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς ὁρῶντας εἰς μὲν τοιοῦτον ἀγῶνα
μηδέποτε καταστῆναι, ὥστ' ἢ πάντα λαβεῖν ἢ παντ' ἀπολαβεῖν, ἕως δὲ καὶ
ἐρρώμεθα καὶ εὐτυχοῦμεν, φίλους ἀλλήλοις γενέσθαι. οὕτω γὰρ ἡμεῖς τ' ἂν
δι' ὑμᾶς καὶ ὑμεῖς δι' ἡμᾶς ἔτι μείζους ἢ τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον ἐν τῇ
Ἑλλάδι ἀναστρεφοίμεθα.

We all know that there will always be wars and attempts to end them,
and that we will desire peace, if not now, then at some future time
hence. Why then should we wait for that future time when we will be
worn out by a multitude of sufferings? Why not make peace as quickly as
we can, before we suffer some irreparable blow? I do not admire those
athletes who have won many victories and acquired renown, and yet
nevertheless so love competition that they do not cease participating un-
til they have been defeated and lost their skill. Nor do I praise a gambler
who makes a winning roll and then immediately doubles his bet. I ob-
serve that the majority of such men become completely impoverished.
Seeing this to be the case, we must not ever enter such a contest, one
where the stakes are complete success or utter failure; but while we are
strong and our fortune is good, we should become friends. In this way
we through you and you through us will be even greater in Greek affairs
than we were in times gone by.

After such humble 'examples' the Spartans agree to the peace.

In this assembly, the first two speakers clearly have much less success
than the third. The first fails probably because his *exemplum* is manifestly in-
appropriate, drawn from a time long past and having little bearing on the
contemporary reality of Athenian–Spartan relations. (Isocrates would have
seen this as a poor employment of that particular event.) The second
speaker uses relevant historical examples, but employs them in such a man-
ner that he alienates his listeners: straight speaking is not always, indeed it
seems not usually, the way to win over your audience. It is only the final
speaker who by a contextualised employment of historical *exempla*, and by a
different type of *exemplum* altogether, wins over the Spartans. His *exempla* are

appropriate but presented in a way that his listeners will find acceptable, and the comparison with athletes and gamblers takes the audience out of the realm of history altogether – which itself may be significant.[33] And indeed this may have been a deliberate strategy, given the manifest hostility of Athens and Sparta in the previous years: for in this instance it would have been difficult, and even foolish, to argue for Spartan–Athenian cooperation from the recent past, and there was more to be gained by avoiding history than by employing it. Only in that last sentence is there a reference (though brief and veiled) to the great Athenian–Spartan cooperation in the past.

The next incident is an assembly convened when the Athenians have learnt of the Theban invasion of the Peloponnese in 370/69, and Sparta needs their immediate assistance (6.5.33–47). The Athenians, alarmed by such action, call an assembly and it happens that Spartan ambassadors were present in Athens and addressed the Athenians. Their speech, given in indirect discourse, is a replay of 'greatest hits' from Athenian–Spartan cooperation in the past (6.5.33–34):

ἀνεμίμνῃσκόν τε γὰρ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὡς ἀεί ποτε ἀλλήλοις ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις καιροῖς παρίσταντο ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθοῖς· αὐτοί τε γὰρ ἔφασαν τοὺς τυράννους συνεκβαλεῖν Ἀθήνηθεν, καὶ Ἀθηναίους, ὅτε αὐτοὶ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ὑπὸ Μεσσηνίων, προθύμως βοηθεῖν. ἔλεγον δὲ καὶ ὅσ᾽ ἀγαθὰ εἴη, ὅτε κοινῶς ἀμφότεροι ἔπραττον, ὑπομιμνήσκοντες μὲν ὡς Ἀθηναῖοί τε ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ᾑρέθησαν ἡγεμόνες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καὶ τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων φύλακες, τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ταῦτα συμβουλομένων, αὐτοί τε κατὰ γῆν ὁμολογουμένως ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόνες προκριθεῖεν, συμβουλομένων αὖ ταῦτα τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

They reminded the Athenians that the Spartans had always been present with them in their greatest crises, and always to their benefit. For they said that the Spartans had joined in driving the tyrants from Athens and that the Athenians had eagerly helped the Spartans when they were being besieged by the Messenians. They spoke too of all the successes that had accrued when they had acted in concert, reminding them first of how they both beat back the Persian, then recalling for them how the Greeks chose the Athenians as leaders of the naval force and guardian of the common funds, all with Spartan support, and how the Athenians in their turn approved of Sparta being selected by all the Greeks to be leaders on land.

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[33] See the remarks below, pp. 16-17.

This is a fail-safe line-up, one might have thought. Yet this speech elicits disbelief from the Athenian audience, who think merely that the Spartans now need them, while simultaneously recalling that a powerful Sparta was not their ally but their enemy (6.5.35). A further appeal by these ambassadors to the people to abide by their oaths has no greater success with the Athenians, and causes yet another uproar (6.5.35–36). The Corinthian Cleiteles speaks next, reminding the Athenians that the Corinthians have harmed neither side but have themselves been injured by the Thebans, which elicits a further commotion, but now to the effect that the Corinthians have spoken rightly and to the point (6.5.37). The last speaker, Procles of Phleious, is given the longest speech. He begins by telling the Athenians that the Thebans are greater enemies than the Spartans, and that bringing help to the Spartans at this point would make them unhesitating friends towards the Athenians for all time – and there will be witnesses if the Spartans fail to honour this. He then summons up images of the past but with a contemporary spin (6.5.43):

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐνθυμήθητε καὶ τάδε. εἴ ποτε πάλιν ἔλθοι τῇ Ἑλλάδι κίνδυνος ὑπὸ βαρβάρων, τίσιν ἂν μᾶλλον πιστεύσαιτε ἢ Λακεδαιμονίοις; τίνας δὲ ἂν παραστάτας ἥδιον τούτων ποιήσαισθε, ὧν γε καὶ οἱ ταχθέντες ἐν Θερμοπύλαις ἅπαντες εἵλοντο μαχόμενοι ἀποθανεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντες ἐπεισφρέσθαι τὸν βάρβαρον τῇ Ἑλλάδι; πῶς οὖν οὐ δίκαιον ὧν τε ἕνεκα ἐγένοντο ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν καὶ ὧν ἐλπὶς καὶ αὖθις γενέσθαι πᾶσαν προθυμίαν εἰς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὑμᾶς καὶ ἡμᾶς παρέχεσθαι;

Think, too, that if Greece should ever again be endangered by the Persians, whom would you trust more than the Spartans? Is there anyone you would be happier to have by your side than those whose countrymen, when they were stationed at Thermopylae, chose one and all to die in battle rather than live and allow the Persian into Greece? Is it not just, therefore, that you and we should provide help to them, since they were brave men when they fought with you, and there is reason to hope that they will be so again.

We have seen earlier that references to the great deeds of Spartans and Athenians in the past are not sufficient by themselves to persuade the audience, so it may not be a simple piling-on of παραδείγματα when Procles hearkens back to events of long ago (6.5.46–47):

τῶν μὲν οὖν ὑμετέρων προγόνων καλὸν λέγεται, ὅτε τοὺς Ἀργείων τελευτήσαντας ἐπὶ τῇ Καδμείᾳ οὐκ εἴασαν ἀτάφους γενέσθαι· ὑμῖν δὲ πολὺ κάλλιον ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ τοὺς ἔτι ζῶντας Λακεδαιμονίων μήτε ὑβρισθῆναι

μήτε ἀπολέσθαι ἐάσαιτε. καλοῦ γε μὴν κἀκείνου ὄντος, ὅτε σχόντες τὴν Εὐρυσθέως ὕβριν διεσώσατε τοὺς Ἡρακλέους παῖδας, πῶς οὐ καὶ ἐκείνου τόδε κάλλιον, εἰ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἀρχηγέτας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλην τὴν πόλιν περισώσαιτε; πάντων δὲ κάλλιστον, εἰ ψήφῳ ἀκινδύνῳ σωσάντων ὑμᾶς τότε τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, νῦν ὑμεῖς σὺν ὅπλοις τε καὶ διὰ κινδύνων ἐπικουρήσετε αὐτοῖς.

There is a fine account told of your ancestors, that they did not allow those Argives who had died at the Kadmeia to remain unburied. Well, it would be a much finer accomplishment for you to prevent the Spartans here, while they are still alive, from being outraged and destroyed. And there is another noble deed told of your ancestors, that they restrained the violence of Eurystheus and preserved the sons of Herakles: would it not now be a finer deed if you preserved not just the founders of Sparta but the entire city of Sparta? It would indeed be the most splendid of deeds if you were to bring assistance to these Spartans – who once saved you with a vote that brought them no danger – by taking up arms and undergoing dangers for their sake now.

After this, the Athenians will hear no word against taking up the Spartan alliance (6.5.38–49).

Unlike Callias' employment of the Triptolemus story, this reach into the mythical past has the intended effect. What is noteworthy here is that the examples given by the Spartan ambassadors are not enough by themselves to persuade the Athenians to ally with the Spartans. Procles of Phleious may be successful in fact because he combines a particularly choice *exemplum* – Thermopylae – with an appeal to what is advantageous to the Athenians; he also summons up the Athenians' old suspicion of the Thebans (the reference to Thermopylae thus does double duty). And it cannot be without point that unlike the Spartan ambassadors who emphasised *Spartan* deeds in the past, Phleious emphasises *Athenian* deeds, the very ones so often mentioned in the *epitaphios*. He summons the Athenians, that is, to take on again their native character, and this is what makes them ready to assist the Spartans. The last sentence, in fact, presents a challenge to the Athenians: their saving of our city brought no danger to them, but our saving of their city would be dangerous and thus more glorious. If Tuplin is right to argue that behind these speeches lies an appeal to a renewed Athenian ἀρχή,[34] then it is all too clear why such a call to character would appeal to the Athenians, and why the example of that particular past would here have such strong appeal.

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[34] Tuplin 1993, 112.

The final incident is in some ways the most straightforwardly revealing. Here again, and barely two pages later in the narrative, Procles of Phleious plays an important role. Now the matter before the assembly is the question of command in the Spartan–Athenian alliance. Procles makes an argument for a joint command, Sparta by land, Athens by sea (7.1.2–11):

τῇ μὲν οὖν βουλῇ προβεβούλεθται ὑμέτεραν μὲν εἶναι τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν, Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ τὴν κατὰ γῆν· ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ μᾶλλον ἢ θείᾳ φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ διωρίσθαι. ... πλείστους γὰρ καὶ μεγίστους ἀγῶνας ἠγωνισμένοι κατὰ θάλατταν ἐλάχιστα μὲν ἀποτετυχήκατε, πλεῖστα δὲ κατωρθώκατε. εἰκὸς οὖν καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους μεθ' ὑμῶν ἂν ἥδιστα τούτου τοῦ κινδύνου μετέχειν. ὡς δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀναγκαία καὶ προσήκουσα ὑμῖν αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπιμέλεια ἐκ τῶνδε ἐνθυμήθητε. Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑμῖν ἐπολέμουν ποτὲ πολλὰ ἔτη, καὶ κρατοῦντες τῆς χώρας οὐδὲν προύκοπτον εἰς τὸ ἀπολέσαι ὑμᾶς. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκέ ποτε αὐτοῖς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπικρατῆσαι, εὐθὺς ὑπ' ἐκείνοις παντελῶς ἐγένεσθε. ἔπειτε δὲ ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς ναυτικῷ, οὕτως αὖ ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ γῆν πλεῖστοι καὶ ταχιστ' ἂν ἐξέλθοιεν· ὥστε πρὸς τούτους αὖ εἰκὸς τοὺς συμμάχους εὐθαρσεστάτους προσιέναι. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς δέδωκεν, ὥσπερ ὑμῖν κατὰ θάλατταν εὐτυχεῖν, οὕτως ἐκείνοις κατὰ γῆν· πλείστους γὰρ αὖ οὗτοι ἀγῶνας ἐν τῇ γῇ ἠγωνισμένοι ἐλάχιστα μὲν ἐσφαλμένοι εἰσί, πλεῖστα δὲ κατωρθωκότες. ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαία οὐδὲν ἧττον τούτοις ἡ κατὰ γῆν ἐπιμέλεια ἢ ὑμῖν ἡ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἔξεστι γιγνώσκειν. ὑμεῖς γὰρ τούτοις πολλὰ ἔτη πολεμοῦντες καὶ πολλάκις καταναυμαχοῦντες οὐδὲν προύργου ἐποιεῖτε πρὸς τὸ τούτους καταπολεμῆσαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἅπαξ ἡττήθησαν ἐν τῇ γῇ, εὐθὺς καὶ περὶ παίδων καὶ περὶ γυναίκων καὶ περὶ ὅλης τῆς πόλεως κίνδυνος αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο. πῶς οὖν οὐ τούτοις αὖ δεινὸν ἄλλοις μὲν ἐπιτρέπειν κατὰ γῆν ἡγεῖσθαι, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἄριστα τῶν κατὰ γῆν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι;

Your Council has proposed that you Athenians would have the leadership of the naval forces, while the Spartans would command the infantry and cavalry, and indeed I myself think such a division arises not so much by human as by divine nature and fortune. … For you have participated in the greatest and most numerous sea battles, and you have won the most successes and suffered the fewest misfortunes. It is likely, therefore, that the allies would be happiest to share in these dangers if you were in command. You can see that this naval experience is necessary and appropriate from the following: the Spartans once fought against you for many years and although they controlled your territory they made no progress in conquering you; but when God granted them victory at sea you found yourself immediately and completely in their power. … And

just as you can embark swiftly by sea, so they can march out in the greatest number by land, which increases the probability that allies will eagerly join the Spartans. And just as God has granted you success at sea, so he has granted them success on land. For they have waged the most numerous land wars and have suffered the fewest defeats and won the most victories. One can recognise from past deeds that their experience on land is no less necessary than yours by sea. For you fought with them for many years and often defeated them at sea, but you had no success in gaining the victory in the war. But as soon as the Spartans incurred just one defeat on land, then their wives and children, together with their entire city, were threatened with peril. (11) So then it would likewise be dreadful for the Spartans to relinquish the leadership on land since they are the most skilled at this type of warfare.

The speech seems sensible and straightforward, and the Athenians vigorously praise Procles (7.1.1–12). But then Cephisodotus speaks and he immediately, and rather brusquely, deflates the grand rhetoric of Procles in a brief but forceful speech in which he makes clear to the Athenians that the Spartans will have helots and mercenaries serving on the Spartan ships, whereas the Athenians will send Athenian citizens to serve in the army and cavalry: thus the Spartans will command Athenian citizens, while the Athenians will command slaves and men of least worth. Rather than have such an iniquitous situation, Cephisodotus recommends a joint command that will alternate between Athens and Sparta every five days. At this the Athenians change their minds and vote for the alternating command (7.1.12–14).

The outcome is perhaps unexpected: the fine rhetoric of Procles, so successful, it seems, only moments before, is now revealed as worthless in the matter of a few sentences. 'One can recognise from past deeds', he says, how the command should be divided – yet he fails to see that the great successes of Athens and Sparta by sea and land in the past say nothing about how each state would operate when working together or in the area of the other's domain. This, together with the previous examples, may lead us to think that Xenophon is perhaps suggesting that the use of historical *exempla* is not straightforward and must be carefully analysed by the audience: even those examples based on events that actually happened may not be appropriate in their context. In the *Hellenica*, at least, those speakers who employ historical παραδείγματα and who are successful at achieving their aims are able most of all to demonstrate the utility of the course of action they are suggesting, a utility defined by the immediate advantage and needs of the state being addressed. Historical *exempla* can help, but only if they are appropriate, and even then only in an ancillary role.

In the *Hellenica*, therefore, we can see Xenophon dramatising the contestations involved in the use of historical *exempla*, a portrayal that brings out the difficulties of understanding history and any lessons that it might teach: the Athenian crowd is not impressed with the benefactions of the Spartans made long ago: *those* are not the appropriate *exempla* on which one should base one's decision whether or not to choose an alliance. Too many other historical incidents, unspoken but known to the audience, undermine the speakers' selections. On the other hand, Xenophon does suggest that appealing to the Athenians' historical love of ἀρχή might be a way of persuading them to assist the Spartans. (It is perhaps not incidental that we see here an appeal to a 'timeless' Athenian character.) I do not mean to suggest, of course, that these are necessarily the only, or indeed perhaps even the correct, interpretations. My point is rather that Xenophon expects his audience, in this realm at least, to be active inquirers of his text, to re-think the very decisions that are being made by the historical characters, and – since the reader knows something of the outcome of the events – to examine the incidents with the hindsight afforded by history. Yet did history really afford any insights for the participants at the time? The earlier 'models' brought forth by the speakers – fifth-century cooperation during the Persian wars, fifth-century conflict during the Peloponnesian War, Spartan leadership in the early fourth-century – seem to offer little in the way of guidance for the Athenians and Spartans as they find themselves in the 370s. And was the decision made by the Athenian assembly even the correct one? The coming Theban victory at Mantinea suggests otherwise, but who can say that a different arrangement would have worked?

It would seem, therefore, that many of the *exempla* in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, although seeking to have the effect of collapsing time, force the audience (internal and external) to measure the difference between past and present. Is Xenophon here suggesting something about the utility of history? It has often been noted that the *Hellenica* lacks any clear sense of being a 'story' with beginning, middle and end. The abrupt beginning – 'And after these things' – is mirrored by the lack of finality in the ending, with the battle of Mantinea not confirming or forming a fitting ending to the events preceding, but giving contemporaries only greater uncertainty and confusion.[35] The lack of a story-line perhaps suggests that Xenophon, at least in this work, is suggesting that history has no meaning larger than itself, that the events are simply the events: 'Up to this point, then, let it be written by me; perhaps another will be concerned with what happened after this' (7.5.27). If this interpretation is correct, it may very well be that the historical *exempla* offered

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[35] See Marincola 2005, 308–9.

by the speakers in his history are meant to explore in some sense the limits of history itself.

<div align="center">IV</div>

Let us now turn to Sallust's *Catiline* and the famous debate between Caesar and the younger Cato to show a somewhat different relationship between past and present. The debate, as is well known, concerns the fate of the Catilinarian conspirators, with Cato arguing for the death penalty, Caesar for the milder punishment of exile. Multiple intertexts are at work in these speeches: it has often been noted that the debate is modelled on Thucydides' Mytilenean Debate,[36] but David Levene has also pointed out extensive allusion at the level of both language and content to Cato the Elder.[37] Thus a very complex pattern of allusions develop. I will focus on the historical *exempla*, however, to see what can be made of them.

Caesar, who speaks first, begins with a generalising observation that those who deliberate must be free from all passions, for if they are not, they cannot make valid decisions (*Cat.* 51.1–3). He can recall bad decisions made from either anger or pity but decides to proceed in a different direction (51.4–6):

> Magna mihi copia est memorandi, patres conscripti, quae reges atque populi ira aut misericordia impulsi male consuluerint; sed ea malo dicere quae maiores nostri contra lubidinem animi sui recte atque ordine fecere. Bello Macedonico, quod cum rege Perse gessimus, Rhodiorum ciuitas magna atque magnifica, quae populi Romani opibus creuerat, infida atque aduorsa nobis fuit; sed postquam bello confecto de Rhodiis consultum est, maiores nostri, ne quis diuitiarum magis quam iniuriae causa bellum inceptum diceret, inpunitos eos dimisere. Item bellis Punicis omnibus, quom saepe Carthaginienses et in pace et per indutias multa nefaria facinora fecissent, numquam ipsi per occasionem talia fecere: magis quid se dignum foret quam quid in illos iure fieri posset quaerebant.

> I have a large supply of recollections, conscript fathers, of the occasions when kings and peoples, induced by anger or pity, deliberated wrongly; but I prefer to speak of what our ancestors did rightly and properly in spite of the whim in their minds. In the Macedonian War which we

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[36] See Vretska 1976, 509–12; Scanlon 1980, 102–8 (with references to earlier scholarship).

[37] Levene 2000.

waged with King Perseus, the great and magnificent community of the Rhodians, which had grown thanks to the resources of the Roman people, was disloyal and hostile to us; but, when at the war's end there was deliberation concerning the Rhodians, our ancestors discharged them unpunished, lest anyone should say that the war had been begun for the sake of riches rather than an injustice. Likewise, in all the Punic Wars, although the Carthaginians had often done many unprincipled deeds both in peace and during times of truce, they never did the same despite their opportunities: they asked what was worthy of themselves rather than what could be done with justice to an enemy.

The two historical *exempla* here belong to the period of Rome's rise to hegemony, and this is not coincidental, since Caesar's main emphasis in his speech will be on the perception of the Romans by others. We shall come back to the historical elisions here, but for now let us note that Caesar emphasises the importance to the Senate of considering how they look to the outside world. He goes on to say that since a worthy penalty for the conspirators is not possible (i.e., no punishment would be great enough) the senators must think of their own *dignitas* in the matter, as had their ancestors (51.7); they must be aware that their actions are viewed by the entire world and they do not have the luxury that private people do in making mistakes (51.12–15).

Caesar continues by averring that the death penalty is 'foreign to our republic' (*aliena a re publica nostra*, 51.17) and constitutes 'a new type of punishment' (*genus poenae nouom*, 51.18), and although it may seem as if no one will find fault with the decision to execute the conspirators, nevertheless time or occasion or fortune (*tempus dies fortuna*, 51.25) may one day change people's views. That something should seem a good *exemplum* is insufficient to justify it, since 'all bad *exempla* arise from good ones' (51.27). That observation leads Caesar to his next set of historical examples (51.28–34):

Lacedaemonii deuictis Atheniensibus triginta uiros imposuere qui rem publicam eorum tractarent. Ii primo coepere pessumum quemque et omnibus inuisum indemnatum necare: ea populus laetari et merito dicere fieri. Post, ubi paulatim licentia creuit, iuxta bonos et malos lubidinose interficere, ceteros metu terrere: ita ciuitas seruitute oppressa stultae laetitiae grauis poenas dedit. Nostra memoria uictor Sulla quom Damasippum et alios eius modi, qui malo rei publicae creuerant, iugulari iussit, quis non factum eius laudabat? homines scelestos et factiosos, qui seditionibus rem publicam exagitauerant, merito necatos aiebant. Sed ea res magnae initium cladis fuit. Nam uti quisque domum aut uillam, postremo uas aut uestimentum aliquoius concupiuerat, dabat

operam ut is in proscriptorum numero esset. Ita illi quibus Damasippi mors laetitiae fuerat paulo post ipsi trahebantur, neque prius finis iugulandi fuit quam Sulla omnis suos diuitiis expleuit.

The Lacedaemonians imposed on the defeated Athenians thirty men to handle their commonwealth. At first they began to execute, without trial, all the worst individuals and those resented by all: the people were delighted and said it was deserved. But after, when their license had gradually increased, they killed good and bad indifferently at whim and terrified the rest with dread. So a community which had been oppressed by slavery paid a heavy penalty for its foolish delight. In our recollection, who did not praise Sulla's deed when he ordered the butchering of Damasippus and the others of his kind, whose growth had been to the detriment of the commonwealth? They said that the factious criminals who had stirred up the commonwealth by their rebellions had been deservedly executed. But that affair was the start of a great disaster. For, whenever anyone desired someone's home or villa or, ultimately, his goblet or garment, he did his best to ensure that the man was listed amongst the proscribed. So those for whom Damasippus' death had been a source of delight were themselves dragged off shortly after, and there was no end to the butchery until Sulla had satisfied all his supporters with riches.

As he comes to the peroration, Caesar again invokes the history of his countrymen by noting that the Romans of old showed a remarkable flexibility with respect to foreign peoples:

Maiores nostri, patres conscripti, neque consili neque audaciae umquam eguere; neque illis superbia obstabat quominus aliena instituta, si modo proba erant, imitarentur. Arma atque tela militaria ab Samnitibus, insignia magistratuum ab Tuscis pleraque sumpserunt; postremo quod ubique apud socios aut hostis idoneum uidebatur, cum summo studio domi exequebantur: imitari quam inuidere bonis malebant. Sed eodem illo tempore, Graeciae morem imitati uerberibus animaduortebant in ciuis, de condemnatis summum supplicium sumebant. Postquam res publica adoleuit et multitudine ciuium factiones ualuere, circumueniri innocentes, alia huiusce modi fieri coepere, tum lex Porcia aliaeque leges paratae sunt, quibus legibus exilium damnatis permissum est. Hanc ego causam, patres conscripti, quominus nouom consilium capiamus in primis magnam puto. Profecto uirtus atque sapientia maior illis fuit, qui ex paruis opibus tantum imperium fecere, quam in nobis, qui ea bene parta uix retinemus.

Our ancestors, conscript fathers, were never destitute of counsel or daring; nor did haughtiness stand in the way of their imitating others' institutions, provided only that they were virtuous. They borrowed arms and military weapons from the Samnites, many of their magistrates' insignia from the Etruscans; in short, they pursued with enthusiasm at home whatever seemed suitable anywhere amongst allies or enemies; they preferred to imitate success rather than resent it. Yet at that very same time, in imitation of Greek customs, they chastised citizens with lashes and exacted the ultimate reprisal from the condemned. But, after the commonwealth had matured and the number of citizens led to thriving factions and the innocent began to be entrapped and other things of this type to take place, then the Porcian Law and other laws were provided, laws by which exile was permitted to the condemned. This, I think, is an especially good reason, conscript fathers, for our not adopting a new counsel. Naturally those who created so great an empire from small resources had better prowess and wisdom than there is in us, who scarcely retain what has been so well acquired.

Caesar thus seeks at every step of his speech to guide his audience's reaction by allusion to the Roman past, and to those actions that he saw as unaffected by emotional involvement. He presents Roman ancestors as coolly evaluating others and choosing what was of use to themselves. He presents them, even, as superior to the Greeks, and he appeals to their wisdom as a guide for the present. His invocation of the *lex Porcia*, which must summon up memories of Cato the Elder, also carries weight.[38] The force of his historical *exempla* all point towards mildness and the observance of precedent. Caesar suggests that the execution of the conspirators would be undertaken for the wrong reason and in the wrong frame of mind, and would bequeath to the state an *exemplum* for the future that would be double-edged at best.

Cato's speech, by contrast, has fewer references to past Roman practice, and employs only one specific *exemplum*. Cato begins by averring his own personal rigour and recalling the numerous attacks he has made on others for their moral laxity (52.2–10). He urges them to consider the magnitude of the crisis and then asks whether at such a point anyone would dare to speak of *mansuetudo* and *misericordia*, making now a clear allusion to Thucydides by stating that 'we have long since lost the true designations of things'.[39] After

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[38] See Levene 2000, 185.

[39] *Cat.* 52.11: *iam pridem equidem nos uera uocabula amisimus*; cf. Thuc. 3.82.4, τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν. On the phrase *iam pridem* see further below, p. 24.

questioning Caesar' views on the afterlife and the distinction made there between the virtuous and the wicked (52.13), he goes on to warn that wicked men are present throughout Italy (52.14), and he then returns to the moral question by comparing the virtue of the Romans of old with his contemporaries:

> Nolite existumare maiores nostros armis rem publicam ex parua magnam fecisse. Si ita esset, multo pulcherrumam eam nos haberemus, quippe sociorum atque ciuium, praeterea armorum atque equorum maior copia nobis quam illis est. Sed alia fuere quae illos magnos fecere, quae nobis nulla sunt: domi industria, foris iustum imperium, animus in consulendo liber, neque delicto neque lubidini obnoxius. Pro his nos habemus luxuriam atque auaritiam, publice egestatem, priuatim opulentiam; laudamus diuitias, sequimur inertiam; inter bonos et malos discrimen nullum, omnia uirtutis praemia ambitio possidet. Neque mirum: ubi uos separatim sibi quisque consilium capitis, ubi domi uoluptatibus, hic pecuniae aut gratiae seruitis, eo fit ut impetus fiat in uacuam rem publicam.

> Do not think that it was by arms that our ancestors made the commonwealth great from being small. If that were so, *we* would now be seeing it at its finest by far, since we have a greater supply of allies and citizens, and of arms and horses besides, than our ancestors did. But it was other things which made them great, and which we no longer have: industriousness at home, a just empire abroad, and a mind free in deliberation, beholden neither to wrongdoing nor to whim. Instead of these, *we* have luxury and avarice, collective destitution and private wealth; we praise riches and pursue idleness; there is no distinction between the good and the wicked; all the rewards for virtue are in the possession of ambition. And no wonder: when each of you takes counsel separately for himself, when you are the slaves of pleasure at home and of money or favour here – that is how an attack can be made on an abandoned commonwealth.

Here we have an allusion to the past, but it is all very generalised, and speaks of the Roman ancestors as a group, not as individuals, nor is there any effort so far to take a particular incident and see it as relevant to the discussion at hand.

Cato goes on to point out the specific danger that the Gauls, the most hostile enemies of Rome (here surely some sort of historical allusion is present), have been encouraged by the conspirators, and he marvels that his colleagues are not afraid. He ascribes it to inertia and softness, and suggests

that perhaps the Senators are relying on the gods; but trust in the gods, he says, is no substitute for good counsel and watchful action. Only now at this point, almost at the end of his speech, and with the scene set, so to speak, by the contrast between ancient virtue and contemporary vice, does Cato employ his single specific *exemplum* (52.30–31):

> Apud maiores nostros A. Manlius Torquatus bello Gallico filium suom, quod is contra imperium in hostem pugnauerat, necari iussit, atque ille egregius adulescens immoderatae fortitudinis morte poenas dedit; uos de crudelissumis parricidis quid statuatis cunctamini?

> In the time of our ancestors, A. Manlius Torquatus during the Gallic War ordered his own son to be executed because he had fought with the enemy contrary to command; and that exceptional young man paid the penalty for his unrestrained courage by death. Do *you* hesitate over what to decide concerning the cruellest of parricides?

The *exemplum* is a powerful one, and its effect is intensified because it is the only one used and has been held in abeyance for most of the speech. With a final warning that Catiline is at their throats and that the matter demands a speedy decision (52.35), Cato solemnly demands that in accordance with the ways of our ancestors (*more maiorum* – another allusion to a generalised past, 52.36) they pay for their crimes with death.

In the case of Xenophon we saw speeches that followed a particular trajectory, and the narrative focused on the movement towards persuasion. Here, by contrast, we have competing speeches, set against each other, with deeply different views of the situation at hand, and – not coincidentally – with very different ideas of what particular incidents from Rome's past are appropriate in considering the fate of the conspirators. The way in which each speaker deploys historical *exempla*, moreover, is noteworthy. Caesar uses them right at the beginning of his speech and continues to do so throughout (he has seven all told – and he makes clear he could have cited others), while Cato uses a single specific one and this only at the very end of his speech.

Caesar's first two *exempla* (Rhodes, Carthage) place Rome in the larger world of its diplomatic engagements and responsibilities, while his second two (the Thirty, Sulla) move the focus to civil war and the way in which good precedents can turn out differently from the way that contemporaries envision. These four *exempla* serve to hammer home his two main points to his fellow senators: take care for your *dignitas* and how you are viewed by the world at large; and do not establish a new precedent which can later be misused. His last three brief *exempla* show another side of Roman character:

flexibility, change over time, and 'progress'; the sense here is that the Romans were not averse to what others might teach them, nor were they averse to changing what they had taken from others when they determined that something could be done better. Even these brief *exempla* place Rome in her relations with the larger world.

Cato, by contrast, gives a speech that is almost wholly inwardly focussed. He has no concern with how the Romans will look to others, nor with how others may judge the Senate's actions. His speech focuses on internal discipline (first his own, then the lack amongst his contemporaries), on keeping the Roman house in order, on the Senators being proper stewards both of themselves and of the state. His sole *exemplum* is that of a man who killed his own son, showing an internal discipline par excellence, we might say. And this filicide is then immediately contrasted with the conspirators who are called parricides.[40] The movement in time towards milder punishment that Caesar saw as progress Cato by contrast characterises as decline; a pristine morality is compared with the corrupt present. Cato's call to his colleagues is in some way a 'timeless' one in the sense that he summons them to be not who they are now at this particular point in their history but who their fathers were in the very early days of Rome.

It is timeless in another sense as well. Levene has argued persuasively that Cato's single *exemplum* is problematic: it is morally ambiguous, an excessive and barbaric action inappropriate to late-Republican times, and the reader of Sallust's history should have misgivings about this (especially in light of the later events which he knows).[41] Yet we must note that Caesar's first two *exempla* are problematic as well and elide important historical information. Roman treatment of Rhodes after the Third Macedonian War was only 'mild' in the sense that the Romans did not execute the Rhodians; yet the punishment that they did exact was so great that the decline of Rhodes as a power in the eastern Mediterranean can be traced from that point. And far from being an example of the Romans judging a situation without anger or partiality, Polybius at least speaks of the 'angry and threatening attitude' of the Senate towards the Rhodians, and says that the Senate 'bitterly and severely reproached them' for what they perceived as offences against themselves.[42] Likewise, the mention of Carthage and all three Punic wars

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[40] *Cat.* 52.31: *uos de crudelissumis parricidis quid statuatis cunctamini?* Caesar had also referred to the conspirators as *parricidae* (see 51.25), but Cato's juxtaposition here with the *exemplum* of Torquatus throws the contrast into high relief.

[41] Levene 2000, 176–7, 185; cf. now Feeney 2010 on the *exemplum* of Torquatus in poetry.

[42] See Pol. 30.4.2: τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὀργὴν καὶ τὴν ἀνάτασιν τῆς συγκλήτου; cf. 4.8: ἡ σύγκλητος πικρῶς καὶ βαρείως ὠνείδισεν.

(note that Caesar is explicit: *bellis Punicis omnibus*, 51.6) cannot fail to recall in any reader the ultimate fate of Carthage and its utter annihilation. Was that really done without emotion? And can it be coincidence that the destruction of Carthage in 146 had already been noted by the narrator himself as an epochal date in the moral decline of Rome (10.1)?[43]

Speaking of timelessness, one might make a last point on the allusive moment when Thucydides on Corcyra is recalled. There is an interesting temporal collapse in Cato's first two words, *iam pridem*: 'long since'. But for how long? And since when? In the immediate context, of course, Cato means that the Romans long before his own time abandoned their traditional morality. But in the summoning up of Thucydides, the words *iam pridem* indicate that almost four centuries earlier than Cato, a society in the midst of civil war had lost its bearings – and that is indeed a long time ago. We are here, I think, very close to an 'Alexandrian footnote' as the author calls particular attention to a model just at the point where he is integrating it into a new context. For Cato's context, interestingly enough, is an inversion of the model: in Thucydides the breakdown of civil society leads to a change in the meaning of words; for Cato it is the other way round: it is *because* (*quia*) things are no longer called by their right names that Roman society is at the brink. A small change, but a whole world of difference brought in its train, especially as the *Catiline* had begun with an examination of the relationship between word and deed (3.1–2).

Caesar's other *exempla* have the effect of complicating the issues revolving around civil war. The Thirty at Athens and Sulla at Rome killed fellow citizens, and Sulla's actions, in fact, still have historical consequences in the events of the *Catiline* – again, something emphasised by the narrator in the early part of the work (11.5–8; 16.4). Indeed part of the dilemma faced by the Senate in this debate was the exact status of the accused. Were they citizens entitled to their rights (so Caesar, who explicitly mentions the *lex Porcia* and other laws) or had they forfeited their rights when they took up arms against their country (so Cato)? Cato seems much more attuned to the internecine aspects of the conflict, given that he alludes to Thucydides' description of what happens during civil war, and his *exemplum* of M'. Torquatus suggests a close kinship relation, a house divided, with the father (in the past) killing the son just as he urges the *patres* (in the present) to kill the *parricidae*.

Sallust provides no answer, of course, nor was he supposed to. He was dramatising a conflict that had no easy resolution.[44] Nor should we look for

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[43] See the excellent remarks on this in Levene 2000, 190.

[44] See Marincola 2010 for the argument that this unwillingness to take sides in a civil conflict greatly influenced the end of Virgil's *Aeneid*, where many of the same issues are in play.

the answer in the *synkrisis* that follows the speeches. As Levene has also shown, in the *Catiline* ancient *uirtus* has been fractured: both Caesar and Cato embody some aspects of that *uirtus* but neither possesses it entire.[45] It is also not clear that because the Senate ultimately endorses Cato's resolution, this means it was the right thing for them to do. We cannot know, as the Romans then could not know, whether things would have been better if Caesar had prevailed.

Indeed what the reader can see in this debate is the whole question of where Rome stood at the time, and, in a sense, how each speaker was trying to make sense of events. Caesar tried to place them into a larger historical and political nexus, while Cato fought to make his colleagues see that the issues were no different from earlier ones, and that what was right for Rome in the past was right for Rome in his own day. Here the intertextual moments, as in Xenophon, although seeking to collapse past and present instead emphasise the space between them. For Caesar the new *exemplum* will erase the old, while Cato struggles to make his ancient *exemplum* relevant for an era that both he and the narrator have emphasised is utterly different from that earlier 'pristine' age. The way that each invokes (or fails to invoke) history says much about how they viewed the past and its relevance for their own time and their own actions. Indeed, one must wonder here, as with Xenophon, whether the historian himself was questioning the relevance or utility, or perhaps just the limits, of history as a guide for making the right decision.

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We are left, then, with a paradox, at least in the two authors we have examined. It seems unproblematic to say, with Ellen O'Gorman, that *exempla* have the effect of collapsing time, of making the present equivalent to the past, and indeed we would expect in the traditional societies of Greece and Rome that this would be an attractive procedure. But our historians here seem to be questioning this collapse of past and present and to be emphasising not continuity but distance. Although the Greeks and Romans felt history to be present in a way not generally true for modern societies, and this made ancient political life itself allusive and intertextual, Xenophon and Sallust seem to have used historical *exempla* in their characters' speeches in a way that seems to challenge and undermine their value, and to force the reader to evaluate the appropriateness and utility of the *exempla*. We are presented with a contestation over how to explain the past vis-à-vis the present

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[45] Levene 2000, 180–2.

and vice-versa. Would it be too much to say that at bottom we are witness-
ing a debate over the meaning of history itself?

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